Thus, Israel was the only country to withdraw its ambassador from Vienna in 1986, when Kurt Waldheim – the former UN secretary-general, who was later revealed to have been an officer in the Wehrmacht – was elected president of Austria.

Even in 2000, Israel recalled its ambassador from Vienna when the Austrian Freedom Party, with roots in the Nazi regime, joined the coalition government. Once again, we were among the few in the world who placed an ethical stance above cold political considerations – and we sent a clear message about what was acceptable and unacceptable when it came to Jewish safety.

This is how Israel has acted for years: a Jewish state with a historical memory that obliges it to take a stand for our people and against racism and xenophobia of any kind. But today, 25 years later, I’m concerned about the future of Israel’s moral compass and its Foreign Ministry. The excellent individuals in the Israeli Foreign Ministry are increasingly being asked to implement policies that contradict everything we believe in, everything Israel once represented.

When Israel voted at the UN against the proposal calling for the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – alongside countries like Russia, North Korea, and of course the United States under Donald Trump – it was another painful testament to the dark place into which we have descended.

But it doesn’t stop here.

New policy directives

The Israeli Foreign Ministry continues to receive new policy directives that shame its legacy. For example, the directive from Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to work on strengthening ties with far-right parties in Europe.

These are the same parties that continue the path of neo-Nazi movements. Today, they hide behind an anti-Muslim facade, which should be a reason to not legitimize them in any case. They cast a thin veil over the antisemitic undertone that simmers beneath the surface, waiting for the right moment to break out.

While in 2000, Israel’s government condemned Europeans for allying with right-wing extremists, in 2025, the Likud has made itself an “observer member” of a grouping of far-right European parties.

Government ministers are continuing to cozy up with those who are willing to downplay their hatred for Jews in order to gain legitimacy. This is alongside other activities that shame our nation, such as the support for the ethnic cleansing carried out by Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry is composed of good and dedicated individuals who chose a career primarily focused on representing their country and fighting for it. But today, every Israeli diplomat must take a moment for self-reflection: can they continue to serve a policy that contradicts the Jewish and democratic values for which they joined the Ministry? And if they do, shouldn’t they raise their opposition to the minister’s directive?

Israel was once a moral beacon. Our founding vision was to be a light among nations. It was core to our identity to never forget. We must not lose our way, and the responsibility for this does not lie solely with the leaders – it also falls on the public and our public servants, especially those in the Foreign Ministry. These are the individuals whose role is to implement the policies of the Israeli government on the international stage.

The legitimization of racist and antisemitic parties and support for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine are the diplomatic equivalents of an illegal order with a black flag flying above it. There are things that every principled person must stand against and say clearly: enough is enough.

The article was published on March 17th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Policy Has Lost Its Moral Compass הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A year after Hamas’s murderous surprise attack on October 7, Israel has succeeded in restoring its deterrent edge. All the main members of the “Axis of Resistance” – Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – have suffered major military setbacks, with the entire leadership echelons of Hezbollah and Hamas having been eliminated. Israel has proved that, militarily and technologically, it is superior to its enemies.

Alongside these achievements, an unexpected development has occurred in Syria, indirectly benefiting Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of Sunni Islamic rule have led to Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance, resulting in the removal of Iranian military presence and influence on Israel’s borders and the closure of the corridor through which Iran previously supplied arms and ammunition to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The fall of Assad also exposed the vulnerability of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, which, despite the geopolitical significance of Syria, were unable to prevent the regime’s downfall. However, this positive shift is tempered by concerns that Syria may now be controlled by extremist Islamic factions backed by Turkey, though it remains too early to fully assess the nature of the new Syrian regime.

On the other side, the camp of moderate states that have signed peace and/or normalization agreements with Israel, along with Saudi Arabia, has managed to maintain its cohesion, even if much of the activity has been conducted behind the scenes.

The cooperation between these states was publicly visible during the Iranian missile attack on Israel. With the exception of Jordan, none of these countries withdrew their ambassadors from Israel or severed diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia remains on the table, though the Saudis are now demanding a higher price for such an agreement.

Despite these achievements, Israel has so far failed in its handling of the hostages in Gaza. The military defeat inflicted on Hamas was expected to be Israel’s main bargaining chip, yet the insistence on not ending the war in Gaza is driven by political rather than operational considerations. This represents a moral failure that stands in stark contradiction to the core values of Judaism and humanity in general.

Moreover, the delay in securing an agreement for the release of the hostages, the humiliating treatment of the hostages’ families by ministers and Knesset members from the coalition, and the continuous attempts to push forward the judicial revolution while stalling on solutions for enlisting haredim (the ultra-Orthodox) into military service, have all exacerbated the divisions within Israeli society.

Alongside these failures, there has been growing criticism of Israel, including hate speech and antisemitism, particularly in relation to its policy toward the Palestinians. Israel has been accused of committing war crimes against Gaza’s civilian population.

The International Criminal Court’s issuance of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes seems to be only the tip of the iceberg.

While these accusations are politically motivated, even if they are primarily or partially unfounded – and opinions are divided on this, given the lack of reliable information in the Israeli media – they have severely damaged Israel’s standing in the international community as a law-abiding state.

“War is the continuation of diplomacy by other means,” as the famous quote from the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz suggests. In the current situation, one of the significant failures has been the inability to translate military successes into diplomatic achievements.

The ceasefire with Lebanon, which includes the removal of Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River and the deployment of UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese military in the area between the Litani and the Israeli border, might be considered a success. Yet, only time will tell if this achievement is sustainable, unlike the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

In contrast to the situation in Lebanon, a diplomatic resolution to the Palestinian problem appears to be a distant prospect. Numerous plans have been proposed for the “day after” the war, yet the Netanyahu government remains adamant not to engage in discussions about them.

It appears that the IDF has been instructed to establish a permanent presence in Gaza, at least in its northern part. Additionally, far-right elements within the government are actively considering the possibility of re-establishing Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Opposition to the continued control of Hamas over Gaza is justified, but resistance to the return of an upgraded Palestinian Authority or another recognized and legitimate Palestinian leadership is unwarranted. The vacuum created by the absence of governance is an open invitation for chaos or for Hamas to desperately cling to power. In any case, maintaining the current deadlock is a recipe for failure.

The main diplomatic goal that remains to be achieved is a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States have expressed interest in such an agreement, but they are waiting for the Trump presidency. The central issue revolves around the demands of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in exchange for normalization with Israel.

The key question is whether the current Saudi position, which insists on the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, is open for negotiations. Regardless, any Israeli government pursuing normalization will likely have to make concessions regarding the Palestinian issue, although the exact price remains uncertain.

Sinwar caused permanent changes

When Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar launched his murderous attack on Israel on October 7, he likely considered the possibility of becoming a martyr, but he could not have foreseen the profound and far-reaching changes it would trigger in the Middle East.

Despite the significant setbacks and failures suffered by the Axis of Resistance, Sinwar may be remembered for successfully bringing the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the international and regional agenda. This, however, came at an immense cost, particularly for the Palestinian people in Gaza, who have borne the brunt of the consequences of his actions.

In conclusion, Israel’s military successes must be translated into diplomatic achievements. The war has opened up a unique opportunity to reshape regional dynamics, but realizing this potential will require visionary leadership. The challenge, however, is that, at present, such leaders are not evident on either side of the conflict. After the calamity of October 7, failing to seize these new opportunities would amount to another profound tragedy.

The article was published on January 4th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s 2024 Military Successes Came at a Cost – Will It Pay in 2025? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Mitvim Institute’s 2024 Israeli Foreign Policy Index, compiled almost a year after the outbreak of the Gaza war, challenges the notion that the Israeli public moved sharply to the right. It reveals that when Israelis are asked to consider long-term strategies regarding Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Iran, a majority of them favor diplomatic solutions. This shift reflects not a leftward movement but rather a turn towards pragmatism. This emerging trend presents an opportunity for Europe to lead, together with Middle-Eastern partners, a bold, long-term vision for peace and stability in the Middle East. Outlining a vision becomes crucial as the region gradually transitions toward a regional conflict, with shockwaves likely to reverberate across the Mediterranean.

Mitvim’s survey reveals two main trends in the Israeli public – one of broad agreement and the other of deep polarization. The first trend is the rejection of the conflict management approach and the public ambition to seek decisive solutions. Only 12% said Israel should avoid strategic measures and adhere to the pre-war situation in its relations with the Palestinians. However, it is this recognition that strategic decisions can no longer be avoided that divides Israelis, leading to two radically different perceptions of what these decisions signify. Hence, the Index highlights polarization between two camps.

The pragmatists, comprising a small relative majority of about 40-50% of the public, support the setting of a political horizon with the Palestinians within a broad regional framework, recognize the limitations of military power, and seek diplomatic cooperation to solve Israel’s security problems. They back regional cooperation as a primary means of advancing an end to the war. They support a package deal that includes normalization with KSA, a US security umbrella, and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state (44%); see a regional coalition as the main solution to the Iranian threat (46%); and support the deployment of a multinational force as a temporary solution after hostilities in Gaza cease (46%).

The other camp, the fundamentalists, are a large minority (about 30%) that currently adopt positions which were the radical right domain prior to the war. This camp favors annexation of the West Bank and resettlement in Gaza (29%), independent Israeli military campaign against Iran (32%), and reliance on an independent military action.

While the survey was conducted before Nasrallah’s elimination and the escalation of the Iran-Israel war, it still reflects a significant preference among Israelis for diplomatic solutions. Even after 10 bitter months of Hezbollah’s shelling and failed diplomatic efforts to stop this unprovoked attack, not to mention the failure of the international community to fulfill UNSCR 1701 and prevent the armament of Hezbollah, a majority of the Israeli public still opt for a diplomatic solution if one could be found. 51% pavor a diplomatic solution whether in the form of an immediate negotiated withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani river, or a longer-term Israeli-Lebanese agreement. 60% opt for diplomatic options when examining long-term strategies to deal with Iran.

Mitvim’s index highlights that a majority of Israelis align with European policymakers on key issues, notably that the war’s end should coincide with broader Israeli-Palestinian-international efforts for a settlement. They also favor long-term diplomatic solutions with Iran and its proxies, provided Israel’s security remains intact. Most importantly – the public mindset in Israel is a mindset of decisive steps, offering a unique opportunity for the international community—especially Europe—to present a bold Middle East vision. As the U.S. approaches elections, the Biden administration is likely to avoid risky agenda-setting, making it crucial for Europe and MENA actors to lead a new coalition for peace and stability. At the brink of an uncontrolled regional conflict, Europe must lead the efforts to outline an alternative future for the Middle-East. It should channel this devastating year of warfare into an opportunity for generating new political momentum for long-term stability.

The article was publish on October 7th, 2024 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine.

הפוסט An Israeli Public Turn into Pragmatism a Year Into the War May Provide an Opening for a New International Vision for Ending the War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document is one of a series of studies and policy documents that examine the relations between the local climate and foreign policy, as part of a project by the Mitvim Institute and with the support of the Glazer Foundation. The document was written in collaboration with SID-Israel, the umbrella organization of the Israeli professional community in the fields of humanitarian aid and international development. SID-Israel incorporates civil society organizations, government institutions, academic and research programs, private companies, consultants, and independent experts, and works to create a supportive professional environment, based on the exchange of knowledge and experience. Sid-Israel was established and operates thanks to the generous and ongoing support of Pears Foundation.

הפוסט Humanitarian Strategy in the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This policy paper, written in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), examines the concepts of inclusive and feminist foreign policy and seeks to suggest elements of these concepts that Israeli policymakers may adopt, whether in the short term or the long run.

הפוסט Inclusive Foreign Policy in Israel – Trends and Processes from a Gender Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Adapting the foreign system to the challenge of the climate crisis requires, first and foremost, a profound conceptual change. It calls for a shift from the logic of dealing with the climate issue as a “foster child” of secondary importance to core strategic issues to a new approach of climate diplomacy that sees the climate crisis as a political strategic game changer of prime importance to foreign policy and its implementation. Dealing with the climate crisis as a political issue challenges traditional thinking about the practices shaping foreign relations and about the actors expected to lead these processes. For example, it redefines the importance of non-governmental actors – civil society organizations, the scientific technological community, and the business sector – and positions them as active participants in shaping foreign policy. More broadly, adopting climate diplomacy provides an opportunity to reexamine the relationship between the government and non-governmental sectors in shaping Israel’s foreign relations as a whole.

Based on a review of the structure and activities of Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus on climate issues and case studies from other countries and interstate bodies, the aim of this policy paper is to propose recommendations for conceptual and structural-systemic changes to upgrade Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus handling of climate change challenges. Implementation of conceptual change in the field of climate diplomacy at the national level relies on three main components: a) anchoring and defining the role of Israel’s foreign policy within the framework of Israel’s national effort to confront climate change; b) a structural change in the foreign affairs system itself – defining a strategic integrating actor to deal with the international pillar of Israel’s climate policy; a clear internal division of roles within the system and improvement of inter-ministerial coordination through a permanent government forum; and substantial increase of resources and managerial inputs devoted to the field within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, we see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a national integrator in shaping Israel’s climate diplomacy. c) the creation of new multisectoral systems of cooperation between Israel’s governmental and non-governmental sectors.

הפוסט Upgrading the Capacity of Israel’s Foreign Policy Apparatus to Deal with the Climate Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These anti-liberal forces do not operate only through institutional frameworks. They are frighteningly effective in permeating broad sectors of society and generating moral deterioration.

Israel, for example, has seen a sharp increase in the exclusion of women from the public sphere, along with an increase in crimes by Jewish West Bank settlers against Palestinians. In the US, the repeal of the landmark Roe v. Wade ruling has encouraged conservative organizations to promote a civil surveillance strategy against women who have undergone or intend to undergo an abortion. In Germany, the recent gains of the far-Right Alternative for Germany (AfD) have given rise to a growing number of dialogue circles in which party supporters engage the general public in a bid to mainstream their radical views.

Western democracies are displaying pronounced helplessness in the face of these anti-liberal trends and activism. They have refrained from efforts to root out the phenomenon of democratic withdrawal for a variety of reasons, neglecting their vital normative role. Poland and Hungary continue to pursue anti-liberal policies, while the EU, fearing internal collapse, is crippled by indecision over its response other than imposing economic sanctions.

The West has also responded with considerable inconsistency to the drastic anti-democratic measures adopted by the current Netanyahu government. The deepening occupation carried out under cover of the regime coup roiling the country has prompted, at best, clear White House condemnation and warnings about the future of US-Israel relations; at worst, it has generated stuttered statements from Brussels.

After years of trying to contain these anti-liberal forces, we can no longer escape the realization that we are in the midst of a global campaign that requires a decisive victory, and we can no longer wait for Western leaders to make the first move. Given the leadership and ideological vacuum afflicting Western political-liberal echelons, and the public’s mistrust of them, civil society activity is more vital than ever. Liberal organizations in the West must rise above the obstacles posed by forces on the right and establish an international partnership to lead a global campaign for democracy, leaving no country behind.

The current government

THE CURRENT government’s planned regime coup has given rise to a widespread liberal awakening, which has recorded impressive achievements over the past eight months. Despite the anemic reaction of Western governments to the Netanyahu government’s attempted democratic withdrawal, the world has not remained indifferent to the power of Israel’s emerging liberal camp. At the same time, and unlike Hungary and Poland, the protest movement has gained considerable support among leading economic, defense, and cultural circles, while continuing to learn from similar struggles around the world.

The rise of the Israeli liberal camp is particularly unique and impressive given the innate handicaps facing the struggle for democracy. The continued occupation, the rise of Jewish nationalism, and the widespread and deep impact of ultra-Orthodox political influence have long been a hallmark of the state’s identity. Therefore, the consequences of the democratic withdrawal will be much more severe in Israel than in Poland and Hungary if the democratic struggle fails to achieve its goals. The emergence of the liberal camp and its effective stand against the handicaps it faces, the great support it enjoys at home, its success in exporting the protest to Jewish-Israeli communities around the world, and the extensive global coverage of its struggle – all pave the way for driving an international liberal partnership.

The Israeli liberal camp must showcase its struggle to the world as the pivot of a global ideological campaign, the success of which could set a precedent for civil protest overcoming the worst restrictions and conditions imposed by governments in democratic retreat. The Western world must understand that the success of the liberal camp in Israel is most likely the best textbook example for which it could ask. In fact, Israel’s democratic struggle may emerge as the country’s most important and effective export sector, more so than its arms deals, and perhaps even more than its high-tech or agricultural innovations.

IN THE absence of sufficient action by Western political echelons, the power of civil society can serve as a significant asset for the struggle of the global liberal camp. The democratic struggle in Israel, and elsewhere in the world, presents us with a bleak picture regarding the liberal camp’s growing sense of alienation from its representatives. Civil society, endowed with key research and action capacity, can bridge that gap between them.

Research institutes specialize in cross-border mutual learning, developing concepts and generating knowledge relevant to political action. Think tanks and activist organizations seek to promote political influence, based on existing knowledge and to develop effective practices. Political influence may be exerted on the institutional level, such as drafting and publishing policy papers vis-à-vis elected officials in parliamentary committees, or on the public level, through demonstrations, social campaigns, the media, etc.

Two avenues are open to political cooperation among liberal organizations around the world. The first is promoting joint action against global illiberal developments, such as the undermining of judicial systems, weakening of the media, and shrinking the space of civil society. The democracy defense campaign requires an organizational coordination mechanism (a kind of war room) promoting a number of significant steps: creating pressure on the political echelon in the West and international institutions to oppose escalating measures of democratic retreat, awakening public awareness through designated protests, and mobilizing various resources, such as the business sector.

The Mitvim Institute took on the challenge. It is currently working to establish a network of liberal pro-democracy think tanks and policies around the world to promote these goals of learning and joint action. In this context, it held a briefing in February with civil society organizations in Turkey, issuing nine recommendations for the pro-democracy struggle in Israel. In April, a panel discussion with Czech experts discussed the successful opposition to the right-wing populist Babiš government. On October 11, the Mitvim Institute, together with civil society organizations from Eastern Europe, will hold  a joint conference in the European Parliament in Brussels to discuss the future of the struggle for democracy.

The conference will deal with the importance of democratic solidarity and ways to strengthen it. The conference will launch a new platform of civil society organizations from Israel and around the world, Democrisis: Civic Action Network, linking protest organizations as they work together to ensure the resilience of liberal democracy against those working to weaken it. This platform will serve as the foundation stone for building an international liberal-democratic war room.

THE SECOND channel available to political cooperation among liberal organizations is the formulation of liberal-democratic ideas and concepts relevant to the reality of the struggle in which we find ourselves. These will provide the narrative and tools necessary for those fighting for freedom and equality around the world. Likewise, discussions among liberal civil society organizations on a global level, through strategic dialogues and international conferences, could serve as an up-to-date conceptual foundation for the Western political echelon in a variety of areas, such as inclusive foreign policy, entrenchment of the rule of law, and protection of human and minority rights.

Much of the Israeli public is beginning to understand the importance of cross-border liberal ties in achieving democratic victory. According to Mitvim’s 2023 Foreign Policy Index, 45% of the public has been influenced to a great or very great extent by international criticism of the regime coup in shaping their positions on the issue. In other words, while steadfast for years in the face of criticism from the Western world, with an emphasis on the Palestinian issue, many Israelis seem to have realized the relevance of warnings about the broader consequences of local democratic regression. Many survey respondents appear to have gradually realized that regime change processes in Israel are intimately linked to the global struggle for democracy.

As a result, the emerging liberal camp in Israel is increasingly appreciative of the demonstrated international engagement with its goals, but above all, it knows that its success at home depends on expressing mutual concern for similar struggles in the Western world. Therefore, only a broad liberal-civil partnership, not limited to countries where democracy is collapsing, can advance one more step to a substantive democratic victory.

We are in the throes of a new cold war: the democratic struggle is occurring everywhere, including countries considered strongholds of democracy. The protest leaders and civil society organizations in Israel must reach out to their partners around the world and create a liberal-democratic bloc, just as Western countries united against the Communist bloc. They must act in close coordination, both in terms of learning and political cooperation, just as the anti-liberal camp has succeeded in cross-border affiliations. Above all, they must understand that the “end of history” will never happen. The forces struggling for democracy can never let down their guard.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on September 26th.

הפוסט Israel’s most important export is its democratic struggle הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This year, the FPI analyzed public perceptions on the drastic changes in Israel’s foreign affairs since the formation of Netanyahu’s far-right government. The index is divided into five areas: Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus, Israel’s foreign relations, the Judicial “Reform’s” implications for Israel’s foreign relations, Israel and the region, and Israel and the Palestinians.

The briefing delved into significant insights from the FPI through an analysis of the critical gap between the public’s views and the fundamental foreign policy goals and mindset of the current government.

הפוסט The 2023 Israeli Foreign Policy Index: Netanyahu and the Israeli public at odds on foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This is a skewed, false message formulated by those seeking to task Israeli diplomats with whitewashing what is essentially a regime coup championed by an extremist government that is leading Israel to the brink of dictatorship. In other words, the Foreign Ministry is demanding that Israel’s official representatives around the world portray Israel as a “strong democracy” even as the government is removing the checks and balances of the democratic system and severely undermining the independence of the judiciary. This is a genuine Orwellian attempt to portray a campaign to crush the judiciary as “preserving the independence of the courts.”

These messages make it incumbent on all diplomats to ask themselves whether this was the reason they joined the foreign service and whether they really want to describe a coup d’état as a measure to “strengthen democracy.” Our representatives abroad who are anxious about what amounts to a regime coup should refrain from defending a policy that endangers themselves, their families, and their country. This is not a call for their resignation; it is a call for soul-searching and for establishing boundaries.

After all, the diplomats are not being asked to ignore a policy disagreement on a specific issue. They are being told to soft-pedal a fundamental contradiction between the foreign service of a country that purports to be based on democratic values that are articulated in our Declaration of Independence – and the direction in which the government of Yariv Levin, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich, and Benjamin Netanyahu is leading us.

These extremists are aiming to eliminate the separation of powers that is the underpinning of the democratic system, destroy judicial review, promote discrimination and misogyny, divert state budgets to serve ultra-Orthodox and nationalist constituencies and shatter the Zionist ethos on the basis of which the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people was established.

The role of diplomats is to represent their country, including the government and its policies, but also the cultural, economic, and political totality of the society and country they serve, in all its diversity. As long as the government adheres to its basic contract with the public, diplomats can do both, despite the challenges involved. Such is the case in all democratic countries, and the same is true in Israel.

The role of diplomats, like all other civil servants, is not only to broadcast the government’s messages to the world but also to clarify to the government in a professional and courageous manner the implications of the policies it adopts for its interests in the international arena.

Those applying for foreign service training know that they will be called upon at some point in their career to represent policies with which they disagree. Diplomats are civil servants serving democratically elected governments that come and go. Therefore, the ability to serve different governments is a prerequisite for anyone who wishes to represent the State of Israel. Such service involves a willingness to represent and promote the policies of any government, not necessarily the one for which they voted as long as the basis of our democracy is maintained

This challenge faces anyone sent to represent Israel abroad. I myself faced it when I served as Israel’s consul general to the states of New England (at the consulate in Boston). When I disagreed with the Israeli government’s handling of its relations with the US administration, I voiced my criticism behind closed doors in internal forums (although they turned out to be more porous than I thought and my criticism was leaked to the media).

However, I always knew that I would draw the line when I felt that my views were no longer just a policy disagreement, but a fundamental rejection of the messages I was told to convey and of the policies I was required to promote. I did take early retirement from the Foreign Ministry, partly because I felt I could promote my country’s interests better from outside the system. My decision was right for me personally, but may not necessarily be the right choice for all of my many friends at the Foreign Ministry who have achieved wonderful accomplishments for many years from within the system.

Deepening tensions between government policy and civil servants’ personal beliefs can pose a heartbreaking dilemma. They require difficult personal decisions that involve complicated implications for lives and livelihoods, and therefore no one has a right to judge them. Moreover, when a government undermines democratic values, it makes no sense for those who seek to promote such values from within the system to resign, since they will clearly be replaced by officials willing to help the government crush our democracy.

Notwithstanding this argument, civil servants have both the right and the duty to voice their opinions forcefully and describe the implications of government policy on the matters under their purview. Those who can influence from within should do so and make their voices heard.

A large liberal democratic camp has emerged in Israel in recent months under the current government, a citizenry unwilling to sacrifice its future and that of its children and grandchildren for a dictatorship in the making. Right now, the role of democracy lovers is to help preserve the basic values of democracy, if possible, from within the government and if not, from the outside

The current government’s policy cannot and must not be justified or “explained,” not even in diplomatic language.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on August 8th.

הפוסט Diplomats should represent the country, not the government הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document presents key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy from January to July 2023, corresponding to the first six months in office of Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government. This government’s composition and policies distanced Israel from the league of liberal-democratic countries – even as the continuing war in Ukraine divided the world between democratic and autocratic forces, geopolitical developments shifted the system of Middle East alliances (including China’s successful Iranian-Saudi mediation), and the spreading climate crisis consequences underscored the urgency of cooperation. The government promoted an anti-democratic judicial overhaul and deepened the occupation and defacto annexation of the West Bank, generating growing tensions in relations with the United States as well as much international criticism. An attempt was made to continue managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the assistance of regional and international forces, and strategic cooperation with Egypt and Jordan was maintained. Relations with the normalization countries progressed, but the Palestinian issue prevented additional countries from joining the process and convening multilateral frameworks. Israel encountered difficulties in persuading other countries to adopt its position on Iran’s nuclear program, and its attempt to avoid taking sides on the war in Ukraine drew increasing criticism in the West. The rehabilitation of relations with Europe that began under the previous government was replaced by cooperation based on specific interests. The government continued to strengthen relations with Turkey, and at the same time, with Greece and Cyprus. Still, the standing of the Foreign Ministry was undermined, and it was removed from its place at the decision-making table.

1. Israel pays the price for the makeup of its government and its attempts to engineer a regime coup – Many in the Western world, including heads of state, legislators, jurists, economists, and public and intellectual figures, spoke out against the proposed regime coup in Israel, as did Jewish institutions and communities around the world. Israel’s ranking on international democracy indices deteriorated, and its credit rating suffered. The Prime Minister and his cabinet members were no longer welcomed in world capitals, and some were actively boycotted by Israel’s closest allies. Government representatives were challenged by Israeli and other demonstrators on their visits to Western countries and by increasing criticism from their hosts. 

2. In the face of international condemnation, the government promotes annexation and deepens the occupation at an unprecedented pace and scope – The government transferred authority over building in the settlements to pro-settlement hardliner Bezalel Smotrich and promoted massive Jewish construction in the West Bank, granted significant budget preference to settlement development, repealed the 2005 Disengagement Law and promoted a renewed permanent settlement in Homesh in violation of its commitment to the US. These and other developments provided a tailwind for violent settler rampages against Palestinians and undermined the perception of a status quo on the Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif. Palestinian terrorist attacks were exploited to legalize illegal outposts and enable the establishment of others. The international community condemned these measures and urged a halt to further settlement construction and settler violence.

3. Regional and international actors mobilize to help Israel’s continued efforts to manage the conflict with the Palestinians – The regional and international community, headed by the United States, Egypt, Jordan, and Europe, mobilized to help prevent the escalation of violence during Ramadan. These allies also hosted two regional meetings on Israeli-Palestinian security coordination – in Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh; some Israeli ministers contacted senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials to urge calm, promises were issued of supportive Israeli measures to strengthen the PA and the Palestinian economy, and pressure was exerted on Israel to refrain from building in the territories and other unilateral actions. Ramadan was relatively calm but was followed by another bout of fighting between Israel and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza that ended only with the help of Egypt, Qatar, and the United States.  

4. Strategic cooperation continues with Egypt and Jordan to ease Israeli-Palestinian violence and specific crises – Jordan and Egypt cooperated in the international effort to prevent escalation in the Palestinian arena, hosted regional meetings in Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh, and stressed their commitment to advancing a solution to the Palestinian issue. Both countries strongly condemned the deepening Israeli annexation and settler violence, but continued to promote joint projects with Israel, especially in the energy sector. Specific crises, such as a deadly attack on Israeli soldiers on the Egyptian border and an attempt by a Jordanian lawmaker to smuggle weapons, were resolved through bilateral cooperation. 

5. Normalization continues with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, but the Palestinian issue restricts, delays and damages the process and efforts to expand it – Previous agreements between governments and business companies have been implemented and new ones have been signed, civil society organizations have promoted cooperation, tourism from Israel to normalization countries continued, and trade expanded. Government ministers visited Morocco, and teams within the multilateral frameworks continued their work. However, the tension in Jerusalem, the Gaza campaign in May, settlement construction and violence in the territories gave prominence to the Palestinian issue in the normalization process, with Israel’s new allies condemning Israel’s actions in the territories, the UAE increasing its political involvement and financial support for the Palestinians and halting planned cooperation with Israel. Netanyahu’s planned first visit to the UAE was postponed following Ben-Gvir’s ascent to the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif, and the Negev Forum meeting in Morocco was postponed several times and finally canceled due to the boost in settlement construction. The Americans and Saudis made clear to Israel that its actions in the Palestinian arena make it difficult for them to advance public normalization of ongoing unofficial Saudi-Israeli contacts.

6. Israel keeps challenging Iran in various arenas, but has trouble persuading other countries to adopt its position – Israel continued to act against Iran’s efforts in the region and against its nuclear program. It operated clandestinely on Iranian soil, attacked Iranian forces in Syria and Lebanon, strengthened ties with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, cooperated with Cyprus and Turkey, and held joint military exercises with the United States to promote deterrence. The Israeli government acted on the diplomatic level in a bid to persuade other countries to increase pressure on Iran, and tried to leverage Iran’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine to that end. US-Israel tensions over Iran arose despite ongoing dialogue between them on this issue, while the administration made progress toward an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program.

7. Israel continues to refrain from expressing full support for Ukraine and condemning Russia, and is increasingly criticized by Ukrainians and their Western partners – Israel kept up its humanitarian aid to Ukraine but avoided condemnation of Russia and declined Ukrainian requests for more significant support. Foreign Minister Cohen made his first visit to Ukraine but also refrained from condemning Russia. His promises to provide Ukraine with aerial warning systems have yet to be realized and, in any case, do not correspond with Ukraine’s request for Israeli air defense systems. Ukraine made it clear that Israel’s neutrality is in fact a pro-Russian position.

8. The process of rehabilitating relations with the EU is replaced by promoting functional relations, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and European criticism of the occupation and the regime coup – Israel accepted the EU’s proposal to schedule a meeting of the Association Council, although no date has yet been set, and continued to promote joint regional projects with the Europeans. Israel continued its dialogue with European leaders on the Iranian issue, the fight against anti-Semitism and the Abraham Accords. The war in Ukraine boosted Israeli arms sales to EU member states, even as the government’s regime coup became a regular agenda item in conversations between the sides. Netanyahu’s government was in touch with Orban’s government in Hungary and Duda’s in Poland in the context of the regime coup, boosting relations with Poland by reaching an agreement that accepts the Polish narrative on Holocaust remembrance.

9. Israel continues to restore relations with Turkey, at the same time strengthening relations with Greece and Cyprus – Despite Turkey’s public criticism of the Israeli government’s moves in the Palestinian arena, efforts continued to improve bilateral relations. Israel assisted Turkey in the wake of the disastrous February earthquake, aid that was highly appreciated by the Turks. At the same time, Israel continued to bolster its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, with an emphasis on security and energy.

10. Israel and the United States try to ease growing tensions over the planned Israeli regime coup and its deepening West Bank occupation and to prevent these issues from turning into a deep rift between them – The United States expressed its opposition to the government-led coup, emphasized the democratic values on which its alliance with Israel is based, and pressed for controversial legislation to be achieved through broad consensus. The Israeli government tried to calm US concerns about the threat to Israeli democracy emanating from its judicial overhaul, while at the same time making clear it views the US stand as interference in its domestic affairs. Nonetheless, relations deteriorated over Israel’s continued efforts to weaken its judiciary, its repeal of the Disengagement Law and settlers’ return to Homesh contrary to Israel’s commitment to the United States. Tensions were also exacerbated by the transfer of building authority in the territories to Smotrich, by settler pogroms against Palestinians, and condemnation of Biden and his administration by several government ministers. The White House continued to shun Netanyahu by refusing to issue an invitation to the White House, also boycotting his top allies, Finance Minister Smotrich and Public Security Minister Ben-Gvir. The administration tried to distinguish between continued US support for Israel, for example through participation in marking Israel’s 75th anniversary celebrations, visits by senior US officials to Israel, continued security and political coordination, and a White House invitation issued to President Herzog, and between the current government’s actions, especially its attempted regime coup and occupation. The administration reverted to past US policy of refusing to cooperate with Israeli academic institutions located in the settlements.

11. The Foreign Ministry is removed from the decision-making table and struggles to maintain its standing and budget – Netanyahu reversed the previous government’s efforts to restore power and authority to the Foreign Ministry and rehabilitate its status, reestablishing the Ministry of Strategic Affairs headed by his confidante Ron Dermer. In fact, Dermer has become a leading figure in diplomatic moves, more so than the foreign minister. In addition, the government decided to rotate the foreign minister’s post between two Likud contenders for domestic political reasons, established a Ministry of Information, and weakened the Ministry of Regional Cooperation. The foreign minister and his ministry were kept out of security-political decision-making and Foreign Ministry employees resumed their fight for improved working conditions and a return of their trusted standing. 

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Editors: Dr. Roee Kibrik and Dr. Orni Livny

This document reviews key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy for the July-December 2022 period, which began under Lapid as prime minister and ended with the formation of a far-right government headed by Netanyahu. During Lapid’s tenure, the government continued its conflict management strategy in the Palestinian arena, coordinated its moves vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip with Qatar and Egypt, which achieved relative calm; strengthened and developed relations with the new normalization states and continued attempts to draw Saudi Arabia into the circle; enhanced relations with its veteran peace partners Egypt and Jordan; kept up its campaign against the Iranian nuclear program; warmed relations with Turkey while ensuring the resilience of ties with Greece and Cyprus, and restored relations with the European Union and the US administration. Despite a more favorable attitude towards Ukraine, Lapid’s government continued to refrain from expressing unequivocal support for it, and was careful not to upset Russia. Energy resources in the Mediterranean contributed to a historic agreement with Lebanon and growing regional cooperation, with the climate crisis remaining a secondary issue in policy considerations. The choice of a far-right government has generated concerns among Israel’s partners and neighbors. Jordan expressed grave concern, tensions with Europe reawakened, the US administration was called upon to draw red lines for the new government, the Palestinian Authority expressed its concern over impending annexation moves, and the UN asked the International Court of Justice in The Hague to examine whether the occupation is truly temporary as Israel claims.

1. The conflict management strategy, increasing violence, and creeping annexation bring Israel to the doorsteps of the International Court of Justice in The Hague – The Israeli government continued its policy of conflict management, with an emphasis on security coordination and improving the economic and civil lives of the Palestinians, along with continued promotion of creeping annexation and avoidance of political measures. In Gaza, Israel continued to work with Egypt, the UN, and Qatar to manage the enclave and maintain calm. Increasing settler violence, the high number of Palestinian fatalities, and the outlawing of Palestinian civil society organizations turns into an international issue, undermining security coordination with the Palestinian Authority and contributing to its ongoing weakening. In the absence of a political process, and in light of concerns ahead of the installation of a far-right government, the international debate over the ostensibly temporary nature of the Israeli occupation intensifies, and the UN General Assembly seeks a ruling from the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

2. Relations with the normalization countries deepen and expand, and efforts continue to draw Saudi Arabia into the normalization process – Reciprocal visits by senior officials continued between Israel and the normalization states – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, economic agreements were signed and bilateral trade increased, new civilian cooperation initiatives were launched, and security cooperation and arms trade were strengthened. Cooperation between Israel and the normalization countries also expanded in multilateral arenas, such as the Negev Forum, the Central Command of the US Army and NATO, and the I2U2 quadrilateral framework that includes Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and India. Early signs of possible progress in the normalization process with Saudi Arabia were reflected in cooperation through a third party or an international framework. The new government has stated that it will continue strengthening the normalization process, and try to expand it.

3. Israel steps up its campaign to block a renewed nuclear agreement with Iran and to cripple the Iranian nuclear program – The Israeli government acted against a return to the nuclear agreement in the diplomatic sphere, taking care not to engage in a public confrontation on the issue with the US administration. In view of the decline of the nuclear agreement at this time, Israel and the United States signaled that the military alternative to the Iranian nuclear attack exists. Israel has acted against the Iranian presence in Syria, Lebanon, and the shipping lanes, and stressed to Europe Iran’s position on Russia’s side in its war in Ukraine, as evidence of Iran’s negative role in the international system and the need to impose additional sanctions on it.

4. Israel continues to strengthen its ties with Egypt and to rehabilitate relations with Jordan – Israel and Egypt continued to cooperate in the management of the Gaza Strip, and in promoting regional activities, mainly in the energy sector. Among other things, the countries tried to restart the efforts to develop the gas field in Gaza. Israel continued its activities to rehabilitate and strengthen its relations with Jordan, the leaders met, promoted agreements in the fields of tourism and cooperation in the rehabilitation of the Jordan River as in the joint energy and water project between Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, and an attempt was made (unsuccessfully) to connect Jordan to the Negev Forum. Egypt and Jordan have expressed their desire for continued cooperation with Israel under the new government, but Jordan has also expressed strong concern and even willingness to enter a confrontation in view of a change in the status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem or the development of a third intifada.

5. Two years of warming relations with the EU culminate in a meeting of the Association Council and end with a new government pouring cold water over the process – Israel worked to strengthen relations with Europe despite its ongoing criticism of the Israeli occupation, and succeeded in bringing about a convening of the Joint Association Council. Israel and the EU agreed on Israeli participation in European cultural and police programs, but the continued European policy towards the occupation and settlement project, and the installation of the new right-wing government, halted these moves before they were officially signed. 

6. Israel tries to support Ukraine without upsetting Russia, but ends up losing out both ways – The Lapid government adopted a more favorable policy on support for Ukraine compared to the policy during Bennett’s tenure, but refrained from supplying it with weapons. It settled for sending humanitarian aid, and did not join to the international sanctions against Russia in its continued bid to avoid clashing with Moscow. Iranian aid to Russia nudged Israel toward closer cooperation with the West on Ukraine, but neither side was satisfied and both criticized Israel’s policy. Russia warmly welcomed Netanyahu’s return to office. 

7. Israel advances normalization of relations with Turkey while advancing ties with Greece and Cyprus – Lapid and Erdogan agreed to restore full diplomatic relations, new ambassadors were appointed, and Israeli ministers met with their Turkish counterparts. Cooperation in trade, aviation, and security deepened, and Turkey moderated its condemnation of Israeli actions on the Palestinian front. Both sides have declared their intention to maintain the process with the new government, too. At the same time, cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus continued to deepen and expand, particularly in the security field.

8. Israel and Lebanon sign an agreement marking their maritime border – Decade-long negotiations came to a successful end when intensive American mediation and guarantees enabled Israel and Lebanon to reach agreements on the demarcation of their economic maritime border, and to allow each country to turn to the development of the underwater energy resources in its territory, while deepening their interdependence and presenting a possible example of regional cooperation between rival states.

9. The restoration of the “special relationship” with the US is interrupted by the new government – Lapid and Biden signed the “Jerusalem Declaration” emphasizing their countries’ shared values of democracy and the rule of law. Cooperation against the Iranian nuclear program was tightened, a technological-strategic dialogue was launched, and Israel acceded to the US request to establish a mechanism for examining foreign (Chinese) investments in Israel. However, the US administration and the American Jewish community have expressed growing concern over the new far-right Israeli government. The administration stressed that it would continue to work with any government, but stressed its opposition to annexation and the importance of the rule of law.

10. The disappointing hopes of rehabilitating the foreign affairs apparatus under Lapid, dashed by the advent of the new government that resumes previous Netanyahu policy of dismantling it – After the upgrading of the Foreign Ministry’s status under Lapid, including its significant inclusion in political processes and decision-making, the momentum stalled when Lapid failed to appoint a foreign minister upon his move to the Prime Minister’s Office, ambassadors were excluded from Lapid’s meetings with heads of state, and Foreign Ministry employees were forced to continue their fight for improved working conditions, facing an attempt to bypass their labor actions through the privatization of certain foreign services. The formation of the new government led to a renewed split in the foreign affairs system in view of the re-establishment of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, the establishment of a separate publicity ministry, the transfer of regional cooperation affairs to the purview of the Minister of Education and the handling of the boycott movement to the Minister of Diaspora Affairs, as well as a job-sharing rotation in the Foreign Minister’s position.

11. The climate crisis is mobilized for regional cooperation, but remains of secondary importance in shaping foreign policy – Although Israel set up a booth at the 2022 international climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh for the first time, dispatched a diverse and larger delegation than ever before, joined the international zero emissions initiative by 2050, and took advantage of the opportunity to establish regional ties on climate issues, it did not update its greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, already low compared with those of Western countries, did not complete the enactment of a climate law, and promoted diplomatic projects at the expense of the joint fight against the climate crisis.

הפוסט Semi-Annual Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policy July– December 2022 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The current government has embarked on a fundamental clash with international law due to its intent to transform the occupation into a permanent reality de facto even if not de jure. Despite the claims of Israel’s political right that “a people cannot be an occupier of its own land”, and without denying the historical connection of the Jewish people to regions of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, this is also undoubtedly the land of the Palestinians living in these territories. The Palestinians in the West Bank experience violent military occupation whereas Palestinians living in annexed East Jerusalem face discrimination in all aspects of life. In the West Bank, a different law applies to Palestinians and to Israeli settlers living there, and in East Jerusalem, Palestinian residents do not enjoy Israeli citizenship and are discriminated against in terms of municipal and social services and in the residency permits they are required to obtain from the government and municipality. In other words, Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are subject to different and discriminatory rules compared to their Jewish neighbors.

Israeli governments has nonetheless managed to avoid significant international sanctions over this clearly immoral reality unparalleled in Western democracies due to its claim that the situation is temporary in nature and that Israel is reaching out to the Palestinians in search of a peaceful solution to the conflict. These two claims have long since ceased to hold water, but nonetheless enjoy US backing and benefit from European inertia. Israel has thus been spared sanctions of the kind imposed on Russia since its 2014 occupation of Crimea, and even more so since its invasion and occupation of parts of eastern Ukraine.

Dr. Micah Goodman’s theory of “shrinking the conflict”, which was adopted by the previous government as unofficial policy due to its inability to seek an accommodation with the Palestinians, is nothing more than self-delusion. Anyone familiar with the situation in the Occupied Territories knows that the conflict cannot be shrunk and cannot be “managed.” The question is essentially dichotomous – Israel is either an occupying power or it is not. Vague definitions and hollow words cannot change this fundamental fact. In practice, the “shrinking the conflict” policy of the past year has failed to achieve its already limited goals. The Israeli presence in the West Bank creates a routine of violence against the Palestinian population,by Jewish settler violence intended to take over Palestinian territory and make Palestinian life a misery. Discriminatory laws, which allow Palestinians to be evicted from their homes and lands while their Jewish neighbors live comfortably in homes on land that belongs to Palestinians, are intended to thwart any solution that would divide the land between Israelis and Palestinians. Nonetheless, successive Israeli governments, including the so-called government of change (2021-2022), have succeeded in convincing the world that the occupation that begun in 1967 is temporary.

The new government, according to its declarations and the wording of the coalition agreements underpinning its formation, is about to expose this prolonged masquerade and thereby eliminate the international protective umbrella that allowed Israel to keep it in place. This government has announced its intention to continue building settlements in the Palestinian territories and even to whitewash the outposts considered illegal under Israeli law due to their location on private Palestinian land.

The new government also intends to significantly weaken the independence of Israel’s judicial system, which has served as a shield against international legal intervention by convincing the West that Israel should be allowed to deal with human rights violations in the Occupied Territories on its own.

Moreover, the new government intends to undermine the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, a move that would severely undermine the peace agreement with Jordan and damage Israel’s other agreements with Arab countries, not to mention the real danger of widespread violence as a direct result. It should be noted that, contrary to Netanyahu’s claim that the Abraham Accords proved that the Sunni Arab states are not interested in the occupation, all Arab states supported the December 2022 UN resolution seeking the International Criminal Court’s opinion on the Israeli occupation.

The new government’s policy reflects a disregard for international law and the norms underlying it. It is important to understand that most countries in the Western world, of which we claim to be a part, regard international law as the infrastructure for their foreign affairs policy. Therefore, once it becomes clear that the occupation is not temporary and does not comply with the rules governing transition periods, their policy towards us may change significantly. Without the US veto power in the Security Council, the Palestinians would have long since been accepted as a UN member. In fact, without the American diplomatic umbrella, most countries would have recognized a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. The two-state solution, which the new government is renouncing, is accepted by almost all countries of the world except Israel, Iran and a number of other non-democratic states.

The longstanding American diplomatic defense on which we have pinned our hopes for decades is about to be eroded, and rightly so. The US administration will no longer be able to justify, either domestically to the majority of Democrats, nor externally to the international community, the protection it provides for Israel’s occupation once Israel’s new government exposes the fraud that enabled its existence. There are already increasing calls in the Democratic Party to stop providing Israel with financial and diplomatic assistance given the Israeli government’s contravention of the two countries’ shared values and interests. Younger American Jews no longer remember Israel as the small and week country extending a hand of peace to the hostile neighbors threatening its existence, which justified their parents’ mobilization to help the fledgling state at all costs. The younger generation rightly sees Israel as a military power making no move to end the conflict while continuing to expect American military aid.

The ultra-Orthodox right-wing government is causing the great majority of the American Jewish community and the Democratic Party to distance themselves from Israel, undermining not only the automatic defense of Israel, but also our ability to serve as the national home of the Jewish people in the Diaspora in accordance with the Zionist mission. The vast majority of American Jews and Democratic voters will be unable to adhere for long to a partnership with Israel cemented by shared values and interests when the State of Israel chooses to disengage from these values and turn itself into an ethnocracy based on Jewish supremacy. Israel’s position at the center of US political consensus has already been severely eroded by Netanyahu’s previous governments. If the State of Israel continues in the direction on which it has embarked, we will soon be left only with the support of Trumpist populists and evangelical Christians who hope for Armageddon in which they hope that most of us will be killed and that the rest of us will convert to Christianity with the return of Jesus Christ.

For years, there has been talk of a political tsunami. The fact that it failed to materialize no longer means it will not.  For those like myself who fear the demise of the Zionist dream and its promise as the democratic homeland of the Jewish people, external intervention to halt such deterioration is not bad news. For all those who, like me, think that the eternal domination of the Palestinians is incompatible with our humane and Jewish values, removing the mask may actually be beneficial by exposing the obvious cost of the occupation and making it clear to all that we cannot be part of the enlightened world as an occupying people. My only hope is that the price we pay will not include bloodshed and the dangerous weakening of Israeli society and of the magnificent Zionist project established by our grandparents and parents.

This article is from “Haaretz“, from Janurary 5, 2023

הפוסט The Impact of the Occupation on Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It also highlights that the Palestinian issue, while not a top priority on the global agenda, is still one of concern to many in the international community. And while it is true that most countries are not presently motivated to translate this concern into action, by casting their votes in the U.N., they can catalyze processes that could eventually result in concrete policy implications.

Countries and international organizations that were supportive of the Lapid-Bennett government (June 2021-December 2022) and refrained from excessive criticism of its policies pertaining to the Palestinian issue, are not willing to do so in the context of the new government, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, that took power at the end of December. The government’s composition and declared intentions are problematic enough, and criticism and warnings were voiced even prior to any governmental action being taken.

Last week’s UNGA vote showed that even countries aligned with Israel on multiple issues — including its new regional allies, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain — may still vote against the Israeli position when the Palestinian issue is on the line in international fora. Still, U.N. votes are often declaratory in nature with few long-term consequences, and should not necessarily be taken for granted as reflecting genuine foreign policy priorities.

Nevertheless, the votes by the European Union member states — a larger number of which abstained or backed the Israeli position compared to previous votes — is noteworthy, especially in the context of the new Israeli government’s harsh criticism toward the EU. Eleven member states supported the Israeli position, nine abstained, and only seven voted against it. Future votes will indicate whether this is a new pattern of behavior or a unique event.

The United States’ vote in support of the Israeli position represented continuity. The Biden administration is in an early phase of articulating its policy and conduct vis-à-vis Israel’s new government. Only after the anticipated series of high-level mutual visits and meetings takes place over the coming months, and once the actual policies of the new Israeli government become clearer, can we expect a coherent updated American policy to emerge. However, whatever form this new policy takes, it is not likely to be reflected in voting patterns at the U.N.

