ארכיון Israel and Europe - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/areas_tax/israel-and-europe/ מתווים Thu, 10 Apr 2025 09:19:25 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.2 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון Israel and Europe - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/areas_tax/israel-and-europe/ 32 32 Tomorrow’s Global Superhighway https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/tomorrows-global-superhighway/ Thu, 10 Apr 2025 09:19:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12747 Why the US should appoint a special envoy for the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor? Ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor gains momentum amidst geopolitical shifts and renewed diplomatic efforts. Read the full article here

הפוסט Tomorrow’s Global Superhighway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Why the US should appoint a special envoy for the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor?

Ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor gains momentum amidst geopolitical shifts and renewed diplomatic efforts.

Read the full article here

הפוסט Tomorrow’s Global Superhighway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU-Israel Association Council: Harsh Criticism of Israel Alongside Desire to Advance Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-eu-israel-association-council-harsh-criticism-of-israel-alongside-desire-to-advance-relations/ Sun, 09 Mar 2025 10:25:35 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12591 Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who last year wanted to suspend the Association Agreement, stated that the meeting did not take place under a “business as usual” atmosphere. And yet, nothing in EU – Israel relations seems to have changed since the previous meeting in October 2022 despite 7 October and the Israel – Hamas war. Back then, Israel was ruled by the “change government” of Prime Minister Yair Lapid. In fact, under growing global friction, when fractures are clearly showing between the unpredictable and belligerent Trump administration and the rest of the West, the current far-right Israeli government finds itself in a more comfortable EU zone – that of interests and real-politic. The new Israeli foreign Minister, Gideon Saar, even said that some in Europe sees Israel as a potential bridge to the Trump administration. Netanyahu was the first international leader to meet Trump at the White House and received more support than he could have expected. When EU’s new High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas, visited Washington, secretary of state Marco Rubio canceled the meeting with her without explanation or apology. Later that day, at his first cabinet meeting, Trump stated that the EU was created “to screw the US” and that he intends to impose 25% trade tariffs on the bloc. In the rapidly shifting transatlantic relationship—where a Trump administration appears to be disengaging from Ukraine and Europe — the EU must choose its battles. It is clear to everyone that Ukraine comes first and is linked

הפוסט The EU-Israel Association Council: Harsh Criticism of Israel Alongside Desire to Advance Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who last year wanted to suspend the Association Agreement, stated that the meeting did not take place under a “business as usual” atmosphere. And yet, nothing in EU – Israel relations seems to have changed since the previous meeting in October 2022 despite 7 October and the Israel – Hamas war. Back then, Israel was ruled by the “change government” of Prime Minister Yair Lapid.

In fact, under growing global friction, when fractures are clearly showing between the unpredictable and belligerent Trump administration and the rest of the West, the current far-right Israeli government finds itself in a more comfortable EU zone – that of interests and real-politic. The new Israeli foreign Minister, Gideon Saar, even said that some in Europe sees Israel as a potential bridge to the Trump administration.

Netanyahu was the first international leader to meet Trump at the White House and received more support than he could have expected. When EU’s new High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas, visited Washington, secretary of state Marco Rubio canceled the meeting with her without explanation or apology. Later that day, at his first cabinet meeting, Trump stated that the EU was created to screw the US” and that he intends to impose 25% trade tariffs on the bloc.

In the rapidly shifting transatlantic relationship—where a Trump administration appears to be disengaging from Ukraine and Europe — the EU must choose its battles. It is clear to everyone that Ukraine comes first and is linked to strengthening the defence of Europe. Gaza is not even third. Perhaps reacting to Trump’s tariffs on Europe are? The EU’s internal interest of repatriating rejected asylum seekers to the new Syria and elsewhere? Stopping Iran from turning nuclear? Much is on the list. Under the current ceasefire, Gaza and the Palestinian issue ranks low in priority.

Thus, while the EU formulates a normative language that largely reflects its liberal-democratic values, its bark has no bite. This is not new. We’re back to the EU simultaneously condemning Israel while also considering deeper cooperation with it in research and innovation, energy, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and other fields.

Critical engagement

It’s important to remember that the convening of the Association Council is a commitment under the EU -Israel Association Agreement, setting a routine and institutionalized political dialogue once a year. Nowhere in the agreement does it say that meetings will only occur if relations are good or improving. The purpose of the Association Council is to facilitate dialogue — whether critical, friendly, or a mix of both.

Actually, it is precisely in times of crises that it is essential for the parties to engage in an open and candid dialogue – what EU calls critical engagement.

More than anything, the latest Association Council meeting reflected the shift from the previous Commission, where the former foreign policy chief Josep Borrell led a strongly critical tone – even confrontational – toward Israel, to the second von der Leyen Commission. President Ursula von der Leyen had always a friendlier stance toward Israel.

Borrell’s successor, Kaja Kallas, does not have a particularly defined position on Israel. She adheres to EU’s “agreed language” and promoted the meeting for the sake of engagement. She is now scheduled to visit Israel in late March. Borrell only visited Israel once in November 2023, six weeks after Hamas’s murderous terrorist attack on Israel, when he was still using acceptable language.

Soon afterwards he returned to harsh rhetoric against Israel. Later he amplified the positions of Spain and Ireland, who pushed to invoke Article 2 of the Association Agreement. The article stipulates that the agreement is based on shared democratic values and respect for human rights.

By now, the position of Spain and Ireland aimed at downgrading relations with Israel has been dropped. Article 2 was only generally mentioned in the EU position paper for the Association Council.

The new Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, has been tasked to plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. Similarly to Kallas, she does not have a specific approach to Israel – neither as favorable as Várhelyi, the former Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, nor as critical as Lenarčič, the former Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid. Together with von der Leyen, this trio of women is relatively neutral or even supportive of Israel.

Criticism, cooperation and challenges

Kallas must also represent the position of all 27 EU member states. As a result, the EU’s statement on the eve of the Association Council meeting was drafted as a 1+1 formula: both political and normative criticism, alongside an expressed willingness for deeper cooperation with Israel.

It is mainly diplomacy and security which stands in the center of this real-politic approach. In a world where global friction and internal Western fractures are intensifying – as highlighted by the Trump-Zelensky disastrous meeting in the Oval Office – Israel is both a burden and an asset to the EU.

It is a burden because when the EU engages with Israel in what appears to be business as usual, it faces allegations of double standards from the Global South, human rights organizations and part of the public in Europe. About 120 organizations have signed a protest letter calling for a review of the Association Agreement with Israel because of its alleged violations of international and humanitarian law. The protest would have probably been even stronger if they would have added settlers’ violence and de-facto annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank.

Israel is an asset because, like it or not, it got the upper hand in its multi-front war against Iran and its proxies in the region. As the EU has to rebuild and strengthen its defence capabilities and military know-how, Israel has valuable assets to offer.

The Israeli government is a liability because of its refusal to plan for a political exit strategy from Gaza which could lead to a political solution of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Israel can become an asset if it brings about a desired normalisation with Saudi Arabia, which will also advance peace with the Palestinians. Such a 1+1 approach is a direction that the EU would be willing to advance and take part in.

Yet a year and a half after 7 October, when asked how he would like to solve the challenge of Gaza and Hamas’s rule there, Netanyahu doesn’t have a good answer and continues to act as if Hamas still is an asset. It’s an inescapable conclusion, that for Netanyahu, the terror group’s continued presence in Gaza is a convenient obstacle to a two-state solution.

The article was publish on March 4th, 2025, in The Brussels Times.

הפוסט The EU-Israel Association Council: Harsh Criticism of Israel Alongside Desire to Advance Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-revitalized-eubam-rafah-one-avenue-for-eus-involvement-in-the-day-after-in-gaza/ Sun, 02 Feb 2025 14:43:53 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12509 The re-deployment of the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) emerges as one crucial component for promoting stability and governance in Gaza already during the cease-fire and in “the day after” the war. The deployment and re-deployment of international missions in conflict zones often present complex and multi-dimensional challenges that require a thorough examination of political, security, and socio-economic factors. EUBAM Rafah remains a critical focal point in efforts to stabilize the region, enhance humanitarian aid delivery, and facilitate trade. This paper aims to evaluate the opportunities and challenges associated with the re-deployment of EUBAM Rafah in the post-conflict scenario, as part of the general role the European Union (EU) can take in the aftermath of the Gaza war. The paper draws valuable lessons from several EUBAM missions, provides a practical roadmap for future engagement by outlining both immediate and long-term strategies aimed at improving border management, strengthening security measures, and supporting Gaza’s reconstruction and economic recovery, and presents a framework for understanding how an international mission can play a pivotal role in shaping a more secure and stable future for Gaza and the wider region.

הפוסט A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The re-deployment of the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) emerges as one crucial component for promoting stability and governance in Gaza already during the cease-fire and in “the day after” the war. The deployment and re-deployment of international missions in conflict zones often present complex and multi-dimensional challenges that require a thorough examination of political, security, and socio-economic factors. EUBAM Rafah remains a critical focal point in efforts to stabilize the region, enhance humanitarian aid delivery, and facilitate trade. This paper aims to evaluate the opportunities and challenges associated with the re-deployment of EUBAM Rafah in the post-conflict scenario, as part of the general role the European Union (EU) can take in the aftermath of the Gaza war. The paper draws valuable lessons from several EUBAM missions, provides a practical roadmap for future engagement by outlining both immediate and long-term strategies aimed at improving border management, strengthening security measures, and supporting Gaza’s reconstruction and economic recovery, and presents a framework for understanding how an international mission can play a pivotal role in shaping a more secure and stable future for Gaza and the wider region.

הפוסט A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Europe’s Response to the War in Gaza: Capabilities and Actorness https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/europes-response-to-the-war-in-gaza-capabilities-and-actorness/ Sun, 29 Dec 2024 12:20:39 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=12260 The European Union’s response to the war in Gaza has been widely criticized as irrelevant and incoherent, casting doubt on its ability to become a credible player in the region. While the EU is indeed incoherent, it is not entirely irrelevant. Its chief relevance lies in the civil sphere, mainly through its efforts to sustain and encourage reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and its role as a capacity builder. These EU actions and capabilities have political significance for the “day after” the war. The EU has many tools it can use in the region but has yet to show a collective willingness to fully employ them, because of internal divisions and the multiplicity of voices within it. The paper reviews these spheres of cacophony and maps the realignment of camps within the EU in response to the war in Gaza. This article was published in the Strategic Assessment of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Issue 27 (4), November 2024. Introduction Less than a week after October 7, some analysts were quick to argue that “the Israel-Hamas war exposed the EU’s irrelevance” (Karnitschnig, 2023). “No one cares what Europe thinks” continued the harsh assessment. “Europe has been relegated to the role of a well-meaning NGO, whose humanitarian contributions are welcomed but is otherwise ignored.” Many in Israel, Europe and around the world would agree, yet we wish to present a more nuanced picture. Unlike in Ukraine, Europe struggles to find a strong, united voice regarding the Israel-Hamas war in

הפוסט Europe’s Response to the War in Gaza: Capabilities and Actorness הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The European Union’s response to the war in Gaza has been widely criticized as irrelevant and incoherent, casting doubt on its ability to become a credible player in the region. While the EU is indeed incoherent, it is not entirely irrelevant. Its chief relevance lies in the civil sphere, mainly through its efforts to sustain and encourage reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and its role as a capacity builder. These EU actions and capabilities have political significance for the “day after” the war. The EU has many tools it can use in the region but has yet to show a collective willingness to fully employ them, because of internal divisions and the multiplicity of voices within it. The paper reviews these spheres of cacophony and maps the realignment of camps within the EU in response to the war in Gaza.

This article was published in the Strategic Assessment of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Issue 27 (4), November 2024.

Introduction

Less than a week after October 7, some analysts were quick to argue that “the Israel-Hamas war exposed the EU’s irrelevance” (Karnitschnig, 2023). “No one cares what Europe thinks” continued the harsh assessment. “Europe has been relegated to the role of a well-meaning NGO, whose humanitarian contributions are welcomed but is otherwise ignored.” Many in Israel, Europe and around the world would agree, yet we wish to present a more nuanced picture. Unlike in Ukraine, Europe struggles to find a strong, united voice regarding the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The EU’s incoherence significantly reduces its capabilities as a credible player and prevents it from taking a meaningful role while the war expands. Yet Europe is relevant as a mid-level player in the reform of the Palestinian Authority, the rebuilding of Gaza, and in wider efforts to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict.

In 2018, then president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, asserted that it was not enough for Europe to exert its financial muscle. It also had to learn to act on the global stage: “The EU is a global payer, but must also become a global player” (European Parliament, 2018). Josep Borrell, the High Representative (HR) of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), argued in 2019 that Europe “must learn quickly to speak the language of power,” and not only rely on soft or normative power as it used to do (European Union External Action, 2020). Over the past three decades, the EU has been one of the main donors to the Palestinians. It became a significant actor in the civilian sphere, but not a meaningful political player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and certainly not in the realm of security (See Hollis, 1997, Bouris, 2014 for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the EU’s lack of actorness, see Toje 2008). What has changed (if at all) since October 7?

This paper focuses on the European response to the war in Gaza and the hostilities towards Israel in the wider region. Although it concentrates on the EU, there is also a brief discussion of actions taken by other European countries, mostly the United Kingdom (UK). It aims to give an empirical description and analysis of Europe’s responses, capabilities and actorness in this regional war. The article begins with the shifting European positions from strong support and solidarity with Israel after the October 7 massacre, to fierce criticism of Israel and its government. The second section maps where the EU is a mere payer and where it is a player. It reviews the EU’s decisions and actions in the humanitarian field, Palestinian state-building, the diplomatic arena, its employment of “sticks” and sanctions and the military sphere. The third section discusses the divisions afflicting the EU which have hampered its ability to act as a meaningful player in the region. It reviews the instances of discordant voices within the European Commission, between heads of EU institutions and mostly between member states on multiple issues, and maps the realignment of camps in Europe on the conflict. In the conclusions, the article evaluates the EU’s response to the war in Gaza, its capabilities and actorness in the Gaza war. It argues that the EU has been able to chalk up some accomplishments in less sensitive areas, most noticeably as a capacity builder in the Palestinian Authority. Its financial muscle has come to the fore in important humanitarian activity and especially in working to prevent the financial collapse of the PA. Europe has also carried out operations to enhance maritime security in the wake of attacks by the Houthis. Despite divisions which prevent it from becoming an effective actor in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, it still has an important role to play.

The EU and the War in Gaza: From Support to Criticism of Israel

Europe’s solidarity with Israel in the wake of the Hamas massacre of October 7 and kidnapping of more than 250 civilians and soldiers, was remarkable. It was immediate, extensive, and strong. Political support came from across Europe. There was fierce condemnation of Hamas from across the board. All EU member states supported Israel’s right to defend itself. The strong solidarity with Israel was demonstrated through numerous declarations, visits, and actions.

For a few weeks, the Gaza war took precedence over the war in Ukraine on the EU’s agenda. Manifold statements, speeches, Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) declarations, and European Council conclusions condemned the Hamas attack in the strongest terms (European Council, 2023). An unprecedented European Parliament (EP) resolution called for the elimination of Hamas with 500 votes in favor and 21 against (European Parliament, 2023a). These verbal expressions of support were important to Israel and gave it legitimacy for the war against Hamas.

Many heads of state as well as foreign and defense ministers from all across Europe visited Israel within a matter of weeks in an impressive show of solidarity. They travelled to the south of Israel to witness the devastated communities, they met with relatives of the hostages and restated Israel’s right to exercise self-defense. Among the first to arrive, on October 13, were the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and French President Emmanuel Macron all visited Israel between October 17-24 to express their solidarity with the Israeli people. Several weeks later HR Josep Borrell visited. This was his first visit to Israel since he assumed his mandate in 2019 (Lis, 2023). Between October 7, 2023 and May 2024, about 80 out of 100 high level visits to Israel were from Europe (Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe Division, June 23, 2024). Israelis felt they were not alone.

Yet, as the war in Gaza continued, European support for Israel gradually declined. Support for Israel’s right to defend itself is on condition that civilians are afforded protection in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law (IL & IHL). Amid the growing number of Palestinians killed in Gaza and the increasingly acute humanitarian situation there, the mood in Europe gradually turned against Israel. In addition, the refusal of Netanyahu’s government to accept a cease-fire, or discuss plans for the “day after” the war, its outright rejection of a role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an alternative to Hamas in Gaza and its fierce opposition to the possible establishment of a Palestinian State in the long run, have created great difficulties for Israel’s friends in Europe, since both the EU-27, the UK and Norway support the establishment of a Palestinian State.

The international legal cases against Israel make it more difficult for Europe to support it, especially under its current extreme right-wing government. In December, South Africa petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is now investigating claims that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. In May, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor applied for arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Gallant. In July, the ICJ published its advisory opinion on Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories (case opened in 2022). IL & IHL are normative pillars of the EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, in view of Europe’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war, where it has demanded that Russia adhere to IL & IHL and has imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow, and despite the major differences between the war in Ukraine and that in Gaza, the EU has been accused of applying double standards regarding Israel’s conduct in Gaza. This harms the EU’s reputation and interests in the Global South.

Europe’s solidarity with Israel and its delayed call for a ceasefire have strained its relations with countries in the Global South. Europe has worked hard since February 2022, reaching out to these countries in order to mobilize support for Ukraine. The alarming death toll in Gaza and the severe humanitarian situation sabotaged Europe’s efforts. Equating these two wars is problematic (Navon, 2024), but this doesn’t prevent some in the Global South and in Europe from doing so. As Konečný (2024) points out:

Efforts to convince [the Global South] that Europe’s… support for Ukraine against Russian aggression was based on universal principles of international law rather than the West’s geopolitical agenda, were squandered when the West veered off those same principles in Gaza.

Borrell concedes that this is a problem for the EU, and that he is regularly confronted with accusations of double standards:

What is now happening in Gaza has portrayed Europe in a way that many people simply do not understand. They saw our quick engagement and decisiveness in supporting Ukraine and wonder about the way we approach what is happening in Palestine… The perception is that the value of civilian lives in Ukraine is not the same as in Gaza, where more than 34,000 are dead, most others displaced, children are starving, and the humanitarian support [is] obstructed. The perception is that we care less if United Nations Security Council resolutions are violated, as it is the case by Israel with respect to the settlements, [as opposed to] when it is violated by Russia. (EEAS Press Team, 2024a).

Europe’s credibility and its ability to forge a wide international coalition against Russia is undermined by the perception of countries in the Global South that Europe’s attitude towards the war in Gaza is an embodiment of its double standards. Support for Israel by some European countries exacts a price for the whole EU, impacting its relations with the Global South, and its case for and reputation as a supporter of Ukraine.

The EU’s RoleFrom Payer to Player? 

The EU has taken concrete steps in several fields in an attempt to transform itself from a mere payer in the conflict to an actual player. It seeks to intervene and influence by applying leverage on some actors, especially by exerting its financial muscle. In addition, the EU has conducted a defensive operation to intercept Houthi attacks on ships, and has taken steps to crack down on the financing of Hamas. It adopted sanctions against violent Israeli settlers aimed at impacting the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But its main intervention comes in its significant role in financially sustaining the PA and conditioning its contributions on substantial and comprehensive PA reforms, alongside agreed US-EU conditions for the PA to return to rule in Gaza (see below).

The Humanitarian Field: Significant Payer, Attempts as a Player

There is no doubt that the EU is a significant payer. Humanitarian aid provided by the 27 member states to the Palestinians from October 7 until September 2024 was more than quadruple its level in the equivalent period preceding the war, reaching €678m, while EU aid increased ninefold from €28m to €262m (European Parliament, 2023b; Reuters, 2023). For comparison, in the same period the US donated $1 billion to the Palestinians. (USAID, 2024b).

The European Commission and a number of EU member states also tried to become more actively involved, by forging a multilateral force which facilitated a new pathway for humanitarian aid. In March, the European Commission, Cyprus, the US and the United Arab Emirates launched the Amalthea Initiative, operating a maritime route for emergency assistance from Cyprus to the northern part of the Gaza Strip. The initiative was proposed by Cyprus less than three weeks after October 7 (Politico, 2023) but was implemented only in March 2024 amid an increasingly acute humanitarian situation in Northern Gaza. The US was the key player in implementing the project in Gaza, building the jetty, while Europe established the Joint Rescue Coordination Center in Larnaca. Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK all participated in the operation ( ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2024).

The gap between expectations and implementation of the Amalthea Initiative was considerable. There were high expectations that at full capacity, the route could facilitate the transfer of humanitarian assistance for at least 500,000 people (USAID, 2024a), yet the quantities of aid delivered were very small (7000 tons, equivalent to only 350 trucks, or a day and a half of aid transferred by land). Between May and July, the jetty operated for only 12 days due to bad weather and the need for repairs, while its building costs were over $230 million. Several European ships delivered cargo to the jetty, which was distributed by aid organizations in the Strip. The jetty was eventually dismantled by the US at the end of July (Cleaver, 2024). The maritime route was diverted to Ashdod port and aid continued to enter Gaza via land crossings. In effect, the Amalthea initiative made only a cosmetic difference to humanitarian efforts and contributed little to Europe’s actual role.

Palestinian StatehoodSignificant Payer and Possibly a Significant Player

The EU’s financial assistance to the Palestinians testifies to its potential to become a more significant player. In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to the PA, with over €1.2 billion originally planned for 2021-2024 (European Commission, 2023). This gives the EU potential leverage over the PA. While it has been reluctant to use it in the past, this now appears to be changing.

The PA depends upon Israel to collect import taxes on its behalf, which constitute 64 per cent of the Authority’s total income. The EU’s increased payments to the PA are an attempt to counter the Israeli government decision to confiscate parts of Palestinian tax revenue. This policy, led by Finance Minister Smotrich, dates back to January 2023 and is justified as a consequence of PA payments that incentivize terror by rewarding families of Palestinians in Israeli jails and those who killed Israelis. After October 7, the part of the budget that the PA routinely transferred to Gaza was also confiscated by Israel (Times of Israel, 2023; Gal, 2024). The PA has been in a dire financial situation for many years and the confiscation of funds could bring about its collapse. This would destabilize the West Bank and the region even further. After the EU and its member states invested so much in building the PA as the institutional backbone of a future Palestinian State and enhancing systems of governance, their role as payer has come to the fore and heightened their significance as a player

In July, the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), which oversees support programs in Europe’s Eastern and Southern areas, signed a “Letter of Intent” to the PA, announcing a €400m emergency package of aid to it to be paid until September, conditioned upon reforms in eight fields (DG NEAR, 2024a,b). In addition to playing a significant role in preserving the PA, the EU is using its financial leverage to pressure the PA to carry out reforms by employing conditions to the funding (as it does with states seeking to join the EU). The EU has significant experience and expertise in state building in general and with the PA in particular. It could use its financial muscle to help restore the independence of the Palestinian judicial system and de-radicalize and reform its education system (Tzoreff, 2024); although the latter is best done in cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. If its efforts to revitalize the PA succeed, the EU’s credibility as a player in the region would be strengthened. Such careful conditionality can build trust with Israel and could therefore enable the EU to play a more meaningful role not only vis à vis the PA, but also in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Capacity Builder for the Day After the WarEstablished Player 

The EU has been advancing Palestinian statehood via capacity building for a few decades. A month after October 7, the US, EU and UK were aligned regarding the basic conditions for a ceasefire leading to a long-term sustainable plan for the day after the war in Gaza. It included the return of the PA to Gaza (Gal and Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024). To date, the Israeli government has not agreed to their proposals, but preparations on the European side have begun nevertheless. For example, on May 27, the FAC agreed in principle to reactivate the civilian Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), which operated out of Rafah until Hamas took over the Strip in 2007. The EU appeared to be willing to reactivate it, but needs the approval of and coordination with the PA, Egypt and Israel (FAC 2024). According to reports, Israel rejected this option (Barel, 2024). To gain agency, the EU needs to prove itself as a credible player, and to engage and build trust with Israel.

The mandate of the EU police and rule of law capacity building operation in the PA (EUPOL COPPS), already includes the Gaza Strip but it too has stopped operating there since Hamas took over. Its operative plans may be expanded as part of the PA revitalization process ahead of its possible return to the Gaza Strip (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a). Through such missions, the EU can function not only as a payer but also a mid-level player. These missions can be a core component of EU civil boots on the ground in the Palestinian arena.

The (Failed) Diplomatic Front

Europe has been active on the diplomatic front, proposing several initiatives, none of which was acted upon. Only one tool was adopted by the European Council. On October 27, Spain pushed to include in the European Council conclusions support for convening a peace conference (European Council, 2023). Although the move appeared disconnected from reality on the ground, it was in accord with Borrell’s diplomatic objectives. Indeed, Borrell was the source of several diplomatic initiatives. They should be viewed in the context of his Peace Day Effort Initiative—trying to incentivize the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—that was launched in September 2023 but halted by the war (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a).

In January 2024, Borrell put forward a twelve-point non-paper for “creating a comprehensive peace plan,” proposing to hold a preparatory peace conference which would involve the pragmatic Arab states (Psara & Liboreiro, 2024). On January 22, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of four Arab states, Israel and the PA for separate discussions at the FAC. His initiative was discussed, but did not progress. Facing internal objections by member states, the initiative failed to get off the ground. In addition, the Biden Administration stayed silent regarding the plan, probably in part due to Israel’s rejection of the initiative. It didn’t help that Borrell was perceived as being strongly pro-Palestinian to the extent that some heads of state told him that he did not represent them (Moens et al., 2024), while others described him as “obsessed” with the issue.

In another diplomatic initiative on May 27, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (known as the “Arab Quint”) to the FAC. The discussion focused on finding a political solution to the conflict and potential pathways of cooperation as a means to resolve it. Borrell used these meetings and initiatives to strengthen EU-Arab relations, seemingly to enhance the EU’s actorness, though it was clear in advance to all sides that nothing concrete would come out of these sessions.

The next meeting took place in Madrid on September 13. It aimed to discuss “the need to reinforce the engagement of the international community on peace and security in the Middle East, and the challenge of creating an international consensus on a way forward based on the Two-State solution” (EEAS Press Team, 2024c). In effect, it demonstrated the lack of consensus, as only four European foreign ministers participated (Spain, Ireland, Slovenia and Norway) along with the PA and five Arab countries.

More serious efforts were made to prevent military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah. France played a leading role working for de-escalation. Europe has an interest in preventing Lebanon from becoming a failed state. It also wants to prevent the expected refugee flows resulting from a war between Israel and Lebanon. On June 13, President Macron said that France and the US had agreed in principle to establish a trilateral group with Israel to “make progress” on a French proposal to end the violence on the Lebanese border (Boxerman et al., 2024). Yet Israel has not always been willing to accommodate French or European diplomatic engagement in this sphere. Over the past year, Hezbollah argued that the key to ending the battle in Lebanon was the achievement of a ceasefire in Gaza, which in turn depends largely on agreement between Hamas and Israel on the release of all hostages. Later in the war in Lebanon, Israel sought to break this linkage. In summary, Europe is on the sidelines of diplomatic initiatives to resolve the war in Gaza and in Lebanon. What France and Europe did demonstrate was their financial role, gathering $1 billion for Lebanon in October 2024.

Employment of Sticks and Sanctions Regimes

President Macron’s proposal to build an international coalition against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), along the lines of the coalition against ISIS, did not gain traction (France 24, 2023). Yet France hosted a multilateral meeting in Paris on December 13, to enhance the financial war against them, by targeting the sources of their funding, and took action to stem the spread of terrorist content online (France Diplomacy, 2023). After the EU designated Hamas and PIJ as terrorist organizations in 2003, on January 19, 2024, the Council of the EU adopted a package of additional sanctions against them, including a freeze on the assets of several of their military leaders, among them Yahya Sinwar (Council of the EU, 2024a). This decision allowed the EU to take actions against additional individuals and entities supporting, facilitating, or enabling violent actions by Hamas and the PIJ. Yet enhancing its role through further intervention, for example, against straw companies in Turkey, did not ensue.

The EU did extend the sanctions list in June, adding six individuals and three entities (Council of the EU, 2024b). For the first time, sanctions were also imposed against violent Israeli settlers and some of their organizations in the West Bank. The process of imposition proved slower and more complicated politically for the EU than for its counterparts or its member states. The US imposed a first round of these sanctions on February 1, expanding them on March 14. The UK and France followed suit a couple of weeks later. It took the FAC until March 18 to cross the high threshold of unanimity and overcome Czech and Hungarian opposition. When the list of sanctions was published by the Council on April 19, it included four individuals and two organizations (Council of the EU 2024c,d ). The second round of EU sanctions came only on July 15, adding five individuals and three organizations (Council of the EU, 2024e). Those listed under the EU sanctions regime are “subject to an asset freeze, and the provision of funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly, to them or for their benefit, is prohibited.” Additionally, the EU imposed a travel ban on the sanctioned individuals. The slow pace of the sanctions adopted is indicative of the EU’s political difficulties in crossing what was considered a red line in its policy vis a vis Israel. Yet it was crossed.

The EU has considerable economic leverage with Israel as its largest trading partner. So far, the EU has shown little willingness to use its leverage vis à vis Israel inside the 1967 lines as the threshold of unanimity for such action in the FAC or European Council is too high (see disagreement regarding the Association Agreement below). The war has prompted the re- or over-politicization of relations in all areas of cooperation, in addition to the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli attitudes, including latent or vocal grassroots boycotts and lost opportunities. For example, it is unlikely that the EU would be able to sign a Partnership Priorities agreement with Israel anytime soon. It is also probable that a new UK-Israel trade agreement, currently under negotiation, would pose greater political challenges for the Labour government to sign.

The relative ease of taking decisions at the national level, in comparison to the EU level, is noticeable. Some European countries have shown greater readiness to impose bans on arms sales to Israel. In February, a Dutch court ordered the government to block the delivery of US-made F-35 fighter aircraft parts to Israel, over concerns they were being used to violate international law. Yet the government appealed, and meanwhile sent the parts to the US, where they were sent to Israel. Three European states took steps to fully suspend military exports to Israel: Spain, Italy and the Walloon part of Belgium. The UK, Denmark and Germany examine the export licenses on a case-by-case basis. Of the above, Germany’s stance is most significant: 30 per cent of Israel’s arms were imported from Germany and 69 per cent from the United States between 2019 and 2023 (Bermant 2024a; Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024d). Therefore, the damage caused by other European countries’ arms ban is felt less in the military-security sphere and much more in the political and diplomatic domain. This is illustrated by President Macron’s call in early October 2024 for a weapons embargo on Israel, although he referred only to the war in Gaza, not the one with Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies. In addition, France prevented Israeli companies from participating in the June 2024 Eurosatory international arms fair, although a number of Israeli companies did participate in the Euronaval defense exhibition which took place in November 2024.

Defensive Military Role

To the extent that Europe is even playing a military role, there is a clear distinction between the UK and the EU. Right after October 7, Britain joined the US in dispatching military forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to support Israel and deter Hezbollah and Iran from a full-scale attack on Israel. In addition, both Britain and France were involved in the interception of Iranian attacks against Israel in April and later in October (Times of Israel, 2024).

The EU’s military role emerged in response to the Houthis’ trade route disruption in the Red Sea. Since the Houthis began their offensive on November 19, they have attacked over forty ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Targeted strikes by the US and the UK against Houthi bases began on January 11. The EU launched operation EUNAVFOR Aspides on February 19. However, unlike the US and UK, the EU’s rules of engagement are defensive. They aim only to protect merchant shipping and restore freedom of navigation and exclude direct attacks on Houthi positions. This sea route from Asia through the Suez Canal to Europe accounts for twelve percent of global trade and is of special significance to Southern European Mediterranean countries. Alternative sea routes double shipment costs at a time when inflation has already been high in the EU and the cost of living is a sensitive social and political issue.

As of July, five European frigates had escorted over 170 merchant ships and intercepted nineteen Houthi missiles and drones (Al-Batati, 2024; EEAS Press Team, 2024b). By aiming to secure the Suez Canal route, the EU’s operation is also crucial for Egypt and the region’s economy. Through this operation, the EU enhances maritime security, furthers the protection of European, regional and international commercial interests, or at least mitigates to some extent the economic damage caused by the Houthis, while strengthening its joint military cooperation capabilities under EU command (Matoi & Caba-Maria, 2024). The success of the EU military operation as well as that of the US and the UK, is limited at best. Maritime traffic has stabilized since January at 50-60% of levels in equivalent months in 2023 (Gard, 2024).

Europe’s Tendency for Cacophony

Immediately after October 7, alongside the strong and widespread demonstrations of European solidarity with Israel and fierce condemnation of Hamas, there were many issues where the EU did not speak with one voice. The cacophony started within the European Commission, followed by open disagreement between heads of EU institutions and then between member states on issues such as funding for the Palestinians, calls for a ceasefire, recognition of a Palestinian state, South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel and the issue of payments to UNRWA. This cacophony hampers the ability of the EU to play a meaningful role.

Within the Commission, the difficulties started with the Hungarian commissioner for neighborhood policy, Olivér Várhelyi, who tweeted on October 9 that aid to the Palestinians would be cut. A few hours later, the Slovenian Commissioner for crisis management, Janez Lenarčič, tweeted that humanitarian aid would actually be doubled. He was echoed by HR Borrell who asserted that the EU should support the Palestinians “more, not less,” stating that this is the position of 95 percent of EU member states. Borrell stressed that the EU differentiates between terror organizations such as Hamas and the PIJ, and the PA and Palestinian civilians. Later that day, the Commissioner spokesperson clarified that there would be no aid cuts. Instead, the Commission decided to review its payments to the Palestinians, in order to ensure that no funding was reaching Hamas or the PIJ (Moens et al.2023). This review process ended in November 2023 with the decision to continue payments and, as mentioned, increase them (European Commission, 2023).

Between Heads of EU Institutions

The president of the European Council, Charles Michel, criticized the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for stating in her press conference with Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu in October 2023 that Israel had the right to defend itself, without adding that it must be done in accordance with IL & IHL. According to Michel and others, this failure to state the EU’s core values was a reflection of her pro-Israeli stance. She was accused of overstepping her powers, not representing the EU’s interests properly, “undermining the position of the EU as credible actor and honest broker between Israeli and Palestine,” projecting the image of double standards to the Global South (Borges de Castro, 2023). Also, in an unusual move, 850 employees of EU institutions published a letter complaining about von der Leyen’s omission (Agence Europe, 2023).

There are also significant differences between EU member states. On the issue of a ceasefire, on October 27, the heads of 27 member states in the European Council agreed on phrasing that called on Israel to allow “humanitarian corridors and pauses for humanitarian needs” (European Council, 2023). It took them hours to reach an agreement on “pauses,” in plural, to avoid the impression that they were calling for a permanent pause. On that very same day, the EU member states split into three camps over a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, calling for an “immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities” and condemning terrorism. Eight member states voted in favor, fifteen abstained and four voted against the text, as it did not mention Hamas or the October 7 massacre (UNGA, 2023; Alessandri & Ruiz, 2023). These divisions demonstrated once again the difficulties for the 27 member states to speak with one voice on the details of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Analysis of the EU’s UNGA voting on the Palestinian issue shows unanimous agreement among the 27 member states and the UK on the end goal of the “right of the Palestinians to self-determination” and “on permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories” (two decisions adopted on December 19). Yet when it came to the more practical vote calling for a ceasefire on December 12, or the admission of Palestine as a UN member state on May 10, the EU was split again into three camps. Overall, on eight resolutions between October 7 and May 10 relating to the Palestinian issue and the war in Gaza, the EU stayed united on only three occasions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024b). As this analysis suggests, Europe is united when it comes to supporting the two-state solution, yet it is divided on the translation of that goal into concrete policy.

In the wake of Israeli charges that some of UNRWA’s employees participated in the attacks of the October 7 massacre (UNRWA, 2024), EU member states were also split on the question of whether to freeze UNRWA’s funding. The EU and eleven European countries (among them the UK) briefly suspended the funding, while eight did not (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024c). Further cacophony continued upon the resumption of funding. The EU attached three conditions to renewed UNRWA funding, which could have served to apply its normative power, or at least lead a united voice for all the funders of UNRWA. Yet, the EU was unable to put its own house in order, the conditions adopted by each member state were different, and most did not adopt any.

South Africa’s case against Israel in the ICJ is another example of division. Germany announced it would intervene on Israel’s behalf as a third party. Another five EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary and France) expressed their support for Israel. The UK joined them. Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium and Spain joined in support of South Africa. Other member states only called on Israel to comply with its rulings and with IL and IHL (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024c).

On February 14, the prime ministers of Spain and Ireland sent a letter calling on von der Leyen to carry out an urgent review of whether Israel was complying with its obligations to respect human rights, which constitute “an essential element” of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. They requested that appropriate measures be taken if Israel was found to have breached them (Lynch, 2024). The Association Agreement is the basis for EU–Israel relations in all fields: trade, economic, political dialogue and participation in different EU programs, such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus. This was the first time such a demand had been made at the level of prime ministers. Nevertheless, differences of opinion meant that the request was shrugged off at the FAC which met on March 18.

On May 27, 2024 the FAC for the first time engaged in a “significant” discussion on steps against Israel if it didn’t comply with IHL (Weatherald, 2024). That was after the ICC submitted applications for arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant on May 20, and the ICJ intermediate ruling on May 24 that Israel should adhere to IHL in its operation in Rafah. According to the foreign minister of Ireland, Micheál Martin, “there was a very clear consensus about the need to uphold the international humanitarian legal institutions,” i.e. the ICJ and ICC. Yet the FAC’s sole conclusion was to hold an EU-Israel Association Council meeting with Foreign Minister Katz to address the EU’s serious concerns and seek Israel’s response on ICJ compliance. Despite the calls from Ireland and other member states, no sanctions paper against Israel was drawn up. So far, the letter achieved little more than headlines and an unpleasant invitation to Katz.

The recognition of a Palestinian state is a major point of division in Europe. While there is consensus on the two-state solution, opinions differ on how and when to advance it. On January 30, British Foreign Minister Cameron was the first to publicly consider recognizing a Palestinian state since October 7. French President Macron, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, and senior heads in Germany also indicated they were considering it, but no actions were taken. On May 28, Spain, Ireland, and Norway recognized Palestine, followed by Slovenia on June 5, making it the 147th state and the 11th in the EU to do so (excluding Sweden’s 2014 recognition, earlier recognitions date back to 1988 and were by former Communist states, and Cyprus which was not an EU member then). Belgium and Denmark chose not to recognize Palestine. While such recognition can yield domestic and international political benefits, it is largely symbolic for Palestinians and leave realities on the ground unchanged. This cacophony demonstrates again that Europe agrees on the concept of two states for two peoples, but remains divided on how and when to pursue this goal.

Realignment of Camps

A year after October 7, the Czech Republic and Hungary continue to express strong support for Israel. The UK, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, and some Central European countries, which offered firm support for Israel, adopted a more nuanced stance in the months that followed. All stressed the importance of complying with IL & IHL in the Gaza Strip. When Israel’s security was on the line, as happened in mid-April and again in early October, the UK and France actively participated in thwarting Iran’s missile attacks, underlining their position that Israel has the right to defend itself.

Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Slovenia, and Malta were quick to restate their critical position of Israel, with Spain and Ireland calling for a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Both formally recognized the Palestinian state with Norway and Slovenia.

Germany’s long-standing historic responsibility to Israel’s security, Germany’s Staatsraison or raison d’état, is being tested. This commitment has been inserted in coalition agreements in Germany since 2008, including by the current SPD-Green-Liberal government. Despite criticism of Israel, Germany has maintained support for the country. However, amid accusations that Israel has breached IL and IHL, Germany has shown a readiness to reexamine its continued sale of military exports to Israel, including the possibility of delaying the supply of certain items.

Ultimately, the normative traditions and narrow self-interests of the government in each European state are what count in the formulation of policy towards Israel and the Palestinians, rather than the need to maintain a united harmonious and coherent European response. Given the mix of normative and interest-based approaches, consensus has been hard to achieve in the FAC or European Council. This represents the “old” CFSP, in contrast to the brisk and assertive EU response to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Alignments may shift due to elections, as was seen in Belgium in June and the UK in July, where the new Labour government under the leadership of Keir Starmer has already dropped its opposition to an international arrest warrant for Netanyahu and Gallant. His government has also suspended 30 out of 350 arms export licenses to Israel (Bermant, 2024b). However, Starmer has ruled out a complete ban on UK arms exports to Israel, saying it “would be the wrong position for this government” (Hardman, 2024).

In the past years, under Netanyahu, Israel has strengthened ties with Greece, Cyprus, and some Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria, using these alliances to counter unfavorable EU votes. Netanyahu’s “divide and thwart” diplomacy harnessed the support of friendly member states to block or soften anti-Israel decisions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2021). This tactic has been effective when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured less prominently on the global agenda, or when initiatives with considerable implications come to the fore, such as reassessing the EU–Israel Association Agreement. However, during the war in Gaza, this strategy has been effective only up to a point. For example, it did not prevent sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The EU’s emphasis on IL & IHL is highlighted by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With the ICJ’s judgement on Israeli occupation, South Africa’s proceedings on Gaza, and the ICC request for warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, the EU and its member states’ room for maneuver vis à vis Israel in the Gaza war is shrinking.

* Change after general elections

The result, one year after the war is the following continuum, from the most critical of Israel to the most supportive:

The current realignment of camps regarding Israel is much more complicated than it was before October 7. It reflects not only the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Israeli occupation and settlement building; but now encompasses Israel’s security, its right to defend itself against Iran and its proxies, and its struggle for legitimacy.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of October 7, the EU initially showed strong solidarity with Israel in its darkest hour. Yet as the civilian death toll in Gaza rose and the humanitarian situation deteriorated, most of Europe’s leaders began distancing themselves from the Israeli government and expressed increasing criticism. Despite general agreement on the two-state solution, the divisions on how and when to proceed in this direction paralyze the EU. The Gaza War demonstrated once again the difficulties of the 27 member states in speaking with one voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to the need for consensus, the only agreed action by the EU was to impose sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The rest of the moves were taken by small groups of member states: some joined South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, four countries recognized Palestine as a state and a couple requested a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

The Gaza war has revealed once again the divisions, cacophony and ponderous decision-making characteristics of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In August, Borrell conceded that “the Palestine-Israel conflict is one of the most difficult issues to build EU27 consensus on, probably more than on any other issue” noting it as the stumbling-block to effective intervention (Scheindlin, 2024).

So what has changed (if at all) since October 7 in the EU’s actorness? Seemingly not much. The EU has a range of financial and civilian tools to offer today and for the day after the war. It is a considerable humanitarian payer, though less of a player on the ground. It is a significant actor in Palestinian capacity and state building, willing to reactivate EUPOL COPPS in Gaza and EUBAM at the Rafah border crossing. Their renewal could enhance the EU’s role alongside its participation in the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip the “day after”.

The EU is already playing a significant role in the West Bank. At a time when elements in the Netanyahu government are acting openly to bring about the financial collapse of the PA, the EU’s role as a stabilizer in funding the PA and preventing its collapse is vital. This is essential for preserving the two-state solution and helping to prevent a major conflagration in the West Bank.

Taking into consideration that the EU’s diplomatic initiatives have all failed internally and were usually ignored by the US, the EU should think anew about how to strengthen its actorness. The EU’s most significant potential leverage stems from being the largest donor to the PA. By using its financial muscle to revitalize the PA through conditionality, DG NEAR, which has the ability to act consistently, could strengthen the EU’s role and credibility. This is the EU’s main potential leverage asset, depending on the scope and depth of the implementation of PA reforms and could make the EU a more credible player in Israeli eyes.

It remains to be seen how powerful and effective this conditionality will be under the next European Commission. If successful, the EU could be viewed in time as a more significant player, which would prompt Israel to take Europe more seriously and pay more attention to European concerns, rather than dismissing them. However, for this to happen, the EU would also need to engage more positively and directly with Israel’s government. The new European Commission, which took office on December 1, appears better placed to do this.

The EU has potential leverage with Israel, as its biggest trade partner, yet divisions among member states have hampered its ability to use this effectively. The war caused a considerable realignment, and many European governments have distanced themselves from the current Israeli government. The proceedings in the ICJ and ICC are raising serious questions over whether Israel’s actions in Gaza comply with IL & IHL. Rulings against Israel would reduce Europe’s room for maneuver in supporting Israel, let alone advance relations. Indeed, this support is likely to shrink further as Europe’s normative emphasis on IL & IHL aligns with its geopolitical interests relating to the Russia-Ukraine war.

In the wider regional conflict, the EU is more than just a humanitarian actor or a payer. It also acts as a modest security provider, as in the EUNAVFOR Aspides operation, where the EU attempts to restore maritime security and freedom of navigation, operating as a defensive rather than offensive player, protecting its own economic interests and those of Egypt as well as other developing countries on this trade route.

This paper analyzed Europe’s attempts to develop its actorness in relation to the Gaza war and hostilities in the wider region. These efforts have been only partially successful, and have been achieved mainly on the sidelines of the Gaza war. As the EU navigates an increasingly unstable multipolar world, it is still searching for ways to align its political influence with its economic and financial weight. Unlike the geopolitical awakening prompted by the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza war has not triggered a similar response. Despite the region’s security challenges and the destabilizing actions taken by Iran, its proxies, and Israel, the war in Gaza does not pose a strategic threat to Europe as does Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The EU has sought support from the Global South for Ukraine against Russia, yet the war in Gaza has undermined these efforts, amid mounting criticism of perceived European double standards towards Israeli actions in Gaza. One way to restore credibility is by laying the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a future Palestinian state. By revitalizing the PA, the EU can also strengthen its credibility and regional influence. However, the EU’s incoherence regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict reduces significantly its credibility as an actor, yet accusations that it is an irrelevance in the Middle East are wide of the mark.

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Gal Y. and Sion-Tzidkiyahu M. (2024). A Vision for Regional – International Partnership for Gaza Rebuilding and Palestinian Economic Leap. Mitvim Institute. https://mitvim.org.il/en/a-vision-for-regional-international-partnership-for-gaza-rebuilding-and-palestinian-economic-leap/

Gard (2024). Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Persian Gulfsituation update 30 September 2024. Published in April, updated in September. https://www.gard.no/articles/red-sea-situation-update/

Hardman. I. (2024, October 7). Starmer insists he hasn’t stepped back support for Israel. The Spectatorhttps://www.spectator.co.uk/article/starmer-insists-he-hasnt-stepped-back-support-for-israel/

Hollis. R. (1997). Europe and the Middle East: Power by stealth? International Affairs 73(1), 15-29.

Karnitschnig, M. (2023, October 12). Europe’s power outage. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-hamas-war-europe-eu-power-irrelevance/.

Konečný M. (2024). The EU’s response to the Gaza War is a tale of contradiction and division. The Cairo Review of Global Affairshttps://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-eus-response-to-the-gaza-war-is-a-tale-of-contradiction-and-division/

Lis J. (2023, March 15). Israel blocks EU’s foreign minister from visiting over comments on settlements. Haaretzhttps://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-03-15/ty-article/.premium/israel-blocks-eus-foreign-minister-from-visiting-over-comments-on-settlements/00000186-e3e4-d8aa-a996-f7ef9b140000

Lynch S. (2024, February 14). Spanish, Irish leaders call on Ursula von der Leyen to review EU-Israel trade accord over human rights concerns. Politicohttps://www.politico.eu/article/call-for-eu-review-eu-israel-trade-accord-over-human-rights-concerns-rafah/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=Twitter

Matoi E. and Caba-Maria F. (2024). European Union’s security perspectives in the context of conflict zones multiplication: The Red Sea crisis. MEPEI Institute. https://mepei.com/european-unions-security-perspectives-in-the-context-of-conflict-zones-multiplication-the-red-sea-crisis/

Meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe Division. (2023, June 23 2024) – One of co-authors, Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, was present at the meeting.

Moens. B. et al. (2023, October 10). Europe struggles to present consistent messaging on Palestinian aid. Politicohttps://www.politico.eu/article/europe-battles-to-present-common-front-on-palestinian-aid/.

Moens B. et al. (2024, April 16). Germany’s Scholz lashed out at EU foreign policy chief over Gaza stance. Politicohttps://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-josep-borrell-benjamin-netanyahu-karl-nehammer-lashed-out-at-eu-foreign-policy-chief-on-gaza-stance/

Navon E. (2024, August 26). Europe can condemn Russia while supporting Israel. Times of Israel. https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/europe-can-condemn-russia-while-supporting-israel/

Politico. (2023, October 26). Cyprus Proposes to Send Humanitarian Aid to Gaza Via Sea. https://www.politico.eu/article/european-council-summit-eu-leaders-israel-palestine-hamas-ukraine-war-migration/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=alert&utm_campaign=European%20Council%20summit%20live%3A%20EU%20leaders%20meet%20amid%20Israel-Hamas%2C%20Ukraine%20wars

Psara M. and Liboreiro J. (2024, January 19). Revealed: Josep Borrell’s 10-point peace roadmap for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Euronewshttps://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/01/19/revealed-josep-borrells-10-point-peace-process-for-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict. Also published here.

Reuters (2023, December 22). EU adopts 118 million euros aid plan for Palestinian Authority. https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-adopts-118-million-euros-aid-plan-palestinian-authority-2023-12-22/

Scheindlin. D. (2024, August 29). “Israel’s right to defend itself has a limit”: Top EU diplomat Borrell on Israel, Netanyahu and the Gaza War. Haaretzhttps://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-08-29/ty-article-magazine/.premium/israels-right-to-self-defense-has-a-limit-top-eu-diplomat-on-netanyahu-settlers-gaza/00000191-9e18-d453-ab9f-fe9cfc570000

Sion-Tzidkiyahu M. (2021). The lost decade: EU-Israeli relations 2010-2020. Mitvim Institute. https://mitvim.org.il/publication/hebrew-the-lost-decade-israel-eu-relations-2010-2020-dr-maya-sion-tzidkiyahu/

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הפוסט Europe’s Response to the War in Gaza: Capabilities and Actorness הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-eus-possible-role-in-the-day-after-the-gaza-war-according-to-a-reverse-engineering-roadmap/ Thu, 12 Sep 2024 14:01:41 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11905 The paper outlines the existing and potential role of the EU in helping to shape a sustainable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the aftermath of the Gaza war under new Israeli government. It builds on the three stages and sequence of “The Israeli Initiative,” a detailed roadmap to establish a demilitarized de-radicalized Palestinian state and promote long-term security for both Israel and Palestine. The paper emphasizes the EU’s possible transition from being mainly a financial supporter (“payer”) to an influential participant (“player”) in the resolution of this conflict. Key points: 1. The Gaza war reignited the Two-State Solution, with the US, EU, and Arab countries working together to achieve it through a “reverse engineering” approach. 2. The EU’s potential role is outlined in three stages of “The Israeli Initiative”: Political Horizon: Establish a political vision and international monitoring forum. Transitional Phase (peace-building): Demilitarize the Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, hold elections, and begin regional projects. Negotiation (peace-making): Final negotiations for Palestinian statehood and normalizing Israel-Arab relations. The paper highlights the importance of the EU’s role in maintaining the viability of the Two-State Solution in the West Bank. In the short term, the EU should provide humanitarian aid, counter annexation efforts in the West Bank, stabilize the Palestinian Authority (PA), and address Iranian proxies. Its influence depends on trust-building with both sides and leveraging its status as both a financial and political player. The conclusion calls on the EU to prepare for post-war diplomatic and economic opportunities, with a focus on

הפוסט The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The paper outlines the existing and potential role of the EU in helping to shape a sustainable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the aftermath of the Gaza war under new Israeli government. It builds on the three stages and sequence of “The Israeli Initiative,” a detailed roadmap to establish a demilitarized de-radicalized Palestinian state and promote long-term security for both Israel and Palestine. The paper emphasizes the EU’s possible transition from being mainly a financial supporter (“payer”) to an influential participant (“player”) in the resolution of this conflict.

Key points:

1. The Gaza war reignited the Two-State Solution, with the US, EU, and Arab countries working together to achieve it through a “reverse engineering” approach.

2. The EU’s potential role is outlined in three stages of “The Israeli Initiative”:

Political Horizon: Establish a political vision and international monitoring forum.

Transitional Phase (peace-building): Demilitarize the Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, hold elections, and begin regional projects.

Negotiation (peace-making): Final negotiations for Palestinian statehood and normalizing Israel-Arab relations.

The paper highlights the importance of the EU’s role in maintaining the viability of the Two-State Solution in the West Bank. In the short term, the EU should provide humanitarian aid, counter annexation efforts in the West Bank, stabilize the Palestinian Authority (PA), and address Iranian proxies. Its influence depends on trust-building with both sides and leveraging its status as both a financial and political player.

The conclusion calls on the EU to prepare for post-war diplomatic and economic opportunities, with a focus on revitalizing the PA, stabilizing the region, and gaining trust with Israel through continued engagement.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The European Parliament Elections and Their Influence on Israel- International Briefing https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/the-european-parliament-elections-and-their-influence-on-israel-international-briefing/ Mon, 24 Jun 2024 13:28:03 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=11455 The Mitvim Institute, the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASE), and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung invite you to a Zoom webinar to delve into the European Parliament elections and their influence on Israel. During this session the speakers presented and analyzed the elections’ outcome and explore their significance in relation to the two wars surrounding the EU: the Israel-Hamas war and the Russia-Ukraine war. Moderator:  Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu- Director of the Israel-Europe Relations Program, Mitvim; the European Forum at the Hebrew University; Board Member of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI) Panelists: Assaf Uni- European correspondent, Globes Newspaper Rina Bassist-  Head of Israel Pulse, Al-Monitor Matthijs Schüssler- Chief Executive Officer, ELNET-EU & NATO Watch the panel

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections and Their Influence on Israel- International Briefing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Mitvim Institute, the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASE), and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung invite you to a Zoom webinar to delve into the European Parliament elections and their influence on Israel. During this session the speakers presented and analyzed the elections’ outcome and explore their significance in relation to the two wars surrounding the EU: the Israel-Hamas war and the Russia-Ukraine war.

Moderator: 
Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu- Director of the Israel-Europe Relations Program, Mitvim; the European Forum at the Hebrew University; Board Member of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI)
Panelists:
Assaf Uni- European correspondent, Globes Newspaper
Rina Bassist-  Head of Israel Pulse, Al-Monitor
Matthijs Schüssler- Chief Executive Officer, ELNET-EU & NATO

Watch the panel

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections and Their Influence on Israel- International Briefing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Netanyahu’s way of governance leads to unilateral recognition of Palestinian state https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/netanyahus-way-of-governance-leads-to-unilateral-recognition-of-palestinian-state/ Sun, 23 Jun 2024 08:36:43 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11407 Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan. The flood of Western countries stepping up recently to recognize a Palestinian state should not have come as a surprise. In fact, 143 countries have already recognized it, most of them when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat announced its creation in Algiers in 1988. A steady drizzle of other states have joined over the years, such as Sweden, in 2014. Two months ago, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States said their governments were considering such recognition. Now, with the imminent declaration of recognition of a Palestinian state by Norway, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia (with Malta and Belgium in the pipeline,) the trickle is starting to resemble a tsunami. Netanyahu’s political refusal to declare that at some future point he would be willing to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state, subject to international security guarantees, isolates and weakens Israel, with potentially disastrous results. In numerous debates over the past three decades in parliamentary plenaries around the world and at various UN assemblies, the Palestinians have recorded several key achievements: deepening their diplomatic and economic ties with the countries that recognized them, as well as with other Western countries, and gaining recognition in 2012 of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an observer state (although not a member) of the UN General Assembly. But with this recognition, the Palestinians cannot go to the bank and “cash” a state. An actual Palestinian state

הפוסט Netanyahu’s way of governance leads to unilateral recognition of Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan.

The flood of Western countries stepping up recently to recognize a Palestinian state should not have come as a surprise. In fact, 143 countries have already recognized it, most of them when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat announced its creation in Algiers in 1988. A steady drizzle of other states have joined over the years, such as Sweden, in 2014.

Two months ago, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States said their governments were considering such recognition. Now, with the imminent declaration of recognition of a Palestinian state by Norway, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia (with Malta and Belgium in the pipeline,) the trickle is starting to resemble a tsunami. Netanyahu’s political refusal to declare that at some future point he would be willing to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state, subject to international security guarantees, isolates and weakens Israel, with potentially disastrous results.

In numerous debates over the past three decades in parliamentary plenaries around the world and at various UN assemblies, the Palestinians have recorded several key achievements: deepening their diplomatic and economic ties with the countries that recognized them, as well as with other Western countries, and gaining recognition in 2012 of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an observer state (although not a member) of the UN General Assembly. But with this recognition, the Palestinians cannot go to the bank and “cash” a state. An actual Palestinian state cannot be established without Israel’s consent.

What does recognition of a Palestinian state mean for Israel?

If recognition stops with the above four to five European countries, the move will remain symbolic, similar to Sweden’s recognition a decade ago. But in another scenario, which is not far-fetched, given strong global support for the Palestinians these days, the floodgates would open for the 50 countries that have not yet done so to recognize a Palestinian state. These would include the leading members of the Euro-Atlantic “moral majority” (France, Germany, UK, and, first and foremost, the United States,) with dire consequences for Israel.

There is a consensus among the member states of the European Union and the US on the need to establish a Palestinian state, and that the only solution to the conflict is two states that allow the two peoples to live side by side in security and peace (or at least without violence). This is a worthy vision. However, the states that are about to recognize a Palestinian state do not understand or do not want to see, that unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state will not result in a de facto Palestinian state and will not achieve security for Palestinians or Israelis.

With the PA at an unprecedented nadir and Hamas enjoying peak popularity on the Palestinian street, unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by Western countries risks creating a state of “Hamastan.” Such an outcome would contradict the interests of those very same countries that seek to promote security, stability, and peace in the Middle East.

The Biden administration has made clear that it will not recognize a Palestinian state and that the issue should be settled in negotiations with Israel rather than unilaterally by third parties. Negotiations would allow Israel to present demands to the Palestinian side in order to ensure security, demilitarization, de-radicalization, an uncompromising fight to counter terrorism, and security coordination. However, such negotiations are unlikely under the hardline Netanyahu-Smotrich government.

