Policy papers and recommendations
/ Israel and Egypt
The October 13, 2025 peace summit led by President Donald Trump in Sharm el-Sheikh, as well as other initiatives proposed since October 7, 2023, illustrate Egypt’s vital role in efforts to end the war in Gaza and shape its future. Egypt is uniquely placed to impact the vital stabilization and reconstruction processes there due to its regional and international status as one of the Trump plan’s sponsors, its border with Gaza and its ties with Israel and the Palestinian factions, its years of experience as a regional and bilateral mediator, and its willingness to assume an active role in promoting security measures in Gaza and economic and social development there.
This is the backdrop of the two strategic alternatives facing Israel. The first is to promote regional and international measures for the future of the Gaza Strip, while cooperating, bridging differences and improving dialogue with Egypt, informed by Egyptian concerns as well as justified Israeli security demands. Elements in Egypt’s March 2025 comprehensive reconstruction plan for Gaza, supported by the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the international community, offers Israel such an alternative. The plan also served as an important platform at the September 2025 Saudi-French UN conference and at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit.
This alternative would enable Israel and Egypt to advance a range of shared interests in the Gaza Strip: the deployment of international, Arab, and Palestinian contingents to enforce order in the Strip and demilitarize it; formulation of joint arrangements to monitor its borders; civil and economic reconstruction; establishment of an alternative Palestinian government to Hamas; strengthening regional stability and weakening the Islamist threats undermining it. The new arrangements would be geared to removing the terror threat posed by Hamas to both Israel and Egypt, restoring the control of a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) over the Gaza Strip, and promoting gradual and conditional Israeli-Palestinian political solution.
Conversely, Israel’s alternative option would be to renew its military campaign against Hamas coupled with confrontational measures vis-à-vis Egypt, such as encouraging the voluntary emigration of Gaza’s residents, annexing Palestinian territories and deepening the separation between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This alternative would prevent renewed PA control of the Gaza Strip and therefore likely force Israel to choose between imposing military rule on the Strip, or parts of it, or enabling continued Hamas rule. This alternative would likely deter Egypt from assuming constructive roles in the Gaza Strip and exacerbate the nadir in Cairo’s peace relations with Jerusalem.
The first alternative – bolstering the strategic partnership and historic peace treaty (1979) between the two countries – calls for the following Israeli and Egyptian measures:
Formulating a joint long-term strategic vision for the Gaza Strip’s future under the rule of an alternative, non-Hamas Palestinian government.
Incorporating the Gaza solution into a gradual and conditional outline for the PA’s return to Gaza and resolution of the Palestinian problem as a whole. This would be subject to the PA’s performance and capacity to establish a reformed, effective, legitimate, and peaceful rule in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Enhancing dialogue and discourse between the countries, underpinned by attention to each side’s sensitivities, interests, and red lines, and avoiding unilateral moves that could be construed as a threat.
Defining Egypt’s role in stabilizing security in the Gaza Strip, with a clear mutual commitment to the goal of disarming Hamas, rejecting armed Palestinian resistance, and ending the dynamics of recurring escalation cycles between Israel and Hamas.
Updating the security annex to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in a manner that bolsters trust between the two military forces, while designing effective arrangements for supervising the Sinai-Gaza border crossings, preventing arms smuggling, and deploying forces in the vicinity of the Philadelphi Corridor.
Promoting Egyptian-led reconstruction, economic development, and infrastructure projects in the Gaza Strip, with Arab and international funding. Progress on such projects would be conditioned on removing Hamas control of Gaza’s government Gaza and disarming it, and on channeling the reconstruction funds solely for civilian use.
Devising an international economic incentive package for Egypt to encourage its constructive involvement in the Gaza Strip.
Establishing a forum led by Egypt, Israel and the United States, with the participation of other regional and international actors, to coordinate the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, promote PA reforms, and formulate a gradual and conditional outline for resolving the Palestinian problem
based on the two-state vision.
Implementation of these recommendations would contribute to enhanced cooperation between Jerusalem and Cairo and promote their security and civilian interests in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, it will help expand bilateral and multilateral ties and restore mutual trust between their governments, security establishments and peoples.
Hopefully, the Gaza challenge, which endangered the pioneering peace treaty between the two countries during the two-year Israel-Hamas war, will thus serve as a lever for restoring Israeli-Egyptian relations and provide a solid foundation for ongoing bilateral strategic cooperation and expanded regional integration.
In this context, it should be noted that the Egypt-Israel peace treaty has provided its signatories with stable security for over 46 years, and has proven a vital strategic asset for both. It therefore also serves as a positive model for future peace processes and long-term security based on an optimal power balance that ensures Israel’s military advantage, and on a partnership of interests that distances the motivations for war and conflict on both sides.
This document consists of five parts: a concise overview of Egypt’s changing status in the Gaza Strip from 1948 to the “Iron Swords War” (2003-2005); an analysis of the war’s impact on Israel-Egypt relations; Israel’s views about them; a discussion of Egypt’s centrality in the Gaza Strip and its potential political-security, economic-infrastructural, and humanitarian-social-educational roles; and policy recommendations for a strategic Israel-Egypt partnership in dealing with the Gaza challenge.