Israel aggressively rebuked the UNGA vote, showcasing the diplomatic tone that we can expect from the new government going forward. It reflected a return to the kind of rhetoric employed by previous Netanyahu governments — reflexively labeling criticism of Israeli policies as “anti-Israeli,” supportive of terrorism and boycotts, and de-legitimizing of Israel as a sovereign state.

The Israeli response attacked the U.N. as a whole and reproved the Palestinians for raising the issue in this forum. Though of course, in practice, the vote represented the positions of independent countries.

Such severe Israeli rhetoric reduces the space for dialogue with legitimate critics on actual policy differences that exist — a basic pillar of diplomacy. By doing so, it weakens Israel’s global standing rather than reinforces it. Netanyahu’s confrontational foreign policy approach has distanced Israel in the past from its traditional allies and partners in the liberal democratic camp, and it is likely to do so again.

Instead, the Israeli government would do well to engage constructively with its critics and provide clarity on its intentions regarding the settlements and the Palestinians as well as regarding its desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Are we heading toward annexation? Permanent occupation? Or perhaps territorial compromise and a two-state solution, after all?

The international community can also seek answers from Jerusalem, not only from The Hague. Without such answers, actions like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s visit to the Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, on Jan. 3, will speak for themselves and will be assumed to represent Prime Minister Netanyahu’s official policies.

The article was published in MEI@75 on Janurary 4.

הפוסט What the UN vote tells us about international sentiments and Israeli diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A Letter of Appreciation from Prime Minister Yair Lapid for the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous escalations forced Netanyahu to conduct a diplomatic dialogue with Jordan and agree on arrangements emphasizing his commitment to the status quo, as well as restrictions on visits by Knesset members or Temple Mount activists (i.e. the 2015 Kerry understandings). But the balance in the emerging government coalition has shifted, with the members of the Religious Zionist bloc that advocate significant change in the status quo having greater influence and Netanyahu being more dependent on them, thus having limited room for maneuver.

Growing tension

Against this backdrop, Jordanian officials have been warning that an attempt by the new government to change the status quo at the site and allow provocative actions by Ben-Gvir as a future minister of national security, could threaten peaceful relations with Jordan and inflame the entire region. Netanyahu had reportedly sent reassuring messages to Jordan but this is unlikely to allay the serious concerns over the issue.

In view of the growing tension over this issue, and based on the long history of escalation and violent eruptions at the site, it is incumbent on all relevant actors to increase coordination and institutionalize communications channels to forestall crises. The recently published annual Mitvim Foreign Policy Index found that 61% of the Israeli public (including a majority of center-right voters) support the idea of establishing a coordination mechanism among Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians to prevent escalation at Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Only 20% objected, reflecting the Israeli public’s awareness of the issue’s sensitivity and of the need to strengthen coordination and dialogue among the parties involved.

After the Six Day War in 1967, a secret channel of communication was established between Israeli authorities and the Wakf administration under Jordanian auspices, which is tasked with the management of the Temple Mount site, and a modus vivendi was developed between the parties. Professor Yitzhak Reiter demonstrated in his research on the Temple Mount that the coordination mechanism and the quiet understandings formed between the sides collapsed following the 1996 Western Wall Tunnel affair and the severe rift following the second intifada and the escalation at the site.

Under Netanyahu’s rule, tensions with Jordan deepened and the contacts with the Wakf weakened. The rounds of violence during this period led to American involvement in a bid to fill the vacuum and end the crises. This was the case, for example, in November 2014 and October 2015, when then-secretary of state John Kerry shuttled between Jerusalem, Amman, and Ramallah, and formulated understandings to ease tensions.

Over the past year, the Bennett-Lapid government attempted to preempt escalation during Ramadan through intensive Israeli-initiated contacts with Jordan and the Palestinians, which included meetings between Yair Lapid, Benny Gantz, and Omer Bar Lev with senior Jordanian and Palestinian officials. This move was led by the parties, rather than by an external actor, and was made possible by the improved relations with Jordan and the PA, reflecting a desire to act before and not after escalation.

A model for a permanent framework

But the idea examined in the Mitvim survey suggests a different model. Instead of efforts by external parties to douse the flames after the fire has already broken out or ad hoc contacts between senior officials to ease the crisis, the model proposes a permanent framework of dialogue, coordination and cooperation on this most sensitive and volatile issue.

SUCH A mechanism would enable a constant channel of communications, serve as a tool for message and information exchanges and confidence building measures, promoting coordination and preparations for times of crisis, and agreed moves to calm tensions and restore order.

Public support for the idea shows that Israelis understand the special sensitivity of the Temple Mount and the need for coordination with other parties, and recognizes their role in managing the site, especially given the risks of escalation and loss of control. Such a step is, of course, politically sensitive and will likely be opposed by those seeking to change the status quo but the majority of the public appears to support it.

If this policy direction is agreed upon, the sides will be required to discuss the nature of the mechanism, the parties involved and its mandate. The mechanism must include those involved in the daily running and protection of the site, who are well acquainted with the ins and outs of the situation, as well as political representatives acting in coordination with the decision makers to ensure a civil-political dimension and not just a security one.

Mechanisms to prevent escalation are urgently needed

The parties will also be able to discuss the integration of other actors, including a possible dialogue with religious leaders and community representatives. The Geneva Initiative of 2003 proposed the establishment of an interfaith council to serve as an advisory body on the management of the holy sites.

At the same time, the participation of additional players at the regional or international level is also important. These players could include Morocco, which chairs the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Saudi Arabia, which bears responsibility for Islam’s holy sites in Mecca and Medina.

Similar proposals and ideas have arisen over the years regarding the establishment of special mechanisms for the management of the holy sites. Then-prime minister Olmert’s proposal in 2008, for example, included a framework consisting of five states: Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the US. The Amirav-Husseini plan (2000) proposed a composition of 11 states, including Israel, Palestine the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and four Arab states.

The Oslo process chose to postpone the question of Jerusalem’s future to the final stage of negotiations, consistent with Israel’s desire to delay discussion of the issue as much as possible. But the periodic tensions that erupt in Jerusalem make it clear time and again that the issue cannot be ignored.

Therefore, the construction of mechanisms to prevent escalation in Jerusalem should be an immediate and urgent move, not the end of the road. Moreover, a mechanism regarding the holy sites could also be a first step in laying the ground for cooperation on other issues, and perhaps even the start of political momentum in the future and the beginning of a real dialogue on the question of Jerusalem.

The combination of recent and increasing instability in the West Bank, the tensions in eastern Jerusalem and the fears of extreme and dangerous policies promoted by some members of the new government create a particularly volatile mix and any unusual incident on the Temple Mount could trigger a flare-up.

This state of play underscores the critical importance of preventing escalation at this sensitive site and instituting permanent and effective coordination and dialogue mechanisms between all parties involved.

This article is from “JPost“, from December 5, 2022

הפוסט As tensions grow, all eyes are on the Temple Mount הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the world he faces at the end of 2022 is very different from the one he knew as prime minister two or three years ago. His new coalition is likely to diverge from others that Israel and the world have known, without the required checks and balances to restrain its extremist partners from the Religious Zionist party.

Stay away from Putin’s camp

In the 2019 election campaign, Netanyahu used photos of himself with former US president Donald Trump, President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi to promote his foreign affairs expertise. He presented himself as a full partner of the global conservative axis peopled by leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Britain’s Boris Johnson and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro. The opposing camp included former US president Barack Obama, Jewish Democratic voters, the European Union and liberals of various hues.

Two years ago, Trump lost the US elections and in February of this year, President Putin invaded Ukraine, a watershed geopolitical development that has divided the world broadly into anti-Putin and the pro-Putin camps. Friendship with the Russian dictator is no longer a source of pride: the war in Ukraine has largely united Europe and strengthened its relationship with the US and the NATO alliance.

Israel’s cautious position in relation to Russia and its refusal to sell defensive weapons to Ukraine is raising eyebrows in the West. Before the elections, Netanyahu promised his Russian-speaking supporters to consider selling weapons to Ukraine but that was before the elections. His government will have to deal with this sweeping change in Western perceptions in relation to Russia and to those who express support for it or do not condemn it sufficiently. Over the past eight months, Netanyahu has maintained a circumspect silence regarding the war in Ukraine but rarely criticized the Bennett-Lapid government for its cautious policy. The question is how Netanyahu will reshape his relationship with the Russian ruler after years of boasting and bragging about their close friendship.

Avoid damaging the fabric of relations with the Arab countries

Arab capitals have been silent so far about the Israeli elections, waiting for the final results and the formation of the government. There is no doubt that Netanyahu, the architect of the Abraham Accords, is determined to return to resume his involvement in this arena and even succeed where his predecessors Bennett and Lapid failed in expanding the circle of countries normalizing relations with Israel. But even if the Gulf countries, Morocco and Egypt wish to continue the partnership with Israel and expand it, they cannot ignore the far more radical leanings of the emerging government on the Palestinian issue.

During the recent escalation in Gaza, the Union of Gulf Principalities was the first to call a meeting of the UN Security Council on the Palestinian issue, while Jordan strongly condemned Israel’s actions. Saudi Arabia has said clearly that it would only normalize relations with Israel once progress is achieved in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Arab world is not as exclusively focused now on the Palestinian issue as it was 20 or 30 years ago but there is no doubt that violent clashes in the West Bank, clashes at Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem or further escalation against Gaza will trigger a wave of angry reaction in the Arab world and further opposition to the Abraham Accords. Any talk of annexation will undermine the foundation on which the peace agreements between Israel and the Gulf Principalities were built.

It is also important to add a few words about Jordan: relations with the kingdom improved under Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi and continued to improve when Bennett and Lapid were in office. The task of any future government is to preserve the strategic relations with Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and the countries of the Abraham Agreements.

To this end, and also to preserve Israeli interests, it is important to avoid policies that risk undermining the Palestinian Authority and contributing to its complete collapse. Netanyahu’s partners in the Smotrich-Ben-Gvir bloc will pull the government toward extreme positions, such as lobbying for the annexation of Area C, population exchanges, increased demolition of Palestinian homes, and more.

It is not clear how the Prime Minister will balance the demands of this bloc, but such a gallop into the abyss could cost Israel dearly – both in relations with Arab countries and with Europe and the US.

Israel and the Palestinians

It is important to understand that today the Palestinian Authority is on its last legs. A small push, a slight tap on the shoulder and this rickety structure will collapse. Will the expected ensuing chaos create a convenient opportunity for annexationists who dream of taking over the most attractive and largest part of the Palestinian Authority? In the summer of 2020, Netanyahu proposed annexing the Jordan Valley – Area C. In addition to warnings about the reaction of the Arab countries, especially partners in the Abraham Accords and Jordan, it is important to understand that such a step would set off a severe chain reaction in the Western world. This is not only the traditional position of the US and the European Union, which support the formula of two states for two peoples and oppose unilateral measures by Israel that may harm a future solution.

Any Israeli annexation in West Bank will invariably be compared to Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian land, encouraging critics of Israel wherever they may be. It is quite clear that the emerging right-wing government will be unable or unwilling to promote any peace solution with the Palestinian Authority. Will Netanyahu be able to prevent deterioration and withstand his partners’ determination to fulfill their promises to the voters and promote annexation, deportation, demolition of houses and legalization of illegal outposts? Netanyahu undoubtedly knows that in order to maintain good and open relations with the US and Europe, Israel must avoid extremist policies toward the Palestinians. The West is ready to accept the status quo, but will not hesitate to respond to developments reminiscent of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Post-election Israel needs a clear, cautious foreign policy. Any future Israeli government must preserve the country’s standing in the international arena and avoid harming the good relations with its friends in the democratic world.

The op-ed was published in November 2022 in JPost.

הפוסט Israel must not let election results undermine foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was impossible to miss the positive and optimistic coverage of Netanyahu, and it brought to mind similar coverage of President Donald Trump’s campaign and victory in 2016. When the Kremlin looks at Netanyahu, it sees a friend with whom Moscow can find a common language.

This sentiment was perfectly expressed in a recent Telegram post by Alexei Naumov, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council: “The return of Benjamin Netanyahu to the PM’s office in Israel is good news for Moscow, and the point here is absolutely not whether he is ‘Putin’s friend’ or not. He is a friend of the Russian vision of the world.”

Naumov explains that Russia prefers countries that mind their own business, not “the interests of mankind,” preferring “the Erdogans, Trumps and Netanyahus” of the world over the “difficult” Bidens and Johnsons. The Kremlin is pleased that Netanyahu will most likely “take care of Israel’s security interests” but be “absolutely numb to the ideology of the future of the human race.”

Naumov’s assessment is correct, but also troubling. For the past eight months, Netanyahu has been extremely quiet about the ongoing war in Ukraine. He has never called the war a war, and didn’t make any reference to the invasion at all until very recently.

During a late October interview with MSNBC, Netanyahu placed his support behind the “prudent” policies of the Bennett-Lapid governments regarding Ukraine, and added that weapons supplied by Israel in the past to foreign governments “in one battlefield end up in Iranian hands used against us.” Officially, Israel refrains from supplying weapons to Ukraine, fearing Russian retaliation in Syria or on other fronts.

Soon after this interview, Netanyahu told USA Today that he would “look into the possibility of supplying weapons to Ukraine” if he were to return to the prime minister’s office. “We all have sympathy for Ukraine,” he added. “It’s not even a question, and I’m no different.”

The Russians, who previously had been fast to condemn and threaten Israel over every rumor about possible weapon supply to Ukraine, surprisingly didn’t make any reference to Netanyahu’s campaign promises in their post-election coverage. Perhaps they believe that they know him well, and that it would be significantly easier for Moscow to find a common language with a man who wrote in his recent memoir that “Putin is smart and insightful and completely focused on one goal as a politician: to restore Russia to its historical greatness,” than with the alternatives.

Indeed, Netanyahu might soon find himself under a Russian “friendly offensive”: he might get a call from Putin to congratulate him on his victory, or receive a suggestion from the Kremlin to host a visit of a Russian diplomat or politician to Israel.

Just a year ago, Netanyahu — who used a photo with Putin in a 2019 campaign poster — would probably have been delighted. But these days, when any coziness with the Russian leader is considered toxic in the West, he might feel differently.

In March, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett tried his luck mediating between Moscow and Kyiv. Lacking any powerful tools or personal connections, Bennett was unsuccessful in his stint as peace broker, and quietly put an end to this saga.

Netanyahu might want to explore this direction, too, in order to maintain his ties to both sides without risking American ire, as well as to promote his image of a seasoned and respected international politician.

It’s unclear how this kind of initiative will be perceived in Washington, and how Netanyahu will be able to explain his friendly ties with a Moscow that gets closer each day to Tehran.

Logic suggests that, as U.S. intelligence indicates that Russia might repay the Iranians by assisting their nuclear program, any Israeli leader would draw a clear red line. All the more so Netanyahu, who has long campaigned to stop a nuclear Iran.

But it remains to be seen what policies Netanyahu will wage on Russia, Ukraine and Iran. How he will maneuver Israel’s essential relations with the U.S. and ties with his old friend Vladimir Putin is very much an open question.

As of today, in Russia, it’s obvious that Moscow is currently optimistic about Netanyahu’s victory. It never made a secret about its view of his political adversary, Prime Minister Yair Lapid. Now, the Kremlin believes it has a much friendlier leader with whom to work.

Moscow will probably make a move to test the waters the moment Netanyahu forms a government and starts his term. However, in our new, post-Feb. 24 invasion reality, it might also find out that the tide is turning, and that warmness with Israel is a thing of the past.

One can only hope.

This article is posted in “Foward” from November 8, 2022

הפוסט What Netanyahu’s win in the Israeli elections means for the war in Ukraine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Who is this man and why did he, from among all Israeli politicians, define and shape Israel for the past generation? Today, at the age of 72, after countless embarrassing political combinations, broken promises to his supporters, three criminal cases, quarrels with US Presidents Clinton and Obama, and a flirtation with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Netanyahu is considered the most seasoned and charismatic politician. He enjoys the highest percentage of support in the Israeli public of any candidate, when asked who is the most qualified for the position of prime minister. One can feel various emotions toward Netanyahu, but it’s hardly possible to ignore him. Even when his competitors talk about themselves and their ideology and goals, they often end up talking about Netanyahu.

Not only in Israel but also abroad, attitudes toward Netanyahu are polarizing—you either love him or hate him. His supporters believe that he is irreplaceable in somewhat messianic terms. In practice, they credit him and his policies for the country’s dramatic economic growth during his years in office since 2009. They respect his ability to avoid dangerous concessions and yet achieve a breakthrough with several Arab countries in the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, his opponents warn of the great danger inherent in his ambitions (and his efforts to shed off his legal problems) and do not shy away from using the harshest terms in describing him as not trustworthy, sneaky, cheap, and egoistical. They hint heavily that he has come under the influence or control of his wife and son.

Thus, in public, he is either greeted with chants of “Bibi—King of Israel” or with bitter “Don’t come back” banners placed on the roadsides. Some of his own supporters may occasionally promise themselves to wean the Likud off its dependence on Bibi. And yet, despite the curses and disappointments, his support base crowns him time and again as their absolute leader. His grip on his party is as firm as ever.

The Leader of the Jews

Netanyahu leads the second generation of right-wing politicians since the founding of the state in 1948 (Ze’ev Jabotinsky led the right in the pre-state era). The first-generation leaders were Prime Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, both of whom were active in pre-state underground organizations who fought the British. They were known to live modest lifestyles and adhere to conservatism in politics and personal life.

Netanyahu, who became the head of the opposition for the first time in 1992, was their antithesis. He grew up in the United States, after his father—Benzion Netanyahu, an historian of Jewish life in Europe—left the country, unable to advance his academic career due to his revisionist views. Benjamin Netanyahu or Ben Nitay, as he called himself during his years in the US, served—alongside his two brothers—in the prestigious General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal), but the aura of heroism and sacrifice that he gained stemmed from being the brother of Yonatan Netanyahu who fell while commanding the Entebbe rescue operation in 1976.

Netanyahu loved the US and built a life there, focusing on a career in business and with an MBA from MIT (making him the Israeli prime minister with the highest level of formal education). He also got involved with the Institute for the Study of Terrorism named after his brother and thus got to know senior Israelis and developed close ties with them. The transition to a new career as an Israeli diplomat was sharp and quick. In 1984, paradoxically, it was Prime Minister Shimon Peres who appointed Netanyahu to serve as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, to the dismay of the Likud leader, Yitzhak Shamir, who called Netanyahu an “angel of destruction.” This nickname stuck with Netanyahu, and many of his political enemies still use it today when they come to imply that in politics, Netanyahu ruins everything that he touches.

The Likud’s young generation of “princes” (sons of the party founders) were also not enthusiastic about Netanyahu either—he was too American, he relied on American advisers, and according to many of them (none of whom is currently in the Likud’s Knesset list), his style was more suited to the US. It turns out that the American style and advisers were exactly what the Israeli right needed.

The millionaire from Caesarea, the owner of luxury real estate who went to one of best US schools and endorsed a firmly entrenched free market philosophy, became the idol of the people living in the small towns of Israel’s periphery who suffered from discrimination and the lack of good work opportunities. They had been the key voting force behind the right-wing revolution in 1977 that brought the Likud to power. The man whose way of life is distinctly secular had whispered in a conversation with an influential religious mystic (Rav Kaduri) the iconic phrase—“They [the Left] forgot what it is to be Jewish” and implied that Israelis who believe in the partition of the land are not Jews at all. Later, in the aggressive campaign he would lead against civil society organizations, much of the media, and the left-wing parties in 2015, he would define their activities as “anti-Jewish.”

L’Etat, C’est Moi

Bibi’s articulation of “Jews against a hostile world”—which gained credence among many in Israel after the horrifying violence of the Second Intifada in the years 2000–2005, destroying the political base of the left-wing parties—helped him shape Israel during his years in power. He had friends among fellow conservative leaders in the West—Stephen Harper in Canada, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and others—but he retained his belief that even the US, Israel’s greatest friend, is capable of abandoning the Jews to their fate, hence his willingness to openly challenge President Obama over the Iran nuclear deal. When he developed close ties with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, despite the American sanctions against Russia following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, he justified it as “good for the Jews.” Russia controlled (and still controls) the airspace over Syria, which Israel uses to attack Iranian forces planning attacks against Israel. His ties with figures on the European extreme right, such as Victor Orban in Hungary, gave leverage to the pro-Israel elements in Europe and weakened the critics of Israel: again, in his eyes, it was good for the Jews, even when many Jews in Europe and the US begged to disagree.

Netanyahu’s growing attention to foreign policy in his later years in office led to a personal brand of diplomacy (while chopping away at the functions of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he saw as rife with critics of his policies). He built a new relationship with Greece (even when it was led by the left) and Cyprus. He struck a significant personal bond with Prime Ministers Narendra Modi of India and the late Shinzo Abe of Japan and renewed Israel’s involvement in African affairs. His crowning achievement in foreign affairs was the promulgation of the Abraham Accords. This new diplomatic momentum further enhanced his sense that his personal presence at the helm has become vital for the national interest.

As time went by, indeed, it seemed that what was “good for Netanyahu” became (in his and his family’s eyes) a central part of what is “good for the Jews.” A talented and gifted man, well-read and broad-minded, he began to identify himself more and more with Israel. In 2017 he claimed that his investigations were driven by the “left” in an attempt to launch a “judicial coup” against the will of the voters and despite the impressive state of Israel’s foreign relations and economic success. According to Netanyahu, his opponents as well as Israelis who chose to protest against him were probably on the “payroll of the New Israel Fund,” and every critic, even one with the most impressive military record, became a “stooge of the Arabs, Iran and the left.”

Soon the media that accused him of corruption, and the justice system that wanted to investigate and then pressed charges, became personal arch-enemies, and even the subversive enemies of his state.

Gradually, his sense of being persecuted intensified, as Mazal Mualem, an Israeli journalist wrote in her book Cracking the Netanyahu Code. So did his desire to restructure and adapt the media, the judiciary, and the political systems to his needs. Many biographers of Netanyahu believe that the turning point came in 2016, when he appointed himself minister of communications, maintained close ties to the key media moguls, and, according to their testimonies, personally interfered when negative items were published about him, his wife, or his son. As the judicial system kept investigating his dealings with his billionaire friends, whose gifts seemed to cross the thin line into graft, every person involved in the proceedings—the general commissioner of the Police, the attorney general, the state prosecutor, and the judges—all became targets of campaigns of incitement led from the prime minister’s residence on Balfour Street. Could it be that Netanyahu, who used to be an energetic and dynamic minister of finance, now avoided promoting necessary but difficult reforms and refrained from significant changes in the political, economic or social spheres, because he was too busy with political survival and wars with the media and the justice system? It might be just another one of Netanyahu’s paradoxes. Another one is his attitude toward Israel’s Arab minority—which he warned against during political campaigns while taking pride in having initiated a massive program of public sector investment in Israeli Arab towns and neighborhoods.

Today, his base is united behind him. But many other Israelis are flying banners against him from the bridges and overpasses. They fear that in another twist of the endless elections saga and in an attempt to escape a criminal verdict that might end his otherwise spectacular political career, Netanyahu will continue his brutal war against the media and the judiciary, form a government with the most extreme and xenophobic elements in the far right, and carry forward Israel’s “Orbanization” process following the Hungarian model. At the same time, the other part of the Israeli polarized public apparently believes that Israel could collapse if Netanyahu does not return to power, and that the Lapid–Ganz government, that lasted for just one year, was the least competent in the history of Israel.

Many in Israel attribute the country’s ongoing political polarization to this man who has ruled the government for nearly 15 years, already longer than the founding father, David Ben-Gurion. Others will conclude that this attribution is an attempt by Netanyahu’s opponents to suppress popular support for him, out of their elitist disdain toward his voters. All other issues—the worsening security situation in the West Bank, the gas deal with Lebanon, the high cost of living, the war in Ukraine—are currently woven into this lasting political moment of Benjamin Netanyahu and his ability to shape Israel’s discourse and its politics. For now it seems that Netanyahu is not going anywhere, even if he will lose (again) the ability to build a rightwing majority after elections. And even if at some point he will be removed from the Likud leadership, his influence will continue for many years to come.

The op-ed was published in November 2022 in Jerusalem Strategic Tribune.

הפוסט The Paradox of Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For many Israelis—Jewish and Arab—the last 18 months have been a rollercoaster ride with the lows of unprecedented friction, including the violent events of May 2021, and the highs of unparalleled integration, as modeled by a new political experiment. Ra’am—”The United Arab List” which represents the southern Islamic movement in Israel—became the first Arab political party to ever sit in a ruling coalition in Israel and was thus at the heart of the experiment. This reality gained approval from some parts of the Jewish public and opposition from others.

When anticipating how this past year and a half will impact the Arab population’s political participation in the coming months, it is important to keep three factors in mind. First, while the Ra’am experiment has been successful and Party Chairman Dr. Mansour Abbas has  defied the old taboo by joining the political fray rather than sitting on the fence—as has been typical of Arab politics for decades—his victories are far from astounding. The measures he put in place against crime and violence, along with the budgetary increases he obtained for the Arab society are considered by many to be quite modest.

Secondly, while many favored Abbas’s historic move into politics, some still find it difficult to support Ra’am’s traditionalist and religious flavor. And as a result of the bitter, internecine struggle among Arab political parties resulting in the dismantling of the Joint List in September, there are few attractive alternatives for the Arab public. Indeed, of the political parties that survived the Joint List’s split—namely, Hadash-Ta`al and Balad—none are seen as capable of providing solutions to the Arab population’s troubles.

Finally, no Zionist political party has placed an Arab candidate in any realistic slot on its list—a reality that many Arabs view as a clear sign that Jewish leadership is unwilling to honestly accept Arabs in political society. This aversion comes even after some Arab leaders have made dramatic political moves, including Mansour Abbas’s landmark declaration of his willingness to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Indeed, several right-wing Jewish figures continue to call for a rejection of cooperation with Arab parties currently in parliament, including Ra’am, along with future restraints on their activities.

Given these factors, there is a growing sense in Arab society that to continue to play in Israel’s political sandbox is pointless, especially when the Arab population’s capacity to make an impact is fundamentally limited. Recent public opinion polls indicate that the voting rate of Arabs in the coming election can be expected to hover around 40 percent or less. This expected participation rate is even lower than the 45 percent who participated in the 2021 parliamentary election, which itself was the lowest rate since the establishment of the state. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Arab representation in the Knesset that now accounts for ten of the parliament’s 120 seats—six held by the Joint List and four by Ra’am—will shrink, and that one of the parties—most likely Balad—will fail to cross the electoral threshold.

Arab Society in a Multidimensional Crisis

The emerging political crisis is developing at a time when Arab society in Israel is experiencing a multitude of troubles, manifested most acutely in the younger generation, which suffers from a double estrangement vis-à-vis the state and vis-à-vis political and social authority in Arab society.

About one-third of Arab youth aged 18 to 24 neither work nor study, making them easy prey for recruitment into organized crime or anti-establishment movements, such as the violent events of May 2021. In the last few years, some 40 percent of minors tried in court country-wide have been Arabs, and at 33 percent, they are overrepresented in criminal cases. Some 28 percent of adolescents have admitted to carrying guns on school grounds.

At the same time, however, these younger generations appear to be trying to intensify their integration into Israeli society and the state establishment. Like other members of “Gen Z” throughout the world, Arab youth in Israel feel alienated from politics, tired of ideologies, and eager for personal growth and self-actualization through education, careers, and material achievements. Ample evidence of this growth can be found in Israel’s healthcare system: almost half of all pharmacists and 17 percent of physicians in Israel are now Arabs, up from only 7 percent in 1990.

This ambition in the younger generation is especially reflected among Arab women, whose status in society is rising in a type of silent revolution. The number of women studying at the post-secondary level is rapidly growing, and women now represent almost 66 percent of Arab students at colleges and universities. They are also more involved in the public sector and are entering the general workforce in large numbers. For example, Arab women constitute about one-third of all women working at Haifa’s Technion, a leading global institution comparable to MIT. This is a significant per capita overrepresentation, as Arab citizens only constitute about 17 percent of Israel’s population. In tandem with increased female participation in the workforce, fertility rates are dropping and the age of marriage is rising.  In stark contrast, 58 percent of Arab men have no matriculation certificate, and only 18 percent are university students, compared with 39 percent of Arab women and 48 percent of Jews.

While the young Arab generation despairs of the political system, it simultaneously seeks to assimilate in other areas of society—namely the economy, media, academia, and culture–albeit without blurring its national identity. Indeed, it appears that Arab youth are attempting to frame their identity in a way that will not hinder integration. Over time, this identity has become uniquely hybrid, influenced heavily by context and the geopolitical situation and thus based on four different components: ethnicity (Arab), religion (Muslim for 85% of Arab citizens), citizenship (Israeli), and nationality (Palestinian).

Unlike most of the Jewish population, young Arabs don’t see a conflict between being Israeli citizens and having a sense of national belonging and identification with the Palestinian people. Still, this acceptance is a profoundly challenging effort and it is always difficult to find the golden means by which Arabs can integrate into society and state while maintaining a collective identity, especially when they are so politically limited.

Approaching a Historic Crossroads

The low rate of Arab participation in Israeli politics is already at odds with the clear willingness of Arabs, or at least Arab youths, to pursue integration. A further reduction of their representation in the Knesset—which now seems to be on the horizon—would make things even worse for both Arabs and Jews. In such a situation, mutual alienation between the communities can only increase, adding to the ongoing tensions that have built since the events of May 2021 in what Jews and Arabs alike refer to as “an unfinished story.”

Growing alienation is liable to strengthen the extremists and separatists on the fringes of Arab society and could even lead over time to violent clashes worse than those of 2021. More specifically, if the coming election ends with a sense that the gate has slammed shut on Arabs, there will inevitably be a profound crisis of expectations within the Arab population and Arab youth in particular, especially since Arabs have more recently had the feeling that their assimilation into Israeli politics and society had improved.

On the eve of Israel’s election, Jews and Arabs must both acknowledge that they are on the foot of a volcano—one that is ready to erupt at any moment and test the nation’s resilience no less than external challenges. Navigating the situation requires mutual understanding and flexibility: the Israeli state and Jewish citizens will have to open the political doors wide, honestly welcoming Arab citizens at all levels, purging manifestations of discrimination, addressing the underlying causes behind youth issues such as  crime, and examining new options for identity expression. For their part, the Arab public and its political leaders will have to accept the state and its current players as citizens with equal rights. They will also have to shelve the persistent demand of a foundational state change from the “Jewish and Democratic State”—Medina Demokratit Ve-Yehudit—set out in the country’s Declaration of Independence to a “state of all its citizens”—Medinat kol Ezracheha—as proposed by the Joint List. Thus far, that struggle has only entrenched the mutual alienation between Arabs and Jews.

For the sake of the future, it is vital for both societies to engage in a deep, long-overdue discourse—the likes of which have been missing since 1948—about the status of Arab citizens in Israel. Such discourse must clearly define Arab citizens’ connection to the state, enumerating their rights and obligations. As it stands, the current state of affairs is unclear and incredibly fragile, and it cannot last. Jews and Arabs must both recognize the historic crossroads at which Israel finds itself. They can either choose a path of descent into past mistakes and dangerous alienation, or they can opt to collectively stride a new route—one which is not free of its own pitfalls, but can still lead to a more stable, mutually beneficial future.

The op-ed was publishes in October 2022 in Washington Institute.

הפוסט At the Edge of the Precipice: Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel on the Eve of the 2022 Parliamentary Election הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As Sino-American relations become more contentious, Israel has been quickly drawn into the crossfire given its close association with the US. Still, Israel’s technological exports to China and the challenges they pose for the US are not new. In the mid-1990s, for example, the Israeli government sought to sell China several Phalcon Airborne Early Warning (AEW) systems for an estimated $1 billion (NIS 3.5 b.). Under massive pressure from the White House and Congress, Israel eventually canceled the deal and had to pay back the $200 million (NIS 705.6 m.) down payment to the Chinese government, as well as $150 million (NIS 529 m.) in compensation.

Over the past decade, the American administration has become exceedingly apprehensive about China’s legal, as well as illicit efforts to boost its technological competency, and challenge the US’ advantage in innovative research and development (R&D). Beijing was frequently accused of engaging in extensive cyber campaigns designed to steal sensitive data concerning novel military technology from American governmental agencies, as well as private defense contractors.

FBI Director Christopher Wray publicly asserted in July 2020 that “The greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and our economic vitality is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our economic security and by extension, to our national security.” This harsh rhetoric is reminiscent of the Cold War era and it implies there is an all-consuming Sino-American great power competition that does not allow US allies to flirt with adversaries even in the ostensibly innocuous economic realm, let alone when it comes to advanced technology with military applications.

THE TENSE technological China-Israel-US triangle is further complicated by American worries regarding the efforts of Chinese companies to gain access to and possibly ownership over Israeli critical infrastructure, including ports, railways and highways as part of Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative. In August 2021, for example, director of the CIA William Burns expressed his concerns regarding Chinese investments in Israel during a meeting with then-prime minister Naftali Bennett. A senior State Department official told the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, “We know our partners and allies in the Middle East have trade relations with China and that’s OK… but we made it clear that there is a certain kind of cooperation with China we cannot live with.”

According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, China became Israel’s largest source of imports in 2021, topping the US, and Israel’s largest trade deficit was also with China, totaling $6.6 billion (NIS 23.3 b.). Given the clear imbalance, from the Israeli perspective expanding trade relations with China makes sense and it is all about the promise of a massive and lucrative market for Israel’s burgeoning tech industry.

From the American administration’s standpoint, however, the problem revolves around military technology and dual-use technology that can serve both civilian and military functions. Israel’s role in China’s economic and military rise in support of Beijing’s regional or global aspirations, albeit considerably modest as well as indirect, is something with which the US is growingly uncomfortable.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, David Ben-Gurion had to make a difficult decision about Israel’s global orientation and choose between East and West despite previous efforts to remain non-aligned. Israeli leaders are about to face a similar pivotal moment, although this time the dilemma is less severe. The US-Israel special relationship and the diplomatic, military and economic reliance on the Americans do not lend any meaningful support to a keep-all-options-open Israeli approach.

As Sino-American relations continuously worsen, the fork in the road moment is fast approaching, and Israeli policymakers must be prepared and willing to take the right path. Ben-Gurion chose the West over the East, the US over the Soviet Union. There are short-term benefits to selling technology to China or allowing it to build or own parts of Israel’s critical infrastructure.

There may be a way to tactically come to an understanding with the American administration regarding certain aspects of the China-Israel relationship. In the long-term, however, Israel’s future is with the US and maintaining the bilateral special relationship is of the utmost strategic importance.

This article is from “JPost“, from October 7, 2022

הפוסט Israel remains caught between China and the United States- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index of 2022 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Jewish Agency – or “Sochnut”  in Hebrew – has been very active throughout Russia (and the former Soviet Union) since the late 1980s. Allowing the Agency to operate openly was a seismic development. Where Jews had been sentenced to harsh prison sentences just years earlier for the crime of practicing their religion or requesting a visa to emigrate, they were now free to openly “be,” and were, furthermore, assisted by a foreign-based agency.

In the final years of the USSR, the Agency’s primary role was to assist Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel and, equally importantly, participating in the rebuilding of Jewish life in the country. The damage wreaked upon the population of approximately three million Jews in Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics resulting from extreme and unceasing persecution and repression was enormous.

The immediate post-Soviet era allowed a Jewish renaissance to flourish in the Russian Federation. Jewish religious and lay leaders felt secure and took great pride in the vibrant community they had revived after decades of fear, and the extremely punitive state-sponsored antisemitism of the Soviet era.

On July 5, 2022, everything changed.

But the reality is that what seemed to happen so suddenly had been building for many years, reflected in the steadfast focus of domestic security services on the Jewish Agency.

I. THE JULY 5 CRISIS: MOSCOW THREATENS TO CLOSE THE JEWISH AGENCY IN RUSSIA

Upon hearing the news of a threatened closure, Agency representatives in Israel and Russia attempted a calming spin, saying that the story was blown out of proportion; that the issue was procedural, not political or diplomatic. It would pass.

On July 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin returned to Moscow from a tripartite summit in Tehran which also included Turkey. That same day, the Agency was notified that a court hearing would be held – on July 28 – at which the Ministry of Justice would demand that the Agency cease operations in Russia.

Israel immediately attempted to send a delegation of legal experts to negotiate with Russia and defuse the situation before it became a full-blown crisis.

Forebodingly, Moscow denied the Israeli officials entry visas until 36 hours before the commencement of the trial. In Jerusalem this development was seen as a clear signal of Russia’s intention to escalate the conflict.

The “official” reason provided for this drastic action was an allegation that the Jewish Agency had breached Russian law by collecting and maintaining a database with sensitive information about Russian citizens. This represented a breach of the privacy rights of Russian citizens by a foreign agent.

The Russians were clearly turning up the heat.

II. THE PROFOUND IMPACT OF THE “SOCHNUT” ON JEWISH LIFE IN RUSSIA

As Russia sprinted from a command economy to a market one in a flash, the resulting social and economic upheaval was severe and intense. Into this breach stepped numerous enterprising Jewish organizations and individuals. All were focused on reviving Jewish life that had, for more than 70 years, been dormant, unless “underground.”

The common, critical and central element of domestic Russian Jewish organizations was that they were invested – fully – in the continuation and flourishing of Jewish life in the country. The Jewish Agency, however, had a mandate to assist and counsel any Jewish Russians wishing to emigrate to Israel. It was always in a special, suspect category.

A little known fact is that in 1996, Russian authorities threatened to close the Jewish Agency, alleging that it was engaged in illegal activity, acting as a “foreign agent.”

We know now that the fuss then had nothing to do with Agency activity and everything to do with a valuable patch of property in Jerusalem that Moscow claimed as its own. The matter was resolved eight years later to Russia’s satisfaction, but the warning shot certainly grabbed Israel’s attention.

III. THE QUIET UNEASE OF 1996-2022

Vladislav Roytblat, who was a representative of The Joint Distribution Center in the Russian Federation from 2014-2019, recalled the uncertainty of this time in a recent conversation with State of Tel Aviv. He is certain that the Jewish Agency was singled out for “special treatment,” unlike the Joint and other foreign Jewish organizations that operated in Russia at the time.

Roytblat recalled a number of unusual occurrences during his tenure in Russia. Once, for example, a Jewish Agency representative in Omsk, Siberia was questioned by several representatives from the FSB. They were asking about why a formerly high-ranking IDF official was serving with the Agency in Russia in a senior role.

Roytblat felt that the Jewish Agency in the Russian Federation was being harassed systematically. There were many incidents – like the one in Omsk – often involving educational camps. Sudden, inexplicable problems arose – often last-minute – with procuring rental accommodations suitable for their events, for example. It was clear that the FSB was watching Agency activities carefully and they wanted everyone to know.

Whereas the Jewish Agency was an ongoing concern for the FSB, if other Jewish organizations were perceived to be “too active” in promoting immigration or educational programs in Israel, they encountered similar challenges.

Alexander Shlimak, director of the Moscow branch of Hillel from 2009-2015, recalls a day when FSB officers stopped by his office. They knew every single detail about Hillel’s operations, he said, which was very disconcerting.

“We were preparing a major Hillel event at that time, and they demanded that we present them with a list of participants’ names. Their ostensible reason for this intrusive request was “security,” but Shlimak did not believe that. “They already knew everything about it,” he explained when speaking with State of Tel Aviv.

They just wanted the Jews to know that they were being surveilled. Perhaps, even when the state seemed to be relaxed about the Russian Jewish renaissance, they really were not.

IV. THE PUTIN FACTOR: A HELP OR THE PROBLEM?

Just as in the Soviet days, the state security services continued to keep an eye on the activity of Jewish religious and community organizations, especially those with strong ties to the State of Israel. And it seems that the time has now come for this trove of information to be deployed, once again, against the Jewish Agency, Israel and, possibly, Russian Jews.

In spite of the close scrutiny, until recently, most Russian Jews and Jewish organizations did not experience overt problems or pressure. Many believed that the special connection between President Putin and the Jews, based on his childhood and youth experiences and memories, would protect them.

Over time, Putin’s regime has become significantly more authoritarian and repressive. Particularly since the massive and frequent protests at Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square between 2011-2013, the authorities have been especially harsh with civil society organizations, with particular wrath targeting human rights groups.

Some organizations were forced to close, some were prosecuted on various fabricated charges, and some were designated as foreign agents. With the annexation of Crimea and hostilities with Ukraine in 2014, the crackdown on civil society intensified. Even the most tenacious groups were forced to submit to the creeping authoritarianism; realizing that the court system just rubber-stamped predetermined outcomes.

Eventually, the state turned its sights to the Jewish Agency. Beginning in 2019, the pressure began to build, yet again.

Semyon Dovzhik, a former Sochnut press secretary in the Russian language, recalls the sudden chill that set in. “There were always some routine checkups,” he said, “but three years ago (2019) the situation changed dramatically. Suddenly there were serious inspections – all documents were checked thoroughly, and sometimes they were confiscated.”

Dovzhik likened the atmosphere and relationship to one of hyper-alertness, with the Agency fearing and understanding that “something might happen at any time… but the only thing that changed was the attitude,” Dovzhik explains. Jewish Agency operations carried on as usual, for the time being.

The current Jewish Agency crisis erupted at a time when relations between Russia and Israel were souring. The pretext for the 2022 attack on the Jewish Agency is that Russia is owed property rights in yet another lucrative Jerusalem property, that the state claims belongs to the Russian Orthodox church.

But that’s just the latest grievance. Russian authorities have been diligently compiling a dossier of alleged Israeli transgressions, including Moscow’s displeasure with certain actions said to have been undertaken by Israel in Syria.

And then, of course, there’s the quite significant issue of Ukraine, as well as the extreme military tension between Israel and Russia over ongoing activity in Syria. (Both issues are considered at length in this superb analysis by Moav Vardi.)

Putin is clearly displeased with Israel and sending very clear signals about what has irked him.

V. WHERE TO FROM HERE

This is a raw power play.

On Friday, August 19, Moscow’s Basmannaya Court deferred its threat to issue a verdict in the case of Russia v. Jewish Agency for another month.

The Court denied the Jewish Agency’s request for an additional two months to gather exculpatory evidence, particularly in light of the extreme consequences and very truncated time for case preparation. In the meantime, in an effort to address the alleged problems regarding its operations, the Agency has agreed to modify certain procedures that would address concerns put forward by the Russian Ministry of Justice.

The judge agreed to a 30-day adjournment of proceedings. It seems that any additional evidence the Agency intends to submit must be presented by September 19. It is also possible that a verdict could be rendered the same day.

Jewish Agency employees in Russia concede that they are “not optimistic” about the eventual outcome of the court case. But they do express hope that during this time some form of rapprochement will be negotiated between Russia and Israel to allow Agency operations to continue.

One thing is very clear. Russian Jews – not only the Jewish Agency – have been put on notice.

After centuries of extreme persecution in Tzarist Russia, and decades under Soviet rule, Russian Jews were beginning to feel “at home” in the “new” Russia. Unlike the Soviet authorities, the new rulers of Russia did not engage in state-sponsored antisemitism, and practicing Judaism or learning Hebrew was not an act of subversion meriting serious gulag or prison time. Quite the opposite – Jewish life was thriving. So much so that Russian Jews were becoming a little too comfortable, in the eyes of some, while the witch-hunt against civil society, the NGO’s and foreign institutions was in full swing.

Many Jewish leaders and organizations maintained a silence with respect to these changes, likely from an ingrained sense of caution.

But that, too, is changing.

Pinchas Goldschmidt, the Chief Rabbi of Moscow since the early 90s, abruptly left Russia in March 2022. In June, when he officially stepped down from his position, his daughter-in-law – journalist Avital Chizhik-Goldschmidt – disclosed publicly that her father-in-law had been pressured by Russian authorities to support its war against Ukraine. He refused to do so.

Speaking to the press recently, Rabbi Goldschmidt described the current situation in Russia darkly, indicating that it was “not the same country” he had moved to 29 years ago.

When the Jewish Agency story broke in early July, Rabbi Goldschmidt issued a chilling statement saying: “What the Jewish Agency didn’t succeed in doing in terms of encouraging the Jewish community to immigrate, the Russian government has [accomplished], with its policies over the past few months with the fighting in Ukraine.”

Many friends in Moscow with whom I have spoken in recent weeks expressed grave concern about the possible closure of the Jewish Agency. Such an event would be dramatic, not just because of its support of potential immigrants, but even more so, because its mere presence has become a powerful symbol of a time when Jews believed they were free and equal in Russia; free to participate fully in life there and at liberty to leave, should they so choose.

Many now fear that the Iron Curtain may well close, once again, and that Russian Jews will be the first victims. For them it is clear that Russia has very deliberately chosen isolation – first from the West – and now also from Israel. The Jewish Agency episode may well be a precursor of things to come.

The potential closure of the Jewish Agency raises fears of reverting to the Soviet era of paranoia and constant suspicion, an obsessive state-sponsored hunt for inner and outer enemies. Should the Jewish Agency become persona non grata in Russia, its Jews may well be forced to reassume their well-rehearsed role as the ultimate “other,” scheming with their “foreign connections” and “foreign influence.”

Just like it used to be during the Soviet era.

This article from “State of Tel Aviv“, from September 2, 2022

הפוסט Russia v. Jewish Agency: behind Putin’s curtain הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On November 1, Yair Lapid will cast his vote at the ballot box in the posh north Tel Aviv neighborhood of Ramat Aviv, hoping for the stars to align just right to allow him to carry on with the job of prime minister (a position he currently holds in a caretaker government). Lapid has waited for this moment for ten years, since entering Israeli politics in 2012, shortly after the massive social protests over the cost of housing in Israel.

Back in 2012 one could hardly imagine that Lapid would one day achieve his proclaimed goal of becoming prime minister. The gap between his media persona—television talk show host, newspaper columnist, author, and songwriter—and the public image of a serious politician seemed too wide. It would have been easier for many Israelis at the time to imagine Lapid taking Hollywood by storm rather than moving into the prime minister’s residence on Balfour Street in Jerusalem. Lapid, however, was determined to make the switch from celebrity to prime minister. He aimed high.

In 2013 Lapid and his party gained 19 mandates, a major surprise, but the government in which he served as minister of finance under Prime Minister Netanyahu was short-lived, and soon he found himself in the barren fields of the opposition for four long years. His support shrunk to 11 seats. The media ridiculed him as an ambitious neophyte “flavor of the season.” Yet Lapid used wisely his time in the opposition, building bases of support on the ground and forming ties with leaders abroad, acting as a shadow minister of foreign affairs at a time when Israel under Netanyahu was growing distant from the Democrats in the US and from major center-left European politicians as well.

During the 20th Knesset, between 2015–2019, when Lapid was a fellow member of the opposition with me (I was a member of the Zionist Union, which led the opposition at the time), partisan divisions in Israel became sharper. It often seemed that the Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister at the time, was unstoppable. Lapid focused his efforts on reinforcing the center of the Israeli political map in every sense of this word. Once in an interview he admitted to be “an extreme centrist” and was dubbed by some as the “Israeli Emanuel Macron.”

Then in May 2021, after four excruciating rounds of elections in three years, Lapid allied with right-wing Naftali Bennett and—with the help of unlikely and improbable partners like right-wing Avigdor Lieberman, Islamist Mansour Abbas, and left-wing Merav Michaeli and Nitzan Horowitz—managed to broker a coalition government, after Netanyahu failed time after time. Lapid had regained former levels of support with 17 mandates. He gave up the premiership to coalition partner Bennett, who held just seven seats. For many Israelis, this was a sign of political maturity, patience, and even altruism—qualities seldom found in politicians across the globe. It was now clear to all that Lapid was not just another momentary blip on the Israeli political scene.

“What Is Israeli to You?”

Before he entered politics in 2012, when he was juggling several gigs—acting in tv commercials, writing columns at Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, and hosting the most popular talk show of the time—Lapid used to pose the same question to each guest who appeared on his show: “What is Israeli to you?” Media critics and commentators used to mock him for this corny survey of the Israeli psyche. Lapid knew better, being the son of journalist-turned-politician and Holocaust survivor Tommy Lapid, who, during the late 1990s, had also created a secular, centrist party, “Shinui” or Change. Years later Lapid the son would integrate what he had learned about Israelis from his father and from his career as a journalist and synthesize it into a political ideology of the “extreme center.” Seeing Israel being torn apart by rival ideologies and political battles, becoming a divided society of warring tribes, he was looking for a centrist promised land that would include secular Israelis across the political spectrum from left to right, promising to take care of the middle class and fight corruption.