Netanyahu’s refusal to engage in any discussion of a political solution on the day after the war precipitated the Norwegian, Irish, and Spanish decisions to recognize a Palestinian state. Such a step promises domestic political gains due to the broad support for it among their voters. Some leaders are trying to enhance their chances of securing an international position.

The price tag that the Netanyahu government can exact from these countries is low: The recall of ambassadors erodes Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering precisely when it is needed most – since there are high-level meetings that only ambassadors can conduct. At this difficult economic time for Israel, it would be irresponsible to harm arms sales or mutual intelligence transfers.

We must not forget the tremendous and unprecedented support Europe demonstrated for Israel in response to the October 7 Hamas massacre, including those member states critical of Israel. The current right-wing government has completely wasted this goodwill and credit, its policies alienating these governments rather than mobilizing their continued support through positive statesmanship. Norway, Ireland, and Spain directed their decision mostly against the Netanyahu-Smotrich government, prompted by a desire for Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side in peace and security.

Indeed, the idea of a Palestinian state is anathema for most Israelis. But with seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, separation from the Palestinians through political negotiations will make it possible to receive international guarantees of a demilitarized and de-radicalized Palestinian state. Such separation is vital to Israel’s national interest of remaining a democratic state and the home of the Jewish people.

Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan. Instead, Israel, the Palestinians, the states in the region, and the West must commit to a process of lengthy negotiations that will ensure the strengthening of the moderate camp that wants peace and security – and thwart the efforts of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to destabilize the Middle East.

The article was published on May 28th, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Netanyahu’s way of governance leads to unilateral recognition of Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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EU on Palestine: Is There a Credible Peace Plan? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/eu-on-palestine-is-there-a-credible-peace-plan/ Wed, 15 May 2024 12:41:48 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=11328 The UN General Assembly passed on Friday with overwhelming majority a resolution which upgrades Palestine’s rights at the world body as an observer state, without offering it full membership. In the EU, opinions are still divided in the absence of any common position on the day after the on-going Israel-Hamas war. In a statement, EU’ foreign policy chief, High Representative Josep Borrell, acknowledged the result of the “momentous” UN vote. He also recalled EU’s commitment to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two-state solution, “with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign, and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security and mutual recognition, and with Jerusalem serving as the future capital of both states”. It is vital to restore a political horizon towards a two-state solution, he added. The EU stands ready to work with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and regional and international parties toward this goal. But the EU member states continue to be divided in UN votes and for Borrell, who repeatedly has complained about the lack of a common EU position, this must have come as a set-back. Less than half of the member states voted for the upgrade of Palestine’s status in the UN (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). Two member states, the Czech Republic and Hungary, joined those few countries who voted against it. The rest abstained, claiming that time was not yet ripe for this step. Furthermore, the

הפוסט EU on Palestine: Is There a Credible Peace Plan? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The UN General Assembly passed on Friday with overwhelming majority a resolution which upgrades Palestine’s rights at the world body as an observer state, without offering it full membership. In the EU, opinions are still divided in the absence of any common position on the day after the on-going Israel-Hamas war.

In a statementEU’ foreign policy chief, High Representative Josep Borrellacknowledged the result of the “momentous” UN vote.

He also recalled EU’s commitment to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two-state solution, “with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign, and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security and mutual recognition, and with Jerusalem serving as the future capital of both states”.

It is vital to restore a political horizon towards a two-state solution, he added. The EU stands ready to work with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and regional and international parties toward this goal. But the EU member states continue to be divided in UN votes and for Borrell, who repeatedly has complained about the lack of a common EU position, this must have come as a set-back.

Less than half of the member states voted for the upgrade of Palestine’s status in the UN (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). Two member states, the Czech Republic and Hungary, joined those few countries who voted against it. The rest abstained, claiming that time was not yet ripe for this step.

Furthermore, the European External Action Service (EEAS), which Borrell heads, seems not to have a clue about how to end the war and jumpstart a peace process towards a two-state solution. In his remarks before the start of the Foreign Affairs Council (Development) meeting a week ago, he was asked whether he had any peace plan to present.

“At the moment, there is not, unhappily, the possibility of starting to discuss peace plans,” Borrell replied. “What we have to do is continue working for a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and then, the start of a political process. I think that the next Foreign Affairs Council will be important for that.” That meeting will take place on 27 May.

He is right that the most urgent thing right now is to pressure both sides in the war, Hamas and Israel, to agree on a hostage deal in the context of a phased ceasefire which naturally would be extended to a permanent ceasefire. A ceasefire in Gaza would likely also lead to a ceasefire in the north between Hezbollah and Israel. For this to happen, Israel must stop its limited offensive in Rafah before it escalates.

But without a credible peace plan, or rather roadmap, for an exit from the war and the transition to a two-state solution on the ground, there is no hope and political horizon for neither Palestinians nor Israelis. In fact, there is already a such a plan, “The Israeli Initiative”, which was presented last month by a policy team at two Israeli think tanks (the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katznelson Center).

“We are doing a lot to disseminate the initiative in Israel and abroad but we feel that we are working in a vacuum,” Dr Omer Zanany, head of the Foreign and Security Policy Team at the two institutes, told The Brussels Times. “Ours is the only concrete proposal for relaunching the peace process towards a two-state solution.”

The Initiative is based on the lessons learned from the mistakes in the past and the examples of political-diplomatic turning points (such as the Egypt – Israeli peace treaty after the October war in 1973). In line with Josep Borrell’s often stated assessment, the Oslo Accords in the 90-ies failed because the lack of clear political horizon and the definition of the final goal (a Palestinian state).

Another failure was Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 without any peace agreement. It did not work and led to to a vacuum which was filled by Hamas who took over power after elections, only to violently expel its political opponents from the Gaza Strip and never more allow any elections.

Zanany insists on that Hamas with its Jihadist ideology is an obstacle to peace and must be removed from power – not necessarily by military means but by offering an alternative to them. Currently Hamas enjoys widespread support in particular the West Bank but that could easily change, as in the past, if there were to be a political horizon for the Palestinians.

The Initiative also offers Hamas a political future on the condition that the organisation accepts the Quartet’s three conditions for participation in Palestinian elections – recognition of Israel, recognitions of previous agreements with Israel and last but not the least the abandoning of the path of terrorism.

“The biggest threat against Hamas is a political solution,” he explained. “The non-military way to neutralize them is to allow them take part in the political process on the condition that they accept the conditions of the Quartet.” The Quartet refers to the Middle East Quartet (consisting of the UN, the US, the EU and Russia) which was established in 2002.

Russia is of course out of the picture now and has aligned itself with Iran. Another difference that matters is that the process will almost immediately start with reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, including economic “mega projects”, and tangible state building measures by a revitalized Palestinian Authority.

International peace conference critical

This time, setting a broadly supported political vision at the outset will provide impetus for a rapid transition from the current state of conflict to a political process which will result in a Palestinian state in a phased process which would take up to five years. “An international peace conference in the very first phase of the process is critical,” he says.

The idea of an international peace conference is also one of Borrell’s favorite ideas. At the conference, both Palestinians and Israelis will have to make commitments and decide on confidence-building measures. Israel among others will have to stop construction in the settlements and agree on a connection between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The Initiative is based on the understanding that Israel will declare that it will recognize a demilitarized and viable Palestinian state in accordance with a stable political settlement. (In his statement, Borrell excluded the word “demilitarized”.) Omer Zanany refers to Ehud Olmert, a former Israeli Prime Minister who was forced to resign in 2008 because of corruption charges.

To Olmert’s credit, he almost succeeded in agreeing on a roadmap for peace with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the Annapolis peace conference in 2007. Olmert defined “demilitarization” as “a state with limited arms”. The two sides were very close to a solution which would have seen Israel withdrawing from almost the whole West Bank, with agreed land swaps.

Without going into the gritty and nitty of the core issues in the conflict – final status issue such as borders, Jerusalem, and the return of refugees – the Initiative leaves it to the Palestinians and the Israelis to negotiate about the peace settlement in the two final years of the process. In the meantime, he foresees a joint mechanism with all relevant stakeholders to prevent escalation over the Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif.

Will Israel allow elections in East Jerusalem? “It will be necessary and was already foreseen in the Oslo Accords,” he replied.

“Have you estimated how many Israeli settlers would have to return to Israel in a two-state solution?” This is a major issue and tot mentioned in the Initiative but he estimates them to 100,000 – 120,000. Not counting Jerusalem, the majority of them live in cities and settlement blocs which are foreseen to become part of Israel in a “peace for land” solution including land swaps.

Do you foresee the possibility of Israeli citizens remaining in a future Palestinian state? “Too early to discuss this.“

Does the Initiative foresee a return of Palestinian refugees to the future Palestinian state or to Israel? “Surely to the Palestinian state depending on its absorption capacity,” he replied. “Israel may symbolically receive up to 50,000 refugees in family reunion programmes.”

What makes Zanany optimistic this time is that the solution will be anchored in a robust regional framework, supported by the US, the EU and moderate Arab countries that already have made peace with Israel. The goal is also to promote Palestine’s economic integration in the region and make it less dependent on Israel. “Once there is a Palestinian state, we can talk about a confederation,” he added.

That said, nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed. He is aware of the immense obstacles in even getting started.

First of all, the current Israeli government must be replaced after elections, the sooner the better. Hamas will not disappear by itself and therefore there needs to be a change in the equation to remove it from power. Iran could also be a problem but if the Palestinian issue will be solved, they will lose its pretext to continue its destabilizing role in the region by proxies and threatening Israel.

The article was publish on May 13th in The Brussels Times.

הפוסט EU on Palestine: Is There a Credible Peace Plan? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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EU cannot receive racist minister Ben Gvir on Europe Day in Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/eu-cannot-receive-racist-minister-ben-gvir-on-europe-day-in-israel/ Tue, 09 May 2023 09:01:16 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=9487 Many Europeans would look at Israel and say that democracy and occupation cannot go together. They are right. Others would say that Israel is a thriving democracy and appreciate the impressive demonstrations calling to preserve the democratic order in Israel. They are right too. For 18+ weeks huge mass grassroots movements demonstrations coupled by civil society are taking place all over the country, outcrying the values of democracy, separation of power, civil, political, and social rights, human rights, and protecting minorities. The result of these demonstrations was halting the judicial “reform” to give time for discussions between the government and the opposition on a broad consensus solution. If the Israeli liberal democratic camp prevails, this is the best chance for a future solution to the Palestinian problem. When Israelis fear for their own basic democratic rights it is much easier to acknowledge the horrors of occupation under which the Palestinians lack basic rights and even to identify with their suffering. More and more Israelis also understand the dangers of Israel’s creeping annexation of the occupied territories to Israel’s democracy. Yet the heads of the EU have largely shied away from stressing the importance of preserving Israeli liberal democracy. EU’s low profile can be explained by a reluctance to interfere in the internal debate in Israel and by the convergence of interest between the EU and the current government of Israel when it comes to Ukraine, and the move to Real-politic foreign policy style declared and conducted by HR/VP Joseph Borrell.

הפוסט EU cannot receive racist minister Ben Gvir on Europe Day in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Many Europeans would look at Israel and say that democracy and occupation cannot go together. They are right. Others would say that Israel is a thriving democracy and appreciate the impressive demonstrations calling to preserve the democratic order in Israel. They are right too.

For 18+ weeks huge mass grassroots movements demonstrations coupled by civil society are taking place all over the country, outcrying the values of democracy, separation of power, civil, political, and social rights, human rights, and protecting minorities. The result of these demonstrations was halting the judicial “reform” to give time for discussions between the government and the opposition on a broad consensus solution.

If the Israeli liberal democratic camp prevails, this is the best chance for a future solution to the Palestinian problem. When Israelis fear for their own basic democratic rights it is much easier to acknowledge the horrors of occupation under which the Palestinians lack basic rights and even to identify with their suffering. More and more Israelis also understand the dangers of Israel’s creeping annexation of the occupied territories to Israel’s democracy.

Yet the heads of the EU have largely shied away from stressing the importance of preserving Israeli liberal democracy. EU’s low profile can be explained by a reluctance to interfere in the internal debate in Israel and by the convergence of interest between the EU and the current government of Israel when it comes to Ukraine, and the move to Real-politic foreign policy style declared and conducted by HR/VP Joseph Borrell.

When Iranian drones are used by Russia to attack Ukraine, on the border of the EU, Israeli military intelligence of Iran’s weaponry is valuable. Purchases from the Israeli defence industry is desired by some EU member states. Israeli gas is coming through Egypt to the EU or helping the Egyptians to export more of their gas to the EU.

Yet what has the EU received in return for ignoring to speak its values in the Israeli case? The Israeli Prime Minister Secretariat has allocated Itamar Ben Gvir, Minister for National Security, to represent the Israeli government on Europe Day this Tuesday (9 May). Behind creeping annexation and violent settlers are the same forces that have forged Itamar Ben-Gvir’s anti-democratic racist political party “Otzma Yehudit”.

Europe Day is annually celebrated by a reception hosted by the EU Delegation to Israel. A representative of the government always speaks. Last year it was Nitzan Horwitz from Merez, a year beforehand it was Meirav Michaeli from the Labour Party. If the PM Secretariat would have sent another minister, for example from the Likud party, the EU Delegation would probably welcome him/her politely.

This has been the EU’s  informal stance so far: to work with the moderate ministers in the government and ignore the radical right wing “Religious Zionism”. Now the messy conduct of the Israeli government made this stance a formal one.

Israelis do not wish the EU to try and interfere with the internal processes in Israel. Any EU attempt to interfere would also be counter-productive, as many Israelis view the EU as pro-Palestinian and have a negative image of the EU when it comes to political issues. Yet what about Israelis who have been demonstrating in the streets in the past 4 months? Most likely they would appreciate to hear the democratic values the EU stands for pronounced much louder and clearer by heads of the EU. Values do not necessarily contradict real-politic.

Convergence of interests can easily lead to yielding of values. But when yielding of values comes from the EU, is a not only disappointing, it also blows up in the EU’s face to an embarrassing mini-diplomatic crisis it now has to solve.

One needs to remember that it takes two to tango. Peace cannot be reached when the Palestinians are divided. Since 2006, Palestinians are split between two undemocratic regimes. Two million Palestinians are under Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip, and about 3.5 million under the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmud Abbas. Also, Palestinian public opinion is pro-terror and anti-peace.

Still, strengthening the pro-liberal-democratic camp in Israel is one answer to keep a better chance to one day resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. It is also a way to warm up Israelis public opinion on the EU. In the future these Israelis may support Borrell’s initiative to join the Saudi/Arab peace initiative with the EU’s Special Privilege Partnership proposed to Israel and the Palestinians in 2013.

At the time of writing this op-ed the EU had not taken its final situation on how to handle the diplomatic mini-crisis with Israel around the planned reception on Europe Day. Later, the EU Delegation in Israel decided to cancel the reception on Europe Day (but kept the planned public cultural event).

Beforehand, EU spokesperson said that the EU was consulting internally and with its member states. He underlined that the EU does not endorse the political views of Ben-Gvir and his party as they stand in stark contrast to EU’s values and principles. Europe Day has indeed become a chance for the EU to speak its liberal democratic values.

This article is from “The Brussels Times“, from March 8th, 2023.

הפוסט EU cannot receive racist minister Ben Gvir on Europe Day in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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5 lessons for Israel from the Czech struggle for democracy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/5-lessons-for-israel-from-the-czech-struggle-for-democracy/ Mon, 08 May 2023 10:10:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=9480 If we learn lessons from the Czech case, it becomes clear that Israeli civil society must emphasize the righteousness of its cause beyond the borders of Tel Aviv.

הפוסט 5 lessons for Israel from the Czech struggle for democracy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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At a joint panel of the Mitvim Institute and the Institute of International Relations in Prague (IIR), Czech researchers from different backgrounds discussed the successful struggle against former Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babis, and the similarities and differences that can be drawn to Israel.

The Israeli government’s obsessive focus on promoting the judicial overhaul has led to a loss of overall control: failures in preventing security escalation, rockets in the North and South, the cooling of the normalization process, economic uncertainty, fear of credit rating downgrade, and a crisis with the United States. These are just the tip of the iceberg of a series of frustrating, confusing and fearful moves.

Amid all of this, there is only one success worthy of Benjamin Netanyahu’s credit – the tightening of the ranks in Israel’s liberal camp, its expansion. One can just look at the weekly protests to understand that this is a pivotal and historic moment for democracy, liberalism and equality.

While the protests have successfully led to the suspension of the government’s oppressive actions, the road to achieving their goals is still long. Against this backdrop, the Mitvim Institute has launched “The Liberal Partnership” initiative, with the aim of promoting learning processes and mutual influence between liberal civil society organizations in Israel and around the world.

As part of this, Mitvim and IIR conducted an experts panel, focused on the determined and successful campaign of Czech civil society against democratic backsliding. The analysis of the Czech case highlights a number of lessons that every liberal camp should take into account.

Democratic roots: Prior to the notorious billionaire Andrej Babis’s rise as prime minister in December 2017, the Czech Republic enjoyed a stable and inspiring democratic tradition for a country that until the early 1990s was part of the Communist bloc. Unlike its neighbors in Eastern Europe, the democratic tradition is an inseparable part of the Czech identity historically, due to the creation of a wide secular and working middle class.

According to Karel Kouba, an associate professor of political science at Hradec Kralove University, this tradition prevented the Czech Republic from a fate similar to that of Poland and Hungary. In fact, since 1993, there has not been a significant political camp in the Czech Republic based on nationalist and religious forces.

However, in 2017 the winds changed, and Andrej Babis was elected after leading a divisive populist, anti-establishment campaign. He began to promote his economic interests while attempting to weaken the guardians of democracy and faced widespread opposition.

Civil society and the media even encouraged a criminal investigation against him on suspicion of embezzling European Union funds. His attempts to suppress democracy were hesitant in relation to the activism shown by his opponents, and after just one term, his government was replaced.

From protest to political power

Petra Guasti, an associate professor of democratic theory at Charles University, argues that the liberal camp must not disconnect the center from the periphery, and that there is crucial importance to the presence of the struggle outside of major cities. To that end, the consensus for democracy needs to be as broad as possible.

However, protests on their own are not enough. Guasti argues that they must be translated into political power through the creation of a broad coalition of different parties that agree on one singular goal: to defend liberal democracy at any cost. Ultimately, the success of the struggle must be reflected in changes to voting patterns in the ballot boxes.

Unified and focused messaging: According to Gusti, the most effective way to defeat populism is to put aside disagreements on other issues, unite around a unified message, and sharpen it. Without liberal democracy, the government cannot create effective policies on various issues for the benefit of its citizens.

Since populism feeds on the division between “us” and “them,” it is up to liberal forces to create the widest possible political tent, even at the cost of difficult compromises. Many forget that compromises are part of the democratic game, and when we reject them, there is a chance of pushing different communities toward a populist leader.

The ability of the liberal camp to accommodate a wide range of opinions and political positions, while being willing to come together under a joint effort to preserve liberal democracy, is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for success in the struggle.

Moral power: the successes of Czech civil society did not stem from nothing. Another significant ingredient was the establishment of connections and influence with partners in other countries, notably Hungary and Poland. Through these relationships, the mistakes and difficulties in the struggles of Hungary and Poland were shared and understood. Alongside the construction of an international liberal-civil alliance, every liberal camp should look inward and examine the essence of its actions.

Jaromír Mazák, a sociologist and research director at the STEM Institute for Czech Society Research, believes that another significant component of success is understanding the moral power of civil society. For example, the Czech public was able to distinguish between honoring their court’s ruling to acquit Babis, and the moral arguments surrounding his conduct and the reason for his prosecution. Despite his acquittal, Babis continued to be perceived as unethical, which ultimately led to the end of his rule.

Local victories: The Million Moments for Democracy movement managed to create protest infrastructures in central cities and in peripheral regions, translating them into political power through close collaboration with opposition parties. These parties were divided into two coalitions – one more conservative and the other progressive – but their goal was the same: to establish liberal democracy. This collaboration gave hope that the two sides could jointly form a government that would ensure the protection of liberal democracy.

The challenge in Israel is greater

If we learn lessons from the Czech case, it becomes clear that Israeli civil society must emphasize the righteousness of its cause beyond the borders of Tel Aviv, and assertively create a meaningful political force that can compete with the oppressive strength of populism and nationalism.

To do so, Israeli civil society must learn to build a broad political coalition that regards liberal democracy as its guiding principle. Compromises are part of the democratic game, and if one wants to win the ballot box, one must take them into account.

Despite Israel’s rich democratic tradition, the current state of affairs for the liberal camp is darker than that in the Czech Republic. The issues of occupation and Jewish supremacy impede the wheels of the legal revolution. Kouba notes that the mere fact that the Netanyahu government has begun to reduce democratic space indicates deeper steps toward authoritarian rule than those taken by Babis. In addition, Israeli society’s heterogeneity is rife with other important issues and topics that could lead to divisions.

In the face of Netanyahu’s government’s divisiveness, a positive and unifying campaign must be launched around the importance of liberal democracy for all citizens of the country. In addition to domestic political activity, Israeli civil society must strive to establish relationships of influence, support and shared knowledge with its counterparts around the world. Democratic regression is not unique to Israel alone, and there is much to learn from our global partners.

This article is from The Jerusalem Post, from March 8th, 2023.

הפוסט 5 lessons for Israel from the Czech struggle for democracy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society https://mitvim.org.il/en/launching-the-liberal-partnership-zoom-panel-how-to-successfully-stand-up-against-democratic-backsliding-lessons-from-czech-civil-society/ Sun, 02 Apr 2023 13:06:26 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?p=9301 The Mitvim Institute and the IIR Institute organize a zoom panel that launches our new initiative of Liberal Partnership. The goal of the initiative is to create influencing and learning coalitions with liberal civil society organizations in Israel and globally through strategic dialogues, round tables, joint events, and conferences. The zoom Panel will cover the success stories of civil society organizations in the Czech Republic and what can be learned from them. The panel will take place on Monday, April 3rd, at 5 PM Israel time. Click Here to Register.

הפוסט Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Mitvim Institute and the IIR Institute organize a zoom panel that launches our new initiative of Liberal Partnership. The goal of the initiative is to create influencing and learning coalitions with liberal civil society organizations in Israel and globally through strategic dialogues, round tables, joint events, and conferences. The zoom Panel will cover the success stories of civil society organizations in the Czech Republic and what can be learned from them. The panel will take place on Monday, April 3rd, at 5 PM Israel time.

Click Here to Register.

הפוסט Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/launching-the-liberal-partnership-how-to-successfully-stand-up-against-democratic-backsliding-lessons-from-czech-civil-society/ Sat, 01 Apr 2023 08:41:52 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=9398 The Mitvim Institute and the IIR Institute organize a zoom panel that launches our new initiative of Liberal Partnership. The goal of the initiative is to create influencing and learning coalitions with liberal civil society organizations in Israel and globally through strategic dialogues, round tables, joint events, and conferences. The zoom Panel will cover the success stories of civil society organizations in the Czech Republic and what can be learned from them. The panel will take place on Monday, April 3rd, at 5 PM Israel time. Click Here to Register.

הפוסט Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Mitvim Institute and the IIR Institute organize a zoom panel that launches our new initiative of Liberal Partnership. The goal of the initiative is to create influencing and learning coalitions with liberal civil society organizations in Israel and globally through strategic dialogues, round tables, joint events, and conferences. The zoom Panel will cover the success stories of civil society organizations in the Czech Republic and what can be learned from them. The panel will take place on Monday, April 3rd, at 5 PM Israel time.

Click Here to Register.

הפוסט Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The German “Zeitenwende” still goes unnoticed in Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/9085/ Tue, 28 Feb 2023 13:30:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=9085 A year ago, in February 2022, Chancellor Scholz delivered a policy statement in the Bundestag, as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He spoke about a watershed moment, which requires Germany to stand on the right side of history, and specified new elements of Germany’s security and foreign policies. In Germany, this was coined a Zeitenwende, a sea change, and perceived as a major development. In Israel, though, it generally went unnoticed. Germany is Israel’s second most important global ally, after the United States, and is committed to Israel’s security and well-being, as well as to supporting a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When then Prime Minister Lapid visited Scholz in Berlin in September 2022, the Chancellor stressed that Germany “will always stand by Israel” and that “Germany and Israel were the closest of allies, strategic partners and friends”. Scholz reiterated this message when congratulating Netanyahu on his November 2022 election victory. In their phone conversation, Scholz emphasized that “Germany would remain a close partner to Israel and would continue to work for peace in the Middle East”. One would expect that, when such an important partner of Israel is at a key turning point, this will have ramifications. Especially, at a time in which Israel itself is transitioning under Netanyahu’s new government – away from democracy, further away from peace. In practice, however, business continues almost as usual. Germany’s relationship with Israel is characterized by continuity Germany’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been characterized by continuity this

הפוסט The German “Zeitenwende” still goes unnoticed in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A year ago, in February 2022, Chancellor Scholz delivered a policy statement in the Bundestag, as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He spoke about a watershed moment, which requires Germany to stand on the right side of history, and specified new elements of Germany’s security and foreign policies. In Germany, this was coined a Zeitenwende, a sea change, and perceived as a major development. In Israel, though, it generally went unnoticed.

Germany is Israel’s second most important global ally, after the United States, and is committed to Israel’s security and well-being, as well as to supporting a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When then Prime Minister Lapid visited Scholz in Berlin in September 2022, the Chancellor stressed that Germany “will always stand by Israel” and that “Germany and Israel were the closest of allies, strategic partners and friends”. Scholz reiterated this message when congratulating Netanyahu on his November 2022 election victory. In their phone conversation, Scholz emphasized that “Germany would remain a close partner to Israel and would continue to work for peace in the Middle East”.

One would expect that, when such an important partner of Israel is at a key turning point, this will have ramifications. Especially, at a time in which Israel itself is transitioning under Netanyahu’s new government – away from democracy, further away from peace. In practice, however, business continues almost as usual.

Germany’s relationship with Israel is characterized by continuity

Germany’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been characterized by continuity this past year. No paradigm shift has taken place since Scholz’s speech. Germany continues to be supportive of the two-state solution; occasionally condemns negative developments on the ground – such as terror attacks, provocations in Jerusalem, or (with other like-minded states) settlement expansion; supports Israel at the United Nations, on issues like the International Court of Justice; and maintains its participation in the low-key Munich Group – an informal grouping, which also includes France, Egypt and Jordan, aimed at keeping the option of a two-state solution alive.

In light of possible Israeli-Palestinian escalation, given the composition and policies of Israel’s new government, Germany can reassess its conduct, and seek – in line with Scholz’s new approach – to become more active and influential. It could become engaged in de-escalation efforts pursued in light of the sensitive overlap between Ramadan and Passover this coming April; it could utilize the Munich Group as a stepping stone towards the formulation of a new multilateral mechanism dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian issue, instead of the practically defunct Quartet on the Middle East; it could become more vocal in opposing steps by Israelis or Palestinians that increase violence and distance peace; and it could invest more – as the US recently did – in supporting constructive Israeli-Palestinian interaction on the civil society level.

Beyond the aspiration for peaceful resolution of conflicts, Scholz’s approach also calls to safeguard democracy and freedoms. While this, too, was mentioned in his speech in the context of the war in Ukraine, it is becoming highly relevant to the domestic situation in Israel as well. The current Netanyahu government is advancing game-changing legislation that – if approved – will shatter Israel’s democracy. Israelis from all walks of life are resisting and are taking action for democracy. They look to Israel’s Western allies for backing and support. President Biden and his administration are gradually stepping up their criticism of Netanyahu’s legal reforms, and are indicating that advancement of the reforms will damage bilateral ties and Israel’s interests; President Macron reportedly also raised the issue with much concern in his recent meeting with Netanyahu in Paris.

 Germany should position itself as supporting democracy

Germany’s voice has yet to be publicly heard on democratic erosion in Israel. Not on the legal reforms, and not even on the legislative initiative that would impose high taxes on support from German political foundations to Israeli grantees. In the past, Chancellor Merkel effectively pressured Netanyahu to block a bill targeting NGOs, and Scholz should do the same. Alas, the German government is apparently still working to formulate a comprehensive policy towards the new Israeli government. While such a policy is formulated in Berlin, realities are quickly changing on the ground in Jerusalem. Pro-democracy Israelis generally cherish the friendship with Germany and view it as a beacon of liberal values. They expect Berlin to speak up and have their back. To date, this only happened when the German ambassador to Israel criticized a right-wing Knesset member who claimed that the pro-democracy protests are funded by German and Iranian money. More is needed, including a decision not to engage with the far-right members of the current Israeli government.

Scholz’s approach also signals increased militarization and securitization. Some in Israel would like to see this materialize. They want to see Germany more proactive in handling security challenges that also pose a threat to Israel – like Iran; they want Germany to be more supportive of Israeli actions to fight terror; they see potential to expand cooperation on cybersecurity and military-to-military relations; and they hope that Germany will bring more pro-Israeli leverage into the Middle East, at a time when the US may be pivoting elsewhere. Should such elements play a more significant role in the future of Israel-Germany ties, it is important that they do not overshadow Germany’s traditional added values in the fields of diplomacy, civil society, conflict resolution, multilateralism and liberal democracy.

At a time when Israel is facing a potential sea change moment of its own, and not a positive one, a more engaged and effective German foreign policy could be an asset for those in Israel working to promote peace and safeguard democracy. If that happens, Scholz’s new approach will no longer go unnoticed in Israel, it will be applauded and will position Germany on the right side of Israel’s history.

This article is from “Friedrich Ebert Stiftung“, from February 27, 2023.

הפוסט The German “Zeitenwende” still goes unnoticed in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Is Israel democratic? The new talking point for Netanyahu abroad https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/is-israel-democratic-the-new-talking-point-for-netanyahu-abroad/ Thu, 16 Feb 2023 10:09:33 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=9039 Those who have closely monitored Israel-France relations over the years often conclude that understanding them requires psychological rather than political science expertise. The relationship is rich and varied, sometimes emotional and stormy, occasionally reflecting mutual anger and a sense of insult but also rising to moments of transcendence. A psychological evaluation may be required these days specifically to explain why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose France as the destination of his first foreign travel since taking office in late December. In the midst of an intensifying domestic storm over the country’s essential nature and democratic values, borne on the fumes of an intoxicated coalition that reduces the concept of democracy to the tyranny of the elected majority, Netanyahu chose to travel to Paris, with inexplicable urgency. France is the birthplace of human rights and prides itself – not always justifiably so – as a role model and custodian of democratic values in the most expansive sense of the term, including minority rights, separation of powers, separation of church and state, freedom of expression and creativity, and other liberal values considered an unnecessary evil by Netanyahu and his partners. Before entering the courtyard of the Elysee Palace where rows of sword-bearing Republican Guard soldiers were lined up to honor him, Netanyahu’s office sought to ensure that his host would not embarrass him on this painful issue of the regime reform taking place under his watchful eye. President Emmanuel Macron was circumspect in his public statements and his spokesperson made do with a boilerplate statement about the need

הפוסט Is Israel democratic? The new talking point for Netanyahu abroad הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Those who have closely monitored Israel-France relations over the years often conclude that understanding them requires psychological rather than political science expertise. The relationship is rich and varied, sometimes emotional and stormy, occasionally reflecting mutual anger and a sense of insult but also rising to moments of transcendence.

A psychological evaluation may be required these days specifically to explain why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose France as the destination of his first foreign travel since taking office in late December. In the midst of an intensifying domestic storm over the country’s essential nature and democratic values, borne on the fumes of an intoxicated coalition that reduces the concept of democracy to the tyranny of the elected majority, Netanyahu chose to travel to Paris, with inexplicable urgency.

France is the birthplace of human rights and prides itself – not always justifiably so – as a role model and custodian of democratic values in the most expansive sense of the term, including minority rights, separation of powers, separation of church and state, freedom of expression and creativity, and other liberal values considered an unnecessary evil by Netanyahu and his partners.

Before entering the courtyard of the Elysee Palace where rows of sword-bearing Republican Guard soldiers were lined up to honor him, Netanyahu’s office sought to ensure that his host would not embarrass him on this painful issue of the regime reform taking place under his watchful eye. President Emmanuel Macron was circumspect in his public statements and his spokesperson made do with a boilerplate statement about the need to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and the importance of maintaining regional stability.

But Netanyahu paid a price. Contrary to accepted practice, the sides did not issue a joint statement at the end of the visit, nor did they hold a joint news conference. Macron may be willing to preserve the dignity of his guests, but he is not willing to lie for them in public.

Inside the room, around the dinner table, as leaked to the newspaper Le Monde, Macron was quite clear in suggesting that if the legal reform passes as is, Paris will have to conclude that Israel is moving away from the concept of democracy shared until now by both countries.

With the leak of Macron’s position clouding the smiling photographs, Netanyahu’s people were quick to explain in a somewhat dismissive tone that Macron was “not well versed in the details of the reform.” French presidents have at their disposal a kind of private in-house foreign ministry called “la cellule diplomatique,” comprising skilled diplomats carefully selected according to their geographic specialization.

France also has a large and highly professional embassy in Tel Aviv, which presumably knew how to prepare the president for the meeting with Netanyahu, including on the subject of the legal reform. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that if Macron had known even more details of the planned upheaval, his reaction would have been harsher.

Perhaps a psychologist can determine whether Netanyahu’s appearance alongside the president of France in hopes of obtaining a seal of approval in the cradle of human rights was the result of a sober calculation or of his subconscious playing tricks on him.

A similar question can be asked about the slightly pathetic attempt to arrange a meeting for him with representatives of the business community of the world’s seventh largest economy, in a transparent attempt to contradict the forecasts of JPMorgan and the best Israeli economists regarding the danger to our economy due from the legal reform.

Even if the business leadership in France wanted to stand up and declare loyalty to the start-up nation, the hasty and amateurish way in which this meeting was organized made it a hopeless attempt. According to participants, no more than 10 mid-level businessmen were present in the room, while the rest were representatives of the French Jewish small-business world.

In other words, this attempt to gain legitimacy also backfired, forcing the Prime Minister’s Office to conceal the list of those present and settle instead for throwing about baseless numbers about the foreign investment of billions pouring into Israel.

The nature of Israel’s regime will be a new permanent talking point

Be that as it may, not only did Netanyahu come out empty-handed, but after United States Secretary of State Blinken’s visit and the puzzling trip to France, it is already quite clear that the usual agenda items for discussion between the prime minister and his counterparts, the heads of liberal democratic countries, will now include a new, permanent and particularly burdensome topic: the nature of Israel’s regime.

Macron’s efforts to promote the establishment of a “European Political Community” to examine the EU’s partnership with its neighbors, based inter alia on their commitment to liberal-democratic values is a good example, albeit sometimes inconsistent, of this new parameter. Israel, it must be said, has always been under the watchful eye of the world, one might even say disproportionately so.

But members of the club of world democracies focused on controversial Israeli actions, never on its essence. The community of liberal-democratic countries is even more watchful and critical given the global polarization between liberals and anti-liberals exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.

My former colleagues, Israel’s ambassadors around the world throughout the ages understood that membership in the club of liberal democracies is a valuable asset, not only in terms of Israel’s image, but also of its strategic interests. It is a small club, with only 30+ countries of almost 200 members of the UN but its economic, political and military clout is enormous.

EVEN IN the eyes of many non-members, the club holds the status of a moral compass and serves as a role model. Israel has managed to shelter in the shadow of this exclusive club thanks to its birth as a democracy as anchored in its Declaration of Independence and its preservation of these features despite wars, occupation, terrorism and more. Israel is certainly not a typical member of this club, but the others have accepted it nonetheless.

However, if real damage is caused to the foundations of Israeli democracy and Israel adopts the Hungarian model of democracy according to Orbán, there will likely be a price to pay. Hungary and Poland have been relegated to the sidelines of the club precisely because of the same type of reforms planned in Israel and it is experiencing heavy pressure from other EU members.

If it were not for the EU’s cumbersome structure and the need for consensus on almost every decision, Hungary would have already found itself under heavy sanctions or even suspension of its membership.

Israel is not a member of the EU but it enjoys many of its perks. It would be wise to avoid being sanguine about its prospects. In many ways, we are much more vulnerable than Hungary and Poland because we are a small country in a state of ongoing conflict and in dire need of strategic partners, a diplomatic umbrella and economic partners. This umbrella is provided in large part by the democratic camp.

In his previous term, Netanyahu often preferred the company of illiberal populist leaders who did not make demands and confuse him with talk about human rights and the two-state solution. However, Vladimir Putin is no longer someone to be seen within decent society, Jair Bolsonaro has fled to Florida after losing the election, and the future of another Florida resident, Donald Trump, is shrouded in a thicker fog than before.

Yariv Levin and Simcha Rothman need to understand that the legal reform they are concocting will have implications far beyond the status of the High Court of Justice or the political future of Arye Deri. At stake is Israel’s place in the community of nations and it would behoove those who espouse the biblical promise about “a people that shall dwell alone and shall not be reckoned among the nations” to be careful about what they wish for. The line between membership in the most prestigious club of nations and the status of a pariah among them is much thinner than one thinks.

The prime minister himself needs to understand that the carte blanche he has given them will make Israel’s international integration much more difficult than it has been in the past and that dinner with Macron was just a non-appetizing first course.

This article is from “JPost“, from February 16, 2023.

הפוסט Is Israel democratic? The new talking point for Netanyahu abroad הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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EU Delegation to the PA propose joint development of Area C https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-hunchback-who-doesnt-see-the-enormous-hump-on-his-back-extreme-right-accuses-palestinians-of-settler-style-activism-and-attacks-eu/ Mon, 16 Jan 2023 11:26:08 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8854 A classified document that sets out a plan by the European Union Delegation to the Palestinian Authority proposing joint development of Area C was recently leaked. According to Channel 13 correspondent Moriah Asraf Wolberg, the plan is intended to help “expand Palestinian control of Area C.” The publication prompted belligerent reactions, which appear to be part of an ongoing orchestrated campaign by the right wing and the settlers. National Missions Minister Orit Struck labeled it “a subversive plan to establish a Palestinian state contrary to agreements and against the law.” Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich argued that the EU was helping to establish “an Arab terrorist state in the heart of the Land of Israel, unilaterally.” Shlomo Ne’eman, head of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization representing communities in Judea and Samaria), said that “the takeover of Area C is the greatest strategic threat in our region.” Right-wing MKs banded together and drafted a letter demanding that the EU “immediately cease illegal construction in Israeli sovereign territory.” Area C of the West Bank Area C constitutes 60% of the West Bank’s area. Contrary to right-wing claims, the territory is not under Israeli sovereignty, since Israel never annexed it. According to the Interim Agreement with the PLO (1995), the area, which was occupied in 1967, is under “temporary” Israeli control, and with the exception of the areas left for negotiations on the permanent stage, most of Area C was to be handed over eventually to the Palestinians. As the parties

הפוסט EU Delegation to the PA propose joint development of Area C הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A classified document that sets out a plan by the European Union Delegation to the Palestinian Authority proposing joint development of Area C was recently leaked. According to Channel 13 correspondent Moriah Asraf Wolberg, the plan is intended to help “expand Palestinian control of Area C.”

The publication prompted belligerent reactions, which appear to be part of an ongoing orchestrated campaign by the right wing and the settlers. National Missions Minister Orit Struck labeled it “a subversive plan to establish a Palestinian state contrary to agreements and against the law.” Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich argued that the EU was helping to establish “an Arab terrorist state in the heart of the Land of Israel, unilaterally.”

Shlomo Ne’eman, head of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization representing communities in Judea and Samaria), said that “the takeover of Area C is the greatest strategic threat in our region.” Right-wing MKs banded together and drafted a letter demanding that the EU “immediately cease illegal construction in Israeli sovereign territory.”

Area C of the West Bank

Area C constitutes 60% of the West Bank’s area. Contrary to right-wing claims, the territory is not under Israeli sovereignty, since Israel never annexed it. According to the Interim Agreement with the PLO (1995), the area, which was occupied in 1967, is under “temporary” Israeli control, and with the exception of the areas left for negotiations on the permanent stage, most of Area C was to be handed over eventually to the Palestinians.

As the parties did not reach a permanent agreement, this ongoing conflict has a negative impact on developments in Area C. The PA, for example, cannot exercise the functional powers it was granted under the Interim Agreement, since Israel controls all movement, planning and infrastructure in the territory.

Along with violence, terrorism and crime, nature and the environment are severely damaged; Israel is torpedoing construction projects necessary for Palestinian living and livelihoods; and Palestinians are sometimes expelled from their homes and require international humanitarian assistance. The lack of coordination along a “zero-sum game” approach prevents construction and development according to a long-term spatial perspective, as the EU suggests.

Reviewing the EU Delegation’s proposal illustrates the extent to which the Israeli claims are unfounded and motivated by a political agenda. The EU’s vision has not changed in any way. Europeans have long supported the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and have been trying for many years to provide humanitarian assistance to the isolated Palestinian population in Area C, which Israel abuses.

The European vision is, in fact, in line with Israel’s long-term interest – to promote the two-state solution in order to ensure its existence as a safe, Jewish and democratic state. This differs deeply from the radical Right’s agenda, which wants to demarcate and isolate Palestinian cities, to annex most of Area C to Israel, and to perpetuate a bloody conflict between the peoples.

Contrary to right-wing claims, the delegation’s document adheres to the Oslo Accords and international law, and even recommends avoiding unilateral measures and implementing a nonconfrontational approach to Israel (“Do No Harm”). This constructive approach falls on the deaf ears of politicians in the right-wing government, who today see the PA and the international community as “enemies of Israel,” motivated by antisemitism to work against it.

The document is also based on a professional approach of spatial planning and environmental sustainability (green energy and green economy). Instead of adopting this approach for coordinating European-funded humanitarian and development construction, Israel is taking unilateral divisive measures, expanding settlements deep within the territory, and demarcating extensive “military zones” at the expense of Palestinian living space, taking over land that is not its own and harming the land and the population.

The extreme Right’s claims of an “illegal” Palestinian takeover of “our” territories, accusing the Palestinians of trying to delineate the borders of their state by stealing and defrauding the State of Israel, are astonishing. Blaming the Palestinians for “settlement-style” activism is like a hunchback who doesn’t see the enormous hump on his back.

The majority of the Palestinian population in the West Bank (approximately three million people) lives in densely populated areas A and B. Without Israeli approval, the PA cannot expand the residential areas. The PA’s requests for building permits in Area C are denied in most cases. Only 0.5% of the applications are approved by the Civil Administration. Thus, Palestinians are unable to cope with natural growth without so-called illegal construction.

Since 1967, more than 460,000 Jews have moved to the occupied territories (not including the Jerusalem area). Settlement expansion at a dizzying pace leads to suffering for the approximately 260,000 Palestinians living in Area C, the destruction of structures and facilities, and the expulsion and confiscation of property, while Israel is the party violating international law.

The international community, including the EU, provides humanitarian and economic assistance for the development of the occupied Palestinian territory, with Israeli approval and in accordance with the agreements. The right-wing is reluctant to incite against other foreign elements (such as UN-Habitat, USAID) that also operate on the ground, under similar principles. Instead, it is treating the EU as a scapegoat.

CONTRARY TO the Right’s accusations, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not yet voted to adopt the document on the development of Area C as an official decision. EU resolutions require unanimous consent by the council, which includes representatives of the 27 member states and the European Foreign Service. Until it is accepted, this is a proposal, not an action plan.

The leak of the document has once again unleashed the far-right demon of anti-EU incitement. Right-wing politicians, especially those from the far Right, are no strangers to spreading vicious anti-EU incitement. However, its volume and speed this time suggest a potential new low in relations between Israel and the EU under the sixth Netanyahu government, after relations had been greatly improved by concerted efforts of the previous government.

The two agreements promoted by the Bennett and Lapid government, Creative Europe and the operational agreement with Europol, have already stalled and are unlikely to be advanced by the current government. The European Commission is also renewing its claim for financial compensation from Israel for the destruction of structures and facilities in Area C, damaging European taxpayer funds.

The excessive powers granted to Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir over maintaining security and managing Palestinian civilian life in the West Bank make clear what we can expect from now on – violent provocations, tacit permission to aggravate attacks on Palestinians, particularly in Area C, and activities to promote the de facto annexation of the territory to Israel.

It is therefore difficult to expect a positive change in the attitude of this most right-wing government. On the other hand, engaging the EU in battle at the present time is liable to harm Israel’s interests, and might result in a broad “counter-coalition” vis-à-vis Israel.

This is even as the EU has demonstrated its interest in increasing its partnership with Israel against the backdrop of the Russo-Ukraine war, and in view of Israel’s energy and security assets.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen have a responsibility to prevent Area C from becoming a new focus of escalation and further damage to the PA’s ability to survive, while at the same time maintaining intact relations with the Europeans. In view of the government’s makeup, they are expected to face a fierce containment battle even in meeting these basic goals.

This article is from “JPost“, from Janurary 16, 2023

הפוסט EU Delegation to the PA propose joint development of Area C הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-NATO Relations: Developing a New Strategic Concept https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-nato-relations-developing-a-new-strategic-concept/ Sun, 27 Nov 2022 11:57:27 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8409 Israel’s relations with the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) were never a focal point of its foreign and security policy. In fact, they have weakened since their peak in the 1990s. However, recent geopolitical shifts have highlighted the importance of these relations for Israel, providing a potential foundation for reshaping them. NATO has been undergoing profound reform in recent years, expanding its agenda to deal with additional issues of human security, such as the climate and energy crises, and stressing innovation. The war in Ukraine not only injected renewed vigor and political power into the alliance, it also hastened the processes of organizational renewal and emphasized the alliance’s geographical focus northward and eastward. Israel, too, has undergone change, its security enhanced by normalization agreements with Arab states, a strong Hellenic alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and warming relations with Turkey. Its technological capabilities and its business model orientation could turn its posture vis-à-vis NATO from a consumer of security to a supplier. NATO and Israel now have an opportunity to reshape, deepen and improve their relationship.

הפוסט Israel-NATO Relations: Developing a New Strategic Concept הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s relations with the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) were never a focal point of its foreign and security policy. In fact, they have weakened since their peak in the 1990s. However, recent geopolitical shifts have highlighted the importance of these relations for Israel, providing a potential foundation for reshaping them.

NATO has been undergoing profound reform in recent years, expanding its agenda to deal with additional issues of human security, such as the climate and energy crises, and stressing innovation. The war in Ukraine not only injected renewed vigor and political power into the alliance, it also hastened the processes of organizational renewal and emphasized the alliance’s geographical focus northward and eastward. Israel, too, has undergone change, its security enhanced by normalization agreements with Arab states, a strong Hellenic alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and warming relations with Turkey. Its technological capabilities and its business model orientation could turn its posture vis-à-vis NATO from a consumer of security to a supplier. NATO and Israel now have an opportunity to reshape, deepen and improve their relationship.

הפוסט Israel-NATO Relations: Developing a New Strategic Concept הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Partnership Priorities with the EU – What (If Anything) Is Israel Missing? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/partnership-priorities-with-the-eu-what-if-anything-is-israel-missing/ Tue, 11 Oct 2022 06:23:39 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8254 This paper describes what EU Partnership Priorities (PP) are, why Israel hasn’t signed a PP agreement so far, and asks what Israel is missing out on by lacking an established set of PP with the EU.

הפוסט Partnership Priorities with the EU – What (If Anything) Is Israel Missing? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Among European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries, Israel has enjoyed the most advanced relations with the European Union (EU). This comes as no surprise, as it is a viable liberal democratic country with a free and vibrant economy leading in innovation and many other fields. Yet, since 2016, Southern and Eastern neighbourhood countries signed Partnership Priorities agreements with the EU, while Israel didn’t. This paper describes what Partnership Priorities are, why Israel hasn’t signed a Partnership Priorities agreement so far, and asks what Israel is missing out on by lacking an established set of Partnership Priorities with the EU.

 

הפוסט Partnership Priorities with the EU – What (If Anything) Is Israel Missing? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Europol-Israel Police Operational Agreement: Enhanced cooperation with EU in combatting crime and terrorism https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/europol-israel-police-operational-agreement-enhanced-cooperation-with-eu-in-combatting-crime-and-terrorism/ Fri, 07 Oct 2022 11:49:08 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8862 The Israeli Police and Europol, the European Union’s police agency, have been conducting negotiations over an operational agreement for several years. In September there was signing of end of negotiations, but in December the Council of the European Union decided to re-open the talks. In a global world where crime and terrorism cross borders, countries need to strengthen cooperation among themselves. Such inter-police cooperation takes on a unique form in the EU. The operational agreement between Israel’s Police and Europol can have considerable importance in contributing to the parties’ ability to deal with terror and crime. This paper will review Europol, its cooperation with Israel’s police and other enforcement agencies, including the negotiated agreement, the motivations for upgrading relations with Israel and the benefits and challenges of doing so.

הפוסט Europol-Israel Police Operational Agreement: Enhanced cooperation with EU in combatting crime and terrorism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Israeli Police and Europol, the European Union’s police agency, have been conducting negotiations over an operational agreement for several years. In September there was signing of end of negotiations, but in December the Council of the European Union decided to re-open the talks. In a global world where crime and terrorism cross borders, countries need to strengthen cooperation among themselves. Such inter-police cooperation takes on a unique form in the EU. The operational agreement between Israel’s Police and Europol can have considerable importance in contributing to the parties’ ability to deal with terror and crime. This paper will review Europol, its cooperation with Israel’s police and other enforcement agencies, including the negotiated agreement, the motivations for upgrading relations with Israel and the benefits and challenges of doing so.

הפוסט Europol-Israel Police Operational Agreement: Enhanced cooperation with EU in combatting crime and terrorism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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EU-Israel Relations During the Czech Presidency of the EU https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/eu-israel-relations-during-the-czech-presidency-of-the-eu/ Wed, 07 Sep 2022 11:56:11 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=8218 Our aim in this event was to catch the zeitgeist of current EU – Israel relations, as the relations have changed from quite negative to more positive spirit, even though the basic disagreements remain. The two panels discussed three topics and their interconnectedness: (1) Russia’s war against Ukraine; (2) The Abraham/ Normalization Accords, and (3) the approaching EU – Israel Association Council. The first panel was of diplomats from Israel, the EU and the Czech Republic. The second panel included researchers from the above as well as from Germany.

הפוסט EU-Israel Relations During the Czech Presidency of the EU הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Our aim in this event was to catch the zeitgeist of current EU – Israel relations, as the relations have changed from quite negative to more positive spirit, even though the basic disagreements remain. The two panels discussed three topics and their interconnectedness: (1) Russia’s war against Ukraine; (2) The Abraham/ Normalization Accords, and (3) the approaching EU – Israel Association Council. The first panel was of diplomats from Israel, the EU and the Czech Republic. The second panel included researchers from the above as well as from Germany.

הפוסט EU-Israel Relations During the Czech Presidency of the EU הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Europe’s efforts to quit Russian gas https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/europes-efforts-to-quit-russian-gas/ Fri, 19 Aug 2022 10:22:22 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8597 European countries’ efforts to wean themselves off energy dependence on Russia continue. The European Energy Council held a meeting on June 26, during which Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson provided an update on the steps that have already been taken and those that are planned. Simson mentioned that Russia was already taking several measures aimed at harming the European energy market, including the fact that Gazprom had already reduced supplies to a number of countries. Russia also shut down the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline between July 11 and 21 for what was defined as necessary maintenance work. As is well known, Germany relies very significantly on the supply of gas from this pipeline. Simson warned that no further steps should be ruled out, even with immediate notice. All this was intended to sow uncertainty, contribute to instability in the European energy market, and concretely prevent Europe from filling its gas storage facilities. It is especially important to emphasize the great effort that is now being invested in supplying the emergency storage facilities. Today the storage facilities stand at a level of 56 percent, a historic level that has not existed to date. Moreover, Simson warned that not all EU countries are acting with the same intensity, and therefore called on all to act vigorously. Obviously, the capacity to fill the storage facilities depends, to a critical extent, on the amount of gas that Europe manages to purchase and transport to its territory. The most important player now in the European

הפוסט Europe’s efforts to quit Russian gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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European countries’ efforts to wean themselves off energy dependence on Russia continue. The European Energy Council held a meeting on June 26, during which Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson provided an update on the steps that have already been taken and those that are planned. Simson mentioned that Russia was already taking several measures aimed at harming the European energy market, including the fact that Gazprom had already reduced supplies to a number of countries. Russia also shut down the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline between July 11 and 21 for what was defined as necessary maintenance work.

As is well known, Germany relies very significantly on the supply of gas from this pipeline. Simson warned that no further steps should be ruled out, even with immediate notice. All this was intended to sow uncertainty, contribute to instability in the European energy market, and concretely prevent Europe from filling its gas storage facilities.

It is especially important to emphasize the great effort that is now being invested in supplying the emergency storage facilities. Today the storage facilities stand at a level of 56 percent, a historic level that has not existed to date. Moreover, Simson warned that not all EU countries are acting with the same intensity, and therefore called on all to act vigorously. Obviously, the capacity to fill the storage facilities depends, to a critical extent, on the amount of gas that Europe manages to purchase and transport to its territory.

The most important player now in the European energy market is the USA. The latter provided a quantity of 12.8 billion cubic meters until last May, which accumulates to an annual quantity of 28 bcm(!). This means European dependence on American (liquified) gas. This is not necessarily problematic; however, it is clear that this is a new variable in the global energy market in general, and in the US-European one in particular, and it may have significant political-strategic implications. Clearly, what needs to be taken into consideration is the Biden administration’s interest in dealing with rising energy prices at home ahead of the mid-November elections.

It is essential to emphasize that European emergency measures are intended on one side of the equation to reduce, albeit gradually, dependence on Russian gas; and on the other hand, no less important, ensure enough energy for the winter. This is a complex equation, which Russia will do its best to disrupt.

In her remarks, Simson called for a series of measures designed to encourage gradual savings in gas use in preparation for winter, emphasized the importance of supplying storage facilities, and listed the steps taken to diversify gas sources to Europe:

• Norway – Reached a joint statement aimed at increasing gas supplies to Europe;

• Israel and Egypt – Mentioned the MoU signed recently in Cairo for the export of Israeli gas to Europe through Egyptian liquefaction facilities; Azerbaijan – Work is already under way with Baku regarding the possibility of doubling the amount of gas transferred via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

In conclusion it is essential to emphasize:

• European activity to make a strategic change of direction in the energy field is impressive. The EU is implementing extremely complex moves, in particular complicated circumstances;

• Dependence on American liquefied gas is intensifying and certainly significant. It has implications for the transatlantic relationship and, as stated, imposes a responsibility on both parties to meet this equation.

It is quite clear that Russia will try its best to disrupt these moves, perhaps in supply disruptions, and also that it is counting on the fact that energy prices are rising; moreover, Russia is counting on the uncertainty and instability for the winter, which will have an impact – i.e. perhaps crack down on Western solidarity, especially considering support (mainly weapons) to Ukraine.

Global energy prices will continue to be high under these conditions. Even though President Biden succeeded in persuading the Saudis and the Emirates to increase productivity, it is not a matter of being able to add insignificant quantities to the global energy market.

This article is from “Ekathimerini“, from August 19, 2022

הפוסט Europe’s efforts to quit Russian gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-significance-of-convening-the-european-union-israel-association-council/ Wed, 10 Aug 2022 07:13:54 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8059 On July 18, 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union (EU) decided to move ahead with convening the EU-Israel Association Council (AC) after a decade-long hiatus. This paper explains what the AC is, the reasons for its suspension and for the decision to re-convene it. Assuming it will re-convene, the paper recommends future measures between Israel and the EU.

הפוסט The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On July 18, 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union (EU) decided to move ahead with convening the EU-Israel Association Council (AC) after a decade-long hiatus. What does this mean? What opportunities does it offer, and what were the costs of not convening it so far? This paper explains what the AC is, the reasons for its suspension and for the decision to re-convene it. Assuming it will re-convene, the paper recommends future measures between Israel and the EU. 

Summary:

  • What is the Association Council (AC)? It is the institutionalization of an annual dialogue at foreign ministers’ level between Israel and the EU (usually represented by its High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Council rotating Presidency). It is assisted by an Association Committee of senior officials. Since 2005, eight issue-specific sub-committees and two working groups have been formed within its framework. The AC was established by the 1995 EU – Israel Association Agreement and operated regularly since the agreement’s ratification in 2000 through 2012. The AC is authorized to advance and deepen cooperation between Israel and the EU. 

  • From regular meetings to AC suspension: Between 2000-2012 the AC convened regularly despite difficulties in EU-Israel relations throughout the second intifada (2000-2004) and the faltering peace process with the Palestinians (since 2009). It even continued to convene when the EU decided in 2009 on a “linkage policy” and avoided upgrading relations with Israel (specifically refusing to ratify the second “Action Plan”) pending progress in the peace process. 

  • In 2013, Israel declined to hold the AC meeting to protest the EU’s ‘differentiation policy’, which introduced a territorial clause stipulating that all its agreements with Israel would apply only within the 1967 borderlines, not in the Occupied Territories. In 2014, it was the Europeans who did not convene the AC, and the disconnect continued. 

  • An Israeli effort to reconvene the AC: about five years ago a significant number of EU member states objected to the convention of the AC. Their number has decreased significantly since then. Upon his appointment in June 2021, Foreign Minister Lapid set the resumption of the AC meetings as a major foreign policy goal. 

  • Following the Foreign Affairs Council decision to reconvene the AC, and its scheduling for October 6, the EU has to adopt a Common Position on the matter. Israel is also expected to issue a declaration. 

  • The cost of suspending the AC’s activity can be divided to political and practical costs. Politically, the cost was a diplomatic one concerning image, perception, and public attitudes. Most Southern Mediterranean countries maintain regular ACs with the EU. Its absence with the only democracy in the Middle East, especially given the excellent practical relations between the parties and mutual value, was unusual. The loud and accusatory “megaphone diplomacy” that replaced dialogue and discourse in the decade of the AC suspension contributed to the deterioration of relations, to Israeli incitement against the EU and to the deterioration of the EU’s image in Israel, and vice versa. High-level political meetings between the two sides rarely took place. Since the Abraham Accords and Normalization Agreements were signed (in 2020), the EU has not taken part in leveraging regional peace relations. 

  • In terms of practical cooperation, while other countries have signed new and updated cooperation agreements with the EU, Israel and the EU still work according to their 2004 Action Plan. During this period (since 2013), Israel has not joined new EU programs nor did the sides upgrade their trade agreement. 