Many Israelis, including the writer of these lines, were skeptical that there was such a thing as a political center, a consensus approach to the big problems facing the society from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to housing prices and climate change. Lapid is often criticized for offering superficial, simplistic solutions to complicated issues and problems. He seems to support a two-state solution while insisting on the indivisibility of Jerusalem. He is ready to create a coalition with Israeli Arab parties, including anti-Zionist members of the Joint Arab List, while speaking passionately about the dangers of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement. On one issue, Lapid began his political career as an outspoken extremist—reducing the state subsidies for ultra-Orthodox Jews and including them in the army draft. He was depicted in ultra-Orthodox circles as an outcast and their leaders still argue that joining a Lapid coalition would be impossible. Since his clashes with the ultra-Orthodox in 2013–2014, he has softened his approach to them.

Despite his constant search for the center and avoidance of sharp edges, Lapid is no fan of the status quo. The self-styled “reform government” that he brokered in 2021 made changes in diverse areas from kosher food regulations to foreign relations with Europe. Whether any of these policies will survive the next elections remains to be seen.

The Right Man for the Job?

After ten years in politics, Yair Lapid has matured as a politician and gained respect and appreciation for his persistence, negotiating skills, and humility. For many Israelis, the achievements of his short-lived “reform government” remain controversial. For instance, the right-wing accuses him of bringing in an Islamist Arab party to the ruling coalition and “succumbing to its interests.” Looking toward the November 1 elections, one can be certain of just two things: there will be another election after it (perhaps sooner than later); and Yair Lapid, who made a promise ten years ago not to return to his previous life as a celebrity but to dedicate himself entirely to politics in order to change Israel, will be there, solid as a rock, waiting for his time to come.

This article is from “JSTribune“, from September 2022

הפוסט Yair Lapid- Will He Take Down Netanyahu? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Considering the fact that Israeli voters will go to the polls on November 1 for the fifth time in four years,  one would assume it is inevitable the Iran nuclear deal will play a major role in the public debate between the various candidates in the coming months. While attentive to myriad social and economic issues, Israelis tend to decide whom to vote for based on the national security situation they face.

A public opinion poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) in March 2019 found that although 45% of respondents believed the parties’ positions on social and economic will determine how they vote compared to 28% who argued foreign and security matters will affect which party they will support, 30% said it is the national security situation that would determine the outcomes of the elections.

Similarly, a more recent public opinion poll conducted by the IDI in early August 2022 found that a party’s position on the economic situation and the rising cost of living is currently the most important issue determining voters’ party preferences (44% of the respondents). Only 11% said the party’s platform on foreign policy and security will influence their vote but the survey concluded nonetheless that “if security threats increase, then this issue will return to the top of voters’ agendas.”

Beyond the impact the negotiations between Iran and the major world powers will have on Israeli voting patterns, we should also pay close attention to the policy implications of the current debate in Israel. In the past few days, Prime Minister Yair Lapid was engaged in a public brawl with the leader of the opposition and former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the current government’s response to the negotiations in general, and the American position in particular.

Under such circumstances, Prime Minister Lapid is finding it extremely difficult to deflect Netanyahu’s efforts to politicize this critical issue and present his government’s practical and coherent policy position. Unwilling to be portrayed by Netanyahu as weak, submissive, and complacent, something that can damage his party’s chances in the forthcoming elections, Lapid is politically forced to display a more aggressive and rigid stance that tragically and paradoxically undermines Israel’s long-term national security.

When Netanyahu attempted to block the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal by publically bashing the European and American negotiators at the time, Israel was purposefully left isolated without any direct access to the content of the talks. Moreover, Netanyahu’s speech against the Iran deal and Barack Obama’s policies in the US Congress resulted in a major rift between the two leaders as well as between the Israeli government and the Democratic Party. To his credit, Lapid is fully aware of that precedent and genuinely seeks to address any disagreements with the Biden Administration discreetly.

However, Lapid is still unable to acknowledge publicly that the American return to the Iran nuclear deal is inescapable given the Biden Administration’s desire to focus on a resurgent Russia in Ukraine and a rising China in East Asia. Calls by the head of the Israeli Mossad David Barnea to impose more sanctions or intensify clandestine efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear program are anachronistic since Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal and his “maximum pressure” campaign proved to be exceptionally counterproductive given Tehran was, in fact, able to install advanced centrifuges and enlarge its enriched uranium stockpile. Lapid is also reluctant to admit that having an imperfect agreement that addresses the military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program but not Tehran’s destabilizing policies across the Middle East nor its conventional long-range missile program is far better than having no agreement whatsoever.

This article is from “Times of Israel“, from August 30, 2022

הפוסט On Iran, Yair Lapid is practicing domestic politics הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. The government maintained its policy of managing the conflict with the Palestinians, without setting a political horizon – In an attempt to avoid internal political tensions, the government refrained from promoting a political process with the Palestinians, and adhered to the policy of conflict management. New arrangements vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip yielded a prolonged decline in security tensions. The government chose to use prior coordination with Jordan to contain violence with the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and to bolster security and civilian coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, reflecting a desire to strengthen the PA vis-à-vis Hamas. Relations with the Palestinians were managed by the Ministry of Defense and efforts to link civilian government ministries with their PA counterparts halted. The international community refrained from exerting pressure on the government over its policy on the Palestinian issue. In the absence of a political decision, creeping annexation continued in the West Bank under this government, including the evacuation of Palestinian residents, the expansion of settlement construction and mounting settler violence, which reached new heights and turned into a hot button diplomatic issue.

2. Relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco expanded and deepened, even in light of challenges posed by the Palestinian issue – Israel and the normalization countries – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco – continued to deepen their burgeoning relations, signing a variety of cooperation agreements in the fields of security, trade, health, culture, and more, and overcoming with relative ease various obstacles as well as the challenges posed by the violence in Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. It became increasingly clear that progress in relations between the countries stemmed from the partners’ intrinsic motivations with no need for any prompting or other American political or security incentives. Contrary to previous statements, relations with Morocco have not yet been formally upgraded to the ambassadorial level.

3. Israel was a leading partner in the formulation and institutionalization of a multilateral regional architecture – Israel led and hosted the Negev Summit with the intention of turning it into a permanent regional forum with working groups and the participation of the United States, Egypt, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, with efforts to include Jordan as well. Given the perception of Iran’s actions as a common threat, Israel took part in multilateral security meetings in Egypt and the Gulf, in which Saudi Arabia and Qatar also participated, and promoted a preparatory process to strengthen cooperation with Saudi Arabia under US auspices and with Egyptian involvement.

4. While relations with Egypt improved, the process of restoring trust with Jordan stalled over the issues of Jerusalem and the Palestinians – Israel and Egypt have chosen to increase their cooperation beyond the areas of strategy, security, and energy to the fields of trade and the economy. Egypt served as a key partner in Israel’s diplomatic steps, including promoting regional cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin and the sale of gas to Europe. On the other hand, Israeli efforts to restore relations and trust with the Hashemite Kingdom and to draw it into various regional cooperation measures have not matured, as the violence and Israeli actions in East Jerusalem, on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and other policies towards the Palestinians continued to cloud and damage relations. Cooperation with Jordan did continue in the fields of water, security, and energy, which are perceived in Jordan as a necessary strategic cooperation even in the face of widespread public opposition to relations with Israel.

5. Israel continued to express public opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, but some voices expressed their support for advancing the deal – The Israeli government continued to conduct a dialogue with the Americans on Iran’s nuclear development in an orderly and discrete manner in light of Iran’s progress towards nuclear breakout capability resulting from its withdrawal from the 2015 agreement. While the Prime Minister and his associates expressed vehement public opposition to a return to the nuclear agreement, other voices in the foreign and defense establishment argued that a return to the agreement is the best alternative available, a view they shared with the Americans. Israel worked intensively to prevent a US administration decision to remove the IRGC’s from the list of terrorist organizations, and with the IAEA to exert increasing international pressure on Iran. Israel continued to mount intelligence-based operations against the Iranian nuclear program, slightly shifting its policy of full ambiguity by indirectly taking responsibility for some of these actions.

6. Ties with Europe strengthened in the shadow of the conflict in Ukraine and the marginalization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – The consequences of the war in Ukraine have led Europe and Israel to cooperate in the field of energy and security. Civil cooperation agreements and Israel’s accession to European treaties were promoted. Cooperation in the field of culture was strengthened with the decision to include Israel in the ‘Creative Europe’ program, subject to the exclusion of settlements, and additional agreements were promoted in other civilian areas. Europe has refrained from taking strong and public action against government policy on the Palestinian issue, but has also refrained from promoting the reconvening of the Association Council, despite growing support for the idea from European countries that previously opposed the move. Instead, the outdated 2005 EU-Israel cooperation program was extended for an additional three years.

7. The government maintained its efforts to avoid fully siding with either Russia or Ukraine in the ongoing war, hoping the price to pay would not be too high – Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Israel has refrained from fully and completely supporting Ukraine. At first, Israel tried to make exceptional and conspicuous use of the mediation tool to explain its failure to adopt the Western position towards Russia, and later used Russia’s presence in Syria and Russian Jewry as reasons for the ambiguity of its position. As part of this strategy, Prime Minister Bennett and Foreign Minister Lapid expressed different messages to different audiences around the world and in Israel, with Lapid clearly articulating Israel’s stand alongside Ukraine, and Bennett trying to avoid disrespect toward Russia. Israel sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but failed to provide weapons and defense systems. The Israeli government created obstacles for refugees and migrants from Ukraine, refrained from joining the global sanctions mechanism against Russia, and clashed with Russia in the Ukrainian context only when the latter invoked anti-Semitic arguments.

8. Israel continued to promote relations with Turkey, while taking care to maintain and cultivate relations with Greece and Cyprus – The gradually warming relations with Turkey were further enhanced by President Herzog’s visit to Turkey and a meeting with President Erdogan, reciprocal visits by the foreign ministers of both countries, and close and successful security cooperation in preventing Iranian terrorism against Israelis on Turkish soil. The two sides also decided to renew cooperation in civil aviation. Even in light of the challenges posed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the clashes in Jerusalem during the month of Ramadan, the parties adopted measured and positive rhetoric towards each other. At the same time, Israel held a number of trilateral meetings with Greece and Cyprus at the executive and ministerial levels, as well as bilateral meetings with each, placing an emphasis on security and energy cooperation.

9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) standing in government was enhanced but remained weak in structure and budgets – Minister of Foreign Affairs Lapid’s role as a major political player led the MFA to take a more significant role in shaping and executing Israel’s foreign policy. Coordination was achieved between the Prime Minister’s Office and the MFA regarding their respective purviews and issues, and the presidency was widely used to take an active part in promoting Israel’s foreign policy, due in part to President Herzog’s willingness to effectively utilize his office. At the same time, the structural and budgetary problems of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs persist, and an ongoing labor dispute has not been resolved.

10. The climate crisis has not gained much weight in shaping Israel’s foreign policy – Israel has not adopted significant steps to deal with the climate crisis in the long term through advanced legislation, regulatory changes, or regional and international cooperation. The Israeli government, which pledged serious attention to these issues, has chosen to promote short-term fossil fuel-based energy cooperation (vis-à-vis Egypt, Europe, and even Lebanon) and has even expanded its investment in gas reservoirs in its exclusive economic zone. This fact stands out in light of the scheduled international climate conferences in Egypt this year and in the Emirates in 2023. President Herzog continued to promote the idea of a climate-based regional partnership in his talks with regional leaders and through the climate forum he established.

הפוסט Semi-Annual Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policy January – June 2022 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The entire project will be published on July 12th, 2022. 

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Haifa, and a Board member of Mitvim.

The state of Israel’s democracy
The state of Israel (excluding the occupied West Bank) is a democracy. Leaders are replaced in the polls; the judiciary is independent and there is protection of civil rights. Israel is defined as free with a grade of 76/100 in the 2020 Freedom House index; it received a 33/40 in political rights, and 43/60 in civil liberties. This places it above most states in the international community, and at the medium to low end of the OECD.  At the same time, Israel has ruled the West Bank under “temporary” military control since 1967. Currently, there is no indication that it is moving towards relinquishing control over the region or awarding the local population full citizenship. Many Israelis see this challenge as external to Israel’s body politic, and therefore not a democratic deficit. Others, in Israel and outside of it, argue that since the same government exercises its authority both in Israel and in the West Bank (albeit shared, to an extent, in the West Bank with the Palestinian Authority), the whole region should be analyzed as a single political unit. Seen from this perspective, Israel is no longer a democracy.

The state of Israel’s foreign affairs

Against the background of a challenged democracy, Israel’s stature in the world is probably at its zenith. After decades in which Israel was shunned by a large number of states, by 2021, it had diplomatic relations with 164 states, and is represented abroad by 108 embassies and missions. Israel is also well integrated into the global economy. As of 2018, exports and imports accounted for some 60% of its GDP. Since the late 1960s Israel has been a close ally of the US, the most dominant actor in the international system. Washington provided over the years military, financial, and political support for Israel. Indeed, Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid since the Second World War. The two countries’ close relationship does not include a formal treaty of alliance, but both countries signed dozens of agreements that have institutionalized various aspects of the relationship. Israel further maintains close relationships with major European actors, most notably, Germany.

Despite its close relationship with the US, Israel is effective in maintaining close relations also with America’s current global challengers, China, and Russia. The latter is particularly important, as since 2015, Russian forces have been based in Syria and are serving, in effect, as a potential check on Israeli military activity in the region. Israel also experienced improved foreign relations in its immediate environment. Massive gas discoveries in Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean since 1999, serve as a basis for an Israeli “turn to the sea”. Israel developed a close alliance with the Hellenic states of Greece and Cyprus which includes, among other things, military cooperation, and plans for a joint gas pipe from Israel via Greece to Italy, though the plan’s feasibility remains unclear. Egypt also joined this axis, and indeed led the creation of a new regional organization, the EastMed Gas Forum. This is the first regional organization in which Israel took a leadership founding role. Joint concerns about Iran, the decline in the intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coupled with pressures from Trump’s Washington, led to closer relationship between Israel and Arab actors that traditionally shied away from it. A portion of these relationship came to the public eye with the fall 2020 Abraham accords, in which Israel embarked on diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. This was followed by similar moves with Morocco and Sudan.

Israel’s democratic makeup and its foreign affairs

Although scholars highlight the significance of domestic factors in shaping Israeli foreign policy, It seems that its democratic makeup is not part of this effect. The Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) is generally left outside of the foreign policy process and does not even have a separate committee for foreign relations. Structurally, Israeli foreign policy making is rather centralized and much of it is handled directly by the Prime Minister and his staff. In the broader bureaucracy, core aspects of foreign relations are led by security organs: the Defense Ministry, Israel’s external intelligence agency, the Mossad, the Israel Defense Force, and the National Security Staff. These institutions are less exposed to public scrutiny compared to other elements of the executive. The foreign ministry, an organ that might have been more open to the public, has been marginalized in the foreign policy process. For example, for most of the years, the top diplomatic positions, such as Israel’s ambassadorships in the US and the UN, were political appointees by the Prime Minister and not professional diplomats. Members of Knesset have small staffs, and for many years, did not have an independent ability to assess information, until a small research center was set up to help them. Civil society also has a limited role in foreign policy. There are very few think tanks that challenge government policy, and the matter has rarely attracted public interest in a way that could lead to collective action. There are a few exceptions, such as activists Eli Yosef and Itai Mack that seek greater transparency, public oversight, and limitations on Israel’s largest export industry – arms. Both activists oppose arms sales to governments that oppress their population. To date, however, these efforts had no substantial effect.

The lack of any major effect of Israel’s democratic make-up on its foreign policy is further a result of Israel’s strategic culture and approach. While diplomacy was central to the early Zionist efforts, the reality of a security challenge, meant that diplomacy had become, in the words of scholar Charles Freilich, “an instrument of defense policy”. As such, much of the strategic considerations are realist, based on raw power, rather than a normative outlook. Israel was willing to support whoever assisted it in its defense. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Israel felt especially isolated in the world, it had cooperated with blatantly non-democratic regimes, such as Apartheid South Africa, Pinochet’s Chile, and Argentina under the Junta. Cooperating with these autocracies was justified by another feature of Israel’s foreign policy: its commitment to world Jewry. Argentina and South Africa had sizable Jewish communities, and their governments had a history of antisemitism. The rationale in Jerusalem was, therefore, that closer relations with these governments will allow Israel to better protect local Jews.

Even if one underplays the role of security in shaping foreign policy, Israeli diplomacy was driven by the need to work with whoever was willing to do so. Uri Bialer argued recently that the “supreme goal” of Israel’s foreign policy was to “build a state and secure its existence”. Under these conditions, normative considerations of advancing democracy, or including morality in foreign policy, were marginalized.

Interaction with democratic countries

What is the effect of the interaction with other democracies on Israeli policies? The pre-state Zionist movement and the state it beget have been highly sensitive to the positions taken by its great power democratic allies. This contributed to an Israeli commitment to democracy. In 1953, David Ben Gurion, said that “Israel historically, culturally and spiritually [is] part of the free world.” In the 1950s and 1960s Israel devoted many resources to supporting young African nations in their newly created free states. Yet, by the 1970s this streak of Israeli “norms-based” foreign policy, retreated. In part, as Israelis were disappointed with the behavior of African nations, who swiftly cut diplomatic relations with it under Arab threats and promises between 1967 and 1973. Israel also learned that its foreign relations were affected much more by material capabilities, as opposed to normative preferences. Only once it demonstrated its military prowess after the 1967 war, and in light of Soviet support to its Arab foes, did the US launch into a closer relationship. More recently Israel scored progress with a number of Arab states, based on its military and political power, and its strong posture against Iran. Beyond the internal drive for a democratic procedure, the pattern could also be understood as stemming from external power relations. When the Zionist movement and then Israel were weak, they sought support from the international system. As the international system was led by democratic countries and values, Israel highlighted its commitment to liberal democracy. Once Israel had become stronger, it could rely more on material capabilities to attract allies, and it was its foes — mostly the Palestinians – who needed secure international support and turned to liberal-democratic arguments in doing so.

הפוסט Democracy and Foreign Affairs in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Naqrachi, a Moroccan woman who is president of the Amal Arab Group for the Elimination of Child Marriage (AAGEEM) and of the Nour Foundation for Solidarity with Rural Women (ANSFR), sounded deeply while speaking with The Media Line from Auschwitz.

She arrived in Poland on Wednesday to take part in the annual International March of the Living along with Arab participants from Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and other countries, as part of a delegation that was organized by Sharaka (“Partnership”), an Israeli-Emirati NGO established in 2020 to promote dialogue between Israel and the Arab world.

Almost a hundred Arab youth from Israel also took part in the March of the Living this year.

Until very recently talking about the Holocaust was practically taboo in the Arab-speaking world, where Shoah denial is still common. Sitcoms about the “fake Holocaust” have been hits in Egypt and Gulf countries, hundreds of books that denied the Nazi genocide were and still are sold in bookshops across the Arab world. In 2009, a quarter of Israeli Arab citizens denied the Holocaust, according to a survey carried out by the University of Haifa.

A quick search on Twitter and Facebook yields many thousands of results that link to Holocaust denial articles and many angry posts claiming that the extermination of six million Jews is not more than “another Jewish hoax, meant to extort the world.” Activists who tried to teach the Holocaust and organize visits of Palestinians and Israeli Arab citizens to Nazi death camps were condemned.

In March 2014, Professor Muhammad Dajani of Al-Quds University took a group of 27 students to Auschwitz. Upon their return Dajani was labeled a “collaborator” by Palestinian media and activists.

The situation appears to have changed in recent years, especially following the signing of the Abraham Accords normalization agreements.

Exploring the Holocaust in the Gulf

A year ago, a permanent Holocaust memorial exhibition, the first of its kind in the Arab world, opened in Dubai. The “We Remember” exhibition at the Crossroads of Civilizations Museum includes testimonies of survivors and photos and objects from that time.

This year Ahmed Obeid AlMansoori, the man who founded the exhibit and the museum, led a historic delegation from the United Arab Emirates in the March of the Living, along with Eitan Neishlos, the newly appointed ambassador of the International March of the Living in the Gulf states.

International Holocaust Remembrance Day this year was marked in many cities across the Arab world – from Manama to Abu Dhabi to Rabat. The US embassy in Cairo cosponsored the city’s first-ever official Holocaust commemoration.

In 2020, Muhammad al-Issa, the secretary-general of the World Muslim League, led a delegation to Auschwitz composed of Muslim religious leaders who repeated the words “Never again” and performed a prayer for the six million Jewish victims.

“I believe that there is a gradual change, the rhetoric of the Abraham Accords. To many in the region the whole story today looks different, no more sharp dichotomy between Jews and Arabs, Shia and Sunni, but rather a win-win situation,” Dr. Nir Boms, a research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, and the coordinator of the TAU

Workshop on Israel and the Middle East and the Hiwar Forum for Intra-Regional Dialogue, told The Media Line.

“We are here in Poland, surrounded by three million Ukrainian refugees who can be seen everywhere. It is another powerful reminder of why we are here,” Boms continued.

“We are all acute observers of our own history. Our region has seen much hate and lives were taken and are being taken easily still. It is up to us to bring some understanding and tolerance as an alternative. This message is our lesson from the March of the Living. It is the most important legacy we can carry from here,” he said.

The Arab sector in Israel: Holocaust education and empathy are key

Despite the impressive representation of Arab youth from Israel at the March of the Living, Colette Avital, chairperson of the Center Organizations of Holocaust Survivors in Israel umbrella organization, a Holocaust survivor and a former Israel Knesset member, believes that for now there is no significant change in studying and understanding the Holocaust in the Arab sector in Israel.

“I know that there are many initiatives abroad. Project Aladdin is doing a great job [countering Holocaust denial] in the wider Middle East. But here in Israel, it’s tough,” she told The Media Line.

“And the problem is certainly not only among Israeli Arab citizens who don’t stand in silence during the siren [on Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day]. Many people have different reasons why not to stand up. Some say that it’s merely an Ashkenazi issue, that it doesn’t concern them and unfortunately, for many Arabs, it is still something very foreign,” Avital said.

Jalal Banna, a columnist and an expert on Arab affairs, said the State of Israel doesn’t do enough to promote understanding of the Holocaust among Arabs.

“The Holocaust is a human issue, not only Jewish and certainly not only Israeli. Yet the State of Israel appropriates the issue almost entirely and thereby creates antagonism,” Banna told The Media Line.

“The Arabs in Israel are first exposed to the Holocaust in high school; it is a part of the curriculum. But it is not presented as a significant historical event, one of the cruelest and most awful in history. It seems that those who wrote this curriculum just wanted to be done with it, to check off a box,” he said.

“It also seems that they were afraid to evoke emotion and empathy among the Arab students, fearing that someday –without making comparisons and parallels – these students will also demand some empathy and solidarity with their pain,” Banna said.

The situation in the Palestinian Authority is even worse since the textbooks do not include any mention of the Holocaust. However, in social networks, the word is often used in the context of denial or fake news.

Despite the positive changes taking place in some Arab countries today, Israel, the Yad Vashem memorial and other organizations still have a lot of work to do to explain, show and teach the Holocaust, not far from home, but in Israel, and in the PA.

This article is from “JPost“, from April 28, 2022

הפוסט Holocaust denial still common in the Arab world, but views are changing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli decisions in the face of this dramatic and clear violation of another state’s sovereignty through the use of military force has substantive implications for the way it will be viewed by the international community. Events in Donetsk and Crimea should be viewed as opening maneuvers in a global development. The increasing friction between the liberal camp and its illiberal challengers, chiefly Russia and China will shape the international arena for years to come. The current conflict is a test of the West’s resolve to reaffirm its strong liberal credentials even if it comes at a cost. This camp stood on the side-lines in the face of past aggression with disastrous consequences; now it is clearly expressing its determination to stand up to Russia, with countries like Germany and the UK willing to pay the price.

The current conflict finds Israel’s brand in the liberal world under continued erosion, the product of 12 years of Netanyahu governments’ policies and internal changes. The 2018 Nation-State Law that prioritizes the state’s Jewish identity over its democratic one, the ongoing settlement enterprise, and above all, support for the Trump Administration and its illiberal allies, have undermined Israel’s position among its traditional, liberal allies in the US and Europe. The current crisis finds the liberal camp divided on Israel, pitting the traditional mainstream, i.e., the Biden Administration and European governments, which regard Israel as an important ally despite its drawbacks, against radicals, including parts of the progressive camp in the US and leading human rights organizations that cast doubts on the morality of Israel’s political model. Under these circumstances, clearly siding with the liberal camp is an opportunity for Israel to reaffirm its alliance with its friends in this camp.

The need for an unambiguous stance also stems from Israel’s rise as a regional power with global influence. A state’s ability to integrate values into its policies is a consequence of its position and international status. Israel instinctively feels it does not have the luxury of values-based considerations; as a small state surrounded by enemies it must focus on survival above all. The darkest time in Israel’s foreign relations – the ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1970s – followed its diplomatic isolation in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israel is still small and enemies still surround it, but its global position has dramatically changed from those difficult days. It is now a central axis in the Mediterranean Basin, a leading member of a regional coalition confronting the Iranian threat, and its homemade surveillance technology affects the political reality in countries near and far. Israel, for better or worse, is a global-level actor. The government’s hesitation over its stance on the Russian invasion reflects the fact that unlike in the past, Israel now has the choice, and the obligation, to make a values-based decision.

However, a clear Israeli stance does not require sacrificing its interests on the altar of moral values. It is also the rational choice for long-term thinking.

First, given the common perception of an Israeli-Russian “honeymoon” in Syria, it is important to differentiate between long-term, values-based strategic alliances and ad-hoc interest-based relations. The welcome Israeli-Russian operational coordination in Syria is a temporary asset dependent on shifting short-term interests. It cannot serve as a strategic alternative to a substantive partnership with the US. Given the perceived US withdrawal from our region, it is incumbent upon Israel to ensure the sustainability of American assets for every scenario –continued US support of Mediterranean Basin partnerships, its military presence in Syria and its efforts to enhance the Abraham Accords.

Second, Israel must not be portrayed as the weak link in the liberal camp. We have already seen Russian strategy applying pressure on hesitant actors, for example the Baltic states. Israeli ambivalence could invite such additional pressure. The recent joint Russian-Syrian aerial patrols near the ceasefire line with Israel and the extensive sea and air drill the Russians conducted along the Syrian coast are clear indications of such potential.

When Kissinger said that Israel does not have a foreign policy, only a domestic one, he overlooked one salient truth – all foreign policy ends up shaping domestic policy. The values we choose to project to the world – whether Netanyahu’s policies or the approval of spyware sales to dictators – have substantive repercussions for the values that resonate with the Israeli public and the norms of our conduct. Israel’s stance in this crucial global test is an important domestic statement about our identity, especially in light of the challenges Israel faces both domestically and abroad. Therefore, Israeli decision-makers must not “ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee”.

הפוסט The bells of the liberal world toll for Israel: Why taking a stance against the invasion is both the smart and just move הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The order consolidated after World War II included aspects of power: The economic, technological, and military dominance of the United States and its democratic allies since 1945, and even more so, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. As well, the liberal order included a foundation of democratic values as guidelines for the conduct of international relations, including the protection of human rights, although the US did not always live up the standards it set.

China’s rise and the relative decline of US power are undermining the validity of this order. Furthermore, China is offering the world a successful state model, economically and in confronting the global health crisis, although it is not liberal, nor open like the western states, and its market economy is under government control.

Significant cracks have emerged at the core of the liberal world. The cradle of liberalism, Britain, has cut itself off from the European Union, the most ambitious liberal project of recent decades. Citizens of the US, the leader of this camp, democratically elected president Trump who expressed outspoken reservations about the domestic and international liberal projects, thus exposing the limits of American leadership of the liberal camp.

More deeply, some of the public in the West is expressing doubt about the ability of liberal democracies to deal with key global challenges, such as migration, economic disparities and health crises. Overall, the West failed to act against significant human rights crises, such as the civil war in Syria. Some of the most prominent democratic projects of the 1990s, such as the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa, have lost their moral conviction and shine, swept away in a tide of corruption and dysfunctional governance.

Some of the most ardent activists championing the liberal order in European and American civil society started devoting increasing time and resources to activity considered secondary in importance, not to mention esoteric, such as signage on bathrooms for various gender identifications and politically correct discourse to the point that many lost touch with the substantive global issues facing the international order. William Butler Yeats’ immortal lines are apt in this case: “The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.”

The Ukraine crisis challenges the liberal order in at least two aspects. First, Russian moves, especially as they near a real invasion, are opposed to international norms that ban the declaration of war and the threat of force other than for self-defense, and territorial expansion through the use of force. Second, the very threat of war has bolstered Russia’s standing, for now.

THE UNDERMINING of the prevalent liberal order presents Israel with four issues.

irst, how to preserve the alliance with the US, leader of the liberal world, and at the same time conduct correct relations with the states challenging this order, especially Russia and China? The importance of this balance is heightened given the Russian military presence in Syria and the limitations it imposes on the freedom of action, which Israel reserves for itself in the skies over its north-eastern neighbor.

Additionally, this balance is required given the pressures Washington is exerting on Israel to decrease China’s economic footprint in Israel. The issue becomes even more complex since most Jews live outside Israel, especially in the US. Therefore, maneuvering among all these considerations will require advanced acrobatic skills, diplomatic juggling, and precise and sensitive navigation. This is a significant challenge that requires a strong cadre of experienced diplomats.

Second, Israel might enjoy the relaxation of pressure in the short run regarding its control of a disenfranchised population in the West Bank, but to the extent that this will be the outcome of the West’s decline, Israel could face long-term risks. The weakening of the US could weaken Israel, as well. A sizeable part of Israel’s material and symbolic power stems from its closeness to Washington. A US decline would project onto us, as well. It is hard to see Israel forging a close alliance with Beijing to replace the one with the US.

Third, a world with two competing focal power centers, Beijing and Washington, will be more closed. Israel has benefited from US-led globalization, an overarching process that enabled the flourishing of Israeli high-teach. A divided world will result in shrinking markets and offer fewer global opportunities for Israeli entrepreneurs. What is more, Chinese technological leadership, certainly a reasonable scenario, could challenge the access of Israeli technology experts and entrepreneurs who enjoy easy access to the US market.

Finally, global disagreements also resonate in Israel’s domestic arena. Contrary to the pervasive myth, Israel cannot dwell alone. Global divisions assume domestic dimensions, as well, and Israel’s divergent camps will find inspiration in such international developments. The weakening of liberal forces already echoes the weakness of the Israeli Left and the rise of nationalist right-wing parties in Europe is reminiscent of similar trends here.

A more nationalistic world will inevitably bolster national trends here because Zionism includes a dimension of domestic national Jewish response to external nationalist threats. After all, Polish antisemitism in the 1920s prompted the fourth wave of immigration to Israel and Nazi nationalism generated the fifth wave a decade later. A world in which everyone barricades themselves behind nationalist walls will presumably lead us to do the same.

In the final analysis, the tensions over Ukraine are the tip of a giant iceberg that will affect the most significant aspects of our lives here. It is important to follow developments closely. They are highly troubling and could constitute an initial indication of the type of challenges facing the international order and Israel in the years to come.

**The article was published on JPOST, 22 February 2022

הפוסט What does it mean for Israel to undermine the liberal global order? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Israel renews dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, but declares it will not advance a peace process – Internal government disagreement over the Palestinian issue was reflected in its inconsistent policies; On the one hand, the government designed policies to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and the dialogue with it, but concurrently opposed negotiations that would offer a political horizon and promoted creeping annexation. Ministers from the center-left parties met with Mahmoud Abbas and their Palestinian counterparts to promote and deepen cooperation after years without such meetings. The government successfully implemented measures toimprove Palestinian lives in order to ease international pressure on the Palestinian issue. At the same time, however, creeping annexation, settlement construction, and the eviction of Palestinian families in East Jerusalem continued, and settler violence in the occupied territories set new records.

2. Israel cooperates with Qatar, Egypt and Hamas to rebuild the Gaza Strip and maintain calm – The Israeli government stated its intention to build a new mechanism for managing and rebuilding Gaza, which, among other things, would support an end to the internal Palestinian split, restore the Palestinian Authority to its position in the Gaza Strip, and prevent direct money transfers to Hamas. Within this framework, Foreign Minister Lapid presented an economic plan for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in return for increased security. As part of the newly formulated measures to assist and rebuild Gaza, Qatar transferred funds for humanitarian aid and diesel fuel to the Gaza Strip and provided Hamas with fuel through Egypt, Israel eased restrictions on employment and trade, and Egypt advanced reconstruction plans and mediated between the parties.

3. Israel seeks to restore relations with Jordan and turn a new page after Netanyahu – Israeli and Jordanian efforts to restore relations, which were restricted by Netanyahu, bore fruit. After years of severed ties between King Abdullah and Netanyahu, the King hosted Prime Minister Bennett and Ra’am Party Chair Abbas at his palace, and was in contact with President Herzog. The economy, energy and agriculture ministers of both countries met and signed cooperation agreements. Israel increased the quotas of water sold to Jordan, and enabled expanded trade between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates signed an agreement in Dubai to promote water and energy exchanges, an initiative promoted by EcoPeace Middle East and an example of multilateral cooperation in the region. Jordan continued to emphasize its commitment to the two-state solution, and public opposition to normalization with Israel remained widespread.

4. Diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt expand, as does Egypt’s willingness for increased visibility – Security cooperation continued between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai, as well as cooperation in the Gaza Strip and in the energy and business fields. In an unusual move, Egyptian President a-Sisi hosted Prime Minister Bennett for a high-profile visit, increasing the visibility of relations with Israel, and Foreign Minister Lapid met with his counterpart in Egypt. Israel softened its travel alert on the Sinai, and examined options for expanding trade between the two countries. However, public opposition to normalization with Israel still dominated the Egyptian street, limiting the expansion of cooperation to additional areas.

5. Normalization process with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco deepens, and formal agreements lay the foundation for broad-based cooperation – The government continued to lay a diplomatic and formal infrastructure for relations and cooperation with the normalization countries – the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco . Relations and high-level meetings previously restricted by Netanyahu were revived, ambassadors were appointed, and Israeli leaders visited the three countries. The developing relationships are characterized, unusually so for Israeli ties in the region, by significant weight given to the civilian and business dimensions, and with the broad and varied involvement of civil society. The normalization process demonstrated resilience in the face of challenges, such as Israel’s activities in East Jerusalem and steps to cancel an energy deal with the UAE in the face of domestic Israeli criticism. Morocco did not open an embassy in Israel, despite declarations that it would do so by the end of 2021.

6. Israel continues to publicly oppose a return to the nuclear deal with Iran while maintaining dialogue with the US – Israel persisted in opposing the Iran nuclear deal and continued its activity to counter Iran’s entrenchment in the region. The US-Israel Strategic Consultative Group, led by the two countries’ national security advisers, resumed its confidential dialogue. Israeli representatives continued to bring up Iran’s nuclear program as a key issue in their meetings with US officials and their European allies, sharing information on the progress of Iran’s program and warning against Iran’s negotiation tactics. A growing number of Israeli officials and experts expressed regret over supporting the US’ withdrawal from the original agreement with Iran.

7. The Israeli government focuses on improving ties with the US administration and return to bipartisanship – Israel launched an intimate, primarily confidential dialogue with the United States, including on issues of disagreement such as the Iran nuclear deal, the American consulate in East Jerusalem, the banning of Palestinian human rights groups, the NSO spyware affair, and relations with China, while taking care to avoid harming US interests. The new government also promoted dialogue with the liberal, non-Orthodox Jewish community in the US.

8. Israel bolsters ties with the European Union despite ongoing disagreement on the Palestinian issue – Foreign Minister Lapid continued his predecessor Ashkenazi’s efforts to strengthen ties with the European Union (EU), conducting one of his first foreign trips to Brussels, where he participated in a meeting of EU foreign ministers. Israel joined the EU Horizon research and development program, and signed additional cooperation agreements with the EU, but failed to bring about the resumption of the Israel-EU Association Council meetings. Israel strengthened its cooperation and bilateral dialogue with individual European states, while distancing itself from populist leaders and underscoring liberal-democratic values. Positive contacts were renewed with Sweden. Europe, for its part, did not exert pressure on the new government regarding the occupation and settlements, but adhered to its commitment to the two-state solution and to its policy of excluding the occupied territories from any agreements with Israel. The use of Israeli spyware provoked harsh criticism and prompted a diplomatic crisis with France.

9. Israel renews leadership dialogue with Turkey, and continues to bolster relations with Greece and Cyprus – Israel, Greece and Cyprus continued to deepen their cooperation, holding an additional summit meeting in Israel. Israel supported Greece and Cyprus against unilateral Turkish steps in the northern Cypriot town of Varosha. At the same time, dialogue between the leaders of Israel and Turkey was renewed, especially between Presidents Erdogan and Herzog, even as Israel clearly stated that the moves would not undermine its strong ties with Greece and Cyprus.

10. Israel declares a more serious attitude towards the climate crisis and its integration into foreign policy considerations – The Israeli government set targets and formulated plans for a shift to a low-carbon economy and instructed the National Security Council to include climate crisis issues in the annual assessment it delivers to the foreign affairs and security cabinet. Prime Minister Bennett and Minister of Environmental Protection Zandberg led a large Israeli delegation to the climate summit in Glasgow, and Israeli representatives took part in other international climate conferences, including the multinational forum being led by the special US Climate Envoy Kerry. President Herzog established anadvisory climate forum led by former MK Dov Hanin to promote regional cooperation on climate issues, and the Foreign Ministry adopted a green standard for its overseas missions.

11. Measures by the Foreign Minister and the new government to bolster the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deemed insufficient – Lapid’s appointment as Foreign Minister raised hopes for the ministry’s regeneration, stunted under Netanyahu. Officials from the dissolved Ministry of Strategic Affairs were incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, new ambassadors were appointed, and following a long hiatus, a new training course was launched for administration cadets. However, subsequent criticism over Lapid’s political appointments arose, and employees expressed disappointment over their working conditions, launching a public campaign against him. There was a sharp decline in t he number of applicants to this year’s foreign service cadet training program.

הפוסט Semi-Annual Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policy July – December 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hopefully, with the public outcry of all those who were able to conveniently ignore this crisis until it started to threaten them directly, the government will be forced to understand that a serious response is called for. If handled correctly, that response can present a rare opportunity for the Foreign Affairs Ministry to prove its strategic value and to chart a new course by introducing ethical dimensions into Israeli foreign policy. In so doing, it would also bolster Israel’s standing in the world and instigate a move of public and political usefulness.

To realize the extent of the opportunity at hand requires an understanding of the problem that has prompted harsh criticism of Israel over the use of technologies once considered the pride of the nation. The crux of the problem is not in the way companies such as the NSO Group, Candiru and others operate. Perhaps, one might have hoped that these firms would display greater responsibility in their commercial dealings with tyrants and human rights violators, but it is hard to blame them when the Defense Ministry and government license and even encourage their actions. The real problem lies in an oversight policy that fails to take proper consideration of the ethical aspects of Israeli defense exports and the egregious human rights violations they enable.

Rather than regulating curbs on exports to regimes known for their poor human rights records, as every Western state has done, the human rights aspect is just one amongst a host of considerations weighed by the Israeli Defense Export Controls Agency (DECA) in its licensing process. In most cases, these consideration appear to be marginalized in favor of a narrow foreign policy, where economic and security interests reflect a limited perception of foreign policy grounded in realpolitik that views as legitimate tools all means fair and foul to promote Israel’s immediate, short-term commercial and diplomatic interests. This perception was not born during the past decade, but one can safely say that it has characterized the foreign policy approach of former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

From his first day on the job, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid sought to make a clean break with such past policy. In the June 14, 2021 ceremony marking his entry into office, he suggested telling Israel’s story differently in order to re-position it in the world as a liberal democracy in tune with global trends. At the July 2021 Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, he explained what he meant. “It’s time to tell the right story about antisemites. It’s time that we tell the world what we face. Antisemites weren’t only in the ghetto in Budapest. The antisemites were the slave traders who threw chained slaves into the ocean. The antisemites were the Hutu tribe members in Rwanda that slaughtered the Tutsis,” he said.

If Israel insists on defining antisemitism as a unique and special phenomenon directed solely at the Jewish nation, Lapid argued, we cannot expect the world to identify with us. On the other hand, if we explain that antisemitism is a distinct form of racism, opposition to democracy and violation of human rights, we will succeed in mobilizing solidarity and understanding of the problem that threatens all of us.

UNLIKE NETANYAHU, but similarly to the views of the current Democratic administration in Washington, this approach seeks to place the values of a modern and liberal world at the core of foreign policy. This is how the foreign minister phrased it in a document outlining the key points of the Foreign Ministry’s plans for the 36th government. “Contrary to popular perception, relations between states are not based on interests alone, but also on values. A wise foreign policy balances the ideal with the real, distinct interests with world views… the Foreign Ministry’s role is to present the State of Israel as it truly is – a liberal, vibrant democracy.”

This approach highlights the major opportunity provided by the cyber spyware scandals for the Foreign Ministry to prove the sincerity of its intentions and implement a deep change in Israeli foreign policy. When the US Commerce Department ruled that Israeli firms were supplying technologies to dictatorial regimes that use them to threaten journalists, human rights activists and dissidents, it imposed heavy sanctions on them saying they were part of the Biden-Harris administration’s efforts to put human rights at the center of US foreign policy. If Lapid wants to prove his commitment to such values, he could use the veto power that the law gives the Foreign Ministry to block exports to questionable regimes.

This policy shift would also reflect the global shift in approach to exports of weapons systems. The addition of two Israeli firms to the US blacklist proved that we cannot keep priding ourselves on being a liberal, vibrant democracy and at the same time help other regimes trample democratic values. Mobilizing the world to combat antisemitism in its universal form, as Lapid suggests, becomes a far more formidable task when Israelis sell weapons to the Hutu in Rwanda who slaughtered the Tutsi or to offer tyrannical regimes offensive cyber tools for surveillance of journalists and human rights activists.

Changing the Foreign Ministry’s engagement with this issue would allow Lapid to bolster the ministry’s standing as a significant, prominent player in government decision making. It will bolster Lapid’s efforts to re-position the ministry as an actor shaping strategic policy after years of erosion in its standing. The Foreign Ministry’s veto power over defense exports was one of the innovations introduced into the Defense Exports Law of 2007 under US pressure. Whereas, in the past the ministry mostly served as a rubber stamp to uphold Defense Ministry interests, an opportunity and a need have now presented themselves to affect the considerations of the DECA.

As well, this crisis offers an opportunity to enhance Israel’s standing vis-à-vis world Jewry. A foreign policy shift that places values front and center is essential to stemming the growing alienation between many diaspora Jews, especially the younger ones, and Israel. When Israel sold Myanmar weapons, over 300 American rabbis signed a letter demanding that Israel halt all military aid to the regime, which was carrying out ethnic cleansing. Headlines around the world highlighting the use of cutting-edge Israeli technologies to persecute human rights activists and stifle free speech were a harsher blow to many Jews wishing to feel pride and identification with Israel than thousands of BDS campaigns have been.

Many advantages lie in significant Foreign Ministry involvement in this crisis, but addressing the root of the problem requires political backing for legislation curbing arms exports to regimes abusing human rights, similar to laws adopted in the US, the European Union and the entire western world. Such a move also presents an opportunity for courageous political leadership, and that enjoys broad support both within the government coalition and the public at large. The coalition would regard such legislation as a unique measure promoting a human rights agenda, and at the same time winning support from figures in the Nationalist Religious and right-wing arena, such as Rabbi Haim Drukman and Rabbi Shlomo Aviner. Such a goal also enjoys broad public support, as reflected in the annual foreign policy index of the Mitvim Institute, which found that 64% of respondents believe Israel should ban sales of technology products used to violate human rights – the most distinct finding in Israeli public opinion on foreign policy.

To sum up, serious Foreign Affairs Ministry intervention and clear legislation putting a stop to Israeli weapons transfers into the wrong hands could turn a series of crises into a host of opportunities, bolster the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Israel’s standing on the world stage and vis-à-vis world Jewry, and above all, prove that this commitment to values underpins our foreign policy and our identity as a state.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 22, 2022

הפוסט A different take on the NSO Group affair- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli public’s trust in the IDF is in decline, according to the 2021 Israeli Democracy Index. In October 2021, according to the survey, the level of trust (in the Jewish sector) reached a record low of 78%, compared to 90% in June 2021.

The data compiled by the Israel Democracy Institute’s Index also show a continuation of erosion of trust in other state institutions such as the presidency, the Knesset, the government and the judiciary. Yet, for many Israelis, the change in how citizens see the IDF – the people’s army that for years was seen as the ultimate melting pot where all social strata and all ethnic and religious groups mixed – is a worrying sign that reflects a significant change in public attitude toward the army and its role in society.

While the army keeps promoting its image of the defender of the nation, a unifying force, a powerful force for upward mobility, more and more people criticize the IDF for its constantly swelling budget, the poor living conditions of soldiers performing mandatory service, and its inability to provide a sense of security. Along with authentic grievances and complaints, there are also power struggles in the cabinet, political interests and plenty of egos to go around.

Three senior Israeli military officials (now retired) explain this complicated development to The Media Line.

Budget, pensions, and reservists

One of the most heated issues in public debate today is the question of the military’s budget, and most importantly, the generous pensions of retired IDF officers.

In 2021, soon after the state budget was approved, the Defense Ministry demanded and received another 7.4 billion shekels ($2.4 billion), a hefty addition to the already approved 58 billion shekels. In comparison, the Transportation Ministry received an addition of a mere 6 million shekels, while the Social Welfare Ministry got 17 million shekels. And a few days ago, the Finance Ministry reported that the average overall value of a pension paid to a retired IDF officer is 8.8 million shekels, compared with 1.7 million shekels for state employees.

Col. (res.) Ronen Itsik, who researches relations between the military and society and who served as a brigade commander in the Armored Corps, believes the problem is the lack of distinction drawn between those who serve with combat units and those who do not.

“The army should show sensitivity and respond to criticism and the public outcry. This hasn’t happened. There is no argument regarding those IDF officers who serve on the frontline, in the South or in the North. Their spouses most often can’t develop their own careers, since they [the officers] are rarely at home, and the public knows this. However, there is a question mark regarding those who serve at home-front bases. They don’t risk their lives, they go to work every day just like everybody else – a nurse at the hospital or a civil engineer,” says Itsik.

At the same time, Dr. Efraim Sneh, a retired brigadier general and a former deputy defense minister, believes the media is doing an injustice to the men and women who serve the country.

“The IDF’s ratings have dropped for many reasons, and one of them is the negative image that is presented by the media, which is portraying the officers as greedy. This media attack [concerning the pensions] is unjustified and its source is not the public but rather the Finance Ministry. It’s more about power struggles [among the political leadership], and the people are not aware of this fact,” Sneh says.

Itsik mentions another important factor that contributes to the drop in public trust – the changing status of reserve soldiers, miluimnikim.

“During the last 10 years many reserve units were closed, and we know from studies that when Mom or Dad do their reserve service, it affects the whole family. It becomes something very central and unifying and contributes to an increase in patriotism,” he says.

“We also saw a drop in IDF ratings after the Second Lebanon War [of 2006], when the IDF experienced severe problems in this respect; the reservists were mistreated, there was a lack of funds and supplies. I know that this issue is being taken care of right now and we will probably see positive results in the next few years,” says Itsik.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad is the executive director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) and chair of the Annual Herzliya Conference Series at Reichman University. He mentions yet another IDF-related controversy that recently stirred public debate – the tension between service in combat roles and technological ones.

“The IDF chief of staff said recently that the most important and valuable service is in the combat units, rather than in technological ones such as Unit 8200. So, if he really means it, he should raise the salary of these [combat] soldiers by five or even eight times. But the words have not been followed by deeds for now,” says Gilad.

In recent years the competition among young Israelis to get accepted to Unit 8200 − responsible for collecting signal intelligence and code decryption − and similar tech units has become fierce, since after service they can easily find lucrative employment in top Israeli high-tech companies.

“We need to fight this phenomenon where the sons of the rich do their service in the tech units, which only enlarges social gaps,” Sneh says. “This purpose can only be served through improvement of education in the periphery, since you can’t build a First World army with a Third World education.”

‘Glass half empty, glass half full’

While the reasons behind the drop in public trust in the IDF are many, some researchers and retired IDF officers debate the significance of the survey. Does it reflect a long-term trend or merely the current mood?

Itsik says that despite the data provided by the Israel Democracy Institute, there is no real decline in attitudes toward the IDF.

“When I look at the long-term study conducted at the University of Haifa since 2000 by Professor Gabriel Ben-Dor, I see that the level of trust in the IDF from 2000 until today remains high,” Itsik says. “There are peaks and low points, but all in all the trend remains the same. The findings of the Israel Democracy Institute also show this.