  • Convening the AC in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Convening the AC is an opportunity for the EU to rethink the framing of its policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the Abraham Accords indicate that the US and Arab countries do not condition their relations with Israel on promoting peace with the Palestinians, leaving the EU as the main body to insist on such a stipulation. The EU’s ‘linkage policy’ has not reversed Israeli governments’ unwillingness to restart the peace process with the Palestinians since its collapse in 2014, and currently excludes it from involvement in the regional peace processes. 

  • The conclusion is that Europe must reexamine the path to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The EU will continue to support the two-state solution, to oppose the construction of settlements and any changes that jeopardize the two-state solution. Its differentiation policy is also expected to continue. However, the EU should examine its linkage policy, which harms trust between the parties. 

  • One way for Europe to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace is by helping to link the Abraham Accords and Israel’s relations of peace/normalization with Arab countries in favor of promoting peace with the Palestinians. 

  • Practical opportunities that may emerge once the AC is convened: Convening the AC is not just an end in itself; rather its success is in promoting practical cooperation between the sides. Specifically, the goal of reconvening the AC is to start talks on a Partnership Priorities agreement setting a number of common goals to advance in the next 3-5 years. Potential cooperation goals could include climate change (with an emphasis on energy, food, agriculture, water, and innovation in each), digitalization, cyber, artificial intelligence, health (including the handling of epidemics), as well as triangular/quadrennial cooperation between Israel, the EU, and an Arab peace/normalization state, leveraging the Abraham Accords in these and other areas. 

  • In addition, Israel should conduct a more comprehensive and up-to-date review of the 20 EU programs for which it is eligible, decide which ones to join, and consider starting negotiations on a new trade agreement that will include the services sector as well as an investor protection agreement, or at the very least on removing barriers and an approximation of laws to facilitate trade. 

  • Conclusion: The EU is Israel’s main economic partner, with which it has extensive strategic practical cooperation. Convening the AC would be the political highlight of the much-improved relations between Israel and the EU over the past year. For the EU, this is an opportunity to end the unhelpful and even harmful absence of regular high-level political dialogue with Israel. 

  • The AC is not an instrument to goad the other side. It is a tool for dialogue, even if critical and harsh, to clarify the parties’ positions. Its renewal is both a constructive means and a symbol of the renewal of substantive dialogue between the parties. It is a tool to rebuild trust between two sides, as well as to strengthen the Abraham Accords and normalization agreements to encourage every opportunity to renew the Israeli – Palestinian peace process. 

  • The renewal of the political dialogue should be leveraged for practical cooperation between Israel and the EU, which will also spill over into ties between Israelis and Europeans, between countries and citizens in the region, to promote prosperity and growth, peace, stability, and democracy, and to jointly combat regional challenges. Relations should be promoted for the benefit of both parties under any government. 

הפוסט The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU and Israel should resume their suspended high-level dialogue https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-eu-and-israel-should-resume-their-suspended-high-level-dialogue-2/ Sun, 17 Jul 2022 16:26:33 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7988 Some 100 European Parliament (EP) members and nine Knesset members (from the coalition and the opposition) sent a letter to European Union Foreign Affairs Minister Josep Borrell on June 23 urging resumption of the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, the ministerial-level dialogue last held between the sides eight years ago. The letter, instigated by Antonio López-Istúriz White, chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with Israel, protested the EU’s attitude toward Israel, noting that while the EU continues to hold annual Association Council meetings with Israel’s non-democratic neighbors, such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, and even signs new agreements with them, it last convened the ministerial-level dialogue with Israel in 2012. In 2013, Israel canceled the annual meeting to protest EU instructions excluding territories beyond its 1967 borders from all Israel-EU agreements. Borrell’s predecessor, Federica Mogherini, led several attempts to reconvene the Association Council, but failed due to reservations on the part of certain EU members during a freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and tensions in Israel-EU relations. The Association Council did not reconvene, and the regular high-level dialogue was halted. The dialogue, which brought together EU foreign ministers with their Israeli counterparts, was launched within the framework of the 1995 Association Agreement between Israel and the EU. Its aims were to discuss issues of importance to each side and convey messages in a better, more precise and effective manner than those conveyed by so-called “megaphone diplomacy” (exchanges through media channels in times of tension, which tend to be aggressive

הפוסט The EU and Israel should resume their suspended high-level dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Some 100 European Parliament (EP) members and nine Knesset members (from the coalition and the opposition) sent a letter to European Union Foreign Affairs Minister Josep Borrell on June 23 urging resumption of the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, the ministerial-level dialogue last held between the sides eight years ago.

The letter, instigated by Antonio López-Istúriz White, chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with Israel, protested the EU’s attitude toward Israel, noting that while the EU continues to hold annual Association Council meetings with Israel’s non-democratic neighbors, such as Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, and even signs new agreements with them, it last convened the ministerial-level dialogue with Israel in 2012.

In 2013, Israel canceled the annual meeting to protest EU instructions excluding territories beyond its 1967 borders from all Israel-EU agreements. Borrell’s predecessor, Federica Mogherini, led several attempts to reconvene the Association Council, but failed due to reservations on the part of certain EU members during a freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and tensions in Israel-EU relations. The Association Council did not reconvene, and the regular high-level dialogue was halted.

The dialogue, which brought together EU foreign ministers with their Israeli counterparts, was launched within the framework of the 1995 Association Agreement between Israel and the EU. Its aims were to discuss issues of importance to each side and convey messages in a better, more precise and effective manner than those conveyed by so-called “megaphone diplomacy” (exchanges through media channels in times of tension, which tend to be aggressive and conflictual).

The high-level meetings allowed both sides to examine the state of their relations and to seek paths to advance them. Such meetings entail months of preparations by relevant government agencies in Israel and the EU to ensure an optimal outcome.

Cooperation between Israel and the EU is conducted on an unusually high level. It encompasses economic ties (a free-trade agreement on goods and even agriculture), science, innovation and development (the Horizon program), higher education (the Erasmus+ program), aviation (the Open Skies agreement), and more.

HOWEVER, ALONG with the flourishing economic ties, diplomatic relations have deteriorated under the previous Netanyahu governments to a low ebb, exacerbated by Netanyahu’s attempts to drive a wedge between EU members to scuttle resolutions critical of Israel.

Israel’s new government, which includes the centrist Blue and White Party and in which Gabi Ashkenazi serves as foreign minister, may enable improved ties with the EU and allow renewal of the beneficial high-level political dialogue between the sides. Initial positive exchanges between Ashkenazi and Borrell indicate that both sides are seeking constructive engagement.

Lopez and other signatories of the letter to Borrell (many of them members of the EP’s largest faction, the center-right European People’s Party, which includes supporters of Israel) believe the time is ripe for a new page in relations. However, their initiative is highly speculative.

If the Israeli government annexes even a small part of the West Bank, the Association Council will not convene any time soon. The Europeans view any annexation as burying the two-state solution and violating Palestinian rights and international law. Annexation would be a game-changer. Some 1,000 EP members from 25 states recently signed a letter condemning the planned Israeli move.

Should resumption of the Association Council meetings depend on the annexation issue? The demand for the EU to reconvene the council is a substantive one. Since 2014, the EU (and especially a number of members) have adopted a discriminatory attitude toward Israel in refusing to do so. If the EU supports high-level dialogue with other countries regardless of their democratic and human rights performance, it should not impose preconditions on Israel.

The Israeli government and the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council have grown accustomed to the absence of a regular, established diplomatic dialogue between them. Such a dialogue could well be tough for both sides and critical in nature, but it must take place.

Foreign Minister Ashkenazi and High Representative Borrell, who already agreed to meet each other in Brussels, should work together to reconvene the Association Council, and thus enable an annual high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU to take place.

 

This article is posted in “JPost” on July 17, 2022

הפוסט The EU and Israel should resume their suspended high-level dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Democratic values: The heart of Europe- Israel relations – opinion https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/democratic-values-the-heart-of-europe-israel-relations-opinion/ Wed, 13 Jul 2022 10:52:05 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8613 The strongest bond that Europe and Israel share “is our belief in democracy and in democratic values,” said president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen in her speech at Ben-Gurion University in Israel on June 14. “Today, more than ever before,” she continued, “democracies like Europe and Israel should come closer together” to address external threats, as well as threats from within, in particular “the risk of backsliding that all our democracies face.” Indeed, the last decade has witnessed a global trend of democratic backsliding. An array of populist and illiberal forces, and leaders has called into question and, in some countries, actively dismantled key institutions of liberal democracy, such as independent judiciaries and civil liberties. What is more, the liberal international order has been under attack, not only by those who seek an adjustment of its governing institutions and rules for today’s balance of power but also by those who challenge its very foundations of international law and multilateralism. This global trend has not spared Europe and Israel: right-wing populism has made inroads, liberal democratic values have been questioned, discourses focused on ethno-national identity and security have gained popular support, and official historiography has been politicized in the service of identity, sovereignty and security. Democratic backsliding has also taken a toll on Israel-Europe relations, as alliances were formed – during the years of Netanyahu as prime minister – between populist and illiberal right-wing Israeli and European leaders, around shared interests in weakening the EU and in fostering divisions among member

הפוסט Democratic values: The heart of Europe- Israel relations – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The strongest bond that Europe and Israel share “is our belief in democracy and in democratic values,” said president of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen in her speech at Ben-Gurion University in Israel on June 14. “Today, more than ever before,” she continued, “democracies like Europe and Israel should come closer together” to address external threats, as well as threats from within, in particular “the risk of backsliding that all our democracies face.”

Indeed, the last decade has witnessed a global trend of democratic backsliding. An array of populist and illiberal forces, and leaders has called into question and, in some countries, actively dismantled key institutions of liberal democracy, such as independent judiciaries and civil liberties.

What is more, the liberal international order has been under attack, not only by those who seek an adjustment of its governing institutions and rules for today’s balance of power but also by those who challenge its very foundations of international law and multilateralism.

This global trend has not spared Europe and Israel: right-wing populism has made inroads, liberal democratic values have been questioned, discourses focused on ethno-national identity and security have gained popular support, and official historiography has been politicized in the service of identity, sovereignty and security.

Democratic backsliding has also taken a toll on Israel-Europe relations, as alliances were formed – during the years of Netanyahu as prime minister – between populist and illiberal right-wing Israeli and European leaders, around shared interests in weakening the EU and in fostering divisions among member states.

Pro-democracy Europeans and Israelis – some of whom have reached positions in government over the last couple of years – have been trying to respond. But so far, they have done so in a limited and rather ad-hoc manner.

And the risk of further democratic backsliding is by no means banned: Israel is headed towards an election that might well bring to power a governing coalition dominated by the right-wing and incorporating extremist elements of the far-right. The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia are likely to have massive socio-economic repercussions, fuel social strife and empower populist forces in Europe.

Liberal democracy

Progressive Europeans and Israelis should therefore join forces to jointly stop and reverse democratic setbacks, and strengthen liberal democracy. In that context, Europeans should, in their endeavor to strengthen ties with Israel, emphasize the relevance of strengthening Israeli democracy rather than turning a blind eye to domestic developments.

That should include intervening in case an Israeli government advances (de jure or de facto) annexation or anti-democratic legislation, and actively supports pro-democracy steps advanced by the Israeli leadership. In line with its more-for-more approach, the EU should spell out concrete positive benefits of democratic enhancement and negative consequences of democratic setbacks. Israelis should, in turn, go beyond purely pragmatic and transactional foreign policies emphasizing their interest in strengthening liberal democracy in Europe, rather than allying with non-liberal forces.

Peacemaking and shared society

Europeans should also highlight the interrelation between democracy, peacemaking and shared society – for without a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and equality between Israel’s Jewish and Arab/Palestinian citizens, Israel will continue to suffer from a democratic deficit. Europeans should therefore seek a more active and effective role in efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, not least as a means of supporting Israel’s democracy.

Even as hurdles are mounting on the way towards a two state solution and as more pressing issues dominate the European agenda, Europeans should increase their pro-peace engagement in a way that overcomes internal European divisions and addresses the real needs of both sides to the conflict, and cooperate with like-minded international actors.

They should also explore the potential inherent in the Abraham Accords to strengthen Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and support constructive steps in that regard. At the same time, they should try to mitigate negative side-effects of Israeli-Arab normalization on the Israeli-Palestinian arena and beyond.

Last but not least, to play an effective role in peacemaking, the EU will need to improve its image in Israeli society. It will thus have to invest greater efforts in public diplomacy, communicating its positions and the reasoning that underlies them to the wider Israeli public.

Empowering allies

This is also about – mutually – empowering pro-democracy actors. European parliamentarians and officials should regularly meet with pro-democracy actors, when they visit Israel and they should showcase their work by inviting them to speak at conferences, mention them in speeches and on social media, and act as their champions in Europe. A regular forum, convening high-level EU officials with Israeli pro-democracy actors could serve as an additional empowerment tool.

Israeli civil society organizations working to advance liberal democracy often lack institutional capacity to bring about the change to which they aspire. They need additional resources and financial support. Europe, being a key donor on democracy issues, can expand and diversify its funding schemes.

Funding should be made more easily accessible to new, small and innovative initiatives, in parallel to continued support for well-established organizations that effectively promote long-term positive change.

But this is not only about funds: Pro-democracy actors in Israel, such as organizations promoting shared society, Israeli-Palestinian peace and human rights, have been under pressure from the right-wing. The EU and its member states should uphold their funding for these organizations, back them politically and refrain from enforcing on them inappropriate conditionality.

At the same time, progressive Israelis should help strengthen pro-democracy actors in Europe, in particular those working to confront illiberal tendencies and replace populist leaders. This should include support by Israeli progressives for maintaining space for constructive, diverse debates in Europe on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Liberal democracy at the center of relations

Europeans and Israelis can also work together to strengthen their bilateral relations based on liberal-democratic values and they can do so by setting a new agenda. In March, the EU decided to extend its Action Plan with Israel, adopted in 2005, for another three years, to “give the parties the opportunity to take forward their cooperation for the coming years, including through the possible negotiation of partnership priorities.”

This step – together with the new EU Agenda for the Mediterranean adopted in April, 2021 – should be leveraged to chart new paths for Israel-EU cooperation, based on the pillars of democracy and peace. If new priorities are set, new implementation mechanisms put in place, new resources allocated and new actors mobilized – all with a focus on advancing cooperation on liberal democratic values – Israel-Europe bilateral relations will be on a better track moving forward.

That also means not to let security dominate ties between the two entities. While the war in Ukraine is likely to enhance security as a strong feature of Israeli-European cooperation, it should be done in a way that strengthens rather than compromises liberal democratic values.

Cooperation on science, education, environment, tourism and culture should therefore be prioritized by maximizing Israeli-European civilian cooperation through programs like Horizon Europe, Creative Europe and Erasmus+, which include territorial clauses that ensure that European funds are not diverted to settlements in occupied Palestinian territories.

A concentrated Israeli-European effort that puts liberal democracy at the heart of the relationship and empowers pro-democracy actors should be the way forward in Israel-Europe relations.

This article is from “JPost“, from July 13, 2022

הפוסט Democratic values: The heart of Europe- Israel relations – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU, and Israel-Europe Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/democratic-backsliding-and-securitization-challenges-for-israel-the-eu-and-israel-europe-relations/ Sat, 09 Jul 2022 00:28:26 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7788 This report analyses the illiberal trends and democratic backsliding that can be seen in both Europe and Israel, and is a product of a two year project between Mitvim, PAX for Peace Netherlands, and SWP.

הפוסט Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU, and Israel-Europe Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The report “Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU and Israel-Europe Relations” analyses the illiberal trends and democratic backsliding that can be seen in both Europe and Israel. Over the course of a two year project, experts from Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs) as well as external experts reflected on the implications these developments have. The authors offer highly relevant recommendations and insights for anyone interested in EU-Israel relations, eroding democratic trends and securitization policies. The report specifically highlights the relationship between the EU and Israel and how these have adapted in light of the illiberal trends, also showing the impact and lack of prospect in light of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and advancement towards a resolution of the Palestinian struggle.

The relevance of this report goes beyond the specific relations between the EU and Israel, however, also showing global tendencies. It demonstrates the eroding global democratic trend and impact on liberal values. Therefore, this report is not only a research but also a call to action to counter the negative trend in order to protect the liberties we have.

Below you can find the full report, as well as three short policy briefs: one on Democracy and Foreign Affairs in Israel, one on Illiberalism in the EU and Israel, and one on the International Alliances with the Israeli left.

The findings from this report were presented at both an international conference in Brussels on July 12th, and will be presented in the future in Jerusalem.

Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace – Netherlands and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU, and Israel-Europe Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Leaving Illiberalism Behind: An Opportunity to Establish a New Liberal Foundation in EU-Israel Relations? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/leaving-illiberalism-behind-an-opportunity-to-establish-a-new-liberal-foundation-in-eu-israel-relations/ Thu, 07 Jul 2022 13:37:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7852 This policy paper analyzes the global surge of illiberal trends that has affected Israel and several EU member states. It considers the opportunity to strengthen EU-Israel relations on the basis of shared interests and a dialogue on how liberalism should inform domestic and international politics.

הפוסט Leaving Illiberalism Behind: An Opportunity to Establish a New Liberal Foundation in EU-Israel Relations? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Mitvim is proud to have partnered with PAX for Peace Netherlands and SWP Germany on an extensive research project, “Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU and Israel-Europe Relations”. Three short policy papers were developed as part of this project. This is the second, written by Dr. Toby Greene and Dr. Stephan Stetter, which analyzes the global surge of illiberal trends that has affected Israel and several EU member states.

The entire project will be published on July 12th, 2022. 

Dr. Toby Greene is a lecturer in the Department of Political studies at Bar Ilan University and Prof. Stephan Stetter is Professor of International Politics and Conflict Studies at the University of the Bundeswehr Munich.

Introduction

The global surge of illiberal trends, that has affected also Israel and several EU member states, has harmed the framework of shared liberal values that was an enabler of EU-Israel cooperation in the past. It caused EU-Israel relations to fall short of potential. Yet recent changes, including the displacement of Netanyahu and Trump, provide opportunities for reigniting EU-Israel relations. However, the threatened erosion of multilateral institutions based on international law and human rights and liberal democratic principles at home is neither inevitable nor irreversible. At this moment of opportunity, EU-Israel relations should be strengthened not only on the basis of shared interests. They should be more firmly based on a dialogue on how liberalism should inform domestic and international politics, informed by past experiences.

הפוסט Leaving Illiberalism Behind: An Opportunity to Establish a New Liberal Foundation in EU-Israel Relations? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Is there room for Israel in the EU’s newly proposed political alliance? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/is-there-room-for-israel-in-the-eus-newly-proposed-political-alliance/ Sat, 25 Jun 2022 16:08:29 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7985 Prompted by the conflict in Ukraine, the EU is redefining its relations with the second tier of its friends and allies and examining which of them shares its democratic-liberal values. At a festive meeting of the European Parliament in Strasbourg to mark Europe Day (May 9), French President Emmanuel Macron – in the tradition of French presidents before him – raised a new idea to establish a “European Political Community.” To European history aficionados, the term may sound familiar from the 1950s, when it emerged to complement the establishment of the European Defense Community. Had the initiative been accepted at the time, the six founders of the EU would have formed a community with federal characteristics. Macron’s current proposal is far more modest. Instead of strengthening the union inwardly, it places great hope on strengthening ties with the democracies in its environs. Such a community would serve as a kind of “club” for countries that – although not members of the European Union – share its values: democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. These values currently determine the European fault line in the war against Russia. On the face of it, the proposal refers to a total of 12 countries: eight that want to join the EU (five in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), those uninterested in joining (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland), and those that left it (the UK, some would include Greenland). Turkey, which is no longer a candidate for accession, was not mentioned. For the

הפוסט Is there room for Israel in the EU’s newly proposed political alliance? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Prompted by the conflict in Ukraine, the EU is redefining its relations with the second tier of its friends and allies and examining which of them shares its democratic-liberal values.

At a festive meeting of the European Parliament in Strasbourg to mark Europe Day (May 9), French President Emmanuel Macron – in the tradition of French presidents before him – raised a new idea to establish a “European Political Community.” To European history aficionados, the term may sound familiar from the 1950s, when it emerged to complement the establishment of the European Defense Community. Had the initiative been accepted at the time, the six founders of the EU would have formed a community with federal characteristics.

Macron’s current proposal is far more modest. Instead of strengthening the union inwardly, it places great hope on strengthening ties with the democracies in its environs. Such a community would serve as a kind of “club” for countries that – although not members of the European Union – share its values: democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. These values currently determine the European fault line in the war against Russia.

On the face of it, the proposal refers to a total of 12 countries: eight that want to join the EU (five in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), those uninterested in joining (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland), and those that left it (the UK, some would include Greenland). Turkey, which is no longer a candidate for accession, was not mentioned.

For the candidates, this political community would be a kind of “waiting room” during the protracted and difficult process involved in joining the EU. Macron estimated that it would take Ukraine many years or even decades to complete its accession. In the meantime, this community would allow its members to enjoy upgraded status and a political framework, including formally coordinated positions and responses to the needs of countries such as Ukraine, until they officially accede into the union. The community will enable stronger relationships with those left out, allowing them to enjoy some of the economies of scale of the EU without renouncing national autonomy.

The proposal

ACCORDING TO the proposal, community leaders would meet several times a year (at various levels) to make decisions. Macron noted that the community would engage in political and security cooperation (not in defense), and in the fields of energy, transportation, investments, infrastructure and the movement of people, with an emphasis on youth. Its goal would be to contribute to the security, stability and prosperity of its members.

How would such a European political community affect Israel? Would Israel be accepted for membership? Macron set two conditions for accession: a European state, and one that is a liberal-democracy.

Israel is a liberal democracy that shares the values of the EU within the 1967 lines. Outside these lines, however, it violates international law, for example, by building settlements and transferring population to occupied territory. This criterion distances it from its moral affiliation with this community, which aims to serve as a clear buffer line vis-à-vis Russia.

Indeed, formulas have been found in previous agreements between Israel and the EU that have differentiated between Israel within the 1967 borders and beyond, but when it comes to building a forum of values, Israel’s policy in the Palestinian sphere constitutes an obstacle.

Regarding the extent of Israel’s European identity, opinions are divided. The majority would support the geographical approach that excludes the State of Israel from Europe. Indeed, Macron’s proposal refers to the “Eastern neighborhood” of the EU, in which, for example, Georgia is located east of the Black Sea, between Russia and the northeastern part of Turkey. His proposal does not relate to the “Southern neighborhood,” south and east of the Mediterranean Sea, with which the EU associates Israel.

A minority would support the identity-cultural approach, allowing for Israel to be defined, at least in part, as a European state. Significant parts of the “DNA” of the State of Israel and its citizens are comprised of European human, cultural, traditional, conceptual, governmental and even moral and normative components. By virtue of these identities, about 55% of Israelis are eligible for a European passport.

The EU’s alliances

THE EU aligns itself with differing circles around it. These are not orderly concentric circles within each other, but rather a complex “variable geometry.” Some of these circles are closer to the EU, others more distant. The closest circle is the “European Economic Area” comprising Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which participate in large parts of the European Common Market.

This circle is followed by Switzerland, with its complex system of some 120-140 agreements with the EU, which are also part of EU legislation. The outer circle is reserved for the European Neighborhood Policy, which consists of 16 countries, from Morocco in the southwest, along the Mediterranean coast, through Israel, to Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus in Eastern Europe. Of these EU neighbors – minus the countries that are candidates for accession – Israel has the greatest number of agreements and the deepest level of practical/functional ties with the EU.

Israel and the EU have extensive ties in the fields of economics, research and innovation, aviation and tourism, agriculture, regulation and standardization and more. The energy sector has also been added to the list with last week’s signing of a memorandum of understanding on gas exports from Israel via Egypt to the EU. The laying of a power cable connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece (and Italy) is also under discussion.

Last week, the Israeli government voted unanimously to join the EU’s Creative Europe cultural program. Negotiations are underway on Israeli participation in other EU programs, too. In a wider European circle, Israel also recently signed its accession to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Human Trafficking, becoming the first non-European member of the Council of Europe to do so.

In recent weeks, a series of senior EU (and European) officials have visited Israel, reflecting its importance to the Europeans. The line of European officials queuing to visit Israel is long, forcing the Foreign Ministry to postpone some visits.

The first of these latest European visitors was Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi. He was followed by President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola on her first visit outside Europe since being elected, and the president of the European Investment Bank.

 The highlight was the visit of President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, the first such visit in a decade by a European Commission president. Waiting in line are Frans Timmermans, vice president and commissioner for Green Deal and climate change; and Margaritis Schinas, commissioner for promoting the European way of life (including oversight of the rule of law, immigration and security matters).

The European Council, which includes the heads of EU member states, will convene on June 23-24 to discuss Macron’s proposal to establish a European political community. The French are pressing for a decision on the matter by the end of the year.

If Macron’s proposal is accepted, should Israel apply for membership or would it be better off settling for observer status? Formal status in this community would constitute an important normative anchoring and an unequivocal statement about Israel’s membership in the community of liberal democracies, expressing values that the State of Israel aspires to project.

However, Israel is unlikely to apply because joining this political community would expose it to EU pressure on ending or managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given the currently complex political state of affairs, it is unclear whether there is a courageous or significant enough leader in Israel today to lead such a move.

 

 

This article is posted on “JPost” on June 25, 2022

הפוסט Is there room for Israel in the EU’s newly proposed political alliance? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Exporting Israel’s gas to Europe: An initial but momentous step- opinion https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/exporting-israels-gas-to-europe-an-initial-but-momentous-step-opinion/ Tue, 21 Jun 2022 16:56:59 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8691 Since the discovery of off shore natural gas last decade, Israeli officials have ambitiously pursued an export agreement that would deliver natural gas to Europe. And last week, Israel took its most meaningful step yet toward achieving this goal by signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) together with Egypt and the European Union. The MOU articulates that Israel and Egypt will increase natural gas sales to EU countries, who in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are trying to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels. According to the agreement, Israel will deliver natural gas via pipeline to Egypt, where it will then be converted to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and sold on the European market. There is good reason for the fanfare around the agreement. The EU is moving heaven and earth to replace the 150 billion cubic meters (BCM) that Russia delivered in years past (40% of its total annual needs). By committing themselves to exporting natural gas to Europe, Israel and Egypt reaffirmed their commitments to the West’s efforts in this conflict. And after years of discussions that failed to produce fruit, the signing of this MOU is a particularly important achievement for Israel – albeit one that materialized as a byproduct of geopolitical developments beyond anyone’s control. Successful energy diplomacy is as much about confidence-building and momentum towards the future as it is about any singular project in the present moment. This new agreement accomplishes both, addressing immediate concerns while presenting Brussels and Jerusalem an opportunity to diversify their

הפוסט Exporting Israel’s gas to Europe: An initial but momentous step- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Since the discovery of off shore natural gas last decade, Israeli officials have ambitiously pursued an export agreement that would deliver natural gas to Europe. And last week, Israel took its most meaningful step yet toward achieving this goal by signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) together with Egypt and the European Union.

The MOU articulates that Israel and Egypt will increase natural gas sales to EU countries, who in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are trying to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels. According to the agreement, Israel will deliver natural gas via pipeline to Egypt, where it will then be converted to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and sold on the European market.

There is good reason for the fanfare around the agreement. The EU is moving heaven and earth to replace the 150 billion cubic meters (BCM) that Russia delivered in years past (40% of its total annual needs). By committing themselves to exporting natural gas to Europe, Israel and Egypt reaffirmed their commitments to the West’s efforts in this conflict.

And after years of discussions that failed to produce fruit, the signing of this MOU is a particularly important achievement for Israel – albeit one that materialized as a byproduct of geopolitical developments beyond anyone’s control.

Successful energy diplomacy is as much about confidence-building and momentum towards the future as it is about any singular project in the present moment. This new agreement accomplishes both, addressing immediate concerns while presenting Brussels and Jerusalem an opportunity to diversify their energy relationship in the coming years.

Nevertheless, it is also important to be modest. The MOU’s language was vague, using terms like “endeavor” and “exploring possibilities” to reflect a shared interest in cooperation, without legally binding the parties to any contractual obligations. This was done intentionally. The global energy market is in tremendous flux and everyone is hedging their bets in the event a more affordable deal comes along.

The MOU doesn’t commit to investing in new infrastructure that would expand Israel’s capacity to export natural gas or Egypt’s ability to liquefy it. Presently, Israel can deliver somewhere between 7-10 BCM to Egypt via existing export contracts, where it could then be converted into LNG and sold on the global market. Future pipeline projects will enable this quantity to increase, however Egypt’s liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals can only convert around 17 BCM per year.

IN OTHER words, the MOU loosely weaves EU energy interests into Israel and Egypt’s current energy partnership, as well as the broader trend of energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. This isn’t a game changer that will alter European energy security, rather a piece of a complex puzzle that Brussels is trying to tackle with a combination of short, medium and long-term policies on the import of fossil fuels and the development of renewable projects. It also means that future exports to Europe won’t dramatically weaken Israel’s energy security, as some have claimed. The quantities aren’t significant enough and the timeframe that the parties are discussing isn’t long enough.

To fully maximize the potential of this agreement, Israel should pursue additional methods beyond natural gas exports to support Europe’s efforts. Investing in renewable infrastructure and technology would both enable Israel to expand its storage capacity (which in turn would allow it to export more natural gas), as well as contribute to international efforts to transition from fossil fuels. Israel has yet to green-light the EuroAsia Interconnector, a proposed electricity interconnector or high-voltage cable that would link the electricity systems of Greece, Cyprus and Israel.

Unlike pipelines, interconnectors transfer electricity in both directions and are commonly viewed as one of the better vehicles to maximize the strengths of renewable energy. Imagine a scenario where Israel – alongside other Middle Eastern and Mediterranean states – supplied renewable-based electricity to Europe. And with the right dose of American mediation, Israel might find the right language to reach a maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon, thus enabling international oil and gas companies to explore additional Mediterranean waters and discover more hydrocarbons.

When world leaders gathered at COP26 in Glasgow last November, the conversation focused almost exclusively on the transition to renewables and combating climate change. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dramatically altered the short-term interests of Europe and its allies, those long-term goals remain unchanged.

Eastern Mediterranean states, such as Israel, that can adeptly navigate between these somewhat contradictory trends will not only play a constructive role in supporting Europe during this current crisis but help lay the foundations for a more interconnected and renewable tomorrow.

This article is from “JPost“, from June 21, 2022

הפוסט Exporting Israel’s gas to Europe: An initial but momentous step- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers https://mitvim.org.il/en/for-the-first-time-a-roundtable-with-ukrainian-research-centers/ Sat, 18 Jun 2022 10:03:15 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?p=8074 In one virtual space, for the first time, Israeli and Ukrainian researchers set and discussed bilateral relationship between the two countries during the war in Ukraine and Middle Eastern issues that troubles Israel. In the event participated researchers and managers from Mitvim Institute, and representatives from the Center of the Middle Eastern Studies, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Israel friends of Ukraine. The discussion was opened by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Kornichuk, and former Israeli ambassadors in Russia – Arkadi Milman and Zvi Magen. There were debates about policy, economy and communication. The participants discussed issues of food security, questions regarding the tariffs against Russia and the expectations of image that exists in both sides of the conflict.

הפוסט For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In one virtual space, for the first time, Israeli and Ukrainian researchers set and discussed bilateral relationship between the two countries during the war in Ukraine and Middle Eastern issues that troubles Israel.

In the event participated researchers and managers from Mitvim Institute, and representatives from the Center of the Middle Eastern Studies, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Israel friends of Ukraine.

The discussion was opened by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Kornichuk, and former Israeli ambassadors in Russia – Arkadi Milman and Zvi Magen. There were debates about policy, economy and communication. The participants discussed issues of food security, questions regarding the tariffs against Russia and the expectations of image that exists in both sides of the conflict.

הפוסט For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/for-the-first-time-a-roundtable-with-ukrainian-research-centers/ Fri, 17 Jun 2022 21:36:11 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=8076 In one virtual space, for the first time, Israeli and Ukrainian researchers set and discussed bilateral relationship between the two countries during the war in Ukraine and Middle Eastern issues that troubles Israel. In the event participated researchers and managers from Mitvim Institute, and representatives from the Center of the Middle Eastern Studies, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Israel friends of Ukraine. The discussion was opened by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Kornichuk, and former Israeli ambassadors in Russia – Arkadi Milman and Zvi Magen. There were debates about policy, economy and communication. The participants discussed issues of food security, questions regarding the tariffs against Russia and the expectations of image that exists in both sides of the conflict.

הפוסט For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In one virtual space, for the first time, Israeli and Ukrainian researchers set and discussed bilateral relationship between the two countries during the war in Ukraine and Middle Eastern issues that troubles Israel.

In the event participated researchers and managers from Mitvim Institute, and representatives from the Center of the Middle Eastern Studies, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Israel friends of Ukraine.

The discussion was opened by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Kornichuk, and former Israeli ambassadors in Russia – Arkadi Milman and Zvi Magen. There were debates about policy, economy and communication. The participants discussed issues of food security, questions regarding the tariffs against Russia and the expectations of image that exists in both sides of the conflict.

הפוסט For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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What Future for European Security? https://mitvim.org.il/en/what-future-for-european-security/ Mon, 16 May 2022 13:05:28 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?p=7886 Mitvim Institute, the French Embassy, the EU embassy, IASEI and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung held a conference about: The potential for European Strategic Sovereignty and the EU’s new ‘Strategic Compass’ in the light of the Ukraine Crisis, and its significance for Israel and the Middle East. Watch it here.

הפוסט What Future for European Security? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Mitvim Institute, the French Embassy, the EU embassy, IASEI and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung held a conference about:

The potential for European Strategic Sovereignty and the EU’s new ‘Strategic Compass’ in the light of the Ukraine Crisis, and its significance for Israel and the Middle East.

Watch it here.

הפוסט What Future for European Security? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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What Future for European Security? https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/%d7%9e%d7%94%d7%95-%d7%a2%d7%aa%d7%99%d7%93-%d7%94%d7%91%d7%99%d7%98%d7%97%d7%95%d7%9f-%d7%94%d7%90%d7%99%d7%a8%d7%95%d7%a4%d7%99/ Mon, 16 May 2022 11:14:42 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/event/%d7%9e%d7%94%d7%95-%d7%a2%d7%aa%d7%99%d7%93-%d7%94%d7%91%d7%99%d7%98%d7%97%d7%95%d7%9f-%d7%94%d7%90%d7%99%d7%a8%d7%95%d7%a4%d7%99/ Mitvim Institute, the French Embassy, the EU embassy, IASEI and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung held a conference about: The potential for European Strategic Sovereignty and the EU’s new ‘Strategic Compass’ in the light of the Ukraine Crisis, and its significance for Israel and the Middle East.  

הפוסט What Future for European Security? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Mitvim Institute, the French Embassy, the EU embassy, IASEI and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung held a conference about:

The potential for European Strategic Sovereignty and the EU’s new ‘Strategic Compass’ in the light of the Ukraine Crisis, and its significance for Israel and the Middle East.

 

הפוסט What Future for European Security? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s balancing act still not enough for Russia https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-balancing-act-still-not-enough-for-russia/ Fri, 22 Apr 2022 13:47:30 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8683 Since the beginning of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Israel has been struggling with a balancing act: tiptoeing between pleasing its Western allies and keeping in check its powerful Russian-influenced neighbor on its northern border, Syria. Today it seems that Israel’s attempt to stay as neutral as possible on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine – for example, Israel did not join the Western countries’ sanctions against Russia and declined to sell weapons to Ukraine – has not succeeded in pleasing Moscow. Earlier this month, Israel voted at the United Nations General Assembly in favor of removing Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. “There was a poorly camouflaged attempt to take advantage of the situation in Ukraine to distract the international community’s attention from one of the oldest unresolved conflicts – the Palestinian-Israel one,” Russia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement over the weekend, reacting to Israel’s vote and to Foreign Minister Yair Lapid’s statements regarding the suspension of Russia’s membership in the UNHRC. Lapid said Russia’s “unjustified invasion” of Ukraine and the “killing of innocent civilians” were the reason that Israel voted in favor of the motion and that the vote “doesn’t change our view of the UN Human Rights Council, which is a radical, morally flawed, biased and anti-Israeli body.” The Russian Foreign Ministry statement also said, “The Israeli Foreign Minister’s statements evoke regret and rejection,” leaving no doubt: Moscow is watching every move and every word of Israeli officials and it has in its arsenal plenty of poisonous

הפוסט Israel’s balancing act still not enough for Russia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Since the beginning of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Israel has been struggling with a balancing act: tiptoeing between pleasing its Western allies and keeping in check its powerful Russian-influenced neighbor on its northern border, Syria.

Today it seems that Israel’s attempt to stay as neutral as possible on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine – for example, Israel did not join the Western countries’ sanctions against Russia and declined to sell weapons to Ukraine – has not succeeded in pleasing Moscow.

Earlier this month, Israel voted at the United Nations General Assembly in favor of removing Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.

“There was a poorly camouflaged attempt to take advantage of the situation in Ukraine to distract the international community’s attention from one of the oldest unresolved conflicts – the Palestinian-Israel one,” Russia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement over the weekend, reacting to Israel’s vote and to Foreign Minister Yair Lapid’s statements regarding the suspension of Russia’s membership in the UNHRC.

Lapid said Russia’s “unjustified invasion” of Ukraine and the “killing of innocent civilians” were the reason that Israel voted in favor of the motion and that the vote “doesn’t change our view of the UN Human Rights Council, which is a radical, morally flawed, biased and anti-Israeli body.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry statement also said, “The Israeli Foreign Minister’s statements evoke regret and rejection,” leaving no doubt: Moscow is watching every move and every word of Israeli officials and it has in its arsenal plenty of poisonous arrows.

On the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly sent an appeal to authorities in Israel in which he asked that the Russian government be permitted to register its property rights to the Alexander Courtyard in Jerusalem. Last month, the Jerusalem District Court canceled the registration of the Russian government’s ownership rights to the property, which former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved in 2020. Russian officials have harshly criticized the Israeli backtrack on the issue.

These recent harsh statements could impact Israeli-Russian relations going forward.

According to Ephraim Sneh, a retired IDF general and a former deputy defense minister who was a member of several Israeli government cabinets, the current Russian reaction to Israel’s policy on Ukraine was “expected.”

“We are well aware of their position on the Palestinians and this kind of reaction was indeed anticipated,” Sneh told The Media Line.

AFTER THE fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, modern Russia has continued the Soviet Union’s policy on the Palestinian issue – not only does it support a “two states for two peoples” formula, but it also condemns Israel in every vote in international forums and maintains close ties with both the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Russia often resorts to condemning Israel on the Palestinian issue when there is some tension between Moscow and Jerusalem.

Roman Bronfman, a former Israeli lawmaker and an expert on Russian affairs, characterizes the current Russian reaction as “traditional Russian political and diplomatic games – hypocritical and ambiguous. Russia is not a neutral country here in the Middle East. It has close ties with many terrorist organizations here. Look at Israeli borders – we are surrounded by Hezbollah and Syria in the North, and by Hamas and other Palestinian military groups in Gaza and in the West Bank. All of them are supported by Russia.”

Bronfman believes that although the use of the Palestinian card by the Russians in the midst of the deadly war in Ukraine is merely cynical, he acknowledges that the Russian claims also contain a real argument.

“We certainly don’t need a Russian protectorate on our northern borders, however, we are obliged to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict with the Palestinians and we must strive to resolve the conflict,” he said.

Sneh points to future developments with regard to the continuation of Israeli control of the Palestinian territories.

“We have to understand that the war in Ukraine will add to the delegitimization of the occupation. Perhaps this development doesn’t preoccupy Israeli policy-makers right now, but they have to take into account that this scenario is quite likely,” Sneh said.

Bronfman, who was born in Ukraine, believes that no additional pressure will be applied on Israel while the world is focused on the war in the besieged country.

“I’ve heard these claims, and I do not support them. I don’t think that there will be extra pressure on Israel. The Russian war on Ukraine is a global war, and all diplomatic efforts will be concentrated in this direction,” he said.

“Also, our conflict with the Palestinians is entirely different from the war on Ukraine. We experience an ongoing ethnic and religious conflict, the other side used terror to achieve its ends and it cannot be compared to the fascist attack on Ukraine.”

THE RUSSIAN Foreign Ministry’s statement on Israel’s vote in the UN was released on the eve of Passover. On the same day, Sergei Stepashin, chairman of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society and a former prime minister of Russia, told the journalists in the city of Sergiev Posad that Putin appealed in writing to Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in order to return ownership of the Alexander Church compound in the Old City of Jerusalem to Russia.

“This is a unique case,” says Stepashin. “So, we’ll put pressure on this situation.”

In early March, Judge Mordechai Kaduri of the Jerusalem District Court decided to cancel the decision giving the registration of rights to the Alexander Compound to the Russian Federation, following a petition by the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, which had previously owned the property.

The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that on December 30, 2019, Israel announced a formal decision to transfer ownership of Alexander’s Court to Russia, and even published a document confirming this transfer.

“Now we are fighting for the return of the Alexander Compound, and it is very difficult: We were almost there, we worked for five years, we found all the historical documents, but the situation with Ukraine had occurred, and Israel behaved as it often does – playing with both sides, trying to ping-pong with everyone,” said Stepashin, making a direct connection between the Russian battle for the historic building in the midst of Old Jerusalem, the war in Ukraine and Russian relations with Israel.

According to many Israeli officials, the real burning question here involves Syria and Iran. In the past, Russia often tried to revive the Palestinian issue in order to sting Israel or increase its dominance in the Arab world. However, there is little doubt that, unlike Syria, the Palestinian issue is not Russia’s first priority in the Middle East.

After the war in Ukraine was launched, only a few countries enthusiastically supported Russia – one of them was Bashar Assad’s Syria and another was Iran. During the last few weeks, Russian and Iranian diplomats and businessmen have met several times, and promised to increase cooperation and trade.

LAST WEEK, negotiations between an Iranian trade delegation and a Russian government official and directors of major Russian companies concluded with an optimistic promise of increasing the trade volume to $10 billion annually during the next two years. Russia might also sell its advanced weapons to Iran, especially if Iran signs a revived nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement, with the world powers, including the United States.

This forced rapprochement, for lack of other options, means that Moscow could inevitably prevent Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Sneh believes that if Russia decides to clash with Israel in Syria, it will only do so to promote its own interests.

“Despite the rapprochement with Iran, Russia will only act according to its own interests. It will not risk anything for the sake of the Iranians,” he said.

“I believe that currently they don’t need another entanglement. However, if Moscow will decide to change its strategy vis-à-vis Israel in Syria, the situation could get very tough for us. This is the most important and critical issue for Israel. At the end of the day, I believe that the conflict with Iran – which is expanding its presence in Syria and in Lebanon – is unavoidable.”

Three weeks ago, Alexander Yefimov, the Russian ambassador to Syria, blamed Israel for “provoking Russia to react to its actions in Syria,” adding that Israeli airstrikes aim at an “escalation of tensions in order to allow the West to carry out military activities in Syria.”

At the moment, the Russian-Israeli deconfliction center over Syria continues to work as usual. Just last week, Syrian media reported that the Israel Air Force made a rare daylight strike on the Masyaf area in central Syria, where Iranian forces and pro-Iranian militia bases are located. For now, it seems that business in Syria continues as usual, however it’s difficult not to notice the warning signs and the black clouds on the horizon of Israeli-Russian relations

The op-ed was published in Ynet in April 2022.

הפוסט Israel’s balancing act still not enough for Russia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Russia’s Chilling Manifesto for Genocide in Ukraine https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/russias-chilling-manifesto-for-genocide-in-ukraine/ Thu, 07 Apr 2022 13:21:01 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8677 “The peculiarity of modern, nazified Ukraine is in its formlessness and ambivalence, which disguises Nazism as a desire for ‘independence’ and a ‘European’ (Western, pro-American) path of ‘development’…The denazification of Ukraine is also its inevitable de-Europeanization…’Ukronazism’ poses a much bigger threat to the world and Russia than the Hitler version of German Nazism.” Timofei Sergeitsev, “What Russia should do to Ukraine,” RIA Novosti, 3 April 2022 (English translation here) The Russian government and its propaganda machine has not, and will not, acknowledge any of the atrocities perpetrated by Russian soldiers in Ukraine – in Mariupol, Bucha, Berdyanka or anywhere else. First of all, according to the Kremlin, there is no war going on in Ukraine. Second of all – the Russians soldiers there only hit military targets, and as for destroyed cities and slain citizens – they’re the cynical manipulations of the Ukrainian army or local defense battalions who committed those actions themselves in an attempt to defame Russia’s good name. So when the whole world, horrified by the war crimes revealed in Bucha, asks: “What is next for Russia?” weighing more sanctions and punitive actions against Moscow, the Russian leadership is focused on a parallel question: What’s next for Ukraine? Whoever thought that failing to blitz Kyiv into submission would derail President Vladimir Putin from his original plan, to return the disobedient Ukraine to its natural subjugation under Russian wings, must revisit their assumptions. Over the last few days, Russia’s propaganda operation has escalated its efforts to explain the logic beyond this “special military operation.” An op-ed

הפוסט Russia’s Chilling Manifesto for Genocide in Ukraine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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“The peculiarity of modern, nazified Ukraine is in its formlessness and ambivalence, which disguises Nazism as a desire for ‘independence’ and a ‘European’ (Western, pro-American) path of ‘development’…The denazification of Ukraine is also its inevitable de-Europeanization…’Ukronazism’ poses a much bigger threat to the world and Russia than the Hitler version of German Nazism.” Timofei Sergeitsev, “What Russia should do to Ukraine,” RIA Novosti, 3 April 2022 (English translation here)

The Russian government and its propaganda machine has not, and will not, acknowledge any of the atrocities perpetrated by Russian soldiers in Ukraine – in Mariupol, Bucha, Berdyanka or anywhere else.

First of all, according to the Kremlin, there is no war going on in Ukraine. Second of all – the Russians soldiers there only hit military targets, and as for destroyed cities and slain citizens – they’re the cynical manipulations of the Ukrainian army or local defense battalions who committed those actions themselves in an attempt to defame Russia’s good name.

So when the whole world, horrified by the war crimes revealed in Bucha, asks: “What is next for Russia?” weighing more sanctions and punitive actions against Moscow, the Russian leadership is focused on a parallel question: What’s next for Ukraine?

Whoever thought that failing to blitz Kyiv into submission would derail President Vladimir Putin from his original plan, to return the disobedient Ukraine to its natural subjugation under Russian wings, must revisit their assumptions. Over the last few days, Russia’s propaganda operation has escalated its efforts to explain the logic beyond this “special military operation.”

An op-ed published by RIA Novosti (Russia’s state-owned domestic news agency) written by Timofei Sergeitsev, a writer and a filmmaker who once used to consult for Ukraine’s pro-Russian presidents Leonid Kuchma (1999) and Victor Yanukovich (2004), offers a brutal manifesto for Russia’s plan for Ukraine: a horrifying view of an imperialist ideology that calls not only for denazification, but also for de-Ukrainization and eventually, the dismemberment of Ukraine, “brought back within its natural boundaries and stripped of political functionality.”

While Putin’s references to denazification in his last speech just days before the war were rather vague (was he referring to the Ukrainian government? To specific Ukrainian battalions, like Azov or Aydar?) Sergeitsev is both specific, and comprehensive, about whom the Nazis are and how hard Russia has to hit them.

Sergeitsev explains in his propaganda master-class that: “Denazification is necessary when a significant part of the people, very likely its majority, has been cowed by the Nazi regime and drawn into its political agenda. That is, when the hypothesis ‘the people are good – it’s the government that’s bad’ does not work.”

He describes at length, how (unlike Georgia or the Baltic states) “the modern Ukrainian nation state is a failure,” because any attempt to build such a state will lead to Nazism. “Ukrainism is an artificial anti-Russian construction that lacks any civilizational substance.”

During the last few years, Sergeitsev has written numerous op-eds about Ukraine and the danger that it presents to the Russian state and the Russian people.

He is a regular guest on the talk shows of Vladimir Soloviev, a top Putin propagandist who has made it on to the EU and U.S. sanctions list. He likes to call Ukraine “country 404,” a riff on the internet error message that appears when a link leads to a page or resource that does not exist, in order to imply that Ukraine is a fiction that doesn’t exist in real life.

And who is to decide whether Ukraine is a successful or a failed state, and thus whether it deserves a national identity, individual freedoms and sovereignty?

It’s Russia, says Sergeitsev, echoing the country’s own leaders – Putin and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. The latter said just recently that “Deep Ukrainianism, fueled by anti-Russian poison and all-consuming lies about its identity, is one big fake,” and continued: Ukraine has become “the Third Reich” and will share its fate. Sergeitsev declares that Russia will be the post-war “guardian of the Nuremberg Trials.”

According to this ideology, the soldiers who fight today against Ukrainians are not fighting against humans but against Nazis, and since a large portion of population voted for its government (called by Sergeitsev, Soloviev and others, “Bandera’s gang,” after the WWII Ukrainian nationalist who allied then broke with Hitler) it is equally infested by the Nazi bacillus.

The horrifying outcome of this logic is that the civilian population, immutable collaborators with Nazism, cannot and must not be spared, just as civilians weren’t spared during the firebombing of Dresden at the end of WWII. Putin, who served in Dresden as a KGB officer, often speaks about Dresden. He knows the story well.

After dehumanizing Ukrainians (Russia’s key propaganda goal), denying them the right to an unique identity different from a Russian one, after justifying atrocities (“the punishment must be harsh”) and glorifying repression, re-education and Ukrainian suffering (“tragedies and dramas are good for those nations seduced to become Russia’s enemy”), Sergeitsev finally explains what Russia – an imperial power tasked with “decolonizing Ukraine,” in his own words, and a state unashamed to flaunt its strength – needs to do to Ukraine next.

The only way to control Ukraine and its inherently Nazi character is to dismember it. The east of the country should be annexed by Russia, while “the Catholic regions,” western Ukraine, “will remain hostile to Russia, but it will be neutral and demilitarized, and Nazism will be banned there. The haters of Russia will go there.”

And what would “guarantee” the quietist subjugation of rump Ukraine and its compliance with Russian diktats? The “threat of an immediate continuation of the military operation,” says Sergeitsev. He also speculates whether ensuring a neutral, and neutralized, residual Ukraine may require “a permanent Russian military presence on its territory.”

No Marshall Plan for Ukraine sponsored by the West must be allowed. No process of Westernization, no return to Europe, can take place after the war. Ukraine must (in language somewhat reminiscent of the Iranian Revolution’s ideologists) “free itself from the intoxication, temptation, and dependence of the so-called European choice.”

Moscow has scripted a different future for Ukraine: To join an alternative, but as yet imaginary, axis, that Medvedev envisions as an “open Eurasia, from Lisbon to Vladivostok.”

This manifesto of hatred, that integrates many features of fascism, resonates with the ideas and assumptions that have floated around in public discourse during the last few years in Russia. While Sergeitsev’s piece isn’t an actual Kremlin action plan, military and political, for Ukraine, it reveals much about how the ideologists and supporters of this war envisage the post-war future – a crushed, dismembered, hollowed out Ukraine lacking any political will, cultural identity, army or independence.

How long will the war in Ukraine last? How long is Russia prepared to dig in? Will the imminent, and highly resonant anniversary next month – May 9th, Victory Day over Nazi Germany – trigger further Russian military escalation beyond conventional weapons?

Timofei Sergeitsev’s op-ed leaves no room for optimism: Russia sees Ukraine as a battleground not only for tanks and missiles, but for an ideological war between Moscow and the collective West. The stakes are existential for Moscow, and therefore for the sake of victory in this war anything can (be allowed) to happen – torture, murder and even genocide.

Russia, under Putin, will not rest until it can broadcast an image of its victory over “the Nazis” and forcefully expand its sphere of influence. As long as Putin’s regime stays in power, Ukraine and Ukrainians will not be safe. It is just as doubtful whether Kyiv will even be allowed to recover.

The question is what will happen if Russia can’t achieve this goal using conventional weapon. Its propagandists aren’t shy of reminding the world that Russia always has other, even more frightful and devastating options.

The op-ed was published in Haaretz in April 2022.

הפוסט Russia’s Chilling Manifesto for Genocide in Ukraine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dancing In Two Weddings: Israel Balances Russia and Ukraine https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/dancing-in-two-weddings-israel-balances-russia-and-ukraine/ Wed, 30 Mar 2022 11:50:33 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8658 Every Saturday night for the last four weeks, thousands of Israelis have been gathering at Habima Square in Tel Aviv to offer their support to Ukraine. Waving signs and blue-and-yellow flags, they’ve been calling on their government to accept more Ukrainian refugees and take a tougher line on Moscow. Near the same spot just two years ago, huge posters put up by then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s election campaign showed him cordially shaking hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Today, most of Israeli society is disgusted by the brutality of the Russian invasion. Some Israeli men have travelled to Ukraine to fight, and Israel is actively involved in the aid effort for Ukrainians at all levels. Yet, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has sought to play the role of mediator. He has refused to sell Kyiv anti-rocket systems or join anti-Russian sanctions, and his statements have been carefully crafted to support Ukraine without calling out Russia explicitly by name. When asked, every official in Bennett’s government has mentioned the need to balance between backing Ukraine, protecting Jewish communities in both warring countries, and, most importantly, preserving Israel’s freedom of maneuver in Syria, where it coordinates its every move with the Russian army. In fact, Israel’s balancing act with Russia goes back to well before Russia intervened in Syria. But it will be hard to sustain in the coming months. Not only will Western pressure increase, but many of the Israeli government’s current justifications will fall apart. If Jerusalem cannot play the role of meditator or protect Jewish communities in

הפוסט Dancing In Two Weddings: Israel Balances Russia and Ukraine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Every Saturday night for the last four weeks, thousands of Israelis have been gathering at Habima Square in Tel Aviv to offer their support to Ukraine. Waving signs and blue-and-yellow flags, they’ve been calling on their government to accept more Ukrainian refugees and take a tougher line on Moscow. Near the same spot just two years ago, huge posters put up by then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s election campaign showed him cordially shaking hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Today, most of Israeli society is disgusted by the brutality of the Russian invasion. Some Israeli men have travelled to Ukraine to fight, and Israel is actively involved in the aid effort for Ukrainians at all levels. Yet, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has sought to play the role of mediator. He has refused to sell Kyiv anti-rocket systems or join anti-Russian sanctions, and his statements have been carefully crafted to support Ukraine without calling out Russia explicitly by name. When asked, every official in Bennett’s government has mentioned the need to balance between backing Ukraine, protecting Jewish communities in both warring countries, and, most importantly, preserving Israel’s freedom of maneuver in Syria, where it coordinates its every move with the Russian army.

In fact, Israel’s balancing act with Russia goes back to well before Russia intervened in Syria. But it will be hard to sustain in the coming months. Not only will Western pressure increase, but many of the Israeli government’s current justifications will fall apart. If Jerusalem cannot play the role of meditator or protect Jewish communities in Ukraine from Russia’s assault, it will have little to show for its current fence-sitting. Beyond this, Israel’s identity as a Western democratic country will make it harder for the government to follow the ambiguous approach of its Middle Eastern neighbors.

Between Crimea and Syria

In September 2015, Israel woke up to discover that it shared a border with Russia. After Moscow intervened in Syria, Russia quickly became the most dominant power in the country. Despite Israeli requests, Moscow deployed its most advanced S-400 air defense system, which theoretically enables it to close Syrian skies to Israeli military aviation. As a result, Israel was forced to coordinate its activities with Moscow through a “deconfliction center.” So far, despite occasional friction and rebukes, Israel has maintained the activities that it deems essential to prevent Iran from expanding its influence or establishing a presence on Israel’s borders.

The Syrian complication is often cited by various Israeli officials as one of most significant reasons for Jerusalem’s nuanced position on Russia. Yet, in March 2014, when Israel declined to join the United States in denouncing Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea, Russia was still 18 months away from sending forces to Syria. According to a Haaretz report from that time, Netanyahu resisted pressure from the Obama administration and refused to denounce Putin’s actions. Two years later, shortly after Donald Trump’s November 2016 election, Israel voted in favor of condemning the Russian occupation of Crimea as a reaction to the Kremlin’s support of a resolution that didn’t recognize the connection between the Jews, the Western Wall, and the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. In short, Israel was happy to use the situation in Crimea tactically in its own relations with Russia.

As a matter of fact, Israel’s balancing act was always at the center of its foreign policy when Russia was involved. During the 2000s there was fear that Moscow might supply Israel’s enemies with more lethal weapons. When Netanyahu’s relations with Washington soured during the Obama administration, his visits to Putin’s palace in Sochi became more frequent. In May 2018, he was one of only two Western leaders who marched alongside Putin in a Red Square military parade honoring Russia’s 1945 victory over Nazi Germany.

The View From the Middle East

Today Israel is hardly the only Middle Eastern country that maintains some form of neutrality on Russia. In fact, its position is closer to that of the Arab Gulf states or Egypt than to that of the United States or European countries. During the last few years, American partners in the Middle East have improved their relations with Moscow. Their weapon purchases swelled, and their dependency on Russian wheat grew. Concerned by Washington’s changing global priorities, specifically the pivot to China, Arab leaders welcomed Putin to their capitals and increased cooperation. In Egypt, Russia built and financed the al-Dabaa nuclear plant, while in Libya its mercenaries operated alongside Arab forces in support of Gen. Halifa Haftar.

It’s clear why non-democratic Arab governments would work with Putin. Many see Ukraine’s bid to break away from Moscow and consolidate a democratic government as akin to the threat that they faced during the Arab Spring. Although many might fear that Putin breaching the sovereignty of another state — reminiscent of Saddam Hussein — sets a dangerous example, they still prefer to wait and see how the war plays out.

But Israel, being a democratic country that sees itself a part of a collective West, faces a degree of scrutiny that is not applied to Egypt or Morocco. Even Turkey appears to be taking a firmer stance: Ankara didn’t join Western sanctions and is also trying to offer its services as a mediator, but it is not shy about selling advanced weapons to Kyiv or closing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits to Russian warships.

When Bennett met Putin

One week after the first Russian bombs were dropped on Ukrainian cities, Bennett travelled to Moscow to meet with Putin. The meeting took place during Shabbat and lasted for 3.5 hours, emphasizing the just how committed Israel was to the risky task of mediation. Since then, there have been a few more Bennett-Putin talks, endless spins and leaks, and even some reports of progress on negotiations between the two sides. Now, according to Israeli officials, the country remains justified in pursuing “neutrality” between Russia and Ukraine. They argue that if Israel joined the Western sanctions and sold weapons to Ukraine, it would lose the special status in Russian eyes that could make it an effective mediator.

While Washington was quite hesitant about Israel’s new role, Kyiv, as well as many European capitals, welcomed it. This allowed Jerusalem to gain some support and legitimacy for its position. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Bennett — the mediator — refrained from straightforward expressions of condemnation, while his foreign minister Yair Lapid was more explicit in criticizing Russia’s war.

Three weeks later, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke in front of members of the Israeli Knesset, Bennett appeared to be shifting toward Kyiv. He insisted that Israel would stand by Ukraine, provide it with weapons and join the international sanctions against Russia. “You cannot mediate between the good and the evil” he said, probably implying that Ukraine was losing faith in Israeli mediation. Then, immediately after Zelensky’s speech, Israeli media wrote that Bennett was examining the possibility of travelling to Kyiv “if there were substantial progress in the negotiations.” But, in the end, no such journey happened. And as the carnage in Ukraine goes on, the prospects for Bennett’s mediation appear increasingly questionable.

Work in Progress

As Ukraine keeps bleeding, Israel’s arguments for neutrality will begin to wear thin. It is hard to claim that Israel is protecting Jewish communities when Ukrainian Jews are dying in Russian attacks. If Israel’s mediation efforts remain unsuccessful, pressure on the Israeli government to adjust its position might grow from the inside and outside.

What would this look like? Israel has begun abandoning its favorite oligarchs, even if this means saying goodbye to their hefty donations. Two weeks into the war, the Yad va Shem Holocaust Memorial decided to cut ties with Roman Abramovich, while Lapid had allegedly warned ministers “not to help the oligarchs.” Israel still hasn’t joined the Western sanctions against Russia, but its banks have temporarily frozen the assets of Russian citizens. All these steps indicate that the situation has changed, and that Israel should consider not only the Russian presence in Syria, but also mounting Western pressure.

What is the worst-case scenario for Israel? For now, the coordination between the two sides is ongoing, yet it is clear that the clouds are getting darker. Russia’s tone towards Israel’s activities in Syria turned more hostile before the war, and is getting worse now. On March 24, the Russian ambassador in Syria warned that Israeli strikes are “provoking” Russia to react, one of the strongest Russian condemnations of Israeli operations there to date.

Even if coordination breaks down in the skies above Syria, it still seems illogical for Moscow to risk opening another front by taking on Israeli planes directly. However, as the last month has shown, Russian foreign policy logic can be difficult to predict. Faced with a renewed Syrian insurgency when Moscow is vulnerable, Putin might double down on aggressive policies in the Middle East to consolidate Russia’s ties with its few remaining allies and reassert its global and regional role. Worse, if Moscow really felt compelled to escalate, it might also sell more advanced weapons to Israel’s enemies or contribute to a nuclear race in the region.

But, despite these risks, the shift in Israel’s policy is real. In December 2021, Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Russian Duma, was supposed to pay a visit30 to the Knesset and even speak at a plenary session. Today, Volodin is under sanctions from the United States and European Union, while Zelensky had addressed the Knesset directly. As the situation on the ground develops quickly, the traditional Israeli position on Russia and Ukraine is being constantly challenged and, as a result, changing. Being a democratic country and an ally of the United States, Israel simply cannot afford to conduct its relations with Russia as if nothing has happened.

The op-ed was published in Texas National Security Review in March 2022.

הפוסט Dancing In Two Weddings: Israel Balances Russia and Ukraine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s delicate navigation in the Russia-Ukraine war – opinion https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-delicate-navigation-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-opinion/ Sat, 26 Mar 2022 11:43:32 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7549 When considering Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering options in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine, it is important to first take stock of the fundamental, relevant facts. The first of these is that Russia shares a common border with Israel. In northwest Syria, Russia is present in large air and naval bases, and maintains a significant military presence. This forms a central consideration for Israel. Russia has been a strategic pillar for Assad’s political and physical survival. Without Russian-provided military equipment and air power, the Assad regime could not have won its civil war. Russian surface-to-air missile batteries – the most advanced in the world – are on Syrian soil, including the S-300 battery that Syria received from Russia, and the S-400, the peak of Russian air defense capabilities, operated by Russian forces in the country. These assets could potentially form a major threat, not only to Israel’s military freedom of action in the crowded Syrian skies, but also to civil aviation in Israeli airspace. As a result, Israel places enormous weight on the dialogue with Russia. This dialogue occurs as Israel works to prevent the entrenchment of Iran in Syria. Understandings with Russia play a hugely important role in this context and undermining these understandings could have significant consequences. In addition, Israel is dealing with a two-dimensional Iranian threat. The first is the Iranian nuclear program. The Russian war on Ukraine has led to a delay of the signature on the revived Iranian nuclear program, despite America’s desire to fast-forward completion of the

הפוסט Israel’s delicate navigation in the Russia-Ukraine war – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When considering Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering options in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine, it is important to first take stock of the fundamental, relevant facts.

The first of these is that Russia shares a common border with Israel. In northwest Syria, Russia is present in large air and naval bases, and maintains a significant military presence. This forms a central consideration for Israel.

Russia has been a strategic pillar for Assad’s political and physical survival. Without Russian-provided military equipment and air power, the Assad regime could not have won its civil war.

Russian surface-to-air missile batteries – the most advanced in the world – are on Syrian soil, including the S-300 battery that Syria received from Russia, and the S-400, the peak of Russian air defense capabilities, operated by Russian forces in the country.

These assets could potentially form a major threat, not only to Israel’s military freedom of action in the crowded Syrian skies, but also to civil aviation in Israeli airspace. As a result, Israel places enormous weight on the dialogue with Russia.

This dialogue occurs as Israel works to prevent the entrenchment of Iran in Syria. Understandings with Russia play a hugely important role in this context and undermining these understandings could have significant consequences.

In addition, Israel is dealing with a two-dimensional Iranian threat. The first is the Iranian nuclear program. The Russian war on Ukraine has led to a delay of the signature on the revived Iranian nuclear program, despite America’s desire to fast-forward completion of the talks so that it can focus on Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the world has developed a new thirst for oil after disruption to Russia’s exports and a post-nuclear deal Iran can help quench some of that thirst, particularly if the West upgrades the sanctions on Russia to include import of oil.

Surprisingly, while both the Iranians and the West have exhibited willingness to complete the deal, it has been Russia that introduced a new clause demanding exception from sanctions placed on it when it comes to its ties with Iran.

This has led to a return to consultations, which took several days to resolve until Russia said it received the necessary guarantees from Washington.

Whatever happens with the nuclear agreement, from the Israeli perspective, it is vital that it remains free to deal with the second dimension of the Iranian threat, namely its regional military-terrorist entrenchment program, particularly in Syria.

These factors form Israel’s principal considerations, which do not vanish as Russia mercilessly pounds Ukraine. While Israeli public opinion is firmly on the side of the Ukrainian people, Israel’s government does not have the luxury of ignoring key national security calculations.

Thus, Israel has adopted a policy that condemns the aggression by Moscow. It co-sponsored the UN General Assembly condemning the Russian invasion, provides humanitarian and medical aid, and has also made clear that it will not become a route to bypass economic sanctions on Russia. However, Israel has declined Ukraine’s request for Israeli military equipment.

To date, the United States has a full understanding of Israel’s array of considerations and its careful maneuvering.

Furthermore, Washington has found Israel’s role as a mediator between Kyiv and Moscow useful, although, so far, both sides remain too far apart for compromise solutions at this time.

There is no doubt that Israel’s stance and the practical steps are being tested and examined every day by decision-makers in Jerusalem. This is not a fire-and-forget policy and it may not remain static if the war drags on for months longer.

As warnings of chemical attacks by Russia continue to hover in the background, they serve as a reminder of the fact that critical changes in the situation in Europe, such as a WMD attack or continued unrestrained Russian shelling, will obligate Israel to reassess its current position.

This would lead Israel to lose its position of mediator, but this is less important compared to the fact that it could lead to undesired elevated tension between Israel and Russia in the Middle East, should Russia choose to escalate.

In addition, should the situation change, the US could demand more categorical statements and actions from Israel as part of an alignment with Washington.

Israel is, after all, a part of the Western camp and enjoys a special alliance with the US. US support for Israel, past, present, and future, is of strategic vitality that cannot be exaggerated. This is backed by shared Israeli – American values. Hence, if the US demands a stronger Israeli posture on the European war, Israel will not be able to remain aloof.

Lastly, Israel’s handling of the Ukrainian refugee crisis began poorly, but has improved steadily with time. Many of the Ukrainians headed for Israel are eligible for automatic citizenship under the Right of Return.

Should tens of thousands arrive, this will present a considerable event for a state the size of Israel.

At the same time, unforced and morally inappropriate errors were made by Israel in the initial reception of non-Jewish refugees. As Jews, we remember the dark days of the 1930s when the world shut its doors to us and we could not escape the inferno of the Holocaust. As a nation that experienced this, we can’t turn away the small number of Ukrainian refugees who knock on our door. Most of them do not view Israel as their final destination.

Fortunately, on March 13, the Israeli government improved its policy and enabled thousands of additional Ukrainian refugees to claim asylum in Israel.

With no end to the crisis in sight at this time, Israel must prepare to keep adapting its policies as the situation evolves.

The op-ed was written in The Jerusalem Post on March 2022.

הפוסט Israel’s delicate navigation in the Russia-Ukraine war – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Can Israel Cope With the Immigrant Wave From Russia’s War on Ukraine, Jews and non-Jews Alike? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/can-israel-cope-with-the-immigrant-wave-from-russias-war-on-ukraine-jews-and-non-jews-alike/ Mon, 21 Mar 2022 11:13:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7547 Three decades after the fall of the Soviet empire, and in the wake of Russia’s invasion, Israel is once again facing a significant spike in Jewish immigration from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. It will also face a sizable number of Ukrainian refugees, staying more temporarily with Israeli friends and relatives. The big question is whether Israel has learnt from its mistakes and successes in absorbing the massive aliyah wave of the 1990’s, following the break up of the Soviet Union – and whether Israel’s current government has the capacity and the political will to make crucial decisions about welcoming and integrating these new citizens, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. For now, what is more apparent is the lack of a clear policy on both immigration and refugees. As too often happens in Israel, decisions are taken either because of immediate political pressure or out of dire necessity, when the problem has already grown from manageable proportions into something much more critical and uncontrolled. As planes with new olim (immigrants) and refugees are already landing at Ben-Gurion Airport from Poland, Romania and Russia, Israel must use the little time left to formulate a new policy that will benefit both the newcomers and the state. Unlike the new olim, who get identity cards and the right to social and medical care on arrival (or after completing standard bureaucratic procedures at the Nativ immigration office), refugees are not currently entitled to any medical plan, schooling, nor do they have the right to work. This is the “policy” formulated

הפוסט Can Israel Cope With the Immigrant Wave From Russia’s War on Ukraine, Jews and non-Jews Alike? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Three decades after the fall of the Soviet empire, and in the wake of Russia’s invasion, Israel is once again facing a significant spike in Jewish immigration from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. It will also face a sizable number of Ukrainian refugees, staying more temporarily with Israeli friends and relatives.

The big question is whether Israel has learnt from its mistakes and successes in absorbing the massive aliyah wave of the 1990’s, following the break up of the Soviet Union – and whether Israel’s current government has the capacity and the political will to make crucial decisions about welcoming and integrating these new citizens, Jewish and non-Jewish alike.

For now, what is more apparent is the lack of a clear policy on both immigration and refugees. As too often happens in Israel, decisions are taken either because of immediate political pressure or out of dire necessity, when the problem has already grown from manageable proportions into something much more critical and uncontrolled.

As planes with new olim (immigrants) and refugees are already landing at Ben-Gurion Airport from Poland, Romania and Russia, Israel must use the little time left to formulate a new policy that will benefit both the newcomers and the state.

Unlike the new olim, who get identity cards and the right to social and medical care on arrival (or after completing standard bureaucratic procedures at the Nativ immigration office), refugees are not currently entitled to any medical plan, schooling, nor do they have the right to work. This is the “policy” formulated by Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked regarding refugees with relatives in Israel.

But with these severe limitations, why would the term “refugee” even be used?

According to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees (ratified by Israel) and its 1967 Protocol, member states are obliged to establish and maintain a national asylum system and to create or authorize competent national authorities to establish a framework for refugee protection. Since health, according to the Convention, is a fundamental human right for all, refugees should have access to the same or similar healthcare as host populations. Today, the government, bowing to pressure, announced refugees over 60 will get full medical cover; other will have access to first aid and emergency medicine.

If refugees won’t be able to get medical treatment, to send their kids to kindergarten or school or to earn their bread (or get financial aid from the government), how are they expected to survive?

If Israel’s government wants to prevent a deep social crisis involving refugees in a few months’ time, it had better rethink its core refugee policy in its entirety. There is also little doubt that Israel needs to increase its working population, and that it is fully capable of finding a solution to the questions of medical care and education to those who will stay in Israel.

Instead of fighting about whether a third degree cousin is “family” enough to take care of a Ukrainian refugee, Israel must look at this issue from entirely different lens, using humanitarian optics and avoiding another traumatizing social crisis among the new refugee population.

The situation of new olim who become full Israeli citizens after their documents are endorsed by the immigration authorities, under the Law of Return, is much better than that of non-Jewish refugees, as they are entitled to an array of services known as the “absorption basket”: Hebrew ulpan, medical care etc.

However, everyone who remembers the massive wave of aliyah back in the 1990s easily recalls how immigrants with academic backgrounds and solid working experience were forced into lower-qualification work as house cleaners, street sweepers and care for the elderly.

Israel’s economy is much stronger and better developed than 30 years ago, and the aliyah from all three countries will probably not end up with the same one-million strong wave. However, even today Israel is still clueless about fully respecting and positively exploiting the tremendous human capital that it will now receive.

Serving in the Knesset between 2015-2019, I met with many new olim from Russia and Ukraine. Many had vast business experience (far more rare in Israel 30 years ago) and had reasonable plans about how to establish their business in Israel. What they lacked was an understanding of the Israeli business culture, the right contacts and steady governmental support.

Lacking incentives and a helping hand in their new home, many eventually continued to win their bread by working in Russia, unable to break the language barrier or to become part of the Israeli business bubble.

Today, as Putin’s vicious war against Ukraine continues, and with the concurrent, massive wave of Western sanctions, this is not an option anymore. Most have left their countries penniless. Some are still unable to use their Israeli bank accounts due to sanctions. Some are “returning citizens,” who immigrated to Israel but went back to live in Ukraine or in Russia. Some have experience in high-tech, many others come from a business or arts background.

Israel must have a strategy to make the maximum use of these people’s skills and knowledge for their mutual benefit: Israel does not have enough teachers, doctors, engineers and has shortfalls in many other professions. It’s essential to formulate an employment plan for new olim and to offer a steady and significant help for small and medium to include not only special loans, but also workshops, mentorships and other forms of aid – managed by business veterans, not lifelong bureaucrats.

As for scientists, experts and researchers, Israel should revive its three decades old plan of “scientific incubators,” where newcomers will be able to continue their research or contribute to existing research in areas of national priority. The goal must be not only helping the new olim to survive, but to put them on fast track of employment and adaptation.

Needless to say, Israel must immediately boost the staff responsible for the care of olim and extend their office working hours. Already today there are excruciatingly long lines that every immigrant must brave, from the interior ministry to the immigration offices to the absorption ministry and more. It is absurd how few social workers are fluent in the languages that olim and refugees speak: In 2018 there was one fluent social worker for 1000 immigrants who spoke that language.

The government must raise the budget for ERAN – psychological first aid – and improve the service they offer in various languages: Many of today’s immigrants have escaped from horrific experiences and need help coping with the trauma.

Last but not least, there is the core issue of state and religion. As thousands of immigrants pour into Israel, the number of non-Jewish citizens of Israel will grow as well. Non-Jewish family members and patrilineal Jews will become Israelis, and soon they will find out that they and their children can’t get married in Israel, and that even the option of conversion (to those who want it) is almost unattainable.

Policy makers in government must realize that there is no time like today to formulate a policy to fully integrate and answer the needs of non-Jewish Israelis who have made and will make Israel their home, and who made aliyah according to the Law of Return. The 400,000 non-Jews who came in the 1990s are likewise here to stay. Some members of Israel’s government understand this very well. Now they just have to convince the rest.

The op-ed was published in Haaretz in March 2022.

הפוסט Can Israel Cope With the Immigrant Wave From Russia’s War on Ukraine, Jews and non-Jews Alike? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Real Danger of Putin’s ‘Nazi’ Slur for Ukraine, Israel and the World https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-real-danger-of-putins-nazi-slur-for-ukraine-israel-and-the-world/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 15:32:04 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7433 “When we are told that Ukrainian nationalism and neo-Nazism are a myth, ‘propaganda invented by Russia,’ they are obviously counting on someone who is not familiar with the history of the issue. The roots of Nazism in Ukraine reach deep into past centuries, crippling many of the noble and free souls of the people of Little Russia [Ukraine]” – Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, recently sanctioned by Europe and the U.S. When Russian President Vladimir Putin offered the world his prolonged alternative history lesson, days before invading Ukraine, he dedicated a significant part of his televised speech to “Ukrainian neo-Nazism.” Two days later, when he announced the beginning of his “special operation” in Ukraine designed to protect the “suffering people in Donbas,” he mentioned “denazification” as one of its key goals, along with the demilitarization of Ukraine. For anyone who hasn’t followed Russian TV during the last eight years, Putin’s claims might sound weird. But if you’d absorbed hours of endless debates about “hereditary Ukrainian neo-Nazism,” stories about crucified Russian boys and the Ukrainian Russophobe hordes who assault peaceful families in eastern Ukraine – all fake news – it is considerably easier to understand the context of Putin’s rhetoric. According to a 2018 study by the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, between 2014-2017 a full third of all the news on the main Russian TV channels focused on Ukraine, and more than 90 percent of the mentions were negative. These were the five main narratives most energetically promoted by state-run Russian media platforms: -There is

הפוסט The Real Danger of Putin’s ‘Nazi’ Slur for Ukraine, Israel and the World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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“When we are told that Ukrainian nationalism and neo-Nazism are a myth, ‘propaganda invented by Russia,’ they are obviously counting on someone who is not familiar with the history of the issue. The roots of Nazism in Ukraine reach deep into past centuries, crippling many of the noble and free souls of the people of Little Russia [Ukraine]” – Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, recently sanctioned by Europe and the U.S.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin offered the world his prolonged alternative history lesson, days before invading Ukraine, he dedicated a significant part of his televised speech to “Ukrainian neo-Nazism.” Two days later, when he announced the beginning of his “special operation” in Ukraine designed to protect the “suffering people in Donbas,” he mentioned “denazification” as one of its key goals, along with the demilitarization of Ukraine.

For anyone who hasn’t followed Russian TV during the last eight years, Putin’s claims might sound weird. But if you’d absorbed hours of endless debates about “hereditary Ukrainian neo-Nazism,” stories about crucified Russian boys and the Ukrainian Russophobe hordes who assault peaceful families in eastern Ukraine – all fake news – it is considerably easier to understand the context of Putin’s rhetoric.

According to a 2018 study by the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, between 2014-2017 a full third of all the news on the main Russian TV channels focused on Ukraine, and more than 90 percent of the mentions were negative. These were the five main narratives most energetically promoted by state-run Russian media platforms:

-There is a civil war in Ukraine: 33 percent

-Ukraine is a failed independent state: 22 percent

-Russia helps Donbas: 15 percent

-Ukraine is full of irrational Russia-haters: 10 percent

-Fascists and extremists are destroying Ukraine: 7 percent

As we can see now, every single one of these narratives are currently used by the Russian government to explain the necessity of the invasion and its uncompromising nature.

Since those fateful days of the Maidan revolution in February 2014, when Putin’s satrap Victor Yanukovich was ousted from power, the Kremlin has depicted Ukraine as a dangerous, radical place run by fascists and neo-Nazis. Over the last eight years the term “neo-Nazis” has been replaced by plain “Nazis,” and that’s the toxic term that Russian military correspondents, talk show hosts, analysts and politicians now use in regards to Ukraine.

And it wasn’t just Ukraine that was tarred as “neo-Nazi,” “pro-Nazi” or just “Nazi” during the last eight years. Europe at large, and specifically Poland and Germany, were described by Russian propagandists as leaning towards Nazism, while Russia was depicted as the last bastion against it, just like in June 1941 when Hitler attacked Soviet Union.

This last point is especially significant in creating today’s mirror-narrative of “us [Russia] versus the Nazis [Ukraine].” The memory of the Great Patriotic War, which ‘begins’ in the Russian telling from Hitler’s invasion of the USSR in June 1941, is still very much alive in Russian-speaking communities around the world.


Everyone has a grandfather or a grandmother who fought in the Red Army, died by the hands of Nazis in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, was evacuated to Central Asian republics and barely survived, starved in the siege of Leningrad or joined the partisans in the woods. While Victory Day, the 9th of May, was always a beloved, bittersweet holiday in the Soviet era, in Putin’s Russia it became the calendar’s only truly ideological holiday, since May Day and October Revolution Day had lost their resonance.

In Putin’s Russia, each year the parades became grander, and the rhetoric around them – more aggressive and edgy. A common slogan is: “Mojem povtorit” – We can do it again. It means that modern Russia can repeat the Soviet victory over the Nazis, wherever they are and in which ever form they take.

It contained a threat, and a hidden promise. By promoting the narrative of “Russia against the Nazis,” the Russian leadership also exempted itself from any comparisons with fascism, turning assumptions into facts: the victors, those who liberated Europe from the Nazis, cannot be wrongdoers by definition, while the Europe that succumbed to the Nazi invasion and was unable to protect itself still harbored the Nazi virus.

The narrative is black-and-white: The Ukrainians were antisemites and Nazis, while the Russians were Red Army liberators who are still fighting against Nazism today. All this flies in the face of the obvious facts that all Soviet citizens served in the Red Army, including Ukrainians, while antisemitism was widespread in both the Russian Empire and in Soviet Union.

At this point the Israeli connection comes to mind. Among 1.2 million Russian-speaking Israelis, there were and are many Red Army veterans, real heroes who marched all the way to Berlin, who liberated Auschwitz and the capitals of Europe. Victory Day is still celebrated by many Israelis who made aliya from the former Soviet Union, who know well that if not for that hard-won victory, there could be no future for the Jewish people anywhere.

This sentiment, and the recognition of ex-Soviet Jews’ heritage, encompassing not only the Holocaust, but also fighting in the Red Army (over 650,000 Jews fought, many volunteering to go to the front) has been exploited by Moscow to recruit Israel and its institutions in its narrative war against Ukraine and Europe.

While European leaders refused to join the Moscow May Day military parades over the last few years, rejecting Putin’s policies, Israel’s prime minister eagerly cooperated. In 2018, Benjamin Netanyahu was one of just two Western leaders who marched side by side with President Putin on May 9th. The second one was Serbian President Aleksander Vucic.

“We will never allow history to be rewritten, and we will never let anyone forget who saved the world from slavery and extermination. It was the USSR that determined the outcome of the Second World War, but today they [the West/Europe] are trying to rewrite the history, and we will not allow this to be done.

“The same ugly features emerge as new threats: selfishness and intolerance, aggressive nationalism and claims to exclusivity. We understand the gravity of these threats,” opined Putin, addressing the Russian people that day.

By involving Israel and Israeli organizations in this narrative, Russia was trying to hold on to a very important card: It had Jews on its side, and so it spoke in their name, too, attacking acts of antisemitism that occurred in the still ‘Nazi-contaminated’ parts of Europe – Ukraine, Poland and Germany, among others.

There is no doubt that in recent years antisemitism has been on the march around the globe – mostly in Europe and in U.S. – as reflected in the data collected by many monitoring organizations. There is no reason to be oblivious to or forgiving of the fact that in Ukraine, in common with many other countries on the continent, there are neo-Nazi and extreme right groups who march with torches, brandish swastika tattoos and incite if not commit violence. These kinds of displays cannot be tolerated, not in Ukraine, not in the U.S., and not in Russia.

However, when these facts are inflated beyond any proportion and interpreted as equal to the Nazi threat to humanity in 1939, Israel should be alarmed. When Russia raises a false “denazification” flag to justify invading a democracy with a thriving Jewish community, a sizable population of Israeli citizens, a Jewish president, Jewish MPs and legislation that criminalizes antisemitism, Israel should stand up and resist.

Putin’s “de-nazification” drive is both false and dangerous. It equates the Ukrainian government led by Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the Third Reich, and the Holocaust to the “genocide” of Russians in Donbas – both unfounded, spurious and revisionist allegations.

And most importantly, when Moscow uses this same rhetoric to bomb Ukrainian cities and kill Ukrainian citizens, Israel, the “Never Again nation,” should always be the first to stand up against it, to decline handouts from the oligarchs in Putin’s clique, and to reject rhetoric that leverages Jewish suffering to whitewash atrocities and aggression.

The op-ed was written in Haaertz in March 2022.

הפוסט The Real Danger of Putin’s ‘Nazi’ Slur for Ukraine, Israel and the World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Is Bennett gambling Israel’s international standing away? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/is-bennett-gambling-israels-international-standing-away/ Mon, 07 Mar 2022 11:38:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8652 Two Middle Eastern leaders are now busy working to mediate a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine: Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both countries have good ties with both sides in the conflict, and both are dependent on Russia to some extent. Israel’s Achilles’ heel is Syria, while for Turkey, it is diverse economic ties. While Erdogan has fulfilled the role on his own terms – speaking to Russian President Vladimir Putin by phone while selling advanced drones to the Ukrainian military and closing the Bosporus Strait to Russian naval ships, Bennett has flown to secret meetings on Shabbat, avoided any condemnation of Russia as well as any weapons sales to Ukraine. Erdogan, whose ties with the West have seen better days, is taking less of a risk. Bennett, who heads the government of a country strategically allied with the US, is putting his neck on the line for mediation efforts between Moscow and Kyiv. Of course, if there is even the slightest chance of there being a solution that could satisfy both sides, Bennett must take it. Should he succeed, he will earn international recognition and dignity, and honor at home. However, as long as Russia continues to pummel Ukraine, bomb buildings, and massacre innocent civilians, Bennett is perceived as the only Western leader trying with all his might not to anger Putin by avoiding sanctions and condemnation and the only Western leader offering the Russian regime, which now appears more isolated even than North

הפוסט Is Bennett gambling Israel’s international standing away? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Two Middle Eastern leaders are now busy working to mediate a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine: Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both countries have good ties with both sides in the conflict, and both are dependent on Russia to some extent. Israel’s Achilles’ heel is Syria, while for Turkey, it is diverse economic ties.

While Erdogan has fulfilled the role on his own terms – speaking to Russian President Vladimir Putin by phone while selling advanced drones to the Ukrainian military and closing the Bosporus Strait to Russian naval ships, Bennett has flown to secret meetings on Shabbat, avoided any condemnation of Russia as well as any weapons sales to Ukraine. Erdogan, whose ties with the West have seen better days, is taking less of a risk. Bennett, who heads the government of a country strategically allied with the US, is putting his neck on the line for mediation efforts between Moscow and Kyiv.

Of course, if there is even the slightest chance of there being a solution that could satisfy both sides, Bennett must take it. Should he succeed, he will earn international recognition and dignity, and honor at home. However, as long as Russia continues to pummel Ukraine, bomb buildings, and massacre innocent civilians, Bennett is perceived as the only Western leader trying with all his might not to anger Putin by avoiding sanctions and condemnation and the only Western leader offering the Russian regime, which now appears more isolated even than North Korea, legitimacy.

When Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, Israel did not issue any condemnation. When no Western leader would attend Russia’s Victory Day Parade, then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Moscow and marched with Putin at Red Square. When the Russians accused Europe and Ukraine of allowing neo-Nazis to operate freely and rewriting history, Israel took Russia’s side. And now, as Putin lays out his bizarre and fictitious goal of “de-Nazifying” Ukraine, Israel says nothing about this show of contempt for the Holocaust.
With all due respect to the need to maintain Israel’s security interests, policymakers here must understand Russia only does what is good for Russia. That means that if Moscow decides tomorrow to provide Iran with S-400 missile defense systems and Syrian President Bashar Assad with modern fighter jets, then that is exactly what will happen. It’s nothing personal, just interests Moscow must advance to increase sales, bolster its allies, and so on and so forth. It’s doubtful Israel will be abler to influence such moves.

On the other hand, Israel’s strategic ties to the US and Europe could suffer a significant blow. In both these political arenas, many have already spoken critically of the Israeli position, which is better suited to the Middle East landscape, as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have all remained silent on the issue. Both the US and Europe are questioning whether Israel is at all interested in being part of the collective West.

It remains unclear whether Bennett’s attempts at mediation in Moscow will be deemed a success. I hope they are. I hope the terrible slaughter in Ukraine will stop without Kyiv having to relinquish its sovereignty and bend to Moscow. But the questions that arise from the contemporary Israeli experience do not necessarily pertain strictly to Ukraine or Russia, but to Israel and its place in the international arena.

The op-ed was published in Israel Hayom in March 2022.

הפוסט Is Bennett gambling Israel’s international standing away? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Russia-Ukraine war may be a defining moment, Israel must make a choice – opinion https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/russia-ukraine-war-may-be-a-defining-moment-israel-must-make-a-choice-opinion/ Sun, 06 Mar 2022 14:55:15 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7421 History is replete with defining moments, most of which are only recognized after the fact. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine could very well turn out to be a defining moment in the struggle for world order. The world order consolidated in the wake of World War II is based on liberal ideas, among them international organizations dedicated to advancing peace and cooperation, protection of human rights, adherence to international law, scientific progress, freedom of navigation and prohibition of occupying others’ territory and population. This is the world order with which one can begin to imagine nations joining together to confront shared challenges, such as pandemics and the climate crisis. Today, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is putting this order to the test. It is true that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is not the first challenge to this global order. It has faced wars, conflicts, human rights violations, conquests and occupations. Lately, however, it seems that the lessons of World War II have been forgotten as we witness growing threats to the current order from authoritarian-populist illiberal leaders driven by xenophobia, undermining democracy, questioning their state’s legal underpinnings, nurturing nationalism and promoting “alternative facts.” The struggle for world order today is not waged between states or nations, but rather between worldviews. Putin’s incursion into Ukraine is a major step in this struggle, the results of which could have repercussions on our world and the laws that govern us. A few years from now, Putin’s invasion could be one of those defining moments in global events

הפוסט Russia-Ukraine war may be a defining moment, Israel must make a choice – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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History is replete with defining moments, most of which are only recognized after the fact. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine could very well turn out to be a defining moment in the struggle for world order.

The world order consolidated in the wake of World War II is based on liberal ideas, among them international organizations dedicated to advancing peace and cooperation, protection of human rights, adherence to international law, scientific progress, freedom of navigation and prohibition of occupying others’ territory and population. This is the world order with which one can begin to imagine nations joining together to confront shared challenges, such as pandemics and the climate crisis. Today, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is putting this order to the test.

It is true that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is not the first challenge to this global order. It has faced wars, conflicts, human rights violations, conquests and occupations. Lately, however, it seems that the lessons of World War II have been forgotten as we witness growing threats to the current order from authoritarian-populist illiberal leaders driven by xenophobia, undermining democracy, questioning their state’s legal underpinnings, nurturing nationalism and promoting “alternative facts.” The struggle for world order today is not waged between states or nations, but rather between worldviews. Putin’s incursion into Ukraine is a major step in this struggle, the results of which could have repercussions on our world and the laws that govern us.

A few years from now, Putin’s invasion could be one of those defining moments in global events of which people ask, “where were you when Putin rolled into Ukraine?” This is a simple question whose answer could succinctly define one’s identity and place in the world. The actions and positions adopted at such defining moments take on great significance and linger for a long time. States remember who stood by their side in times of trouble and offered assistance (just ask the Turks, who remember how Israel helped them following the 1999 earthquake to this day). Israel has not forgotten who voted in favor of the 1947 UN Partition Resolution and who didn’t, and many Israelis still determine their attitudes toward various countries according to their conduct during the Holocaust.

So, where is Israel while Putin is invading Ukraine?

For now, it seems Israel is busy compiling a scorecard – portraying itself as a possible mediator just to walk between the lines and preserve its short-term interests.

Prior to the invasion, Israel tried to lay low and avoid any response to the impending disaster. When it could no longer ignore developments, it expressed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, without mentioning Russia. Once Russia invaded, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid issued a clearer statement condemning the Russian invasion, but Prime Minister Naftali Bennett continued to maintain ambiguity as long as he could, and Israel did not accept the US invitation to sign on as a sponsor to a UN Security Council condemnation of Russia, much to the chagrin of Washington, Israel’s closest ally. Then, Israel announced it would vote in favor of the condemnation in the UN General Assembly, which it did, even helping the US recruit other states to join.

Israel has many considerations to juggle – freedom to operate in Syrian skies, relations with Russia and Ukraine, the safety of the Jewish communities in these countries, a series of alliances with Western states, potential economic repercussions, the impact on Iran’s nuclear program, and more. This tactical scorekeeping is indeed complex and of some importance, but the bigger picture is sometimes simpler.

Israel’s decision will have long-term implications for its relations with the US and Europe, which are its closest friends and provide it with the vital support it needs for its security, economy and identity. They, too, are asking where Israel stands.

Israel’s choice also has implications for its ethical-normative position in the world and its soft power. Over the years, Israel – established on the ruins of the Holocaust – positioned itself as leading the struggle to absorb the lessons of World War II, as the “sole democracy in the Middle East,” and as a developed western-liberal state. Does the State of Israel seek to keep nurturing its ethical identity in accordance with these values?

Israel’s choice also has an impact on its mutual relationships with other countries. At such defining moments, a country’s core character comes into play. Other than the US, Europe, Ukraine and Russia, Israel is being watched by Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to see which way it leans in relation to the world order. Can it be relied on in times of trouble? Where does it draw a red line? With which ideological camp does it affiliate?

Israel’s choice also has implications for the identity it projects domestically. Israel’s citizens are looking at their government’s behavior, at the values and preferences it reflects. The Israeli government’s decisions regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine are the type that shape a country’s identity. Will they enhance Israel’s fragile democracy or push it closer towards illiberalism?

The singular reason for Israel to avoid completely allying itself with Ukraine is to preserve its ability to respond to Ukraine’s request to serve as a mediator with Russia. Indeed, in the past few days, we have seen how Bennett hosted German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Israel, talked on the phone with Putin and Zelensky, visited Putin in Moscow and went from there to brief Scholz in Berlin, after another phone call to Zelensky. If the motivation for these activities is to fulfill Zelensky’s request for Israel to assist him in mediating and bringing a quick end to the war and occupation, then it is the right thing to do – morally and politically.

These actions would then have to be coordinated with the US, Israel’s European friends, and Ukraine; Israel should adhere to the liberal-democratic world order and values, even as a mediator; And, it must not mix its own tactical interests with the work of mediation. Reports that the Bennett-Putin meeting included discussion about the Jewish communities in Russia and Ukraine, Israel’s freedom of action in Syria, and even Israel’s objections to the revival of the Iran nuclear deal, is a bad sign. It signals that Israel still focuses on its own tactical interests, continues to calculate short-term implications, and uses the role of a mediator as an excuse to refuse to take a clear stand. I truly hope this is not the case.

Yes, Israel is weighing many tactical considerations, just as every state does when called on to make a decision. It appears that in this case, despite its own wrongdoing and major challenge to the liberal order (the continued conflict with the Palestinians), it is incumbent on Israel to make a strategic decision about where it stands in the struggle for the existing world order. Is it on the side of the bullies or the one that promotes cooperation? Both ethically and for realpolitik considerations, Israel must take a clear and decisive stand on the side of Ukraine, on the side of Europe and the US, on the side of Russians who oppose the war and the Poles helping the refugees. Israel must stand on the side of peace.

The article was published in JPost in March 2022.

הפוסט Russia-Ukraine war may be a defining moment, Israel must make a choice – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Russia-Ukraine war is Europe’s hour to act https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/russia-ukraine-war-is-europes-hour-to-act/ Thu, 03 Mar 2022 11:39:05 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7414 “This is the hour of Europe,” Luxembourg’s foreign minister declared in June 1992, when civil war broke out in the disintegrating Yugoslav Republic. His statement proved hollow. When European diplomatic efforts failed, US bombing was what ended the Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide three years later. When diplomacy fails to deter a bully, a big stick is required. Since the 1990s, European Union member states have hardly strengthened their armies and failed to translate their economic power into military might. They did not build a common European army, continuing to live peacefully and comfortably under the “perpetual peace” they created. In recent years, when Russian President Vladimir Putin, the regional bully, bit off big chunks of his neighbors’ land (Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine) and dispatched his soldiers to train in Syria and Libya, an angry EU mainly barked, but did not really bite. Is this the hour of Europe? The EU insists on respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent country, and its right to chart its own course, foreign policy, and membership in international organizations, including NATO and even the EU. The 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea was a direct response to Ukraine signing an Association Agreement with the EU. The EU does not have a military force, relying instead on NATO, which is under US leadership. But for the first time since the Soviet Union collapsed over three decades ago ending the Cold War, European leaders, including newly elected German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, agree that defense spending should be increased. They agree that the world

הפוסט Russia-Ukraine war is Europe’s hour to act הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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“This is the hour of Europe,” Luxembourg’s foreign minister declared in June 1992, when civil war broke out in the disintegrating Yugoslav Republic. His statement proved hollow. When European diplomatic efforts failed, US bombing was what ended the Bosnia-Herzegovina genocide three years later.

When diplomacy fails to deter a bully, a big stick is required. Since the 1990s, European Union member states have hardly strengthened their armies and failed to translate their economic power into military might. They did not build a common European army, continuing to live peacefully and comfortably under the “perpetual peace” they created.

In recent years, when Russian President Vladimir Putin, the regional bully, bit off big chunks of his neighbors’ land (Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine) and dispatched his soldiers to train in Syria and Libya, an angry EU mainly barked, but did not really bite.

Is this the hour of Europe? The EU insists on respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent country, and its right to chart its own course, foreign policy, and membership in international organizations, including NATO and even the EU. The 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea was a direct response to Ukraine signing an Association Agreement with the EU.

The EU does not have a military force, relying instead on NATO, which is under US leadership. But for the first time since the Soviet Union collapsed over three decades ago ending the Cold War, European leaders, including newly elected German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, agree that defense spending should be increased. They agree that the world order has changed, and that the EU must prepare.

While Merkel dragged her feet for years, Scholz announced an increase in Germany’s defense budget from 1.53% to 2% of its GDP for troop buildup and advanced rearmament.

Scholz also seemed to be aligning himself with French President Emmanuel Macron’s wish for the EU’s “strategic autonomy,” meaning the EU’s ability to act independently of NATO (i.e., the US).

Europe’s “hour” in terms of military power is not imminent. Strategic autonomy is a goal that, even if agreed on by the 27 member states, will take years to achieve. But EU consensus on this matter in response to Putin’s aggression will add a further dimension to the changing world order observed in recent days. For now, Europe continues to dwell under NATO’s US-led umbrella.

THE EU – which seemed to be limping from crisis to crisis over the past 15 years, with its foreign policy in disarray – is shaping up in front of our eyes over the past two weeks as a significant proactive body, capable of adopting tough diplomatic decisions despite the harm they cause to its member states. Foreign ministers and heads of member states have consolidated an array of increasingly harsh sanctions as the war in Ukraine has escalated.

These financial sanctions are a double-edged sword. They will undermine Russia, but also hurt EU-member states. Severing Russian banks from the international SWIFT financial transaction network, for example, means Europeans will have trouble paying for Russian gas and oil. The already high European energy prices will go up and governments (at least in Germany) have already pledged to subsidize the rising electricity and gas costs of low-income residents.

Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration, we have been living in a world run in accordance with the slogan Bill Clinton minted to defeat George Bush Sr., “It’s the economy, stupid.” This aphorism applies mostly to countries living in peace, such as the EU members. China seemed to have adopted it too, becoming a market economy (under the eagle-eye of the authorities).

Israel cannot afford to be governed by this dictate alone. It knows that without a strong, growing economy, it will be hard-pressed to maintain a powerful, advanced army. European leaders now realize that a strong economy alone is insufficient; military force is also required.

Since the end of the Cold War, global trade in goods and services has expanded significantly, as have foreign investments throughout the world. Interdependence among states has also grown substantially. According to certain international relations scholars, the greater the interdependence between states, the fewer the prospects of their waging war against each other.

Russia is not dependent on Ukraine’s economy, on the contrary. Putin expects to take Ukraine over as he did Belarus. But Putin misjudged the resolve of the EU, on whose member states he does depend economically, to use this mutual dependence against him.

Much of Russia’s export volume depends on EU energy purchases, chief among them Germany’s. Putin gambled that the states dependent on Russian energy would stand aside while he “gobbles up” Ukraine, as was the case (to a large extent) with his takeover of Crimea.

He miscalculated. This double-edged sword is turning against him. The Russian army, too, marches on its stomach and is reliant on economic resources to renew its ammunition. To maintain a significant military force, Putin needs a high-yield economy.

THE EU is not sending troops, but it is willing to pay the economic price for Ukraine’s sake. It coordinated the economic and financial sanctions on Russia with the US, proactively leading the charge rather than being dragged along by the Americans.

Putin – who for over a decade sought to divide the West, to turn the US and EU against the other, to throw a monkey’s wrench into the workings of the EU and NATO – has turned into a unifying factor.

How, then, is this Europe’s hour? Given the world’s democratic decline of the past two decades, the EU still has a potentially significant regional role to play. In the mid-1970s and 1980s, the European Community (precursor of the EU) helped Greece, Spain and Portugal stabilize their fragile democracies by conditioning its accession on such stability.

The current decision to side with Ukraine is a stand in favor of a country’s right to choose its friends, to choose the democratic-liberal model. The invasion of Ukraine brutally tramples the principles underpinning the EU, which seeks to propagate peace, democracy, human rights, and adherence to the rule of law, including international law.

This is where the theory of democratic peace comes in as the only theory of international relations that can be considered a “rule” and has withstood repeated tests: democracies do not fight each other. By inference, that means that the more democracies there are (especially adjacent ones), the fewer wars will be waged.

But researchers also have found that the most unstable stage, both domestically and in foreign relations, is the transition to democracy. This is the stage Ukraine is in. The EU’s assistance to Ukraine is assistance for the spread of democracy in a state that wants it and has chosen it (unlike states around Israel’s region that are not interested in such European intervention; and indeed, in the wake of the Arab “spring,” the EU’s democratic agenda in our region has been eroded in favor of an agenda of stability and good governance).

This is the hour of coordinated multilateral action by peace-loving democracies. This is the hour of Europe.

הפוסט Russia-Ukraine war is Europe’s hour to act הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Russia’s Next Target for Intimidation Could Be Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/russias-next-target-for-intimidation-could-be-israel/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 11:31:41 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8646 As Russia pounds Ukrainian cities and flaunts its nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that the implications of the war between Russia and the West will be felt globally—and the relations between states that prevailed only two weeks ago are unlikely to remain static. The International Criminal Court in The Hague may investigate possible war crimes committed by Russian leadership, while Western governments keep piling on unprecedented economic sanctions. As a result, Russia will be looking for alternative markets and spheres of influence, specifically in the Middle East and Africa, where it has become very involved during the last decade. While Moscow ratchets up military and economic pressure on Ukraine, using forbidden types of weapons and indiscriminate firepower against civilians, many in Israel fear that Moscow’s next move will happen in the Middle East—where Moscow is formally aligned with Israel’s worst enemies. By Feb. 15, when the whole world was still trying to guess Vladimir Putin’s real intentions in Ukraine, his defense minister and confidant Sergey Shoigu had traveled to Syria, where he met with President Bashar Assad and inspected a Russian military exercise—the largest that Russia had held in the Eastern Mediterranean since the end of the Cold War. For this occasion, Russia transferred advanced weapons, including MiG-31s armed with hypersonic missiles, as well as strategic Tupolev Tu-22M bombers to its Khmeimim air base, positioning a potent new threat near Israel’s borders. Just a few years ago, there was hardly any Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the

הפוסט Russia’s Next Target for Intimidation Could Be Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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As Russia pounds Ukrainian cities and flaunts its nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that the implications of the war between Russia and the West will be felt globally—and the relations between states that prevailed only two weeks ago are unlikely to remain static. The International Criminal Court in The Hague may investigate possible war crimes committed by Russian leadership, while Western governments keep piling on unprecedented economic sanctions. As a result, Russia will be looking for alternative markets and spheres of influence, specifically in the Middle East and Africa, where it has become very involved during the last decade. While Moscow ratchets up military and economic pressure on Ukraine, using forbidden types of weapons and indiscriminate firepower against civilians, many in Israel fear that Moscow’s next move will happen in the Middle East—where Moscow is formally aligned with Israel’s worst enemies.

By Feb. 15, when the whole world was still trying to guess Vladimir Putin’s real intentions in Ukraine, his defense minister and confidant Sergey Shoigu had traveled to Syria, where he met with President Bashar Assad and inspected a Russian military exercise—the largest that Russia had held in the Eastern Mediterranean since the end of the Cold War. For this occasion, Russia transferred advanced weapons, including MiG-31s armed with hypersonic missiles, as well as strategic Tupolev Tu-22M bombers to its Khmeimim air base, positioning a potent new threat near Israel’s borders.

Just a few years ago, there was hardly any Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the beginning of the Russian intervention in Syria, facilitated by the Obama administration to counterbalance Turkey and aid Iran, Moscow has reinforced its naval presence there dramatically. Although the Russian forces in this area are still limited in comparison with their abilities in the Black Sea, experts from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies believe that Russia already has enough forces to present a potential challenge to longstanding U.S. and NATO naval dominance in the area.

As war clouds gathered over Ukraine, Israel became worried. Israel and Russia maintain tactical cooperation over Syria and run a deconfliction center in order to prevent Russian and Israeli forces from clashing. Since the beginning of Russia’s military involvement in Syria, Israel has been walking on thin ice, trying to balance its own security needs with the necessity of making nice with the Russians who now controlled the Syrian skies. A change in the Russian posture in Syria, particularly as America works to seal its reentry into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, portends a far less favorable and more dangerous calculus than the one that Israel has grown used to since 2014.

For a time, the balancing act went well. While the Russians did not prevent Israel from hunting Iranian war targets in Syria (as was often reported in foreign media), Israel refrained from commenting on Russia’s aggressive demeanor—even when the United States publicly voiced opposition. In fact, this arrangement predates Russian involvement in Syria. In 2014—one year before Russia became Israel’s neighbor on its northern border—Israel refused to condemn Russia’s annexation of Crimea despite some pressure from the Obama administration to do so.

But 2022 isn’t 2014. Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid first timidly condemned Russian behavior in a TV interview. He then announced that Israel will vote with the United States and EU countries against Russia in the U.N. General Assembly.

So what might be the repercussions for Israel of its public anti-Russian stance, however mild? There is no doubt that Russia is looking to flex its muscles in Syria, where it’s built an impressive military presence. As Russia slides into a pariah status in the international arena, it will want to upgrade ties with its closest allies in the region: Syria and Iran.

On the military front, signs of Russia’s new regional posture are already visible. During the last few weeks that preceded the war in Ukraine, Russia strongly rebuked Israeli activity in Syrian skies, while Israelis complained that Russia was jamming GPS signals in Israeli airspace. At the end of January, Russia and Syria started joint patrols along the Golan Heights and the Euphrates River. In Israel, this activity was interpreted as a sharp message to Jerusalem: Things in Syria might change soon, and fast. Since other countries like the United States and Turkey also operate in Syrian skies, the Russian message might be addressed to all concerned parties to let them know that Russia is determined to force them out of Syrian airspace and help Damascus reclaim its sovereignty there.

Yet other Russian messages were clearly directed at Israel. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Israel was still mulling its reaction, busy Russian diplomats found the time to rebuke Israel over construction of new cities in the Golan Heights—possibly in reaction to timid Israeli attempts to support Ukraine without condemning Russia too strongly. While Moscow has since signaled that cooperation with Israel will go on as usual, many in Israel fear that Russia, emboldened by its violent move on Ukraine and furious about global sanctions, will become more aggressive and assertive in protecting its interests in Syria, and pay less attention to possible Israeli responses.

Until recently, some in Israel believed that Russia might work together with Israel and the United States to push Iran out of Syria—under the assumption that Russia and the United States shared this interest in common with Israel. Nowadays, this kind of scenario (however dubious it was in the past) is simply out of the question. Moscow will need Tehran and Damascus more than ever, perhaps even more than they need Moscow. This development might mean more intercooperation between all three parties and a significantly more aggressive tone toward Israel. In turn, if Israel is not able to freely operate in Syrian skies against Iranian military targets, an emboldened Iran seems likely to try to further grow its military presence near Israel’s borders, raising the stakes in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

Another possible target for Russia’s military is the Eastern Mediterranean. If until now the sea was mostly seen as EU and NATO playground, today’s Russian navy presence might pose a serious challenge to Europeans and Americans—and by extension Israel, whose economy depends in large part on open shipping from its ports. Turkey might soon see new developments in Syrian Idlib, where pro-Turkish militants still operate, and 3 million Syrians find their refuge, which may create wider instability in the region.

While Russian-Iranian rapprochement in Syria seems almost inevitable, the future of strategic relations between the two countries is still a puzzle.

Until recently, Russia saw Iran as a problematic neighbor, an occasional partner (for example, in Syria) and mostly as a country that was best held at arm’s length. When Iran demanded acceptance as a full member of the Eurasian Economic Treaty (a Russian-led block that also includes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan), Russia took its time to “consider.” And when Iranians offered extensive cooperation in trade and industry, Russia generally ignored these requests. During the visit of the new Iranian president to Russia in January this year, no important treaty or memorandum of understanding was signed, to the disappointment of the Iranians.

Now, Russia needs Iran and its markets more than ever before. For Moscow it might be the right time to expand the partnership, as the Iranians have been demanding. Yet if Iran signs the nuclear deal, brokered in large part by Russia, the roles of Russia and Iran may be reversed, with Iran—if sanctions are lifted—having a stronger and even determining hand in that relationship.

There is a loud anti-Russian camp in Iran that remembers well how Moscow ignored Iranian demands for a long time. Yet there is also no doubt that Tehran will be happy to receive the latest Russian weapons. It now seems likely that Iran will get the weapons systems it demanded a long time ago even if for some reason the nuclear deal is not finalized. Russia has nothing more to lose and it will have to seize every opportunity to continue to sell its weapons to anyone who demands them.

What’s on the Iranian shopping list? According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran is interested in SU-30 fighters, Yak-130 trainers, T-90 tanks and—the cherry on top—S-400 surface-to-air missile defense systems that Russia previously refrained from selling. Even if Russia fulfills only part of the Iranian shopping list, it will be very bad news for Israel. Until recently, advanced Russian missile systems inside Syria were under full Russian control. That might change as well.

The greatest threat that Russia poses to Israel may be in the expansion of its regional influence, especially in the absence of an effective U.S.-led security structure. With the exception of Lebanon and Kuwait, which denounced Russia, and Syria, a full Russian client that denounced the West, the Arab states are currently sitting on the fence, unwilling to put their neck on the line for either the United States or the Russians. During the last few years some of these countries, particularly the Gulf states, didn’t hide their frustration with American Middle East policy, which aimed under both the Obama and Trump administrations at diminishing the American presence in the region—and which under Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden put a U.S. nuclear deal with Iran at the top of American regional priorities. In response, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt all began purchasing Russian (and Chinese) weapons, and putting their relations with Moscow on display.

Russia has significantly expanded its web of relations in the Middle East, mostly due to the fear of some countries that they might be abandoned by the West. If the United States wants these countries to join an alliance against Moscow, it might have to rethink its regional policy—or else rethink its relations with Arab countries who might wish to continue with their current balancing act. Yet Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia heavily depend on wheat supplies from Russia and Ukraine. Rising prices on basic food staples and energy might disrupt stability in many countries in the region, creating more risks and insecurity. All of these developments might in turn have a negative influence on Israel and its attempt to build new alliances in the region—especially if Russia sees Israel as an American instrument, while the Americans see Iran as a partner.

There is little doubt that fateful events in Ukraine have turned over the chess board in the Middle East, as elsewhere. While risks for Israel are bound to increase, it will need—now more than ever—firm American support and a confident U.S. policy in the Middle East. A new American deal with Iran, which remains America’s regional priority even during the war in Ukraine, seems unlikely to provide those assurances.

The op-ed was published in the Tablet in March 2022.

הפוסט Russia’s Next Target for Intimidation Could Be Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Chechens Are Fighting on Both Sides of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/chechens-are-fighting-on-both-sides-of-russian-ukrainian-conflict/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 11:24:28 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8640 mages of Chechen fighters preparing to join the battle in Ukraine on behalf of Russian troops spread widely on social media networks in the early days of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen leader and an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, encouraged them in messages on his Telegram account. “Uncompromising and universal fighters from the Chechen Republic overcome any difficulties on their way and move like a rapid avalanche. Mashallah! The lions of Allah! Allah Akhbar,” wrote Kadyrov, who assumed power in Chechnya after his father, Ahmet Kadyrov, was killed in a terrorist attack in 2004, largely believed to being planned and backed by Russian security forces. Since Chechen fighters are famous for the brutality and cruelty that they displayed during past wars in Chechnya, Syria and other hotspots, many Ukrainians believe that the videos showing the bearded Chechens marching in front of their leaders were meant to demoralize and intimidate them. “We know what the Chechens did to Russians, and also to each other, during the war in Chechnya. They are very brutal. But this is our home and we will defend it, even if Ramzan Kadyrov would personally come and fight against us,” says Nicolay Shevchuk, 28, from the city of Dnipro, told The Media Line. However, Kadyrov, who has a mosque in the Arab-Israeli town of Abu Ghosh named after him, is not the only Chechen leader eager to fight in Ukraine, and not necessarily for the same side. Ahmad Zakayev, a forgotten name from

הפוסט Chechens Are Fighting on Both Sides of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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mages of Chechen fighters preparing to join the battle in Ukraine on behalf of Russian troops spread widely on social media networks in the early days of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen leader and an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, encouraged them in messages on his Telegram account.

“Uncompromising and universal fighters from the Chechen Republic overcome any difficulties on their way and move like a rapid avalanche. Mashallah! The lions of Allah! Allah Akhbar,” wrote Kadyrov, who assumed power in Chechnya after his father, Ahmet Kadyrov, was killed in a terrorist attack in 2004, largely believed to being planned and backed by Russian security forces.

Since Chechen fighters are famous for the brutality and cruelty that they displayed during past wars in Chechnya, Syria and other hotspots, many Ukrainians believe that the videos showing the bearded Chechens marching in front of their leaders were meant to demoralize and intimidate them.

“We know what the Chechens did to Russians, and also to each other, during the war in Chechnya. They are very brutal. But this is our home and we will defend it, even if Ramzan Kadyrov would personally come and fight against us,” says Nicolay Shevchuk, 28, from the city of Dnipro, told The Media Line.

However, Kadyrov, who has a mosque in the Arab-Israeli town of Abu Ghosh named after him, is not the only Chechen leader eager to fight in Ukraine, and not necessarily for the same side.

Ahmad Zakayev, a forgotten name from the 1990s who fought against the Russians during the First Chechen War, declared during an interview with the Russian-language, US funded Current Time TV, that Chechens are ready to defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion.

“Participating in foreign armed conflicts is forbidden by law and punishable by jail. It’s important to obtain a formal agreement that will allow this form of military cooperation,” Zakayev said. According to this veteran of wars with Russia, the Chechens who were already in Ukraine at the time of the invasion have participated in battles in the eastern part of the country.

kavkazr.com news agency that two battalions of local Chechens – the Sheikh Mansour Battalion and the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion – already fight in Ukraine. “They defend Kyiv against the Russian troops along with other nationalities who live in Ukraine,” Bakaev said.

On Sunday, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged foreigners to head to Ukrainian embassies worldwide to sign up for an “international brigade” of volunteers to help fight invading Russian forces.

British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss told BBC that she would support UK citizens who chose to defend Ukraine. “They are fighting, the people of Ukraine are fighting for freedom and democracy, not just for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe because that is what President Putin is challenging. And absolutely, if people want to support that struggle, I would support them in doing that,” Truss said.

In addition to British citizens, Americans, Germans, Poles and many others have expressed interest in joining Ukrainian forces and fighting alongside them. Meanwhile, a Croatian journalist revealed that a group of Croats is leaving for Ukraine to join hands with the Ukrainian army in defense of the country.

This is not the first time that foreign fighters have come to defend Ukraine from the Russians.

During the war in 2014, many foreign fighters joined the notorious Azov Battalion, a far-right militia with connections to neo-Nazism. According to Russian and Ukrainian sources, many volunteers who joined Azov began in far-right movements in Europe. Today, members of far-right movements in the United States and Europe are eager to join the “nazbaty” – the national battalions, such as Azov.

Anna Zharova, CEO of the Israeli Ukrainian Alliance, says that it is important to stick to the truth and avoid disinformation that is often spread by the Russian media.

“International fighters who fight for Ukraine are not something new. We also had fighters who volunteered to help Ukraine in 2014, among them many Israelis and Georgians. They worked closely with the Ukrainian army and many served as instructors. As far as I know, the majority worked with the army, not with nazbaty,” she said.

While the debate on foreign fighters heading for Ukraine is ongoing, many Israelis have expressed interest in helping Ukraine and joining the fighting. Some left their phone numbers on the web page of Ukraine’s embassy in Tel Aviv, while others asked to be contacted if a group of Israelis travels to Ukraine for that purpose. Many are concerned about the legal ramifications, however.