“I agree that there is volatility and that currently, we are not in a very good place. There are many factors that contribute to this – the problematic appointments during the last 10 years, the ambiguous results of the last military operation in Gaza [Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021], the problems of the reserve soldiers, the pensions issue, and yet I believe that we are looking at fluctuations within a trend, and of course, they have to be dealt with,” says Itsik.

Gilad says that in comparison to other state institutions, trust in the IDF still remains very high.

“The good news is that the Israeli public still thinks that there is no substitute for the IDF, and the vast majority believes that the IDF defends Israel sovereignty and independence,” he notes.

“After all, when you analyze Israel’s strategic situation, you realize that the security situation is actually very good – the borders are quiet, Iran doesn’t have a nuclear bomb, the IDF is striking Iranian targets in Syria and enjoys alliances with the Sunni Arab countries, Gaza is quiet. That’s why the trust level still stands at 78%,” Gilad says.

‘There are no grand victories anymore’

The relative security calm that Israel currently enjoys has proven to be a double-edged sword for the IDF. On the one hand, it gives it time to modernize and prepare for future scenarios.

In one of these scenarios, Israel will have to fight against Hizbullah in the North, Gaza in the South and pro-Iranian forces in Syria all at once.

On the other hand, when nothing happens on the security front, many Israelis ask whether such a huge chunk of their tax money should go to the military, while others expect better performance during combat, for example, an improvement over the events in Gaza during Operation Guardian of the Walls last May.

Itsik argues, “There was a large contradiction when the IDF presented the [aerial] liquidation of the so-called Hamas metro [miles of tunnels in Gaza] as a huge achievement, but very soon it became clear that very few terrorists were killed in this attack. Also, Israelis continued to be subject to [Hamas] missiles afterward, also in Jerusalem, so there was a problem with credibility. The public thought that the results of the operation were ambiguous.”

Sneh adds, “When there is no fighting, the public does not understand where all the money goes and starts asking questions.” He believes that the IDF should remain a “people’s army” where rich and poor, secular and religious, serve together.

Gilad says, “There aren’t any more ‘grand victories’ like we had in the past, and there won’t be any in the future. We must get used to this but remember that the IDF is the provider of Israel’s security and defense. Lessons should be learned, and mistakes corrected in order to increase the public trust in the army.”

This article is from “The Media Line“, from January 18, 2022

הפוסט Israelis Still Believe in IDF but Criticism Is Growing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is disappointing because Lapid has professed his support for a two-state solution and all the polls indicate that a majority of Israelis support this solution above all others. What is more, a recently survey commissioned by the Geneva Initiative (GI) indicates that most Israelis favor diplomatic negotiations with the Palestinian leadership.

Is the most powerful member of Israel’s government of change still suffering the poisonous effects of the legacy of Benjamin Netanyahu governments?

Lapid has already proven that he is not necessarily bound by Netanyahu’s harmful policies. He skillfully restored relations with Jordan. He improved ties with the European Union (EU), despite its criticism of Israel’s occupation and settlements. He normalized relations with Sweden, despite its recognition of a Palestinian state. He engaged in rebuilding Israel’s relations with the US Democratic Party and American Jewry, neglected by Netanyahu in favor of an alliance with the populists and messianic evangelists in the US. In a refreshing recent comment, Lapid said Israel was not necessarily opposed to an agreement between world powers and Iran, after Netanyahu fought every agreement and drove Iran closer to military nuclear capabilities.

Lapid certainly realizes that without a diplomatic horizon we are weakening moderate Palestinians and bolstering Hamas. He surely understands that without a diplomatic horizon the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be hard pressed to continue its security cooperation with our forces, and that saves lives on a daily basis. He must have heard during his meetings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain that the absence of a diplomatic horizon hampers the expansion and deepening of the normalization circle. He certainly knows that the absence of a diplomatic horizon poses a dire threat to our ability to preserve the Zionist vision of Israel as the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people.

Limiting the conflict with the Palestinians, a strategy espoused by Micah Goodman, is important in order to ease the daily lives of our Palestinian neighbors, but it is not an alternative to the need for determined action to end the occupation that threatens our strategic and moral future. Limiting the conflict could anesthetize the diplomatic process to a great extent, causing far more harm than good.

That is why last week’s meeting between PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Defense Minister MK Benny Gantz was important for the sake of strengthening cooperation, but cannot replace a significant diplomatic process.

I am not naive and I realize the importance of preserving the current government and preventing the return of an alliance between Netanyahu supporters and extremist right-wingers, but the refreshing policies adopted by the government of change in so many areas will not go down in the annals of history unless it seeks with all its might to extricate Israel from the greatest threat to the future of the Zionist vision.

Lapid has displayed impressive political capabilities in facilitating the formation of this government. Lapid proved that an Arab party can take part in an Israeli government and that agreements can be reached between opposing ideological parties for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Israel. He must display that same political and diplomatic wisdom by presenting a diplomatic horizon. The diplomatic horizon is the Zionist horizon.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 9, 2022

הפוסט Israel needs a diplomatic horizon to preserve the Zionist vision- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The danger of Israeli panic over Iran – analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel can use Middle East partnerships in Palestinian peace talks הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Foreign Policy Plan for the 36th Government of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Suspicion that Israeli officials were in the know about the plot, if not outright complicit in it, surfaced almost immediately following a report reports that a Sudanese security delegation had secretly visited Israel just weeks earlier. And this suspicion seemed all but validated in light of the revelation that an Israeli delegation, which included defense and Mossad representatives, traveled to Khartoum in the aftermath of the coup for talks on unspecified topics.

While it is not known who headed the Israeli side on both these occasions, it appears that on the Sudanese side it was Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the notorious commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and a key ally of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the man responsible for the putsch.

Unfortunately, even if there are no grounds to believe that Israeli military and intelligence officials were complicit in the military takeover (a possibility about which even some Israeli journalists have openly speculated), Israel is far from an innocent bystander.

Israel is a stakeholder with vested interests, formally bound up in Sudan’s political transition in light of the Trump administration’s ill-witted decision last year to force Khartoum to agree to normalize relations with Jerusalem in exchange for a package of vital financial incentives, including Sudan’s long-awaited removal from U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

It was a role in a quid pro quo that Israel should have refused to play, and precisely because of its genuinely strategic interests in forging a long-term relationship with a stable and functioning Sudan. Indeed, as some analysts, including myself, had warned ahead of the announcement of the deal, the heavy-handed manner in which Washington pressured Khartoum to normalize relations with Jerusalem was bound to backfire.

At a time that Sudan was governed by a fragile cohabitation arrangement between military and civilian stakeholders and undergoing a fragile process of democratization, we argued, a decision as publicly contentious as recognizing Israel risked strengthening the very elements who posed the greatest impediment to a smooth transition to civilian rule – primarily, the military, which assumed the lead in establishing contacts with Israel, and the Islamists, who opposed any such contacts.

In the event, Israeli prime minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, put aside Israel’s long-term interests in favor of a short-term public relations victory in the form of yet another normalization deal with a Muslim country. In so doing, he joined President Trump’s desire to score a quick victory for expedient political gains – just two weeks before the U.S. presidential elections.

The risk that such a move would add further friction to Sudan’s internal political process – a process whose derailment would not only doom the country’s chances of transitioning into a Western-oriented democracy but throw it into a prolonged political turmoil and perhaps even civil war – was blithely ignored. Sudan, after all, was a trophy, not a partner.

To be sure, turmoil in Sudan would first and foremost constitute a tragedy for the people of Sudan. But as Netanyahu must have appreciated, it would also undermine Israel’s broader strategic goals.

Absenting a functioning government, Sudan would be in no position to partner and collaborate with Israel on any number of issues, including strategic-related interests pertaining, most urgently, to Iranian regional actions directly and through its proxies – both inside Sudan and the Red Sea. And it is these very interests that appear to have guided Israel’s most recent moves against the backdrop of the military takeover in Sudan.

Certainly, from a narrowly-defined security perspective, Israel is right to be seeking assurances from Sudan’s military leadership that any preliminary understandings over security and intelligence cooperation, reached before the coup, would be upheld.

Thus, for instance, of utmost concern to Israel is that the establishment of an intelligence base on the Red Sea, presumably near the Sudan’s principal coastal city of Port Said, not be imperiled, not least given the recent unrest in the area that had seen tribal protesters blockading the seaport for several weeks.

All the same, even as it is too early to tell how the military coup in Sudan will play out, Jerusalem’s recent actions suggest it has no actual thought-out policy toward Khartoum. Israel-Sudan relations require a broader and more nuanced view, especially as the new military leadership has failed to win legitimacy from Washington and other key Western powers.

Indeed, the strong condemnation by the Biden administration, which has already suspended $700 million in financial assistance to Sudan, should cast a chill on Israel’s rapprochement with the Sudanese leadership rather than, as Jerusalem seems determined to show, stimulate it.

The very fact that Israeli officials have confirmed the report about the visit of the Israeli delegation to Khartoum last week – a report that originally appeared in a Sudanese newspaper and which Israeli officials might have easily dismissed, refused to comment on, and even ban its publication in Israel – suggests that there are those in Jerusalem who deem it useful to demonstrate that Israel is defying the consensus among its allies on how to respond to the putsch in Sudan, perhaps as a way of rewarding the Sudanese military leadership for their willingness to continue to cooperate with Israel on vital security needs.

And the possibility that Israeli actions have, at the very least, been coordinated with Washington only underscores the apparent utility in this defiance – namely, that Israel is determined to tread its own course and is willing to prove useful for its allies should they so desire.

Either way, Israel’s conduct betrays misguided diplomatic and strategic thinking.

It’s misguided, in that it feeds into Sudanese misconceptions about Jerusalem’s sway over Washington (misconceptions, often tinged with antisemitism, that are prevalent not only in the Arab and Muslim world but also in many European capitals). And misguided, in that it fails to read the regional and international map.

In contrast to the global acquiescence to the counter-revolutionary coup in Egypt that toppled the government of Mohammed Morsi, Western powers are unlikely to accept the counter-revolutionary putsch in Khartoum. It is one thing to overthrow an Islamist leadership, even if it was democratically elected; it is another thing altogether to derail a political process that holds out the promise of a Western-oriented democracy.

Rather than let narrow security interests combined with diplomatic hubris drive its policy toward Khartoum, therefore, Israel and its relatively new government have an opportunity to rethink its approach to Sudan. Such an approach, which might be called differential normalization, might also help inform and refashion its outlook toward diplomatic opportunities such as brokering ties with further former adversaries more broadly.

With respect to Sudan, Israel should curb its instincts and proceed cautiously, limiting its relations with the military leadership only to the most vital security and intelligence needs.

Israel must recall that what incentivized the Sudanese military stakeholders – first and foremost, General al-Burhan, the most conspicuous backer of the normalization agreement with Israel within the Sudanese leadership – was the generous financial package that was offered in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. Now that key elements in the package are in jeopardy, it remains to be seen whether, and for how long, the generals will continue to embrace Israel.

And although al-Burhan continues to enjoy considerable support, including also financial, from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, their money can never entirely supplant the kind of aid that Sudan would need from the World Bank, IMF, and other international institutions.

The very need for Israel to adopt a more cautious and nuanced approach to Sudan applies also to other regional players. The gung-ho enthusiasm Jerusalem conveyed toward the first signatories of the so-called Abraham Accords last year, the UAE and Bahrain, and, at least in the case of the UAE, its reciprocity, set a standard that was difficult and perhaps impossible to reach for others.

Indeed, it is no wonder that, despite the expectations that as many as nine countries might follow the example of the UAE and Bahrain and normalize relations with Israel, only one single country in addition to Sudan did so – namely, Morocco, which took the step in return for winning American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

While the reluctance of others to join, notably Oman and Saudi Arabia, may have also had to do with a wide array of considerations, including the expectation of a change in administrations in Washington, Israel’s ham-fisted approach played a factor.

The way in which Israel bungled the direct face-to-face talks at a meeting between then-prime minister Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Neom last November is a case in point. The Israeli public’s swaggering bombast over the meeting, which was supposed to remain undisclosed, generated considerable backlash from opponents of normalization with Israel from within the Saudi royal household and quashed whatever existed for a diplomatic breakthrough during the final weeks of the Trump administration.

Having instantly established a uniform model for how normalization should look and feel, Israel is losing opportunities to make diplomatic advances with countries that might have been put off by the triumphalist terms and adulatory tones in which Israel’s accords with the UAE and Bahrain were cast. After all, no country is like another, and no relationship can, or indeed should, be like another. What suits the UAE and, with some adjustments, Bahrain, does not and cannot suit Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Djibouti.

Yet Israel’s one-size-fits-all approach did not originate with the Abraham Accords. It has shaped its attitude to allies and rivals alike since at least the 1979 signing of its peace treaty with Egypt. Indeed, it explains why Israel is so resentful of the cold peace with Egypt and impatient with the standoffish attitude of Jordan.

In Israel’s black-and-white diplomatic imagination, peace must translate into a warm and thriving relationship, with trade and tourism at their heart; anything that falls short of that feels like a snub.

It is this same attitude that hampered efforts to reach a peace agreement with Syria, especially during the final days of Hafez al Assad in 2000, when Israel’s demands for a full-blown peace deterred the ailing leader out of concern that his son and apparent successor, Bashar, would be unable to overcome the domestic opposition which the influx of Israeli goods and tourists was expected to generate. Unfortunately, his preference for a “go-slow” approach was taken by then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak as a sign that Assad was not serious enough.

Finally, a policy of differential normalization might also help Israel overcome some of its ingrained resistance to making meaningful progress with the Palestinians.

Israel’s seemingly countless demands on the Palestinians at the level of their attitude to Israel – whether that they recognize Israel as a “Jewish state” or abandon their myth of the Right of Return – all bespeak the same intrinsic difficulty to fathom a peace agreement, especially one that required making supposedly painful concessions, that did not reflect amity and reconciliation. It is yet one more reason why Israel has failed to do all that it might have done to reach a final-status agreement with the PLO and, mutatis mutandis, a long-term hudna, or truce, with Hamas.

A policy of differential normalization would not only open up a world of possibilities for Israel that, as yet, remain inconceivable. And it will help Israel make peace with the peace that it has already won.

The Article was published on Haaretz, 5 November 2021

הפוסט First Saudi Arabia, Now Sudan: <br> Why Israel’s Normalization Strategy Is Imploding הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Several major developments marked significant change for Israel in the first half of 2021. President Biden assumed office, Israel ramped up its campaign against Iran’s nuclear program, Hamas and Israel engaged in another round of fighting, Knesset elections were held for the fourth time in two years and Netanyahu was replaced after 12 years in office. How are these developments shaping Israeli foreign policy trends?

1. A new government with Lapid as Foreign Minister augurs well for the continued rehabilitation of Israel’s Foreign Service. Lapid’s additional post as Alternate Prime Minister and his considerable political standing have placed an influential player at the helm of the Foreign Ministry. In keeping with the new government’s guidelines that expressly call for strengthening the Foreign Ministry, a decision was made to shutter the Ministry for Strategic Affairs and dozens of professional and diplomatic appointments were approved. The appointments were previously made by former Foreign Minister Ashkenazi, but Netanyahu blocked their approval.

2. Events in Jerusalem and Gaza demonstrate the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite political attempts to marginalize it. For years, Israel had adhered to a strategy of conflict management with the Palestinians, shunning diplomatic initiatives to advance the peace process. Its actions in Jerusalem generated international criticism and sparked widespread violence in May, which also stemmed from the cancelation of elections in the Palestinian Authority (PA). The violence with Hamas in Gaza and between Jews and Arabs in mixed Israeli towns, triggered by tensions in Jerusalem, highlighted the growing difficulty in Israel’s efforts to divide the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel itself. At the same time, Israel is dealing with the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to launch a war crimes investigation of its actions in the occupied territories.

3. Relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco survive challenges. The political instability in Israel, the coronavirus crisis, the fighting with Gaza and tensions in Jerusalem, and the advent of a new administration in Washington posed challenges to the newly established relations with the normalization states. Netanyahu’s political use of the Abraham Accords posed a special difficulty, as did his veto of visits by members of his government to the Gulf. Nonetheless, and despite the round of fighting with the Palestinians, the Abraham Accords displayed resilience and sustainability. Diplomatic missions were opened in Israel and Arab states, economic, civilian and security cooperation agreements were signed and moved forward.

4. Netanyahu policy undercuts Ashkenazi and Gantz’s efforts to improve relations with Jordan. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi and Defense Minister Gantz led attempts under the previous government to rehabilitate relations with Jordan, renewing a high-level dialogue with the Kingdom. However, the canceled visit by Jordan’s Crown Prince to the Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif compound and tensions in Jerusalem curtailed the impact of these moves and failed to significantly ease the crisis in relations, as reflected in the cutoff between Netanyahu and King Abdullah. Nonetheless, Israel stressed its support for the Kingdom’s stability, as was particularly evident in the context of the attempted coup in Jordan and strengthening of security coordination with Jordan. With the installation of the new government, Lapid highlighted the need to rehabilitate relations with Jordan.

5. Diplomatic, economic relations with Egypt expand, but not people-to-people links. Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation in Sinai and Gaza continued, along with cooperation on energy issues and in business. The saga of the Palestinian elections and the Israeli-Palestinian escalation underscored Egypt’s key role in internal Palestinian mediation and Israel-Hamas mediation. Nonetheless, the pervasive opposition to normalization with Israel persists among the Egyptian public and limits the expansion of cooperation between the two countries to other fields.

6. Israel gets to know the new American administration. The new US administration brought about change in American foreign policy, including restored support for the two-state solution and for a renewal of the nuclear agreement with Iran, and adoption of a multilateral approach to advancing democratic-liberal values and dealing with the climate crisis. The Biden Administration backs the normalization between Israel and Arab states and the gradual US withdrawal from the Middle Eastern arena. Israel adapted itself to these changed circumstances, undertaking to build a good working relationship with the Democratic administration and party and to restore the bi-partisan support of Israel eroded by Netanyahu’s favoritism toward the Republicans.

7. Israel continues to oppose Iranian nuclear program while adopting a new approach to US moves.  Ahead of the March 23 Knesset elections, parties running against Netanyahu on the political right, center and left advocated dialogue with the US administration on the Iran nuclear issue rather than the confrontational approach Netanyahu adopted vis-à-vis Obama at the time. On the professional level, and after the elections on the political one, too, Israel shifted to a policy of dialogue with the US, even as it continued its wide-ranging military and intelligence activity against Iran’s nuclear program, often assuming clear responsibility for its actions and abandoning its traditional policy of ambiguity.

8. Netanyahu puts a damper on Ashkenazi’s efforts to strengthen relations with the European Union (EU). Ashkenazi persisted in efforts to enhance relations with the EU as a strategic goal and sought to expand and deepen links with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, Israel’s political instability, Ashkenazi’s limited term in office and Netanyahu’s tight hold on power precluded significant progress in relations. Along with continued economic and civilian cooperation, tensions with the EU persisted over its commitment to the two-state solution and criticism of the ongoing and deepening occupation. Upon taking office, Lapid declared he would turn the page on Israel’s relations with the EU.

9. Israel plays a key role in advancing and bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Israel continued to bolster its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and advanced cooperation with them in the fields of security, energy, tourism and the coronavirus crisis. Israel also continued to advance the development of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and advocated for the UAE’s integration in the Mediterranean arena. It also displayed flexibility in renewed contacts over demarcating its maritime border with Lebanon. At the same time, Israel reacted coolly to Turkish feelers regarding a possible warming of relations.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Prime Minister Bennett and President Biden face a special challenge given the significant disparity between their views on key issues, especially in the Iranian and Palestinian arenas. On the other hand, the sides share a deep and refreshing commitment to establish close strategic cooperation built on mutual trust. Unlike Netanyahu, who sacrificed relations with the US to advance his political and personal agendas, Bennett has been demonstrating noteworthy national responsibility in strengthening the special relationship with the US as he did in rehabilitating ties with Jordan immediately upon taking office.

Israel’s overriding interest lies in taking advantage of the top-level Washington visit to formulate a US-led diplomatic initiative to achieve a two-state solution with the Palestinians, but unfortunately, this is not a realistic option at the moment. Nonetheless, the two countries share important interests that the visit can advance, taking advantage of the improved regional constellation relevant to the Palestinian context, too.

Bennett’s visit comes against the backdrop the US pullout from Afghanistan, and the understanding that US military involvement in the region is no longer in the cards – seminal developments that illustrate the vital need for a new roadmap of intensified US diplomatic leadership. Such diplomatic leadership has not been felt so far. Meanwhile, the US vacuum is filling up with Sunni and Shiite Islamist agitators, while US partners are crying out for a new regional architecture of alliances. Despite the Biden Administration’s decision to prioritize East Asia and domestic issues, the US must be able to “walk and chew gum at the same time”. Otherwise, others will fill the vacuum left by the Americans in the Middle East, as already evidenced by China’s recent strategic partnership agreement with Iran.

Iran

During his election campaign, Biden declared that he would try to revert to the diplomatic arena in order to block Iran’s progress toward military nuclear capabilities, accelerated by Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA between the P5+1 with Iran. Attempts to restore and enhance the agreement have stalled. The Iranians do not seem to feel a sense of urgency and the intentions of Khamenei and the Raisi government regarding the Vienna negotiations are unclear.

The Bennett government wisely decided to abandon Netanyahu’s pointless confrontational tactics vis-à-vis the US in favor of dialogue with the administration on Iran. Biden and Bennett will have to reach several understandings on combined efforts to pressure Iran both in case an agreement is reached and in case it is not. Coordination and consultation mechanisms must be established if Israel is to try to influence decisions by the US and its allies on an agreement with Tehran, and Israel’s room for maneuver vis-à-vis Iran must be defined.

In addition, the two sides must agree on a regional cooperation mechanism that includes the US allies under threat by Iran in a manner that will also serve their relations with Israel and expand the normalization circle. Iran’s ballistic missile program and proxy terror attacks are a greater threat to the Gulf States than the nuclear threat, concerns that Israel shares as reflected in recent Iranian attacks on Israeli owned vessels and Hizballah launching rockets. The US and Israel must reach agreement on integrating these states into an American plan to deal with Iran’s subversive activities in the region. They should agree to provide these states with anti-missile defenses developed jointly by Israel and the US, which would also enhance Israel’s standing as an asset to the Gulf States.

The Palestinians

Bennett should prepare an answer for the question Biden is likely to put to him regarding solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, although agreement on the issue is highly doubtful. A plan that foresees autonomy for Areas A and B of the West Bank and annexation of Area C contradicts stated US values and interests. Micah Goldman’s blueprint for “shrinking the conflict” could serve as a temporary tactical phase, but not as an alternative to a long-term vision.

Despite the divide on this issue, agreement on two general principles could be possible: Avoiding measures that preclude the prospects of a two-state solution in the future and significantly improving living conditions for the Palestinians. We should not forget that the collapse of moderate forces in Afghanistan could be replicated in the West Bank, an outcome both Israel and the US have an interest in preventing.

Bennett must come equipped with answers on preventing unilateral Israeli moves in Jerusalem and the West Bank that risk sparking violence, especially as regards depriving Palestinians of their homes in Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan and upsetting the status quo on the Temple Mount. At the same time, Bennett must explain how he plans to prevent settler violence and violation of Palestinian human rights in light of the many horrifying violations taking place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Israel and the US have a shared interested in forming regional coordination mechanisms to counter attempts to undermine Israel’s relations with the Arab/Muslim world through provocations at Islam’s holy sites in Jerusalem and handing Hamas and Turkey additional public relations victories as the one in May. Such a mechanism should also include Jordan and Morocco in a manner highlighting the value of their agreements with Israel. Ways should also be found to integrate Saudi Arabia in light of its standing in the Arab and Muslim world and in order to incentivize it to join the normalization circle.

As for the West Bank, coordination is required ahead of the expected change in Palestinian leadership prompted by Abu Mazen’s age and the nadir of his domestic legitimacy. Israel and the US have an interest in strengthening moderate forces in the West Bank, although it is unclear right now who will lead them. The administration must be mobilized for efforts to improve the economy and governance in the West Bank. Jordan should be included in these efforts, having a significant interest in their outcome, as should the UAE, which has the resources to provide economic support, improve governance and strengthen civilian institutions.

As for Gaza, Israel should agree with the US on a mechanism to gradually rehabilitate and demilitarize the enclave while avoiding re-enforcement of Hamas but recognizing its existence as a significant factor in Palestinian society. This must be carried out in conjunction with the Palestinian Authority (PA), the UAE and Egypt, while diminishing Qatar’s influence.

Along with renewal of US aid to UNRWA to avoid a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, a blueprint should be drawn up for a gradual handover by UNRWA to the PA and to the states where Palestinian refugees live in a manner that bolsters the PA and addresses UNRWA role in the Palestinian sense of victimization and encouragement of their refugee status.

Syria and Lebanon

Israel lacks diplomatic levers to ensure calm on its northern front, and the vacuum left by the Americans in the region constitutes a security threat. Israel and the US have a shared interest in stability in the region and in preventing a buildup by Iran and its proxies. With that in mind, the US should be asked to include in its dialogue with Russia a demand on blocking further Iranian buildup in Syria. The US could also exert direct influence in Lebanon and in cooperation with France to leverage the economic crisis there and ensure that international aid for Lebanon results in reining in and weakening Hezbollah. In addition, the US could increase its mediation efforts in the Israel-Lebanon negotiations on demarcating their maritime border and leverage this channel to advance other Israel-Lebanon issues.

China

Biden has declared China the most significant challenge to the US and its NATO allies. Israel has an interest in continued economic relations with China, which is a vital market for the Israeli economy, without undermining US interests. Bennett must propose mechanisms to enable this dual goal, while making clear that despite Israel’s clear priority for preserving its relationship with the US, it cannot afford to turn its back on some opportunities from China for which it has no alternatives. The sides must therefore define Israel’s potential room for maneuver.

Bilateral

The US 2022 foreign appropriations bill approved by the House in July is expected to win Senate approval and will include all of the US defense aid promised to Israel, reflecting the support of a large majority of Democrats for Israel’s security. Nonetheless, there is growing pressure from the progressive wing of the party to condition aid for Israel on progress in negotiations with the Palestinians. Israel should offer of its own volition a mechanism to prevent use of American aid in the violation of human rights and in creeping annexation of Palestinian territory.

To forge ties with the increasingly influential progressive elements on the US political map, a shared fund should be established to aid developing states (a “Tikkun Olam” fund), in accordance with the model of existing bi-national funds (BIRD that funds cooperation in industrial R&D, BARD that funds cooperation in agricultural R&D and BSF that funds scientific R&D). Such a fund would enable cooperation between MASHAV (the Foreign Ministry’s foreign aid arm) and USAID in development work internationally and encourage cooperation between American and Israeli NGOs dedicated to support disadvantaged populations on both sides of the ocean. Such a fund could also constitute a basis for the mobilization of progressive American Jews who are currently hard pressed to find a common cause with Israel.

The American Jewish community

Bennett should hold an event at a Washington Reform synagogue in order to send a message to North American Jewry that Israel embraces the large majority of American Jews not affiliated with Orthodox Judaism. Bennett should come with a solution to the divisive issue of prayer at the Western Wall. He should also take the opportunity to convey a message that the State of Israel embraces Jews critical of its policies, too, and supports an inclusive “big tent” approach toward Jews everywhere. This is a vital message not only related to US-Israel relations but also the State of Israel’s founding principle as the home of the Jewish people, which cannot afford the growing gap between itself and the largest and most important Jewish community in the world.

In summing up, Bennett has an opportunity and a commitment to open a new chapter between Israel and the US after his predecessor inflicted dire damage on Israel’s relations with the Democratic Party and with the American Jewish community. It is incumbent on Bennett to maintain the nationally responsible line he has adopted thus far and avoid missing the opportunity to do so.

הפוסט Ahead of PM Bennett’s White House visit: Six agenda items הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Scenes of Afghans fearing for their lives and convoys of refugees pouring out of the country are heart wrenching, indeed, and the western countries who were involved should do their utmost to absorb refugees who are running for their life. However, the events should surprise no one, nor is there any reason to accuse the Biden administration of abandonment (although intelligence forecasts of the immediate repercussions appear to have been flawed). One can however certainly blame those who thought it would be possible to change Iraq and Afghanistan and forcibly impose on them Western values.

Since the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon 20 years ago, and the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, most Americans have gradually realized the extent of the fiasco. Despite the heavy loss of life and the astronomic sums it invested, the US failed to achieve sustainable, organic change.

The article was published on Jpost, August 2021

הפוסט The alleged American abandonment of Afghanistan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Several major developments marked significant change for Israel in the first half of 2021. President Biden assumed office, Israel ramped up its campaign against Iran’s nuclear program, Hamas and Israel engaged in another round of fighting, Knesset elections were held for the fourth time in two years and Netanyahu was replaced after 12 years in office. How are these developments shaping Israeli foreign policy trends?

1. A new government with Lapid as Foreign Minister augurs well for the continued rehabilitation of Israel’s Foreign Service. Lapid’s additional post as Alternate Prime Minister and his considerable political standing have placed an influential player at the helm of the Foreign Ministry. In keeping with the new government’s guidelines that expressly call for strengthening the Foreign Ministry, a decision was made to shutter the Ministry for Strategic Affairs and dozens of professional and diplomatic appointments were approved. The appointments were previously made by former Foreign Minister Ashkenazi, but Netanyahu blocked their approval.

2. Events in Jerusalem and Gaza demonstrate the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite political attempts to marginalize it. For years, Israel had adhered to a strategy of conflict management with the Palestinians, shunning diplomatic initiatives to advance the peace process. Its actions in Jerusalem generated international criticism and sparked widespread violence in May, which also stemmed from the cancelation of elections in the Palestinian Authority (PA). The violence with Hamas in Gaza and between Jews and Arabs in mixed Israeli towns, triggered by tensions in Jerusalem, highlighted the growing difficulty in Israel’s efforts to divide the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel itself. At the same time, Israel is dealing with the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to launch a war crimes investigation of its actions in the occupied territories.

3. Relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco survive challenges. The political instability in Israel, the coronavirus crisis, the fighting with Gaza and tensions in Jerusalem, and the advent of a new administration in Washington posed challenges to the newly established relations with the normalization states. Netanyahu’s political use of the Abraham Accords posed a special difficulty, as did his veto of visits by members of his government to the Gulf. Nonetheless, and despite the round of fighting with the Palestinians, the Abraham Accords displayed resilience and sustainability. Diplomatic missions were opened in Israel and Arab states, economic, civilian and security cooperation agreements were signed and moved forward.

4. Netanyahu policy undercuts Ashkenazi and Gantz’s efforts to improve relations with Jordan. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi and Defense Minister Gantz led attempts under the previous government to rehabilitate relations with Jordan, renewing a high-level dialogue with the Kingdom. However, the canceled visit by Jordan’s Crown Prince to the Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif compound and tensions in Jerusalem curtailed the impact of these moves and failed to significantly ease the crisis in relations, as reflected in the cutoff between Netanyahu and King Abdullah. Nonetheless, Israel stressed its support for the Kingdom’s stability, as was particularly evident in the context of the attempted coup in Jordan and strengthening of security coordination with Jordan. With the installation of the new government, Lapid highlighted the need to rehabilitate relations with Jordan.

5. Diplomatic, economic relations with Egypt expand, but not people-to-people links. Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation in Sinai and Gaza continued, along with cooperation on energy issues and in business. The saga of the Palestinian elections and the Israeli-Palestinian escalation underscored Egypt’s key role in internal Palestinian mediation and Israel-Hamas mediation. Nonetheless, the pervasive opposition to normalization with Israel persists among the Egyptian public and limits the expansion of cooperation between the two countries to other fields.

6. Israel gets to know the new American administration. The new US administration brought about change in American foreign policy, including restored support for the two-state solution and for a renewal of the nuclear agreement with Iran, and adoption of a multilateral approach to advancing democratic-liberal values and dealing with the climate crisis. The Biden Administration backs the normalization between Israel and Arab states and the gradual US withdrawal from the Middle Eastern arena. Israel adapted itself to these changed circumstances, undertaking to build a good working relationship with the Democratic administration and party and to restore the bi-partisan support of Israel eroded by Netanyahu’s favoritism toward the Republicans.

7. Israel continues to oppose Iranian nuclear program while adopting a new approach to US moves.  Ahead of the March 23 Knesset elections, parties running against Netanyahu on the political right, center and left advocated dialogue with the US administration on the Iran nuclear issue rather than the confrontational approach Netanyahu adopted vis-à-vis Obama at the time. On the professional level, and after the elections on the political one, too, Israel shifted to a policy of dialogue with the US, even as it continued its wide-ranging military and intelligence activity against Iran’s nuclear program, often assuming clear responsibility for its actions and abandoning its traditional policy of ambiguity.

8. Netanyahu puts a damper on Ashkenazi’s efforts to strengthen relations with the European Union (EU). Ashkenazi persisted in efforts to enhance relations with the EU as a strategic goal and sought to expand and deepen links with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, Israel’s political instability, Ashkenazi’s limited term in office and Netanyahu’s tight hold on power precluded significant progress in relations. Along with continued economic and civilian cooperation, tensions with the EU persisted over its commitment to the two-state solution and criticism of the ongoing and deepening occupation. Upon taking office, Lapid declared he would turn the page on Israel’s relations with the EU.

9. Israel plays a key role in advancing and bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Israel continued to bolster its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and advanced cooperation with them in the fields of security, energy, tourism and the coronavirus crisis. Israel also continued to advance the development of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and advocated for the UAE’s integration in the Mediterranean arena. It also displayed flexibility in renewed contacts over demarcating its maritime border with Lebanon. At the same time, Israel reacted coolly to Turkish feelers regarding a possible warming of relations.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Sadly, the response by the “government of change” to the Ben & Jerry boycott of the settlements illustrates that the toxic influence of “Bibism” on public opinion remains.

As Sami Peretz wrote recently in Haaretz (“The boycott isn’t working”, July 21), ongoing BDS attempts to undermine Israel’s economy have failed simply because global demand for the innovation and dynamism of Israel’s private sector is far stronger.

הפוסט The ice cream (meltdown) threat הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Women in Israel’s key decision-making posts:<br> Not just numbers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Lapid overturns central pillar of Netanyahu foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Four memorable lies in Netanyahu’s legacy of falsehoods הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu’s political ambassadorial <br> appointees should resign הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In its platform, the Yesh Atid party describes the climate crisis as one of the greatest challenges facing humanity today. The Yamina, Meretz, Blue and White, Yisrael Beitenu and New Hope parties all refer to the climate crisis challenge as well. The draft copies of the new government coalition’s agreements also mention the climate crisis, but only towards the end of the documents, around Article 21. As such, it does not represent a contrast from the Netanyahu governments’ policies and priorities.

Israel is not a climate crisis denier and it toes the line of the international community on the issue. It participates in global conventions, its government adopts targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and it occasionally discusses the matter in diplomatic meetings with regional and international actors. Israel does what is required, no more. This is not the expected behavior of a country that boasts being a pioneer, innovator, entrepreneur, and a significant global leader. Not on such a crucial matter. The climate crisis is not simply “another issue” that needs to be handled. It is one of the fundamental elements of our lives and reality. We must understand, deal with, and formulate and implement policy within this reality.

In recent years, the climate crisis has been absent from the government and the Foreign Ministry’s published policy agendas. It is also largely missing from the state budget and from State Comptroller reports on the government’s implementation of its plans. The government perceives climate change as “nice to have”, an issue that cannot be completely ignored, but that is neither central nor vital. It is little wonder, therefore, that Israel repeatedly fails to achieve the targets it sets for itself and which it is committed to on the international stage.

Several reasons come to mind in explaining the absence of the climate crisis from Israeli policy actions and discourse. First, Israel’s political structure does not encourage long-term planning and responsibility. The need to reap immediate political dividends before the next elections dictates government decisions and action plans to a large extent. Furthermore, the gradual undermining of experienced civil servants by the political echelons is also detrimental to any long-term strategizing on environmental issues, and others.

Secondly, Israel’s economic structure is geared towards providing immediate profits and overexploiting existing resources. Our economy is predicated on neo-liberal values and concepts, propped up by socialist remnants trying desperately to stem the capitalist tide. The idea of endless and perpetual growth drives the Israeli economy, but the climate crisis requires us to shift to a different kind of thinking and to adopt a circular and sustainable economy.

Thirdly, the dominant security discourse in Israel is not compatible with a climate-based foreign policy. Instead, it is a security-military discourse which treats climate-change as a mere background issue that contributes to the creation or intensification of security threats, but which is not a threat in and of itself.

Fourth, the climate crisis is the victim of the human tendency to address immediate threats before making time to deal with the more distant ones (even though they are more significant). Procrastination and repression are not necessarily an Israeli invention; evidently, they are two highly effective mechanisms worldwide.

Finally, linking the climate crisis to our daily lives in an immediately recognizable, cause and effect way is a formidable challenge. Climate change is gradual, incremental, and difficult to identify firsthand. This makes it hard to link the variety of disasters and phenomena already affecting our lives to the general threat of climate change, and to forge the emotional and intellectual connection required to mobilize political and public support to allocate resources to the issue.

New Government:  Opportunity for a Change

The State of Israel needs to overcome the obstacles standing in the way of a more serious approach to the climate crisis. It must place this issue at the top of its priorities as a central threat to our existence, and seize the opportunity here and now to improve its people’s lives.

Primarily, the climate crisis contains persuasive power on its own due to its repercussions becoming more noticeable and severe. We live in a region defined as a global “hot spot” — the warming in our region is faster and harsher than elsewhere. Clearly, this fact already has implications on our lives, thus addressing the climate crisis is becoming an immediate goal. This also explains why we are seeing growing responses and strategies (albeit still too slow) devoted to dealing with the issue.

Second, the climate crisis is re-shaping global structure and discourse, which Israel cannot ignore. If Israel wants to guarantee its regional and international standing and preserve its relationship with the US, it must adopt these changes and prove its intentions are serious. Not only have President Biden and his administration placed the climate crisis at the top of their agenda, but other international actors – states, institutions, businesses – are also adopting the climate crisis as a fundamental component of policy making. If Israel wants to assume a significant global role, it must recognize that this is the entry ticket to a changing world order.

Lastly, adopting climate-based policies and a serious response to the climate crisis will provide Israel with many opportunities to achieve its other goals. For example, a climate-oriented foreign policy enables, and truly requires, regional, cross-border cooperation and political stability. These, in turn, are vital for ensuring food and energy security in an era of renewable energies. Climate-oriented foreign policy would highlight Israel’s scientific and technological capabilities and contribute to positioning the country as a positive actor in the regional and international arena. It would narrow socio-economic gaps and bolster democracy and peace in the region because these are necessary components for building greater resilience to deal with the climate crisis and its consequences.

This is hardly a theoretical or philosophical discussion. Israel faces decisions on urgent, concrete matters. For example, should it invest in linking its power grid to those of Europe and the Gulf to facilitate trade in surplus renewable energy, thereby enhancing its energy security? Should it cooperate with Cyprus and Egypt in producing protein out of seaweeds to enhance its food security? Should it support forming regional institutions to effectively address crises and emergencies? How can it resolve conflicts of identity and religion in order to mitigate violence and clashes and divert resources to building shared lives that protect our world? These are vital questions now confronting Israel’s incoming government. Turning Israeli foreign policy into a climate policy is a pivotal goal to guarantee a better life for ourselves and our children, but it is also an instrument with which to achieve additional goals through regional and international cooperation and peaceful coexistence to improve life in Israel and the region.

הפוסט Climate policy is the entry ticket into the new world order הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Without getting into the political-social complexities that await us and the new government, it is worth reminding Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and Defense Minister Benny Gantz of several foreign policy principles that even the polarized incoming government can accept. Several basic truths bear repeating:

1. Israel’s natural place is among liberal democratic states. In recent years, Israel has strengthened its relations with increasingly authoritarian regimes (in Hungary, Brazil and other countries) with which it appears to feel quite comfortable. Israel’s strength lies in a combination of shared values and long-term interests, and not in short-term interests alone. True, our liberal friends are often critical of us, but since when does Israel fear criticism.

2. Relations with our strategic ally, the United States, must be mended quickly. Israel’s intimate relationship with the Trump Administration damaged ties with the Democratic Party and undermined its standing in the American public arena where it had always enjoyed impressive bi-partisan support. President Joe Biden is a true friend, but he does not operate in a vacuum. So are the diverse streams of the American Jewish community.3. Now more than ever, Israel needs a diplomatic initiative, one that highlights the positive rather than the negative. Israel should strategize to peacefully integrate into the region and the international arena in general. The required initiative would be based on international principles and resolutions that have been acceptable to all Israeli governments, such as the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the Bush Administration’s “Road Map”.

This initiative must take into account the dramatic changes in the region over the past decade, including the achievement of the former government in normalizing relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. The Arab Peace Initiative, sponsored by our new unofficial friend Saudi Arabia, could provide a sound basis for reshaping the face of the region in a manner that serves Israel’s national security.

An iron principle guides Israel’s foreign and defense policies: initiative conveys power and foresight, even if the path is rough. Initiative preserves room for maneuver and favorable public opinion at home and abroad.

4. A diplomatic initiative that attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, no matter how tough and complex, creates momentum. This in itself, if managed wisely and responsibly, creates hope, a vital component of any conflict resolution, and especially welcome on the international stage that cries out for positive signals relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Momentum does not mean naiveté, but rather a sober understanding of what can be expected of a state such as Israel. This translates into the launch of a diplomatic dialogue on all levels between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The prolonged absence of such a dialogue, and the deeply rooted narrative according to which Israel does not have a partner for dialogue, have generated a deep and understandable feeling of mistrust among Israelis. A change of atmosphere, the conduct of meetings and dialogues will ease this skepticism and boost trust. And who knows, it might even lead to agreements and concessions. The success of such a diplomatic process with the Palestinians is hardly guaranteed, but it is vital. The “Guardian of the Walls” operation proved yet again that the Palestinian issue is alive and kicking.

5. Strengthening the Foreign Ministry. The coalition agreement refers to the importance of strengthening the foreign policy component of Israel’s national security and it must be translated into action. The Foreign Ministry is a professional organization tasked with the conduct of Israel’s foreign relations. Diplomacy is a distinct profession, and diplomats are the unchallenged experts in dealing with the region and the international arena. Their voice must be heard, even ahead of the defense agencies’ voice. This principle has been eroded greatly in recent years, despite its crucial importance for Israel, given the unique and complex challenges it faces. Bolstering diplomacy and foreign policy must also be translated into budgetary allocations. We are talking about negligible sums, not to mention almost ridiculous, out of the state budget.

6.“Hasbara”, Hebrew for public diplomacy, is a corollary of policy. We tend to buck this basic truth: The State of Israel is a regional power – diplomatic, military and economic – but it is also a state that occupies Palestinian disputed territories. Rather than perceiving the high expectations of Israel as an unfair outrage, we should view them as a compliment.

Adopting these principles will bolster Israel’s standing and position far more than the many entities engaged in “Hasbara”, mostly without any coordination.

**The article was published on ynetnews, 20 June 2021

הפוסט A little friendly advice for Bennett and Lapid הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The weakening of Israel’s Foreign Service under Netanyahu, flawed policy directions that were taken, and regional potential that was left untapped – all provide fertile ground for action on which the government could agree despite its diversity.

Netanyahu’s departure from office will create positive diplomatic momentum for Israel in itself. Along with alliances that Netanyahu forged with world leaders and his regional achievements (chief among them the Abraham Accords and Israel’s ties in the Eastern Mediterranean), Netanyahu’s conduct in the diplomatic arena generated deep antagonism, especially on the part of leaders of liberal democracies, which are of great value to Israel. He was regarded as challenging the fundamental principles of governance and democracy, supporting racist parties in Israel and abroad, and undermining prospects of a two-state solution.

Netanyahu’s credibility was also questioned – in Washington, Paris, Amman and perhaps in other capitals, a perception that took a tangible toll on Israel. His “aggressive diplomacy” approach prompted loud clashes with critics of Israel, even ones inherently friendly toward the state. And finally, the recent years of political crisis in Israel portrayed Netanyahu’s actions in the international arena as motivated first and foremost by his desire for political survival, and only then by his concern for Israel’s national interests.

הפוסט How will Israel’s foreign policy change with new government? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Gil Murciano, CEO of the Mitvim Institute

Climate change has important implications on many regional and national security issues — from the civil war in Syria to water interests throughout the Middle East. There are three particular spaces of opportunity in the region, first the renewed commitment of the Biden Administration to climate change policy, in partnership with European actors. Second, how the long-term nature of climate change allows for the creation of a significant regional framework for international cooperation. EcoPeace has done crucial work in these efforts. Lastly, with a new Israeli government, new government officials could create new opportunities for regional cooperation specific to environmental policy.

Dr. Daniel Shapiro, Former US Ambassador to Israel

The Biden Administration is clearly making climate change a priority in both domestic and foreign policy, especially working to identify how climate change can serve other foreign policy interests. President Biden is hoping to create a policy that encourages new job growth in renewable industries in the US and to cooperate with both its allies and its global competitors, chiefly China and Russia. Crucially, addressing climate change and environmental policy provides opportunities for crisis mitigation, management and resolution. The Administration’s work in these areas and Israeli environmental technology innovation and climate issues in the Middle East create a deep understanding of the potential for diplomacy and climate action to achieve shared goals.

Janet Rogan, Conference of Parties 26 UK Regional Ambassador to the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia

International politics and conflicts are immensely impacted by shared actions relating to the environment. Climate change threatens the stability and economic growth of the global population, especially in the Middle East, the most water scarce region in the world. As a result, international diplomacy has focused on coming together to address these shared challenges, particularly mitigating global warming (through renewable technologies), adapting human activity, determining means of implementation, whether financial or otherwise, and collaborating in a coordinated way. The importance of incorporating traditionally marginalized groups, such as women and indigenous folks, in these discussions cannot be overemphasized. Without international cooperation, these issues will continue to worsen and thus worsen conflicts.

Dr. Roee Kibrik, Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute

The Israeli government has taken a slow approach to prioritizing the climate crisis within its domestic and foreign policies. This is unfortunate, firstly because today one must embrace climate change as an essential, overarching framework in order to understand the world and operate within it. Secondly, because foreign policies that directly address climate change can help fulfill Israel’s most important foreign policy goals. Embracing policies that address climate change entails embracing regional cooperation, multilateralism and the pursuit of peace.  Thus, it could push Israel to cooperate with Jordan on water security, to search for energy connectivity to Europe, or to work with United Arab Emirates on food security. Furthermore, Israel is in a unique position to gain from these policies, not only from increased security and peace in the region, but because of the innovative technologies Israel has developed that will provide it with more opportunities in the international community.

Amb. Gideon Behar, Special Envoy for Climate Change and Sustainability,

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains the fundamental belief that regional cooperation on climate change is a necessity. The risks from climate change in the Middle East are catastrophic and cannot be addressed alone, but there can be tremendous opportunities from multilateral efforts. The Abraham Accords have opened new doors for investment and cooperation, providing just one example of the regional partnerships that can be created to address climate change. The ongoing cooperation between Israel and its neighbors has always been a priority of the Israeli government, and today there is increased prioritization of environmental issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA has formed a special team on climate change to work on these issues daily, and instructed all global diplomatic missions to reach the green standard in their offices, reducing their carbon footprints and raising awareness of sustainability.

Dr. Susanne Wasum-Rainer, German Ambassador to Israel

Germany is extremely committed to and highly prioritizes climate change within its foreign policy and diplomacy. The European Commission defines climate diplomacy as committing to multilateral economic policy, addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security, taking domestic action at all political levels, and enhancing international climate cooperation through outreach. Climate change requires a global response, chiefly through multilateral cooperation, such as the Paris Climate Accords. Israel is seen as a key partner in this endeavor, both due to its regional position and high level of innovation. Israel can play a huge role in the development of natural gas and energy, which can strengthen cross-border cooperation in the Middle East. The EU is seeking to invest more in environmental technologies, and Germany is committed to participating and working on these initiatives as needed.

Gidon Bromberg, Co-founder and Regional Director of EcoPeace

There are several policy opportunities for climate change and regional diplomacy in the Middle East. The Green Blue Deal for the Middle East plan addresses the positive correlation between water scarcity and the presence of conflict, as well as the heightened impact of climate change on the particularly vulnerable MENA region. If serious action is not taken at a regional level, several parts of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean will become uninhabitable; however, these proposals offer rich opportunities for peacebuilding and unprecedented cooperation. Jordan has an advantage for producing renewable energies, while Israel and Gaza hold the advantage for the production of water. The Israeli Ministry of Energy and Water Authority have already taken increased steps in acknowledging the need for renewable energy, including buying from neighbors such as Jordan. New initiatives include looking towards private interests, including investments from the Gulf States, to build up solar markets and water supply in Jordan and the broader region. The potential threat to Jordan’s water supply could destabilize the country, which would decrease Israel’s stability as well, however the availability of resources throughout Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories can allow for economic growth, regional interdependence, and peacebuilding.

Additionally, the climate crisis provides opportunities for increasing movement towards peace and the two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. To this end, the Green Blue Deal for the Middle East includes mechanisms for water technology sharing, from desalination to sewage treatment to increase Palestinian capacity building. Tackling water issues can provide both sides with a direct response to one of the historically intractable final status issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is no possibility for a zero-sum game in climate change policy, which can provide an important paradigm shift in the understanding of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Furthermore, by creating new projects to clean and resupply the Jordan River, new green jobs and economic opportunities can be created in the region. Lastly, there is extreme importance in educating and empowering Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians to work together to break the cycle of poverty and create a better environmental future for themselves and future generations.

The Green Blue Deal for the Middle East was presented at the United Nations Security Council, the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit, and will be presented at the upcoming G7 meeting, highlighting the willingness of the international community to move forward with climate action in the Middle East.

הפוסט The Climate Crisis as a Foreign Policy Issue:<br> Israeli Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The experts of the Mitvim Institute shed light on the implications of the new government for Israeli foreign policy. Dr. Gil Murciano describes the “government of change” as a “government of rehabilitation” and urges it to sever alliances Netanyahu forged with illiberal governments; Dr. Nimrod Goren outlines the broad agreement on foreign policy issues among the diverse coalition parties enabling them to set aside ideological differences; Merav Kahana-Dagan welcomes the increased representation of women in strategic spaces; Dr. Lior Lehrs describes the gaps between Bennett’s “conflict reduction” approach and ongoing unilateral Israeli moves, suggesting a potential clash in the future both within the coalition and between Bennett and the Biden Administration; Dr. Roee Kibrik believes that despite the constraints of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the new government still has significant foreign policy maneuverability; Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu sees Netanyahu’s downfall as an opportunity for renewed top-level dialogue with the European Union if the government adopts a new tone on the peace process; Sana Knaneh describes the new coalition as representing the spectrum of Israel’s many tribes but wonders whether numerical representation promises equal partnership in terms of influence; Nadav Tamir identifies an opportunity to turn the page on relations with the US administration; and former Knesset member Ksenia Svetlova calls for re-prioritizing Israel’s relations with Jordan given their current nadir.

הפוסט Israel’s New Government; Initial Commentary by Experts at the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Some would say that, in the international arena we are doing well. Indeed signing the Abraham Agreements was an uplifting moment for all of us. However, we have not come any closer to the solution of the main conflict with our Palestinian neighbors; some will even suggest that it is time we realize that this is an enduring problem, never to be resolved. I beg to differ and maintain that our relations with the Palestinians are always an essential issue. The celebrated Abraham Agreements were a welcome development but they were made with countries that we never fought, while the painful dispute between Israel and the Palestinians lingers on. However, whether in times of conflict or in times of conflict resolution, Israel must seek the support or at least the understanding of the international community.

This is why we should act promptly to fix the damaged relations between Israel and so many in the United States.  Under Prime Minister Netanyahu Israel abandoned its long time bi-partisan policy and sided whole-heartedly with the Republican president. I recall how, during the Obama presidency, a republican activist (who will remain unnamed), had told me that as an Israeli diplomat I must work with both parties; however, his mission was to “make sure that this president should be shoved into the dustbin of history, and if it takes your hallowed bipartisanship, so be it!”

We must always avoid these acrimonious situations. We should strive for bi-partisanship and thanks to President Biden, we can resume the traditional bi-partisanship. In fact, by initiating a friendly telephone call to PM Bennet, President Biden already made the first step towards restoring the special relations with Israel. PM Bennett and FM Lapid will no doubt embrace this impressive and heart-warming presidential gesture and work closely with the administration, in contrast with Netanyahu’s livid defiance.

Israel’s relations with the US Congress are just as important and should be cultivated by our political leadership. There is an urgent need to reestablish the intimacy with the democrats in order to restore the bi-partisanship. However, given that there are five hundred and thirty five lawmakers on Capitol Hill and that each one of them has a voting finger, this task is overwhelmingly huge and must be shouldered by the talented diplomats we have. After all, how many lawmakers can the PM meet? Thus, activating its eight consulates general throughout the United States, Israel should be able to approach as many lawmakers as possible. The consulates should therefore be strengthened. In fact, it would be a good idea to restore the consulate general in Philadelphia, which the MFA had to close down a few years ago in a “penny wise and pound foolish” move.

Sometimes it is easier to obtain a meeting with a lawmaker in his or her hometown rather than in Washington. Hence, the joint activities of the embassy in Washington and the consulates should be coordinated by the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem, assigning duties to the various missions abroad.

The Jewish communities, including the reform and conservative streams, are significant in that respect.  Firstly, our brotherly connection with the second largest (or maybe the largest) half of the Jewish people is vital for Jewish continuity. Secondly, a vast Jewish majority favors the democrats and for them. They can help bridging the gap and facilitating an easier approach to the heart of the American decision-making process. Those who prefer evangelical inroads and treat the Jewish communities with an easy-going disdain may cause a significant damage. The evangelicals may by friendly all the way to Armageddon, but they are not family.   Our Jewish brethren may scold us for deserting our liberal foundation, but their rage is of the loving sort and they will be with us, critical as they may be, because we are family. Once again, we need as many branches in the United States to uphold that partnership (and, of course, maintain and promote our relations with non-Jews as well).

In short, Prime Minister Bennett and Foreign Minister Lapid have their jobs cut for them. It is their turn now. Beyond the many challenges enumerated above, they must restore the bi-partisanship and rebuild our alliance with the United States and its Jewish community. To achieve this goal, Israel must rehabilitate and expand its foreign service.

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 14 June 2021

הפוסט Healing the rift: The road that must be taken הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The war between the wars strategy is underpinned by an assumption that Israel is destined to experience significant, temporary escalation every few years in its conflict with the resistance axis – whether Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Its goal is to delay escalation as long as possible and shore up Israel‘s strategic position in the interim in preparation for the next round.

However, this strategy has failed to achieve its far-reaching goals in recent years. Each round of fighting has eroded Israel’s position further. Israel’s standing deteriorates with each new round of escalation as Hamas grows stronger in the domestic Palestinian arena and Israel grows weaker on the international stage. This has become abundantly clear with the ICC’s decision to investigate alleged Israeli war crimes during Operation Protective Edge (2014).The recent round of escalation also caused a the deep tear in the fabric of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel. In addition, despite the Israeli military’s operational successes, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have upgraded their capacity to inflict damage on Israel’s home front, in terms both of quantity and quality. Instead of the war between the wars shaping reality during the rounds of fighting, the rounds of fighting are shaping the overall reality.

However, the main flaw of the war between the wars does not lie in the strategy’s failure to achieve its operational goals, but in the adoption of its underpinning logic by Israel’s political leadership in lieu of diplomacy. The war between the wars dictates the logic of maintaining the status quo at all cost and accepting a chronicle of certain deterioration while eschewing a real attempt to shape reality. It constitutes a desperate attempt to freeze reality with the best case scenario that things will not get any worse. As a plan conceived by Israel’s security echelons in response to a change in the nature of the threat, the war between the wars aims to limit the enemies’ capabilities and influence their short-term considerations rather than affecting their motivations. It is hard to blame the security echelons for this failure; as a military stopgap measure this strategy was never meant to change the systemic conditions of the conflict or provide long-term political incentives.

The war between the wars was conceived by a security establishment subordinate to a political leadership that lacks vision or desire for long-term policy. Its adoption as a national work plan fits the anti-solutionism approach adopted by Israeli governments over the past decade to a tee. The Netanyahu governments have turned the decision to avoid decisions into a strategy, studiously avoiding discussion of long-term solutions, and instead creating a creeping reality, whether annexation of Area C or the conduct vis-à-vis the Hamas or in the state’s relationship with its Arab citizens. Even the significant diplomatic developments of recent years – President Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and the Abraham Accords – were not the product of an Israeli peace initiative. They simply exploited circumstantial opportunities.

The war between the wars creates a false sense of proactivity. It is a policy that sanctifies creativity and operational initiative in eliminating operational risks but enables the political echelon to avoid diplomatic measures. We have thus become a nation of terrorist hunters rather than of statespersons and foreign policy makers, excelling in the military act but repeatedly squandering its precious achievements in the absence of a strategic policy agenda or even of specific policy goals. This illusion of proactivity collapses with every escalation. While we are busy trying to preserve the status quo, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are learning, adapting and improving conditions for the next round.

The diplomatic paralysis finds Israel at a critical moment for the future of the conflict – on the one hand an unprecedented array of regional opportunities, on the other, a significant level of risk in the national-Palestinian arena. Shared interests provide Israel with an opportunity to make use of its partnership with states in the region (especially Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) as leverage to revitalize the negotiation process with the PA and as a temporary conflict prevention tool through economic development of Gaza. However, Israel is also facing the twilight of the Abu Mazen era and its unusual Israeli-Palestinian security coordination that foiled the establishment of a terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and renewal of terror attacks from PA territory. The new reality of a politically weak, divided Fatah, abandoned by its Arab partners and weakened by the Israeli government, casts a dark shadow on the continued security coordination with the PA and increases the odds of Hamas growing its power in the West Bank. The next round of fighting could present Israel with an active new front on the West Bank.

Following a decade of voluntary paralysis, Israel must now prioritize diplomacy once again and renew its bid for peace with the Palestinians. Israel must provide a political alternative to the policy of repeated escalations, while still taking advantage of regional and local changes. Israel must formulate a new political blueprint for its relations with the PA, including halting settlement activity and creating joint mechanisms to reduce tensions in Jerusalem and its surrounding communities. Such an initiative would stabilize the relationship with Abu Mazen‘s successors, present Palestinians with hope and ensure continued security coordination with Israel. It can eventually constitute the basis for confidence building between the sides‘ leaders and the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In this regard, Israel should turn the Abraham Accords into a strategic tie breaker by integrating the states of the region into renewed diplomacy with the Palestinians. Such a move would also be beneficial for deepening regional cooperation to encompass additional strategic areas, such as forging defense alliances vis-a-vis Iran and its proxies and roping Saudi Arabia into the normalization agreements. Within the framework of a renewed political process, Israel must commit to a joint international effort for Gaza’s development. Plenty of ideas and initiatives have been floated in the past decade. But Israeli and international attention to this issue usually lasts two-three weeks after each round of escalation, receding with the shift in public attention. Linking improving the quality of life for Gaza‘s residents with the political process would generate long-term Israeli, Palestinian and international commitment.

The war between the wars has served as the necessary minimum for Israel’s bearable existence in a dynamic threat arena over the past decade. But the limitation of this military strategy in ensuring Israel’s security underscores the message resonating in recent weeks from Gaza all the way to the northern border – that along with a determined struggle against the resistance axis and its proxies, the main campaign in which Israel should engage to prevent further wars is the campaign for peace.

הפוסט The Defeat Between the Wars: Time for Diplomacy to Lead הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

2020 was a year of tremendous disruption. Israel, like the entire world, was shut down by the coronavirus pandemic. Elections were held, the new government weighed the possibility of pursuing annexation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank, only to pivot towards signing normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.

Throughout the year, Mitvim generated new progressive foreign policy knowledge for fast-developing situations. Mitvim applied this knowledge to foster change in the policy world by engaging with Israeli and international actors in politics, diplomacy, and civil society. Mitvim executed its mission by producing original research, developing policy recommendations, organizing public online events, participating in regional and international policy dialogues, conducting Israeli public opinion polling, and giving briefings to Members of Knesset (MKs), government officials, and foreign diplomats. In addition, Mitvim experts regularly appeared in leading media outlets to provide commentaries and spell out possible paths forward regarding a variety of foreign policy issues.

To improve Israel’s foreign policy, Mitvim worked in 2020 to highlight foreign policy issues throughout the general elections, impact the new government’s foreign policy priorities and conduct, monitor developments and assess trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy, study Israeli public opinion, convene its fourth annual conference, strengthen the democracy component in Israel’s foreign policy, and empower Israel’s Foreign Service after several years in which it was constantly marginalized. Mitvim regularly engaged with Members of Knesset (MKs), ministers, and senior government officials, and its experts appeared before relevant Knesset committees.

הפוסט The Mitvim Institute 2020 Annual Report הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Morocco is committed to the Palestinian issue and to safeguarding Islam’s holy sites, a commitment stemming above all from the religious authority vested in its king as a descendant of the Alawite dynasty and Prophet Muhammad’s family. Morocco has been an Arab League member since 1958 and has chaired the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Al-Quds Committee for the protection of Islam’s holy sites since 1975.

This role makes Morocco relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and especially to any discussion of Jerusalem as a core issue in such negotiations. A deep cultural tie also binds Morocco to Israeli Jews of Moroccan origin. Tens of thousands of Israelis visit Morocco annually, many of them in search of their roots and heritage, often more than once. The Moroccan language, culture and heritage remain conspicuously present in many Israeli homes.

Morocco has played a role in the peace process between Israel and its neighbors from time to time throughout its history due to its relatively neutral foreign policy, its location between east and west, and the trust it engenders in both sides to the conflict.

King Hassan II attributed importance to this role and his involvement consisted mainly of facilitating communication between rival actors and providing an ideal meeting venue for initial stages of negotiations. Such was the case at the difficult birth of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process in the 1970s.

However, since the Second Intifada broke out in October 2000, Morocco’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shrunk significantly and to this day is characterized by avoidance and excessive caution.

Nonetheless, Morocco has increased its involvement in mediating other conflicts in the Arab world and Africa in recent years as a tenet of its foreign policy. This may provide an opportunity for increased Moroccan involvement in moves to advance Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution, which would depend on the political and public attitudes of Israelis, Moroccans and Palestinians.

Public perceptions in Israel present an opportunity for cooperation. The declaration of renewed official ties between Israel and Morocco generated widespread support in Israel. For Many Israelis, Morocco is not just “another state” in the region; it blends seamlessly into the landscape of nostalgia and memory that is the backdrop of Israeli society. An extensive network of civilian ties based on shared Moroccan identity and values also binds the two countries.

Some one million Jews of Moroccan origin live in Israel, where they preserve their Moroccan identity alongside their Israeli one. Morocco recognizes them as its second-largest diaspora in the world (after France).

Morocco’s renewal of ties with Israel generated a measured response by the Palestinian Authority, certainly compared to its harsh criticism of Israel’s Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Personal calls by the Moroccan monarch to PA President Mahmoud Abbas may have softened its stand, as well as Morocco’s insistence that it was not forging new ties with Israel within the Abraham Accords framework but merely resuming previous relations. The PA’s reluctance to damage its ties with Morocco was also a contributing factor. However, the renewed ties might have damaged Morocco’s neutral image in the eyes of the Palestinians to a certain extent.

The Palestinian issue remains on Morocco’s agenda, and pro-Palestinian public activity has increased significantly in recent years. Reactions in Morocco to the official renewal of relations with Israel were complex. On the one hand, they were highly positive, primarily due to the resulting US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and prompted a significant awakening of new organizations dedicated to strengthening ties with Israel and expansion of activities by existing ones. On the other hand, the move generated protests and significant opposition, along with sensitive questions in the Moroccan political arena as it prepares for elections this year.

Morocco has not been and will not be the main engine or catalyst for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, nor a key mediator. There are other more powerful international actors with greater resources and more effective leverage that could play a more significant role under certain circumstances in prompting or accompanying the peace process. However, Morocco’s politics, geography and identity provide it with an opportunity to assist and support on a wide variety of issues that are key to advancing peace.

Moroccan foreign policy that strives for a posture of neutrality and for contributing to regional stability, the positive attitude and relative trust it engenders among both Palestinians and Israelis, as well as its historic experience, provide it with an opportunity to assist in mediating between the sides. For example, on the issue of Jerusalem.

This issue is broader than the national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and involves many actors, such as adherents of the three monotheistic faiths, Jordan that serves as the Arab world’s custodian of the Jerusalem sites holy to Islam, Saudi Arabia that is seeking a prestigious foothold in Jerusalem, as well as Turkey, the Catholic and Orthodox churches and, of course, Morocco, which as mentioned, holds a formal position on behalf of the OIC.

Morocco has important symbolic standing in this arena and an opportunity to legitimize whatever creative agreements the sides reach on the future of Jerusalem. It could also aid in improving the fabric of ties in the city even before agreement is reached.

Morocco’s geopolitical location between East and West and Africa and Europe also provides it with opportunities to contribute to the peace process. Morocco is a member of African regional organizations, which it could harness in support of the peace process. Morocco is also part of the Mediterranean, together with Israel and the PA.

While Israel’s immediate interests in that region lie in its partnership with Greece and Cyprus, Morocco could constitute a significant partner for strengthening institutions and cooperation throughout the Mediterranean, at the same time leveraging regional frameworks to advance Israeli-Palestinian cooperation (such as the Union for the Mediterranean, of which Israel and the PA are also members).

Morocco could also contribute to mobilizing public Israeli support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by virtue of its symbolic and emotional value for many Israelis of Moroccan origin. Morocco’s support, and the support of King Mohammed for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations could have a positive impact on the attitudes of Israelis of Moroccan origin to negotiations. This impact could increase as civilian ties between the two states expand and their relationship warms.

The international community sees similarities between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara, at least in terms of international law on occupation and sovereignty claims. Morocco is doing all it can, and is likely to continue doing so, to prevent such comparison, but there is undoubtedly room to study and compare international attitudes and policies to both these cases.

Should Israelis and Palestinians harness the political will to advance peace, both will find a credible, committed and positive ally in Morocco, which offers relevant opportunities and assets and would be positively inclined to help to the best of its ability to ensure the success of the process. And until the peace process is revived, it would be worthwhile offering Morocco a role in encouraging dialogue on the issue of Jerusalem in order to ease tensions and prevent escalation.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 8th 2021.

הפוסט How Morocco relates to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli government and the public are unaware of the dramatic change in US attitudes toward Israel, especially in the American Jewish community. This change reached new heights at the last conference attended (virtually due to the pandemic) by Democratic Party leaders in both houses of Congress and senior government representatives alongside leaders of all the religious denominations of American Jewry.

The J Street conference received minimal Israeli media coverage, which focused narrowly on comments made by leading progressive senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, who both mentioned the importance of monitoring how Israel applies the $3.8 billion in US military aid received annually under former US president Barack Obama’s administration’s memorandum of understanding.

Israeli media falsely portrayed J Street as a marginal organization in which only members of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party participate. In reality, at the conference, along with the senators mentioned, Senate Democratic Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi also appeared alongside US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield and many other leaders of the Democratic party.

The lack of response to the conference in Israel stems from Israel’s inability to understand the general picture in the US, an understanding that is critical to our relationship with our most important ally. The special relationship with the US is a key element in Israel’s national security. So too, is the connection to the largest Jewish community in the world, outside of Israel, which is strategic to a state that defines itself as the nation state of the Jewish people.

For years we have become accustomed to all-encompassing American support regardless of our governments’ policies while relying on legacy Jewish organizations in the US to ensure that this situation lasts forever.

J Street was established because the vast majority of American Jews no longer agree that blindly supporting the Israeli government by established Jewish organizations ignores the values and opinions of the majority of American Jews. American Jews are tired of Israel expecting them to support the country financially and advance Israeli government positions through lobbying, while Israel ignores their values and positions and discriminates exclusively in favor of the Orthodox Jewish denomination.

Most American Jews seek a home and a voice for those who want to support Israel without sacrificing their progressive values.

Before the establishment of J Street, the only option for those who care about Israel but did not identify with Israeli government positions were to disengage or support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. With the growth and success of J Street, they now have a liberal Zionist option.

In a relatively short period of time, J Street has transformed itself from a “start-up” that was not given a chance to compete for impact with the institutionalized organizations into a significant force in American foreign policy in the Israeli context. A large number of Democratic candidates for US House and US Senate running in the 2020 elections sought and received J Street’s endorsement.

Keinon correct states that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Republican representatives did not attend the conference. But they were certainly invited: I myself sent the invitations to the prime minister and ambassador in Washington, and know that the invitations were received.

The reason that the Republicans and representatives of the Israeli government did not participate in our conference is that J Street is not another organization without taste and without color. This is an organization that represents a clear worldview that is inconsistent with today’s Republican Party, which in the era of former US president Donald Trump lost the moderate elements that it has had throughout history and aligned entirely with the position of Netanyahu’s coalition.

There has been a shift in the Democratic Party, not due to anti-Israel sentiments, as is commonly thought in Israel. The shift was toward a more critical stance due to Netanyahu’s abandonment of the bipartisan approach that Israel has taken since its inception and his decision to take a clear side in American politics, allying with Republican and Evangelical Christians. The shift was created because, in the Netanyahu era, Israel is abandoning the liberal values manifested in Declaration of Independence that connected the Democratic Party with the state.

There are important organizations that deal with Israeli-US relations and focus on the relations between the countries regardless of the values and policies that this alliance represents. J Street is not such an organization. For us, close relations that eliminate any chance for peace and violate Palestinian human rights are not a worthy goal. We certainly want close relations that strengthen Israel’s security and prosperity, but also those that help Israel achieve an arrangement that will prevent the continuation of the toxic status quo that leads to a dual-national catastrophe. We are promoting relations that will keep the morality of Israel alongside its security.

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with J Street, no other organization represents the vast majority of the Jewish community and no other organization is closer to the Democratic Party, which is currently in the White House and has a majority in both houses of Congress. Those who care about US-Israel relations should listen to Herb Keinon.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 1st 2021.

הפוסט Israel is unaware of the change in US attitudes towards it הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu Says He’s a Mega-Diplomat, <br> but Key Embassies are Empty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel Must Restore Bipartisanship in the US Political System הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The two countries leading this new mode of diplomacy are China and Russia, which are both trying to market their homegrown vaccines to, mainly, developing countries lacking the resources to obtain vaccinations or to countries that have yet signed agreements with western vaccine producers. China vigorously acts for obvious reasons: by delivering vaccines to developing African countries, and recently to developed countries also, china gains valuable credit points which will translate in the future to economic and political currency. Understandably, China also gains favorable public opinion coverage. China also joined the WHO’s COVAX initiative intended to assist in vaccinating developing countries. This comes at the backdrop of the US withdrawal from the WHO under Trump, and Biden’s announcement of its return. It was recently reported that Israel is harnessing the vaccines as a tool in its diplomatic toolkit, sharing the vaccines, according to reports, with a few countries. Among them, are countries that are intending to move their embassies to Jerusalem, such as Guatemala, Honduras and the Czech Republic.

The discourse of recent years, which weighs almost every issue in terms of utility, has pushed aside moral-social arguments and justifications which are perceived as testimonies for weakness instead of strength

However, what about the Palestinians in the West Bank? Does Israel need to ensure their supply of vaccines (not only to the Palestinian workers in Israel)? If so, after we established that “charity begins at home”, Israel must assist the Palestinians regardless of the vaccine diplomacy. Why is that you ask? For four main reasons: First, morally, after Israel ensured the needs of its citizens, it is appropriate that Israel helps its neighbors under its control, or at least under its influence, to deal with a global pandemic. It is in a time of need, that the true character of a country and a society is exposed. When it comes to the Gaza Strip, some have created a linkage between supplying vaccines in return for the Israelis held by Hamas. However, Aviram Shaul, the brother of the fallen soldier Oron Shaul who is still in the hands of Hamas, explained very well that Israel has a moral, religious and health-related interest in supplying vaccines to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip regardless.

Secondly, Israeli courts have clarified before that Israel has a legal obligation to take care of a population under its control. Once in regard to providing gas masks to Palestinians during the first Gulf War and second in regard to preventing a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Some will also forcefully argue, with a great deal of justice, that the international law obliges Israel to do so.

Thirdly, from the point of view of ensuring the health of the Israeli public, it is necessary to vaccinate our neighbors with whom we interact. After all tens of thousands of Palestinian workers enter Israel and return to their family and environment daily and as we all know, the borders between us and Judea and Samaria are not sealed.

Fourthly, from a public relations point of view, it is clear that sharing vaccines with the Palestinians will serve Israel well in the international arena, both against public opinions and governments. The necessity of public diplomacy is well illustrated by the joke told on Saturday Night Live’s news parody, “weekend update”, that “Israel is reporting that they’ve vaccinated half of their population, and I’m going to guess it’s the Jewish half”.

The discourse of recent years, which weighs almost every issue in terms of utility, has pushed aside moral-social arguments and justifications which emphasize the necessity of values such as social solidarity, shared responsibility and the like. These, are perceived as testimonies for weakness instead of strength and righteousness. These notions are indeed discussed around the world, but it is precisely Israel – which often praises its capabilities and virtues to all of humanity to see – who must from time to time look at crises and epidemics with more humane eyes.

הפוסט “Vaccine Dealers” Have Forgotten Morality הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Emilie Moatti, Labor:

Since Rabin’s assassination, the leadership of the Israeli left has internalized its own delegitimization perpetuated by the right, and it has tended to seek confirmation of its positions from the right-wing mainstream. People with liberal views generally refrained from expressing unpopular positions, and this has prevented the left’s leadership from speaking out on the Palestinian issue, despite the fact that the majority of the Israeli public supports negotiations and the two-state solution. Despite the delegitimization against the left, the majority of Israelis still believe that peace is the correct path and that conflicts are not resolved by war.

The pursuit of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is first and foremost an Israeli interest, which concurrently pursues justice for the aspirations of our Palestinian neighbors. This is important both strategically and morally. The right’s claim that the Palestinian issue can be ignored is childish and dangerous, despite the Abraham Accords. Even if Arab countries let go of the Palestinian issue, we must not do so. Labor has a clear interest in turning every stone to find a solution to the conflict, based on separation and the 1967 borders, to promote a vision of a secure Israel.

Labor has never abandoned the quest for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, and our entire list is in sync and share the same vision. In the next government, which hopefully will be an alternative to Netanyahu’s rule, Labor will lead a return to negotiations. Today there is not much cooperation with Jordan and Egypt, hence we will cultivate our peace with them, especially economically and culturally, as even a cold peace needs a nurturing hand and a caring shoulder.

We should stop claiming that the whole world is against us and that Israel’s existence is in doubt. It is in Netanyahu’s interest that we feel persecuted, but in practice, Israel is a significant player in the international arena and cooperates with many countries. Israel’s global reach should be expanded, but without aligning with non-liberal leaderships, such as Brazil, Poland, and Trump. The Americans were able to say goodbye to a populist president, who was bad for both them and us.

The powers of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have been dispersed to countless other ministries, and in recent years more and more professional diplomats left the ministry. This requires change. Professional diplomats should be preferred over political appointees, especially in major capitals around the world. Israel’s diplomats should represent the country, regardless of the political identity of the foreign minister, and feel part of an influential and meaningful Foreign Service.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair of Meretz:

The Israeli MFA is very weak as its powers have been stripped away for many years to form new, unnecessary ministries. This has ultimately harmed Israeli interests. The MFA has the knowledge and experience to lead Israeli diplomacy, and it needs to be strengthened. This can be done by passing the Foreign Service Act, which will solidify the status of the MFA and will prevent any political whim to weaken it. Israel’s foreign relations must highlight democracy and human rights. Israel must be on the side of democracy, as democracies around the world are deteriorating. Israel should not prefer countries that erode democracy, as Netanyahu does.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue is very relevant and the recent decision by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) shows how crucial solving the conflict is for Israel’s future. Meretz opposes the prosecution of Israeli soldiers and we are in favor of Israel and Israelis, but it is the right-wing government’s policy that drags Israel to the ICC. It is impossible to control millions of Palestinians, deny them basic rights, reject any international involvement, and then say that anyone who criticizes Israel is anti-Semitic and an enemy of Israel. Israel has a responsibility. We must take our destiny into our own hands and make a change in Israel’s policy that works towards solving the conflict. This will resolve the issue of the ICC.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is frozen and the situation on the ground is getting worse. We need to return to dialogue and negotiations, and leverage the renewed American support for a two-state solution under President Biden. The two-state solution will lead to breakthroughs in Israel’s relations with other actors, including in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. This is in Israel’s best interest. To realize and maximize the potential of normalization with Arab countries, we must concurrently move forward with the Palestinians. As long as there is a stalemate in the peace process, relations with the region will remain limited.

The situation in the Gaza Strip is severe. It is in our interest to allow the Gaza Strip to be developed and promote political unity between Gaza and the West Bank, under the Palestinian Authority’s rule. The Palestinian Authority is an ally of Israel and anyone who says that Palestinian President Abbas is a terrorist is detached from reality. The Israeli right has not repealed the Oslo Accords, which it likes to slander, because the accords serve Israel. It would be good if there were elections in the Palestinian Authority and if a democratic society prevails there. Palestinians living in East Jerusalem should also participate in the elections if they wish to, and the decision as to which parties will participate and in what way is an internal Palestinian matter.

The EU is a friend of Israel and is enormously important to Israel, also because of its commitment to democracy. The political right’s claim that the EU is hostile to us and persecutes us, just because it criticizes the settlements, is simply not true. The EU is a strong ally, and relations between Israel and European countries, such as France and Germany, are a tremendous asset to Israel.

MK Orna Barbivai, Yesh Atid:

The MFA is significant to Israel’s national security, as diplomacy is a strategic tool for maximizing Israel’s qualitative edge. Our national resilience lies not only in security, but also in foreign affairs. The erosion of Israel’s democracy also affects our diplomacy, as the latter has become synonymous with populism because of one man’s monopoly to determine with whom we build relations and with whom we destroy. Legislation is needed to regulate the status of the MFA and give it more legitimacy to influence policy.

Israel must strive for normalization and peace. Israel’s power, which occasionally needs to be demonstrated, is meant to be used to achieve peace with our neighbors. The discourse on peace and the two-state solution must be returned to the agenda. The normalization agreements with Arab states must be leveraged in favor of promoting dialogue with the Palestinians. Leadership is the ability to analyze risks and identify potential collaborations.

I welcome the normalization agreements, but they lacked transparency, which is not how foreign relations should be conducted. The accords were brought to the Knesset’s approval before Members of Knesset even knew what they included. The Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee needs to deal more with foreign affairs. The parliaments of many countries separate between security and foreign issues, and Israel should take a similar approach to increase the importance of foreign affairs.

In my opinion, the ICC’s investigation has no legitimacy. Israel does not, in any way, commit war crimes. It makes a great effort to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Every effort should be made to repel the investigation, beginning with leading a transparent procedure that will legitimize the Israeli position.

The EU is a friend of Israel and it preserves Israel’s interests. One-third of Israel’s trade is with the EU. We need to improve our dialogue with the EU, and advancing these ties should be defined as a policy objective. There are many differences of opinion between Israel and the EU, including on the lack of European condemnation of the BDS movement, which require change. But in order to bring change there is no escape from having a dialogue with Europe and promoting cooperation with it. A different approach is harmful to Israel and reinforces negative perceptions of Israel.

The Iranian threat is vital and Israel’s deterrence is an important tool for dealing with it. Iran is making a great effort to harm us. It should be shown to Iran that it is not worth provoking Israel. Israel must be involved in formulating the new nuclear agreement and ensure that the agreement addresses its interests. This requires a well-oiled decision-making system that is not based solely on Netanyahu’s interests. We will also have to work hard to rebuild the bridges Netanyahu burnt and the damage he has done to Israel’s relations with the Democratic Party.

Dani Dayan, Tikva Hadasha:

Netanyahu clipped the MFA’s wings due to a fundamentally wrong assumption that the ministry serves a political agenda. When I was appointed by Netanyahu to serve as the Israeli Consul-General in New York, I found a financially depleted ministry with very professional and stately staff. Crucial information should not be hidden from the MFA, which must also be empowered by abolishing unnecessary ministries.

It is blatantly irresponsible and inconceivable to me that we have a part-time ambassador in Washington DC, who simultaneously acts as Israel’s ambassador to the UN. It is an impossible task for one person and disrespectful to both the US and the UN. It is another symptom of a political system that has a state, and not a state that has a political system.

During my tenure in New York, I felt that Netanyahu did not back me on the three issues I devoted most of my time to, and which in my view were the most important to Israel’s foreign policy: (1) the need to maintain bipartisan support in the US. The spirit coming out of Netanyahu’s office, and of our embassy in Washington DC, was one of complete identification with a single party, not just with their president. Many ties were severed, and unnecessary rivalries were created; (2) We greatly missed an opportunity to address minorities in the US. We demand that the Americans understand us, but we did not make an effort to understand the Democratic Party. This requires a comprehension of the African-American narrative and the issue of immigration. If we continue this path, we will lose the Democratic Party; (3) We neglected the Jewish community and acted indifferently, or even worse, towards them.  For five years, there has been no meeting between Netanyahu and the president of the US Reform Movement. Gideon Sa’ar [the chair of Tikva Hadasha] will take a fundamentally different approach and will welcome all Jews with open arms.

We do not see eye-to-eye with the Biden administration regarding the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most of the disagreements revolve around the settlement issue, but it is still important to maintain a dialogue with the administration. The Biden Administration is the friendliest Democratic administration we could expect, and it will not force us and the Palestinians into a peace process. Everyone realizes an agreement is not feasible at the moment. On the Iranian issue as well, we can reach a fruitful dialogue with the White House. The administration wants to return to the nuclear deal. Dialogue with the administration can influence the way things are done, and perhaps it could even prevent a return to the nuclear agreement altogether.

Lastly, I am glad that we have recently forged diplomatic relations with three countries in Latin America, with which we have not had diplomatic relations before. I believe that we should now try to renew relations with Cuba as well.

MK Aida Touma-Suleiman, Joint List:

Israel does not conduct its foreign relations as a state of nine million people, but as a superpower because of its relationship with the US, which also affects other regional states’ foreign policy towards it. Israel will not integrate into the Middle East as long as the occupation continues. The prolong occupation impacts Israel domestically and diplomatically, especially with Europe, the US, international bodies, and the Middle East. If Israel is interested in normalizing its foreign relations, it must end the occupation and treat its Arab minority equitably. Thereafter, Israel will be better accepted in the world.

The Joint List’s attempt to explain to the world what is happening in Israel from our experience, as those who are fighting the occupation, is often considered in Israel as sabotaging its foreign affairs. In fact, the Israeli government wants to hide what is happening in Israel. When this is revealed to the outside world, it is considered sabotaging and a crime according to Israeli law. Only countries that have something to hide legislate such laws. Israel must not base its international relations on lies and lack of transparency.

We are asked “why have you not joined Israel’s Foreign Service?” First of all, until recently there was not a single Israeli political leader who said that the Arabs were legitimate partners in the government. Indeed, most Arab citizens have a problem representing Israel abroad, as Israel continues to occupy our people. A person with opinions like mine cannot fit into the Israeli Foreign Service and be happily accepted. The Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee already had Arab members, but I do not see myself sitting in a committee that almost completely discusses security issues. If we do participate, it will be a game of cat and mouse, as they will surely move the important issues to be discussed in subcommittees to avoid us.

Israel’s agreements with Gulf states are part of a power struggle in the Middle East. Israel instils fear in everyone regarding Iran, to preserve its hegemony and nuclear supremacy in the region. The agreements are meant for bilateral cooperation and have nothing to do with the Palestinian cause. They were promoted as part of the Trump plan, which did not promote peace. On the contrary, the agreements exclude and isolate the Palestinians. They are an attempt to impose a process and decisions on the Palestinians, to suit Israel’s goals. The normalization agreements do not contribute to peace but rather distance it.

הפוסט How to Improve Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies? <br> Summary of the Mitvim Institute’s Pre-Election Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Naturally, the current focus is on the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the campaign agenda relates largely to the domestic handling of the crisis, it also highlights some external aspects. For the Likud, for example, the vaccinations serve as a campaign tool, as does the proposed joint Israeli-European-Gulf vaccination initiative. Blue and White has lambasted Netanyahu’s plan to provide vaccines to other countries, claiming he was not authorized to do so. The Arab Joint List and Meretz highlighted Israel’s responsibility as an occupying power to vaccinate the Palestinians in the territories. The Yamina and Religious Zionist parties conditioned the vaccination of Palestinians on the return of soldiers’ bodies held by Hamas, and New Hope called for vaccinating Israelis first and charging the Palestinian Authority for inoculating the Palestinians.

The nuclear agreement with Iran is also an election issue given President Biden’s decision to renew diplomatic approach towards Tehran. Whereas during the Trump Administration, almost all parties sided with the Likud and Netanyahu on this issue, this time their views have diverged. The Likud opposes any return to the agreement and advocates continued sanctions even at the cost of a clash with the Americans. Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu and Blue and White emphasize the importance of Israeli dialogue with the US, whereas Labor and Meretz argue that the nuclear agreement is the best strategy to curb Iran’s nuclear program and urge a return to diplomacy in coordination with the Americans.

The decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on a war crimes probe against Israel has also become a campaign issue. The Likud, Yamina and Yisrael Beitenu have described the ruling as anti-Semitic, New Hope underscored the Court’s politicization, Yesh Atid, Blue and White and Labor emphasized the ICC’s lack of jurisdiction in this matter, whereas the Religious Zionist party demanded that Israel raze Khan al-Ahmar in response. Meretz and the Joint List argue that the ICC operates in accordance with international law and that it is in Israel’s best interests and responsibility to end the occupation and the settlement enterprise.

The tar from an oil spill that polluted Israel’s coast provided an opportunity for the parties to address the key global climate change issue. Yesh Atid took the opportunity to present its plans for dealing with climate change through cooperation with other countries. Netanyahu chose to call for establishment of an association of states to handle such incidents. Meretz highlighted the need to strive for zero carbon emissions, as did New Hope, which also highlighted Israel’s possible contribution to the global campaign to address climate change.

However, the occupied territories, an issue around which past campaigns have revolved, is generating hardly any attention. The Likud, Yamina, New Hope and Religious Zionist parties continue to express support for construction in the settlements and Jerusalem and strengthening Israeli sovereignty in the Golan, but other than the Religious Zionist party, none of the others mention territorial annexation or sovereignty over the West Bank. The Labor Party, which supports a two-state solution based on the 1967 borderlines and evacuation of isolated settlements, calls for a halt to construction outside the settlement blocs, declaration of intent to reach a diplomatic agreement, and dialogue with the Palestinians and mediators. Nonetheless, the Labor campaign has marginalized the Palestinian issue. Meretz is the only Zionist party to spotlight its support for the two-state solution and opposition to settlements, urging Israel to take advantage of the Biden presidency to return to negotiations with the Palestinians.

Other foreign-related issues have cropped up on the sidelines of the campaign, such as the need to rehabilitate and strengthen the Foreign Ministry, with the Yesh Atid, Blue and White and Yisrael Beitenu platforms devoting attention to the issue, and Israel’s ties with the European Union that Yamina describes as an enemy, whereas Labor, Meretz and Yesh Atid describe it as a loyal partner. Surprisingly, the recent normalization with Arab states has not drawn much attention in the campaign. Most parties welcome the new ties. Some use them to claim that they obviate the need to move forward with the Palestinians, while others argue that the new relationships can serve to advance the peace process. However, none of the parties emphasize the major potential that lies in relations with the Arab world. The Likud may be avoiding the issue because the public links the opening to the Emirates with increased Covid-19 morbidity. Other parties avoid highlighting the matter in order to deprive Netanyahu of the credit he has assumed for the breakthrough. Normalization with Morocco is the only move that all parties have praised, with Shas, which normally avoids foreign policy issues, including it in its election campaign.

Parties tend to address foreign affairs during campaigns when they want to promote issues that underpin their existence – such as the occupation issue for Meretz or the settlements for Religious Zionism – and feel obliged to react to current affairs that make headlines, as was the case with the ICC ruling. They also refer to such issues when these serve the positioning of their party, as was the case with the Pfizer vaccinations for the Likud. Decisions to highlight certain issues are not random; they are designed to serve the election campaign.

Election campaigns are sensitive to current events that attract public attention. However, our lives and quality of life also depend on fast moving developments outside the country’s borders after the elections – be it a new epidemic, peace agreement, ecological disaster, war, scientific breakthrough or economic crisis. Therefore it is important that we familiarize ourselves with the parties’ positions beyond the immediate campaign.

Party platforms should be read carefully as should the plans they issue, and the extent to which they adhere to their principles should be monitored over time in the Knesset. Where do they stand on strengthening the Foreign Service? What solution do they see to the conflict with the Palestinians? Are they committed to bolstering the peace with Egypt and Jordan? Do they view the EU as friend or foe? How do they think Israel should build relations with countries in the region and the Arab world? Do they think Israel has a role to play in advancing liberal-democratic values in the world? What place should Israel have in the region and the world? These are all important questions for which we must demand clear answers from the parties so that we can make the correct choice on Election Day.

הפוסט Foreign Policy Issues in Israel’s Current Election Campaign הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The latest decision to vaccinate 120,000 Palestinians working in Israel is a step in the right direction, but all Palestinians should be our top priority for all the good reasons – moral, medical, as well as strategic.

From a moral point of view, there is no doubt that we have a responsibility and there is no point in quibbling about unnecessary legal disputes. According to the Israeli government, we have no responsibility for the Palestinians due to the transfer of responsibility for health to the Palestinian Authority in the Oslo Accords. There is a great deal of irony in the fact that the Israeli right-wing camp is suddenly presenting the Oslo Accords at the forefront of its arguments, after years of defaming the agreement, a defamation that even led to the assassination of prime minister Rabin. In addition, it is ironic that the argument about the International Criminal Court having no ruling authority on the Palestinian Authority is 180 degrees opposite to the argument on health, where we hold that this is not a legal entity under international law.

It is important to remember that the Oslo Accords were supposed to lead to a five-year process, at the end of which the temporary state of occupation made possible by international law would end. In reality, not only does the occupation continue, the Israeli government’s policy of promoting settlements and putting demographic pressure on the Palestinian population does not lead to an end to the occupation, but rather to its perpetuation. In addition, we have full control over the mobility of the Palestinians, and even over the population register of their residents. At the bottom line, we definitely have a moral responsibility to their health, as long as they do not have full control and independence as we do.

From a medical viewpoint, we and they are not really separate. Netanyahu was right when he said in an interview with Udi Segal (on Israeli TV Channel 13), that in this context, we are not an island state like Cyprus, New Zealand or Taiwan; but at the same time, Netanyahu misled the public by claiming that the Palestinians were the ones who infected us. The data show that the Palestinian morbidity was caused by contact with Israelis, by contacts that occurred due to political decisions regarding illness-laden flights from New York, Dubai and more.

As we know, Palestinians cannot fly abroad or cross into Jordan without our permission. That is, we could be an island state if we treated the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean as one epidemiological unit, to which uncontrolled entrances should be prevented and all Israelis and Palestinians alike should be vaccinated.

Strategically, the use of vaccines as a lever, in order to improve Israel’s reputation is correct, but we could, with the help of vaccine diplomacy, promote relations with the Palestinians who have invaluable importance to our security and to our future far more so than the residents of Honduras, Guatemala, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to whom Israel offered vaccines. We could also coordinate aid to the Palestinians with the World Health Organization, with the new Biden administration, and with key European countries, which are very rightly concerned about the humanitarian situation of the Palestinians, as very prominently having been raised at the recent AHLC meeting.

We could become an example and role model for the strategic use of vaccine diplomacy. But instead, our government is trying its best to use the vaccines as a political gimmick, which does not have a diplomatic effect on anyone in the world, because its cynicism is transparent and clear.

Countries around the globe are adapting to a change in the leadership of the free world following the recent US elections. Even in our region – the Palestinians are working to promote elections. The Saudis, Egyptians, Turks are changing behavior because they understand that there is a new administration in Washington, for which civil rights and democracy matter.

Only the Israeli government mourns about Trump’s departure, and continues to act as if the world is still led by an inhumane narcissist who has irresponsibly left the World Health Organization in the midst of a global epidemic that cries out for global cooperation.

It is still not too late to correct and leverage the advantage we have in the field of vaccines, in order to do the right thing morally, medically and diplomatically, and to benefit ourselves through aid to the Palestinians.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 10 March 2021.

הפוסט Coronavirus: Israel must vaccinate our Palestinian neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A key cooperation opportunity lies in the field of energy, and specifically alternative energy transportation methods from the Persian Gulf to Europe through the Mediterranean. On a December 2020 visit to Abu Dhabi shortly before leaving office, Former Trump administration Energy Department secretary Dan Brouillette met with his counterparts from the Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel to discuss energy security and the use of pipelines for gas exports. “If we can move natural gas to the coast of Egypt or the coast of Israel, then we’re moving it through the Mediterranean,” he said. He was referring both to the strategic aspect of such a move vis-à-vis Iran, and the importance of diversifying energy export routes from a sensitive region such as the Persian Gulf.

Following a visit to the Emirates in late January, Israeli Energy Ministry Director-General Udi Adiri issued a statement underscoring “the unique opportunity to develop the energy economy of both states and the entire region.” Adiri said his office was promoting a series of infrastructure projects designed to provide a connection to Europe, “and perhaps to Gulf infrastructure in the future. Electricity and natural gas projects will improve regional cooperation.”

It should be noted that the Europe-Asia Pipeline Company (formerly the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company) signed a memorandum of understanding in October 2020 for the transportation of fossil fuel from the Persian Gulf to Israel. The fuel and oil products from the UAE will be shipped to a Red Sea terminal in Eilat and from there to the Mediterranean Ashkelon terminal for distribution to clients. The signing ceremony was held in the presence of the then-US Treasury Secretary and the Emirati Minister of Economy.

Reports and analyses have also emerged in recent weeks about plans for an overland pipeline through Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. These plans have been denied, citing the high costs of such a project, but those involved in the plans appear to be seized with a spirit of creativity.

The diplomatic-strategic rationale is clear. Diversifying gas and oil export routes from the Gulf would reduce the total dependence on the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow, strategic sea route considerably vulnerable to an Iranian attack. In other words, a pipeline running through Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian or Israeli coasts, as mentioned by the former US Energy Secretary, could change the regional energy map and the relationships between the countries involved.

For now, these ideas and plans are all only on paper. However, they have already generated clear concern in Egypt given their possible implications for the Suez Canal.

The head of the Canal Authority has expressed concern about linking the Europe-Asia pipeline to the Persian Gulf. In an Egyptian television interview (January 29) he noted that Egypt was examining ways to deal with the “Israeli-Emirati project” – as he defined it – that could significantly reduce traffic through the canal.

Income from shipping through the canal, it should be noted, is vital to the Egyptian economy, which has already been severely affected by the novel coronavirus crisis. Such plans could also undermine Egypt’s aspirations to become a regional energy hub.

AS PRECIOUSLY noted, the projects’ diplomatic-strategic rationale is sound. The congruence of interests between the Gulf States and Israel, largely based on fear of Iran, could be translated into the energy field.

Nonetheless, Israel has no interest in undermining its relationship with Egypt. Serious thought must be given to integrating Egypt or compensating it appropriately if that is not possible. From an American standpoint, diversifying export alternatives from the Persian Gulf fits its interest in energy security and does not appear to contradict the Biden Administration’s desire to return to the nuclear deal with Iran.

Nonetheless, these plans generate many challenges and question marks. Can the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia adopt such strategic decisions? Is the level of trust with Israel sufficiently high and stable? And if so, can it be preserved and survive future crises? What about the problematic implications for Egypt? And what about the tremendous costs of such an overland pipeline? And of course, what is the position of the new US administration?

In-depth thinking is required to examine the seriousness and feasibility of such plans. Clearly, the Gulf angle opens up a new horizon for relevant players.

Israel is at a strategic-energy crossroads, facing a new range of options. At a news conference (February 14)) alongside the visiting Cypriot president, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to regional cooperation in the post-Abraham Accords era, including energy cooperation. Netanyahu mentioned the UAE’s desire to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and reiterated the shared interest in the proposed East-Med gas pipeline to Europe. The Cypriot president presumably asked how the Gulf angle could be combined with the Hellenic one. As far as Israel is concerned, the two could be complementary.

At issue are strategic-scale decisions and projects. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated global economic uncertainty and cast a measure of doubt on the feasibility of these energy plans and the willingness of international energy companies to invest significant sums given the unclear post-pandemic economic picture.

Nonetheless, Israel is at a fascinating crossroads with significant room for maneuverability. It must ensure a close relationship with the Biden Administration, a necessary precondition for taking advantage of the maneuvering room it now has. The main obstacle for Israel is clear: to conduct itself in light of US plans to renew the nuclear deal with Iran, and to a lesser extent in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a manner that does not place it on a collision course with Biden’s Washington.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2021.