Nathan, who agreed to talk to The Media Line on condition of anonymity, expressed his readiness to join the fight. “I served in the IDF, in one of the elite units. I can give a lot to the Ukrainians, but I have to be certain that I will not be prosecuted for that,” he told The Media Line.

Many Palestinians online had expressed their anger regarding the possibility of Israelis joining the fight in Ukraine, blaming Zelenskyy for supporting Israel in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In what seems to be the defining moment for Russia and Western relations in the 21st century, many in the Middle East and beyond are taking sides according to their own relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and have affiliated themselves with these countries and their people based on their own hopes, disappointments and grievances.

The op-ed was published in The Media Line in February 2022.

הפוסט Chechens Are Fighting on Both Sides of Russian-Ukrainian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel Weighs Its Neutrality on Russia-Ukraine Conflict https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-weighs-its-neutrality-on-russia-ukraine-conflict/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 11:19:32 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8637 While Western countries mull sanctions against Russia after it formally recognized the independence of two self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine, Israel is busy reshaping its attitude toward current developments. Until very recently, Israel kept mum on Russian threats and their implications, refraining from taking a clear stand like other countries in the West or expressing criticism. According to some analysts, the latest statement from Foreign Minister Yair Lapid could signal a break from Israeli neutrality on Russia and Ukraine. What did Lapid really say? Speaking with Oded Ben-Ami on Israel’s Channel 12 News on Sunday, the foreign minister answered the anchor’s question on the possibility of Israel imposing sanctions on Russia if the US does. Here are Lapid’s exact words: “Look, then we’ll have to consider. That’s not the situation [right now]. We need to understand, we are not there, and I assess twice a day if and when we want to move our embassy from Kyiv. We are being careful, and we need to be careful.” Soon after the interview, the headline on Channel 12, and later in other media outlets, said, “Israel will support sanctions on Ukraine,” misquoting Lapid. It seems that the media were too fast to interpret Lapid’s words as readiness to join the Americans in imposing sanctions on Russia, and yet his actual “wait and see” statement can also be considered an interesting deviation from traditional silence. Why Israel chooses to be ‘Switzerland’ on Russia and Ukraine Israeli officials often say that Israel is a

הפוסט Israel Weighs Its Neutrality on Russia-Ukraine Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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While Western countries mull sanctions against Russia after it formally recognized the independence of two self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine, Israel is busy reshaping its attitude toward current developments. Until very recently, Israel kept mum on Russian threats and their implications, refraining from taking a clear stand like other countries in the West or expressing criticism. According to some analysts, the latest statement from Foreign Minister Yair Lapid could signal a break from Israeli neutrality on Russia and Ukraine.

What did Lapid really say?

Speaking with Oded Ben-Ami on Israel’s Channel 12 News on Sunday, the foreign minister answered the anchor’s question on the possibility of Israel imposing sanctions on Russia if the US does. Here are Lapid’s exact words:

“Look, then we’ll have to consider. That’s not the situation [right now]. We need to understand, we are not there, and I assess twice a day if and when we want to move our embassy from Kyiv. We are being careful, and we need to be careful.”

Soon after the interview, the headline on Channel 12, and later in other media outlets, said, “Israel will support sanctions on Ukraine,” misquoting Lapid.

It seems that the media were too fast to interpret Lapid’s words as readiness to join the Americans in imposing sanctions on Russia, and yet his actual “wait and see” statement can also be considered an interesting deviation from traditional silence.

Why Israel chooses to be ‘Switzerland’ on Russia and Ukraine

Israeli officials often say that Israel is a small country and cannot afford to be caught between two Great Powers – Russia and the US – considering that it depends on Moscow’s cooperation in Syria.

However, even before Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, Israel maintained silence on the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Back then, the White House and State Department explicitly expressed their anger over Israel’s neutrality. Senior members of the Obama Administration, some of them are currently part of Joe Biden’s team, privately expressed disappointment at Israel’s position. After Crimea was annexed, Israel’s relations with Russia continued to flourish. Then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid multiple visits to Moscow and Sochi and often bragged about his “warm personal relations” with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Zvi Magen, a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, who was Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine from 1993 to 1997 and ambassador to Russia from 1998 to 1999, told The Media Line that what seemed to some like a light fluctuation in Lapid’s approach actually reflected a policy change.

“This kind of statement is not in any way incidental. I believe that the ‘narrow cabinet’ ministers took and approved this decision. Let me remind you what kind of relations we have with Russia. We have agreements and understandings: They don’t meddle with what we do in Syria [against Hizbullah and Iranian agents]; we don’t meddle in their internal business or the situation in Ukraine,” Magen said.

“But in recent weeks,” he continued, “something changed. They [the Russians] changed their tone. Their rhetoric on Israel became harsher, they operate jammers and other electronic devices that cause interference with our flights, they conduct airborne drills on the [Syrian-held eastern] Golan along with Syrians.

“It seems like a change of a political course and even a looming conflict. I have a feeling that Russia intends to open another anti-US front here in the Middle East. It will not necessarily be against us but there will be consequences,” the expert said.

Magen believes that Lapid’s cautious statement has to do with the changing situation on the Syrian front.

Ex-MK Roman Bronfman, who was born in Ukraine, said he was “pleasantly surprised” by Lapid’s words.

“The era of deliberation and the search for concealment and silence is coming to an end. It is good that Israel has chosen this step for several reasons, certainly because of the strategy of partnership with Americans, and also in terms of values. The State of Israel must stick with humanitarian values and cannot be in favor of an illegal invasion and provocations by Russia against its neighbors. It happened to us with Belarus − instead of returning the ambassadors, we sent them to attend [President Alexander] Lukashenko’s parties and events.”

The right side of history

For many Israelis of Ukrainian and Belarusian origin, Israel’s awkward silence on tragic events in Belarus, where peaceful demonstrations were crushed and supporters of change are brutally persecuted, is a sore point. Some hope that due to changing circumstances and American pressure, Israel will make the right choice.

Alexander Fruman, an Israeli who was brutally beaten and tortured by Belarusian security forces in 2020 during demonstrations in Minsk, believes that Israel can no longer afford to stick to what he calls “cowardly neutrality.”

“When responding to the Belarusian diaspora in Israel, Yair Lapid hinted that the fear of waking up a sleeping bear on the ‘common border with Russia’ on the Golan prevented the Foreign Ministry from taking any active measures against Belarus,” Fruman told The Media Line. “A fear of unpredictable actions by the Belarusian regime against Jewish organizations in Belarus was also noted as a deterrent.”

“Fateful events are taking place in the world and, as things stand now, the cowardly silence of Israel will go down in history as a diplomatic disgrace and be an eternal stain on relations between the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Israeli peoples,” he said.

“The fact that the Foreign Ministry, under pressure from the United States, is ready to quietly express its position on what should be obvious, only makes Israel out to be not completely independent in foreign policy and supports Putin’s mythical narrative that there is one sovereign and his vassals,” he added.

It is still unclear whether Israel will support American actions in case of further escalation in Ukraine. But it seems that the pressure on decision-makers in Jerusalem from within and without will continue to mount. Eventually, Israel, a staunch US ally, might discover that neutrality is not always the right or the easy choice.

The op-ed was published in The Media Line in February 2022.

הפוסט Israel Weighs Its Neutrality on Russia-Ukraine Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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By threat or raw power, Russia is determined to get its way in a post-Soviet world https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/by-threat-or-raw-power-russia-is-determined-to-get-its-way-in-a-post-soviet-world/ Mon, 21 Feb 2022 10:14:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7355 On March 24, 1999, then-Russian prime minister Yevgeny Primakov was en route to the US for a visit. While flying over the Atlantic, he was informed that NATO forces had begun bombing Yugoslavia without even a UN Security Council resolution and against Russia’s position. Primakov immediately ordered the plane to turn around and return to Moscow for urgent consultations with president Boris Yeltsin. His decision signaled the start of a new era in Russian relations with the West. Several months after Primakov expressed his displeasure with NATO’s conduct in Yugoslavia, an energetic young president came to power in Moscow. His name was Vladimir Putin. He decried the breakup of the Soviet Union and dreamed of restoring influence and power to Russia. Addressing the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy, Putin expressed his intentions in bold, outspoken language that stunned the high-ranking participants. “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable, but also impossible in today’s world,” he said, adding a sentence that presaged every development in the post-Soviet world over the past two decades. “It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfill the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all,” the Russian president said, wondering, “What happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?” In 2022, no one is in any doubt: The era of unipolar American global predominance is over. Putin’s Russia is one of the

הפוסט By threat or raw power, Russia is determined to get its way in a post-Soviet world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On March 24, 1999, then-Russian prime minister Yevgeny Primakov was en route to the US for a visit. While flying over the Atlantic, he was informed that NATO forces had begun bombing Yugoslavia without even a UN Security Council resolution and against Russia’s position. Primakov immediately ordered the plane to turn around and return to Moscow for urgent consultations with president Boris Yeltsin.

His decision signaled the start of a new era in Russian relations with the West. Several months after Primakov expressed his displeasure with NATO’s conduct in Yugoslavia, an energetic young president came to power in Moscow. His name was Vladimir Putin. He decried the breakup of the Soviet Union and dreamed of restoring influence and power to Russia.

Addressing the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy, Putin expressed his intentions in bold, outspoken language that stunned the high-ranking participants. “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable, but also impossible in today’s world,” he said, adding a sentence that presaged every development in the post-Soviet world over the past two decades.

“It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfill the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all,” the Russian president said, wondering, “What happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”

In 2022, no one is in any doubt: The era of unipolar American global predominance is over. Putin’s Russia is one of the many actors challenging it.

Russia is not the Soviet Union and its economy is medium-sized and riddled with systemic flaws. Nonetheless, it is still a nuclear power covering immense areas with a strong military that is skilled and experienced in combat in Syria and Ukraine over the past eight years. It wants to take what it perceives as its due, whether through diplomacy, threats or force.

Since Russia recovered from the economic crisis induced by the Soviet Union’s breakup, its positions have remained steadfast: First, it views itself as a global force that must be reckoned with, and second, that there will be no expansion of NATO at the expense of the post-Soviet states, which Putin treats as his natural playground.

The current Russian campaign against Ukraine may have started out as an attempt to achieve its desired results through manipulation – deploying forces (as it has done in the past), issuing threats and trying to squeeze far-reaching concessions from the West, while demarcating borders of influence and signaling other post-Soviet states to beware.

Putin knows that President Biden is focused on China, that his domestic standing is shaky, and that he is still recovering from the fiasco of the chaotic Afghanistan pullout.

Putin has no real desire to rule Kyiv by force, first of all because such a scenario would incur unbearable costs, externally – stifling international sanctions; domestically – high casualties. He would rather advance his goals through sophisticated tactics that combine the threat of force, psychological warfare and a war of information.

BUT CONTRARY to the Russian forecast, the West has not folded and instead began preparing energetically for a possible war in Ukraine, despite feeble sounds of opposition emanating from Kyiv.

Authorities in the Ukrainian capital realize fully that Putin is not necessarily interested in taking a bite out of their territory (after all, occupied territory needs to be administered, a heavy burden as the Middle East well knows). They also realize that they will be the ones paying the price for the clash between Russia and the West.

Prospects of Ukraine’s acceptance by NATO have always been slim to none. A test case in this regard is Georgia, for years considered a “candidate” for NATO accession but whose candidacy is advancing slowly; another example is Turkey’s protracted attempts to join the EU.

The West will not send its armies to save Ukraine, will not deploy ground forces on its territory, and will not accept it into NATO nor into the EU. Since Western states ordered the evacuation of their Kyiv embassies and a halt of flights, the Ukrainian economy has taken a deadly hit.

In this sense, Putin has already won, because any post-Soviet state that dares to eye the West will know that when chased by the Russian bear, no club-wielding ally will rush to its side.

President Putin is capable of drawing out these tensions for weeks, as long as they serve him so well. On the other hand, he might decide to expand Russia’s activities in eastern Ukraine, where war already has been underway for eight years.

He will choose the scenario that is most beneficial at any given moment. He may be hit with tough personal sanctions in the short term, but the Europeans are unlikely to cooperate with the US in the long term by cutting off their northern neighbor completely.

However, this discourse on sanctions of one kind or another is irrelevant in a broader context, which is far more significant than the current speculation about the day war will break out with Ukraine. The unipolar world that Putin spoke about in 2007 is no more and the regional fight for spheres of influence is heating up.

The dramatic events in Ukraine are bound to affect the Middle East, too. Russia, China and even Iran are about to challenge the US, which has lost interest in the region and is on its way out. The implications for Israel’s security could be harsh and dangerous.

**The article was published on Jpost, 21 February 2022

הפוסט By threat or raw power, Russia is determined to get its way in a post-Soviet world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The war in Ukraine that hasn’t happened and how the media failed https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-war-in-ukraine-that-hasnt-happened-and-how-the-media-failed/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 11:07:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8626 Ukrainian parents received a text message from the Education Ministry on Tuesday that called on them to send their children to school the following day in national outfits to celebrate the Unity Day earlier proclaimed by President Volodymyr Zelensky. While media outlets all over the world counted down the hours before the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as if it were a New Year’s celebration on Times Square, Russian politicians repeatedly denied this scenario and Ukrainians carried on with their daily lives. As foreign embassies and companies were being evacuated, the Ukrainian government, army command and parliament stayed put; not because they didn’t fear war and death, but because they assessed that war was not imminent. At the same time, foreign leaders planned visits to Kyiv for February 16, February 17 and dates in the future. This did not stop the speculations, apocalyptic predictions and media frenzy surrounding the activity on the border between Russia and Ukraine, probably because – along with questionable reports in British tabloids that suddenly became a credible source of information – US President Joe Biden himself stood firmly behind the “imminent invasion” theory. There is little doubt that President Biden was relying on the American intelligence interpretation of what was happening on the Russian-Ukrainian border, yet it was left up to the media to corroborate the information provided to the president from other sources, pose questions, raise doubts and simply do its job. While nobody in the West doubts that Russian President Vladimir Putin wages

הפוסט The war in Ukraine that hasn’t happened and how the media failed הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Ukrainian parents received a text message from the Education Ministry on Tuesday that called on them to send their children to school the following day in national outfits to celebrate the Unity Day earlier proclaimed by President Volodymyr Zelensky.

While media outlets all over the world counted down the hours before the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as if it were a New Year’s celebration on Times Square, Russian politicians repeatedly denied this scenario and Ukrainians carried on with their daily lives.

As foreign embassies and companies were being evacuated, the Ukrainian government, army command and parliament stayed put; not because they didn’t fear war and death, but because they assessed that war was not imminent. At the same time, foreign leaders planned visits to Kyiv for February 16, February 17 and dates in the future.

This did not stop the speculations, apocalyptic predictions and media frenzy surrounding the activity on the border between Russia and Ukraine, probably because – along with questionable reports in British tabloids that suddenly became a credible source of information – US President Joe Biden himself stood firmly behind the “imminent invasion” theory.

There is little doubt that President Biden was relying on the American intelligence interpretation of what was happening on the Russian-Ukrainian border, yet it was left up to the media to corroborate the information provided to the president from other sources, pose questions, raise doubts and simply do its job. While nobody in the West doubts that Russian President Vladimir Putin wages a hybrid war that includes massive use of disinformation and manipulations, it appears that the other side uses psychological warfare and its own disinformation for political and other gains.

First of all, let’s set the record straight: no one denies that the escalation between Russia and Ukraine is very real and that a large number of Russian soldiers and military equipment are currently stationed near its borders with Ukraine. The current Russian military exercise that involves many thousands of troops is not the first – in fact, it is the third military exercise of this magnitude to have taken place during the last 12 months, yet it is the largest exercise in Europe for the past three decades. For the time being, some Western leaders and experts estimate that according to intelligence data the war is imminent, while others, such as the UK secretary of state, believe that the current phase of escalation could “drag on for months.” Though Russia launched a war in 2008 against Georgia and annexed Crimea in 2014, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a Russian invasion of Ukraine is imminent and inevitable, according to experts.

Dr. Sagi Elbaz, a political communication researcher and lecturer at Oranim College who has written several books on the media and political reporting in Israel, believes that Israeli media coverage of the developments on the Russian-Ukrainian border has been quite shallow while many important questions have not been asked.

“As a communications researcher, I do not feel that the media is giving me the full picture. If someone says that there are 150,000 troops on the border, what is the source for that? Also, there was hardly any background and context – is there any connection to American exercises in the Black Sea, how is NATO expansion seen in Russia, what is happening in Ukraine, etc. The media should not focus just on one narrative, it should provide the full picture, to interview people on both sides and that was not done,” Elbaz told The Media Line.

But is it really possible to provide the full picture, to verify all the details and to get to the bottom of things in our current world since it is often impossible to tell right from left and truth from fake? For the last few years, the world has been awash with disinformation campaigns and the search for actual facts is getting harder. During the war in Syria, for example, the media has often been shaken by the blunt attempts of both sides to lie, manipulate and use fake news in order to defend the narrative, and verifying the facts has often been mission impossible.

Yoram Peri, an expert on politics and communications and a professor at the University of Maryland who serves there as director and Kay Chair in Israel Studies at Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies, believes that despite the obvious difficulty, it is still possible for the media to perform its duty and to provide balanced and nuanced reporting.

“Anyone who is leaning on the guiding principles of journalism can stand against this stream of fake news and disinformation, even if it sometimes is extremely difficult. I believe that it’s crucial for the reporter to cross-check the facts. In Israel today this principle is dead. Calling different sources? Corroborating the news? This is over. But the thing is that if you have some breaking news that was released by let’s say CBS, you have to look for other sources as well. What does European media say? What do other reliable news sources say? Second of all, a reporter cannot be passive,” Peri told The Media Line.

“One of the awful things that happened with the media today is that it became passive. You receive some information, and then you just publish it as is. Very often the source isn’t even mentioned, especially when we deal with defense and security issues. I believe that it’s crucial for the reporter to reveal the source of information. Don’t just write that the ‘troops are moving.’ Who is the source? Be specific! Check if this source is associated with some specific agenda,” he also said.

“One of the most fascinating things that happened during the last few days, when the West was bracing for war in Ukraine, was Ukraine itself. The country that was supposed to be wiped from the map – according to endless Western experts and pundits – cried out that the doomsday scenario of conquering Kyiv and rolling the Russian tanks all over the country just wasn’t true. So why did nobody in the media in Israel and in the West choose to listen to the Ukrainians,” Peri added.

Elbaz believes that Israeli reporting on the situation in Ukraine has been biased. “We always talk about Putin’s Russia – a great power that has nuclear weapons, while Ukraine is perceived to be a poor state. Its citizens go to Israel to seek jobs, they are engaged in manual labor, and Ukraine is probably seen as a smaller player that is squeezed between the Great Powers. That’s why there was little attention to what was actually happening there,” he said.

Peri points to the sensationalism that has become the most dominant feature of many media outlets. “This is very dangerous. The media, especially in Israel, is chasing sensations, rather than facts. And this is the result – leaning on something that was reported by a British tabloid,” he said.

The current escalation between Russia and Ukraine will probably continue beyond the dates that are circulating in the media. The Russian troops will stay at the border, as well as in Belarus, which has rapidly turned into another Russian base of operations and lost much of its independence; meanwhile, the military confrontation in Eastern Ukraine between the separatists and the Ukrainian army will continue. There might be or might not be a war. The question is whether the media will choose to learn from its current failure and change the optics the next time the dates of a possible invasion are flying around and avoid sensationalism, even if it helps sell papers.

The op-ed was published in JPost in February 2022.

הפוסט The war in Ukraine that hasn’t happened and how the media failed הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Jerusalem Tries to Navigate Russia-US-Israel Triangle Over Ukraine Conflict https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/jerusalem-tries-to-navigate-russia-us-israel-triangle-over-ukraine-conflict/ Mon, 14 Feb 2022 11:02:53 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8619 The war clouds over Ukraine grow ever darker as Russian forces amass on the borders, on three sides, and Western media speculate on when exactly “D-Day” will come. Western diplomats are leaving and foreign governments, including Israel, are urgently calling on their citizens to come home, to the frustration of Ukrainians, who believe that Kyiv will not be bombed or occupied, and that war with Russia is still just one of many possibilities. In addition to issuing the travel warning to its citizens, Israel also evacuated the families of the diplomats from Kyiv. Interestingly, the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem cited the “worsening of the situation in Ukraine,” without mentioning Russia or a possible war between it and Ukraine. Since 2015, when Russia interfered in the war in Syria, Israel has been coordinating its combat activities there with the Russian army command. Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian skies largely depends on this coordination. Unlike other Western countries, Israel is being extra careful walking the tightrope between Russia and Ukraine. While President Joe Biden warns the world of “Russian aggression,” Israel is focusing on possible evacuation of Israelis and Jews and providing some humanitarian assistance. It seems, however, that Kyiv is growing tired of this balancing act. Yevgen Korniychuk, Ukraine’s ambassador in Tel Aviv, lately criticized Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and blamed him for “adopting the Kremlin’s rhetoric.” “If war breaks out in Europe − I suggest that Israel will be left alone in the face of the Iranian threat,” Korniychuk

הפוסט Jerusalem Tries to Navigate Russia-US-Israel Triangle Over Ukraine Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The war clouds over Ukraine grow ever darker as Russian forces amass on the borders, on three sides, and Western media speculate on when exactly “D-Day” will come.

Western diplomats are leaving and foreign governments, including Israel, are urgently calling on their citizens to come home, to the frustration of Ukrainians, who believe that Kyiv will not be bombed or occupied, and that war with Russia is still just one of many possibilities.

In addition to issuing the travel warning to its citizens, Israel also evacuated the families of the diplomats from Kyiv. Interestingly, the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem cited the “worsening of the situation in Ukraine,” without mentioning Russia or a possible war between it and Ukraine. Since 2015, when Russia interfered in the war in Syria, Israel has been coordinating its combat activities there with the Russian army command. Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian skies largely depends on this coordination.

Unlike other Western countries, Israel is being extra careful walking the tightrope between Russia and Ukraine. While President Joe Biden warns the world of “Russian aggression,” Israel is focusing on possible evacuation of Israelis and Jews and providing some humanitarian assistance.

It seems, however, that Kyiv is growing tired of this balancing act. Yevgen Korniychuk, Ukraine’s ambassador in Tel Aviv, lately criticized Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and blamed him for “adopting the Kremlin’s rhetoric.”

“If war breaks out in Europe − I suggest that Israel will be left alone in the face of the Iranian threat,” Korniychuk said. He was later summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem for a reprimand call.

On Sunday, the Israeli Friends of Ukraine organization called on the government to “join a number of Western countries in an effort to prevent war between Russia and Ukraine.”

The statement, which was published in social media and sent to offices of the prime minister, foreign minister, and minister of defense, made a moral argument for supporting Ukraine.

“As Israelis and Jews, we have experienced the horrors and disasters of wars, we understand the importance and value of support by friendly countries. … After all, the lessons of history have already taught us that indifference, watching from the sidelines, or attempts to appease the aggressor always lead to disaster,” the statement read.

“We are aware of the complexity of the security situation in the Middle East and the policy of ambiguity that Israel is pursuing while refraining from supporting either side in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. But at this critical moment, Israel, as an integral part of the family of liberal states and the Western world, cannot stand aside and watch from afar the relentless preparations for war,” the Israeli Friends of Ukraine’s appeal continued.

For now, there is no change in the Israeli position. But what will Israel do if the worst-case scenario eventuates? If the situation gets out of control and hostilities break out and shake the earth in Ukraine, will Israel keep to its neutrality and remain silent in order to appease the Russians?

Dr. Vera Michlin-Shapir, a visiting research fellow at the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications in London, believes the current conflict is much more than a regional brawl, but rather it is a tectonic clash between Russia and the West, which will make it significantly more difficult for Israel to maintain its balancing act.

“Russia wants to position itself as a Great Power. For that to happen, it aims to weaken the current Great Power – the collective West, i.e., the USA, Europe, and NATO. The Russians want to drive a wedge between the US and Europe, between Western and Eastern Europe,” Michlin-Shapir said.

“Ideally, they want to push the US away from Europe and to promote their plan for a ‘new European architecture’ that eventually will be led by Russia. I believe that now Israel will have to position itself where it belongs, with the USA,” she said.

Michlin-Shapir, who recently co-authored with Ofer Fridman an analysis called “Smoke and mirrors: Western misperceptions of Russia in Ukraine,” which was published by Institute of Modern Russia, believes the West is wrong in using the dichotomic optics of war and peace in Ukraine, and assuming that Kremlin does the same.

“In reality, the Russian strategic mindset is more flexible, as it envisions the notions of war and peace as existing on a continuum,” Michlin-Shapir said. The current crisis will include many ups and downs, and this reality might allow Israel to use its leverage and its strategic place in the Russian-Ukrainian-American triangle, she continued.

“It’s not unreasonable that in the future Israel will be able to create new spaces of dialogue. But Israel first needs to mature as a diplomatic force. Yes, it needs to take Syria into account, but now that Israel plays along with the Great Powers it needs to toughen up and to put its strategic alliances – specifically its alliance with the US − on the table,” Michlin-Shapir told the Media Line.

Dr. Evgeny Klauber, an expert on former Soviet Union countries from Tel Aviv University, warns that regardless of whether Israel maintains silence on war in Ukraine, the consequences of this conflict are already inevitable. In his assessment, war may still be prevented, or limited to areas of Eastern Ukraine, but even the possibility has already led to major developments in the Middle East.

“In the current situation, the US weakness in the Middle East will grow, and the Iranians might be drawn closer to Russia. In fact, there might be a direct connection between the US’s speedy retreat from Afghanistan and current events in Ukraine. The Middle East will feel the fire as well; it’s inevitable,” Klauber said.

The op-ed was published in The Media Line in February 2022.

הפוסט Jerusalem Tries to Navigate Russia-US-Israel Triangle Over Ukraine Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU on the EU’s Trade with Israel’s Disputed Territories https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/judgments-by-the-court-of-justice-of-the-eu-on-the-eus-trade-with-israels-disputed-territories/ Fri, 17 Dec 2021 07:37:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7221 The EU is one of the largest trading partners of the Disputed Territories (DTs) in the world. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) reaffirmed the EU’s differentiation policy between Israeli products from within or outside the DTs. This paper considers the aptness of the role played by the CJEU, the effects and effectiveness of the judgments, and their foreseeable significant implications for Israel.     * Dr. Rachel Frid de Vries is a senior lecturer for international economic law at Ono Academic College, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI) and a former Senior Official for international affairs at the Israeli Ministry of Justice.

הפוסט Judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU on the EU’s Trade with Israel’s Disputed Territories הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU is one of the largest trading partners of the Disputed Territories (DTs) in the world. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) reaffirmed the EU’s differentiation policy between Israeli products from within or outside the DTs. This paper considers the aptness of the role played by the CJEU, the effects and effectiveness of the judgments, and their foreseeable significant implications for Israel.

 

 

* Dr. Rachel Frid de Vries is a senior lecturer for international economic law at Ono Academic College, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI) and a former Senior Official for international affairs at the Israeli Ministry of Justice.

הפוסט Judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU on the EU’s Trade with Israel’s Disputed Territories הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/renewed-partnership-with-the-southern-neighbourhood-implications-for-israel/ Sun, 25 Jul 2021 15:52:31 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6904 On 10 May 2021, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel. The event featured Mr. Michele Merloni, Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Ms. Noa Ginosar and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu. This document summarizes the key points raised in the discussion. Mr. Michele Merloni, Policy Officer – Relations with Israel, The European External Action Service: The Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood comes 25 years after the initiation of the Barcelona Process, with its main themes being human development, peace and security, migration and mobility, the strengthening of resilience and new themes of digital and green transition. Israel has a strong bilateral economic and technical cooperation with the EU. The EU is the first trading partner of Israel, and in the region Israel is the second or third partner of the EU. In the field of investments Israel is no. 1. Israel also engages in regional programs on various sectors, including climate, environment, and transport. By the end of 2021, we expect the implementation of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin (for those who complete the procedural adoption), which can help the economic integration of Israel in the South-Mediterranean region and with the EU. In the Joint Communication on the Renewed Partnership between the EU and the southern neighbourhood, the Commission proposes to mobilize up to EUR 7 billion under the Neighbourhood and Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Israel is mentioned

הפוסט Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 10 May 2021, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel. The event featured Mr. Michele Merloni, Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Ms. Noa Ginosar and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu. This document summarizes the key points raised in the discussion.

Mr. Michele Merloni, Policy Officer – Relations with Israel, The European External Action Service: The Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood comes 25 years after the initiation of the Barcelona Process, with its main themes being human development, peace and security, migration and mobility, the strengthening of resilience and new themes of digital and green transition.

Israel has a strong bilateral economic and technical cooperation with the EU.

The EU is the first trading partner of Israel, and in the region Israel is the second or third partner of the EU. In the field of investments Israel is no. 1.

Israel also engages in regional programs on various sectors, including climate, environment, and transport. By the end of 2021, we expect the implementation of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin (for those who complete the procedural adoption), which can help the economic integration of Israel in the South-Mediterranean region and with the EU.

In the Joint Communication on the Renewed Partnership between the EU and the southern neighbourhood, the Commission proposes to mobilize up to EUR 7 billion under the Neighbourhood and Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Israel is mentioned in the Joint Communication regarding digital transformation and research and innovation, in light of its great added value in those sectors.

In the same document, the EU mentions that it is willing and ready to explore regional, sub-regional or trilateral cooperation and joint initiatives, also in the light of the recent normalization agreements.

Now is the time to reflect and exchange ideas on how to operationalize the Normalization Agreements, how the EU can support the process, the ways in which Israel can contribute and receive economic and political added value from the Renewed Partnership and the areas that can be explored. We attach importance to P2P and initiatives between municipalities, SMEs, schools, universities, associations, etc. Climate change and digitalization are also of importance. It is time to come with initiatives. The participation of experts from Israel and the region is also welcomed.

Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Research Fellow, Center for European Reform: The Renewed Partnership is an effort to broaden the EU agenda and give greater prominence to green and digital issues, while emphasizing a people-centered agenda on youth and women, rule of law, and democracy.

The question remains to which extent what the EU is offering to its partners is an incentive for them to undertake reforms. This is also because the European model is becoming less attractive and less visible in the region given that there are emerging alternatives such as Russia and China, and the Gulf model.

The Renewed Partnership points to the EU’s wish to play a bigger role in regional conflicts and in the field of security. But the EU has hardly been an influential security actor in the region. Member States have been divided in their positions, which hinders EU action. The EU is unwilling to take on hard security challenges and to think strategically about them. This also comes at a time when the EU is more likely to be focused on internal matters rather than on an external agenda.

Regarding implications for Israel, the Renewed Partnership does not bring major changes in EU policy. The EU will keep looking with Israel for ways to deepen the economic and other frameworks of cooperation. There is much potential to cooperate in the Green and Digital fields. The EU will try and preserve the two-state solution. This is explicitly stated in the document. This will amount to attempt to foster more democracy and accountability in the Palestinian Authority, and member states might want to take a look at the differentiation agenda in response to Israel’s settlement building. The legal framework is there, but it’s not fully implemented, so there might be gradual moves in that direction, but it’s not a priority for the EU, partly because of the internal divisions. If more member states become convinced that what emerges is a one state reality, that gradually would shift and undermine Israel – EU relations and cooperation.

Ms. Noa Ginosar, Political Counselor, Mission of Israel to the EU: The EU worked in partnership with its neighbours in producing the Renewed Partnership document. Foreign Minister, Gabi Ashkenazi, participated in the discussions that Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi (DG NEAR) and High Representative Joseph Borrel conducted with the Southern neighbourhood countries in order to better understand their priorities and challenges. This process was undertaken in order to engage in dialogue with the partner counties, and better understand their challenges and their ideas of projects they would like to advance The Covid-19 crisis has shown that we share joint challenges that cross borders, and those regions need to enrichen and deepen the dialogue and cooperation between them. The EU has a clear interest in tapping into this discussion and can utilize its leadership to foster better relations between different partners that can benefit from cooperating in order to address these challenges. Energy, climate and also defence and security are no longer phenomena which happen in separate countries. These are all regional issues that require dialogue.

From the perspective of Israel, it was significant that the EU’s approach to the Renewed Partnership recognized the most important development in the region in recent times – the normalization of Israel’s relations with new regional partners. In this way, the Renewed Partnership brings forth a tangible connection between regional developments, and EU-Southern Neighborhood relations. Normalization has brought a change of paradigm for the region, for Israel, for the Arab and Muslim world. We see in this process positive implications for the EU both internally and from a regional perspective.

Europe can strengthen its role in the region by tapping into these new developments. We’re looking forward to further exploring with our European partners how to take this forward, by looking at more operational elements and concrete ideas. This process should advance in parallel to the signature of a Partnership Priority agreement between Israel and the EU.

Normalization has already brought forward a myriad of concrete initiatives which are already occurring, with or without Europe. We wish to see the EU and the member states as a very clear partner in this. This would serve to embolden European relevance in the region, as well as in the context of bilateral Israel-EU relations, which can only benefit from cooperation in this area of mutual interest for Israel, the EU and the greater Southern Neighborhood.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Co-President, IASEI; Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations, Mitvim Institute: The normalization agreements bring hope for expanding regional stability and economic cooperation and development. They can serve as a new trigger for a renewed MEPP.

Within the Renewed Partnership, Israel and the Arab countries it has relations with (Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Morocco and possibly also the PA) should decide what regional and inter-regional projects to suggest to the EU. Many projects can be envisaged under the goals the EU set, be it infrastructure to enhance economic relations, or the green and digital transition, climate change, etc. The indirect opportunity is the improvement of EU – Israeli relations if such regional process would take place also under its auspice.

The next Israeli foreign minister should take advantage of the options in the Renewed Partnership, adopt a positive attitude towards the EU, and visit Brussels instead of visiting member states capitals only.

The EU, meanwhile, should consider renewing the Association Council with Israel. It is a commitment the EU and Israel took upon themselves in the 1995 Association Agreement. It will improve the relations with Israel and domestic public opinion on the EU. The EU’s model is to advance through dialogue. From all the countries in the region, not holding the Association Council with Israel is imbalanced.

The EU should also sign Partnership Priorities with Israel, as it did with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon in the past years.

Israel should also evaluate whether it desires to start negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area that deals with services, investments and removal of non-trade barriers.

However, even if no Partnership Priorities is signed, the Joint Communication allows to develop these priorities on the basis of “equivalent policy documents”. In 2005 Israel signed an “Action Plan” with the EU, which is the old generation of the Partnership Priorities. It is not updated but it is very elaborate, and can serve as the basis on which to further develop the relationship.

To watch the conference on the EU’s “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighborhood”, click here.

הפוסט Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Improving access to the EU’s market for services https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/improving-access-to-the-eus-market-for-services/ Wed, 09 Jun 2021 07:29:03 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=7209 Regulatory heterogeneity between Israel and its key trading partners restricts the potential for bilateral trade. Approximation of the European Union’s regulatory standards would contribute to increased trade and investment. Upgrading Israel’s 1995 trade agreement with the EU could provide the optimal response to the regulatory heterogeneity and improve mutual access to markets for services.   *Marc Luban works for the Finance Ministry’s Chief Economist. He is responsible for ties with the OECD, the IMF and the EU

הפוסט Improving access to the EU’s market for services הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Regulatory heterogeneity between Israel and its key trading partners restricts the potential for bilateral trade. Approximation of the European Union’s regulatory standards would contribute to increased trade and investment. Upgrading Israel’s 1995 trade agreement with the EU could provide the optimal response to the regulatory heterogeneity and improve mutual access to markets for services.

 

*Marc Luban works for the Finance Ministry’s Chief Economist. He is responsible for ties with the OECD, the IMF and the EU

הפוסט Improving access to the EU’s market for services הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/renewed-partnership-with-the-southern-neighbourhood-implications-for-israel/ Tue, 25 May 2021 20:36:06 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=7319 On 10 May 2021, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel. The event featured Mr. Michele Merloni, Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Ms. Noa Ginosar and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu.  

הפוסט Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 10 May 2021, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel. The event featured Mr. Michele Merloni, Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Ms. Noa Ginosar and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu.

 

הפוסט Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Principles and Recommendations for Israel’s Foreign Policy Towards the EU; Recommendations from a Mitvim Institute Task-Team https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/principles-and-recommendations-for-israels-foreign-policy-towards-the-eu-recommendations-from-a-mitvim-institute-task-team/ Mon, 26 Apr 2021 10:35:21 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6665 Relations with the EU are a strategic asset and central element to Israel. Not only is Europe Israel’s largest trading partner, but Europe also provides a pillar of norms and values with which Israel identifies, a source of diplomatic and security support, the primary partner in research and innovation as well as in shared cultural endeavors. Given the vital importance of these ties, Israel must devote attention and resources to preserving, expanding and deepening them. This document presents principles and recommendations in four key policy areas – Israel’s attitude towards ties with the EU, as well as diplomatic, civil, and economic relations. These recommendations were put together by a Mitvim Institute task-team, comprised of Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Amb. (Ret.) Eviatar Manor, MK Nitzan Horowitz (while out of office), Dr. Eyal Ronen, Raanan Eliaz, Dr. Roee Kibrik and Merav Kahana-Dagan, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Principles and Recommendations for Israel’s Foreign Policy Towards the EU; Recommendations from a Mitvim Institute Task-Team הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Relations with the EU are a strategic asset and central element to Israel. Not only is Europe Israel’s largest trading partner, but Europe also provides a pillar of norms and values with which Israel identifies, a source of diplomatic and security support, the primary partner in research and innovation as well as in shared cultural endeavors. Given the vital importance of these ties, Israel must devote attention and resources to preserving, expanding and deepening them. This document presents principles and recommendations in four key policy areas – Israel’s attitude towards ties with the EU, as well as diplomatic, civil, and economic relations. These recommendations were put together by a Mitvim Institute task-team, comprised of Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Amb. (Ret.) Eviatar Manor, MK Nitzan Horowitz (while out of office), Dr. Eyal Ronen, Raanan Eliaz, Dr. Roee Kibrik and Merav Kahana-Dagan, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Principles and Recommendations for Israel’s Foreign Policy Towards the EU; Recommendations from a Mitvim Institute Task-Team הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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How Israel-EU relations have been impacted by Germany’s Council presidency https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/how-israel-eu-relations-have-been-impacted-by-germanys-council-presidency/ Sat, 30 Jan 2021 17:34:12 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6434 From July to December 2020, Israel had a window of political opportunity: Germany’s six-month period at the presidency of the Council of the European Union handed Israel an opportunity to improve its deteriorated relationship with the EU by harnessing its unique relations with Germany. During this period Israel perhaps could have reached an agreement with the EU to resume the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, which in turn could have advanced and upgraded the contractual relationships that are stuck since 2009. What were Israel’s achievements during Germany’s Presidency? The opening point seemed rather grim. The past decade includes the linkage policy by the EU, conditioning in 2008-09 the upgrading to a new action plan with Israel to an advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Another blow came in 2013, after the EU introduced the differentiation policy, explicitly excluding the occupied territories beyond the 1967 lines from all Israel-EU agreements. Since then, no Association Council convened (first due to Israel, but due to the EU since 2014). Labeling products from settlements came next. The Israeli government marked July 1, the first day of Germany’s presidency, as the date it can begin annexation of territories in the West Bank. During the first half of 2020, the EU and about half of its member states, including Germany, were conducting a diplomatic offensive against Israel to deter any annexation. Some member states, excluding Germany, even threatened Israel that the annexation would result in punitive “sticks,” ordering the European External Action Service (EEAS) to prepare

הפוסט How Israel-EU relations have been impacted <br> by Germany’s Council presidency הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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From July to December 2020, Israel had a window of political opportunity: Germany’s six-month period at the presidency of the Council of the European Union handed Israel an opportunity to improve its deteriorated relationship with the EU by harnessing its unique relations with Germany.

During this period Israel perhaps could have reached an agreement with the EU to resume the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, which in turn could have advanced and upgraded the contractual relationships that are stuck since 2009. What were Israel’s achievements during Germany’s Presidency?

The opening point seemed rather grim. The past decade includes the linkage policy by the EU, conditioning in 2008-09 the upgrading to a new action plan with Israel to an advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Another blow came in 2013, after the EU introduced the differentiation policy, explicitly excluding the occupied territories beyond the 1967 lines from all Israel-EU agreements. Since then, no Association Council convened (first due to Israel, but due to the EU since 2014). Labeling products from settlements came next.
The Israeli government marked July 1, the first day of Germany’s presidency, as the date it can begin annexation of territories in the West Bank. During the first half of 2020, the EU and about half of its member states, including Germany, were conducting a diplomatic offensive against Israel to deter any annexation.
Some member states, excluding Germany, even threatened Israel that the annexation would result in punitive “sticks,” ordering the European External Action Service (EEAS) to prepare a list of possible measures against Israel. While Germany warned Israel about the ramifications of annexation, the Israeli government relied on Germany (and others) to block the more severe measures against Israel.
The turn started on August 13, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the postponement of annexation for singing a peace accord with the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
This turnover from annexation to normalization surprised the EU. Netanyahu’s remarks in the Israeli media that the annexation was not canceled but rather postponed kept the EU’s suspicion toward Netanyahu’s government in place. And indeed, in November, before Biden’s inauguration, the Israeli government announced that it would advance the construction of 1,257 housing units in controversial Givat Hamatos in south Jerusalem. The EU considers such construction as de facto annexation that will prevent a territorial continuum between east Jerusalem and Bethlehem for a future Palestinian state.
Most Israelis view the EU as a foe, not a friend, critical toward Israel and siding with the Palestinians. These political disagreements reach the headlines and receive most of Israeli public attention, overshadowing the extensive cooperation with the EU.
Knowledgeable Israeli representatives are aware that in many areas the EU is of great strategic importance to Israel as its most important trading partner, the biggest external source of funding to Israeli research and innovation, most significant in foreign direct investments, and that it greatly contributes to Israel’s higher education, tourism, agriculture, culture and overall economic growth. However, for the relationship to be upgraded, the official bilateral high-level dialogue should resume.
Heading the Council of the EU gives the presidency a very modest influence, such as the power to set the meetings’ agenda. It is expected to be an honest mediator between the member states, to reach agreements and forward resolutions. The Treaty of Lisbon ratified in 2009 reduced the presidency’s importance over the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), giving the chairmanship to the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy (currently Josep Borrell), and it is the EEAS that sets the FAC’s agenda.
GERMANY HAS a leading position in the EU and a great deal of influence over it, but despite its honest efforts, it ran into the EU’s structural limitation, unable to overcome the politically difficult Israel-EU relationship. The EU foreign policy decision-making process requires a consensus among all member states. Any state can veto a proposition, and all states are equal. A vote by small member states, such as Luxembourg or Ireland, is equal to Germany’s.
The special relationship between Israel and Germany was further strengthened by the warm relationship forged between German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and his Israeli counterpart, Gabi Ashkenazi. Germany did a great service to Israel by inviting Ashkenazi to an informal meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers (known as a Gymnich meeting). Ashkenazi was the only non-EU foreign minister invited to the summit. He developed good relations with other foreign ministers, including Borrell.
These good personal relationships, together with actions taken before and after the summit, had a positive influence on the tone of the relationship between Israel and Europe and with the EU. Nevertheless, this did not translate into a formal decision by the FAC to resume the Association Council meetings with Israel or opening the possibility of upgrading the relationship. Still Israel’s Foreign Ministry deserves all the credit for attempting and partially succeeding to reverse the negative political tensions with the EU and to establish more positive relations.
The FAC always has a busy schedule, and it is difficult to put a topic that isn’t burning on the agenda, let alone a subject lacking consensus. Ashkenazi’s participation in the informal summit on August 27-28 was held only two weeks after Israel and the UAE announced their normalization agreement. Even the later normalization with Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco did not change the EU’s policy toward Israel.
Among other things, the fact that Ashkenazi (and Defense Minister Benny Gantz) were kept in the dark regarding the talks with the UAE made it much more difficult for the Foreign Ministry to utilize the historic achievement into further diplomatic achievements on the European front. The EU is a tough nut to crack, cumbersome and slow to change, adhering to its goal to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
The presidency passed to Portugal on January 1, and will transfer to Slovenia in July. Ashkenazi already asked Portugal to act in favor of reconvening the Association Council meetings with no preconditions. He said, “We identify a real need to adopt a new approach and model for cooperation between Israel and the EU institutions and we are convinced that Portugal [in its presidency] will act to do so.”
The ball is in Portugal’s court. Yet, bearing in mind Israel is entering another election, a real change between Israel and the EU is not expected to happen before the second half of 2021. As things stand today, the almost complete erase of the Israeli peace camp from the electoral landscape makes it unlikely that the next Israeli government will bring good news in this context, even toward the end of Portugal’s presidency.
In recent weeks, the EU passed its largest-ever budget of €1.8 trillion for 2021-2027. It intends to help the EU market recover faster from the pandemic-related economic crisis. The budget might entail new opportunities for Israel that are not yet clear, but various government ministries in Israel are working on mapping them out. The Israeli government could find itself in a better position to take advantage of those opportunities if it continues the positive trend toward the EU that Ashkenazi initiated and expands it into a comprehensive government policy.
**The article was published on Jpost, 30 January 2021

הפוסט How Israel-EU relations have been impacted <br> by Germany’s Council presidency הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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How Did Israel-EU Relations Evolve During Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the EU? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/how-did-israel-eu-relations-evolve-during-germanys-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/ Sun, 10 Jan 2021 13:22:55 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6306 Between July to December 2020 Israel had a political window of opportunity: Germany’s six-month period at the Presidency of the Council of the EU. It handed Israel an opportunity to improve its deteriorated relationship with the EU by harnessing its unique relations with Germany. During this period Israel perhaps could have reached an agreement with the EU to resume the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, which in turn could have advanced and upgraded the contractual relationship which are stuck since 2009. As Germany’s Presidency ends, let us review Israel’s achievements during this time frame. The opening point seemed rather grim. The past decade includes the linkage policy by the EU, conditioning in 2008-09 the upgrading to a new contractual Action Plan with Israel to an advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The relationship took another blow in 2013 after the EU introduced the differentiation policy, explicitly excluding territories beyond Israel’s 1967 lines from all Israel-EU agreements. Since, no Association Council convened (first due to Israel, but since 2014 due to the EU). Labelling settlements products came next. The Israeli government marked July 1st, the first day of Germany’s Presidency, as the date the government can begin annexing territories in the West Bank. During the first half of 2020, the EU and about half of its member states, including Germany, were engaged in a diplomatic offensive against Israel to deter against any annexation. Some member states, excluding Germany, even threatened Israel that the annexation will result in punitive “sticks”, ordering the

הפוסט How Did Israel-EU Relations Evolve During <br> Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the EU? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Between July to December 2020 Israel had a political window of opportunity: Germany’s six-month period at the Presidency of the Council of the EU. It handed Israel an opportunity to improve its deteriorated relationship with the EU by harnessing its unique relations with Germany. During this period Israel perhaps could have reached an agreement with the EU to resume the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, which in turn could have advanced and upgraded the contractual relationship which are stuck since 2009. As Germany’s Presidency ends, let us review Israel’s achievements during this time frame.

The opening point seemed rather grim. The past decade includes the linkage policy by the EU, conditioning in 2008-09 the upgrading to a new contractual Action Plan with Israel to an advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The relationship took another blow in 2013 after the EU introduced the differentiation policy, explicitly excluding territories beyond Israel’s 1967 lines from all Israel-EU agreements. Since, no Association Council convened (first due to Israel, but since 2014 due to the EU). Labelling settlements products came next.

The Israeli government marked July 1st, the first day of Germany’s Presidency, as the date the government can begin annexing territories in the West Bank. During the first half of 2020, the EU and about half of its member states, including Germany, were engaged in a diplomatic offensive against Israel to deter against any annexation. Some member states, excluding Germany, even threatened Israel that the annexation will result in punitive “sticks”, ordering the European External Action Service (EEAS) to prepare a list of possible measures to be taken against Israel if push comes to shove. While Germany warned Israel from the ramifications of annexation, chiefly the damage it will further cause to Israel’s relationship with the EU, the Israeli government relied on Germany (and others) to block the more severe measures against Israel.

The turn started on 13 August, when Netanyahu announced the postponement of annexation for singing a peace accord with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This radical shift from annexation to normalization came as a surprise to the EU. In its DNA, the EU supports regional peace processes, but the peace process it aspires for first and foremost is between Israel and the Palestinians, and based on the 1967 line, not on the Trump plan.

Netanyahu’s remarks in the Israeli media that the annexation was not cancelled but rather postponed, kept the EU’s suspicion towards Netanyahu’s government in place. And indeed, in November, before Biden’s inauguration, the Israeli government announced it will advance the construction of 1,257 housing units in the controversial Givat Hamatos (neighbourhood in south Jerusalem). The US and the EU had tried to prevent this construction over the last six years, believing it would harm the two-states solution. They consider such construction to be a de-facto annexation, which will also further drive a wedge between East Jerusalem and Bethlehem, preventing a territorial continuum for the future Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Most of the Israeli public conceives the EU as a foe, not as a friend; as a critical body towards Israel, siding with the Palestinians. The political disagreements between Israel and the EU and the EU’s criticism of Israeli policy in the West Bank reach the headlines and receive most of the Israeli public attention, overshadowing the wide economic, research and innovation and civilian cooperation among the two. Israeli knowledgeable representatives are aware that in many areas the EU is of greater strategic importance, in some fields even more significant than the United States. The EU is Israel’s most important trading partner, the biggest external source of funding to Israeli research and innovation, most significant in FDIs and greatly contributes to Israel’s higher education, tourism, agriculture, culture and overall economic growth. Therefore, it is important to resume the high-level dialogue between the sides to open the way to upgrade the relationship.

Once in thirteen-and-a-half years, an EU member state receives a modest influential position for six months at the presidency of the Council of the EU. The position entitles chairing the member states’ ministerial summits (e.g. meetings between all the member states’ ministers of economy, or of tourism, or agriculture etc.). The presidency has the power to set the meetings’ agenda and is expected to be an honest mediator between the member states, to reach agreements and forward resolutions. The Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in 2009, reduced the presidency’s importance in foreign policy. The foreign affairs council is chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (currently Josep Borrell) and it is the European External Action Service who sets this council’s agenda.

Germany has a leading position in the EU and a great deal of influence over it, but despite its honest efforts, it ran into the EU’s structural limitation, unable to overcome the politically difficult Israeli-EU relationship. The formal procedures governing the EU foreign policy decision-making process require a consensus among all member states. Under these procedures, any state can veto a proposition and all states are equal, hence a vote by small member states, such as Luxemburg, Ireland or Sweden, is equal to Germany, Austria or the Czech Republic.

The special relationship between Israel and Germany was strengthened by the warm relationship that was forged between the German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, and his Israeli counterpart Gabi Ashkenazi. Germany did a great service to Israel by inviting Ashkenazi to an informal meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers (known as a Gymnich meeting, which does not have the authority to make formal decisions). Ashkenazi was the only non-EU foreign minister invited to the summit. He developed good relations with other foreign ministers, including Borrell. The good personal relationships between Ashkenazi and his European counterparts, together with actions taken before and after the summit, had a positive influence on the tone of the relationship between Israel and Europe/the EU. Nevertheless, this did not translate into a formal decision by the Foreign Affairs Council to resume the Association Council meetings with Israel or opening the possibility of promoting and upgrading the relationship. Still, the Israeli foreign ministry deserves all the credit for attempting and partially succeeding to reverse the negative political tensions with the EU. Though no significant change occurred yet, important steps were taken and laid a much more positive infrastructure for the relations.

The Foreign Affairs Council always has a busy schedule, and it is difficult to put a topic that isn’t burning on the agenda, let alone a subject lacking consensus. Ashkenazi’s participation in the informal summit, held on August 27th-28th, was held only two weeks after Israel and the UAE announced their normalization agreement. Even the later normalization with Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco did not change the EU’s policy towards Israel. Among other things, the fact that Ashkenazi (and Minister of Defense Gantz) was kept in the dark regarding the talks with the UAE, made it much more difficult for the foreign ministry to utilize the historic achievement into further diplomatic achievements on the European front. Indeed, the EU is a tough nut to crack, cumbersome and slow to change, adhering to its principles and policies – advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

The presidency’s baton has passed into Portugal’s hands at the beginning of the new year, and thereafter to Slovenia in July 2021. Ashkenazi already asked Portugal to act in favor of reconvening the Association Council meetings with no preconditions and said: “we identify a real need to adopt a new approach and model for cooperation between Israel and the EU institutions and we are convinced that Portugal, the current chair of the presidency of the Council of the EU, will act to do so”. The ball is in Portugal’s hands. Yet, bearing in mind Israel is entering another elections, a real change between Israel and the EU is not expected to happen before the second half of 2021. As things stand today, the almost complete erase of the Israeli peace camp from the electoral landscape, makes it is unexpected that even towards the end of Portugal’s presidency the next Israeli government will bring good news in this context.

In recent weeks, the EU passed its largest-ever budget (of €1.8 trillion) for 2021-2027. The budget is almost twice as big as the previous budget and it intends to help the EU market recover faster from the Coronavirus economic crisis. The budget may entail new opportunities for Israel that are not yet clear, but various government ministries in Israel are working on mapping them out. The Israeli government can find itself in a better position to take advantage of those opportunities if it continues the positive trend towards the EU that Ashkenazi initiated and expand it into a comprehensive government policy.

הפוסט How Did Israel-EU Relations Evolve During <br> Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the EU? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment, November 2020 https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-regional-foreign-policies-an-annual-assessment-november-2020/ Wed, 25 Nov 2020 09:26:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6056 The Mitvim Institute presented its annual assessment of Israel’s regional foreign policies at its fourth annual conference on October 28, 2020. The conference was held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and with the participation of experts, government representatives and Members of Knesset (MKs). The first session, devoted to Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, featured Prof. Elie Podeh, Dr. Moran Zaga, Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Gabriel Mitchell, and Dr. Roee Kibrik (moderator). The second session, devoted to Israeli diplomacy in Arab and Muslim states, featured senior Foreign Ministry officials Haim Regev and Yael Ravia-Zadok, former MK Ksenia Svetlova, Dr. Ehud Eiran, and Dr. Nimrod Goren (moderator). Minister of Strategic Affairs and Tourism Orit Farkash-Hacohen, as well as MKs Nitzan Horowitz, Ofer Shelah and Aida Touma-Suleiman delivered keynote addresses at the conference. Opening Remarks Merav Kahana-Dagan, Deputy Head, Mitvim Institute The year 2020 will be remembered as a particularly strange one. On the one hand, Covid-19 seemed to bring the world to a stop and freeze everything in place; on the other, it was a year of change and development, both globally and regionally. Despite and along with all the challenges, we at the Mitvim Institute continued to advance a fix in Israel’s regional foreign policies. We saw progress and positive developments on some issues, while on others, progress is yet to be seen. We were successful in promoting joint action with government representatives and MKs to improve Israel’s foreign policy and strengthen the Foreign Service. We conducted

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment, November 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Mitvim Institute presented its annual assessment of Israel’s regional foreign policies at its fourth annual conference on October 28, 2020. The conference was held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and with the participation of experts, government representatives and Members of Knesset (MKs). The first session, devoted to Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, featured Prof. Elie Podeh, Dr. Moran Zaga, Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Gabriel Mitchell, and Dr. Roee Kibrik (moderator). The second session, devoted to Israeli diplomacy in Arab and Muslim states, featured senior Foreign Ministry officials Haim Regev and Yael Ravia-Zadok, former MK Ksenia Svetlova, Dr. Ehud Eiran, and Dr. Nimrod Goren (moderator). Minister of Strategic Affairs and Tourism Orit Farkash-Hacohen, as well as MKs Nitzan Horowitz, Ofer Shelah and Aida Touma-Suleiman delivered keynote addresses at the conference.

Opening Remarks

Merav Kahana-Dagan, Deputy Head, Mitvim Institute

The year 2020 will be remembered as a particularly strange one. On the one hand, Covid-19 seemed to bring the world to a stop and freeze everything in place; on the other, it was a year of change and development, both globally and regionally. Despite and along with all the challenges, we at the Mitvim Institute continued to advance a fix in Israel’s regional foreign policies. We saw progress and positive developments on some issues, while on others, progress is yet to be seen. We were successful in promoting joint action with government representatives and MKs to improve Israel’s foreign policy and strengthen the Foreign Service. We conducted regional dialogues with think tanks and experts from Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey. We sought to underscore the importance of relations with the EU and aided Israeli efforts to improve these ties. Just recently, we released the 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, an annual survey conducted for the eighth straight year in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, providing information and insights into the Israeli public’s views on a variety of foreign policy issues.

Dr. Paul PaschIsrael Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 

The Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung have been strategic partners since Mitvim was established in 2011. We are especially proud of the fact that the Mitvim Institute is one of the few Israeli organizations that still conducts policy dialogues with a variety of regional partners – Turks, Palestinians, Jordanians, as well as research institutes and organizations engaged in discourse about the Mediterranean. The Mitvim Institute, with its modest means, is ranked in a high and respected place on the University of Pennsylvania’s global think tank index, and this is certainly a source of pride. The Mitvim Institute plays an important role in preserving and improving the dialogue between Israel and the governing institutions of the EU. It currently appears there is an opportunity to renew and strengthen the significant Israel-EU relations, which have suffered over the last few years. In recent months, against the backdrop of the agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan, the Mitvim Institute helped us see beyond the sense of public euphoria and understand the process in a more nuanced perspective.

Israel’s Relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean

Dr. Roee Kibrik, Director of Research, Mitvim Institute

It is hard to pin down Israel as belonging to just one regional system. The State of Israel is somewhere in the middle, between and betwixt, inside and beside, and often outside several regions. That explains why respondents in the Mitvim Institute’s annual surveys, when asked “to which region does Israel primarily belong,” are usually rather evenly divided among the Middle East, Mediterranean and Europe. Israel seeks to advance its interests in all three, as part of the regional fabric and balance of power. We must remember that these regions are not separate from each other and are closely interlinked.

Many significant developments have occurred over the past year, some surprising, some initiated by Israel, some led by other players, and some the result of external circumstances. These developments present Israel with many challenges as well as opportunities. Israel is no longer the isolated, enemy-encircled island that it perceived itself as for many years. Israel is discovering that it has much to gain from cooperation and that it can conduct ties with various countries, even those in conflict with each other or with Israel.