הפוסט Do the Abraham Accords open up new energy opportunities? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The US weakens and converges inward

The important recent change on the world stage was the American decision to reduce its international involvement and withdraw from its leadership position. This trend was evident in the past but gained momentum under Trump, who tended to adopt features of isolationism and who seemed to reject the burden of global leadership. Meanwhile, the international vacuum left by the US was filled by rival powers, chiefly Russia and China, pursuing a return to the multi-polar world order.

China’s global rise began before Obama took office, who respectively pivoted his foreign policy priority towards Asia, but it was Trump who lined-up China and the US on a collision path. Although economic in nature, Trump’s policy had far-reaching political and strategical implications. Meanwhile, Russia exploited the US absence in some areas to return its position to the days of yore. This is evident in the Middle East, more dominantly in Syria but also in Egypt and the Gulf.

What also allowed the illiberal powers to thrive was the EU’s economic and political decline, due to difficulties reaching the necessary consensus among the fragmented member-states to adopt a foreign policy, to the rise of populist leaders and to Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Additionally, the decline of America’s global standing and Trump’s heedless behavior in the multilateral arena, weakened international institutions built upon mutual values of cooperation and solidarity.

Geopolitical changes reshaping Middle East alliances

The events of the Arab Spring, which mostly failed to promote democracy, and the Arab world’s weakening as a collective, fractured the regional standings of most Arab countries and allowed Iran and Turkey to amplify their influence. Iran’s adoption of an aggressive regional policy in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, paved the way for most Sunni states to form an axis with Israel to curb Iran’s influence.

Although Turkey was not as successful in exploiting the Arab countries’ weakening, it remains an influential actor in several scenes and an important country that cannot be ignored. This is true in the Eastern Mediterranean, which attracted increasing global interests, and currently encompasses a battleground between Turkey and other countries but also a fascinating fertile ground for a weave of regional cooperation.

In light of the dramatic changes, the Palestinian cause was pushed aside and the Abraham Accords marked a paradigm shift for some Arab countries, no longer requiring a substantial advancement in the Israel-Palestinian peace process as a precursor for normalization.

Israel shows impressive political maneuvering skills

Israel internalized the regional developments and demonstrated considerable maneuverability in addressing them. It exploited the Arab world’s weakening and the Iranian threat, which also threatened the Gulf states, to improve relations with the Gulf states and even establish formal relations with some. The dialogue with Saudi Arabia has strengthened and at times was even publicly expressed. Simultaneously, Israel tightened its dialogue with Qatar, despite the bad blood between Qatar and the Gulf states, and institutionalized Qatar’s financial support for Hamas to prevent deterioration and preserve the status quo in the Gaza strip.

On the Syrian front, Israel established effective coordination with Russia which was essential after the US decided to withdraw its forces. With Egypt’s Al-Sisi, Israel established a close relationship based on mutual interests, despite the absence of normalization which stands out against the backdrop of Israel’s warming relations with the Gulf states and Morocco. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of an innovative framework for regional cooperation in the form of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, illustrates how much can be achieved with regional cooperation and the close relationships with Greece and Cyprus. Israel also tightened its economic relations with China, but it still needs to navigate the thin line between encouraging Chinese investments and American pressure.

Albeit, the Israeli government exploited the dramatic regional changes to distance the two-state solution, instead of advancing peace with its Palestinian neighbors.

Is there a vision alongside pragmatism?

The question is if Israel’s conduct infers a substantial, paradigmatic shift, or merely a successful “maneuvering skills” as it did before. It seems like it is too early to call Israel’s moves as a paradigmatic shift and much relies on how Israel conducts its relationship with the Biden administration. The entire international arena is gearing up for the new administration, the lion’s share, that of democracies of course, in a clear sigh of relief. Israel’s intimate alignment with the Trump administration and its clear stance on the Republican side, caused considerable damage to Israel’s position in American politics and internationally. The closeness and comfort that Israel felt with the outgoing president and his doctrine, and the publicity Israel gave it, severely damaged the value alignment that Israel shares with the Western-liberal countries, as well as with key parts of the Jewish community in the US. Now, Israel will be required to maneuver and change direction again.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, most central for Israel, the erosion of America’s global standing and its withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, with Israel’s clear encouragement, raise many questions about Israel’s political sage in recent years. The international community is now required to renegotiate on an improved deal with Iran, which increased uranium enrichment levels, signaling a rigid bargaining position despite its difficult economic situation due to sanctions and the pandemic. A renewed and united international front against Iran will better serve Israel’s interests, than the sweeping opposition it has expressed to the previous negotiations between the powers with Iran.

The repression of the Palestinian issue and the ongoing creeping annexation do not eliminate the necessity for a solution to the conflict, rather they only distance it. It is precisely the improved regional and international circumstances in recent years, including some Arab countries’ inclination to promote normalization before resolving the conflict, or significantly advancing towards a solution, which should have been exploited by Israel to advance the peace process. Israel could have leveraged the improved regional understanding of its position to secure its interests, including security arrangements, territorial exchanges, or the refugee issue.

In recent years, Israel successfully adapted to the regional and international dramatic changes. But it is important that Israel’s sense of self-confidence, partially understood, will not delude Israeli decision-makers of Israel’s ‘natural size’. Israel should not be tricked into pursuing convenient policy goals and praiseworthy maneuverability, and instead, articulate a long-term vision based on peace agreements and regional cooperation.

הפוסט Israel Pragmatically Responds to Global Changes, <br> but Without a Vision הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A-liberal leaders and political parties have tightened their hold on power over the past two decades in many countries, Israel included. Previously marginal elements of limited influence have found their way to centers of power and influence largely with the help of the very same democratic mechanisms they seek to erode (by emphasizing the principle of majority). They openly display their ambitions to remove democratically imposed limits on elected representatives, focus most power in the hands of the executive branch, weaken the system of checks and balances among the various branches of government, undermine the independence of the judiciary and ultimately subordinate the rule of law to narrow political needs. At the same time, their increased interference in the lives of citizens violate basic individual rights and freedoms in order to strip democracy, de facto, of its substantive values and components.

The 2020 V-Dem Report ranking the state of liberal democracy, published by Gothenburg University in Sweden points to a distinct decline in global democracy and shift of political regimes in developed nations from democracy to authoritarianism. The index, which ranks states according to their implementation of liberal democratic norms, including the right to vote, fair elections, equality before the law, freedom of association and free speech, notes that for the first time since 2001, more states in the world are characterized as being autocratic than as democratic. What is more, The Economist’s Democracy Index for 2019 rates the state of democracy around the world as the worst since 2006.

This trend has not bypassed Israel. Of the 36 developed nations (prior to Colombia’s inclusion) in the OECD, the most pronounced decline in the values of liberal democracy over the past 20 years has occurred in Turkey, Hungary, Poland, the United States, the Czech Republic and Israel.

One might mistakenly assume that the choice of regime and erosion of democracy is an internal, domestic matter, devoid of implications for foreign policy and international relations. However, in comparing the foreign policy effectiveness of various states to the state of their democracy, one finds that liberal democracies are distinctly more successful in this regard, and vice versa. For example, the KOF Political Globalization Index indicates that the more liberal and democratic the system of government in a given state, the greater its diplomatic presence in the international arena, number of its bilateral agreements and stronger its cooperation with international organizations when compared to states characterized by a-liberal trends.

There is also a positive correlation between the state of liberal democracy and the effective deployment of soft power. Foreign aid and international reputation indices, which examine key tools for the achievement of diplomatic goals, clearly illustrate this. The same goes for the advancement of peace and security. The Global Peace Index indicates that the more a country practices liberal democracy, the greater the probability of it enjoying peace and good relations with its neighbors, and the higher its level of security stability against the danger of external threats.

Israel likes to boast of being the only democracy in the Middle East. It has used this argument skillfully in its diplomacy, gaining entry into the UN group of Western democratic nations, or strengthening its alliance with Greece and Cyprus by underlining shared democratic values. However, cumulative comparative data from the past 20 years point to an ongoing erosion of Israel’s democratic foundations. The Democracy Index ranked Israel fifth from the bottom among OECD member states, ahead only of Poland, Mexico, Hungary and Turkey. The gap between Israel’s liberal democracy rating and the OECD average has widened consistently in recent years.

Israel’s low ranking on the Liberal Democracy Index should not surprise its citizens given the ongoing occupation, a prime minister on trial for bribery, fraud and breach of trust, a law enforcement and judiciary under constant government attack, a Knesset Speaker who refuses to implement a Supreme Court ruling, flourishing crony and media capitalism, action and legislation against human rights organizations and asylum seekers, a ban on the entry of foreign nationals suspected of supporting BDS, regularization laws and violation of private property rights in the territories, discriminatory treatment of non-Jewish citizens and women, and religious coercion – this non exhaustive list cannot point to any other conclusion. Israel is in the throes of being dragged down a slippery a-liberal slope.

Obviously, some would prefer a distinct ethnic regime, neither democratic nor liberal. For them, the values they cherish, such as the sanctity of the Land of Israel and preservation of its Jewish character, supersede values of equality and individual rights. But they too need to understand that such choices are not only morally reprehensible, they take their toll only on those who are not members of the majority, but on all citizens of the state. Data clearly point to their affect in the foreign policy arena and on Israel’s international relations. The less democratic and liberal a state, the less effective it is in attaining its diplomatic goals and providing a response to all its citizens’ needs.

Given the retreat of Israeli democracy, it is hardly surprising that Israel was ranked in 32^nd place of 34 in the KOF Political Globalization Index. It is also not surprising that Israel made it into the index of soft power leaders only once (in 2015), ranking 26 out of 30 states. It is no wonder that Israel’s foreign aid is the lowest in the OECD, and as a consequence it ranks in almost last place in the International Reputation Index, ahead only of Turkey. In this regard, Israel’s efforts to position and market itself as a technological and cultural leader do not appear to be yielding the expected results. And finally, it is also unsurprising that even the Global Peace Index ranks Israel far behind all other developed nations except Turkey.

Global populist trends have surged in recent years, with growing public demand in some states to replace democratic regimes with authoritarian ones. This trend is partly underpinned by identity politics, along with intensifying political personalization, which places more importance on the identity of a leader than on values, ideas and institutions. Nonetheless, the institutions and norms that prevail in the world order are still undergirded by the values of liberal democracy. The peace, reputation and soft power indices clearly reflect the fact that most people in the world still perceive elements of the democratic-liberal order as good and other elements as bad. Liberal democracies still manage to project power, and in doing so to achieve significant results for their economies and citizens over time and in an optimal fashion compared with authoritarian states or populist regimes.

Therefore, from a utilitarian viewpoint, citizens and states should aspire to bolster the democratic-liberal values and norms of their regimes. Even more importantly, given the struggle between liberal-democratic and populist worldviews, states and their citizens must choose sides and adopt value-driven positions. As far as Israelis are concerned, strengthening liberal democracy is a wise, utilitarian position, but more importantly, it is an essential moral and values-driven choice. In the struggle being waged over the image of the state and its society, not only it is incumbent upon us all to defend democratic institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law, but to fight for an end to the occupation, equality and defense of minorities, social justice and respect for human and civil rights.

הפוסט The Toll of Democratic Regression on <br>Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Most of his predecessors viewed the Foreign Ministry as a political stepping stone to the premiership, devoting few managerial resources to bolster the ministry’s impact and standing. Ashkenazi took the position very seriously, despite his very brief stint in office.

I have long believed that the Foreign Ministry required a leader groomed by the military in order to infuse the organization with a “fighting spirit”, bolster its staff’s eroded confidence and assertiveness, and hone professional practices. By the same token, I believe the Defense Ministry would benefit from having a civilian rather than an ex-general at its helm in order to ensure that the IDF serves overall national security policy, which is not only military in essence.

Indeed, Ashkenazi related to the Foreign Ministry as he did to the military units he commanded. He demanded uncompromising professionalism and integrated professional processes eroded over time by the staff’s sense of exclusion from national decision making. He restored the public servants of the MFA belief in the value of their professionalism, both in executing policy and in decision making, and urged them to translate their unique understanding of the global and bilateral arenas into effective influence.

Ashkenazi was exposed to the exceptional abilities of the Foreign Ministry staff when he served as Director General of the Defense Ministry. When he went on to serve as IDF chief-of-staff he recruited Haim Regev to work in his office. He knew Regev from his service at the congressional liaison office of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, where he was tasked with promoting Israel’s defense appropriation “wish list” in Congress.

Upon assuming the Foreign Minister’s position in 2020, Ashkenazi appointed Alon Ushpiz as Director General. The decision was to prove itself given Alon’s professionalism and keen intellect that brought the ministry’s abilities into play, especially in the normalization process that followed the Abraham Accords.

In terms of policy, Ashkenazi rehabilitated the ministry’s relationship with the European Union, which Netanyahu had used as a “punching bag” for years despite the strategic importance of the Brussels institutions for the State of Israel.

Unfortunately, the Israel public is not privy to the superlatives I hear from European diplomats about Ashkenazi and the Foreign Ministry under his leadership. Ashkenazi also deserves significant credit for making the US administration realize that normalization with Arab states was preferable to annexation, contrary to the political interests advanced by Netanyahu and Trump.

Despite the Prime Minister’s efforts to dwarf the Foreign Ministry and deploy the Mossad for “sexy” foreign policy tasks, Ashkenazi opted for a highly professional but low-key approach in contrast to the PR approach favored by the state’s top spy. For years, Israel’s defense agencies tended to sideline the Foreign Ministry, accusing it of leaks. Having been myself a victim of such a leak, I know that leaks generally emanate from the political rather than the professional echelons.

This was particularly obvious when news emerged of Netanyahu’s secret meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince, in which the Foreign Ministry was not involved. The leak caused significant damage to our burgeoning relations with the Saudis. The Mossad director also met with the outgoing US Secretary of State, excluding the Foreign Minister and breaching accepted practice. The closed-door meeting served the Prime Minister’s intention of showing who is in charge of Israeli foreign policy and was therefore leaked to a Politico reporter.

When Ashkenazi took office, I wrote him a public letter urging him not to treat the post as a temporary stopover on his way to the Defense Ministry following the Gantz-Netanyahu rotation. I argued that the Foreign Ministry poses a far more significant challenge to Israel’s national security given that the state’s defense posture is well established whereas the answer to most of our challenges lies in the diplomatic arena. I do not delude myself into thinking that Ashkenazi read my advice and acted on it. He performed as he did because he is a serious man and should be given full credit for his work, although he did not seek it.

Ashkenazi faces many challenges before he has to vacate the Foreign Minister’s perch. One of the more significant is convincing the government to learn from the mistakes of its adversarial relationship with the Obama Administration in order to ensure a seat at the table once the Biden Administration launches its international effort to improve the Iran nuclear deal.

Yet another challenge he faces is preventing the dangerous process of creeping, de facto annexation in the West Bank before the Biden Administration completes its foreign policy appointments and get organized. Creating such facts on the ground undermines efforts to preserve the option of the two-state solution that is in Israel’s best interests. For my colleagues at the Foreign Ministry, the next challenge will be maintaining Ashkenazi’s proactive spirit once the next minister is appointed.

Given the current era in which government ministers ignore government professionals, as illustrated daily by Finance Minister Katz, former Justice Minister and serving Public Security Minister Ohana and Education Minister Galant, Ashkenazi’s conduct is a breath of fresh air. I hope he has an opportunity to return to foreign policy service despite his party’s political mistakes.

Israel is crying out for political leadership able to create synergy between elected representatives and professional civil servants in a manner that places the state’s long-term policy goals ahead of their personal and political interests. Thank you, Foreign Minister Ashkenazi, for your contribution.

הפוסט A Thank You Letter to Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The counter reaction to the global rise of nationalism, populism and the far-right encourages partnerships among progressive forces around the world as well as the creation of shared frameworks and coordinated action. Such cooperation occurs in both the political arena and civil society. The grim state of Israel’s progressive political camp makes it hard to realise potential ties with political parties and leaders in other countries. However, Israeli civil society is forging significant international cooperation born of its distinct and well-honed progressive ideology and the wide array of highly motivated organisations and activists seeking change: Israeli progressive NGOs are increasingly fostering links with like-minded partners abroad, including through participation in multilateral networks, and their representatives are appearing more before international audiences to share their worldview and expertise. Greater emphasis on forging international partnerships is a key stage in the renewal of Israel’s progressive camp and its empowerment.

Israel’s most recent election campaigns demonstrated the extent to which the a-liberal global network operates as a de facto political alliance. Netanyahu’s allies around the world – Trump, Putin, Modi, Bolsonaro, Orban and Salvini – mobilised one by one to help him position himself as an arch-statesman and garner public support. Their ‘aid package’ consisted of meetings, photo-ops, diplomatic goodwill gestures and friendly pronouncements. As they helped their friend Netanyahu, these leaders had no reservations about being accused of interference in Israel’s domestic politics.

The heads of Israel’s centre-left political camp, however, have avoided encouraging their foreign friends to act, fearing accusations that they were trying to exert external pressure on Israel and to encourage foreign intervention in domestic politics. They were also concerned that expressions and actions by outsiders critical of the Israeli government on the eve of elections would rather unite public ranks against the centre-left and drive voters into the arms of the political right.

Inter-party progressive ties have proven complex and failed to yield appreciable benefit in recent years. For example, the decision of Israel’s Labour party to join in 2020 the Netanyahu-led coalition led to friction with Social Democrat parties in Europe. Real progress, however, is evident in civil society cooperation between Israeli and international organisations. This stems from several factors:

Firstly, a conceptual change within Israeli civil society organisations regarding ties with counterparts abroad has begun in recent years, leading more of them to relate favourably to international activity and cooperation. The change stems from the recognition of the fact that progressive movements in other countries are confronting similar challenges and from the intensifying threat to Israel’s liberal democratic values, which has prompted a search for new tools and partners to confront it. The change also stems from the understanding that in the absence of a significant political alternative to Israel’s right-wing leadership, it is up to civil society to fill the opposition vacuum: from the growing accessibility of information about foreign organisations on social media, facilitating contacts, and from the growing representation of Israelis in international forums and multilateral organisations.

Secondly, today, there is a more egalitarian relationship between Israeli and Western organisations. The interface between progressive Israeli organisations and European and American partners did not tend toward equality over the years. Besides the fact that Western organisations are generally larger, more established, and wealthier, their representatives usually arrived at meetings with Israelis with a desire to give rather than to receive. Changing political realities however have prompted a change. Trump’s election and the rise of the European far-right created an egalitarian discourse, as many countries were facing similar problems. In this need for joint action, the Israeli organisations – used to their opposition role against the governing political right – were now the ones that could advise and help their foreign colleagues who are forced to adjust to a changing political landscape.

Thirdly, there are new connections with organisations in states where democracy is eroding. Israeli civil society groups largely ignored organisations in central and eastern Europe for many years. These states did not play a key foreign policy role in the EU, they lacked financial resources to grant to organisations in the Middle East and they did not display great interest in the Israeli political arena either. Two intersecting processes in recent years have resulted in change: the erosion of democracy on the one hand, and the political alliance between the leaders of those states with Netanyahu on the other. This alerted Israeli organisations to seek connections, to exchange knowledge and tools, as well as to establish cooperation with pro-democracy actors there. Organisations in the European countries were often the ones that took the initiative of seeking partners in Israel’s progressive camp.

These trends gave rise to different forms of cooperation between civil society groups in Israel and abroad – in terms of organisation, ideology, politics, and contents. This includes progressive partnerships that are not only international but also inter-sectoral and that bring together political, diplomatic, and civil society elements. Grassroots organisations and think tanks that promote ideological worldviews, generate ideas and initiate action have an impact on political parties, politicians, and policy makers. This interaction is still not played out sufficiently in Israel, certainly not on the political left. But it appears to be gradually developing, and international partnerships can help it grow. This increased activity on the progressive side has prompted intensified efforts to undermine it in Israel – for example by attempts to curb the international activity of civil society organisations and to curtail foreign funding.

The formation of international partnerships is a goal of prime importance for Israel’s progressive camp. And it must constitute a central part in the process of its ideological, political and organisational renewal. The international arena is riper for this, given the need to confront the common threat faced by liberal democracies due to the rise of populism, nationalism and the far-right. The Israeli arena is also in need of such change with the weakening of the left-wing political parties that have jettisoned some of the values and beliefs they claimed to represent. Israeli progressive parties and civil society organisations must keep this in mind. They can find like-minded partners not only in Israel but also abroad. And investment in developing ties with them will yield benefits both in terms of advancing local change and empowering the liberal counter-wave to the rise of nationalism and the far-right.

The progressive camp in Israel must free itself from the de-legitimisation of its international activities, which the political right imposed on it. After all, the political right is heavily involved in partnerships with like-minded groups abroad – with considerable success, as shown before. Progressive organisations and parties in Israel that open themselves to the world and present a coherent ideological alternative to current policies will discover a wide range of opportunities. This in itself will not bring about the change that is hoped for in Israel, but it will provide a significant impetus to efforts to generate that change. And it could contribute to instilling progressive ideas in the public opinion, advancing progressive solutions to current problems, and catapulting progressives to leadership positions.

This idea also aligns well with the concept of intersectionality that is gaining traction in the progressive camp – in the US and beyond – based on the assumption that different organisations, each working in a different field for different goals but guided by a shared compass of values, must help each other in dealing with shared issues. In Israel, pro-democracy, human rights, peace, Arab-Jewish equality and social-economic justice groups still operate separately by and large. But signs of cooperation and networking emerge in the face of shared challenges, such as the threat of an Israeli annexation in the West Bank. The Covid-19 crisis and its repercussions on the progressive camp, chief among them a growing sense of solidarity, acknowledgement of the need for joint action in the face of global challenges, and the desire to bolster organisations and mechanisms for international cooperation are expected to encourage this trend in Israel and beyond. Israeli progressives should make the most out of this opportunity and reach out more to their international partners.

*This is a shortened version of an article first published, in Hebrew, in Telem, a periodical journal of the Berl Katznelson Foundation.

**The article was published on The progressive post, 14 January 2021.

הפוסט Israeli Progressives should reach out more to their international partners הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The counter reaction we are witnessing to the global rise of nationalism, populism and the far-right encourages connections among progressive forces around the world and the creation of shared frameworks and coordinated action. Such cooperation occurs in both the political arena and civil society. The grim state of Israel’s progressive political camp makes it hard to realize potential ties with political parties and leaders in other countries. However, Israeli civil society is forging significant international cooperation born of its distinct and well-honed progressive ideology and wide array of highly motivated organizations and activists seeking change.

Greater emphasis on forging international partnerships is a key stage in the renewal of Israel’s progressive camp and its empowerment. This article presents the developments, trends, needs and opportunities relevant to the issue, which could encourage positive change.

הפוסט The Importance of International Partnerships <br> for Israel’s Progressive Camp הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

True, Israel and the US enjoy a “special relationship” and personal proclivities do matter. Pro-Israel Jews around the president may indeed make a difference. However, US policy toward Israel will be shaped by broader American considerations. At least four come to mind.

First, the Biden administration is committed to reviving America’s global leadership through its alliances as ”force multipliers of our influence around the world,” in the words of incoming Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. To stress this point, White House press secretary Jen Psaki stated in the first briefing that the president will start his interaction with other nations by calling heads of allied states, beginning with Canada.

In the past, some of these allies, mostly the Europeans, had placed the Israeli-Palestinian issue on their common agenda with the US. Regional and intra-European realities have probably made the matter less urgent for Europeans. However, we should still expect a European nudge, at a minimum, to sustain the possibility of a two-state solution.

Second, the Biden administration will take a more internationalist approach toward global challenges, as opposed to former president Donald Trump’s America First vision. Hours after his inauguration, Biden signed executive orders that re-integrated the US into the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization. Therefore, an expected American return to a multinational negotiated approach toward Iran will not only be based on the merits of this specific case and American reluctance to go to war. It would also reflect a broader policy preference.

The failure of Trump’s strategy in slowing down Tehran’s nuclear project and senior incoming US officials’ involvement in the Iranian-American talks in the Obama era would further support a multinational negotiation goal.

In the past, an internationalist approach also included support for basic tenets of the international normative framework, such as the prohibition on territorial expansion by force. One potential implication would be a possible review of Trump-era policy stances that clash with international law, such as recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This, while taking into account that rolling back policies is not as easy as launching them.

Third, the Biden administration is committed to reviving the global march of liberal democracy. This will restore Washington’s strategic framework since the Cold War, which advocated for a more democratic world both on pragmatic and ideological grounds. In the Israeli context, that would mean a potential growing unease in Washington with the decline in the quality of Israeli democracy. In particular, Israel’s ongoing control of millions of Palestinians and public displays may seem to contradict liberal-democracy, such as the Nation State law.

True, the US overlooked democratic deficits in many of its allies, mostly during the Cold War. However, in our case, Biden may need to respond to voices from progressive circles that would like to end Israeli control over the Palestinians or award them full rights.

Finally, the US under Biden will probably continue viewing China as a rival. Beijing’s economic and political rise and its growing assertiveness under its current leadership challenge US hegemony and are bound to lead to an American response. This, regardless of who sits in the White House. US allies, such as Israel, who aspire to benefit from China’s economic expansion, would need to develop even more nuanced policies that would balance pressures from these two great powers. Israel was able to do so in the last few years, but its approach may be tested by heightened great power competition.

Taking this broader view regarding US-Israel relations is essential. It would provide not only a better understanding of American policy in the region on the issues that are already ongoing – such as the Iranian challenge – but will also offer new opportunities for American-Israeli engagement. For example, Israel is not a significant player in the global effort to deal with climate change. However, the incoming US administration promised to focus on the issue, creating new possibilities for joint projects with Israel’s innovation ecosystem that would benefit not just the alliance but also humanity.

**The article was published on Jpost, 27 January 2021

הפוסט The Broader Drivers of Biden-era Israeli-American Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For anyone for whom Zionism and humanism are important, especially those who remember the trauma of the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, it is hard to think of a more disturbing connection than the one we witnessed that night.

It was a historic event in many ways which harked back to images of the United States during the Civil War. It highlighted a phenomenon that should have been recognized before – Trump’s presidency tried to transform the US from a leader of the free world into a third-world country. Had he won another term, he would likely have succeeded in doing so, due to his shocking disregard for science on the issues of the corona and climate change, his relentless attack on the media and anyone who thinks differently from him, and finally, his unprecedented incitement against the US democratic process.

Trump and his playbook have become a model for an entire network of nationalists, racists and narcissists, which unfortunately includes not only Orbán in Hungary, Bolsonaro in Brazil and others around the world, but also the Israeli Right. Moreover, the Israeli flag has been appropriated as one of the symbols of the struggle of these authoritarian populists. Most of them hate Jews, just as they hate anyone who is different in skin color, religion or values. But they really like Netanyahu’s Israel, which for them represents anti-Muslim machoism, anti-liberalism and a wonderful symbiosis with their idol, Donald Trump.

Right-wing commentators continue to explain that the Left, which criticizes Israeli policies, is antisemitic – a ridiculous claim for too many reasons to list here. Recently, for example, right-wing media commentators have portrayed those critical that Israel does not take responsibility for vaccinating the population in the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, as a sign of left-wing antisemitism. Particularly ironic is their claim that Israel has no such obligation, even though international law obliges the occupier to take care of the needs of the occupied, due to the transfer of powers to the Palestinians in the Oslo Accords.

For self-serving purposes, these commentators appear to suddenly support the Oslo Accords. Moreover, they appear unbothered by the moral and medical consequences of the fact that the Palestinians and Israel remain intertwined, both because of the number of Palestinians working in Israel and because of the number of settlers and our security forces among them.

As someone who opposes BDS and the attempt to blame Israel before examining the facts, I can testify that at times there is no lack of ignorance, naivety and even malice on the radical Left – but antisemitism?! Not only have there always been many Jews on the radical Left, but for many years, the ultra-Orthodox were anti-Zionists and some still retain this view today – does that make them antisemites?

Many contemporary antisemites are actually lovers of Israel. The classical Catholic antisemitism, which accused us of crucifying Jesus, has disappeared due to both theological changes and developments at the Vatican, especially with Pope Francis, who is a sworn lover of Jews. On the contrary, the new antisemitism hates Jews and loves Israel.

ANTISEMITISM IS a racist phenomenon and racism is a phenomenon that is mainly right-wing, just as we see among Trump supporters who believe in white Christian supremacy. These groups are an inspiration to extreme Right organizations, such as “La Familia” and “Flame” in Israel, who believe in Jewish supremacy and a “pure forever” Beitar Jerusalem.

People may be wondering why we are losing the support of liberals and progressives, a fast-growing demography in the US. People may be afraid that we are losing the support of the world’s most important and largest Jewish community. People may not understand why many in Europe have difficulty supporting Israel in recent years. The Israeli flag raised in the riots on Capitol Hill should provide the answers.

However, as a student of former president Shimon Peres, I am a hopeless optimist, so I will end with a positive scenario. Despite the horrific events on Capitol Hill, on the very same day we also witnessed some hopeful signs of an opposing trend: Republican Party leaders, including Vice President Mike Pence and former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, finally distanced themselves from Trump.

In Georgia, a Black senator and a Jewish senator were elected for the first time in history and the exciting alliance between them reminded us of the friendship between Rev. Martin Luther King and Rabbi Avraham Yehoshua Heschel. With their election, the Democrats won a majority in both houses of Congress, giving a greater opportunity to clear the rubble and repair the damage left behind by Trump.

It is precisely the awful images from Capitol Hill that we saw last Wednesday which will demonstrate the dangers of populism and racism to many in the US and around the world. As such, we can begin to see the pendulum of the historical dialectic return toward the liberal outlook we saw during the Obama administration’s eight years and in Europe since World War II.

Here too in Israel, there are signs that even the Right is beginning to understand that one must move away from the cult of personality and “Bibi-ism,” which has rendered the Likud, a party whose connection to Jabotinsky and Begin’s liberalism, as entirely coincidental.

There is also a new and encouraging trend in our politics of courting Arab candidates among parties that have previously distanced themselves from any contact with the Arab sector.

Perhaps the cliché, “it’s always darkest just before dawn,” will come true and the racist populist camp will lose control of politics, not only in the US but also here – soon in our time.

הפוסט New antisemitism hates Jews, loves Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Many must be wondering why I choose to engage in the fate of the Labor Party, which many of the public perceive as obsolete, as well as the question of why it is important for Merav Michaeli to lead the party. It indeed saddens me to imagine the party that was so significant in the establishment of the state and deserves credit for many of the achievements we now take for granted disappearing in the upcoming elections. Moreover, unlike many others, Merav Michaeli has demonstrated her loyalty to the party’s values and remained true to her vow to the public not to join Netanyahu’s government. Beyond the plight of one party or another, or the future of Merav Michaeli, the true issue is, how will the future of the State of Israel look without women in leadership positions?

Most of the arguments about integrating women into politics and public life in general focus on the issue of equality and affirmative action. When the prime minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, was asked why he put together a gender equalized government, he replied: “We are living in 2015.” When the late US Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was asked how many women should serve on the Supreme Court, she replied, “Nine,” clarifying that if for many years nine men held office, then there was nothing to prevent nine women from doing the same. Nonetheless, the need for promoting female leadership goes well beyond the issue of equality.

Anyone who follows what is happening in the world will notice that one of the lessons from the coronavirus crisis is that countries with female leadership, such as Germany, Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, and Taiwan have performed much better. In a relatively short period of time, the coronavirus crisis made blatantly obvious that change, which in the past was an evolutionary, linear process allowing time for adaptation, now accelerates exponentially. This phenomenon, which has been around for a while, challenges our human coping mechanisms. When change was linear, we could extrapolate from the past and the present into the future. This gave leaders the ability to predict and plan for events and processes that were likely to take place in the future. It enabled leaders to speak with certainty about what we were about to face and what action needed to be taken to better prepare for what lay ahead. Today with accelerated exponential changes due to the data and technology revolution, this is not possible. In this reality, there is a dire need for leaders who can help people cope with adaptive challenges. Also, there is great value in humility, in the ability to acknowledge mistakes and in the capacity to lead through a process of collective public learning to adequately deal with the challenges.

There appear to be biological reasons why men tend to publicly display hubris and self-confidence more than women. In primitive times, these traits may have served to give those men an advantage in deterring enemies, so that throughout the process of evolution there was a selection bias of men with these traits. However, in todays’ world, excessive self-confidence can be an obstacle to progress.

Certainly, one should never generalize. Golda Meir, as prime minister, did not excel at detecting the winds of change. Perhaps, if she had been more modest and perceptive, the Yom Kippur War might have been prevented. Moreover, there are men, including those with an impressive military record, who excel in intellectual modesty and capacity for learning. A good example is former commander-in-chief General Gadi Eisenkot, who knew how to admit his mistakes and accept responsibility, following an infiltration incident in the Golan Heights that occurred while he was in charge. Later, after Gallant’s nomination for chief of staff was disqualified, Eisenkot stated that he was not yet prepared to accept the position. In the upcoming elections, he displayed modesty when he decided that he needed more time to learn about politics before deciding to run.

Despite these examples, empirical testing shows that women have on average more of the necessary qualities needed to deal with the adaptive challenges of today. The entire world is internalizing this fact. In the previous US presidential election, Hillary Clinton won the majority of the general public’s votes, however, Trump won the electoral tally and we were all witness, over the past four years, to how tragic was his election. President-elect Joe Biden realized he must appoint a woman as his vice president and chose Kamala Harris. She is likely to be the next president after he completes his term. Nancy Pelosi, who has long been the leader of the House Democrats, immediately follows Harris in the US government hierarchy. For the first time in history, Biden also appointed a woman as secretary of the treasury and another woman as head of federal intelligence. Many attribute the success of the Georgia Democratic Party to the former Democratic minority leader in the Georgia House of Representatives. and candidate for governor, Stacy Abrahams.

For the Nordic countries it has long been accepted that women make up most of the leadership. In Germany, which became the leader of the free world during the Trump era, Chancellor Merkel impressively leads her country and Europe, with modesty and skill.

It is distressing to see that in Israel, which claims to be the innovation nation, we linger behind in terms of the quality of leadership and in understanding the value of female leadership. It is crucial that we will have the option to vote for at least one party with women leadership out of so many parties in the coming elections.

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 18 January 2021

הפוסט Now is the time for female leadership in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document presents key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies in the July-December 2020 period: Establishing diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco; advancing normalization with additional Arab states, but not with Egypt and Jordan; freezing formal annexation but continuing a creeping annexation; capitalizing on US elections to advance diplomatic interests; bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean along with cautious involvement in regional conflicts; leveraging natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean for diplomatic benefits; leading diplomatic efforts to forge a regional and international front against Iran; adopting a more positive approach to the EU despite disagreements on the Palestinian issue; empowering Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) in terms of professionalism, policy influence and public image.

1. Establishing diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – Israel forged diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco and announced progress in normalization with Sudan. These moves were underpinned by US encouragement and support, as expressed in significant defense, diplomatic and economic benefits for the participating Arab states. The formal relations led to advancement of agreements and cooperation in a wide array of fields, with official delegations conducting mutual visits. Attempts were made to harness Saudi participation in the normalization wave, including a reported trilateral meeting between Netanyahu, Bin Salman and Pompeo.

2. Advancing normalization with new Arab states, but not with Egypt and Jordan – The agreements with the UAE and Bahrain prompted a flourishing of security, economic and civilian cooperation encouraged and promoted by the governments. Direct flights were launched between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval to overfly its air space, and maritime trade routes were advanced. Israel and the UAE reacted with enthusiasm to the new relationship, as reflected in the agreement on mutual visa exemptions and the visit of tens of thousands of Israelis to the UAE. The advancement of normalization with Gulf states was particularly pronounced compared to the ongoing freeze in Israel’s civilian relations with Egypt and Jordan.

3. Freezing formal annexation but continuing a creeping annexation – Under international and local political pressure, and the conditions set by the UAE for normalization, Netanyahu announced a freeze of his West Bank annexation intentions. Nonetheless, his government continued to move ahead with de facto annexation, without formal declarations, including construction plans in East Jerusalem and the settlements, along with demolitions of Palestinian homes in Area C, special funding transfers to the settlements and Knesset initiatives to legalize outposts.

4. Capitalizing on US elections to advance diplomatic interests – Ahead of the US presidential elections, Israel took advantage of the Trump Administration’s desire to display foreign policy achievements in order to promote normalization agreements with Arab states, despite the absence of progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. Following Biden’s victory, Israel sought to capitalize on Trump’s final days in office to promote US recognition of the legality of the settlements. The election results also prompted the Palestinian Authority to resume security and civilian coordination with Israel. Israel’s preparations for the Biden administration focused on the Iranian issue in light of an expected US intention to resume negotiations with Iran on the nuclear agreement.

5. Bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean along with cautious involvement in regional conflicts – Israel has strengthened its alliance with Greece and Cyprus, especially in the fields of security, energy, health and tourism, and accepted a Cypriot initiative to form a trilateral secretariat of the alliance in Nicosia. Israel backed Greece and Cyprus in their maritime border disputes with Turkey, but did so cautiously. It wanted to avoid being dragged into a conflict to which it is not a side and not to exacerbate relations with Turkey, also given recent signals of Ankara’s interest in warmer ties.

6. Leveraging natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean for diplomatic benefits – Israel took advantage of its energy resources and geopolitical location to advance regional cooperation. It promoted, in cooperation with Egypyt the formalization of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a recognized international organization, and ratified its foundation charter. Israel also entered US-mediated negotiations with Lebanon on marking the maritime border between the two states. It approved the plan for a gas pipeline to Europe via Cyprus and Greece, and advanced cooperation with the UAE on conveying energy through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline.

7. Leading diplomatic efforts to forge a regional and international front against Iran – Israel continued its military activity against Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria, in coordination with Russia, and its diplomatic activity against the nuclear agreement and in favor of broader sanctions on Iran, in cooperation with the US. The Israeli MFA’s efforts affected decisions by additional states to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to Iran played a significant role in bolstering Israel’s relationship with Gulf states and in Israel’s decision to supply arms to Azerbaijan as part of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

8. Adopting a more positive approach toward the EU despite disagreements on the Palestinian issue – The EU harshly condemned Netanyahu’s planned West Bank annexation intentions and expanded Israeli construction in the settlements and East Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi adopted a positive attitude toward the EU and underlined the importance of improved ties with it. He participated in an unofficial meeting of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, and advanced ties with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, attempts to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council have yet to bear fruit. Israel’s ties with populist, a-liberal leaders in Central and Eastern Europe were sidelined, contrary to Netanyahu’s boasting of these relationships in previous years.

9. Empowering Israel’s MFA in terms of its professionalism, policy influence and public image – The MFA instituted new working procedures and promoted dozens of professional appointments, some of which are still awaiting government confirmation. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi sought to ensure the participation of MFA representatives in all relevant government forums, and to strengthen coordination with other government ministries. The MFA also intensified its media exposure efforts, including spotlighting its contribution to the promotion of relation with Arab states against the backdrop of the Abraham Accords. The MFA stepped up its recruitment efforts, resulting in higher enrollment than in previous years for its cadet training and making the upcoming cadet course the biggest in recent years.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July-December 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Report 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel was founded by workers’ parties and labour organisations from the left. As such, it evolved into a welfare state inclined to socialism and embracing solidarity. The rise of the right in the late 1970s brought about economic change that reflected the trending neo-liberal capitalism around the globe. In Israel, as in other countries, this generated increasing privatisation, eroded the public sector, weakened labour unions, and resulted in growing inequality. Capital was increasingly concentrated in the hands of few wealthy individuals and families, which shape the economy, the media, politics, and, to a growing extent, Israeli society by and large. It is therefore hardly surprising that the criminal indictments against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stem from his ties with business and media tycoons.

Abandoning liberal ideas

While the Israeli right adopted neo-liberal economic principles, it abandoned the liberal underpinnings of these principles, especially over the past decade. The basic concepts of human and civil rights, a substantive component of the Likud party’s ideology in its early days, was subsumed by ideological and political considerations. The marginalisation of human and civil rights makes it easier to justify occupation, and allows the right to question the legitimacy of Israeli Arab voters and thus make it more difficult for them to join up with the political left to provide an alternative to right-wing rule. It also lays the groundwork for the formation of a right-wing coalition of non-liberal parties, leaving the concepts of human and civil rights as the purview of the political left.

Liberal voices within the Likud party, such as former ministers Benny Begin and Dan Meridor or President Reuven Rivlin, have been cast aside. Right-wing governments labelled human rights organisations as ‘traitors’ and adopted legislation and a public discourse designed to undermine their legitimacy, funding, and freedom within the public arena.

The rule of law is yet another fundamental liberal principle targeted by the right. The new Israeli right finds Israeli and international law, based on a liberal world view, disruptive. The law gets in the way of the Israeli settlement enterprises and the occupation. While Israeli courts have used various tactics to successfully whitewash the settlement enterprise, for example differentiating between so-called legal and illegal settlements and thereby greenlighting the whole settlement enterprise, these rulings do not satisfy the nationalist proponents of a Greater Land of Israel, especially when the court rules in favour of Palestinians whose human rights are violated by the occupation.

The law is also a thorn in the side of the Israeli plutocracy, and it seeks to protect individual rights against the power of the majority. It battles corruption and therefore personally threatens leaders on the right who have run afoul of the law: Netanyahu, two leading ultra-Orthodox politicians – Yaakov Litzman of the United Torah Judaism Party and Shas party chair Aryeh Deri, Likud Members of the Knesset David Bitan and David Amsalem, and others. For all these and other reasons, the Israeli right seeks to weaken and undermine the courts, the police, the state prosecution and the justice system, which serves as basic building blocks of the liberal order.

A non-liberal coalition on the right

The abandonment of liberal values provides the underpinnings of the right-wing coalition that is ruling Israel. Its members are several disparate parties – the Likud, the settlers’ parties representing nationalist religious ideas, the non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox parties, and the Yisrael Beitenu party representing many Israelis who hail from the former Soviet Union. Although fundamentally different on issues of religion and state and divided over economic principles, they share a basic rejection of liberal values.

The ultra-Orthodox parties adhere to religious law. They do not identify with the ideas of human and civil rights nor with the basic principle of sovereignty of the people. They are ruled by rabbinical authority. The parties that represent nationalist religious ideas place the goal of a Greater Israel and settlement expansion above all else. Both goals violate Palestinian rights in the territories, create a hierarchy between Jews and Palestinians and contradict the principle of Palestinian self-determination. Yisrael Beitenu, led by Avigdor Liberman, is a secular party in essence, but it is not liberal. Unlike the ultra-Orthodox and religious parties, it promotes the authority of the state as superior to minority and human rights. The ideological thread running through all these parties is a basic concept of Jewish ethnic supremacy (religious, cultural, or historic) and rejection of republican citizenship.

To ensure the continued support of the ultra-Orthodox parties, Likud gives in to their demands on issues of religion and state and funding for their communities. To ensure the support of Zionist religious voters, the Likud party advances the Greater Israel idea.

Netanyahu, squeezed between diplomatic and political pressures, tries to manoeuvre through these minefields. He enables creeping annexation without generating international anger or bearing responsibility for the violence it breeds or the economic burden it entails. This explains the so-called regulation law that he promoted, the annexation declarations he issued during the recent election campaigns but was saved from having to implement by the normalisation deals with Gulf States, as well as the threats to evacuate the Palestinian village Khan al-Ahmar, which he keeps delaying.

Bibism

Today’s political right cannot be understood without relating to the place and role of Benjamin Netanyahu (nicknamed Bibi) as its leader. His supporters regard him as a supreme leader and reject any challenge to his leadership as illegitimate. His personal fate is intrinsically intertwined with that of his party and of the right-wing government he heads. Anyone who tries to run against him in party primaries is considered a traitor. Even the idea of holding leadership primaries within the Likud party is sometimes perceived as an act of treason – for example when Likud leading member Gideon Sa’ar insisted on running against Netanyahu in 2019 (and was roundly defeated).

In January 2020, Netanyahu was indicted on charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. The Prime Minister has been accused essentially of abusing his power and serving his own personal interests at the expense of the public good. However, even the indictments were not sufficient reason for the Likud party to replace him or for its allied parties to withdraw their support. This clearly illustrates the choice of the Israeli right: support for its leader rather than for the rule of law and state institutions.

The Israeli right as part of the global illiberal right

Along with its unique characteristics, the Israeli right adheres to the conservative, non-liberal trends in the titanic global struggle against the values of liberal democracy. Preferring authoritarianism and adulation of a leader over ideology and values, dismissing science and the truth, placing nationalism and ethnicity over liberal and republican values, weakening the judicial and legislative arms of government and strengthening the executive branch – all are trends easily identified elsewhere in the world, from Brazil through the US and all the way to Hungary and Poland.

The State of Israel has long prided itself on being a democracy, even, often, as the ‘only (real) democracy in the middle east’, seeking power and recognition as a dividend. Israel worked hard to be accepted into the club of liberal, developed, free democracies. The trends and characteristics of the Israeli right point to the danger and plausibility of a decline of Israeli democracy.

Democracies can fall – and the Israeli right pushes into this direction.

**The article was published on The progressive Post, 13 January 2021

הפוסט The Israeli right: authoritarianism and ethnic supremacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As a result, the United States had reinstated all the sanctions it had waived as part of the nuclear accord, and it imposed additional crippling financial and diplomatic sanctions designed to exert “maximum pressure” on Tehran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was very content with this policy shift. He was a staunch opponent of the Iran nuclear deal throughout the negotiations and even publicly confronted then-President Barack Obama when he delivered a controversial speech to a joint session of Congress in March 2015 where he attacked the deal and declared it “will not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. It would all but guarantee that Iran gets those weapons, lots of them.”

The “maximum pressure” campaign was an epic failure. Trump’s policies did not force Iran back to the negotiating table and sign a more restrictive and comprehensive agreement, nor did the sanctions curb Iran’s regional influence and involvement. Israel’s efforts to supplement American sanctions and derail Iran’s nuclear program through the assassination of leading Iranian scientists, most recently the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020 attributed to Israel, also proved quite futile.

The Iran nuclear deal was effective

After the news of Iran’s decision to resume the enrichment of Uranium broke, Prime Minister Netanyahu noted this move “cannot be explained in any way other than the continuation of realizing its goal to develop a military nuclear program,” and added, “Israel will not allow Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon.” Moreover, a member of Netanyahu’s cabinet called for Israeli action citing previous preventive military attacks again nuclear facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007).

It seems Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to have his cake and eat it too but one cannot relentlessly work to sabotage the Iran nuclear deal and then protest Tehran is not complying with its terms. The Iran nuclear deal was effective in monitoring Iran’s nuclear program through a robust system of inspections and verification activities, as evident from the numerous reports compiled and released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The deal was never designed to address Iran’s ballistic missile program or Tehran’s regional policies that many find destabilizing; it was exclusively focused on the most existential threat-preventing Iran from developing and obtaining nuclear weapons. In fact, it was always considered to be a springboard that, in time, will enable solving the non-nuclear sticking points.

The prudent approach Netanyahu should have pursued would have been to leverage the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and expand the conversation between the signatories and Tehran to include other important issues such as Iran’s ballistic missile program and disruptive regional policies. Abandoning the Iran nuclear deal not only intensified the mistrust between Iran and the United States leading to several clashes between the two countries directly or by proxy, but it also enabled Tehran to drive a wedge between the United States and the Europeans, the Chinese and the Russians who remained largely committed to reviving the agreement.

President-elect Joseph Biden already noted throughout his campaign he would like to renew the negotiations between the United States and Iran and possibly rejoin the Iran nuclear deal should Tehran resume its compliance with the terms of the agreement. Iran’s recent decision to enrich uranium to 20% purity does not make Biden’s plans easier to implement but it is all part of a new conversation Iran is trying to initiate with the incoming president. Netanyahu must be cognizant of Biden’s different approach to the Iran nuclear deal and make every possible effort to be part of the negotiations rather than stay estranged and isolated. There are more benefits to Israeli security in a deal with Iran than without one, and working with rather than against the new American administration is of vital importance too.

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 11 January 2021

הפוסט The fallacy of Netanyahu’s Iran policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Biden will strive to improve the agreement, postpone the expiration date of the agreement (sunset provisions), improve the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and reach agreements on other issues on the agenda with Iran – the ballistic and other means of launching a bomb, undermining stability and promoting terrorism in the region. But the expectation that Biden will condition the return to the same reality before Trump unilaterally breached the agreement in significantly improving the agreement is unrealistic and even dangerous.

In order to reach an agreement on all issues, a long and arduous negotiation is needed, which requires aligning with the other powers that were partners to the agreement in order for the front against Iran to be effective. During the negotiations on the returning to negotiations, Iran will continue unmonitored to accumulate enriched uranium (it already has 12 times the amount of enriched uranium it had when Trump violated the agreement), and add sophisticated cascades of centrifuges. In addition, there is no chance that Iran, Russia and China will agree to return to negotiations before ending the JCPOA related sanctions which were unilaterally renewed by Trump.