Israel has adopted a complex and more nuanced regional foreign policy. While it appears that external circumstances led Israel to adopt this approach, rather than a reasoned, thought-out internal decision, Israel could benefit greatly if it develops a more sophisticated foreign policy in accordance with these changes and adapts its tools accordingly. To that end it must also transform its Foreign Service into a well-funded, effective and coordinated body that plays a significant role in Israel’s decision-making processes.

Prof. Elie Podeh, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

This was a difficult year, but it had some positive parts, and was clearly an unexpected one. Despite the heavy shadow of Covid-19, Israel signed three normalization agreements, with the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan. These contradict to a certain extent the accepted thesis that progress in Israel’s relations with the Arab world cannot occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Perhaps we failed to correctly assess the shift in parts of the Arab world, the extent of the Arab world’s impatience with the Palestinians, the level of US determination and the pandemic’s repercussions.

The biggest change stemming from the signed agreements is a tremendous improvement of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis its enemies. The second significant change is the benefit for Israel’s economy. What is more, Israel’s image in the media and civil society in some of the region’s states has been enhanced. This was no dramatic, immediate shift; we are talking about a gradual change. The Arab media’s attitude toward Israel is fundamentally negative, but the manner in which Gulf media views Israel has improved. There has also been a shift in the Arab attitude toward the concept of normalization. The peace with the UAE and Bahrain is a different kind of peace. It is substantially different from the peace with Egypt and Jordan, signed primarily with the regimes in those states. With the UAE and Bahrain, the change is also occurring from the bottom up, not just from the top down. This is another kind of peace.

However, we must not be lulled into euphoria, as we have been in the past. These are significant achievements, but they are taking place on the periphery of the Middle East and do not necessarily have a dramatic effect on some of the conflicts and problems plaguing the region. Ultimately, the Palestinian issue is the heart of the conflict and we cannot divert attention to the periphery and assume that this will resolve the conflict. We may have even distanced a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A political shift in the US could result in the hoped-for change that would place the Palestinian issue higher on the US agenda.

Dr. Moran Zaga, Research Fellow, Mitvim Institute

The agreement between Israel and the UAE is a groundbreaking event within a broader process. In recent years, the UAE has positioned itself as a regional power active on the regional and international level. The normalization with Israel signals another milestone in its quest for influence and its efforts to adopt courageous and reality-changing measures. The UAE has strategic and ideological motivations in this regard. Israel, for its part, has an interest in facilitating a significant role for the UAE in the Middle East because it holds regional views similar to our own and wields influence in places that Israel does not, such as in Syria and Iraq.

Israel has invested significant resources in developing ties with the UAE through government and civil society channels. The change in relations that will take place will find its expression not only in the openness of ties, but also in their extent, capacities, and wider array of cooperation – in research, culture, tourism and diplomacy. The two states have shared interests and potential for cooperation in additional fields, such as climate change, food security, energy, technology, regional security and the Iranian threat. The building of the joint platforms we are currently witnessing that encompass government ministries, dedicated task teams, civilian forums and Memorandums of Understanding is an encouraging signal of a firm foundation with continuity potential.

Maintaining the special fabric of relations woven between Israel and the UAE is important, as is expanding the ties created between a narrow stratum of decision makers into broader connections. Since the UAE is a federative state, it is worth trying to link up various local leaders to the process. Some of the emirates in the federation have yet to express their views on normalization, and it is important to monitor their attitude. The UAE needs additional legitimacy for the step it took, and it therefore hopes that other Arab states will follow. That is why the ties that it seeks to forge with Israel are regional and not just bilateral in nature. The two sides have a mutual interest: strengthening the Emirati move towards Israel and expanding Israel’s network of ties in the Middle East.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Director, Europe-Israel Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

Israel-EU relations started off in 2020 under the shadow of the Trump plan, deteriorated into threats of European punitive measures if Israel went ahead with its unilateral annexation intentions, and significantly improved under Gabi Ashkenazi as Israel’s foreign minister.

The EU is Israel’s biggest trade partner, providing it with a stick it can use against Israel with varying degrees of force that could all be harmful (for example, the possibility that was raised not to renew the EU’s research and innovation agreement with Israel for the 2021-2027 period). The suspension of the annexation plan paved the way for better relations, and Ashkenazi enjoys respect and a warm European embrace, not the least of which stems from European dislike of Netanyahu and Ashkenazi’s clear differentiation from him. Officials in Jerusalem, Berlin and Brussels are trying to leverage the archiving of the annexation plan in order to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012 and to which certain European states have objected in recent years.

Israel’s normalization agreements with Arab states is forcing the EU to recalibrate its course on a two-state solution, given that non-resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no longer poses an obstacle to normalization with some Arab states. In addition, in order for Israel to be more attentive to the EU, the organization would do well to undo the ineffective linkage it makes between progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the upgrading of Israel-EU ties. The government of Israel, for its part, must stop its incitement that depicts the EU as a foe rather than friend, and that encourages a negative attitude toward the EU in Israeli public opinion, which is without justification or foundation and is damaging to the relationship. The government of Israel must promote ties with the EU, which is a strategic partner of the State of Israel. We must base our relations on dialogue, even if a critical one, and manage to once again distinguish between politics and interests.

Gabriel Mitchell, Director of External Relations, Mitvim Institute

The combination of Israel’s economic and strategic capabilities has created many opportunities in the Mediterranean. The discovery of natural gas has allowed Israel to dialogue with its neighbors and expand contacts with them. This past year, Israel signed the convention that anchors the status of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) as an internationally recognized organization, signed agreements with the governments of Cyprus and Greece on gas exports via the planned East Med pipeline, and worked together with Greece and Cyprus to stem the spread of Covid-19 and maintain open skies for tourism. Israel also offered Lebanon humanitarian aid following the Beirut port explosion, named Amira Oron as Ambassador to Egypt, maintained open dialogue and cooperation channels with Turkey, and coordinated with Egypt, Qatar, the UN and other international players to allow goods into Gaza and avoid eroding the status quo.

Israel currently faces three significant challenges in the region. It can no longer rely solely on the US, which is in the process of withdrawing from the region, and it must therefore look out for its own strategic interests and find additional pathways to advancing its goals in the region. The two other challenges stem from the collapse of global energy prices and the freeze placed on gas exploration in the Mediterranean as a result of the Covid-19 crisis, and Turkey’s challenge to the regional order with an aggressive foreign policy in a bid to expand its sphere of influence. In order to advance its interests in the Mediterranean, Israel could bolster ties with its EMGF partners, expand cooperation with them on issues such as the environment, renewable energy, tourism, cyber and maritime security. Israel could also strengthen ties with European states invested in the region’s future, encourage US participation in the EMGF and expand joint Israeli-American research projects to additional states, display willingness to resolve the maritime border issue with Lebanon, find a solution to the Gaza energy crisis, and maintain open communication channels with Turkey.

Israeli Diplomacy in Muslim and Arab States

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Mitvim Institute

New opportunities have opened for Israel in the Middle East in recent years. Relationships with Arab states are changing, facilitating new and expanded cooperation. The ties are no longer mostly clandestine and security-focused as they were previously; they are increasingly open and also include civilian, economic and diplomatic aspects. The Israeli public and decision makers have identified this shift and are increasingly viewing the Middle East as a region with potential for cooperation and not just as an arena in which Israel must defend itself from its neighbors. The realization of the full potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. That is true even as some Arab states are willing to normalize ties with Israel in return for suspension of Israel’s annexation intentions, even without concrete progress toward peace with the Palestinians. However, other factors are also delaying the realization of the potential in Israel-Arab relations, among them the Israeli government’s domestic conduct.

The State Comptroller’s report issued this year pointed to serious shortcomings in Israel’s Foreign Service. Other than the Foreign Ministry, which has been significantly and deliberately weakened in recent years, over 30 other government ministries and agencies are active in the foreign policy arena, without a central body to coordinate their activities. This is apparent in the management of Israel’s ties with Arab states, and examples of the issues that arise due to this lack of centralization have emerged over the past two months since the announcement of normalization with the UAE. Key examples include tensions between the security and diplomatic echelons and the continued dominance of security officials on foreign policy issues; the rivalry and lack of cooperation among various government ministries operating vis-à-vis Arab states; the absence of effective Knesset oversight, particularly by the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, over the government’s implementation of foreign policy; and the need for a more effective interface between government agencies and the business and civil society sectors.

With Israel facing new opportunities and forging new ties in the region, a greater synergy must be created among the various elements involved in Israel-Arab relations, and their friction and rivalry must be set aside. Management of the evolving ties with our neighbors must be entrusted to the professionals most equal to the task, with a leading role for the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats. The emerging new period in the Middle East opens a window of opportunity to re-examine Israeli diplomacy in Arab and Muslim states.

Dr. Ehud Eiran, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

The Abraham Accords stemmed primarily from security-strategic interests, such as the need to confront Iran and prepare for the apparent decline in the US commitment to the Middle East. That explains the significant role of Israeli security officials in progress toward the normalization agreements, in dialogue and contacts with Gulf regimes and security counterparts there.

Years ago, diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the Arab world were managed by the agency that preceded Israel’s Foreign Ministry – the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, which also conducted intelligence gathering activities in the Middle East. In later years, Israel’s contacts with Arab states became a military issue (for example, meetings of the armistice committees), largely clandestine in nature (for example, smuggling Jews out of northern Africa), leading to the “securitization” of Israeli relations with the Middle East. There is also a lateral-generational aspect involved. The first Foreign Ministry officials to deal with the Arab issue (such as Eliyahu Eilat and Eliyahu Sasson) were products of an open Middle Eastern environment that closed after Israel’s establishment.

The peace with Egypt and Jordan and the diplomatic processes of the 1990s brought the Foreign Ministry back, to a certain extent and at least at the time, to the Middle Eastern arena with the opening of several representative missions in regional capitals. In other words, the type of interaction between Israel and Arab states has generally determined the identity of the Israeli agency leading the relationship. The undermining of Foreign Ministries in the conduct of foreign relations both in Israel and elsewhere in the world has also affected this aspect.

An opportunity has now opened up to expand the Foreign Ministry’s role in relations with Arab states. Hopes of civilian ties, nurtured at the time of the peace agreement signing with Egypt and Jordan, were dashed; security issues have since dominated those relations. However, Israel’s emerging ties with Gulf states hold a promise of success. There is already a history of civilian cooperation with those states that can be leveraged, Gulf states are far from the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and their general agendas underscore greater openness to the world. An example of the Foreign Ministry’s importance in the renewed ties with the Arab world comes into play in multilateral aspects, such as the formal Israeli mission to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi and Israel’s membership in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum headquartered in Cairo.

Haim Regev, Deputy Director General for Middle East, Foreign Ministry

Israel’s Foreign Ministry under a full-time minister is in a different and better place these days than it was six months ago, and that includes participation in decision making, a significant budget, broader areas of responsibility, and more. In examining the Foreign Ministry’s activity in the Middle East, we have to keep in mind who Israel’s interlocutors are in those states. Often, they are security and intelligence officials associated with the rulers of those states, and therefore their natural partners on the Israeli side are also security officials. Links with the Foreign Ministry are often perceived in Arab states as the final stage before normalization of relations. Nonetheless, since the 1990s, the Ministry has had varied ties in the Middle East with relevant elements, especially in the Gulf. The Ministry’s greatest achievement has been the “routinization” effect – accustoming Arab states to Israeli presence in their territory. Since 2016, an Israeli mission has been operating in Abu Dhabi within the framework of IRENA, with Israeli representatives allowed to enter the UAE on an Israeli diplomatic passport, thus creating a basis for expanded relations.

Links with Gulf states up until now have existed on four levels: diplomatic – dialogue with a small circle of senior figures; economic – widespread Israeli business activity in the Gulf, which would not have been possible without Foreign Ministry involvement; people-to-people – connecting civil society organizations and preparing public opinion for links with Israel; social media – the Ministry is heavily invested in Arabic-language social media, creating a public platform for relations to develop once official ties are declared. The Ministry has learned the lessons of the peace processes with Egypt and Jordan, ones that lacked sufficient preparation of public opinion and routinization. The recent breakthrough with Gulf states provides the Ministry with broad opportunities in terms of business, tourism, culture and more.

The Jordanians and Palestinians are closely aligned on the regional scene and they are beginning to internalize the change in Israeli-Arab relations and the fact that the more they lag behind, the more they stand to lose. Now, with the annexation issue delayed and in light of the fact that the UAE is an important ally of Jordan’s, new Palestinian and Jordanian thinking may emerge. It is important to remember that the peace with Jordan is of great strategic importance to Israel.

Ksenia Svetlova, Director, Israel-Middle East Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

The recent agreements and developments with Gulf states have spotlighted the weakness of the Knesset, especially of its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The Knesset is tasked with government oversight, but it does not carry out its mandate. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee has hardly held any discussions on the regional processes that have matured in recent years. Even when lawmakers wanted to deal with these issues, information was not available to them. Some MKs tabled questions but did not receive answers and were dismissed out of hand on vague security grounds. Security issues have dominated the committee’s work for years and the subcommittee for foreign affairs is very rarely convened.

We at the Mitvim Institute recently published a study on how the government conducts issues related to regional cooperation. The study’s main finding was the absence of an overall coordinating body for the many agencies and ministries active in the region. Such a body, responsible for ties with Arab states and tasked with shaping a national diplomatic strategy, must be established. Specific plans must be drawn up for dealing with each country in the region, and uncoordinated overlaps between different governmental agencies must be avoided. One single body must be tasked with planning and promoting regional cooperation, and all the information available to various governmental agencies must be shared. The Foreign Ministry’s tasks have been generously farmed out to various ministries in recent years while the security establishment enjoys prominence and superiority in decision making processes. In the past six months, the Foreign Ministry’s standing has improved and it is clearly participating and leading more. The Foreign Ministry must be the lead agency in diplomatic relations in general, and in those with Arab states specifically.

We are at the start of an important process turning Israel into a member of the Middle Eastern family after many long years. Along with the clear advantages and opportunities this integration brings, it raises complex challenges, and dealing with them requires cooperation among government agencies. The signing of historic agreements without any Knesset oversight or input is a deeply unsound practice that must change.

Yael Ravia-Zadok, Head of Economic Diplomacy Division, Foreign Ministry

Economic diplomacy is the Foreign Ministry’s growth engine. The Covid-19 crisis has illustrated the Ministry’s essential role in acquiring medical equipment, arranging travel for stranded Israelis, ensuring continued flights to Israel, and more. The Ministry is working to leverage Israeli innovation and capabilities for the needs of other states as well, strengthening Israel’s diplomatic equity and identifying new business opportunities for Israeli firms. Over the past two years, Israeli representative offices have helped advance deals worth 7.6 billion USD, which created over 65,000 new jobs for Israelis. The Ministry thus contributes not only to Israel’s strategic security, but also to its economic security.

The Foreign Ministry is flourishing. It is leading a rich diplomatic agenda and has secured additional budgets. The presence of Israeli diplomats on the ground is an asset, as they forge the connection between local needs and Israeli capabilities (and vice versa), and strengthen ties with countries where they are posted. These needs pave the way for action. In 2011, we identified Jordan’s need for alternative trade routes after its main route through Syria was blocked. The Foreign Ministry initiated the creation of an overland bridge for goods from and to Jordan, thereby strengthening Israel’s regional standing and its equity vis-à-vis Jordan.

The economic dimension is a central axis to promoting ties in the region. The QIZ agreement with Egypt has increased Egyptian exports and created 300,000 jobs. Think of the fact that hundreds of thousands of households make a living off the fruits of the peace with Israel. This is no small achievement. The natural gas discoveries have changed Israel’s standing in the region and turned it into an energy exporter to its neighbors. Energy diplomacy facilitated the founding of the EMGF, established this year in Cairo at the initiative of the Israeli and Egyptian energy ministers.

The Abraham Accords are a historic event affecting the entire region. The trilateral fund announced by the Americans will constitute an important tool for promoting joint economic projects. The agreements already signed (on aviation, visas and investment protection) are laying the foundations for future ties and building trust. We will strive to promote trade, innovation, renewable energy and infrastructure projects in the region. Israel seeks to solidify the new partnerships for the benefit of the region, and beyond. The sky is the limit.

Political Perspectives

Minister Orit Farkash-Hacohen, Minister of Strategic Affairs and Tourism

In dealing with strategic issues, it is important to focus on the campaign being waged on social media against Israel. This is a daily struggle and it is not simply about our image, but about the truth. This is a battle for consciousness and for Israel’s good name. Manipulations of consciousness and awareness generate negative discourse on social media against Israel, born of a desire to influence the public agenda in a way that negates Israel’s existence, its legitimacy and its interests. The Ministry of Strategic Affairs is also active in combating hate speech on the web. I recently inaugurated a new smart communication center with the head of the Julis local council and the Council for National and Civic Service, and this year six young Druze women will operate a digital communications room in Arabic.

In 1967, following the Six Day War, Sudan hosted the Khartoum Summit at which Arab states adopted the notorious “Three No’s” negating Israel’s existence – “no to recognition, no to negotiations, no to peace.” Today, this trend has been reversed to one of recognition. Yes to dialogue, yes to connections, no to boycotts.

Tourism is the best expression of peace between nations.  That was why Begin underscored the importance of tourism for building bridges in his speech during Sadat’s visit to Israel. Governments are the ones that sign agreements and treaties, but true peace is built when people meet each other. The State of Israel and I, too, expect tourists from Arab and Muslim states. This is the way to infuse content into sustainable peace between states. We will continue to strengthen Israel’s standing and legitimacy in the region and the world.

MK Ofer Shelah, Yesh Atid-Telem

The chasm in the heart of the Middle East between states striving for stability and radical Islam offers Israel opportunities to improve its standing in the region. Israel was for decades excluded from regional processes, and decisions on substantive issues (such as the war in Syria and the Iranian nuclear program) were adopted without input regarding its interests and those it shares with its neighbors. Putin may invite Netanyahu for a photo-op, but on matters such as the war in Syria, he talks to Rouhani and Erdoğan. They are players in the arena; we are not. The same goes for the US pullout from the Middle East. The true “deal of the century” would be to offer the US a Middle East led by its allies – Israel and the other states striving for stability.

Following the recent normalization agreements, Netanyahu may be celebrating his argument that we can improve our standing in the region without placing the Palestinian card on the table, but separation from the Palestinians is a paramount Israeli interest if it seeks to remain Jewish and democratic. The Palestinians are paying a heavy price for their rejectionism. If we do not take advantage of the momentum with Gulf states to effectuate a separation from the Palestinians, then the normalization too will boil down to a deal intended to improve the standing of various regimes in the Middle East concerned about losing touch with the US once Trump is replaced.

Just like those surveyed by the Mitvim Institute for its annual Israeli Foreign Policy Index, I do not see a recent change in the standing of the Foreign Ministry. The weakening of the Ministry and the parceling out of its tasks to other ministries for political expediency began a long time ago and has been damaging to Israel. This is not just a technical issue related to the Ministry’s presence or absence at crucial decision-making junctions. It is also about the absence of coordinated Foreign Service activity and lack of backing for it to promote vital Israeli interests.

Netanyahu thinks US Jewry will disappear from the map given the high rate of assimilation and loss of contact with Israel. This must be confronted, and the US Jewish community must be reconnected to Israel. That is a job for the Foreign Ministry to do.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair, Meretz

The new agreements with Gulf states are important and must be backed. Nonetheless, the argument made by the government and the Israeli right that these agreements cancel out the Palestinian issue is fraudulent and damaging to Israel’s interests. Progress in negotiations with the Palestinians is in Israel’s interest in order for us to live here peacefully and securely. The new agreements could help advance negotiations with the Palestinians and achieve a two-state solution.

In recent years, we have witnessed a rise in reactionary, anti-democratic and anti-liberal regimes and leaders. Israel has forged and strengthened ties with some of them at the expense of relations with democratic, liberal governments. Regarding Europe, Israel must invest resources and preserve its ties with the democratic states that have been and remain our allies. The government-backed claims that the EU is hostile to Israel must also be silenced. This is a fundamentally unacceptable and unworthy idea.

Israel’s democratic essence does not allow us to distance ourselves from liberal democracies such as Germany and France, and from an organization such as the EU. Israel’s place in the world is among the enlightened and democratic people who defend human rights and seek peaceful conflict resolution. The current government of Israel will not change its policy in that regard, but even it has sufficient members who are supposed to understand our affinity for and closeness to the democratic and liberal world.

Political change in the US could result in renewed thinking in Jerusalem regarding the direction of our foreign policy. Israel has always enjoyed bipartisan consensus in the US. That consensus has been cracked in recent years and Netanyahu and the government of Israel played a key role in this deterioration. The Jewish community in the US traditionally votes overwhelmingly for Democrats. In its ties with the Jewish communities there, Israel’s government must underscore the shared values and interests we have with them and realize its mistake in undermining relations with the Democratic Party and over-relying on Trump and the Republicans.

MK Aida Touma-Suleiman, Joint List

This would seem to be the most successful period ever for Israel in terms of regional politics, with a new announcement of a supposed peace agreement emerging every few days. However, the states with which Israel is reaching agreements fit the profile of regimes that oppress their people. That happens in Europe, Africa and in the Gulf and the broader Arab world. Despite the general impression of success of the Netanyahu government’s regional policy, we are in fact deteriorating toward a more complex situation. Economic trade agreements are a diversion from the true attempt to resolve the situation that led us to the conflict in the first place. Israel is an occupier of another people and Netanyahu’s policy provides an alibi for continued occupation. The Trump plan is not a peace plan; it fails to advance the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, this is a mega-annexation plan thwarting the founding a Palestinian state. The agreement with the UAE is part of this plan.

The agreements with Gulf states distance us from peace. If these agreements serve the goal of isolating the Palestinians and are intended to bring them to their knees, they cannot be considered peace agreements. Do these agreements serve the interests of the people? In my view, they do not, despite their economic potential. Only the wealthy will profit. Netanyahu and his government have launched a dangerous arms race in the region. Since the signing of the agreements, all we hear about are preparations for war and acquisition of fighter jets. This is not a climate that bodes well for peaceful relations.

Anyone who thinks Israel can conduct a regional policy as an occupying power leaves us with a heavy and explosive legacy. Even after Trump and Netanyahu step down, we will have to deal with the obstacles that they sowed into the road to peace. The question that we, and especially Israel’s Jewish majority, must ask is what kind of future and state we want. Netanyahu is building an apartheid state, and his moves do not help us build a true democracy and end the occupation. The alleged success recorded today in relations with the region actually signals a troubling deterioration.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment, November 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the European Union: Enemies, A Love Story https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-the-european-union-enemies-a-love-story/ Sat, 14 Nov 2020 14:02:12 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6032 Policy paper by Amb. (ret.) David Walzer

הפוסט Israel and the European Union: Enemies, A Love Story הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Israel and the European Union (EU) have built a special, strategic relationship over decades, since the 1960s. Following centuries of war, two world wars, tens of millions dead and destruction across the continent, the EU can be declared as the most successful expression of Europeans’ aspiration for peace and prosperity. With a population of 450 million, the EU is not only Israel’s biggest trade partner, it is also the biggest and most generous aid donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA), without which Israel would be forced to allocate extensive budgetary resources for the PA’s preservation and its commitments. Moreover, a large part of the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora has its roots in Europe. Many Israelis aspire to the continent’s standards of moral and cultural values and to its political systems. At the same time, many in Europe see Israel and the Israelis as members of the European family. Agreements on economic, trade, science, and other matters of vital value to Israel have been signed over the years within the framework of the special relationship that has developed with the EU.

However, for the past two decades, in fact since the second intifada broke out in September 2000 and since Israel gradually distanced itself from the Oslo Accords, these special relations have been on a collision course due to growing differences over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Europe has taken a committed stand in favor of diplomatic negotiations and an agreed two-state solution; often, it seems, Europe is a lone voice in this regard (other than lip service paid by other players). It makes an effort to preserve its standing as the guardian of the Oslo Accords. Europe sees itself as the ultimate barrier against what it views as continued Israeli efforts to erode and even bury the option of two states, Israel and Palestine, living peacefully side by side.

An additional explanation, which I heard from quite a number of sources in Brussels, attributes Europe’s commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state to the same moral values and compass that explain its historic sense of guilt toward the Jewish people. In other words, some in Europe view support for the establishment of Israel to compensate for the injustice of the Holocaust as the source of deep European injustice toward the Palestinians. Europe now feels bound to atone for that injustice, too, and to strive for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Israel finds this worldview hard to digest. Some perceive it as a skewed and even anti-Semitic attitude, which intensifies the alienation and friction between Israel and Europe.

Against this backdrop, the Israeli government constantly maneuvers between the need to improve or, at least preserve, the economic achievements and cooperation with the EU and its concerns over any European involvement in the management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (or in efforts to resolve it). Israel set out to differentiate between its supporters and opponents among the EU member states, and succeeded (to a large extent) with the help of the friendliest among them in averting resolutions critical of its policies by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council (which require consensus) and often by the European Parliament, too. Countries critical of Israel also utilize that same consensus tool to prevent upgrades in the EU’s agreements with Israel and to link them to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. For example, the Israel-EU Association Council, which brings together foreign ministers from both sides, has not been convened since 2012. The goal of Association Council meetings is to set in motion working groups to discuss improvements that each side seeks to make in the relationship. The 2004 ascension of central and eastern European states to the EU, which prompted Israeli hopes of a positive change in terms of the internal European balance of power, only helped slow the Israel-EU collision trajectory to a minor extent. What is more, the weakness of center-left liberalism in Europe and elsewhere in the world over the past decade has contributed to the rise of the European far-left, which holds anti-Israeli positions.

Unfortunately, Israel deals with EU criticism in a tactical manner, mostly responding only to immediate and specific. Israeli political leaders devote too little attention to the complex relationship with EU, whereas the Israeli public is almost totally unaware of the strategic importance of Israel-EU ties and the potential that lies in them. The fact that the last Israeli prime minister to officially visit Brussels was the late Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 is uncontestable proof of Israel’s desire to limit diplomatic ties with the EU and its institutions to a bare minimum. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did meet in Brussels in December 2017 with the EU’s foreign ministers (for an informal breakfast) as part of his lobbying campaign for President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem, but he did not visit the EU institutions.

The struggle that Israel is waging to distance Europe from diplomatic influence in the Middle East blends in well with other regional and global campaigns that trap the EU in a position of international disadvantage. Among the developments undermining the EU’s leadership are its attempts to overcome the 2008 economic crisis, the Arab Spring and the decline of the Palestinian issue in the eyes of key Arab states, the rise of the Islamic State, the drop in oil prices and in the importance of Middle Eastern oil for Europe, China’s rising power, the migrant crisis in Europe, Trump’s election and his humiliating attitude toward leaders of the continent and NATO, Brexit, and most recently the coronavirus crisis. All of the above require the best efforts, time and diplomatic energy of Europe’s leaders. Given this wide array of challenges, Israel thinks it can continue enjoying the best the continent has to offer without overly risking censure.

Germany’s growing power within the European block and the weakness of others (mainly France) is perceived as helpful to Israel in this regard. In the differentiation policy that Israel has adopted toward EU member states and in its identification with the most pro-Israeli among them, Israel often joins “rogue” states such as Hungary and Poland as well as far-right parties and groups. These provide Israel with support for the Greater Land of Israel and annexation ideas, and in return, Israel provides them with legitimacy despite their anti-democratic, anti-European, racist and even anti-Semitic positions. Such is not the case, obviously, regarding Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus. Here, the severe crisis in relations between Israel and Turkey and the discovery of natural gas reserves in Israeli waters are the key factors in these states’ openness toward Israel and their cooperation with it. In addition, the shared values of these three states are presented as one of the foundations for the cooperation among them. However, what is perceived and presented in Europe as the distancing of Israeli governments under Netanyahu from the two-state vision necessarily leads to a widening diplomatic gap, deepening mistrust and lack of sympathy toward Israel among some EU members, especially the Western ones.

That’s Just the Way It Is! Indeed?

Such was the “reality” I encountered upon my arrival in Brussels in August 2012 as Israel’s head of mission to the institutions of the EU and NATO. It reflected the prism through which Israeli politicians, even the most senior ones, viewed the EU. Regrettably, many Israeli diplomats share this view (most are imbued with an American orientation from their initial days as foreign ministry cadets) as do many in Israel’s security establishment. In their eyes, Europe (the EU, Brussels) is an anti-Israel body that is best distanced from every focal point of influence over Israel and allowed only the minimal role (accepting EU membership in the Quartet, ignoring some uncoordinated EU aid to the Palestinians in Area C, and more)  needed for Israel to benefit from relations with it. This, sadly, is a very narrow prism that precludes a fundamental examination of the entire array of Israel’s relations with Europe, the tremendous benefits they yielded for Israel in better days (such as the 1995 association agreement during the Oslo process), and the potential that lies ahead if Israel decides to warm up relations with the EU and not just with some of its member states.

Throughout my four years in Brussels, I was invited regularly to meetings of “regional groups”, such as the Visegrad and Nordic groups, held several times a year. Our access to these frequent sessions allows Israeli representatives to understand what is “cooking” in terms of issues of interest and to inform our friends of our positions and requests, which they in turn pass on to their home countries, briefing their foreign ministers prior to the monthly EU foreign ministers’ meetings, for example. Often, when the issue is sensitive or sufficiently important, this discourse is conducted at the foreign ministers’ level or even the heads of state level.

The negative image of the EU in Israel leads to disinterest and reluctance on the part of Israeli decision makers to invest in relations with it, as proven by the limited number of Israeli ministers and Members of Knesset who visit the EU institutions. Faced with this disinterest, we have been witnessing attempts by far-right Members of the European Parliament in recent years to hold meetings and seminars about “support for Israel”. They mostly invite representatives of the settlements (e.g. the Yesha Council) and largely deal with “Israel’s right to the entire Land of Israel”. Most participants at these meetings are members of European Parliament groups as well as staunch Palestinian supporters who show up to challenge the speakers. Sadly, perhaps because of their political weakness, Israel’s Labor and Meretz parties rarely hold meetings with the Socialists & Democrats Group in the European Parliament. Endless attempts on the part of the Israeli embassy in Brussels to promote discourse between Likud party representatives and representatives of the center-right majority in the European Parliament have yielded few results.

Avigdor Liberman, who served as the Netanyahu government’s foreign minister from April 2009 to December 2012 and again from November 2013 to May 2015, correctly identified the focal points of criticism toward Israel in Brussels (and Strasbourg). Liberman appointed me to my post despite, and perhaps because, of my known political views. My previous posting as head of the Ministry’s Center for Policy Research required quite a few meetings with the minister, including one-on-one. At a meeting prior to my departure for Brussels, Liberman said that in his view, the greatest challenge facing Israel lies in the EU. With his approval, the Foreign Ministry accepted our request and significantly beefed up the embassy department tasked with ties with the European Parliament. Unfortunately, 2019 cuts affected the embassy’s operating budget, doing away with the parliamentary liaison’s slot (already in the 1980s, the Israeli mission in Brussels suggested that its staff be augmented ahead of every European Parliament session with Israeli diplomats posted in European member states).

Wanted: A Broader Prism and A Strategic Israeli Policy on Europe

In early 1994, ahead of the scheduled December summit in Essen of the EU Council under Germany’s presidency, Chancellor Helmut Kohl asked Israel’s then-Ambassador to Germany Avi Primor, “What do you want?” The Chancellor, a friend of Israel, also sought to take advantage of the positive climate in the region and told then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, “I am willing to serve as the engine to advance Israel’s relations with Europe. Tell me what you want”. The Israeli government had a hard time answering the question of the depth and extent of closeness we wanted with the EU. Would we want full membership in the EU (probably not possible)? Would we want a model similar to the EU’s relations with Switzerland? With the EFTA states (the trade bloc consisting at the time of Austria, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein)? Or a model of our own?

This was not the only time the question was put before the Israeli government. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher once told his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres, half-jokingly, “Make peace and we will accept you and the Palestinians into the EU”. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi proposed that Israel be accepted into the EU without linking the Palestinians to such a move. These proposals generated very little interest within Israeli government circles, the media and public. Unfortunately, the Israeli public is exposed to our relations with the EU mostly through negative reactions of Israeli politicians to critical remarks by European officials on the settlements, violation of Palestinian rights and, more recently, the annexation issue.

As I often told senior officials in Brussels, both the EU and the Israeli establishment are not doing enough to inform the public in Israel about the potential of improved relations with the block. Israel’s trade agreements with the European Community, starting in the mid-1960s and the subsequent 1975 Free Trade Agreement, have contributed hugely to Israel’s shift from a largely agrarian society and economy to an advanced industrialized country. The research and science agreements with the EU have yielded billions of euros from the block’s joint fund (to which Israel also contributes, obviously) for Israeli research and development. The “open skies” agreement has contributed significantly to the development of incoming and outgoing tourism, and more. The public at large knows very little about all of the above.

In December 2013, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council suggested upgrading the relationship with Israel to a special privileged partnership once Israel and the Palestinians achieve peace. A similar proposal was made to the Palestinians. The EU reiterated its suggestion in early 2016. The proposal obviously did not facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, but for the matter at hand in this article it is important to note that Israel avoided responding to the proposal and the vast majority of Israelis is completely unaware that it was presented. The European proposal generated very limited discourse among Israel’s political echelon. Then-President Shimon Peres issued a favorable response, but the Foreign Ministry did not instruct Brussels (nor any other Israeli embassy in EU capitals) to examine the seriousness of the idea and what it entailed. We did so informally at our own initiative. Indeed, the Council was wrong in issuing a general and somewhat vague proposal, but what bothered Israeli decision makers was the proposal’s linkage to an Israeli commitment to a peace agreement.

Summary, Or Where Do We Go From Here?

Europe is struggling to overcome the crisis into which it has been plunged by the developments of the past decade and more, exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic and Brussels’ initial ineffective response that left each member state to deal with the disease on its own with very little block-wide coordination. Combined with the expected retirement of Chancellor Angela Merkel, France’s weakness, and failure thus far to achieve agreement on post-Brexit relations with the UK, Europe is hard pressed to play a leading role in the global arena. Nonetheless, it still constitutes the West’s largest economic bloc with a population of 450 million, and is moving toward deeper integration by seeking to jointly raise investment capital for a coronavirus recovery fund. The EU is a close, accessible and familiar neighbor to Israel and Israelis.

In order to indeed be part of the European family, or at least to reduce the friction with Europe, the government of Israel must devote time and resources to understanding the European DNA. It must have an answer (or at least an opinion) to the question of “what is Europe”. Are we talking about Germany, the Netherlands, France and the Scandinavian states, or perhaps Hungary and Poland? And beyond those questions, what do we want from Europe? What type of relationship do we wish to forge with it? And deriving from that answer, which EU group would we like to join, and can we count on the support of so-called rogue states and far-right groups in the long term?

We must remember that due to its long colonial history in the Middle East and its physical proximity to the region, Europe knows our neighborhood and its problems better than most international players. We must concede that Europe is very cautious and sensitive in its relations with Israel. It expresses vocal displeasure with our conduct toward the Palestinians, but is not interested in bringing things to a head. Europe is, indeed, delaying upgrades in its relations with Israel, issuing guidelines on settlement product labeling and condemnations of Israeli behavior that it views as unacceptable, but it has avoided imposing sanctions or concrete steps significantly harmful to Israel’s ties with the continent. Given this state of affairs, even sanctions in response to possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank were more by the way of wishful thinking on the part of some Europeans than a realistic option.

Reality in the Middle East, the convergence of interests between Israel and key Arab states, the drop in global oil prices, the threats of Islamic terrorism and Israel’s affinity for the European family create opportunities for continued development of Israel-Europe relations. Finally, Europe and its positions must be brought up for public discussion in Israel, and even more so, the government of Israel must be willing to converse with the EU and hear out its views (without committing to accept them, of course) rather than alienating Brussels and labeling it as “anti-Israeli”.

הפוסט Israel and the European Union: Enemies, A Love Story הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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How will the Post-Election Israel-EU-US Triangle Shape Up? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/how-will-the-post-election-israel-eu-us-triangle-shape-up/ Sun, 01 Nov 2020 22:05:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6001 Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu on JPOST, towards the US elections

הפוסט How will the Post-Election Israel-EU-US Triangle Shape Up? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Will a Biden victory heal US-European relations after being severely undermined by Trump’s term in office? And if so, how will that affect Israel?

Although the vast majority of the 27 EU member states are led by center-right parties, almost all are privately rooting for Biden, who represents center-left views. That is not surprising. The Trump years have traumatized transatlantic relations, turning the US from the staunchest supporter of the EU into a confrontational, aggressive opponent.

Trump publicly supported Brexit, scrapped the transatlantic trade negotiations (TTIP) with the EU launched by Obama, started a trade war with Europe, and withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. Trump also significantly undermined NATO to the point that French President Macron declared the organization “brain dead”. On the other hand, Trump’s attitude toward Putin and Russia, the adversary that prompted NATO’s establishment, has alternated between friendly and ingratiating. The liberal order and values so dear to the Europeans have been damaged severely.

A second Trump term can be expected to continue undermining dialogue and coordination with Europe on many issues, including those related to Iran, Israel and the Palestinians. Trump’s presidency accelerated the ongoing decline of global US hegemony. As the US withdrew inward, regional stability continued to deteriorate. This was particularly evident in the Mediterranean: Russia entered Syria, Turkey entered Libya, and Iran spread its tentacles further in the region. None of these developments benefit Israel. Moreover, another Trump term could cripple or bring down NATO, further destabilizing the region. Israel has an interest in a robust, significant NATO, given Europe’s inability to fill the US defense vacuum now or in the foreseeable future.

The Netanyahu government has benefitted from the transatlantic crisis and Trump’s unilaterally supporting its positions (e.g. relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, the Trump plan that deviates from the ‘67 borders as the starting point for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and the pullout from the Iran nuclear agreement). While a Biden presidency is not likely to reverse the embassy move, it would restore traditional US support for the two-state solution. The US and Europe would likely renew their dialogue on the subject, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer high on their list of priorities. Covid-19 and the economic downturn have drawn their attention inward, but on the other hand honed growing external threats, such as China.

China is a focal point of US global competition concerns. While Trump treated Europe like the proverbial bull in a China shop, his policy reflected a set of American interests marking China as the key challenge to waning US hegemony – this challenge will remain under Biden. Thus, although a Biden presidency would restore transatlantic relations to their pre-Trump format of cooperation, the agenda of the relationship will change. Europe will have to decide whether to espouse the US containment strategy toward China or try to reap the benefits of trade and mutual investment with Beijing.

Israel is a negligible player in this global game. Israeli regulation tends to follow that of the EU, its main import-export market. The US is therefore expected to keep pressing Israel and Europe to avoid strategic Chinese investment in their territories. If Europe joins forces with the US versus China – a more realistic scenario under Biden than Trump – Israel would obviously go along. However, if Europe opts for a different approach than the American one, Israel may be forced to make political choices it finds economically inconvenient.

As for the Middle East peace process, Biden holds a traditional approach to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He opposes settlements and unilateral annexation, supports full security for Israel, calls for recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, and has taken firm stands against terrorism, incitement and glorification of violence by Palestinian leaders. Biden views the two-state solution as essential to Israel’s survival. In that sense, neither he nor the Europeans seem inclined to new or alternative solutions.

However, here too Trump leaves behind a situation requiring a difficult choice for the Europeans. The welcome normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE and, hopefully, the future agreement with Bahrain, represent a different paradigm that does not link Israel-Arab normalization with resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this paradigm the order is reversed: Normalization first, peace with the Palestinians (maybe) later. Although most Arab states do not share this Emirati and Bahraini approach (yet), Biden will have to consider whether to adopt it, revert to the previous route of peace with the Palestinians first followed by Israel-Arab normalization later, or combine the two. The Europeans, too, will have to examine whether to change track or remain stuck in the logic of the Oslo process. There is growing criticism within the EU regarding its rigid position on the issue, given that the conditions that gave rise to this logic have long since disappeared.

In this context, Trump’s unseating would banish some of the ill populist winds blowing from the US to Europe, which Netanyahu also fanned by tightening relations with a-liberal leaders in states such as Hungary and Poland, but a Biden victory would not significantly bolster EU foreign policy given its deep internal weakness of recent years. This weakness stems from internal European divisions that impede every substantive decision (other than the semi-annual renewal of sanctions on Russia over its Crimean Peninsula occupation). A Biden victory is unlikely to mend this structural weakness. Although Commission President von der Leyen and High Representative Borrell recently proposed doing away with the consensus requirement on certain foreign policy decisions, a move that would enable the EU to adopt resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that it has been unable to adopt since 2016, such a move is unlikely anytime soon. Therefore, even when the populist criticism of the EU no longer enjoys an American tailwind, and even once transatlantic relations are restored, European foreign policy is expected to remain reactive, divided and weak. Will that help Israel? As a strategic Israeli asset, a robust EU is important even if it is perceived as a critical partner on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Should the EU want its voice to resonate louder on these issues with the top echelons in Jerusalem, ahead of a possible Biden administration foreign policy change, the Israel-EU Association Council should reconvene for the first time since 2012. Israel’s Foreign Minister Ashkenazi is already working with his German counterpart Maas to make this happen, and a Biden victory could help. Renewal of the Israel-EU high-level political dialogue would improve relations and hand the Europeans a tool with which to influence developments in the region. Otherwise, it will likely remain an onlooker.

The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 2 November, 2020.

הפוסט How will the Post-Election Israel-EU-US Triangle Shape Up? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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How will the post-election Israel-EU-US triangle shape up? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/how-will-the-post-election-israel-eu-us-triangle-shape-up-2/ Sun, 01 Nov 2020 21:15:21 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6041 Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu towards the US elections

הפוסט How will the post-election Israel-EU-US triangle shape up? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Will a Joe Biden victory heal US-European relations after being severely undermined by Donald Trump’s term in office? And if so, how will that affect Israel?

Although the vast majority of the 27 EU member states are led by Center-Right parties, almost all are privately rooting for Biden, who represents Center-Left views. That is not surprising. The Trump years have traumatized transatlantic relations, turning the US from the staunchest supporter of the EU into a confrontational, aggressive opponent.

Trump publicly supported Brexit
, scrapped the transatlantic trade negotiations (TTIP) with the EU launched by president Barack Obama, started a trade war with Europe and withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. Trump also significantly undermined NATO to the point that French President Emmanuel Macron declared the organization “brain dead.”

On the other hand, Trump’s attitude toward President Vladimir Putin and Russia, the adversary that prompted NATO’s establishment, has alternated between friendly and ingratiating. The liberal order and values so dear to the Europeans have been damaged severely.

A second Trump term can be expected to continue undermining dialogue and coordination with Europe on many issues, including those related to Iran, Israel and the Palestinians. Trump’s presidency accelerated the ongoing decline of global US hegemony. As the US withdrew inward, regional stability continued to deteriorate. This was particularly evident in the Mediterranean: Russia entered Syria, Turkey entered Libya, and Iran spread its tentacles farther in the region. None of these developments benefits Israel. Moreover, another Trump term could cripple or bring down NATO, further destabilizing the region. Israel has an interest in a robust, significant NATO, given Europe’s inability to fill the US defense vacuum now or in the foreseeable future.

The Netanyahu government has benefited from the transatlantic crisis and Trump’s unilaterally supporting its positions (e.g. relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, the Trump plan, which deviates from the ’67 borders as the starting point for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and the pullout from the Iran nuclear agreement).

While a Biden presidency is not likely to reverse the embassy move, it would restore traditional US support for the two-state solution. The US and Europe would likely renew their dialogue on the subject, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer high on their list of priorities. COVID-19 and the economic downturn have drawn their attention inward, but on the other hand honed growing external threats, such as China.

China is a focal point of US global competition concerns. While Trump treated Europe like the proverbial bull in a china shop, his policy reflected a set of American interests marking China as the key challenge to waning US hegemony – this challenge will remain under Biden. Thus, although a Biden presidency would restore transatlantic relations to their pre-Trump format of cooperation, the agenda of the relationship will change. Europe will have to decide whether to espouse the US containment strategy toward China or try to reap the benefits of trade and mutual investment with Beijing.

Israel is a negligible player in this global game. Israeli regulation tends to follow that of the EU, its main import-export market. The US is therefore expected to keep pressing Israel and Europe to avoid strategic Chinese investment in their territories. If Europe joins forces with the US versus China – a more realistic scenario under Biden than Trump – Israel would obviously go along. However, if Europe opts for a different approach than the American one, Israel may be forced to make political choices it finds economically inconvenient.

As for the Middle East peace process, Biden holds a traditional approach to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He opposes settlements and unilateral annexation, supports full security for Israel, calls for recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, and has taken firm stands against terrorism, incitement and glorification of violence by Palestinian leaders. Biden views the two-state solution as essential to Israel’s survival. In that sense, neither he nor the Europeans seem inclined to new or alternative solutions.

However, here too, Trump leaves behind a situation requiring a difficult choice for the Europeans. The welcome normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE and, hopefully, the future agreement with Bahrain, represent a different paradigm that does not link Israel-Arab normalization with resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this paradigm the order is reversed: Normalization first, peace with the Palestinians (maybe) later.

Although most Arab states do not share this Emirati and Bahraini approach (yet), Biden will have to consider whether to adopt it, revert to the previous route of peace with the Palestinians first followed by Israel-Arab normalization later or combine the two. The Europeans, too, will have to examine whether to change track or remain stuck in the logic of the Oslo process. There is growing criticism within the EU regarding its rigid position on the issue, given that the conditions that gave rise to this logic have long since disappeared.

In this context, Trump’s unseating would banish some of the ill populist winds blowing from the US to Europe, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also fanned by tightening relations with a-liberal leaders in states such as Hungary and Poland. But a Biden victory would not significantly bolster EU foreign policy given its deep internal weakness of recent years.

This weakness stems from internal European divisions that impede every substantive decision (other than the semi-annual renewal of sanctions on Russia over its Crimean Peninsula occupation). A Biden victory is unlikely to mend this structural weakness. Although EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and foreign minister Josep Borrell recently proposed doing away with the consensus requirement on certain foreign policy decisions, a move that would enable the EU to adopt resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that it has been unable to adopt since 2016, such a move is unlikely anytime soon.

Therefore, even when the populist criticism of the EU no longer enjoys an American tailwind, and even once transatlantic relations are restored, European foreign policy is expected to remain reactive, divided and weak. Will that help Israel? As a strategic Israeli asset, a robust EU is important even if it is perceived as a critical partner on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Should the EU want its voice to resonate louder on these issues with the top echelons in Jerusalem, ahead of a possible Biden administration foreign policy change, the Israel-EU Association Council should reconvene for the first time since 2012.

Foreign Minister Ashkenazi is already working with his German counterpart, Heiko Maas, to make this happen, and a Biden victory could help. Renewal of the Israel-EU high-level political dialogue would improve relations and hand the Europeans a tool with which to influence developments in the region. Otherwise, it will likely remain an onlooker.

** The article was published on Jpost, 2 November 2020.

הפוסט How will the post-election Israel-EU-US triangle shape up? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2020 https://mitvim.org.il/en/report/the-2020-israeli-foreign-policy-index-of-the-mitvim-institute/ Wed, 14 Oct 2020 03:30:16 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=report&p=5852 The 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index

Findings of the Mitvim Institue Poll, October 2020

The eighth annual public opinion poll of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted in September 2019. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (700 men and women, Jews and Arabs) and with a margin of error of 3.5%. The report presents the poll’s key findings, grouped under four categories: Israel’s Foreign Service, Israel’s foreign relations,  Israel and its surrounding regions, and Israel and the Palestinians.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A Window of Opportunity in Israel-EU Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-window-of-opportunity-in-israel-eu-relations/ Tue, 06 Oct 2020 17:15:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5814 Op-ed

הפוסט A Window of Opportunity in Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Foreign Minister Ashkenazi chose Berlin for his first official overseas visit in late August, attending an informal meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, with the goal of promoting Israel-EU relations. Given the harsh anti-EU rhetoric by Prime Minister Netanyahu and senior ministers in recent years, this was not an obvious choice. It indicates a desire to fix a key component of Israeli foreign policy.

Israel’s previous government often maligned the EU, depicting it as hostile to Israel and encouraging division among its member states to prevent resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies. It did so despite the extensive cooperation that exists between Israel and the EU in numerous fields. The official rhetoric was expressed in actions, too, such as Netanyahu’s unwillingness to meet in Israel with then-EU Foreign Policy Chief Mogherini, Israeli participation in the Visegrad summit where Netanyahu expressed sharp criticism of the EU, and government-issued reports accusing Europeans of funding organizations supportive of anti-Israel boycotts and terrorism. Israelis heard the message loud and clear. The Mitvim Institute’s Israeli Foreign Policy Index indicated in 2019 that most Israelis see the EU as a foe rather than friend.

The annexation intentions that Netanyahu declared over the past year threatened a further deterioration in Israel-EU relations. Prominent European leaders warned repeatedly against annexation, calling on Israel to avoid measures that violate international law and risk regional stability, prospects of peace, Palestinian rights, Israel-EU relations and Israel’s improving ties with Arab states. While Europe did not spell out concrete consequences of annexation on its relations with Israel, there were reports about possible damage to Israel’s participation in EU programs, including the Horizon research and development program.

With the installation of the new Israeli government in May and the increased public discussion of annexation that followed, it transpired that Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi were not enamored of the move. While they stopped short of rejecting it on principle, they presented a series of conditions that led European diplomats to believe their Blue and White party was a potential ally in fighting annexation. This realization and the messages Ashkenazi conveyed regarding Israel-EU relations created an opportunity to turn a new page, further facilitated by the suspension of the annexation idea as part of the normalization deal with the UAE.

Since taking office, Foreign Minister Ashkenazi has repeatedly underscored the importance of ties with Europe and his intention to strengthen them. He also held a series of meetings with European foreign ministers, including HRVP Josep Borrell. When Borrell took office in 2019, Israeli policymakers were concerned that he would adopt a highly critical stance towards Israel. However, and in parallel to his fierce opposition to annexation, he expressed his wish to meet Ashkenazi in Brussels; and following the Berlin Foreign Affairs Council meeting, he expressed support for renewal of the high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU (the “Association Council”), suspended since 2012.

Israel’s ties with the EU hold much untapped potential. Both sides could benefit greatly from intensified cooperation and tighter institutional ties. However, as repeatedly proven over the past decade, the EU directly links upgrades in its relationship with Israel to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israel’s recent governments tried to protest this linkage, to no avail. Even if Israel does not annex territories, as long as it continues to build in the settlements, deepen control over Area C, and undermine prospects of a two-state solution – its relations with Europe will be affected negatively. True, the divisions among EU member states in recent years have precluded EU condemnation and criticism of Israeli policies, but the organization did not upgrade ties with Israel, either.

However, in 2013, the EU offered Israel and the future Palestinian state a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU once peace is reached. While the proposal was kept vague, undermining its effectiveness, successive Israeli government have avoided giving an official response to it. In parallel to this offer, the EU repeatedly rejects claims by right-wing Israeli politicians that European criticisms of Israeli policies in the West Bank, including a demand to label settlement products, is akin to encouraging boycotts of Israel. The EU underscores that the path to upgraded relations would be free and clear once Israel changes its policy.

Removal of the annexation from the agenda has created a window of opportunity to take Israel-EU relations forward. It was manifested by the invitation to Ashkenazi to meet the EU foreign ministers, and the positive attitude in Brussels regarding reconvening the Israel-EU Association Council. Germany, as president of the Council of the EU, contributed to this shift and could continue to help further until the end of its 2020 term.

Israeli-EU dialogue focused in recent years mostly on security issues in which Israel has a stake – Iran and the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. A new round of dialogue, once launched following Ashkenazi’s Berlin visit, should also deal with strengthening bilateral ties and identifying channels through which the EU can contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and to advancing regional cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Israel and the EU are rediscovering each other politically and diplomatically these days. Whereas Israel’s Energy Minister said in 2018 that the EU could “go to a thousand hells”, these days the Foreign Minister is saying, “Europe is a key player in the world and is important for Israel”. This is a positive development, both for Israeli foreign policy and for prospects of restoring Israeli partnership in the club of liberal democracies. This shift should be encouraged and its continuity ensured.

הפוסט A Window of Opportunity in Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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EU Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Can Europe Effectively Promote Peace? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/eu-diplomacy-and-the-arab-israeli-conflict-how-can-europe-effectively-promote-peace/ Mon, 05 Oct 2020 14:54:06 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5802 Conference Summary

הפוסט EU Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Can Europe Effectively Promote Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Conference Summary, October 2020

On 24 September 2020, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on “EU Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Can Europe Effectively Promote Peace?” The event featured Dr. Anders Persson, Prof. Joel Peters, Prof. Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Attorney Gilad Sher, Dr. Mostafa Elostaz, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu.

Dr. Anders Persson, Linnaeus University: The Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict has been more important to the EU than other conflicts. However, the thesis that if this conflict is resolved, other regional problems and conflicts would be resolved has been proven wrong in the last decade. The EU has not achieved its objectives in its attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it was probably never realistic to believe it would be able to do so. It never led high-level diplomacy in the peace talks, but it had a major normative role and it played a technocratic role in building Palestinian institutions. There is a big gap between having leverage and using it. The EU has an enormous economic leverage both over Israel and the Palestinians, including the agreements it signed with Israel in the field of research and beyond. Compared to other international actors, the EU is highly consistent, predictable and transparent in its positions. The EU has been committed to an “inside-out” approach to conflict resolution: first Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution should be reached, then Israeli-Arab. But the current trend is the “outside-in” approach (promoting Israel-Arab normalization prior to progress in the peace process), and this might, to the EU’s concern, bypass direct negotiations with Palestinians and the promotion of the two-state solution. Over the years, three European policies have stood out: (1) Its decades-long legitimization of the Palestinians, including the PLO, and their right to statehood; (2) Its firm recognition of Israel’s right to securely exist within internationally recognized borders without being subjected to terror or boycotts; (3) Its early and continuous singling out of the settlements as a serious obstacle to the peace process. Nowadays, the EU is too divided to be effective. Regarding Israeli criticism of EU funding to the Palestinians in recent years, the Israeli strategy is to have the cake, eat it, and complain about it. When push comes to shove, Israeli policymakers want EU aid to the Palestinians to continue flowing.

Prof. Joel Peters, Virginia Tech University and Mitvim Institute: The EU’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout the 1970s and 1980s can best be described as performative diplomacy.  Europe was keen to forge a common foreign policy and identity, and to gain visibility.  Europeans took pride in their ability to develop a common set of positions and principles on the conflict.  Europe’s involvement in the conflict was driven by an outlook that its traditional ties with the Middle East obligate it to play a special role in the resolution of the conflict, even though it was never made clear what these obligations consisted of and why that afforded it a special and unique role. During the Oslo years, Europeans were resentful of being sidelined from the negotiations.  Europe wanted to be a player, not just a payer, and thought it should be given a role commensurate with its standing in global affairs.  With the 1980 Venice Declaration, Europe recognized the Palestinians right of self-determination. Yet it took another 20 years for the EU to call explicitly for a Palestinian state, and that took place only after the Oslo process collapsed. Looking back this can be seen as a failing in European diplomacy towards the conflict, which continued to speak of the Palestinian right to self-determination rather than explicitly call for Palestinian statehood.

Prof. Raffaella A. Del Sarto, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS Europe: Europe remained trapped in the logic of the Oslo period despite the changes in recent decades, e.g., the collapse of the Oslo process, the split within the Palestinian leadership, the expansion of Israeli settlements, the rightward shift in Israeli politics and public opinion, and the emergence of a binational reality on the ground. The Europeans remain bound to the Oslo logic for three main reasons: (1) The institutional setup of EU foreign policymaking, e.g., the separation between trade relations and other foreign policy issues requiring consensus among member states; (2) The lack of an international consensus on an alternative resolution to the conflict, with the US remaining the key player, and Israel not being interested in a greater European role; (3) European desire for stability and economic benefits in its neighborhood and the hesitation of rocking the Israeli-Palestinian boat too much. The EU and its members remain the largest donor to the Palestinians, with Israel’s tacit blessing. Yet, Europe is being criticized and regularly attacked by Israelis for this funding, which is actually in Israel’s interest. The EU maneuvered itself into an absurd situation, helping to maintain a situation that makes the achievement of the two-state solution less likely while also maintaining excellent trade relations with Israel. The EU has not been effective in promoting peace in recent decades, but the current international climate offers important opportunities to do so. Proposals that have been circulating include a clear definition of incentives and ‘red lines’, addressing asymmetry by recognizing Palestinian statehood, pushing for Palestinian elections, or the phasing out of aid to the Palestinian Authority, thus forcing Israel to pick up the costs. But the institutional setting of European foreign policymaking remains a serious obstacle to reaching common ground.

Attorney Gilead Sher, Chief of staff to former Israeli PM Barak and former senior peace negotiator: Europe could play an important political and economic role in any future resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by preserving the conditions for an eventual two-state solution. Indeed, it played second fiddle to the US. Over the past three decades, however, important benchmarks in the political process occurred on European soil or were facilitated by European mediators, pointing to the role Europe could take up in the future. This is particularly relevant considering developments such as the possible reelection of US President Trump, the stepping down of Palestinian President Abbas and Israel’s normalization of ties with Gulf states. To effectively promote peace, the EU should embrace a three-pronged and gradual approach, operating at bilateral, regional, and international levels, and not insist solely on a paradigm of direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. For example, providing locations for secret talks, or reviving the Quartet, engaging with regional allies, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other parties. It could also support independent and coordinated efforts: alongside regional and bilateral tracks, within the framework of the Quartet, the EU should push independent and coordinated measures for gradual advancement to a two-states-for-two-peoples solution. This goes beyond simply sanctioning conduct. It requires incentives and international support for constructive steps by both sides in implementation of agreed segments of treaties, consistent with the two-state solution, e.g. unilateral withdrawal from certain areas of the West Bank, Palestinian education, subsiding terror, and state-building. Europe should try to intertwine its engagement with Israeli-Palestinian affairs together with the new normalization process that has been jump started by Gulf States.

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Founder and Head of the Mitvim Institute: Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be a top priority for Israel, and Israel’s recent normalization agreements with the UAE and Bahrain should not come at the expense of promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace. International actors, among them the EU, can play a central role in advancing peace. However, in recent years, the EU has not been very effective in doing so. Internal divisions among EU member states prevents the EU from taking joint action regarding the Middle East Peace Process. EU leaders did voice clear opposition to Israel’s annexation intentions in the West Bank, but could not go beyond that. To more effectively promote peace, Europe could put forward a counterproposal to the Trump plan, which will offer a constructive pathway to a two-state solution. The EU can increase its support to pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations, as to enable more positive interaction between societies. The EU can also advance the establishment of a new international mechanism to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, updating or revising the existing Quartet. The EU, which already offered Israelis and Palestinians an incentive for peace (the 2013 offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU), should work with other regional and global actors to introduce a coordinated international package of incentives for peace. The EU’s Foreign Affairs Council already acknowledged the need to do so, but did not follow-through. The EU and Israel should relaunch their high-level political dialogue (the Association Council, suspended since 2012), and utilize this platform to also discuss peacemaking and the EU’s role in the process. Finally, the EU can encourage Palestinian participation in joint endeavors between Israel and other regional states, whether in the Eastern Mediterranean or in the Gulf.

Dr. Mostafa Elostaz, Former head of Human rights and international law department, Al Quds Bard College; The Geneva initiative, Ramallah: The Palestinians are in a desperate situation. There is no agreement how to proceed vis-a-vis the Trump administration or the Israeli government that are completely ignoring the Palestinians. There is total dismissal by the Trump administration of the Palestinian side and full support of the Israeli side. Among the Palestinians there is no acceptance of the peace agreements between Israel and the UAE. Therefore, it seems the situation is about to deteriorate for the Palestinians. There is a total failure of the Palestinian leadership and failure of the Israeli side to advance the two-state solution. It seems that the Palestinians do not know what to do in this situation. The Europeans are ineffective vis-a-vis the Israelis due to their history with the Jews, though the EU does have leverage over Israel. For example, it can impose on Israelis a visa requirement to enter the EU, as the Palestinians are required. The Palestinians are increasingly discussing the one-state option, also due to lack of effective Palestinian leadership.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute: The different speakers agreed that Europe has been ineffective in the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, although it has tools and leverage which enables it to influence both sides of the conflict. The EU is unable to use these tools due to its historical past with Israel and due to internal political disagreements. Towards Israel, the EU has many sticks, while the carrots it can offer are not as significant. There was also agreement among the speakers that the EU can become more effective and put forth renewed or new ideas and initiatives. After Foreign Minister Ashkenazi’s recent visit to the European Foreign Affairs Council in Berlin (September 2020), the possibility of reconvening the Israel-EU Association Council should be advanced.

הפוסט EU Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Can Europe Effectively Promote Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trump and Netanyahu’s Barefaced Gaslighting on the Israel-Kosovo Deal https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trump-and-netanyahus-barefaced-gaslighting-on-the-israel-kosovo-deal/ Sun, 06 Sep 2020 10:18:24 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5773 The announcement that Israel and Kosovo have agreed to establish diplomatic relations is a welcome development for both nations. But as is often the case with Israel’s leadership, this development is not only long overdue, but was also made for the wrong reasons. Moreover, framing it, as senior American and Israeli officials have done, as yet another win for Israel within the Arab and Muslim world, is a cynical spin that constitutes nothing less than diplomatic gaslighting. Since Kosovo has declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008, it has won wide international recognition. Among those who recognized it have been the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. Unfortunately, and despite Kosovar efforts to win over Israel and forge diplomatic relations with it, Israel refused to do so. Until now, that is. Israel’s refusal to recognize Kosovo stemmed from a host of reasons, most of which reflect a deeply-seated anxiety over an imaginary parallelism between Kosovo and Palestine, including: Fear over the dangerous precedence of unilateral declaration of independence: Jerusalem regarded Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence as a dangerous precedent, one that would undercut its own ongoing case against a similar move by the Palestinians. Anxiety over internal Arab-Palestinian secession: Jerusalem worried that recognition of Kosovo might help establish a universally applicable precedent for unilateral secession, one that could encourage Israel’s internal Arab-Palestinian minority – especially in the Galilee – to secede. (Of course, on this Israel was not alone. Other countries that have withheld recognition from Kosovo – notably,

הפוסט Trump and Netanyahu’s Barefaced Gaslighting on the Israel-Kosovo Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The announcement that Israel and Kosovo have agreed to establish diplomatic relations is a welcome development for both nations. But as is often the case with Israel’s leadership, this development is not only long overdue, but was also made for the wrong reasons.

Moreover, framing it, as senior American and Israeli officials have done, as yet another win for Israel within the Arab and Muslim world, is a cynical spin that constitutes nothing less than diplomatic gaslighting.

Since Kosovo has declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008, it has won wide international recognition. Among those who recognized it have been the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. Unfortunately, and despite Kosovar efforts to win over Israel and forge diplomatic relations with it, Israel refused to do so. Until now, that is.

Israel’s refusal to recognize Kosovo stemmed from a host of reasons, most of which reflect a deeply-seated anxiety over an imaginary parallelism between Kosovo and Palestine, including:

Fear over the dangerous precedence of unilateral declaration of independence: Jerusalem regarded Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence as a dangerous precedent, one that would undercut its own ongoing case against a similar move by the Palestinians.

Anxiety over internal Arab-Palestinian secession: Jerusalem worried that recognition of Kosovo might help establish a universally applicable precedent for unilateral secession, one that could encourage Israel’s internal Arab-Palestinian minority – especially in the Galilee – to secede. (Of course, on this Israel was not alone. Other countries that have withheld recognition from Kosovo – notably, within the European Union, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania – all share the same anxiety.)

Concern over the validity of an internationally-imposed solution: Since Kosovo’s independence was imposed on Serbia from the outside, Jerusalem was apprehensive lest a perception of success on Kosovo should bolster the resolve of the international community to try and impose a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Additional reasons include strategic calculations vis-à-vis Russia (Serbia’s age-old patron, which has strongly opposed Kosovo’s independence), and sheer and plain islamophobia. As Aryeh Eldad, the former right-wing member of Knesset, claimed shortly after Kosovo’s declaration in 2008, “The flag of Kosovo is that of Islamic proliferation and a source of serious anxiety to Europe.”

The fact that the Netanyahu government has now decided it was ready to recognize Kosovo is due, first and foremost, to American pressure (a desire by the White House to boast another diplomatic victory, along with the announcement that Serbia would move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem). But Israel’s decision to yield to American pressure also reflects the fact that the traditional reasons that have prevented it from recognizing Kosovo until now have lost their force.

After all, the Palestinians’ standing on the global stage is at a new low point in years. Accordingly, they are in no position to declare their independence, and even if they did – as they threatened to do in response to Israeli annexation – their action would probably not win universal support.

At the same time, secessionist sentiments among Israel’s Arab-Palestinian population increasingly appear to have no real bearing on the ground. Indeed, as evidenced by the uproar created by the clause in Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan that would allow for the transfer of areas within the so-called Triangle to the future state of Palestine, Israel’s Arab-Palestinian population are more focused on enjoying full equality within Israel than in seceding from it.

Finally, concern over an internationally-imposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has significantly dissipated over the past few years. The world is suffering from acute Middle East fatigue, and no such threat seems imminent under either President Trump (whose plan for solving the century-old conflict has turned out to be vehemently anti-Palestinian) or the Democratic contender, Joe Biden, should he win the November election.

Not only does Israel’s decision to recognize Kosovo come 12 years too late, therefore, it also seems motivated by the wrong reasons. Concern over the perceived parallelism with Palestine betrayed an Israeli anxiety rather than a clear-headed policy – one, moreover, that the Serbs themselves capably fueled by publicly proclaiming that “Kosovo is our Jerusalem.”

This and more, contrary to statements by the U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman and Israeli U.N. Ambassador Gilad Erdan, the breakthrough between Israel and Kosovo cannot be couched within the larger effort to bring peace between Israel and the Muslim world.

Doing so is a cynical spin that gaslights the fact it is Israel that has refused to recognize Kosovo all these years, not Kosovo that has refused to recognize Israel.

That Kosovo’s population is a majority-Muslim nation must not turn into yet another conquest for Trump or Netanyahu. Turning it into one, and hailing it “Another great day for peace [in the] Middle East,” as President Trump has done, denigrates its historical and geographical significance and undermines the very spirit that Israel’s agreement to recognize Kosovo should, at long last, usher.

The article was published on Haaretz, 6 September 2020.

הפוסט Trump and Netanyahu’s Barefaced Gaslighting on the Israel-Kosovo Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Differences between the EU’s Differentiation Policy and the BDS Movement https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-differences-between-the-eus-differentiation-policy-and-the-bds-movement/ Mon, 20 Jul 2020 21:48:48 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5423 July 2020

הפוסט The Differences between the EU’s Differentiation Policy and the BDS Movement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The differentiation policy led by the European Union (EU) distinguishes between the sovereign State of Israel within the 1967 borders and the occupied territories. The BDS Movement calls for what its initials stand for – boycott, sanctions and divestment – to be inflicted upon the whole State of Israel. Although they differ in essence, public discourse in Israel often confuses the two – whether unintentionally, stemming from ignorance, or intentionally because of certain political views. This paper aims to draw a clear distinction between the two policies in order to enable a more nuanced, less impassioned and more conducive dialogue in Israel and with the EU, along with an uncompromising fight against the BDS movement.

The EU’s differentiation policy seeks to maintain trade and cooperation with the State of Israel within its 1967 borders, in adherence to international law and Europe’s consumer protection laws – unlike the BDS movement that seeks to boycott and sanction the entire State of Israel. Recognizing the value of EU-Israel relationship, the EU’s differentiation policy aims to incentivize Israel to resume negotiations with the Palestinians. The BDS movement, on the other hand, sets goals (such as revoking the right of return and abrogating the Law of Return) that if fully achieved would mean Israel’s end as a Jewish state. The differentiation policy includes an element of normative condemnation but not delegitimization of the State of Israel as a whole, as espoused by the BDS movement. Whereas the differentiation policy implements existing international law, the BDS movement aspires to change the international perception of Israel even within its 1967 borders.

Currently, the economic implications of both the differentiation policy and the BDS movement are negligible. However, in the long term, the threat posed by the BDS activities is greater than that of the differentiation policy, since the BDS is not limited to the settlements. The UN recently issued a list of companies operating in the settlements, which could serve in the future to boycott the settlements and damage major companies that play a significant role in Israel’s economy. The EU does not see any connection between its differentiation policy and the BDS movement, to which some European states oppose.

 

 

הפוסט The Differences between the EU’s Differentiation Policy and the BDS Movement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-annexation-and-the-eus-research-and-development-program-horizon/ Mon, 20 Jul 2020 21:18:16 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5421 The EU is examining how to respond to a possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank. One of the measures reportedly under consideration is to limit Israel’s participation in the EU’s “Horizon” research and development (R&D) program scheduled for renewal in 2021. This might be a significant blow to Israeli R&D, which has enjoyed substantial EU grants in recent years through the previous phase of the “Horizon” program. This paper provides background about the “Horizon” program and its importance for Israel. A. What is the “Horizon” Program? • “Horizon” is the world’s biggest publicly funded research and development program in terms of budget and number of participating states. The seven-year Horizon 2020 program launched in 2014 provided funding of some €80 billion. Grants under the follow-up seven-year “Horizon Europe” program are expected to total over €100 billion. • Participants include the EU’s 27 member states, the UK and 16 additional states (among them Israel, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine). In 1996, Israel was the first non-European state to join the program since its 1984 launch. • To be eligible for program funding, R&D institutes from several countries form consortiums and submit research proposals in accordance with the program’s calls for proposals. Leading specialists in each field evaluate the proposals and grants are allocated in accordance with their professional decisions. B. Why Is Participation in “Horizon” Important for Israel? • Government officials and experts have for years described Israel’s participation in the EU’s R&D programs as being of strategic importance

הפוסט Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU is examining how to respond to a possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank. One of the measures reportedly under consideration is to limit Israel’s participation in the EU’s “Horizon” research and development (R&D) program scheduled for renewal in 2021. This might be a significant blow to Israeli R&D, which has enjoyed substantial EU grants in recent years through the previous phase of the “Horizon” program. This paper provides background about the “Horizon” program and its importance for Israel.

A. What is the “Horizon” Program?
• “Horizon” is the world’s biggest publicly funded research and development program in terms of budget and number of participating states. The seven-year Horizon 2020 program launched in 2014 provided funding of some €80 billion. Grants under the follow-up seven-year “Horizon Europe” program are expected to total over €100 billion.

• Participants include the EU’s 27 member states, the UK and 16 additional states (among them Israel, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine). In 1996, Israel was the first non-European state to join the program since its 1984 launch.

• To be eligible for program funding, R&D institutes from several countries form consortiums and submit research proposals in accordance with the program’s calls for proposals. Leading specialists in each field evaluate the proposals and grants are allocated in accordance with their professional decisions.

B. Why Is Participation in “Horizon” Important for Israel?
• Government officials and experts have for years described Israel’s participation in the EU’s R&D programs as being of strategic importance for Israel in strengthening and advancing research, development and innovation. It enables cooperation among research, industry, high-tech and academic groups from various states in all major study areas, from the basic research level, through applied research, and all the way to development and product enhancement.

• As of the end of 2019, the acceptance rate of Israeli proposals submitted to the “Horizon” program reached 13.5 percent of all proposals submitted, higher than the 11 percent European average. This reflects, both domestically and externally, the Israeli excellence and leadership in research, development and innovation.

• Participating states are expected to cover their respective part of the “Horizon” program budget. They can reimburse the investment back (and possibly more) through winning research grants. Within the framework of FP7, the predecessor of “Horizon 2020”, Israel contributed €535 million from 2007 to 2013 and received grants at the sum of €875 million. Israel has invested some €1 billion in “Horizon 2020”, receiving to date €1.2 billion in grants (the total is expected to increase by the time the program ends).

• Participation in “Horizon” also benefits Israel in non-quantifiable terms: (1) Opportunities to develop significant international cooperation, strengthen Israeli research capabilities, and build knowledge and advanced technologies; (2) Development of economic ties and a business presence in Europe, Israel’s largest trade partner and natural research partner; (3) EU research grants are a high-level expression of trust in a project and could help attract foreign investment; (4) Formulating research proposals and setting them in motion creates jobs, economic growth and innovation, contributing to Israel’s competitiveness, which, in turn, affects economic performance.

C. What Are the Implications of Curtailing Israel’s Terms of Participation
in the “Horizon” Program?

• Preventing Israeli participation in “Horizon Europe” over the coming seven years does not require a consensus decision by all EU member states. The program can bypass the veto power used by certain EU states to scuttle measures deemed critical of Israel, which require full consensus. That is why measures related to the R&D program are under consideration in response to Israeli West Bank annexation moves.

• Preventing or curtailing Israeli participation in the “Horizon Europe” program would deal a severe blow to Israeli research, industry and academia. It would undermine Israel’s international cooperation and its access to research infrastructure (e.g., specialized labs and facilities) and scientific databases. In a broader context, it would mark a significant setback to Israel’s relationship with the EU.

• In 2013, ahead of the “Horizon 2020” launch, the EU published new guidelines that forbade Israeli entities beyond the 1967 Green Line’s eligibility of benefiting from program grants. The Israeli government opposed these guidelines and considered not joining “Horizon 2020”. This set off a storm among academic and research bodies in Israel that feared being left out of this vital program. The government, realizing the extent of the potential loss and the risk it was taking, relented and joined the program on the EU’s terms.

הפוסט Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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European Responses to an Israeli Annexation in the West Bank: From Statements to Actions? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/european-responses-to-an-israeli-annexation-in-the-west-bank-from-statements-to-actions/ Mon, 20 Jul 2020 20:29:51 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5406 Conference Summary, July 2020

הפוסט European Responses to an Israeli Annexation in the West Bank: From Statements to Actions? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 30 June 2020, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI) and Friedrich-EbertStiftung conducted an online conference on “European Responses to an Israeli Annexation in the West Bank: From Statements to Actions?”, featuring Israeli and European politicians and experts. The conference focused on possible political, economic, and legal responses, and this document summarizes its key points.

 

 

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Mitvim Institute: The EU and almost all its member states have in recent weeks expressed strong opposition to any course of Israeli annexation in the territories. Europe has emphasized that any annexation — large or small — is in violation of international law, will lower the chances of peace and will lead to negative implications with regards to relations with Israel. Europe has so far avoided presenting the practical price an annexation would have on Israel-Europe relations, and is focusing on diplomatic and public  endeavors to prevent it from happening. And yet, Europe has limited influence on decisionmaking processes in Israel, on Israeli public opinion and on the policy of the Trump Administration. If it wishes to do more than simply watch from the sidelines as events unfold in coming weeks, Europe will have to move from declarations to actions, and to present the people and leaders of Israel with the tangible implications that annexation would have regarding Israel-Europe relations.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chairperson, Meretz; Member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee: An Israeli annexation in the West Bank will put an end to the two-state solution, to the vision of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and to the peace process. It will make Israel a de facto apartheid state. To date, no preparations have been carried out ahead of annexation, whether militarily, administratively, or judicially. There is still ambiguity and possibility for change, including the scope of an annexation move. Therefore, the opposition is working to prevent annexation from taking place, to mobilize public opinion against annexation, and to generate support to this effort from Israel’s friends abroad and from our neighbors in the region. The goal is not only to stop the annexation from happening, but also to resume the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and promote the two-state solution, which remains the only viable solution to the conflict. If annexation is eventually prevented, but military occupation persists, then not much will be gained.

Dr. Nils Schmid, Spokesperson on Foreign Affairs, SPD Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag: An Israeli  annexation in the West Bank would be a clear breach of international law and lead to an end of any attempt at realizing the two-state solution that has been the general consensus among the international community and among the EU for many years. Any kind of annexation, even a so-called ‘small solution’ such as annexing parts of the settlement blocks close to Jerusalem, will still be regarded as a breach of international law and would be criticized and opposed by Germany. Germany is avoiding discussions of sanctions because no annexation has taken place yet and will not be the one to initiate European discussions about punitive measures to be taken against Israel if it goes through with it. However, a large majority of its political parties are making known that annexation is a bad idea that will not have German or EU support. The Bundestag is about to adopt a resolution calling not to go ahead with annexation as a warning or a stop sign to Israel. It will not debate the issue of consequences, as this is to be debated at the EU level. At the time being we focus on preventing annexation.

Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Director, Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI); Special Adviser to EU HRVP Josep Borrell: Europeans would have liked to imagine a world in which annexation can be prevented, but we also know there is very little we can do to stop it. Therefore, we are in a political process thinking of consequences, also as a signaling effect to Israel that can be dissuasive. European responses could result in three spheres: economic, political and legal. On the economic front, the most obvious consequences would be restrictive measures, and these would depend on what sort of annexation would take place and its immediate repercussions. With Russia, sanctions were adopted after annexation of Crimea – not a preventive but reactive step, which is never effective in reversing a particular course. On  the political front, European states could recognize the State of Palestine, but this would not be a meaningful move. Instead, a more consequential course of action would be to stop financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority should the two-state solution no longer be pursued. On the legal front, a European response could be a revamp of the differentiation agenda, which could include revisiting arrangements such as Horizon Europe and completing different marketing standards to produce originating from Israel and the territories. There is a difference between violation of international law under occupation and illegal annexation, the latter being a more severe breach of international law. This is why the EU’s differentiation policy is expected to be stepped up, and why an Israeli annexation will be treated differently than the cases of Northern Cyprus, West Sahara, Abkhazia. The eventual European response will be determined by a number of factors, including how exactly the annexation will take place and its immediate consequences, the political conditions in EU member states, the political climate in the US and the reactions of other players in the region, mainly the Arab countries.

Martin Konecny, Director, European Middle East Project (EuMEP): Indeed, Europe is not likely to adopt immediate, major sanctions against Israel in response to annexation in the West Bank. Israel enjoys an exceptional status according to which it is taboo to inflict sanctions on it or even on settlements. But in the context of annexation, this taboo is being eroded. Regarding Horizon Europe, the decision is in the hands of the European Commission. It is unlikely that Israel would be cut entirely from the program, but a scale down may be possible. To protect its own legal order, the EU would need to further insulate its relations from what Israel conducts beyond the Green Line, which could have a significant impact on bilateral relations. Friction surrounding the issue of differentiation is likely to come from both sides: not only will the EU double down on differentiation, but Israel will also show greater reluctance to accept any territorial differentiation (as was with Creative Europe Agreement rejected by Minister Miri Regev in 2017), resulting in the straining of ties. The European Court of Justice may also come into play due to increased legal friction. We have seen its rulings in the past years regarding Israeli settlements, Western Sahara and two decades ago with regards to Northern Cyprus. Long-term consequences of annexation on EU-Israel relations could be more significant: it would be harder to update the EU-Israel agreements, while the economic and technological environment keeps on changing.

Dr. Muriel Asseburg, Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP): Germany is a key player. From 1 July it will hold the presidency of both the EU Council and the UN Security Council. The European Commission is also currently presided by a German. What to expect of Germany? As a friend of Israel, and due to the historical lessons it drew from the Holocaust, annexation is a particular challenge for Germany. While Germany has spoken out clearly against annexation, it has also been signaling to Israel through its actions that annexation will come with no price tag as far as Germany is concerned. Not even recognition of a Palestinian state. German Foreign Minister even marked the difference between annexation of Crimea by Russia and the one to be done by Israel. Not having the EU’s “option paper” vis-à-vis Israel ready yet is another failure by the EU to be the geopolitical proactive and forward-looking player the European Commission declared it aspires to be in 2019. EU is divided on the matter. Yet, while sanctions by the EU require unanimity, so do new agreements with Israel. While Europeans will not throw overboard the two-state solution, they will have to open up to other options of conflict resolution.

Hugh Lovatt, Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): As things stand, it seems that the EU’s response to Israeli annexation in the West Bank will fall short of the sanctions that it put in place against Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But there will nonetheless be consequences as such actions will likely burden the relations between the EU and Israel, and create obstacles for future relations. The major vector of any EU response would be enhancing the differentiation policy, which can be done by the EU institutions based on existing legal and policy positions, without having to get further approval from all 27 Member States. While Israel is still largely perceived in Europe as a liberal and democratic state, annexation will contribute to the change of this image. Relations with Israel would become much more problematic and the equation of Israel as an apartheid state will grow in the public and the policy discourse. If it would become apparent that a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict is no longer possible, the only other alternative that would be acceptable to the Europeans would be equal rights within one state. Meanwhile, Europe should not remain complacent even if formal annexation does not take place given that the Oslo-configured Middle East Peace Process has already collapsed and de-facto annexation will continue to undermine prospects for reaching a two-state solution.

Noa Landau, Diplomatic Correspondent, Haaretz: On the eve of the target day for Israeli annexation in the West Bank, Israeli decision-makers are still not quite sure what annexation means. Similarly, while the Europeans are discussing responses to a full implementation of the annexation plans, it seems they are not prepared for the more likely scenario in which a smaller, more symbolic annexation takes place (such as annexation of Ma’ale Edumim or Gush Etzion). It is worthy to keep in mind that the prevailing argument that Europeans do not have a way to impact Israeli policy is to some extent incorrect: when the European community wanted to prevent the evacuation of the West Bank Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, it was capable of doing so.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Co-President, IASEI; Director of the Program on Israel Europe Relations, Mitvim Institute: In a demonstration of the built-in expectations capabilities gap, the European responses to an Israeli annexation in the West Bank have again proven that the EU is much better at rhetoric and much less capable and influential when it comes to action. The EU has not presented Israel with any heavy economic consequences in case of annexation, and perhaps this is one of the reasons why the EU is not taken so seriously by some in the government. There are not many sticks the EU is willing to use, and not many carrots to give. And yet, to put such measures in a wider perspective, the EU via its linkage policy since 2009 can take its toll by not advancing the relations with Israel further. If there were any hopes to reconvene an EU-Israeli Association Council (high-level political dialogue between the two sides), they are most likely to disappear with annexation. It may be that the “window of opportunity” for annexation is closing down as the polls in the US indicate Trump may not be re-elected. Other considerations are the economic implications of the coronavirus crisis. The EU can play a role in postponing annexation until this window closes.

הפוסט European Responses to an Israeli Annexation in the West Bank: From Statements to Actions? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2020 https://mitvim.org.il/en/report/trends-in-israels-regional-foreign-policies/ Mon, 20 Jul 2020 12:24:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=report&p=5388 Issue 5

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Issue 5
Editors: Dr. Roee Kibrik and Dr. Nimrod Goren

Two major developments affected Israeli foreign policy over the past six months: The Covid19 crisis that spawned new regional and international cooperation, and the declared annexation intentions that prompted international opposition and warnings of damage to Israel’s ties with Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, Israel’s new Foreign Minister demonstrated a desire to empower the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These are the major semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, in January-June 2020:

1. Israel welcomes the Trump Plan but does not advance its implementation – The Trump Plan, unveiled in late January in the midst of Israel’s election campaign, was described by frontrunners Netanyahu and Gantz as a great opportunity. However, the plan drew support only in Israel and the US, whose standing in the world has significantly declined under President Trump. As it heads for the November presidential elections under the Covid19 crisis, US interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue has waned. Israel did not take operative steps to implement the Trump Plan, except Netanyahu’s intention to take the opportunity it provides for annexation and map drawing by an Israeli-American team. The Palestinians vehemently opposed the plan.

2. Israel declares annexation intention, prompting widespread international opposition – The Trump Plan boosted Netanyahu’s pledge to annex territories in the West Bank, which dominated the public and political agenda. Gantz did not express opposition in principle, but conditioned annexation on regional and international approval and preservation of existing peace treaties. Annexation declarations drew harsh condemnation by the EU and key European states, Jordan, the Gulf States, US Democrats, the UN, Russia, and the Palestinians. Opponents argued that annexation violates international law, and warned that it would destabilize the region, damage Israel’s bilateral relations and distance prospects of peace.

3. Israelis and Palestinians cooperate on Covid-19, but clash over annexation – The Covid-19 outbreak spawned Israeli cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and even with counterparts in Gaza on staff training, medical equipment and supply transfers, knowledge sharing, and movement coordination to contain the disease. However, the PA ceased security and civilian coordination with Israel over Netanyahu’s annexation intentions. At the same time, Israel continued to ensure the transfer of Qatari aid to Gaza, to prevent an escalation of violence and a humanitarian disaster, while trying to advance a prisoner swap with Hamas.

4. The Crisis with Jordan deepens – The mistrust between the Israeli and Jordanian heads of state continued, with King Abdullah reportedly refusing to take Netanyahu’s calls but agreeing to meet with the Mossad chief. The Tzofar land reverted to Jordanian control, due to the expiration of the land lease agreement and after a failed attempt to keep it under Israeli cultivation. Jordan became a leading anti-annexation voice, warning Israel against negative repercussions for the peace treaty and working to mobilize international action, especially in Europe and the US, to prevent the move.

5. The UAE advances ties with Israel, warns against annexation – The UAE took positive measures toward Israel, cooperating with it on preparation for Expo 2020 in Dubai (now postponed to 2021), and on tackling Covid-19. The Emirates helped Israel obtain medical equipment and openly flew planeloads of equipment for the Palestinians to Israel’s BenGurion Airport. The UAE also displayed a supportive attitude toward its Jewish community, and senior Emirati officials legitimized ties with Israel even as they disagreed with its policy on the Palestinians. UAE officials directly appealed to the Israeli public, urging Israel to abandon the annexation idea and warning that it would be detrimental to relations and prevent normalization.

6. Diplomatic efforts and escalation against Iran and its proxies – Israel urged European states to outlaw Hezbollah, as Germany and Austria advanced, and to join US sanctions against Iran. Israel continued to strike Iranian targets in Syria and Hezbollah targets in Syria and Lebanon, and the confrontation escalated into mutual cyber-attacks and reports of Israeli sabotage of sites related to Iran’s nuclear program. Senior Israeli and US officials frequently discussed the Iran issue. Israel also pointed to potential threats from Lebanon, which suffers a deep economic crisis.

7. Indications of a more positive Israeli attitude toward Europe despite the shadow of annexation – Israel’s new Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi opted for a more positive approach toward the EU, emphasizing the importance of the relations with it for Israel. He conducted talks with European foreign ministers and with the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell. Ashkenazi also dismissed the phrasing of Hungary’s statement of support for Israel, which included a reference to “shared patriotic values” that are opposed to the European discourse. However, the annexation intention, which the EU clearly opposes, overshadowed attempts to turn a new page in Israel-Europe relations.

8. Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus expands – Israel is reaping the fruit of its expanded cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, which extends beyond the energy field. The Covid-19 crisis, which created a global gas price slump, impaired the countries’ ability to profit from their natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean. However, the civilian infrastructure of the relationship built by Israel, Cyprus and Greece facilitated cooperation among them on new medical, technological, security and tourism challenges. Israel was the first destination of visits by the Greek Prime Minister and Cypriot Foreign Minister at the end of the first Covid-19 wave.

9. Israel maneuvers between cooperation and disputes in the Mediterranean – Natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean exacerbated the conflict between Turkey and Greece/Cyprus over maritime boundaries and drilling rights. In addition, the Libyan civil war embroiled foreign actors and further intensified tensions in the Mediterranean. Israel tried to stay out of these conflicts and to avoid a clear anti-Turkish stand, working instead to preserve channels of communication with the various actors. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum continued its bid to become an international organization, but lost its centrality after the regional focus shifted from energy-economic cooperation to geo-political tensions.

10. International and regional cooperation against Covid-19 – Israel worked with international institutions and other countries to curb the Covid-19 pandemic and its repercussions. It mobilized the help of international partners in repatriating its citizens from abroad and obtaining medical equipment and supplies, shared information and tried to work with other countries on a controlled re-opening of its economy and tourism – before it suffered from significant resurgence of the disease. The Israeli MFA played an important role in all these efforts, displaying its significant added value in dealing with such crises.

11. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi tries to rehabilitate the MFA – Ashkenazi’s entry into the position of Foreign Minister lifted spirits in the MFA. He managed to mobilize budget for operations, recognized the importance of diplomacy as a key component of national security, expressed public appreciation for the Foreign Service’s professionalism, and advanced new diplomatic appointments, chief among them of Alon Ushpiz as the MFA’s Director General. Ashkenazi also displayed willingness to benefit from the experience of retired diplomats. However, many foreign policy issues remain under the responsibility of other ministries, and the Foreign Service is still not efficiently coordinated and arrayed.

*Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. This document outlines major semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, based on Mitvim’s monthly reports on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and Israel’s Foreign Service. The document is published in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU and Israel Should Resume Their Suspended High-Level Dialogue https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-eu-and-israel-should-resume-their-suspended-high-level-dialogue/ Fri, 17 Jul 2020 06:37:33 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5471 July 2020

הפוסט The EU and Israel Should Resume Their Suspended High-Level Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Some 100 European Parliament (EP) members and 9 Israeli Members of Knesset (from coalition and opposition) sent a letter to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell on June 23 urging resumption of the annual EU-Israel Association Council meetings, the ministerial-level dialogue last held between the sides eight years ago. The letter, instigated by EP delegation head to Israel Antonio Lopez, protested the EU’s attitude toward Israel, noting that while the EU continues to hold annual Association Council meetings with Israel’s non-democratic neighbors, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and even signs new agreements with them, it last convened the ministerial-level dialogue with Israel in 2012.

In 2013, Israel cancelled the annual meeting to protest EU instructions excluding territories beyond its 1967 borders from all Israel-EU agreements. Borrell’s predecessor Federica Mogherini led several attempts to reconvene the Association Council, but failed due to reservations on the part of certain EU members against the backdrop of the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and tensions in Israel-EU relations. The Association Council did not reconvene, and the regular high-level dialogue was halted.

The dialogue, which brought together EU foreign ministers with their Israeli counterpart, was launched within the framework of the 1995 Association Agreement between Israel and the EU. Its aims were to discuss issues of importance to each side and convey messages in a better, more precise and effective manner than those conveyed by so-called “megaphone diplomacy” (exchanges through media channels in times of tension, which tend to be aggressive and conflictual). The high-level meetings allowed both sides to examine the state of their relations and to seek paths to advance them. Such meetings entail months of preparations by relevant government agencies in Israel and the EU to ensure an optimal outcome.

Cooperation between Israel and the EU is conducted on an unusually high level. It encompasses economic ties (a free trade agreement on goods and even agriculture), science, innovation and development (the Horizon program), higher education (the Erasmus+ program), aviation (the Open Skies agreement), and more. However, along with the flourishing economic ties, diplomatic relations have deteriorated under the previous Netanyahu governments to a low ebb, exacerbated by Netanyahu’s attempts to drive a wedge among EU members to scuttle resolutions critical of Israel. Israel’s new government, which includes the centrist Blue and White party and in which Gabi Ashkenazi serves as foreign minister, may enable improved ties with the EU and allow renewal of the beneficial high-level political dialogue between the sides. Initial positive exchanges between Ashkenazi and Borrell indicate that both sides are seeking constructive engagement.

Lopez and other signatories of the letter to Borrell (many of them members of the EP’s largest faction, the center-right European People’s Party, which includes supporters of Israel) believe the time is ripe for a new page in relations. However, their initiative is highly speculative. If the Israeli government annexes even a small part of the West Bank, the Association Council will not convene any time soon. The Europeans view any annexation as burying the two-state solution and violating Palestinian rights and international law. Annexation would be a game changer. Some 1,000 EP members from 25 states recently signed a letter condemning the planned Israeli move.

Should resumption of the Association Council meetings depend on the annexation issue? The demand for the EU to reconvene the council is a substantive one. Since 2014, the EU (and especially a number of members) has adopted a discriminatory attitude toward Israel in refusing to do so. If the EU supports high-level dialogue with other countries regardless of their democratic and human rights performance, it should not impose pre-conditions on Israel.

The Israeli government and the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council have grown accustomed to the absence of a regular, established diplomatic dialogue between them. Such a dialogue could well be tough for both sides and critical in nature, but it must take place. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi and High Representative Borrell, who already agreed to meet each other in Brussels, should work together to reconvene the Association Council, and thus enable an annual high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU to take place.

The article was published by The Jerusalem Post on 17 July 2020

הפוסט The EU and Israel Should Resume Their Suspended High-Level Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/europes-initial-reactions-to-israels-annexation-intentions/ Sun, 28 Jun 2020 08:11:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4734 US President Donald Trump’s plan for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, presented in January 2020, was perceived in Jerusalem as a green light to annexation of some 30 percent of the West Bank. It was in accordance with the intentions declared over the past year by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Accordingly, the April 2020 coalition agreement between the Likud and Blue and White political parties included a clause allowing Netanyahu to bring a USapproved annexation plan for government or Knesset approval as of July 1, 2020. 1 Soon after, reactions began pouring in from around the world, including Europe, expressing opposition to annexation and warning Israel against such a move. This paper presents the reactions of the EU, its member states and the UK. It examines them in light of the hurdles to formulating an EU consensus on the issue, and maps them according to the extent of the criticism and the attitudes of the various European states toward the Israeli government’s policy.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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US President Donald Trump’s plan for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, presented in January 2020, was perceived in Jerusalem as a green light to annexation of some 30 percent of the West Bank. It was in accordance with the intentions declared over the past year by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Accordingly, the April 2020 coalition agreement between the Likud and Blue and White political parties included a clause allowing Netanyahu to bring a USapproved annexation plan for government or Knesset approval as of July 1, 2020. 1 Soon after, reactions began pouring in from around the world, including Europe, expressing opposition to annexation and warning Israel against such a move. This paper presents the reactions of the EU, its member states and the UK. It examines them in light of the hurdles to formulating an EU consensus on the issue, and maps them according to the extent of the criticism and the attitudes of the various European states toward the Israeli government’s policy.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel, the EU and Annexation Intentions https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/3927/ Tue, 12 May 2020 14:44:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3927 Israel has been increasingly critical of the EU in recent days, as multiple European leaders are voicing their opposition to a possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank. The Israeli response is in continuation to public statements made by Netanyahu and his top ministers over the last few years, in which they accused the EU of pursuing anti-Israeli policies, supporting boycotts, and funding organizations supporting Palestinian terrorism. Harsh and undiplomatic language was repeatedly used by Israeli officials against Brussels, and this negatively impacted Israeli perceptions of the EU. Israel is wrong in depicting the EU as hostile to Israel, and the new government would do well to shift direction. The EU is a strategic ally of Israel – in trade and economy, in diplomacy and security, in technology and tourism, in research and culture. The EU’s criticism targets Israel’s policy on the Palestinians and is not inherently anti-Israel as some portray it. The EU opposes the settlements and Israel’s annexation intentions. It also encourages differentiation between the Palestinian territories and Israel, but by no means does it advocate a boycott of Israel. The growing divisions among EU member states in recent years have undermined European consensus on a variety of foreign policy issues, among them the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu’s European supporters, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has eroded democracy in his own country, are actively engaged in thwarting EU criticism of Israeli policy in the territories. The EU Foreign Affairs Council has not adopted joint resolutions on

הפוסט Israel, the EU and Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel has been increasingly critical of the EU in recent days, as multiple European leaders are voicing their opposition to a possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank. The Israeli response is in continuation to public statements made by Netanyahu and his top ministers over the last few years, in which they accused the EU of pursuing anti-Israeli policies, supporting boycotts, and funding organizations supporting Palestinian terrorism. Harsh and undiplomatic language was repeatedly used by Israeli officials against Brussels, and this negatively impacted Israeli perceptions of the EU.

Israel is wrong in depicting the EU as hostile to Israel, and the new government would do well to shift direction. The EU is a strategic ally of Israel – in trade and economy, in diplomacy and security, in technology and tourism, in research and culture. The EU’s criticism targets Israel’s policy on the Palestinians and is not inherently anti-Israel as some portray it. The EU opposes the settlements and Israel’s annexation intentions. It also encourages differentiation between the Palestinian territories and Israel, but by no means does it advocate a boycott of Israel.

The growing divisions among EU member states in recent years have undermined European consensus on a variety of foreign policy issues, among them the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu’s European supporters, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has eroded democracy in his own country, are actively engaged in thwarting EU criticism of Israeli policy in the territories. The EU Foreign Affairs Council has not adopted joint resolutions on Israel since mid-2016. Europe’s focus on more urgent challenges, such as refugees, Brexit and now the coronavirus – is also a contributing factor in this regard.

However, Europe is unwilling to ignore Netanyahu’s annexation intentions. The heads of the EU and key member states are finding ways to circumvent internal divisions in order to convey protests, opposition and warnings to Israel: Outspoken remarks by the EU new foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, joint declarations by European members of the UN Security Council, coordinated protests delivered to the Israeli Foreign Ministry by European ambassadors representing states with similar policy views, and cooperation with other international bodies, such as the Arab League, which also oppose annexation.

EU representatives have made use of all these tools in recent weeks. They have expressed unequivocal opposition to annexation, stressed that it would violate international law, recommended that Israel avoid doing so, and some even warned of legal consequences and deterioration of their relations with Israel. Countries like France, Belgium and Luxembourg have been working to place the issue on the agenda of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, calling on the EU to spell out punitive measures against Israeli annexation.

Nevertheless, also due to internal divisions, Europe seems to be waiting to see the nature and extent of Netanyahu’s annexation decision before presenting concrete reactions and a real price tag.

The differences in European approaches are evident in the phrasing of declarations. France, Ireland and Sweden, for example, express themselves in harsher fashion. Borrell, too, is outspoken, but the fact that he does not represent at this stage a unified stance of all member states weakens the significance of his remarks. At the same time, Borrell is seeking to boost EU ties with Jordan, which he identifies as a key state in regards to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Israel has become accustomed to viewing Europe as a weakened entity in the international arena and to dismissing its protests. However, this attitude could turn out to be wrong if Israel decides to take a formal annexation step, which many in Europe would regard as a game changer. Key European leaders might advance measures within EU institutions and elsewhere that would exact a toll on Israel. However, other than a threat of “sticks”, the EU is also offering “carrots” in the event that Israel chooses to progress toward a two-state solution. In 2013, the EU offered a significant upgrade of relations with Israel to that of a Special Privileged Partnership if it makes peace with the Palestinians. It is time to examine this offer, to which Israel has yet to respond, in a positive light.

That, in turn, requires a change in the new Israeli government’s attitude toward the EU. The new government should regard the EU as a friend and partner, and cease EU bashing. It should support a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and prioritize ties with those European states that are guided by liberal democratic values. The government should seek to renew its high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012. It should also welcome EU involvement in efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, including European support to pro-peace and pro-democracy civil society organizations.

However, recalibrating Israel-EU relations will not be possible while Israel is promoting annexation. These two things do not go together. Israel’s new foreign minister should indeed convey a new message to the Europeans as he takes office – of partnership and friendship, commitment to democratic values, willingness for dialogue and openness to criticism – but at the same time he should seek to block annexation. Not only because of European opposition, but primarily out of concern for Israel’s national interests, democratic character, and quest for peace.

הפוסט Israel, the EU and Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/3920/ Mon, 11 May 2020 14:30:16 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3920 The Coronavirus crisis and its impact on Europe has re-ignited the argument over the EU’s future prospects. While the Coronavirus crisis is global, each state has adopted its own coping strategy. For the EU, which has aspired for the past seven decades to promote the integration of its member states, this return to isolation within the nation-state unit could have destructive repercussions. The EU is based on a common market which removes economic and national borders, enabling the free passage of goods, services, capital and people. The Coronavirus crisis has resulted in uncoordinated, unsynchronized closures of national borders, hampering the passage of goods and people and undermining the EU’s integrative vision. Following the debt crisis (2009), immigration crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016), will the Coronavirus pandemic result in spillback or even the dismantling of the European integration project? The EU was slow to react to the crisis and initially has been blamed for some failures in dealing with it. As usual, it provided a convenient punching bag, especially for those who fail to understand the limitations to its competence. Health policy is made and carried out by member states, not by Brussels. It was unrealistic to aspire or expect that in these times of chaos and pandemic fright the slow-moving, cumbersome organization would successfully coordinate emergency policy for its 27 member states, which can each respond far more quickly and effectively themselves. Brussels’ initial coordination attempts failed, and each member state adopted a different strategy at a different time. Coordination

הפוסט The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Coronavirus crisis and its impact on Europe has re-ignited the argument over the EU’s future prospects. While the Coronavirus crisis is global, each state has adopted its own coping strategy. For the EU, which has aspired for the past seven decades to promote the integration of its member states, this return to isolation within the nation-state unit could have destructive repercussions.

The EU is based on a common market which removes economic and national borders, enabling the free passage of goods, services, capital and people. The Coronavirus crisis has resulted in uncoordinated, unsynchronized closures of national borders, hampering the passage of goods and people and undermining the EU’s integrative vision. Following the debt crisis (2009), immigration crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016), will the Coronavirus pandemic result in spillback or even the dismantling of the European integration project?

The EU was slow to react to the crisis and initially has been blamed for some failures in dealing with it. As usual, it provided a convenient punching bag, especially for those who fail to understand the limitations to its competence. Health policy is made and carried out by member states, not by Brussels. It was unrealistic to aspire or expect that in these times of chaos and pandemic fright the slow-moving, cumbersome organization would successfully coordinate emergency policy for its 27 member states, which can each respond far more quickly and effectively themselves. Brussels’ initial coordination attempts failed, and each member state adopted a different strategy at a different time. Coordination among the states was clearly lacking, as was the initial lack of solidarity, reflected for example in a halt to medical equipment exports to Italy.

When hospitals in Italy were collapsing, urgently needing life-saving protection equipment, Germany, France and additional member states where the epidemic had not yet spread suspended exports of these items. European solidarity was exposed as a hollow slogan, anchored in the Lisbon Treaty but not in European hearts. National instincts predominated. Even if Brussels thought in terms of Europe, EU member states thought of themselves and the competence was, as mentioned, in their hands. It was only several weeks later that manifestations of solidarity emerged, such as transferring Coronavirus patients on respirators from northern Italy to hospitals in Germany. The initial impression, however, was seared in the minds of Italians who desperately needed help and did not get it.

In addition to the absence of solidarity on health-related issues, economic solidarity was also lacking. Italy and other states asked the Eurozone’s finance ministers to approve “Coronavirus bonds”, meaning that the 19 members of the currency bloc would pool some of their debt. The Dutch and German refusal to share in the debt burden of southern European states generated anger, bitterness and disappointment in Italy, Spain and other countries. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen eventually apologized to the Italians on behalf of the other Europeans for failing to render assistance when their state’s health system collapsed. This was an unusual move, but perhaps too little, too late.

In April, the EU was able to cut back some of its losses and even record several achievements. The bloc was quick to regain its composure, quickly shifting to new and creative solutions. Lessons have clearly been learned from previous crises. The European Central Bank was quick to spend 750 billion euros in bond purchase, and the European Commission redirected 37 billion euros from the EU’s budget (which totals some 165 billion euro in 2020) to fighting the pandemic’s repercussions. Aid packages for the 27 member states and their 450 million residents total some 4 billion euros.

The Commission has also launched a joint procurement agreement of medical equipment for the member states and is working on EU-funded construction of joint medical equipment stockpiles. Moreover, the EU has allocated 140 million euros for Coronavirus research, to work on a vaccine and other interim solutions. In addition, the EU’s policy and legislation banning and limiting state-aid has been suspended, and a green light was given to EU member states (under the European Commission’s supervision) to increase their deficits in order to help business and citizens.

The Coronavirus crisis is not only a health crisis. It is a mega-crisis with harsh economic aspects. It is also a crisis of governance and a challenge to democracy. Changes to one’s lifestyle beget changes in perceptions, ideas and identity. The epidemic once again pits the skeptics and critics of the European integration project against its supporters, bolstering the populists and mainly the nationalists.

The Coronavirus crisis has exposed the EU’s weakness in dealing with member states not committed to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban pushed through emergency legislation made possible under the Coronavirus crisis that allows him and his government to take action and pass laws without parliamentary oversight. The legislation, with no stipulated deadline, is akin to suspending democracy in Hungary. Although the crisis entails intrusions of privacy in many countries, no democracy in Europe or elsewhere has adopted such harsh measures. The EU is based on values of democracy, the rule of law and human and civil rights, but Orban’s move generated only a feeble response on the part of the EU and its member states. This type of challenge has hovered over the EU for several years and demands a determined response. Weak actions undermine the EU and testify to its institutional inadequacy and its normative frailty.

The economic crisis will affect the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy, too. China, where the epidemic originated, responded forcefully and blocked it relatively fast and effectively. At the height of the crisis in Italy, when its neighbors refrained from providing it with medical equipment, China sent tens of tons of medical equipment as well as medical teams. This gave China points in Italian public opinion, as the EU was losing ground. China’s economic activity has almost reverted to its pre-Coronavirus level; in Europe, the epidemic hit harder and the economy will take longer to recover. From a broader perspective, Europe, which has been experiencing an economic decline, is losing points to China in the global competition.

And what about Israel? The EU’s voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has faded in any case in recent years. Since 2016, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been mobilizing his opportunistic European friends, who are interested to ram Brussels, in order to block EU resolutions critical of Israel. Instead, the EU has only been reiterating consensual decisions adopted in the past. When the number of Coronavirus fatalities in Europe soars, the foreign policy “guns” fall silent. The Coronavirus-induced crisis, weakening Europe and diverting global attention, may weaken the European response to Israeli annexation measures that will be presented as implementing the Trump plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Europe has been hit the hardest by the Coronavirus. Over 100,000 of the virus’ 180,000 known fatalities are EU citizens. For now, it does not appear the EU will be one of the epidemic’s victims, but public confidence in some of its systems has been substantially undermined and some of its “pre-existing conditions” have erupted and intensified. The EU has been weakened both internally and externally, but it is fighting back and the final word in the European integration project is far from being said.

An efficient, functioning international system is vital to confront surging nationalist sentiment. The cross-border Coronavirus does not distinguish between race and color and fighting it requires internal European cooperation. The EU has displayed resilience in bouncing back from its initial hesitant and uncoordinated response. However, the decisive question in the wake of the crisis is whether European leaders and citizens view the EU as a political or merely an economic functional project. In this context, it is too soon to chart the balance of EU losses and wins in the Coronavirus crisis.

הפוסט The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/coronavirus-outbreak-an-important-test-for-globalization/ Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:33:26 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3012 The quick-fire coronavirus spread and the response of different countries to it, not only highlight immediate concerns about public health, but also have a significant impact on the evolving world order and the values that underpin it. While further challenging globalization, the crisis also holds out hope for its resurgence. The epidemic is an additional blow to the vision and practices of the globalization process that is already under strain. The two world powers that led globalization – the US and China – turned to limiting the scope of their cooperation and exchange of goods, people, and even ideas. In early March, the US decreased the number of visas granted to Chinese journalists. In many places, citizens have elected leaders more concerned with domestic values than with a commitment to a global visions and institutions; and the European Union, a crowning achievement of globalization in both practice and values, is creaking and weakening. The coronavirus event provides globalization with additional practical and symbolic challenges. So far, infection has been reported in over 85 countries, and its spread will slow a global economy which is heavily dependent on international production and supply chains. The number of flights between countries, perhaps the most immediate personal experience of globalization, is quickly shrinking, with significant repercussions expected to outlast the epidemic. The outbreak hones the understanding that along with the free passage of people and goods between countries, globalization also can bring with it the spread of disease. Sadly, in the public health context, the limitations to globalization

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The quick-fire coronavirus spread and the response of different countries to it, not only highlight immediate concerns about public health, but also have a significant impact on the evolving world order and the values that underpin it. While further challenging globalization, the crisis also holds out hope for its resurgence.

The epidemic is an additional blow to the vision and practices of the globalization process that is already under strain. The two world powers that led globalization – the US and China – turned to limiting the scope of their cooperation and exchange of goods, people, and even ideas. In early March, the US decreased the number of visas granted to Chinese journalists. In many places, citizens have elected leaders more concerned with domestic values than with a commitment to a global visions and institutions; and the European Union, a crowning achievement of globalization in both practice and values, is creaking and weakening.

The coronavirus event provides globalization with additional practical and symbolic challenges. So far, infection has been reported in over 85 countries, and its spread will slow a global economy which is heavily dependent on international production and supply chains. The number of flights between countries, perhaps the most immediate personal experience of globalization, is quickly shrinking, with significant repercussions expected to outlast the epidemic. The outbreak hones the understanding that along with the free passage of people and goods between countries, globalization also can bring with it the spread of disease. Sadly, in the public health context, the limitations to globalization could be perceived as a positive development. Research examining the effects of the global flu epidemic in the winter of 1957-58 clearly showed Cold War constraints on movement between East and West curtailed the spread of the disease in the West.

The fact that the virus broke out in China is of particular significance. The rising Eastern power plays a critical role in the global economy, inter alia as the production hub of most goods we consume. We hailed this global production chain and the cheap goods it provided. Now that the crisis in China is preventing production and export, many countries will presumably try to bring back home some of their essential production elements. The US under President Donald Trump was trying to do so anyway, albeit for different reasons. Not only that, weakened Chinese economic activity is expected to undermine the global economy and thereby further erode the achievements of globalization.

The second issue highlighted by the epidemic is US-Sino competition. The Trump Administration imposed restrictions on travelers from China on public health grounds. However, China, which has already warned against a global “over reaction” is presumably concerned that some of the restrictions stem from political and perhaps even racist motivations. The crisis is also creating fertile ground for injecting an ideological dimension into US-Chinese tensions. So far, the competition between Washington and Beijing has revolved around material aspects: Global status, economic capacity and military power, but the coronavirus crisis is a test for the regime and society in both China and the US.

On the one hand, the restrictive and hierarchical nature of Chinese society appears to have delayed the identification and treatment of the Covid-19 disease, challenging the legitimacy of China’s Communist Party. It will invariably serve the US in future arguments about the advantages of an open American-style society versus the (partially) closed Chinese one. At the same time, the handling of the disease pits the American model of personal freedom, free market and private and decentralized medicine against the Chinese model that prefers the collective, a partly government controlled economy and medical services shaped according to a public ethos, albeit with some of it privatized nowadays. China’s ability to impose harsh restrictions on its citizens probably helped block the spread of the virus within China, while the ability of the US system to tackle the challenge is unclear as yet.

Nonetheless, the crisis is also an opportunity to revive globalization. First, the crisis is a reminder of our underlining unity as humans. Beyond divisions, wars and hatred, the crisis shows that different people share rather similar anxieties. Second, international cooperation is crucial. A coordinated, cross-border international effort to monitor and treat the disease, and to speedily develop and disseminate a vaccine across national borders will end the epidemic. This is an important lesson in light of other global challenges, especially climate change. In both cases – climate and public health – mobilization to tackle them should overcome national boundaries. Specifically, the epidemic also highlights the importance of international organizations. Those who are critical of such organizations should be reminded that accepted international mechanisms (such as those being promoted by the World Health Organization) are critical for dealing with the challenges to public health such as the Coronavirus epidemic. Without them, things would be much tougher.

We – leaders, opinion setters, educators and citizens – hold the key to addressing the epidemic and later shaping its legacy: international isolation and competition or shared humanity and cooperation mechanisms. Two 20th century novels – Camus’ “The Plague” and Saramago’s “Blindness” – include horrific depictions of human behavior in the face of epidemics. However, they also highlight heroes who act with compassion and humaneness towards their fellow wo.men. Let us hope that we follow their example of cooperation and humanity rather than alienation and disregard towards others.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/attacking-the-eu-for-domestic-political-gains-is-wrong/ Tue, 10 Mar 2020 15:30:44 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3011 No one in Israel was particularly surprised when the EU’s new foreign policy chief Josep Borrell warned that Israeli annexation of territories would not go “unchallenged”. Foreign Minister Israel Katz opted for an aggressive response (compared with accepted diplomatic parameters), but was it necessary to unleash such undiplomatic “ammunition”? Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel? After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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No one in Israel was particularly surprised when the EU’s new foreign policy chief Josep Borrell warned that Israeli annexation of territories would not go “unchallenged”. Foreign Minister Israel Katz opted for an aggressive response (compared with accepted diplomatic parameters), but was it necessary to unleash such undiplomatic “ammunition”?

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/10-trends-in-israels-regional-foreign-policies-july-december-2019/ Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:34:09 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2993 Every six months, the Mitvim Institute maps key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, based on the institute’s monthly reports that monitor ongoing developments. From July through December 2019, we identified the following 10 trends: 1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes. 2) Efforts to achieve a long-term truce with Hamas, while preserving the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) just short of collapse – Israel and Hamas conducted indirect contacts via Qatar, Egypt and the UN special envoy in a bid to achieve a long-term truce, which will also enable the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip. Despite occasional flare-ups of violence, Israel opted to forego another round of war with Gaza and instead sought to reach understandings with Hamas and implement them. At the same time, Israel gave the PA funds it had deducted from its budget in order to avert its collapse but did not support it politically, and continued to encourage

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Every six months, the Mitvim Institute maps key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, based on the institute’s monthly reports that monitor ongoing developments. From July through December 2019, we identified the following 10 trends:

1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

2) Efforts to achieve a long-term truce with Hamas, while preserving the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) just short of collapse – Israel and Hamas conducted indirect contacts via Qatar, Egypt and the UN special envoy in a bid to achieve a long-term truce, which will also enable the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip. Despite occasional flare-ups of violence, Israel opted to forego another round of war with Gaza and instead sought to reach understandings with Hamas and implement them. At the same time, Israel gave the PA funds it had deducted from its budget in order to avert its collapse but did not support it politically, and continued to encourage the intra-Palestinian divide.

3) Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning activists entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4) Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdullah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer. President Reuven Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5) Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf states and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf states, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations toward its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Israel Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf states, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf states, which was not met with a significant American response.

6) Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7) Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement while Israel dials down its Visegrád Group links – The European Union continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner, and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrád Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8) Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9) Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes canceled) international visits and meetings in a bid to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10) Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointment was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, at the expense of diplomats.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, of which Dr. Nimrod Goren is the founder and head.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When Israelis and Palestinians Meet at the European Parliament https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/when-israelis-and-palestinians-meet-at-the-european-parliament/ Sun, 29 Dec 2019 12:55:26 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4146 Less than a month before Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Brussels, we – a group of young Israelis and Palestinians – arrived at the European Parliament for a second meeting of the Young Political Leaders (YPL) program, which connects young people from different regions around the world, mainly from conflict zones, to acquaint them with the European and the international system and to provide them with a space for dialogue. As a member of the Israeli peace camp and as an organizer and participant in numerous meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, I attend these meetings with mixed feelings of excitement and hope alongside skepticism and cynicism. Each time, I am happy for the opportunity to meet and talk to young people on “the other side,” and am sad to discover that our expectations from the encounters are diminished from year to year. Peace? A word too big. Political agreement? No leader has the courage. A diplomatic process? Neither side feels it has a partner. Confidence-building measures? The reality on the ground is different. In the past, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli-Palestinian encounters were much more common. While these were two difficult, painful and blood-soaked decades of the conflict, it was precisely when hope overcame despair. We had the feeling that change was possible, that there was still a possibility for a solution, and that our leaders were able and willing to advance and implement it. In recent years, I have felt that the hope is replaced by

הפוסט When Israelis and Palestinians Meet at the European Parliament הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Less than a month before Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Brussels, we – a group of young Israelis and Palestinians – arrived at the European Parliament for a second meeting of the Young Political Leaders (YPL) program, which connects young people from different regions around the world, mainly from conflict zones, to acquaint them with the European and the international system and to provide them with a space for dialogue.

As a member of the Israeli peace camp and as an organizer and participant in numerous meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, I attend these meetings with mixed feelings of excitement and hope alongside skepticism and cynicism. Each time, I am happy for the opportunity to meet and talk to young people on “the other side,” and am sad to discover that our expectations from the encounters are diminished from year to year. Peace? A word too big. Political agreement? No leader has the courage. A diplomatic process? Neither side feels it has a partner. Confidence-building measures? The reality on the ground is different.

In the past, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli-Palestinian encounters were much more common. While these were two difficult, painful and blood-soaked decades of the conflict, it was precisely when hope overcame despair. We had the feeling that change was possible, that there was still a possibility for a solution, and that our leaders were able and willing to advance and implement it. In recent years, I have felt that the hope is replaced by despair, stemming both from reality on the ground and from the fact that our politicians are mainly focused on preserving the illusion of a status quo.