There is great urgency to return to the agreement also due to the June elections in Iran in which the pragmatic camp, currently led by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, is facing candidates backed by the Revolutionary Guards. The Revolutionary Guard candidates are extremists who prefer that the Iranian economy continue to falter rather than negotiate with the West and compromise.

The claim against immediate return to JCPOA (compliance for compliance) is that the Biden administration is relinquishing the leverage created as a result of the steps taken by Trump against the Iranian economy. In reality, there are many sanctions – unrelated to the JCPOA – that Biden can use as leverage. On top of that, the broad international coalition against Iran, which Biden would also try to extend to US Sunni allies in the region, would provide far more leverage over Iran than American pressure alone.

We have all seen in the years since Trump withdrew from the agreement that American pressure has failed to cause Iran to change policy, even though it has done much damage to the Iranian economy. In fact, the contrary is true. Economic pressure is of no value if it is not accompanied by a diplomatic route that will allow Iranian leaders to justify a policy change. In the absence of a “ladder” that the international community will give to Iran in order to “come down from the tree,” the Iranians will continue with the attitude the more that they are tormented, the more steadfast they will hold.

Contrary to what the detractors say, the Biden administration has no intention of allowing Iran to reach military nuclear capabilities. The Biden approach is that in order to prevent Iran from achieving military nuclear capabilities, diplomacy is needed alongside economic pressure. To this end, it is necessary to renew the international coalition vis-à-vis Iran and its expansion, and it is necessary to strengthen the pragmatic side in Iranian regime that favor the good of the Iranian economy over efforts to achieve Shiite hegemony in the Middle East.

The Israeli government needs to learn from the mistakes of its policies vis-à-vis the Obama administration. We must be a player that contributes to the international effort to stop Iran and refrain from pursuing a unilateral and confrontational policy toward the US and other powers. The Israeli confrontation with the Obama administration meant we were not part of the process of building the agreement, turning Israel into a divisive issue in American politics and tearing up the Jewish community, which largely supported Obama’s approach.

In order to stop Iran and to restore Israeli relations with the US and with the American Jewish community, the Israeli government must cooperate with the Biden government in its efforts to return to diplomacy with Iran from its first day in office, on January 20, not a moment too soon.

**The article was published on Jpost, 6 January 2021

הפוסט Restoring Iran nuclear deal is good for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Creating a political home for Likud Revisionist idealists who founded the party (Sa’ar is not one of them) is urgent. The dramatic distance of today’s Likud Party from Jabotinsky’s and the Revisionist movement’s values was succinctly expressed by coalition chairman Miki Zohar, when he stated that he is motivated by power, pride and money. It is impossible to ignore the chasm separating Zohar’s words from the five compassionate values expressed by Jabotinsky – provision of food, abode, clothing, education and healthcare – in respect to the responsibility of the state to its citizens.

For a person who was raised according to the values of the Labor movement, this change completes for me and other graduates of the Labor movement the process we went through, which ironically brings us together ideologically with the “princes,” the old aristocracy of the Revisionist movement.

I considered this while attending a demonstration in Balfour recently. There I met up with Knesset member Eli Avidar, a former colleague of mine in the Foreign Ministry. Eli and I first met as students at the Hebrew University, and he is the first member of Betar I met in my life.

Over the years, a change evolved in the two central factions of the Zionist movement, which brought them ideologically to a similar place. This is the realization that their original ideologies contradict modern liberal values.

I recall an example of this during president Shimon Peres’s visit to Cyprus, when I served as his political adviser. He met with the head of the socialist parliament, who asked Peres, “Now that you’ve switched from being a politician to being president, are you still a socialist?”

Peres replied that he knows of no person whose heart is not on the left side of his body. He explained that, in his eyes, socialism must adapt from being a rigid economic doctrine to one that embodies compassion for the weaker groups in society and integrates them into the economy in a manner that does not contradict the economic necessity for a free market.

In this context, a defining moment was reflected in a response of Dan Meridor, one of the Revisionist princes, during an interview with Nahum Barnea of Yediot Aharonot, following his failure in the Likud primaries for the 19th Knesset elections. Barnea asked what he thought were the reasons for his failure. Meridor replied that many of the Likud members whom he approached for support retorted that since he supported the two-state solution, they would not vote for him. When Meridor replied that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also supported the two-state solution in his Bar-Ilan speech, they replied, “Yes, but you mean it!”

Beyond the disparity reflected in this statement regarding Netanyahu’s unreliability, Meridor’s explanation expressed the chasm that formed between the values of the Revisionist “princes”/old aristocracy like himself – Tzipi Livni, Ehud Olmert, Ronnie Bar-On and even the current president of Israel. They understood that the State of Israel had already fulfilled Jabotinsky’s vision of power, and that today the proverbial iron curtain could yield to political compromises to better serve the needs of the country.

CONTRARY TO these liberal attitudes that bring together those who were raised both in the Labor and in the Revisionist movements, the current Likud Party is characterized by anti-liberal populists. The Likud today has established an association between Steve Bannon’s school of ideological populism in the US, Yoram Hazony and Gadi Taub in Israel – the expression of which can be seen in the Orbán regime in Hungary, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Duterte in the Philippines and in the route Trump attempted to take America – alongside Netanyahu’s cynical opportunism, including his yea-sayers who attempt to wrest him from judgment day.

In Netanyahu’s Likud, the reigning ideological approach is the one led in Israel by research institutes such as Mida and Kohelet. This approach was dubbed by Fareed Zakaria as that of “illiberal democracy” in which democracy is interpreted as majoritarianism. This is a system in which those who have won a temporary majority can rule without checks, balances and constraints, without separation of authorities, without gatekeepers, without a professional, opinionated public sector and without rights to minorities.

This approach serves the need to portray the charges against Netanyahu as a conspiracy steered by the old elites, a deep state which attempts to distort the will of the elector. This tactic puts pressure on the professional legal system and also on the financial system, sanctioning Likud ministers to rob the public coffers for their own political interests.

It does not appear that Sa’ar’s party will be a home for liberals. Although he rightly challenges the Likud’s corruption and personality cult, he unfortunately does not dispute the equally dangerous nationalism.

The party that is yet to be formed should embody the battle for the future of Israeli democracy, the struggle between liberals and populists. Nationalism that leads to one nation-state, essentially an apartheid state, does not reflect modern liberal values.

The liberal former Likudniks should be our partners in this struggle, as losing would be simply surrendering the Zionist vision that united all those who signed the Declaration of Independence from both the Labor and the Revisionist movements.

**The article was published on Jpost, 4 January 2021

הפוסט Sa’ar’s exit is Likud’s chance to redefine ideological boundary הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Actually, this should come as no surprise, considering similar partnerships that we have long been witness to between anti-liberal, anti-pluralist elements that would have been considered adversaries due to their ethnic, religious and sectorial affiliation.

Some examples are in order. For one, we have long witnessed a connection between the Evangelical religious Right in the US that is on the same side of the political divide as Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews, both in America and Israel. Evangelical Christians and Orthodox Jewish voters support the same candidates in elections and favor appointment of conservative justices to the Supreme Court. Both view their fellows of more liberal denominations and practice – liberal Jews in the eyes of Orthodox Jews and liberal Christians in the eyes of Evangelicals – as political enemies.

Another example is the cooperation between leaders of populist right-wing parties in Europe, Brazil, and Asia, some of whom have distinctly antisemitic backgrounds, and the Israeli government. These populist leaders view the conservative Israeli government as an ally against Muslim immigrants and a partner that shuns the essence of the liberal state – the courts, the media, and an open-minded, vocal civil society.

We are also witness to a pattern where the Israeli government has long supported perpetuation of Hamas rule in Gaza. Israel assists Hamas by streaming funds from Qatar and by various leniencies. At the same time, Israel comes down hard on the secular, compromising leadership of the Palestinian Authority. The element connecting the Israeli government and Hamas is strong opposition to any political compromise.

Is it possible that the beliefs connecting those who do not respect minority rights, who do not respect the right of LGBT people to love and marry as they please, who do not respect women’s rights to choose whether to keep an unwanted pregnancy or to refuse being a victim of polygamy, are stronger than their ethnic and religious affiliations? Apparently, that is usually the case.

This is a reactionary phenomenon related to globalization, progress and science, all inherent to pluralism and liberal ideals. It is this reaction that unites the anti-pluralistic fringes into alliances that would never have been imagined.

As far as Abbas the Islamist is concerned, the connection with secular elements, nationalists and even communists in the Joint List is far less natural than the connection with the Israeli religious Right, which sees secularism as a threat, including women’s rights, LGBT rights, and other liberal values.

Perhaps Abbas and Netanyahu could serve us liberals as an example. Together, we could choose to cease using the debate over the historical narrative between Arabs and Jews to divide our camp. Instead, we could choose to unite the pluralistic elements of our society around universal liberal values that serve both Arabs and Jews. They could serve as an example of how we can rally around a united political camp of Arabs and Jews, in opposition to the conservative forces.

It is imaginable that a unified camp of Arab and Jewish liberals could connect with liberal Jews in the US who also want the State of Israel to support the rights of minorities, promote religious pluralism and prevent religious coercion.

Perhaps it is precisely this strange alliance between Ra’am and the Likud that can challenge the old political order and establish a political home, one able to channel the energies of the young protesters from Balfour and the bridges throughout Israel, a home capable of restoring the vision of the pioneers who drafted Israel’s Declaration of Independence.

Such a political home would serve to align us with our extended family – the countries of the free and liberal world.

**The article was published on Jpost, 28 December 2020.

הפוסט Netanyahu’s cooperation with far Right, Islamists unsurprising הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

We tend to treat each country as a unified, homogeneous, rational player and adopt policies accordingly. In reality, almost each and every country is composed of many players who influence policy, both within and outside of government. This is also true of nondemocratic countries. Time and again, we fail to recognize their impact on internal processes in various countries. It has become our blind spot in policy decision-making.

This phenomenon was researched by Prof. Graham Allison (I had the privilege to be his student at the Kennedy School of Government). In his book Essence of Decision, he analyzes the decision-making of president Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ultimately, Kennedy was able to solve the conflict with the Soviet Union, which brought the two countries to the precipice of a nuclear war, because he understood the complexities of the different perspectives in the Kremlin.

We have seen this process play out in our own arena in various ways over recent years. The Israeli government, for example, has ignored the Democratic Party in the US and, by extension, the sentiments of most American Jews, causing long-term damage to our relations with the United States and with the most important Diaspora community.

We have also erred in our understanding of the need to empower moderate elements in Palestinian society and consequently strengthened the extremist supporters of terrorism.

We have also treated Iran as though it were one, cohesive, uniform whole, which in its entirety wants to eliminate us. In reality, there are different shades within the ayatollahs’ regime and the Iranian public.

All these mistakes are in danger of becoming self-fulfilling prophecies which prevent us from advancing our long-term interests. Too often, we talk about the “American position,” the “Iranian position” or the “Palestinian position,” when there are different positions in each country that influence the decision-making process and must be taken into account.

For example, the Biden administration will have to consider the reality in which there are about 74 million Americans who voted for Donald Trump and will not disappear just because Joe Biden was elected by around seven million more Americans. The Democrats might lose one of the Georgia Senate races on January 5, giving the Republicans a majority in the Senate, and Biden will have a hard time advancing moves that require congressional approval.

Iran is also expected to hold a presidential election in June, and it is currently estimated that the more moderate camp, headed currently by President Hassan Rouhani, will lose. Sweeping statements about Iran rejoicing over Trump’s loss do not consider the complexity within Iran. Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did want Trump to lose because they would like to see a return to diplomacy in general and the nuclear deal in particular. On the other hand, the ultra-extremists supported by the Revolutionary Guards prefer a Trump administration, which justifies their opposition to the agreement.

This is one of the reasons president Barack Obama sought to reach an agreement with Iran faster than we had expected, and it is also the reason Biden is striving to return to the agreement as soon as possible. They both understand that an Iranian presidency that does not prioritize Iran’s hegemony in the Middle East, which prefers a functioning Iranian economy, and is willing to compromise to that end, should be exploited.

Biden rightly understands that Iranian suffering due to the unilateral sanctions imposed by Trump is not enough to stop the nuclear program, which has progressed dramatically since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, and that achieving this requires an agreement and international legitimacy.

It has been speculated that Biden’s ability to return to the agreement will impact the outcome of the Iran election. In other words, the failure of diplomacy will allow more extremist elements to rise to power, with whom it is more difficult to reach an agreement and curb Iran’s military nuclear program.

The recent assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh certainly strengthens all players who are opposed to an agreement and reject the diplomatic route – in Iran, Israel and the US. Understanding this complexity explains the cold response from Democratic and European elements to the assassination, which was viewed as an attempt by Trump and Netanyahu to entice an Iranian response, rendering it impossible for the United States and the P5+1 powers to return to diplomacy.

Another example of the need for understanding such complexity is the way in which the majority of the Israeli public considers the Palestinians to be one united entity, which is supposedly uniformly opposed to an agreement with Israel. In reality, Palestinian society is divided into many different factions and positions.

It is especially important to understand the significant difference between the Palestinian Authority leadership in Ramallah, which is interested in a settlement with Israel, and the Hamas leadership, which is not interested in a political compromise, but only in short-term arrangements. The idea that all Palestinians reject peace plays into the hands of Hamas and its leaders.

In this context, there is a similar interest on the right side of Israeli politics, the Evangelical Right in the United States and Hamas, none of which are interested in a political compromise. On the other hand, there is a partnership of interests between the PA, Arab countries, Europe and the US Democratic Party, which have a common interest in an agreement based on the two states for two peoples solution.

It is important to understand that in Israel, too, there is complexity beyond Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government. For many years, polls have indicated that most Israelis support a diplomatic solution and an agreement with the Palestinians, even if it includes territorial compromise. However, this majority is not politically expressed, due to the lack of leadership on Israel’s Left and the success of the wrongheaded spin, which some regard as an outright manipulation, that we have no partner for a settlement on the Palestinian side.

It is to be hoped that the Biden administration will not view Netanyahu and his government as the be-all and end-all and will be able to conduct itself vis-à-vis Israel in a way that strengthens the majority of the public which supports a return to diplomacy and an agreement.

Such an understanding would allow for cooperation between the forces that are interested in a two-state solution, encompassing the majority in the United States, Israel and Palestinian society.

This complex viewpoint is also important to instill within American Jewry, as its liberal majority appears in danger of moving ever further away from an Israel perceived as conservative.

It is important that we make it clear to our brothers and sisters in the United States that there are other voices in Israel, people who want a peace settlement, who believe in minority rights and social justice, and who do not oppose progressive and liberal Judaism.
This complex understanding will help us in setting smart policies and also in dealing with liberals across the world who are critical of our government’s policies but are also potential partners.

**The article was published on Jpost, 21 December 2020

הפוסט The importance of understanding complexity <br> in other countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the official number of this year’s applicants has not yet been released, the FM is hopeful that recent agreements with the UAE and Bahrain will help invigorate Israel’s best and brightest to join the Foreign Service. In recent years, the number of candidates has dropped dramatically, and many young diplomats decided to leave the profession early in their career. The expected addition of a few dozen new diplomats provides yet another reason to empower Israel’s weakened FM.

In Israel’s conflict-ridden reality, the FM has always been considered inferior to the security establishment. This is still unfortunately true, even though the current challenges and opportunities facing Israel have distinct diplomatic features. For example, promoting bilateral relations with Gulf states, forging ties with the Biden administration, alleviating the situation in Gaza, and even tackling COVID-19 in cooperation with other countries – are all foreign policy-related.

Despite it all, in recent years, the FM was deliberately weakened by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and for political reasons. It has been insufficiently budgeted and understaffed, its responsibilities were stripped away to other, smaller ministries, and above all, it lacked a full-time minister for four years. The blows the FM has been suffering for years have crippled it, damaging Israel’s national security and impairing the FM’s ability to fulfill its mission.

Taking a closer look at the global sphere of diplomacy today, we see a new environment in which foreign relations are no longer at the hands of state actors alone. There are multiple actors seeking to make an impact, ranging from global corporations, civil society actors, international organizations, private entrepreneurs and more. The competition for influence is fierce, and many interests are at play.

Instead of focusing on adapting to this changing reality, the FM has had to deal with a shrinking budget, diplomats who are excluded from decision-making processes, and key positions in Israeli missions abroad that remain unstaffed. Considering this, it is not surprising to see low morale hovering across the FM in recent years, though there has been a positive change since Gabi Ashkenazi took office as foreign minister in May 2020. However, according to the coalition agreement, his tenure will end in November 2021, and early elections might bring change even earlier.

The weakness of Israel’s Foreign Service and its negative implications have not gone unnoticed. Knesset committees and caucuses have been discussing it, think tanks have been developing proposals to empower Israel’s diplomacy, the FM has been carrying out an internal process to better cope with the changing world of diplomacy, and survey findings have been reflecting continuous public concern about Israel’s place in the world and the status of its FM.

Israel’s state comptroller has also addressed the issue. This year, his office published an in-depth report on the FM’s critical condition, but without pointing to the political leaders responsible for the dire situation.

THE REPORT unraveled that more than 30 government bodies are currently involved in foreign affairs on behalf of the State of Israel. The large number of such bodies is not the major problem in itself. Foreign relations are currently relevant to almost every aspect of our lives, and therefore it is only natural for most government ministries to have professional staff dealing with international affairs.

The problem is the diffusion of powers from the FM, sometimes to unnecessary ministries that were established due to political give-and-take and not due to real policy needs. This is amplified by the lack of coordination between the different bodies and by the lack of a single entity responsible to harmonize their activities. The 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that 61% of Israelis think this diffusion of powers and lack of coordination in the Foreign Service damages Israel’s foreign policy to a large extent (while only 18% thought the opposite).

The ramifications of the constant belittling of the FM were evident for all to see during the recent normalization process with the UAE and Bahrain. The FM, which for many years played a crucial role in developing ties with Gulf states, was excluded from the final stages before the agreements were reached. Minister Ashkenazi was not even informed of what was going on. More so, multiple ministries are now looking to develop ties with counterparts in the Gulf, sometimes choosing intentionally to go at it alone and bypass the FM.

This has led to the absurdity of several Israeli ministries approaching a single entity in an Arab state, with different – sometimes even contradictory – offers. It has also happened in Israel’s relations with Jordan. The asynchronous efforts of government officials limit Israel’s ability to fulfill the potential of its relations with Arab states.

The new developments in Israel-Gulf relations provide an opportunity to reassess the functioning of Israel’s Foreign Service, update modes of operations (also within the FM) and generate structural changes that will make the FM more central in decision-making. It will allow it to be the one ministry coordinating, harmonizing and reinforcing the international work conducted by various government bodies. But for that to happen, there needs to also be greater clarity regarding the target and goals of Israel’s diplomacy.

An overarching and coherent foreign policy paradigm should be devised and adopted. Furthermore, the Knesset must carry out more effective oversight of the FM’s activities, for it is unacceptable that the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee largely ignores subjects related to foreign affairs and dedicates more than 90% of its time to defense-related issues.

The new cadets will join the FM next summer, but now is the time to act so they can prosper and shape Israel’s future within a strong, appreciated and influential FM. As Israel is seemingly heading toward yet another election cycle, Foreign Minister Ashkenazi should make use of his remaining time in office to leave a mark and a legacy, to empower the FM and to improve Israel’s foreign policy as much as possible.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 9 December 2020

הפוסט It’s time to empower Israel’s Foreign Ministry הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel became a wedge issue in American politics during the presidency of Barack Obama, and this reality was further solidified during Donald Trump’s term in office. The shift reflects a change in the composition of the Democratic Party and the rise of its progressive faction and, in contrast, the growing influence of Evangelical Christians within the Republican Party. As political and social polarization in the US grew in the last few years, President Trump proactively and repeatedly attempted to make Israel an exclusively Republican commodity. He aligned himself with the positions of Obama’s nemesis, hardliner Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was fighting for his political future in a series of national elections and was also embroiled in several corruption scandals. Netanyahu’s domestic initiatives eroded Israel’s democratic norms and institutions, and his calls to annex parts of the West Bank to bolster his electability among right-wing voters threatened to undermine the democratic character of the State of Israel.

President Trump supported these initiatives directly or indirectly because they benefitted him politically and, to a large extent, replicated some of his own provocative domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore, Trump openly assisted Netanyahu politically by withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, moving the American Embassy to Jerusalem, defunding the Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), closing the Palestinian diplomatic mission in Washington, recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and more recently facilitating the signing of the Abraham Accords.

Netanyahu, for his part, reciprocated by supporting Trump’s efforts to attract American Jewish voters and reaffirm the president’s staunch pro-Israel image. For example, at Trump’s urging, Netanyahu prevented Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib, two Democratic members of Congress, from visiting Israel arguing they backed the anti-Israel Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Netanyahu also met Secretary of State Mike Pompeo a couple of months before the 2020 elections as part of the Secretary’s Middle East diplomatic tour, and Pompeo delivered an address to the Republican National Convention (RNC), recorded while in Jerusalem. Only a few days prior to the elections, Secretary Pompeo announced Jerusalem-born US citizens will be able to choose to enter Israel or Jerusalem as their birthplace. This was but another attempt to score political points for the president in a series of pro-Israel policy shifts.

The outcome of the elections shattered this idyllic and symbiotic relationship between the two leaders. Netanyahu was quite hesitant to congratulate President-elect Joe Biden at first and risk alienating Trump who still yields the power of the presidency. Even after Netanyahu congratulated Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris via Twitter, the Israeli prime minister did not address Biden as “president-elect” nor did he point out that Biden had, in fact, won the elections. To soften the blow somewhat, and hedge his bet on Trump just in case, Netanyahu immediately followed-up with a second tweet and thanked the president for his support for Israel and the prime minister personally.

To complicate things, Netanyahu and Pompeo’s meeting with Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammed bin Salman in the city of Neom as well as the assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist attributed to Israel and possibly supported by the US last week were clear signals to the incoming Biden administration to refrain from rejoining the Iran nuclear agreement. Certainly, this is not the best way to engage the new administration, especially if there is already considerable tension between the two leaders.

It is difficult to see how Israel can resume its role as a partisan issue in American politics given the changes in the Democratic and Republican electorate and the policies introduced by the Trump administration in support of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his anti-democratic conduct as well as his hawkish agenda towards the Palestinians and Iran. However, repositioning Israel above any partisan politics in the US and working with both parties is an interest of all sides and, for the Israeli government, it is a vital interest. A strong US-Israel alliance built on renewed American leadership, and reinforced by bipartisan support, can potentially advance the efforts to broker peace across the Middle East and increase regional stability while placating any concerns Israel may have about the Palestinians or the Iranians.

Netanyahu must take the first step and work to untangle the partisanship associated with Israel in contemporary American politics by rescinding his objectionable domestic and foreign policies. If this transpires, Biden should respond in kind after taking office for the greater good of both countries. Resentment is not a substitute for pragmatic statesmanship and the restoration of Israel as a bipartisan issue will be a sign of genuine leadership on both sides.

**The Article was published on The Times of Israel, 8 December 2020

הפוסט Reclaiming Israel as a bipartisan issue in American politics הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the Israeli context, the period leading up to President-elect Joe Biden’s inauguration on January 20 is especially dangerous. With nothing to lose, the Trump administration could give us more of the “poisoned gifts” he has not yet had time to give, or has had difficulty giving so far.

On Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s last visit to Israel we had an example of this, but there are many more and even more dangerous “poisoned gifts.”

The Evangelist Pompeo, who intends to run for one of the two senate seats in Kansas, sees this period as a great political opportunity to strengthen his position among his political base. After all, the Evangelicals do not want any chance of a settlement between us and the Palestinians, since such an arrangement would prevent the fulfillment of the prophecy of a “battle of Gog and Magog between the sons of light and the sons of darkness in Armageddon (Megiddo),” and its wake, with whoever remaining alive converting to Christianity because they have witnessed the return of Jesus and are convinced he is bringing salvation.

US Ambassador David Friedman, who is more of an ambassador to the Yesha Council than to the United States, also has the opportunity to break free from the barriers of the professional echelon in the State Department and assist his settler friends and his religious faith.

For Trump, who really has no ideology, unless narcissism counts, this is a time when it can be shown that he still rules and he really does not care about the implications for Israel or for the United States.

For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, there is no impediment to continuing to undermine bipartisan support for Israel and the connection between Israel and the Democratic Party and most of the American Jewish community, if it is possible to obtain the support of those looking to vote for Yamina Party’s Naftali Bennett, who is threatening him in the polls.

Thus, for the first time in history, we received a visit from an American official in a settlement and a declaration to abolish the separation between products made in the settlements and products made within the 1967 lines. For dessert, we received official support for the Israeli government’s unfounded claim of antisemitism by the BDS movement.

According to many polls, we learn that most Democrats and most American Jews oppose BDS, but at the same time oppose outlawing BDS, because that would violate the right to nonviolent free expression, which is unconstitutional for American liberals. (Conservatives are known to prefer the unlimited right of citizens to bear arms).

The Israeli Right is attempting to argue that those who oppose the policy of occupation and settlements in the world are traitors to their people (when it comes to Diaspora Jews) or just antisemitic (when it comes to non-Jews). This argument, which expresses a dark mental tyranny, severely harms Israeli interests, because it turns many of Israel’s true friends into enemies for the “sin” for not agreeing with elements of the right-wing government’s policies.

The connection between BDS and antisemitism sounds so ridiculous and absurd to ears that have not been exposed to the brainwashing of the Israeli government, evidenced by the many Jewish supporters of BDS. In addition, it is clear to anyone on the ground that antisemitism is the domain of their opponents on the other side of the political map, those who support white supremacy in alignment with their racism.

Abolishing the distinction between settlement products and Israeli products made within the 1967 lines will ultimately hurt Israel, because it eliminates the choice made by many of those who criticize the occupation and the settlements but support the existence of Israel within the 1967 lines or with agreed-upon territorial exchanges. Many of them will be moved to boycott any Israeli product.

ANOTHER GIFT, Jonathan Pollard’s return to Israel, is welcomed because he is not the main culprit in this affair that caused so much damage to Israeli-US relations. The main culprits were those who sent him. He was just a small fish who betrayed his country for money and offered his services to other countries. However, it is important that Israelis are aware of the opposition of so many of our friends in the United States to his release.

As someone who helped president Shimon Peres’s determined efforts to free Pollard, I know that the American intelligence community was steadfast in their opposition to his release. I also remember how during the Wye River talks in 1998, in which I participated, CIA chief George Tenet threatened to resign when Netanyahu sought Pollard’s release, in order to politically sweeten the compromises he had to make as part of the agreement on Hebron. Tenet, who was a close friend of our intelligence agencies and a strong supporter of Israel, saw the Pollard affair as a betrayal causing serious damage to the intelligence relationship with Israel.

So did American Jewry, who were harmed by the Pollard affair because they have been accused widely of dual loyalty, and as a result, for many years Jews had difficulty being accepted into US intelligence agencies and continuing to support Israel. At least it can be hoped that Netanyahu will not celebrate Pollard’s return for political gain in Israel in a way that harms important communities and supporters of Israel in the United States.

The most worrying “poisoned gifts” are those that may still be delivered to us before the inauguration of the new president. The building permits in Givat Hamatos and the apparent permit for construction in the E1 area are an attempt to block any possibility of an arrangement in Jerusalem. E1 will cut the West Bank into a northern canton and a southern canton and will prevent the integration of east Jerusalem and the holy sites for Palestinians within the Palestinian space, and Givat Hamatos will create a buffer that will cut east Jerusalem from Bethlehem and encircle Beit Safafa in Jewish neighborhoods on all sides.

All of us who believe in a two-state solution and fear the dangers to the future of Zionism in a situation where we will have to choose between being the national home of the Jewish people and being a democracy – must press Blue and White ministers to wake up.

They must prevent the steps of “creeping annexation,” which is no less dangerous than the intentions of annexation repealed by virtue of the Abraham Accords. We must avoid the presents that the most dangerous Santa Claus for Israel in modern history is still planning for us, between Thanksgiving, Black Friday sales and Christmas.

The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 2 December 2020

הפוסט Donald Trump’s legacy leaves behind poisoned gifts for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Opening Remarks

Merav Kahana-Dagan, Deputy Head, Mitvim Institute

The year 2020 will be remembered as a particularly strange one. On the one hand, Covid-19 seemed to bring the world to a stop and freeze everything in place; on the other, it was a year of change and development, both globally and regionally. Despite and along with all the challenges, we at the Mitvim Institute continued to advance a fix in Israel’s regional foreign policies. We saw progress and positive developments on some issues, while on others, progress is yet to be seen. We were successful in promoting joint action with government representatives and MKs to improve Israel’s foreign policy and strengthen the Foreign Service. We conducted regional dialogues with think tanks and experts from Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey. We sought to underscore the importance of relations with the EU and aided Israeli efforts to improve these ties. Just recently, we released the 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, an annual survey conducted for the eighth straight year in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, providing information and insights into the Israeli public’s views on a variety of foreign policy issues.

Dr. Paul Pasch, Israel Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 

The Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung have been strategic partners since Mitvim was established in 2011. We are especially proud of the fact that the Mitvim Institute is one of the few Israeli organizations that still conducts policy dialogues with a variety of regional partners – Turks, Palestinians, Jordanians, as well as research institutes and organizations engaged in discourse about the Mediterranean. The Mitvim Institute, with its modest means, is ranked in a high and respected place on the University of Pennsylvania’s global think tank index, and this is certainly a source of pride. The Mitvim Institute plays an important role in preserving and improving the dialogue between Israel and the governing institutions of the EU. It currently appears there is an opportunity to renew and strengthen the significant Israel-EU relations, which have suffered over the last few years. In recent months, against the backdrop of the agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan, the Mitvim Institute helped us see beyond the sense of public euphoria and understand the process in a more nuanced perspective.

Israel’s Relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean

Dr. Roee Kibrik, Director of Research, Mitvim Institute

It is hard to pin down Israel as belonging to just one regional system. The State of Israel is somewhere in the middle, between and betwixt, inside and beside, and often outside several regions. That explains why respondents in the Mitvim Institute’s annual surveys, when asked “to which region does Israel primarily belong,” are usually rather evenly divided among the Middle East, Mediterranean and Europe. Israel seeks to advance its interests in all three, as part of the regional fabric and balance of power. We must remember that these regions are not separate from each other and are closely interlinked.

Many significant developments have occurred over the past year, some surprising, some initiated by Israel, some led by other players, and some the result of external circumstances. These developments present Israel with many challenges as well as opportunities. Israel is no longer the isolated, enemy-encircled island that it perceived itself as for many years. Israel is discovering that it has much to gain from cooperation and that it can conduct ties with various countries, even those in conflict with each other or with Israel.

Israel has adopted a complex and more nuanced regional foreign policy. While it appears that external circumstances led Israel to adopt this approach, rather than a reasoned, thought-out internal decision, Israel could benefit greatly if it develops a more sophisticated foreign policy in accordance with these changes and adapts its tools accordingly. To that end it must also transform its Foreign Service into a well-funded, effective and coordinated body that plays a significant role in Israel’s decision-making processes.

Prof. Elie Podeh, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

This was a difficult year, but it had some positive parts, and was clearly an unexpected one. Despite the heavy shadow of Covid-19, Israel signed three normalization agreements, with the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan. These contradict to a certain extent the accepted thesis that progress in Israel’s relations with the Arab world cannot occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Perhaps we failed to correctly assess the shift in parts of the Arab world, the extent of the Arab world’s impatience with the Palestinians, the level of US determination and the pandemic’s repercussions.

The biggest change stemming from the signed agreements is a tremendous improvement of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis its enemies. The second significant change is the benefit for Israel’s economy. What is more, Israel’s image in the media and civil society in some of the region’s states has been enhanced. This was no dramatic, immediate shift; we are talking about a gradual change. The Arab media’s attitude toward Israel is fundamentally negative, but the manner in which Gulf media views Israel has improved. There has also been a shift in the Arab attitude toward the concept of normalization. The peace with the UAE and Bahrain is a different kind of peace. It is substantially different from the peace with Egypt and Jordan, signed primarily with the regimes in those states. With the UAE and Bahrain, the change is also occurring from the bottom up, not just from the top down. This is another kind of peace.

However, we must not be lulled into euphoria, as we have been in the past. These are significant achievements, but they are taking place on the periphery of the Middle East and do not necessarily have a dramatic effect on some of the conflicts and problems plaguing the region. Ultimately, the Palestinian issue is the heart of the conflict and we cannot divert attention to the periphery and assume that this will resolve the conflict. We may have even distanced a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A political shift in the US could result in the hoped-for change that would place the Palestinian issue higher on the US agenda.

Dr. Moran Zaga, Research Fellow, Mitvim Institute

The agreement between Israel and the UAE is a groundbreaking event within a broader process. In recent years, the UAE has positioned itself as a regional power active on the regional and international level. The normalization with Israel signals another milestone in its quest for influence and its efforts to adopt courageous and reality-changing measures. The UAE has strategic and ideological motivations in this regard. Israel, for its part, has an interest in facilitating a significant role for the UAE in the Middle East because it holds regional views similar to our own and wields influence in places that Israel does not, such as in Syria and Iraq.

Israel has invested significant resources in developing ties with the UAE through government and civil society channels. The change in relations that will take place will find its expression not only in the openness of ties, but also in their extent, capacities, and wider array of cooperation – in research, culture, tourism and diplomacy. The two states have shared interests and potential for cooperation in additional fields, such as climate change, food security, energy, technology, regional security and the Iranian threat. The building of the joint platforms we are currently witnessing that encompass government ministries, dedicated task teams, civilian forums and Memorandums of Understanding is an encouraging signal of a firm foundation with continuity potential.

Maintaining the special fabric of relations woven between Israel and the UAE is important, as is expanding the ties created between a narrow stratum of decision makers into broader connections. Since the UAE is a federative state, it is worth trying to link up various local leaders to the process. Some of the emirates in the federation have yet to express their views on normalization, and it is important to monitor their attitude. The UAE needs additional legitimacy for the step it took, and it therefore hopes that other Arab states will follow. That is why the ties that it seeks to forge with Israel are regional and not just bilateral in nature. The two sides have a mutual interest: strengthening the Emirati move towards Israel and expanding Israel’s network of ties in the Middle East.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Director, Europe-Israel Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

Israel-EU relations started off in 2020 under the shadow of the Trump plan, deteriorated into threats of European punitive measures if Israel went ahead with its unilateral annexation intentions, and significantly improved under Gabi Ashkenazi as Israel’s foreign minister.

The EU is Israel’s biggest trade partner, providing it with a stick it can use against Israel with varying degrees of force that could all be harmful (for example, the possibility that was raised not to renew the EU’s research and innovation agreement with Israel for the 2021-2027 period). The suspension of the annexation plan paved the way for better relations, and Ashkenazi enjoys respect and a warm European embrace, not the least of which stems from European dislike of Netanyahu and Ashkenazi’s clear differentiation from him. Officials in Jerusalem, Berlin and Brussels are trying to leverage the archiving of the annexation plan in order to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012 and to which certain European states have objected in recent years.

Israel’s normalization agreements with Arab states is forcing the EU to recalibrate its course on a two-state solution, given that non-resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no longer poses an obstacle to normalization with some Arab states. In addition, in order for Israel to be more attentive to the EU, the organization would do well to undo the ineffective linkage it makes between progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the upgrading of Israel-EU ties. The government of Israel, for its part, must stop its incitement that depicts the EU as a foe rather than friend, and that encourages a negative attitude toward the EU in Israeli public opinion, which is without justification or foundation and is damaging to the relationship. The government of Israel must promote ties with the EU, which is a strategic partner of the State of Israel. We must base our relations on dialogue, even if a critical one, and manage to once again distinguish between politics and interests.

Gabriel Mitchell, Director of External Relations, Mitvim Institute

The combination of Israel’s economic and strategic capabilities has created many opportunities in the Mediterranean. The discovery of natural gas has allowed Israel to dialogue with its neighbors and expand contacts with them. This past year, Israel signed the convention that anchors the status of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) as an internationally recognized organization, signed agreements with the governments of Cyprus and Greece on gas exports via the planned East Med pipeline, and worked together with Greece and Cyprus to stem the spread of Covid-19 and maintain open skies for tourism. Israel also offered Lebanon humanitarian aid following the Beirut port explosion, named Amira Oron as Ambassador to Egypt, maintained open dialogue and cooperation channels with Turkey, and coordinated with Egypt, Qatar, the UN and other international players to allow goods into Gaza and avoid eroding the status quo.

Israel currently faces three significant challenges in the region. It can no longer rely solely on the US, which is in the process of withdrawing from the region, and it must therefore look out for its own strategic interests and find additional pathways to advancing its goals in the region. The two other challenges stem from the collapse of global energy prices and the freeze placed on gas exploration in the Mediterranean as a result of the Covid-19 crisis, and Turkey’s challenge to the regional order with an aggressive foreign policy in a bid to expand its sphere of influence. In order to advance its interests in the Mediterranean, Israel could bolster ties with its EMGF partners, expand cooperation with them on issues such as the environment, renewable energy, tourism, cyber and maritime security. Israel could also strengthen ties with European states invested in the region’s future, encourage US participation in the EMGF and expand joint Israeli-American research projects to additional states, display willingness to resolve the maritime border issue with Lebanon, find a solution to the Gaza energy crisis, and maintain open communication channels with Turkey.

Israeli Diplomacy in Muslim and Arab States

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Mitvim Institute

New opportunities have opened for Israel in the Middle East in recent years. Relationships with Arab states are changing, facilitating new and expanded cooperation. The ties are no longer mostly clandestine and security-focused as they were previously; they are increasingly open and also include civilian, economic and diplomatic aspects. The Israeli public and decision makers have identified this shift and are increasingly viewing the Middle East as a region with potential for cooperation and not just as an arena in which Israel must defend itself from its neighbors. The realization of the full potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. That is true even as some Arab states are willing to normalize ties with Israel in return for suspension of Israel’s annexation intentions, even without concrete progress toward peace with the Palestinians. However, other factors are also delaying the realization of the potential in Israel-Arab relations, among them the Israeli government’s domestic conduct.

The State Comptroller’s report issued this year pointed to serious shortcomings in Israel’s Foreign Service. Other than the Foreign Ministry, which has been significantly and deliberately weakened in recent years, over 30 other government ministries and agencies are active in the foreign policy arena, without a central body to coordinate their activities. This is apparent in the management of Israel’s ties with Arab states, and examples of the issues that arise due to this lack of centralization have emerged over the past two months since the announcement of normalization with the UAE. Key examples include tensions between the security and diplomatic echelons and the continued dominance of security officials on foreign policy issues; the rivalry and lack of cooperation among various government ministries operating vis-à-vis Arab states; the absence of effective Knesset oversight, particularly by the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, over the government’s implementation of foreign policy; and the need for a more effective interface between government agencies and the business and civil society sectors.

With Israel facing new opportunities and forging new ties in the region, a greater synergy must be created among the various elements involved in Israel-Arab relations, and their friction and rivalry must be set aside. Management of the evolving ties with our neighbors must be entrusted to the professionals most equal to the task, with a leading role for the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats. The emerging new period in the Middle East opens a window of opportunity to re-examine Israeli diplomacy in Arab and Muslim states.

Dr. Ehud Eiran, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

The Abraham Accords stemmed primarily from security-strategic interests, such as the need to confront Iran and prepare for the apparent decline in the US commitment to the Middle East. That explains the significant role of Israeli security officials in progress toward the normalization agreements, in dialogue and contacts with Gulf regimes and security counterparts there.

Years ago, diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the Arab world were managed by the agency that preceded Israel’s Foreign Ministry – the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, which also conducted intelligence gathering activities in the Middle East. In later years, Israel’s contacts with Arab states became a military issue (for example, meetings of the armistice committees), largely clandestine in nature (for example, smuggling Jews out of northern Africa), leading to the “securitization” of Israeli relations with the Middle East. There is also a lateral-generational aspect involved. The first Foreign Ministry officials to deal with the Arab issue (such as Eliyahu Eilat and Eliyahu Sasson) were products of an open Middle Eastern environment that closed after Israel’s establishment.

The peace with Egypt and Jordan and the diplomatic processes of the 1990s brought the Foreign Ministry back, to a certain extent and at least at the time, to the Middle Eastern arena with the opening of several representative missions in regional capitals. In other words, the type of interaction between Israel and Arab states has generally determined the identity of the Israeli agency leading the relationship. The undermining of Foreign Ministries in the conduct of foreign relations both in Israel and elsewhere in the world has also affected this aspect.

An opportunity has now opened up to expand the Foreign Ministry’s role in relations with Arab states. Hopes of civilian ties, nurtured at the time of the peace agreement signing with Egypt and Jordan, were dashed; security issues have since dominated those relations. However, Israel’s emerging ties with Gulf states hold a promise of success. There is already a history of civilian cooperation with those states that can be leveraged, Gulf states are far from the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and their general agendas underscore greater openness to the world. An example of the Foreign Ministry’s importance in the renewed ties with the Arab world comes into play in multilateral aspects, such as the formal Israeli mission to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi and Israel’s membership in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum headquartered in Cairo.

Haim Regev, Deputy Director General for Middle East, Foreign Ministry

Israel’s Foreign Ministry under a full-time minister is in a different and better place these days than it was six months ago, and that includes participation in decision making, a significant budget, broader areas of responsibility, and more. In examining the Foreign Ministry’s activity in the Middle East, we have to keep in mind who Israel’s interlocutors are in those states. Often, they are security and intelligence officials associated with the rulers of those states, and therefore their natural partners on the Israeli side are also security officials. Links with the Foreign Ministry are often perceived in Arab states as the final stage before normalization of relations. Nonetheless, since the 1990s, the Ministry has had varied ties in the Middle East with relevant elements, especially in the Gulf. The Ministry’s greatest achievement has been the “routinization” effect – accustoming Arab states to Israeli presence in their territory. Since 2016, an Israeli mission has been operating in Abu Dhabi within the framework of IRENA, with Israeli representatives allowed to enter the UAE on an Israeli diplomatic passport, thus creating a basis for expanded relations.

Links with Gulf states up until now have existed on four levels: diplomatic – dialogue with a small circle of senior figures; economic – widespread Israeli business activity in the Gulf, which would not have been possible without Foreign Ministry involvement; people-to-people – connecting civil society organizations and preparing public opinion for links with Israel; social media – the Ministry is heavily invested in Arabic-language social media, creating a public platform for relations to develop once official ties are declared. The Ministry has learned the lessons of the peace processes with Egypt and Jordan, ones that lacked sufficient preparation of public opinion and routinization. The recent breakthrough with Gulf states provides the Ministry with broad opportunities in terms of business, tourism, culture and more.

The Jordanians and Palestinians are closely aligned on the regional scene and they are beginning to internalize the change in Israeli-Arab relations and the fact that the more they lag behind, the more they stand to lose. Now, with the annexation issue delayed and in light of the fact that the UAE is an important ally of Jordan’s, new Palestinian and Jordanian thinking may emerge. It is important to remember that the peace with Jordan is of great strategic importance to Israel.

Ksenia Svetlova, Director, Israel-Middle East Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

The recent agreements and developments with Gulf states have spotlighted the weakness of the Knesset, especially of its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The Knesset is tasked with government oversight, but it does not carry out its mandate. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee has hardly held any discussions on the regional processes that have matured in recent years. Even when lawmakers wanted to deal with these issues, information was not available to them. Some MKs tabled questions but did not receive answers and were dismissed out of hand on vague security grounds. Security issues have dominated the committee’s work for years and the subcommittee for foreign affairs is very rarely convened.

We at the Mitvim Institute recently published a study on how the government conducts issues related to regional cooperation. The study’s main finding was the absence of an overall coordinating body for the many agencies and ministries active in the region. Such a body, responsible for ties with Arab states and tasked with shaping a national diplomatic strategy, must be established. Specific plans must be drawn up for dealing with each country in the region, and uncoordinated overlaps between different governmental agencies must be avoided. One single body must be tasked with planning and promoting regional cooperation, and all the information available to various governmental agencies must be shared. The Foreign Ministry’s tasks have been generously farmed out to various ministries in recent years while the security establishment enjoys prominence and superiority in decision making processes. In the past six months, the Foreign Ministry’s standing has improved and it is clearly participating and leading more. The Foreign Ministry must be the lead agency in diplomatic relations in general, and in those with Arab states specifically.

We are at the start of an important process turning Israel into a member of the Middle Eastern family after many long years. Along with the clear advantages and opportunities this integration brings, it raises complex challenges, and dealing with them requires cooperation among government agencies. The signing of historic agreements without any Knesset oversight or input is a deeply unsound practice that must change.

Yael Ravia-Zadok, Head of Economic Diplomacy Division, Foreign Ministry

Economic diplomacy is the Foreign Ministry’s growth engine. The Covid-19 crisis has illustrated the Ministry’s essential role in acquiring medical equipment, arranging travel for stranded Israelis, ensuring continued flights to Israel, and more. The Ministry is working to leverage Israeli innovation and capabilities for the needs of other states as well, strengthening Israel’s diplomatic equity and identifying new business opportunities for Israeli firms. Over the past two years, Israeli representative offices have helped advance deals worth 7.6 billion USD, which created over 65,000 new jobs for Israelis. The Ministry thus contributes not only to Israel’s strategic security, but also to its economic security.

The Foreign Ministry is flourishing. It is leading a rich diplomatic agenda and has secured additional budgets. The presence of Israeli diplomats on the ground is an asset, as they forge the connection between local needs and Israeli capabilities (and vice versa), and strengthen ties with countries where they are posted. These needs pave the way for action. In 2011, we identified Jordan’s need for alternative trade routes after its main route through Syria was blocked. The Foreign Ministry initiated the creation of an overland bridge for goods from and to Jordan, thereby strengthening Israel’s regional standing and its equity vis-à-vis Jordan.

The economic dimension is a central axis to promoting ties in the region. The QIZ agreement with Egypt has increased Egyptian exports and created 300,000 jobs. Think of the fact that hundreds of thousands of households make a living off the fruits of the peace with Israel. This is no small achievement. The natural gas discoveries have changed Israel’s standing in the region and turned it into an energy exporter to its neighbors. Energy diplomacy facilitated the founding of the EMGF, established this year in Cairo at the initiative of the Israeli and Egyptian energy ministers.

The Abraham Accords are a historic event affecting the entire region. The trilateral fund announced by the Americans will constitute an important tool for promoting joint economic projects. The agreements already signed (on aviation, visas and investment protection) are laying the foundations for future ties and building trust. We will strive to promote trade, innovation, renewable energy and infrastructure projects in the region. Israel seeks to solidify the new partnerships for the benefit of the region, and beyond. The sky is the limit.

Political Perspectives

Minister Orit Farkash-Hacohen, Minister of Strategic Affairs and Tourism

In dealing with strategic issues, it is important to focus on the campaign being waged on social media against Israel. This is a daily struggle and it is not simply about our image, but about the truth. This is a battle for consciousness and for Israel’s good name. Manipulations of consciousness and awareness generate negative discourse on social media against Israel, born of a desire to influence the public agenda in a way that negates Israel’s existence, its legitimacy and its interests. The Ministry of Strategic Affairs is also active in combating hate speech on the web. I recently inaugurated a new smart communication center with the head of the Julis local council and the Council for National and Civic Service, and this year six young Druze women will operate a digital communications room in Arabic.

In 1967, following the Six Day War, Sudan hosted the Khartoum Summit at which Arab states adopted the notorious “Three No’s” negating Israel’s existence – “no to recognition, no to negotiations, no to peace.” Today, this trend has been reversed to one of recognition. Yes to dialogue, yes to connections, no to boycotts.

Tourism is the best expression of peace between nations.  That was why Begin underscored the importance of tourism for building bridges in his speech during Sadat’s visit to Israel. Governments are the ones that sign agreements and treaties, but true peace is built when people meet each other. The State of Israel and I, too, expect tourists from Arab and Muslim states. This is the way to infuse content into sustainable peace between states. We will continue to strengthen Israel’s standing and legitimacy in the region and the world.

MK Ofer Shelah, Yesh Atid-Telem

The chasm in the heart of the Middle East between states striving for stability and radical Islam offers Israel opportunities to improve its standing in the region. Israel was for decades excluded from regional processes, and decisions on substantive issues (such as the war in Syria and the Iranian nuclear program) were adopted without input regarding its interests and those it shares with its neighbors. Putin may invite Netanyahu for a photo-op, but on matters such as the war in Syria, he talks to Rouhani and Erdoğan. They are players in the arena; we are not. The same goes for the US pullout from the Middle East. The true “deal of the century” would be to offer the US a Middle East led by its allies – Israel and the other states striving for stability.

Following the recent normalization agreements, Netanyahu may be celebrating his argument that we can improve our standing in the region without placing the Palestinian card on the table, but separation from the Palestinians is a paramount Israeli interest if it seeks to remain Jewish and democratic. The Palestinians are paying a heavy price for their rejectionism. If we do not take advantage of the momentum with Gulf states to effectuate a separation from the Palestinians, then the normalization too will boil down to a deal intended to improve the standing of various regimes in the Middle East concerned about losing touch with the US once Trump is replaced.

Just like those surveyed by the Mitvim Institute for its annual Israeli Foreign Policy Index, I do not see a recent change in the standing of the Foreign Ministry. The weakening of the Ministry and the parceling out of its tasks to other ministries for political expediency began a long time ago and has been damaging to Israel. This is not just a technical issue related to the Ministry’s presence or absence at crucial decision-making junctions. It is also about the absence of coordinated Foreign Service activity and lack of backing for it to promote vital Israeli interests.

Netanyahu thinks US Jewry will disappear from the map given the high rate of assimilation and loss of contact with Israel. This must be confronted, and the US Jewish community must be reconnected to Israel. That is a job for the Foreign Ministry to do.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair, Meretz

The new agreements with Gulf states are important and must be backed. Nonetheless, the argument made by the government and the Israeli right that these agreements cancel out the Palestinian issue is fraudulent and damaging to Israel’s interests. Progress in negotiations with the Palestinians is in Israel’s interest in order for us to live here peacefully and securely. The new agreements could help advance negotiations with the Palestinians and achieve a two-state solution.

In recent years, we have witnessed a rise in reactionary, anti-democratic and anti-liberal regimes and leaders. Israel has forged and strengthened ties with some of them at the expense of relations with democratic, liberal governments. Regarding Europe, Israel must invest resources and preserve its ties with the democratic states that have been and remain our allies. The government-backed claims that the EU is hostile to Israel must also be silenced. This is a fundamentally unacceptable and unworthy idea.

Israel’s democratic essence does not allow us to distance ourselves from liberal democracies such as Germany and France, and from an organization such as the EU. Israel’s place in the world is among the enlightened and democratic people who defend human rights and seek peaceful conflict resolution. The current government of Israel will not change its policy in that regard, but even it has sufficient members who are supposed to understand our affinity for and closeness to the democratic and liberal world.

Political change in the US could result in renewed thinking in Jerusalem regarding the direction of our foreign policy. Israel has always enjoyed bipartisan consensus in the US. That consensus has been cracked in recent years and Netanyahu and the government of Israel played a key role in this deterioration. The Jewish community in the US traditionally votes overwhelmingly for Democrats. In its ties with the Jewish communities there, Israel’s government must underscore the shared values and interests we have with them and realize its mistake in undermining relations with the Democratic Party and over-relying on Trump and the Republicans.

MK Aida Touma-Suleiman, Joint List

This would seem to be the most successful period ever for Israel in terms of regional politics, with a new announcement of a supposed peace agreement emerging every few days. However, the states with which Israel is reaching agreements fit the profile of regimes that oppress their people. That happens in Europe, Africa and in the Gulf and the broader Arab world. Despite the general impression of success of the Netanyahu government’s regional policy, we are in fact deteriorating toward a more complex situation. Economic trade agreements are a diversion from the true attempt to resolve the situation that led us to the conflict in the first place. Israel is an occupier of another people and Netanyahu’s policy provides an alibi for continued occupation. The Trump plan is not a peace plan; it fails to advance the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, this is a mega-annexation plan thwarting the founding a Palestinian state. The agreement with the UAE is part of this plan.

The agreements with Gulf states distance us from peace. If these agreements serve the goal of isolating the Palestinians and are intended to bring them to their knees, they cannot be considered peace agreements. Do these agreements serve the interests of the people? In my view, they do not, despite their economic potential. Only the wealthy will profit. Netanyahu and his government have launched a dangerous arms race in the region. Since the signing of the agreements, all we hear about are preparations for war and acquisition of fighter jets. This is not a climate that bodes well for peaceful relations.

Anyone who thinks Israel can conduct a regional policy as an occupying power leaves us with a heavy and explosive legacy. Even after Trump and Netanyahu step down, we will have to deal with the obstacles that they sowed into the road to peace. The question that we, and especially Israel’s Jewish majority, must ask is what kind of future and state we want. Netanyahu is building an apartheid state, and his moves do not help us build a true democracy and end the occupation. The alleged success recorded today in relations with the region actually signals a troubling deterioration.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment, November 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From a strategic standpoint, the trend that jeopardizes the great value that the US attaches to Israel is the diminishing strategic importance of the Middle East region to the US. This region was previously the most significant energy supplier of the US, but today the US itself has become an energy exporter. US interventions in the Middle East have recently ended in failure, from the going-all-the-way invasion of Iraq, to “leading from behind” in Libya and ending in helplessness on the Syrian issue.

For Israel, the ability to rely on American support for the region, which has been an important component of our defense, is eroding. As an example, the future of Syria is currently decided by Turkey, Syria and Russia, while the US controls no levers there. As for Iran, the US has found itself in “splendid” isolation in the UN Security Council (alongside the Dominican Republic) in an attempt to extend the embargo on arms sales to Iran.

From a political standpoint, an alarming trend stems from a change happening over the years in what was once a special relationship between the two countries based on bipartisan support and the avoidance of turning Israel into an issue that is politically controversial. Trump and Netanyahu have acted contrary to this, and we are witnessing a very worrying trend in which the liberal public in the US (that has grown demographically in the transition from a white and Protestant majority state to a country of minorities) is moving away from Israel, which is increasingly perceived as conservative and as an arm of the Republican Party.

This distancing is beginning to show its signs among new lawmakers in Congress, who no longer see the special relationship with Israel as an important value and strategic asset of the US. Worse is the impact on the American Jewish community, which is the largest and most important Jewish community outside Israel. There are trends of ambivalence and sometimes even hostility towards Israel, which in recent years has moved away from the liberal values of non-Orthodox Judaism.

What can be done to maintain the US’ strategic commitment to Israel and to restore bipartisan support? The process of the US distancing itself from the Middle East requires Israel to change its traditional policy of opposing the signing of a defense pact enshrined in American law. The Israeli opposition stems from fears such an agreement would reduce Israel’s maneuvering room in the region. However, this argument is eroded in light of the fact that the real threats to Israel today are asymmetric, and our military power cannot prevent them. It is actually through “tying our hands” and refraining from of futile military reactions when provoked, and in parallel generating American motivation to effectively deter our enemies through pulling diplomatic and economic levers, that will achieve much more.

הפוסט How can Israel mend relations with White House following political change? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu dismisses with contempt the assertion that he damaged the traditional bipartisan support for Israel in the United States. He mocks his critics by saying that they cannot teach him anything about the Democratic Party. Undeniably, he does know the American system well, which makes his blatant and reckless preference of the Republican side even worse.

Former Ambassador Martin Indyk tweeted on November 8 that “it’s true that Netanyahu has known Joe Biden for nearly 40 years, but it’s also true that Joe Biden has known Netanyahu for nearly forty years.”  President-elect Biden confirmed a previous assertion, in which he said, “Bibi, I don’t agree with a damn thing you say but I love you”. Nevertheless, Biden will pursue a very different foreign policy than that of his predecessor, Donald J. Trump.

The outgoing U.S. administration interpreted the Trumpian ideology of “America First” as “America Alone”, withdrawing from a long line of international treaties, agreements and institutions. Thus, the United States withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. In matters closer to Israel, the US abandoned the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that have indeed proven to be unfair towards Israel, or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Above all, there looms the May 2018 US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. Netanyahu’s Israel had loudly applauded this move but U.S. allies, such as the UK, France and Germany, did not follow through, although none of them had any illusions regarding Iran.

The Biden administration is likely to commence its return to at least some of the international instruments that Trump has jettisoned, including the Climate Change Treaty. Likewise, it may resume the nuclear deal with Iran, albeit in a different configuration and with stricter adherence to eliminating Iran’s subversive and missile activities.

The justified delight on both the banks of the Potomac and the Jordan Rivers with regard to the recently signed agreements with the United Arab Emirates, could be seasoned by the return of the a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians, as the Biden administration is likely to seek promoting negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This vision is unpalatable for at least some of the components of the Netanyahu government.

Netanyahu has become a vociferous critic of the two state solution. Nonetheless, history proves that he has an impressive ability to artfully collapse in the face of real pressures, be they external or internal. He had done so in the transfer of Hebron to the Palestinians, in the massive release of terrorists in exchange for Gilad Shalit and, more recently, in the issue of opening educational institutions for the ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students while most everyone else had to keep zooming at home. This is the Netanyahu.

He would not be eager to confront a determined American administration, especially in light of his original preference for its political rivals. Some in the democratic administration may take their time in overcoming Netanyahu’s siding with the republicans. Others may demand their (Israeli) pound of flesh, claiming that it was their own “progressive” squad that ensured victory. Netanyahu may also encounter American-Jewish indifference and lack of willingness to bridge, once again, over the gap between a right-wing Israeli government and a democratic administration. He will have to mend many fences in Washington and it is not going to be easy.

In a strange “grin of history” and beyond Netanyahu and his persona, it may very well be that Israel needs a center-left government to adopt a belligerent policy, and a right-wing one to promote peace. Thus, the Israeli right wing had enthusiastically mobilized for war (such as in the Six Day War), but viciously cut short the days of a center-left government trying to reach agreements with the Palestinians. Indeed, it is in these gloomy November days that we remember so painfully the assassination that took place 25 years ago. On the other hand, a right-wing government that would promote peace agreements would always enjoy, albeit grudgingly, the support of the left, as it happened with the 1979 Camp David Accords.

It is likely that if a center-left government will attempt to renew the political process, the right wing, led by Mr. Netanyahu, would deluge it ferociously. Nevertheless, if a right-wing government is in power, Mr. Netanyahu will be able to issue even a second “Bar-Ilan speech”, accepting a two-state solution. In such a case, the right wing, perhaps with the exception of some extreme and delusional circles, would hesitate to attack its own Messiah (“King Bibi!”). The battle hardened Security Services should handle these lunatic circles, according to law, and Israel could continue on its way as a modern and advanced start-up nation.

Mr. Netanyahu may still have a historical role to play. He will have to stand before his judges and respond to the indictments leveled at him, but in the meantime, he can serve as a prime minister who could facilitate, though reluctantly, political moves proposed by the Biden administration. Along the way, Mr. Netanyahu could also act (if he so wished) to calm the socio-political turmoil he has promoted in Israel. Does this sound like too much to expect? Maybe, but hey, there is a not-so-new kid on the block now!

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 19 November 2020.

הפוסט The Not-So-New Kid on the Block הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Some thirty years ago, the battle of the giants between the United States led Western democracies and the Soviet Union had ended in victory. We woke up to a unipolar world, a brighter world where the only superpower was a liberal democracy, the City on the Hill. Some thought, and wrote, that this was in fact the end of history. However, we had realized very soon, how wrong we were.  As Christopher Layne wrote in his article, “The Return of Great-Power War”, (Foreign Affairs,  November/ December 2020). The incoming administration will have to live in a triple-headed global reality, with another super-power and a half, namely, with China and Russia.

This is not going to be easy. Indeed, economically speaking the US has the upper hand with a GDP of some $20,544bn, compared with China’s $13,608bn (according to the Economist 2021 edition of the Pocket World in Figures). However, the average annual growth of China’s economy in 2012-2018 was 6.9% whereas the US’s growth was only 2.4% in the same period.

In and of itself this is not intolerable, especially if one is to combine the US, the EU, the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan into a group of like-minded liberal countries. Most of these countries have advanced creative and well-educated societies with accumulated economies of some $50,000bn. Their joint military strength exceeds that of China or of Russia. Besides, given the West’s superior technologies, the US and the West should enjoy a Qualitative Military Edge.

However, this situation calls for sound and sensible leadership, the kind of which was lacking in the last few years. The US and the EU drifted apart.  The UK, which was promised by Secretary of State Pompeo that, after BREXIT, America would be there for Britain, “pen in hand” to sign an Anglo-American deal, found out that it would be neither quick nor easy. In the Middle East, we also learned once more that there is no vacuum and wherever the US vacates an arena, someone else will take over. Look in Iran penetration of Iraq, or how Turkey and Russia becoming masters of Syria or how Russian mercenaries operate in Libya, to name but a few examples. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has practically enabled Iran to dash towards attaining weapon-grade capabilities, while the “maximum pressure” provided no solution to Iran’s subversive activities in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. It also created a rift betwee the US and its European allies.

Most of these developments resulted from faulty American leadership. It is true that the Trump administration had a major achievement in the shape of the “Abraham Accords” between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, for which we should always be grateful. We had also reached the formal American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. However, very few believe that the status of the Golan will not be challenged in future Syrian-Israeli negotiations. In the meantime, in our jubilant run towards the “Abraham Accords” with distant countries that we never had a war with, Israel and the US trampled over the Palestinian situation. This conflict will probably come back to haunt us. A sound American – and Israeli – Leadership would have thought about it ahead of time.

Thus, what the world needs now is resumed American leadership, as Vice President Biden wrote in his piece “Why America Must Lead Again” (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020). What the world need now is a resumed American leadership, generous and sober, clear-headed and resolved, inclusive and sharing.  What we need is a responsible adult in our chaotic political life.

I recall a speech by PM Tony Blair in the US Congress back in 2003. He referred to a letter from an Idaho farmer who asked, “Why me? And why us? And why America?’ And the only answer is, said Blair, ‘Because destiny put you in this place in history, in this moment in time, and the task is yours to do’.

I hope that American voters, while solemnly casting their votes today, will also remember their global role and responsibilities as well as the scorching need to put their own society in order.

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 3 November 2020

הפוסט Resumed American Leadership, Perhaps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This issue has been highlighted since Donald Trump was elected president of the United States and as radical voices on the left grow in volume across the nation, which seems to have caused an irreparable rift between Israel and U.S. Jewry.

הפוסט Israel, American Jews and the Democratic dichotomy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Findings of the Mitvim Institue Poll, October 2020

The eighth annual public opinion poll of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted in September 2019. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (700 men and women, Jews and Arabs) and with a margin of error of 3.5%. The report presents the poll’s key findings, grouped under four categories: Israel’s Foreign Service, Israel’s foreign relations,  Israel and its surrounding regions, and Israel and the Palestinians.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nonetheless, a careful monitoring of his decisions provides several guiding principles, which we will try to describe here, keeping in mind that some are inherently contradictory and therefore cannot guarantee exact forecasts of his moves, although they do supply a certain level of predictability. Psychological tools may be more effective in analyzing Trump’s decisions, but I will try to do so using the tools of a former diplomat.

Four principles have shaped Trump’s foreign policy to date:

1. Narcissism

Trump’s belief in being the ultimate negotiator and his desire for credit in this regard have underpinned many of his initiatives. Such was the case with his effort to orchestrate the “Deal of the Century” between Israel and the Palestinians (the holy grail of all conflicts) without realizing that there are two sides to every conflict, and with his unprecedented and bizarre summit with the president of North Korea.

Trump’s attitude toward foreign leaders also stems from the extent to which they shower him with the accolades that he believes he deserves. This explains his coolness toward German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for example, despite the clear US interests in its relationship with Germany. Trump tends to gravitate toward like-minded narcissists – Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro and Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte, while giving a cold shoulder to leaders with more restrained egos.

2. The opposite of Obama

Trump sought to brand himself as Barack Obama’s opposite throughout his election campaign and has shaped his presidential decisions accordingly. He withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal engineered by Obama, although he would have embraced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and trumpeted the achievement had someone presented him with the agreement and told him he could take credit for it.

Trump pulled the US out of Obama’s free trade Trans-Pacific Partnership even though it perfectly corresponded with his China isolation policy in the Pacific Rim region. He eventually opted for a trade war with China, which, rather than isolating China, is harming the US and global economy. Trump abrogated the North American Free Trade Agreement deal with Mexico and Canada, only to sign a similar agreement under a different name. Trump abandoned US leadership on climate change issues, and domestically sought to overturn Obama’s healthcare reform – attempts for which the US is paying dearly as it confronts COVID-19.

3. “America First”

This approach is in fact an extension of his personal narcissism to the national arena. Trump has dismissed the traditional US preference for operating through international organizations and promoting alliances – because they require concessions vis-à-vis the interests of other states.

The “America First” approach differs innately from the attempt for exceptionalism that guided US foreign policy, embracing an international role for the US in advancing its values around the world. Trump views the traditional exceptionalism approach and advancement of American values as a waste of resources. Trump’s decisions are guided solely by the potential economic value of relations with other countries, rather than by global leadership ambitions. That was why he avoided leading an international campaign against COVID-19, tried to blame China for the virus and pulled the US out of the World Health Organization – in marked contrast to the Obama administration’s successful world leadership in confronting and eradicating the Ebola virus before it reached American shores.

4. Appeasing the political base

Trump regards the Evangelical right as a loyal base of support and seeks to appease its theological interests in the international arena, not out of identification with its values but out of pure political opportunism. The same goes for key conservative donors, such as Sheldon Adelson. Moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights are telling examples of this attitude. The embassy transfer was designed in part to help a Republican candidate running for the Senate in special Alabama elections where the Evangelical vote is critical.

Trump’s guiding principles often clash, reflecting his tendency to zigzag and change his mind. The high turnover rate and firings of key officials in foreign policy contexts also stems from this flip-flopping on various issues.

Under pressure from Evangelical supporters and Adelson, Trump backed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation intention, which backfired when confronted with his desire to advance major US arms sales to the Gulf (some claim his economic interest was personal, too). Economic interests eventually overcame his annexation support. Trump’s decision might have also stemmed from his conviction that the evangelists would vote for him in any case and not for the liberal, Catholic Biden, and from the fact that most are not from the key swing states that will decide the elections. Such states would appreciate jobs and deals generated by arms sales, especially in the coronavirus-induced economic downturn.

Trump’s policy on the US presence in Iraq and Syria was another case of contradicting decision. He was inclined to stop the investment of US resources and abandon regional leadership but because this policy fit in with the Obama-led trend (Pivot to Asia), it became less attractive. On the other hand, his base was advocating an aggressive policy on Syria and Iran. These contradictions explain the firing of 59 cruise missiles at Syria and on the other hand the decision to avoid retaliation for the Iranian assault on Saudi oil facilities. The contradiction also explains the flip-flop between his declared decision to pull US forces out of Syria and the opposite decision that followed to maintain forces there to protect oil installations.

In the Asian context, a clash was also evident between Trump’s narcissistic ambition to achieve an unprecedented agreement with North Korea and the need to display a tough policy toward China and other states in the region. The narcissism prompted the summit with Kim Jong Un, but the event was not prepared properly because Trump believed his very presence and personality would achieve a breakthrough. Trump canceled joint military exercises with South Korea, undermining the traditional US alliance with Seoul, in order to achieve that breakthrough vis-à-vis North Korea, but the summit ended in a stinging failure.

A Biden victory would restore US policy to its past rational, predictable path. A Trump victory would leave us guessing, and hopefully the principles described here might be of help. We must understand that Trump’s support for the current Israeli government positions does not stem from ideology or strategy, since these terms are not relevant to his decisions and there is no guarantee of its continuity should he win a second term.

**The article was published on Jpost, 12 October 2020.

הפוסט Making a desperate attempt to decipher Trump’s foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As indicated by the normalization of relations with the Emirates, significant aspects of foreign policy have been farmed out to other nuclei of power. Indeed, even the foreign minister was excluded from the decision-making process regarding the deal with the Gulf state.

Some of the ministry’s authority has been poached by the prime minister, acting as a “king-diplomat,” while others have been handed to relatively new agencies, such as the Strategic Affairs Ministry.

The low pay of Foreign Ministry diplomats even prompted an unprecedented 2019 strike at all Israeli missions abroad.

The 2020 appointment of a new, energetic minister, Gabi Ashkenazi, has raised hopes of change. However, power struggles within the coalition signal the challenges he is facing in advancing the Foreign Ministry, and indeed may lead to his early departure from his position.

In the US and the UK, where once-glorious foreign ministries have also been weakened, legislators were the ones who pushed for the restoration of the foreign service. In the US, lawmakers blocked President Donald Trump’s proposed 30% cuts in the State Department budget in recent years. The Democratic minority in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations even issued a comprehensive report recently providing in-depth analysis of the difficulties confronting the State Department and proposing 10 concrete recommendations for its rehabilitation.

The parallel British parliamentary committee conducts relatively close oversight of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The committee is conducting eight probes these days (including the hearing of witnesses and study of documents) on issues such as UK-Iran relations and the foreign ministry’s response to the global health crisis.

The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 1 September 2020

הפוסט The Foreign Ministry deserves support from the Knesset הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s way to deal with the tactical threats of the BDS movement in recent years has greatly contributed to the distancing of liberal and progressive groups away from Israel, hence endangering Israel’s long-standing relations with the US Democratic Party, most American Jewish communities and most European countries. This has become a significant strategic challenge, that is amplified by advancing legislation against freedom of expression, and silencing criticism, which are considered sacred liberal values.

Israel’s instinctive response to the BDS challenge, as is the case with most of the challenges we face, was to perceive the movement as an existential threat, to seek solutions of military-security nature, and to brand it as antisemitic. However, the BDS movement posed a marginal threat to Israel’s security and economic prosperity, while associating it with antisemitic movements was detrimental to both the fight against antisemitism and the fight against BDS. Israel’s use of semi-military means to thwart threats well demonstrates the meaning of the phrase “whoever has a hammer in his hand sees every problem as a nail”. However, the means used are not suitable to address this challenge and are even harmful.

The BDS movement uses the non-violent tactics that civil society organizations used in the past against the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Western BDS proponents are typically politically liberal and progressive, and many among them are Jews who oppose Israeli occupation and settlements in the West Bank, and who believe that only international pressure would bring about change.

antisemitism on the other hand, like other expressions of xenophobia and racism, originates from politically right-wing movements. The association between the BDS movement and antisemites is harmful; first, because when the diagnosis is wrong it is difficult to develop a prognosis; second, because it legitimizes antisemitism among many young people, who might wrongly conclude that antisemitism is legitimate if antisemitism equals criticizing Israeli policy.

Branding BDS as antisemitism is perceived as hypocritical because it puts us in the same group with populist conservative leaders – Trump in the US, Orban in Hungary, Bolsonaro in Brazil and others – who are all supported by antisemites. who are now also supportive of Israel because they perceive Israel as sharing their xenophobic and especially anti-Muslim sentiments.

To fight the BDS movement, Israel must increase contact with liberal and progressive circles and dialogue with them, even if they are critical of certain aspects of Israel’s policy. As regard antisemitism, the way to cope with it is through alliances with other minorities and through forming a broad coalition against racism and xenophobia, rather than using the term antisemitism against anyone who dares to criticize Israel or Zionism.

Our insistence on distinguishing the Holocaust from other incidences of genocide to fight antisemitism, while being completely indifferent or even encouraging Islamophobia, for example, is immoral and doomed to failure.

During a discussion in the Knesset State Audit Affairs Committee, headed by MK Ofer Shelah (July 28), which I attended as a representative of the Mitvim Institute, I was impressed by the presentation of the new Director General of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs Ronen Menalis who claimed that a new and more effective approach to respond to the challenge exists.

I was also encouraged by the understanding presented by Menalis, that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be a key player in addressing BDS due to the knowledge and unique position of its representatives among target audiences. It is to be hoped that a new era will indeed open in this aspect of Israel’s foreign policy, alongside the new spirit of empowerment felt recently in the Foreign Ministry.

The article was originally published on Jewish News, August 6th 2010.

הפוסט The way Israel dealt with BDS played into the hands of its enemies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Ashkenazi revitalized the IDF, now he can do the same to Foreign Ministry הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Editors: Dr. Roee Kibrik and Dr. Nimrod Goren

This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

1. Attempts to influence the American peace plan – Israel maintained a relatively low profile with respect to the peace plan reportedly being developed by the Trump administration, with government representatives avoiding criticism of the initiative. At the same time, Israel made diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the US to influence the content of the plan and to ensure coordination with the American administration regarding it.

2. A focus on economic and security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, while pushing aside the peace process – Israel continued to criticize the Palestinian Authority, describing Palestinian President Abbas as an obstacle to peace rather than a partner. In the absence of peace negotiations, Israel’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority focused on economic aspects, under the leadership of Israel’s Ministers of Finance and Economy, as well as on maintaining security coordination. 3. Efforts to relocate foreign embassies to Jerusalem – Israel endeavored to leverage Trump’s declaration on Jerusalem and decision to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem. It made efforts to persuade additional countries to move their embassies to Jerusalem – with an emphasis on Central and South American nations, as well as East European countries – and was successful in the cases of Guatemala and Paraguay.

4. Participation in international fora regarding Gaza – While continuing the siege over Gaza and adopting a strong hand vis-à-vis a series of protests in the Gaza Strip, Israel tried to contain the humanitarian crisis there, while supporting US efforts to weaken UNRWA. It participated in international fora debating how to provide aid to Gaza, which were led by the donor countries and the US, and were conducted in partnership with Egypt and the Gulf States.

5. Working to marginalize Iran in Syria and to cancel the Iran nuclear deal – In light of the fighting in Syria and the growing Iranian presence there, Israel took military action against Iranian targets in Syria, and increased its diplomatic efforts to ensure coordination with Russia. Israel encouraged the US to leave the Iran nuclear deal and to avoid a withdrawal from Syria. It pressured key EU countries (unsuccessfully) to join the American decision, and conveyed deterring messages to Iran through them.

6. Restoration of ties with Jordan – Israel achieved an agreement with Jordan to end the crisis that erupted between the countries in July 2017. Israel subsequently dispatched a new ambassador to Jordan, and the Israeli embassy in Amman resumed full activity. Although differences between the countries remain on issues related to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the agreement enabled a meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and King Abdullah and strengthened bilateral cooperation.

7. Criticism of the EU and working to deepen disagreements between its members – Israel adopted a more critical line towards the EU, including the casting of accusations and insults by Israeli officials towards Brussels, and questioning the importance of the EU for Israel. In parallel, Israel endeavored to deepen and utilize the existing divisions among EU member states regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to prevent the EU’s from reaching the required consensus on actions and statements.

8. Boycotting Austria’s Freedom Party and cooperating with the Visegrád Group – Following discussions in the Knesset and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Israel chose to boycott Austria’s far-right Freedom Party due to anti-Semitic characteristics. Simultaneously, Israel continued to nurture cooperation with the Visegrád Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) despite the fact that leaders of these countries are pushing their states away from liberal democracy.

9. Stalemate and deterioration in relations with Turkey – Crises in East Jerusalem and Gaza led to harsh Turkish criticism of Israeli policies, to a stalemate in the Israel-Turkey reconciliation process, and eventually to a deterioration leading to the return of ambassadors. While economic relations between the states showed signs of improvement, the possibility that Israel will export gas to Turkey became less feasible. The countries currently lack a shared agenda that would facilitate greater cooperation.

10.Deepening and broadening the alliance with Greece and Cyprus – Israel, Greece and Cyprus deepened their alliance through meetings of leaders and top officials, joint steps regarding natural gas, military exercises, and cooperation on environmental, economic, and communication issues, as well as on coordination between their diasporas. The countries work to positively brand the alliance, to emphasize its shared democratic values, and to bring Egypt into its orbit, via cooperation on natural gas.

11.Attempts by the Israeli MFA to improve its status – The MFA, still without a full time minister, worked to confront efforts to undermine its status. It battled against budget cuts and closure of diplomatic missions, aimed at increasing its impact on decision making, criticized the Ministry of Strategic Affairs for its handling of the BDS issue, launched a policy dialogue with the US State Department, and acknowledged the need to share more information about its work with the public. Nevertheless, the MFA still plays only a marginal role in core issues of Israel’s foreign policy.

12.Efforts by the MFA to excel at digital diplomacy – The MFA increased its activity in the field of digital diplomacy, acknowledging the potential it holds and attempting to establish itself as one of the leading Foreign Ministries in it. The MFA launched new initiatives on social media, including in Arabic (i.e. a Facebook page aimed specifically at Iraqis), and hosted international meetings on digital diplomacy.

* This document is published in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January-June 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two major developments affected Israeli foreign policy over the past six months: The Covid19 crisis that spawned new regional and international cooperation, and the declared annexation intentions that prompted international opposition and warnings of damage to Israel’s ties with Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, Israel’s new Foreign Minister demonstrated a desire to empower the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These are the major semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, in January-June 2020:

1. Israel welcomes the Trump Plan but does not advance its implementation – The Trump Plan, unveiled in late January in the midst of Israel’s election campaign, was described by frontrunners Netanyahu and Gantz as a great opportunity. However, the plan drew support only in Israel and the US, whose standing in the world has significantly declined under President Trump. As it heads for the November presidential elections under the Covid19 crisis, US interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue has waned. Israel did not take operative steps to implement the Trump Plan, except Netanyahu’s intention to take the opportunity it provides for annexation and map drawing by an Israeli-American team. The Palestinians vehemently opposed the plan.

2. Israel declares annexation intention, prompting widespread international opposition – The Trump Plan boosted Netanyahu’s pledge to annex territories in the West Bank, which dominated the public and political agenda. Gantz did not express opposition in principle, but conditioned annexation on regional and international approval and preservation of existing peace treaties. Annexation declarations drew harsh condemnation by the EU and key European states, Jordan, the Gulf States, US Democrats, the UN, Russia, and the Palestinians. Opponents argued that annexation violates international law, and warned that it would destabilize the region, damage Israel’s bilateral relations and distance prospects of peace.

3. Israelis and Palestinians cooperate on Covid-19, but clash over annexation – The Covid-19 outbreak spawned Israeli cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and even with counterparts in Gaza on staff training, medical equipment and supply transfers, knowledge sharing, and movement coordination to contain the disease. However, the PA ceased security and civilian coordination with Israel over Netanyahu’s annexation intentions. At the same time, Israel continued to ensure the transfer of Qatari aid to Gaza, to prevent an escalation of violence and a humanitarian disaster, while trying to advance a prisoner swap with Hamas.

4. The Crisis with Jordan deepens – The mistrust between the Israeli and Jordanian heads of state continued, with King Abdullah reportedly refusing to take Netanyahu’s calls but agreeing to meet with the Mossad chief. The Tzofar land reverted to Jordanian control, due to the expiration of the land lease agreement and after a failed attempt to keep it under Israeli cultivation. Jordan became a leading anti-annexation voice, warning Israel against negative repercussions for the peace treaty and working to mobilize international action, especially in Europe and the US, to prevent the move.

5. The UAE advances ties with Israel, warns against annexation – The UAE took positive measures toward Israel, cooperating with it on preparation for Expo 2020 in Dubai (now postponed to 2021), and on tackling Covid-19. The Emirates helped Israel obtain medical equipment and openly flew planeloads of equipment for the Palestinians to Israel’s BenGurion Airport. The UAE also displayed a supportive attitude toward its Jewish community, and senior Emirati officials legitimized ties with Israel even as they disagreed with its policy on the Palestinians. UAE officials directly appealed to the Israeli public, urging Israel to abandon the annexation idea and warning that it would be detrimental to relations and prevent normalization.

6. Diplomatic efforts and escalation against Iran and its proxies – Israel urged European states to outlaw Hezbollah, as Germany and Austria advanced, and to join US sanctions against Iran. Israel continued to strike Iranian targets in Syria and Hezbollah targets in Syria and Lebanon, and the confrontation escalated into mutual cyber-attacks and reports of Israeli sabotage of sites related to Iran’s nuclear program. Senior Israeli and US officials frequently discussed the Iran issue. Israel also pointed to potential threats from Lebanon, which suffers a deep economic crisis.

7. Indications of a more positive Israeli attitude toward Europe despite the shadow of annexation – Israel’s new Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi opted for a more positive approach toward the EU, emphasizing the importance of the relations with it for Israel. He conducted talks with European foreign ministers and with the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell. Ashkenazi also dismissed the phrasing of Hungary’s statement of support for Israel, which included a reference to “shared patriotic values” that are opposed to the European discourse. However, the annexation intention, which the EU clearly opposes, overshadowed attempts to turn a new page in Israel-Europe relations.

8. Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus expands – Israel is reaping the fruit of its expanded cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, which extends beyond the energy field. The Covid-19 crisis, which created a global gas price slump, impaired the countries’ ability to profit from their natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean. However, the civilian infrastructure of the relationship built by Israel, Cyprus and Greece facilitated cooperation among them on new medical, technological, security and tourism challenges. Israel was the first destination of visits by the Greek Prime Minister and Cypriot Foreign Minister at the end of the first Covid-19 wave.

9. Israel maneuvers between cooperation and disputes in the Mediterranean – Natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean exacerbated the conflict between Turkey and Greece/Cyprus over maritime boundaries and drilling rights. In addition, the Libyan civil war embroiled foreign actors and further intensified tensions in the Mediterranean. Israel tried to stay out of these conflicts and to avoid a clear anti-Turkish stand, working instead to preserve channels of communication with the various actors. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum continued its bid to become an international organization, but lost its centrality after the regional focus shifted from energy-economic cooperation to geo-political tensions.

10. International and regional cooperation against Covid-19 – Israel worked with international institutions and other countries to curb the Covid-19 pandemic and its repercussions. It mobilized the help of international partners in repatriating its citizens from abroad and obtaining medical equipment and supplies, shared information and tried to work with other countries on a controlled re-opening of its economy and tourism – before it suffered from significant resurgence of the disease. The Israeli MFA played an important role in all these efforts, displaying its significant added value in dealing with such crises.

11. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi tries to rehabilitate the MFA – Ashkenazi’s entry into the position of Foreign Minister lifted spirits in the MFA. He managed to mobilize budget for operations, recognized the importance of diplomacy as a key component of national security, expressed public appreciation for the Foreign Service’s professionalism, and advanced new diplomatic appointments, chief among them of Alon Ushpiz as the MFA’s Director General. Ashkenazi also displayed willingness to benefit from the experience of retired diplomats. However, many foreign policy issues remain under the responsibility of other ministries, and the Foreign Service is still not efficiently coordinated and arrayed.

*Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. This document outlines major semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, based on Mitvim’s monthly reports on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and Israel’s Foreign Service. The document is published in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Party leaders utilize foreign policy as an election campaign tool, but avoid in-depth discussion of the issues. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu used the foreign policy arena to boost his 2019 election campaigns, instigating meetings with foreign leaders in a bid to underscore his international standing and diplomatic influence. Opposition parties, for the most part, avoided challenging him, given Netanyahu’s image as an effective player in this arena, and did not present a viable alternative on foreign policy issues. They, too, tried to utilize the diplomatic arena to upgrade their standing. Labor’s Avi Gabbay visited the UAE, Blue and White’s Benny Gantz addressed AIPAC and the Munich Security Conference, Blue and White’s Yair Lapid met with Emmanuel Macron and Meretz Chair Tamar Zandberg with Mahmoud Abbas. However, the issues themselves, including the peace process with the Palestinians, were relegated to the sidelines of public discourse.

2. Netanyahu openly announces policy goals he concealed in the past. Netanyahu has traditionally avoided explicit declarations regarding his goals on sensitive foreign policy issues. However, a shift is underway. In 2018, he declared that Israel was seeking to deepen divisions among member states of the EU to prevent consensus against Israeli policies, and stepped back from the Israeli policy of ambiguity regarding attacks on Iranian targets in Syria. In the first half of 2019, he continued with pronouncements on these issues, adding clear statements about Israeli efforts to maintain the Palestinian split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to avoid the need for progress in peace negotiations, and saying Israel was seeking to advance de facto annexation of settlements. Netanyahu takes advantage of strong backing by the Trump administration to openly promote policies deviating from international norms, without paying an international price and without incurring significant opposition.

3. Israel avoids war in Gaza, props up Hamas regime and undermines the Palestinian Authority. Despite several rounds of escalation that nearly resulted in a broad military offensive in the Gaza Strip, Israel opted to avoid war. It negotiated with Hamas, agreed to mediation by Qatar, Egypt and the UN, and approved the transfer of large sums of Qatari money to Gaza. In doing so, the Israeli government sought to preserve Hamas rule and fuel the internal Palestinian split in order to undermine the feasibility of a two-state solution. At the same time, Israel weakened the  Palestinian Authority by withholding tax money it collects for the Palestinians, and then tried to limit the damage in order to avoid the Authority’s collapse and ensure its continued security coordination with the Israelis. Israel’s security apparatus and finance ministry are the ones leading relations with the Palestinians.

4. Israel cooperates with the Trump plan but keeps a low profile. The Trump plan regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not play a central role in the run-up to the April 2019 elections. Repeated delays in unveiling the plan enabled the Israeli government to put a positive face on its response without having to clash with the US administration over specific details, which it might find less palatable. Israel’s anxiety over the plan ebbed the closer its coordination became with Trump’s envoys, and it welcomed the US decision top resent the economic part of the plan first, avoiding the need to express any opinion on political aspects. Nonetheless, the economic plan did envision a link between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which runs counter to Israel’s policy of driving a wedge between the two Palestinian territories.

5. Ties with Egypt grow warmer, while ties with Jordan cool down. As Israel and Egypt marked the 40th anniversary of their peace treaty, economic and defense ties were growing stronger – as publicly manifested in a declaration by President a-Sisi on security cooperation with Israel and an invitation to Energy Minister Steinitz to the Cairo launch of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Other ties are still very limited despite Israeli efforts to connect with the Egyptian public through social media and increasing Israeli tourism to Sinai. Relations with Jordan, on the other hand, have deteriorated with heightened tensions over Israeli policy on Jerusalem and large opposition in Jordan to normalization. There are no indications of an Israeli effort to reverse this trend, nor of attempts to leverage the 25th anniversary of the Israeli-Jordanian peace accord to improve relations.

6. Israel promotes alignments and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel played a generally positive role in the Eastern Mediterranean, supported Egyptian and Cypriot efforts to forge new regional alignments, kept boosting its trilateral alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and preserved ties with Turkey while making new appointments at its diplomatic missions there. Israel cooperated with American efforts to mediate between it and Lebanon, in a bid to launch maritime border negotiations. During the first half of 2019, Israel avoided intervention in tensions between Cyprus and Turkey over gas drilling and on issues related to Israeli tourism to the northern (Turkish) part of Cyprus. Under US pressure, Israel scaled back some of its ties with China, which is seeking deeper involvement in the Mediterranean.

7. Netanyahu develops ties with populist and far-right leaders amid growing Israeli understanding of the cost. The rise in power of far-right actors around the world raises questions regarding Israel’s policy towards ties with them and its willingness to compromise on historic memory and anti-Semitism. Israel has yet to formulate a coherent policy on the issue, although it continues to boycott the far-right parties in Austria and Germany. However, due to an ideological affinity with the global non-liberal axis and a desire to generate pro- Israel policies, Netanyahu bolstered ties with controversial leaders, such as Brazil’s Bolsonaro, Hungary’s Orban, Italy’s Salvini and Russia’s Putin. The crisis with Poland over Holocaust commemoration pointed to the limitations of this policy, as did opposition on the part of Jewish Diaspora communities and President Reuven Rivlin to Israel’s contacts with leaders tainted by anti-Semitism.

8. Deepening crisis with US Jewry and the Democratic Party. Suspicions of corruption against Netanyahu and the seal of approval he gave far-right parties in Israel; political campaigns with racist and fascist overtones; campaigns against civil society and BDS activists; profiling at border checkpoints; reported arms sales in Africa, Asia and eastern Europe; and attempts to curb the Supreme Court’s authority and ensure immunity from prosecution for Netanyahu – generated international contempt and further eroded Israel’s image as a liberal democracy. Along with Israeli moves to undermine the two-state solution, these developments deepened the crisis with US Jewry (incurring unusual AIPAC criticism) and led to unprecedented and harsh personal criticism by presidential candidates from the Democratic Party against Israel’s Prime Minister.

9. Israel digs itself into diplomatic holes and then seeks a way out. After encouraging a tough US stance on Iran, Israel seemed anxious about a possible US military operation and toned down its rhetoric. After encouraging American criticism of the Palestinian Authority to such an extent that Congress adopted a bill harmful to the Palestinian economy, Israel asked the US to ease its pressure to prevent the Authority’s collapse. After making allowances for the Polish Holocaust law, Israel understood that it had gone too far and adopted damage control measures, with criticism of the Poles resulting in Poland’s cancellation of a planned Visegrad Group summit in Jerusalem. After making the transfer of foreign embassies to Jerusalem a central policy goal, following the US Embassy’s relocation, Israel scaled back its rhetoric on the issue given its limited success.

10. Ongoing efforts to boost the foreign ministry’s standing and authority. The status and budget of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to decline, and ahead of the April 2019 elections, opposition parties and civil society began calling for change. Netanyahu appointed Israel Katz as acting Foreign Minister after holding the portfolio himself for some four years, and then made the appointment permanent. The ministry cooperated with other government agencies to fight looming budget cuts and tried to boost public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the need to upgrade its status. Former diplomats stepped up their public activity, speaking out against the ministry’s eroding standing and Netanyahu’s intention (which fell through) to name a controversial political associate, Ayoub Kara, as Israel’s ambassador to Egypt.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies January – June 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Three cornerstones underpin the existence of the UN: Maintaining world peace, protecting human rights and ensuring social-economic development. Experience at the UN  has unfortunately shown us that due  to Intense politicization and powerful national interests and  the dynamics of the debate, the international community’s goal  to bring peace and safeguard human rights will probably not be attained through the world body.. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the organization constantly re-examines its goals in light of the persistent gap between developed and developing nations and the inherent tension between the “better world” it strives to build (to which many relate cynically) and national interests.

Social-economic development is the one field in which the organization has established itself as an influential global player. Its 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) ,revised in the 2015 blueprint for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which has become a guiding concept for global development and human progress, are  the most prominent expressions of the organization’s success in re-inventing itself in this aspect. Global development challenges necessitate international cooperation, for which the UN can and should serve as a worthy platform.

Israel has a history of complex relations with the UN. For years, the dismissive attitude toward the world body famously coined by David Ben-Gurion – “um shmum” – reflected Israeli strategy vis-à-vis the organization. Its suspicion and mistrust of the organization stemmed from its view of the multilateral arena as hostile to Israel. At the same time, Israel is a living  example of a state that despite defense and sustainable development  challenges  evolved from a developing to a developed nation, a prosperous and stable state, a world leader in innovation, science and technology, agriculture, water, health, defence  and security. Israel constitutes a “developments laboratory and a model for other countries on tackling development challenges. Its success stories in these fields are an asset and “entry ticket” into the global league of the UN’s development diplomacy.

The year 2000 was a turning point in terms of Israel’s standing at the UN. Its designation as a developed nation and acceptance into the WEOG group (Western Europe and Others) UN member states allowed Israel to integrate and become more active and present in the organization. Israeli diplomacy identified the opportunity to shake off the diplomatic “zero sum game” equation focused on the Israeli-Arab conflict in favor of integrating into the UN agenda as an valuable player and “shareholder” in the organization. Israel’s wise decision to deploy its “soft power” in the multilateral arena contributed to all facets of its national resilience: Diplomatic, security and economic.

The conceptual shift was translated into measures that strengthened Israel’s international standing. At Israel’s instigation, the UN General Assembly annually adopts, since 2007 majority vote resolutions on “agrotechnology for development” and “entrepreneurship for development”. Its hydrologists and experts on food security, innovation, technology and counterterrorism are routinely invited to share their experience with the UN. A series of agreements between Israel and various UN bodies constitutes a global professional cooperation framework. Israeli representatives are appointed to UN posts and the organization provides a conduit for Israel into new world markets. This changed paradigm does not ignore the diplomatic challenge Israel faces at the UN, which will continue to color its position within the organization. However, Israel is also reaping the diplomatic, economic and security fruit of its broader engagement with the UN beyond the Middle East conflict, which effectively serves its image and foreign policy goals.

Israel’s relations with the UN are complex, problematic and sometimes frustrating. The UN’s mission to reshape the global order provides Israel with an opportunity to deepen its cooperation with the organization even as diplomatic disagreements remain unresolved. Israel must continue to advance a new diplomatic strategy toward the UN, shake off the complexes of the past and adopt conduct and a proactive approach as a full-fledged member state, shareholder and stakeholder involved in reshaping the world order.

The article was published by The Jerusalem Post on 11 July 2020

הפוסט Israel Should Deepen its Engagement with the UN הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

Trends:

1. From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players,among them Democratic US presidential candidates, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

2. Efforts to achieve a long-term truce with Hamas, while preserving the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) just short of collapse – Israel and Hamas conducted indirect contacts via Qatar, Egypt and the UN special envoy in a bid to achieve a long-term truce, which will also enable the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip. Despite occasional flare-ups of violence, Israel opted to forego another round of war with Gaza and instead sought to reach understandings with Hamas and implement them. At the same time, Israel gave the PA funds it had deducted from its budget in order to avert its collapse but did not support it politically and continued to encourage the intra-Palestinian divide.

3. Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements, while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the BDS movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4. Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders, without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdallah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer.  President Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5. Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf States and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf States, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations towards its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf States, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf States, which was not met with a significant American response.

6. Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders, and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7. Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement, while Israel dials down its Visegrad Group links – The EU continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public opinion’s perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrad Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8. Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9. Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign, but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes cancelled) international visits and meetings to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Trump and Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10. Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister, but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointed was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, on the expense of diplomats.

*This document is published in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and with the assistance of former diplomats Arthur Koll, Nadav Tamir and Michael Harari.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July – December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Erdan, who says he has long aspired to the jobs, reminded us that Israel’s iconic diplomat Abba Eban also served simultaneously in these two senior posts, and claimed he was certain of his ability to fulfill both. As the French would say, “He is proud of his humility”. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu had sought to distance Erdan from Israel for political reasons, he is obviously fully aware of the extent and demands of the two top Foreign Service jobs, having served himself in the US, first as DCM in Washington and then as UN Ambassador.

Representing Israel in the US is a demanding, fulltime job. The ambassador in Washington is in charge of the relationships with the administration and Congress as well as with politicians throughout the 50 states, and with the divided Jewish community. He is also tasked with Israel’s public diplomacy challenges, its security, strategic and economic ties with the US, and oversight over eight Israeli consulates spread all over the country .

The position of Ambassador to the UN is also a non-ending investment of hours and efforts, often in times of crises, of which we supply plenty. Part of the ambassador’s job is also to initiate and conduct ties throughout the year with the representatives of many among the 192 member states and with the organization’s numerous committees. That, too, is more than a full-time position.

I have known Erdan for years, and my appreciation of his skills notwithstanding, I do not believe he can fulfill all these complex tasks at the same time, for the simple reason that no one can do so fully and satisfactorily. Only unique figures, such as Abba Eban, who served at the UN when it was still in its infancy and consisted of only 33 states could have done so.

What, then, is the meaning of Netanyahu’s decision? Cost cutting was obviously not a consideration given the installation of Israel’s biggest and most spendthrift government at the height of an economic-social crisis. The real reason lies in Netanyahu’s consistent attitude and conduct over the past decade toward Israel’s Foreign Service, and the deep contempt he displays toward the ministry that safeguards the state’s essential interests and toward its professional staff.

This attitude has led Netanyahu to strip the Foreign Ministry of many of its traditional purviews, such as diplomatic strategy, the anti-BDS campaign, relations with the Diaspora and public diplomacy and to hand them out as “consolation prizes” to various party loyalists . These moves have deprived the Ministry of many of the key roles its staff carried out for decades on the front lines of Israel’s struggles to establish or renew diplomatic ties with the countries of the world, promote trade agreements and international investments, and defend Israel’s essential interests in international organizations. Some representatives were felled by terrorists in the line of duty. Netanyahu’s moves have demoralized the staff, deprived Israeli diplomats of their professional pride, transferred the handling of important issues to non-professional hands and generated confusion, lack of coordination and even embarrassment.

Last year’s dramatic budget cuts dealt an almost fatal blow to the Ministry and the Foreign Service. The work of the missions abroad ground to a halt due to lack of funding, wages were cut, Israel’s international foreign aid enterprise was suspended, the diplomatic campaign against Iran was stalled, public diplomacy and cultural activities were undermined and the promotion of Israeli economic activity abroad was significantly eroded. As an example of the absurdity of the situation, Israeli diplomats were unable to represent the state at important functions away from the city of their posting because they had no money for train tickets.

Tasking a person of legendary skills like Abba Eban with both positions in the 1950s was born out of necessity when Israel was a young, poor state. A similar move in 2020 reflects the continued systematic destruction of the Israeli Foreign Service even as significant developments are emerging on the horizon with a possible change of administration in Washington and international fallout from the Israeli government’s annexation intentions.

הפוסט Foreign Service Closing-Out Sale: Gilad Erdan’s Dual Appointment to UN and Washington הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט 2015 – 2016 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.