In recent years, I am under the impression that Europe and the international community care more about settling our conflict than we do. Peace initiatives, positive incentives, condemnations and controversial decisions are all examples of measures taken by Europe and the international community showing they have an interest in the region and in Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. We can argue about the essence, the motives and the degree of influence of such measures, but there is no doubt that they indicate interest. On my last visit to Brussels, however, I noticed a change of attitude. Europe has many troubles of its own, both at home and abroad, and its focus in the Middle East is no longer necessarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

During the meetings in Brussels last year, the main message of the European Parliament members present was that Europe definitely wants to see advancement toward a two-state solution and believes it is possible, but without the will of the parties and their leaders the chances for it to happen are slim. During the last visit, however, the main message from our hosts was their impression that there is no solution on the horizon, but that we must try to keep our hopes up, and wait for the right timing, or for a change that allows us to move forward.

In this atmosphere of relatively comfortable despair (for some of us), discussions took place between us Israelis, our Palestinian partners and our European hosts. The atmosphere stayed relatively calm, unlike the heated atmosphere I experienced in previous encounters. Even the tensions over democracy and human rights remained within the bounds of a critical and legitimate discourse of people with different worldviews, living in the “same neighborhood,” but in very different realities. Bystanders were positively impressed – young Israelis and Palestinians can sit in one room and talk to each other. Occasionally they argue, but nevertheless they succeed in finding common ground and reaching understandings and agreements.

On the second day of the program we held a simulation of negotiations over Jerusalem. The discussions within each of the two national groups were no less difficult, and perhaps even more so, than the discussions between the two sides. Although most members of the Israeli delegation had progressive and centrist political views, the attempt to reach agreement was challenging. In the end, all sides recognized the need for clear borders, mutual recognition and international involvement in the Holy Basin, the area in Jerusalem that includes the Old City and its adjacent territories. For the organizers of the simulation, the European mediators, this was evidence that with a little effort and foreign support, the sides are still able to reach understandings, even on the conflict’s most difficult issues. For me, it was actually a reminder that unlike us, the participants, the political echelons on both sides are moving away from the ability to reach and implement agreements.

Despite the difficulties and challenges, each meeting reminds me that there is no substitute for personal contact and sharpens my understanding that dialogue encounters between individuals on both sides must continue. Such meetings are often the only opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians to meet each other not on the battlefield and not behind screens, where both sides are often portrayed as a sworn enemy. Meetings between people are a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the Israelis and Palestinians to recognize, know and understand each other. On days when the political horizon seems so far away, it is important to know and remember that on the other side there are quite a few people who aspire to create a better future and yearn for peace.
I can only hope that the next visit of the prime minister to Brussels will be a joint visit with a Palestinian leader. I also hope that for a change, it will be a visit that focuses on dialogue, seeking agreements and building trust – as we tried to do at the meeting of the young leaders – and not another visit of public relations and wrangling.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israelis and Palestinians Meet at the European Parliament הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Presentation of findings to senior Foreign Ministry forum https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/presentation-of-findings-to-senior-foreign-ministry-forum/ Thu, 19 Dec 2019 11:35:29 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=5563 Briefing on findings of the Foreign Affairs Policy Index, December 2019

הפוסט Presentation of findings to senior Foreign Ministry forum הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Institute of Mitvim hosted a forum of senior Foreign Ministry leaders, headed by the Office’s Director General Yuval Rotem, to present the findings of the Foreign Affairs Policy Index of 2019 and insights from the Institute’s practice. The discussion focused on relations with Europe and the Middle East and the status of the Foreign Ministry.

הפוסט Presentation of findings to senior Foreign Ministry forum הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-EU relations: An annual assessment https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-eu-relations-an-annual-assessment/ Sun, 15 Dec 2019 13:17:38 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2822 The prevailing, negative attitudes in Israel toward the EU, as reflected in the 2019 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, differ greatly from the facts on the ground. The European Union is not hostile to Israel. Along with its member states, the EU is Israel’s largest trading partner. Europe accounts for almost 50% of Israeli imports, and more than 35%-40% of its exports. Anyone ignoring this Israeli dependence on Europe lacks a basic understanding of reality. However, ties with Europe are not limited to trade. They encompass many spheres. Although the EU-Israel Association Council, which is the official framework for high-level dialogue between the sides, has not convened since 2012, Israel and the EU maintain multifaceted ties in accordance with a detailed plan they drew up and a series of agreements on a broad range of issues. For example, Israel greatly benefits from the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and development program, in which it participates. Brexit is expected to affect the Horizon 2020 follow-up program, making it somewhat less beneficial for Israeli researchers, but an amazing network of ties has been forged in recent years, thanks to this program, between Israel’s economic and academic establishment and European institutions and agencies. Israelis take part in dozens of EU public administration and governance training programs. European experts are placed for periods of over a year in Israeli government agencies to advance implementation of European-standard programs. Europe’s Open Skies program has created unprecedented links between Israel and the continent, increasing the

הפוסט Israel-EU relations: An annual assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The prevailing, negative attitudes in Israel toward the EU, as reflected in the 2019 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, differ greatly from the facts on the ground.

The European Union is not hostile to Israel. Along with its member states, the EU is Israel’s largest trading partner. Europe accounts for almost 50% of Israeli imports, and more than 35%-40% of its exports. Anyone ignoring this Israeli dependence on Europe lacks a basic understanding of reality.

However, ties with Europe are not limited to trade. They encompass many spheres.

Although the EU-Israel Association Council, which is the official framework for high-level dialogue between the sides, has not convened since 2012, Israel and the EU maintain multifaceted ties in accordance with a detailed plan they drew up and a series of agreements on a broad range of issues.

For example, Israel greatly benefits from the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and development program, in which it participates. Brexit is expected to affect the Horizon 2020 follow-up program, making it somewhat less beneficial for Israeli researchers, but an amazing network of ties has been forged in recent years, thanks to this program, between Israel’s economic and academic establishment and European institutions and agencies.

Israelis take part in dozens of EU public administration and governance training programs. European experts are placed for periods of over a year in Israeli government agencies to advance implementation of European-standard programs.

Europe’s Open Skies program has created unprecedented links between Israel and the continent, increasing the flow of tourism in both directions.

All these developments have not generated much of an echo nor media exposure, and that is lamentable because many of those polled for Mitvim’s annual poll said that providing the public with additional information about Israeli-EU cooperation could improve Israelis’ perception of the organization.

Tensions between Israel and the EU are mainly political in nature, stemming from differences over the occupation, the settlements and the absence of a peace process with the Palestinians.

Israel blames Brussels and the EU institutions for criticizing its policies and creating tensions, devoting its efforts instead to developing direct ties with EU member states rather than with the EU in its entirety. Other European states act in similar fashion on a variety of issues.

The decision to portray the EU in a negative light is a political one, and Israeli decision-makers must realize how wrong it is, given the extent of Europe’s significance and importance for Israel.

EUROPE IS experiencing an internal crisis, which confronts Israel with a dilemma of principles and practice in its conduct vis-à-vis the EU.

The European crisis is multifaceted, and largely reflected in non-liberal, populist trends. Brexit is a central expression of this process, as are developments in the Visegrad states, mostly Poland and Hungary, and in other states where populist, right-wing forces are on the rise.

This challenge notwithstanding, one must not lose sight of the fact that the EU has been a successful project in realizing its raison d’etre – preventing a pan-European war, such as World War II.

Despite the difficulties, the EU is still robust and still led by liberal, democratic forces.

In economic terms, the EU still serves as a role model, with which Israel should strive for strong ties. A strong EU is good for Israel, first and foremost from an economic point of view, given that any crisis in Europe has an immediate impact on the Israeli economy. Israel is a small state highly dependent on foreign trade. It needs the open markets so characteristic of Europe and not the exclusionary, anti-globalist trends gaining traction in the US and Russia.

Along with diplomatic and economic cooperation, a dialogue on defense and security issues is feasible and advisable, in light of the steps Europe is taking to establish a joint European security agency. Israel is well placed to integrate into this enterprise, to contribute its experience and cooperate with the EU.

It is important to remember that politics is not only about interests; its essence is also in promoting values. The State of Israel, as the state of the Jewish people, cannot ignore its role in this respect. The State of Israel must not link up with dark forces within Europe out of short-term, purely opportunistic expediency. It must not embrace populist leaders or stand by vis-à-vis developments in Hungary, for example, where anti-democratic liberalism is being entrenched in a manner highly reminiscent of pre-World War II Europe. Israel must not ignore abuse or violations of human rights.

The State of Israel is a powerful, sovereign player which can and must make its views heard on such issues; it must hold a moral compass and enhance liberal democratic values. We want not only to live; there is a reason for living – it is called “values,” which should also be brought into the diplomatic discourse.

The same goes for Israeli politics, where rotten apples have emerged to join forces with like-minded people in other countries. One cannot accuse the whole world of racism and antisemitism without looking in the mirror and examining our own behavior.

The new world order creates many joint interests and challenges for Israel and Europe – for example, regarding China’s role. Israel and the EU can deal with this together as two entities with shared values.

A new European Commission elected to lead the EU is taking office these days. There is tremendous potential in promoting cooperation between Israel and the EU, and leadership changes create an opportunity for a new, more positive dialogue. The next government must turn over a new leaf with Europe.

Dan Catarivas is the chairman of the EU-Israel Chamber of Commerce. This article is based on his remarks at the 3rd annual conference of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, held in November 2019 in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel-EU relations: An annual assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Limited European Leverage over Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-limited-european-leverage-over-israel/ Thu, 12 Dec 2019 13:07:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2820 Israel and the EU maintain exceedingly close relations with each other. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and has extensive cultural and political ties to the country. Despite this, Israeli public discourse often portrays the EU as an opponent – not least due to their differences over the Middle East Peace Process and Israel’s settlement policy, as well as the EU’s continued defence of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power. Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the EU maintain exceedingly close relations with each other. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and has extensive cultural and political ties to the country. Despite this, Israeli public discourse often portrays the EU as an opponent – not least due to their differences over the Middle East Peace Process and Israel’s settlement policy, as well as the EU’s continued defence of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-real-danger-that-brexit-poses-for-israel/ Wed, 23 Oct 2019 11:59:34 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2802 When Israelis ask what Brexit means for them, many will think of economy and trade, and about diplomatic relations with Britain and Europe. These are important, but in considering Brexit’s implications, there’s a far bigger picture that Israel’s leaders need to see. Beyond the political crisis in London and Brussels, Brexit represents a clash over the future of world order, and it is this issue which has the most significant long-term significance. For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern. A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages,

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When Israelis ask what Brexit means for them, many will think of economy and trade, and about diplomatic relations with Britain and Europe. These are important, but in considering Brexit’s implications, there’s a far bigger picture that Israel’s leaders need to see. Beyond the political crisis in London and Brussels, Brexit represents a clash over the future of world order, and it is this issue which has the most significant long-term significance.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Attending the 2019 Rome Med Conference https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/attending-the-2019-rome-med-conference/ Mon, 19 Aug 2019 12:04:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=5566 2019 Rome Med Conference, December

הפוסט Attending the 2019 Rome Med Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Prof. Eli Podeh of the Institute of Mitvim attended ISPI’s Rome Med 2019 conference and the Italian Foreign Ministry, which included leaders from Arab states and the Israeli Foreign Minister.

הפוסט Attending the 2019 Rome Med Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Istanbul’s Message of Hope for the Israeli Opposition https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/istanbuls-message-of-hope-for-the-israeli-opposition/ Sat, 29 Jun 2019 09:45:41 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2788 Under the leadership of Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz, the Blue and White party has frequently warned voters of the “Erdoğanization” of Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In other words, don’t let what happened to Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan take place here. It is difficult to assess to what degree this argument swayed voters, but it has remained a central rhetoric tool employed by Blue and White – as well as other opposition parties and figures – both during and after the first 2019 campaign. However, recent developments in Turkey offer a different model that would behove Israel’s opposition to adopt if it is serious about ending Netanyahu’s dominant run in Israeli politics. On June 23rd, opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu defeated the candidate of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP), Binali Yildirim, in a historic repeat election for Istanbul’s mayoral seat. Imamoğlu surprised many in March when he narrowly bested Yildirim, handpicked and heavily endorsed by Erdoğan. After the initial results were challenged by the AKP, it was deemed that Imamoğlu would have to accomplish the feat twice in order to earn the keys to the city. Imamoğlu second victory – in which he expanded his margin from 13,000 votes in March to 777,000 votes in June – simultaneously ended the debate about Istanbul’s future leadership and opened a new discussion about the prospects for change in Turkey at a national level. Israeli opposition voices like Lapid and former prime minister Ehud Barak were quick to

הפוסט Istanbul’s Message of Hope for the Israeli Opposition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Under the leadership of Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz, the Blue and White party has frequently warned voters of the “Erdoğanization” of Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In other words, don’t let what happened to Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan take place here. It is difficult to assess to what degree this argument swayed voters, but it has remained a central rhetoric tool employed by Blue and White – as well as other opposition parties and figures – both during and after the first 2019 campaign. However, recent developments in Turkey offer a different model that would behove Israel’s opposition to adopt if it is serious about ending Netanyahu’s dominant run in Israeli politics.

On June 23rd, opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu defeated the candidate of the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP), Binali Yildirim, in a historic repeat election for Istanbul’s mayoral seat. Imamoğlu surprised many in March when he narrowly bested Yildirim, handpicked and heavily endorsed by Erdoğan. After the initial results were challenged by the AKP, it was deemed that Imamoğlu would have to accomplish the feat twice in order to earn the keys to the city. Imamoğlu second victory – in which he expanded his margin from 13,000 votes in March to 777,000 votes in June – simultaneously ended the debate about Istanbul’s future leadership and opened a new discussion about the prospects for change in Turkey at a national level.

Israeli opposition voices like Lapid and former prime minister Ehud Barak were quick to praise Imamoğlu. But instead of only applauding Istanbul’s new mayor, they should also be learning from his campaign. There are less than three months until Israel’s repeat election. Although some have reported that the major parties do not plan on engaging the public until late August, there is no better time than the present for Israel’s opposition to study Imamoğlu’s strategies and adapt them to the Israeli electorate.

When it was announced in Istanbul that the first election results were being treated as invalid, Imamoğlu had every reason to attack the ruling party and the political system. Nevertheless, he told supporters, “They want conflict from us. But we, the people who don’t want this nation to fight, we will insist upon embracing each other.” This simple message was disseminated through Imamoğlu’s campaign slogan, “Herşey Çok Güzel Olacak” or “Everything Will Be Alright” and ran counter to the polarizing and often fear-based rhetoric employed by Erdoğan and the AKP over the last decade and a half. Rather than trying to divide the electorate, Imamoğlu emphasized the need for cooperation. In doing so, he successfully built bridges between Istanbul’s myriad communities.

Like Turkey, Israeli society is also fragmented and divided. Netanyahu has maintained his position at the top of the political circus largely because of his ability to take advantage of the existing fault lines within the electorate and create new rifts when the opportunity presented itself. He has also benefited from a rudderless opposition that is often more preoccupied on determining its own hierarchy than providing a meaningful alternative for Israelis. If opposition leaders like Gantz and Lapid are truly committed to bringing about change, then they must promote an inclusive campaign message, avoid mudslinging with the establishment, and publish a clear set of policy goals that reflect the shared values of Israel’s opposition parties.

The most impactful way for the Israeli opposition to assume a more inclusive approach is by targeting all potential voters and not settling for the comforts of their political base. In the previous two elections, Haredi and Arab voters accounted for somewhere around 25 percent of the total voting public (this number could be higher, however Arab voting percentages in recent years have been lower than the Jewish population). Both of these populations carry deep historical grievances. Many within these communities do not believe they are equal partners in the state-building enterprise. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that these glass ceilings are being shattered. Engagement with these minority populations is a challenging but necessary step towards gaining public trust and developing new partnerships. This proved to be a winning strategy for Imamoğlu, who crossed party lines and addressed audiences from the most secular and affluent neighborhoods to those traditionally religious strongholds within Istanbul. He openly courted the Kurdish vote, ignoring the existing political tensions in favor of his message of coexistence. What if an Israeli politician did the same?

Israel’s opposition can also borrow Imamoğlu’s positivist philosophy and abandon their doomsday predictions about the collapse of Israeli democracy. Israeli democracy has always been flawed, and without question the Netanyahu years have witnessed both a steady decline in institutional checks-and-balances as well as an increase in political corruption. However, if the democratic process has proven to be resilient a country like Turkey – where the slide towards authoritarianism has been much steeper and far darker – then Israeli opposition leaders should focus more on the policy issues that will draw public support away from the political center than campaigning for “anyone but Bibi”. Imamoğlu’s team was faced with a similar conundrum, particularly after the initial results in Istanbul were rejected. However, the manifesto that helped alter the tone of Imamoğlu’s campaign – a pamphlet called the Book of Radical Love – dissuaded supporters from attacking Erdoğan. Contrary to what has been the logic of Turkish politics for many years, the document called for an issues-based approach that avoided polarizing debate.

Finally, Israel’s opposition needs to decide what it stands for. In order to accomplish this, opposition parties should reach some consensus about their shared goals and then publish those goals for public viewership. Imamoğlu accomplished this by decoupling traditional identity politics from his campaign and focusing on economics, sharing public resources, and emphasizing the importance of good governance. And although many argued the election was about Erdogan, Imamoğlu did not make it personal. Lapid and Gantz should take note of this. Turkey is not only Erdoğan, and Israel is not only Bibi. If you succeed in changing the narrative, you expand the public’s imagination about what the future can be. Israelis have heard enough about Netanyahu’s illicit activities. What they must receive now are opposition party platforms that map out achievable policy goals in the areas of economics, security, and diplomacy.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. If Israel’s opposition is so inspired by Imamoğlu’s accomplishments, then it should borrow his message and reverse the trend of exclusionary and fear-based politics. Rather than crafting a platform that only addresses the country’s Zionist populations, Israel’s opposition should adopt an inclusive narrative that identifies common interests over identity politics. Instead of permitting the campaign to descend into a referendum on the prime minister’s personality, Israel’s opposition should focus on the policy issues and maintain a positive, conversational tone that welcomes discussion with all parties on the political spectrum. If successfully executed, such a strategy could put an end to the Netanyahu government and revolutionize the nature of Israeli politics in the process.

Upon news of Imamoğlu’s victory, hundreds of thousands of Istanbulites exited onto the streets to celebrate. Addressing the crowds, Istanbul’s new mayor said, “You have shown the world that Turkey still protects its democracy. And we have shown other countries who try to go down the road we were choosing that it is no road at all.” Perhaps what Imamoğlu and his campaign actually revealed was a strategy for thwarting the populist wave the world has witnessed in the last decade. There is arguably no better place to put those strategies to the test than in Israel.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Istanbul’s Message of Hope for the Israeli Opposition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2019 https://mitvim.org.il/en/report/the-2019-israeli-foreign-policy-index-of-the-mitvim-institute/ Thu, 27 Jun 2019 18:28:08 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=report&p=4601 The 2019 Israeli Foreign Policy Index

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The 2019 Israeli Foreign Policy Index

Findings of the Mitvim Institue Poll, November 2019

The seventh annual public opinion poll of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted in September 2019. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (700 men and women, Jews and Arabs) and with a margin of error of 3.5%. This report presents the poll’s key findings, grouped under four categories: Israel’s foreign relations, Israel’s Foreign Service, Israel and its surrounding regions, and Israel and the Palestinians.

Key Findings:

A. Israel’s Foreign Relations

  • Israelis rank their country’s global standing at 6.10 out of 10. This ranking has been improving every year since 2015.
  • Israelis rank the state of Israel-US relations at 7.75 out of 10. This ranking is similar to that of 2018, and is higher than in previous years.
  • Israelis see Russia as the most important country for Israel besides the US, followed by Germany, Great Britain, China, France and Egypt.
  • 30% of the public thinks that if Benny Gantz will serve as prime minister then Israel’s foreign relations will deteriorate. 25% think they will improve and 27% do not expect any change.
  • Israelis want their next government to strengthen the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA; ranking of 7.41 out of 10), and then improve ties with the EU (7.26), improve ties with Arab countries (7.12), improve ties with Mediterranean countries (6.96) and advance peace with the Palestinians (6.18).
  • Israelis are split on what is more important for Israel to do ahead of next year’s US presidential elections – draw even closer to Trump and the Republican party (36%) or fix the crisis in its relations with the Democratic Party (34%).
  • Israelis are split on whether Israel should prioritize building ties with democratic countries (40%) or should not consider regime type as a factor (40%).

B. Israel’s Foreign Service

  • Israelis rank their government’s handling of foreign policy at 5.99 out of 10. This ranking has been improving every year since 2015.
  • Israelis rank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) fulfillment of its mission at 5.58 out of 10. This ranking has been improving every year since 2015. The status of the MFA is ranked at 5.37.
  • 39% of the public thinks that the main thing an Israeli diplomat does is advancing diplomatic relations (39%), followed by explaining Israel’s positions (18%), representing Israel at events (15%), advancing economic relations (7%), and assisting Israel in distress abroad (4%).
  • 50% of Israelis think that Israel should take into account, to a moderate or large extent, the impact of its policy decisions on Diaspora Jews. 35% think this should be taken into account to a limited extent, or none at all.
  • In light of the global demonstrations regarding the climate crisis, 43% of Israelis think Israel should focus on solving its own problems. 35% think it should play a more active role in solving global problems.

C. Israel and its Surrounding Regions

  • The Israeli public is divided as to whether Israel belongs more to the Middle East (32%), Europe (27%), or the Mediterranean Basin (21%).
  • A vast majority of Israelis (68%) think that regional cooperation between Israel and Middle Eastern countries is possible. 20% think it is not.
  • Saudi Arabia (25%) and Egypt (19%) are the Arab countries with which Israelis see the most importance in cooperating. Jordan is ranked next, with 3%, and 34% think that Israel should not try to develop cooperation with any Arab country.
  • A vast majority of Israelis (71%) think that the peace with Jordan was and still is a strategic asset for Israel. Only 16% think it is less important for Israel today than it was in the past.
  • 45% of Israelis think that the EU is currently more of a foe to Israel than a friend (27%). In 2018, 55% thought the EU was a foe, while 18% regarded it as a friend.
  • The EU’s image in Israel can be most improved through statements by European politicians on the importance of ties with Israel (32%) and by disseminating more information on existing cooperation between Israel and the EU (31%).
  • A majority of Israelis (53% vs. 32%) think that Israel should try to improve its relations with Turkey.

D. Israel and the Palestinians 

  • A majority of the Israeli public (55% vs. 24%) think that Israel’s Arab citizens should play a more central role in advancing peace with the Palestinians. However, only 37% think that Israel’s Arab citizens should play a more central role in the formulation of Israel’s foreign policy. 45% think they should not.
  • A majority of the public (61%) think that Palestinian President Abbas is not a partner for peace negotiations with Israel. 20% think he is.
  • Apart from the US, Israelis would most like to see (26%) the Arab Quartet (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) mediate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, followed by Russia (13%), the EU (12%), the UN (9%) and China (4%).
  • 46% of Israelis think that peace between Israel and Gulf states can be reached even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 32% think that it can be reached only after progress is made in the peace process.
  • Israelis are divided on how to prevent another with in Gaza. 24% think it can be done through strengthening Israeli deterrence, 17% believe it can be done through Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and 14% believe it can be done through international mediation. 32% believe that another war in Gaza is unavoidable.
  • 55% of the public stated that their image of the UN did not change following the efforts conducted by the UN envoy to the Middle East to prevent war between Israel and Hamas. 13% stated their image changed to the worse, and 12% to the better.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the EU https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/guiding-principles-for-israels-foreign-policy-toward-the-eu/ Wed, 19 Jun 2019 10:10:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3215 Ties with the EU are a strategic asset for the State of Israel. Europe is Israel’s largest trading partner, a source of political and defense support (despite disagreements), an anchor of shared norms and values, a partner in cultural creation, and a central collaborator in research and development. The importance of these ties obliges Israel to invest attention and resources in preserving and even deepening and expanding them. Done right, Israel could leverage the tremendous potential of its ties with Europe for the improved wellbeing of its citizens and for its international standing. However, in recent years, the Israeli government has been leading a negative campaign against the EU. It has been criticizing the EU for being anti-Israel, while making efforts to increase divisions between EU Member States in order to limit the EU’s capacity to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Toward the formation of a new Israeli government in late 2019, this article presents ten guiding principles for an improved Israeli foreign policy toward the EU, based on the work of a Mitvim Institute task team.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the EU הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Ties with the EU are a strategic asset for the State of Israel. Europe is Israel’s largest trading partner, a source of political and defense support (despite disagreements), an anchor of shared norms and values, a partner in cultural creation, and a central collaborator in research and development. The importance of these ties obliges Israel to invest attention and resources in preserving and even deepening and expanding them. Done right, Israel could leverage the tremendous potential of its ties with Europe for the improved wellbeing of its citizens and for its international standing.

However, in recent years, the Israeli government has been leading a negative campaign against the EU. It has been criticizing the EU for being anti-Israel, while making efforts to increase divisions between EU Member States in order to limit the EU’s capacity to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Toward the formation of a new Israeli government in late 2019, this article presents ten guiding principles for an improved Israeli foreign policy toward the EU, based on the work of a Mitvim Institute task team.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the EU הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Europe’s Far-Right Is Blocked, for Now; Israel Should Help This Continue https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/europes-far-right-is-blocked-for-now-israel-should-help-this-continue/ Thu, 13 Jun 2019 09:16:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2783 The May 2019 elections to the European Parliament have blocked the storming of the continent’s parliament and of the EU’s institutions by the far-right, for now. However, the conservative and social-democratic bloc lost its 40-year majority and will now have to form a coalition with the Liberals and Greens. Voters in the world’s largest supranational elections picked 751 representatives from 28 states. Fear of the far-right generated a record turnout, with voters shaking off their usual complacency and heading to the ballot boxes. Some 51 percent of 425 million eligible voters exercised their democratic right, setting a 20-year record. Twenty-one radical right movements operate in the EU’s 28 member states, enjoying an absolute or relative majority in some. Most favored an EU pullout in the past, but are currently working in tandem across the continent to change the union from within. Deputy Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, whose Lega party rose from 6 percent of the vote in 2014 to 34 percent, claims Europe is changing. Salvini, expected to be among the leaders of the far-right and Eurosceptic bloc in the EU Parliament, represents a nationalist, xenophobic and centralistic line. He makes no bones about his admiration for Benito Mussolini and often uses expressions similar to ones favored by the fascist World War II leader. On Mussolini’s birthday, Salvini tweeted: “So many enemies, so much honor”, a variation on “Il Duce”’s famous saying. On a recent visit to Mussolini’s hometown Forli, he addressed the crowds from the balcony that Mussolini

הפוסט Europe’s Far-Right Is Blocked, for Now; Israel Should Help This Continue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The May 2019 elections to the European Parliament have blocked the storming of the continent’s parliament and of the EU’s institutions by the far-right, for now. However, the conservative and social-democratic bloc lost its 40-year majority and will now have to form a coalition with the Liberals and Greens.

Voters in the world’s largest supranational elections picked 751 representatives from 28 states. Fear of the far-right generated a record turnout, with voters shaking off their usual complacency and heading to the ballot boxes. Some 51 percent of 425 million eligible voters exercised their democratic right, setting a 20-year record.

Twenty-one radical right movements operate in the EU’s 28 member states, enjoying an absolute or relative majority in some. Most favored an EU pullout in the past, but are currently working in tandem across the continent to change the union from within.

Deputy Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, whose Lega party rose from 6 percent of the vote in 2014 to 34 percent, claims Europe is changing. Salvini, expected to be among the leaders of the far-right and Eurosceptic bloc in the EU Parliament, represents a nationalist, xenophobic and centralistic line. He makes no bones about his admiration for Benito Mussolini and often uses expressions similar to ones favored by the fascist World War II leader. On Mussolini’s birthday, Salvini tweeted: “So many enemies, so much honor”, a variation on “Il Duce”’s famous saying. On a recent visit to Mussolini’s hometown Forli, he addressed the crowds from the balcony that Mussolini used.

Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won 52 percent of the Hungarian vote; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally garnered some 23 percent of the French vote (compared with 25 percent in 2014); the neo-Nazis of Alternative for Germany received 11 percent of the German vote (compared with 7 percent in 2014). Slovakia’s neo-Nazis recorded the most significant victory of the elections, with Our Slovakia, which includes various Holocaust deniers and anti-Semites, winning 120,000 votes (12 percent) compared with only 9,000 in 2014.

The common goal of Europe’s far-right is to introduce a Trojan horse into the heart of the continent in order to spread a message of fear, erase current European borders and redraw them. They want a white, Christian, nationalist Europe without immigrants and foreigners. The 2008 financial crisis, combined with the crisis of Middle Eastern and African refugees dreaming to reach Europe, intensified the debate about the very need for a union of 520 million Europeans and the threat looming over “Christian Europe”. The ghosts of World War II Europe have re-emerged and could be strengthened if a financial crisis erupts again. The populist rebellion of the 21st century is not necessarily of the poor; it is a protest of the conservative middle class that feels cheated of its rights, jobs and national pride. They are the major losers of globalization who feel nostalgic for past glories, with some dreaming to be part of an empire once again.

Steve Bannon, President Trump’s former adviser, spent a long time in Europe prior to the elections in a bid to establish and organize a nationalist right-wing bloc that would dictate Europe’s future – both through the European Parliament and in member states. After winning national elections in Italy, France appears to be the next target of the radical right. France and Italy, who were among the founders of the European community after two world wars and tens of millions of deaths, are now seeing antiEuropean groups placing high in the European Parliament elections. French President Emmanuel Macron dubbed the far-right led by Salvini, Le Pen and Orban “a spreading leprosy”.

Ironically, the European far-right that awakens all the ghosts of the past is seeking a seal of approval from the State of Israel in order to increase its popularity on the continent. Salvini condemns anti-Semitism at every opportunity and even troubled himself recently to Jerusalem and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial. While Jean Marie Le Pen, the former leader of the extreme right in France, claimed the annihilation of European Jews was merely “a detail” of World War II, his daughter Marine tries to distance anti-Semitism from her party and mobilizes French Jews to clear her name. In the 2017 French presidential elections, 11 million French, more than one-third of the electorate, voted for her. Le Pen demands France for the French and aspires to her country’s presidency.

Israel has a significant interest in developments on its neighboring continent, which provides it with significant economic, security, social, and cultural backing. Ties between Israel and Europe are deep, good and ongoing despite political disagreements and the EU’s frequent criticism of Israel’s Palestinian policy. Recent Israeli governments have tried to drive a wedge between European states critical of Israel and populist, nationalist European governments who toe Israel’s line. The bloc headed by Salvini and Le Pen will try to sway European legislation and policy in order to limit anti-Israel criticism.

However, most European Jews do not fall into this trap. They understand that beyond the pleasing rhetoric, some far-right leaders are seeking to downplay their anti-Semitism and xenophobia in a superficial makeover that will generate political profits for them. Jewish leaders and rabbis in Europe are closely monitoring the election results and expressing concern over the creation of a far-right bloc in the heart of Europe, at the center of its parliamentary decision-making.

Quite a few Israelis shuddered when Salvini laid a wreath at Yad Vashem a few months ago. President Reuven Rivlin has persistently rejected all attempts at a relationship of any kind with the European nationalist right. In an unusual step, he expressed support for Macron over Le Pen in the French national elections. No one is saying Israel should cut off ties with states in which the far-right comes to power. However, it should relate to them with a mixture of respect and suspicion rather than expressing undying friendship for them. President Rivlin knows this is a masked ball by the far-right. The foreign ministry does too and urges Israel to avoid ties with such elements as Alternative for Germany and Austria’s Freedom Party.

Israel must continue to strengthen its scientific, defense, economic, cultural and technological ties with Europe. It must aspire to positive relations with Europe even when it is critical of Israel over the Palestinian issue, and prefer democratic allies even when it disagrees with them. Israel must also display sensitivity toward the fears of European Jewish communities over the rise of the right and their concerns over the repercussions of decisions made in Jerusalem.

Despite its growing power and entrenchment, the European far-right was not as successful in the European Parliament elections as it hoped. Most European citizens still chose parties loyal to European integration and liberal-democratic values. However, the struggle against the far-right continues, and Israel has a role to play. It must place itself on the right side of the values scale and help block the European “leprosy”.

Henrique Cymerman is a television journalist and recipient of numerous human rights and journalism, awards. He covers the rise of the European right and lectures at the School of Government of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Europe’s Far-Right Is Blocked, for Now; Israel Should Help This Continue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The European Parliament Elections Results: Possible Significance for Europe and Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-european-parliament-elections-results-possible-significance-for-europe-and-israel/ Sat, 01 Jun 2019 10:07:43 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3212 A policy roundtable on the 2019 European Parliament elections results and their possible significance for Europe and Israel took place on 30 May 2019 at Tel Aviv University. It was organized by the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI), Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, the EU Studies Program at Tel Aviv University, and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The event featured EU Ambassador to Israel H.E. Emanuele Giaufret, Ariel Shafransky and Noga Arbell from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Maya Sion of IASEI, Dr. Nimrod Goren of the Mitvim Institute, former diplomat Eran Etzion, and Omer Gendler of the Open University.

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections Results: Possible Significance for Europe and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A policy roundtable on the 2019 European Parliament elections results and their possible significance for Europe and Israel took place on 30 May 2019 at Tel Aviv University. It was organized by the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI), Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, the EU Studies Program at Tel Aviv University, and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The event featured EU Ambassador to Israel H.E. Emanuele Giaufret, Ariel Shafransky and Noga Arbell from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Maya Sion of IASEI, Dr. Nimrod Goren of the Mitvim Institute, former diplomat Eran Etzion, and Omer Gendler of the Open University.

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections Results: Possible Significance for Europe and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/recalibrating-the-course-of-israel-eu-relations/ Thu, 16 May 2019 08:51:28 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2779 The formation of a new Israeli government provides an opportunity to rethink the course of Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the EU. Israel-EU relations need to be handled differently, in a manner that reflects and expresses Israel’s long-term strategic interests. Under Netanyahu’s right-wing governments, relations with the EU have sunk to new lows, and a plan to heal and restore the relations is needed. An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016. Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies. While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The formation of a new Israeli government provides an opportunity to rethink the course of Israel’s policy vis-à-vis the EU. Israel-EU relations need to be handled differently, in a manner that reflects and expresses Israel’s long-term strategic interests. Under Netanyahu’s right-wing governments, relations with the EU have sunk to new lows, and a plan to heal and restore the relations is needed.

An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016.

Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies.

While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to help Israel’s long-term interest of trust and friendship with the EU. Up until a few years ago, Israel could boast of having the highest level of achievements and ties with the EU among non-European states. That was only fitting given that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a worldleading innovator with a developed market economy. However, Israel’s economic agreements with its main trading partner are virtually obsolete – an “Association Agreement” from 1995 and an “Action Plan” from 2004 that was meant as a temporary, four-year agreement. In 2008, Israel was about to sign an upgraded plan but the EU created a linkage: absent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, no progress can be achieved with the EU.

The upgrade has been suspended for over a decade. Were it not for the linkage, we could have enjoyed even more prosperous relationship. On the other hand, in 2013 the EU offered Israel the status of a “Special Privileged Relationship” as an incentive – maturation of the peace process would yield significantly upgraded ties. The Israeli government did not even consider the idea. Since 2012, the Israel-EU Association Council, an annual ministerial-level political dialogue, has not convened. Relations are handled by civil servants. Meanwhile, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have upgraded their “Partnership Priorities” agreements with the EU in recent years.

Relations between Israel and the EU have fluctuated over the years. A significant high was recorded in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The most recent “honeymoon” occurred between 2005 and 2008 following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and up until Operation “Cast Lead” and Netanyahu’s rise to power. For over a decade now, political relations with the world’s largest trading bloc have been at a low that is even starting to affect trade relations along with economic and research cooperation.

Netanyahu and his ministers have been inciting Israelis against the EU for several years. Israelis have grown accustomed to seeing the EU as a hostile entity rather than a friendly critic. However, even if there is disagreement with the EU over the peace process, settlement construction, Iran and more recently over Jerusalem, the EU remains Israel’s second most important strategic partner after the US. This is not a partnership born of mutual interests dictated by regional or global circumstances. Strategic partnerships are forged with those who share our world view and values, primarily with liberal democracies in which the rule of law is a substantive component that includes respect for and protection of human and minority rights.

The relationship with the EU is complex, largely because the EU itself is complex. As a union of 28 states (possibly 27 soon due to Brexit), efforts are always under way to ensure that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. While the EU has achieved this goal to a significant degree in the economic arena, it has had a hard time doing so in foreign policy aspects.

Brussels has often played the bad cop, such as the 2013 guidelines adding a territorial clause to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation agreement. Under that resolution, Israeli research institutions can only benefit from the agreement if they operate within the Green Line. The Netanyahu government had no choice but to go along with the EU’s territorial, legal and economic differentiation between institutions on each side of the Green Line. The backlash followed a few years later. Netanyahu has exploited the crises affecting the EU in recent years over debts, migration and Brexit, accompanied by the rise of populist parties. He took advantage of internal EU rifts to mobilize “rogue” states against anti-Israel decisions.

The new Israeli government should stop boasting of its “divide and rule” tactic and inciting public opinion against the EU and try instead to sever the EU’s linkage that is damaging to the relationship. The sad state of relations is not only the Netanyahu government’s fault. The EU did its share, adopting resolutions such as the linkage condition, the territorial clause and the labeling of settlement goods. Only a government that will advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process will be able to fundamentally change this trend and stem the troubling deterioration in relations with Israel’s biggest partner in terms of values, trade and scientific research.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu is co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, a lecturer at Hebrew University’s Europe Forum and a member of a Mitvim Institute task team.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/divided-and-divisive-europeans-israel-and-israeli-palestinian-peacemaking/ Thu, 02 May 2019 07:17:52 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3168 Over the last 40 years, since the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty (that alluded to but did not solve the Palestinian question) and the European Community’s 1980 Venice Declaration, Europe has been seeking ways to help advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The task was not an easy one, mostly due to United States of America (US) dominance of peace negotiations and negative Israeli attitudes towards Europe as a mediator. Thus, while Europeans were key in shaping international language on the conflict, they have remained in the back seat when it comes to shaping dynamics on the ground. Since the collapse in 2014 of the John Kerry initiative to advance the peace process, the task has become even more difficult for the Europeans. Realities on the ground, such as a right-wing government in Israel lacking interest in advancing a peace process, expanded settlement construction, as well as the internal Palestinian split and governance deficiencies in the Palestinian Authority, make the two-state solution ever more difficult to achieve. In addition, Israel’s leadership has worked to weaken and divide the EU in order to limit its role on the issue. In this endeavor, it has profited from different interests and priorities among EU Member States as reflected in discussions and decision-making processes regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These trends have increasingly intensified in recent years, and it is the goal of this publication to analyze them, assess their impact on European capacities and policies, and devise recommendations to tackle and perhaps even reverse them. The publication includes

הפוסט Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Over the last 40 years, since the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty (that alluded to but did not solve the Palestinian question) and the European Community’s 1980 Venice Declaration, Europe has been seeking ways to help advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The task was not an easy one, mostly due to United States of America (US) dominance of peace negotiations and negative Israeli attitudes towards Europe as a mediator. Thus, while Europeans were key in shaping international language on the conflict, they have remained in the back seat when it comes to shaping dynamics on the ground. Since the collapse in 2014 of the John Kerry initiative to advance the peace process, the task has become even more difficult for the Europeans. Realities on the ground, such as a right-wing government in Israel lacking interest in advancing a peace process, expanded settlement construction, as well as the internal Palestinian split and governance deficiencies in the Palestinian Authority, make the two-state solution ever more difficult to achieve. In addition, Israel’s leadership has worked to weaken and divide the EU in order to limit its role on the issue. In this endeavor, it has profited from different interests and priorities among EU Member States as reflected in discussions and decision-making processes regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These trends have increasingly intensified in recent years, and it is the goal of this publication to analyze them, assess their impact on European capacities and policies, and devise recommendations to tackle and perhaps even reverse them. The publication includes three analytical chapters focusing on internal European dynamics, on Israel’s foreign policy towards the EU, and on EU policy-making regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict/peace process.

הפוסט Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/pompeo-the-israel-greece-cyprus-alliance-and-the-eastmed-pipeline/ Thu, 21 Mar 2019 07:59:13 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2773 As the Purim holiday arrives, many are looking forward to a break from the country’s exhausting election cycle. But for Prime Minister Netanyahu, Wednesday evening was an opportunity to reinforce his position as Israel’s leading statesmen. Hosting the 6th trilateral summit between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, Netanyahu hoped special guest US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would deliver a strong showing of support for the embattled premier and his regional energy aspirations. Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters. From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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As the Purim holiday arrives, many are looking forward to a break from the country’s exhausting election cycle. But for Prime Minister Netanyahu, Wednesday evening was an opportunity to reinforce his position as Israel’s leading statesmen. Hosting the 6th trilateral summit between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, Netanyahu hoped special guest US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would deliver a strong showing of support for the embattled premier and his regional energy aspirations.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/mogherinis-meeting-with-arab-legislators-from-israel/ Sun, 16 Sep 2018 15:25:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2905 The EU quite frequently expresses criticism over Israeli policies and legislation that damage prospects of achieving the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts or that run counter to the principles of democracy and human rights. Israel’s recent Nation-State Law ties both aspects together – it contradicts the value of equality that appears in Israel’s Declaration of Independence, and it places additional obstacles on the path to a future peace agreement. EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini emphasized this in her recent public statements, as well as in her decision to meet a delegation of Arab members of Knesset from the Joint List, which arrived in Brussels to protest the Nation State Law earlier this month. In recent years, the EU has found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Internal divisions and differences of opinions among member states – especially between those in western and northern Europe and those in central and eastern Europe – have prevented meaningful decisions on the topic in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council since 2016. The split within the EU has become evident even in UN votes, such as the vote regarding the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to deepen these divisions and to leverage them to his benefit. He recently stated this in public, on his way to a visit in Lithuania. Israel under his leadership is trying to limit the EU’s ability to reach the consensus needed

הפוסט Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU quite frequently expresses criticism over Israeli policies and legislation that damage prospects of achieving the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts or that run counter to the principles of democracy and human rights. Israel’s recent Nation-State Law ties both aspects together – it contradicts the value of equality that appears in Israel’s Declaration of Independence, and it places additional obstacles on the path to a future peace agreement. EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini emphasized this in her recent public statements, as well as in her decision to meet a delegation of Arab members of Knesset from the Joint List, which arrived in Brussels to protest the Nation State Law earlier this month.

In recent years, the EU has found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Internal divisions and differences of opinions among member states – especially between those in western and northern Europe and those in central and eastern Europe – have prevented meaningful decisions on the topic in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council since 2016. The split within the EU has become evident even in UN votes, such as the vote regarding the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to deepen these divisions and to leverage them to his benefit. He recently stated this in public, on his way to a visit in Lithuania. Israel under his leadership is trying to limit the EU’s ability to reach the consensus needed to make decisions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is doing so by fostering alliances with various groupings of European countries – the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Hellenic states (Cyprus and Greece), and next in line may be the Balkan states. This is done in parallel to growing criticism of the EU by top Israeli ministers, often including insults and portrayals of the EU – Israel’s largest trade partner – as a rival rather than a friend and partner.

The EU has not yet found effective policy solutions to these developments. It also does not see a sense of urgency to do so, particularly at a time when no Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are in sight and while the EU is preoccupied with more pressing internal and regional challenges. Nevertheless, the EU is not giving up on voicing its opinions and searching for paths for taking action, even if the potential impact is limited. In addition to condemnations, voicing concern, and conveying messages via traditional diplomatic channels, the EU is also working to maintain, foster, and deepen its ties with those in Israeli society who support peace, democracy, and human rights. This is evident in the support given to Israeli pro-peace civil society organizations and hosting relevant Israeli politicians in Brussels.

This month was not the first time Arab members of Knesset visited Brussels. Most recently, a delegation from the Joint List visited the European Parliament in November 2017. Their latest meeting with Mogherini is a step forward in their efforts to internationalize their quest for equality within Israel and to protest Netanyahu’s policies. This activism in the international arena draws criticism in Israel but it is very much in line with how modern diplomacy actually works in the 21st century. Citizens, organizations, businesses, and politicians can now take a larger role than ever in shaping foreign relations, which is no longer the exclusive domain of ministries of foreign affairs.

The increased involvement of Arab members of Knesset in foreign affairs holds potential that goes well beyond their current protest against the Jewish Nation-State Law. It can lead to an important and constructive role in future peace negotiations, and in efforts to improve ties between Israel and Arab (and Muslim) countries. To date, their involvement in these issues has been low, but the potential is significant.

The EU, from its perspective, sees meeting Israel’s Arab legislators as another opportunity to convey to the Israeli government its deep concern over the direction in which Israel is heading, and to declare its partnership with those in Israel – Arabs and Jews alike – who are working to change Israel’s course. This support, which takes various forms, is welcomed by a large number of pro-peace and progressive Israelis, and should continue.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2018 https://mitvim.org.il/en/report/4615/ Wed, 27 Jun 2018 22:23:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=report&p=4615 The sixth annual public opinion poll of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted in September 2018. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (700 men and women, Jews and Arabs) and with a margin of error of 3.5%. This report presents the poll’s key findings, grouped under four categories: Israel’s foreign relations, Israel’s Foreign Service, Israel and its surrounding regions, and Israel and the Palestinians.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The sixth annual public opinion poll of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted in September 2018. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (700 men and women, Jews and Arabs) and with a margin of error of 3.5%. This report presents the poll’s key findings, grouped under four categories: Israel’s foreign relations, Israel’s Foreign Service, Israel and its surrounding regions, and Israel and the Palestinians.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index for 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Orban in Jerusalem: Challenging Days for Europe-Israel Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/orban-in-jerusalem-challenging-days-for-europe-israel-relations/ Sat, 16 Jun 2018 14:33:21 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2892 The modern State of Israel was established 70 years ago based on humanistic and pluralistic values, noble standards of equality and solidarity among all people. While Jewish presence in the Holy Land persisted for thousands of years, and some 2000 years ago, there was a period of Jewish sovereignty that was extinguished, contemporary Israel was established by pioneers coming primarily from Europe. They held diverse views regarding many aspects of life, however, they all shared a strong conviction that the Jewish people is capable of maintaining democratic sovereignty and with fairness for all, even amidst the difficult circumstances emanating from its geopolitical position. For Zionism, a state was a pre-requisite to safeguarding the Jewish people. Israel exists to provide for the wellbeing of all its citizens, Jews and non-Jews, but it is also an existential point of reference, and if necessary a refuge, for every Jew on earth. Still today, Israel is an exemplar of a functioning democracy amongst authoritarian regimes, a true multicultural society respecting, albeit not perfectly, the rights of minorities. Still today, the majority of Israelis would prefer to live in a country abiding by the high moral tenets that the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and his like, have upheld. The frequent failure of present-day Israel to be fully accepted in the family of nations and to find favor in world public opinion should not in itself be of particular concern to us, Israelis. The critical importance of safeguarding the country’s borders and its citizens against

הפוסט Orban in Jerusalem: Challenging Days for Europe-Israel Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The modern State of Israel was established 70 years ago based on humanistic and pluralistic values, noble standards of equality and solidarity among all people. While Jewish presence in the Holy Land persisted for thousands of years, and some 2000 years ago, there was a period of Jewish sovereignty that was extinguished, contemporary Israel was established by pioneers coming primarily from Europe. They held diverse views regarding many aspects of life, however, they all shared a strong conviction that the Jewish people is capable of maintaining democratic sovereignty and with fairness for all, even amidst the difficult circumstances emanating from its geopolitical position.

For Zionism, a state was a pre-requisite to safeguarding the Jewish people. Israel exists to provide for the wellbeing of all its citizens, Jews and non-Jews, but it is also an existential point of reference, and if necessary a refuge, for every Jew on earth. Still today, Israel is an exemplar of a functioning democracy amongst authoritarian regimes, a true multicultural society respecting, albeit not perfectly, the rights of minorities. Still today, the majority of Israelis would prefer to live in a country abiding by the high moral tenets that the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and his like, have upheld.

The frequent failure of present-day Israel to be fully accepted in the family of nations and to find favor in world public opinion should not in itself be of particular concern to us, Israelis. The critical importance of safeguarding the country’s borders and its citizens against those still seeking its elimination, justifies even the price of certain seclusion. Nevertheless, straying from the high moral standards upon which Israel was established, and breaching the moral boundaries the state founders have set for us, could become a real threat to the existence and wellbeing of Israel as we know it, and of world Jewry.

The visit to Jerusalem this week by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán [18-20 July] symbolizes such moral failure. The recent agreement reached by the Israeli and Polish governments, exonerating Poland of some of its notorious actions during the World War II, is another example of boundaries that Israelis should not cross.

In her unconventional book on the banality of evil, reporting from the trial of Nazi criminal Eichmann, German Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote, “evil can be banal and redefined as a civil norm.” She added that, “most people will comply but some people will not […] The Final Solution […] ‘could happen’ in most places but it did not happen everywhere.” While Orbán and his like across Europe cannot be compared to Nazi criminal Eichmann, reactions today in parts of Europe to immigration from the east serves as a brutal reminder of how quickly and seamlessly moral standards can deteriorate, also and even presently in Europe.

Hosting illiberal leaders in Jerusalem whose raison d’être is elimination of immigration, and by that legitimizing their policies, is an absurdity and an outcry. The reasons pushing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to try to court Poland, Hungary and others, in an effort to split and weaken the EU toll in the region is understandable. He and his government often face automatic and even perfunctory criticism from the EU conglomerate, so trying to draw a wedge inside Europe is basic realpolitik. The EU has some responsibility, too, when others are more inclined to accept forces wishing to destroy the principles on which it stands.

Nevertheless, short-term political gains from realigning with Europe’s extreme right might prove very costly for Israel. Endorsing Orbán works against the Jewish state’s core values and interests. For Israeli leadership, national interest should go far beyond immediate political gains and their responsibility extends to world Jewry. The implications of their actions and statements ought to be in good faith for the Jewish people and for Zionism-at-large.

The litmus test for Israel’s leaders in that regard should be whether the Jewish community in the discussed country supports the leadership in question. Are the country’s Jews as a minority feeling welcome, safe and protected? In the case of Hungary, the answer is no. Orbán’s anti-Semitic undertones and policies threaten Hungary’s Jews. That should be sufficient to disinvite him and several others who are in a similar position.

Beyond the immediate political gains, the EU and Israel should act more responsibly in order to serve the long term interests and wellbeing of their people. Brussels and Jerusalem must reestablish trust and increase practical exchange within the wide spectrum of center-right and center-left in both entities. They should work together, within the many existing joint frameworks, to create more unity between moderate forces, and together reject radicalism. Israel has valued expertise it can share with the EU in the field of absorbing immigrants and making refugees feel at home. Europe’s greatest challenge today is one Israel has dealt with throughout its existence, being a true immigrant society. In proportional terms, Israel taking in one million Russian immigrants when it had less than six, some three decades ago, can be compared to Germany taking in over ten million immigrants today. Albeit not similar, specifically on the background of religious affinity between Jews which is absent in Europe, many challenges are the same.

Israel will stand to gain from opposing Europe’s extremists and sticking to the noble values upon which it was established. World Jewry will be proud once again to be affiliated with their second homeland, Israel. And Europe will have an ally with unprecedented credibility in fighting xenophobia, a calming element to a most volatile region at its footsteps, to defend the values upon which the European Union was created, on the rubbles of World War II.

Raanan Eliaz founded and led for a decade the European Leadership Network (ELNET) and its Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD), two organizations dedicated to strengthening relations between Europe and Israel. He is a member of the Mitvim Institute’s task-team on Israel-EU relations.

(originally published by EurActiv)

הפוסט Orban in Jerusalem: Challenging Days for Europe-Israel Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-art-of-the-israeli-russian-deal/ Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:46:18 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2882 On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions. On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/time-for-an-israel-turkey-dialogue-on-syria/ Thu, 29 Mar 2018 10:15:37 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2828 Iranian involvement in Syria is increasing, bolstering Israeli motivation to influence Syria’s reality. Israel has carried out successful military moves in recent years in order to preserve its security interests around its northern border. Its ability to influence Syria’s future using diplomatic channels, however, appears to be quite low. The February 2018 incident between Israel and Iran near the Syrian border provides Israel an opportunity to explore whether additional diplomatic channels can be put in place in order to promote Israel’s interests in Syria and prevent further escalation. To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there. Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large. After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Iranian involvement in Syria is increasing, bolstering Israeli motivation to influence Syria’s reality. Israel has carried out successful military moves in recent years in order to preserve its security interests around its northern border. Its ability to influence Syria’s future using diplomatic channels, however, appears to be quite low. The February 2018 incident between Israel and Iran near the Syrian border provides Israel an opportunity to explore whether additional diplomatic channels can be put in place in order to promote Israel’s interests in Syria and prevent further escalation.

To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there.

Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large.

After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping a firm hold on Syria. These messages probably did not convince senior officials in Tehran to change their course of action. However, Israel approaching these countries shows the importance of Israel’s traditional allies in Europe, toward whom the Israeli government has in recent years taken an aggressive approach on the basis of differences of opinion on the Palestinian issue.

There is another country, with a growing influence on events in Syria, to which Israel has yet to turn: Turkey. In the past, Turkey had called for the downfall of Assad, but it recently changed course and aligned itself with Russia. As a result, it has become a central part of the Astana Process, also shared by Russia and Iran, and in which significant decisions are made regarding the reality in Syria.

Turkey has also recently reached some understandings with the American administration with the aim of toning down tensions between the two countries, which also stem from differences of interests in Syria. Turkey is militarily and politically involved in Syria and has significant interests in shaping the country’s future. Aspects related to Kurds, Syrian refugees, trade and economic relations, as well as geopolitical areas of influence shape Turkey’s policy toward Syria.

Much like Israel, Turkey is also concerned by the growing Iranian influence in Syria, albeit to a different extent and due to other reasons. Turkey and Iran share some interests with regards to Syria, are dividing between them military zones of influence in the country, and are trying not to step on each other’s toes. However, they are not allies in the sense that Israeli officials often portray.

Over the years, Turkey and Iran have been able to foster bilateral cooperation and establish normal neighborly relations, but there is also suspicion and rivalry between them, including on issues of hegemony and influence (not only in the Middle East). Iran’s grip on Syria is not a security threat for Turkey as it is for Israel. Turkey’s concerns are mainly economic and political, and Turkey cannot be expected to take measures that would limit Iran’s military presence in Syria. But, Turkey may have interest in restricting the entry of Iranian products and companies into the Syrian market and weakening the political ties between Damascus and Tehran.

This situation creates a certain alignment of interests between Israel and Turkey which should be leveraged, particularly at a time when the two countries seem to have a limited common agenda. The mutual trust between Turkey and Israel is at a low point, and the positive dynamic created after the signing of their 2016 reconciliation agreement receded in the second half of 2017, especially after the tensions that emerged on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in July.

At the same time, the two countries remained loyal to the reconciliation agreement and now enjoy full diplomatic relations. They continually demonstrate that they can cooperate in certain areas despite fundamental disagreements over the Palestinian issue. The Syrian issue can be yet another example of that.

Given the differences in Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria, and in view of the existing security coordination between Turkey and Iran, an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on Iran’s role in Syria should be diplomatic and economic in nature, and not military. As such, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (both of which have already taken steps to increase cooperation between the two countries since 2016), should be taking the leading role in these efforts rather than the defense establishment (which has been traditionally dominating Israel-Turkey relations).

Many in the Israeli government reject up front the option of a dialogue with Turkey and consider Erdoğan as an enemy. In the past, they did not believe that the two countries could succeed in reaching an agreement to restore relations, but reality proved them wrong. Just as the relations between Turkey and Iran are complex, so are the relations between Turkey and Israel.

Israel’s interests in its northern border require an in-depth examination of the feasibility of an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on limiting Iran’s role in Syria. Israel’s other diplomatic options did not prove themselves effective enough. Even if such a dialogue will be carried out at first with the assistance of a third party or through unofficial channels, and even if it is finally proven to yield only limited results, it is a diplomatic channel that should not be ruled out and that Israel’s Foreign Service should work to advance.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-eastern-mediterranean-new-dynamics-and-potential-for-cooperation/ Sat, 10 Mar 2018 08:31:29 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3037 New dynamics are taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean. Signs of increased political cooperation between different countries, new opportunities for economic cooperation due to natural gas finds, and common threats related to security and refugee flow all lead to the emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean as a new sub-region. This has been acknowledged by the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which stated in late 2015 that “the EU will support sub-regional cooperation as appropriate in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Maghreb and the Southern Caucasus.” While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt. However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights. The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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New dynamics are taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean. Signs of increased political cooperation between different countries, new opportunities for economic cooperation due to natural gas finds, and common threats related to security and refugee flow all lead to the emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean as a new sub-region. This has been acknowledged by the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which stated in late 2015 that “the EU will support sub-regional cooperation as appropriate in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Maghreb and the Southern Caucasus.”

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-partners-in-europe-yes-to-democracies-no-to-the-far-right/ Thu, 01 Mar 2018 10:11:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2827 The Israeli government and the Knesset are formulating approaches to address the rise of the far-right Austrian Freedom Party and the new Polish law regarding the Holocaust. In this effort, there is a need to address the growing gap between official Israeli policy and the actions of Israeli right-wing politicians. A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel. Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims. This gap between Israel’s

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Israeli government and the Knesset are formulating approaches to address the rise of the far-right Austrian Freedom Party and the new Polish law regarding the Holocaust. In this effort, there is a need to address the growing gap between official Israeli policy and the actions of Israeli right-wing politicians.

A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel.

Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.

This gap between Israel’s official policy and the actions of right-wing politicians must be narrowed. Far right-wing parties are gaining influence in certain countries in Europe. In Austria, such a party has recently even joined the coalition and some of its members are now appointed senior officials. It is possible that in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the representatives of such parties will also become significant in EU institutions. In light of this, the MFA should formulate criteria and guidelines to instruct Israeli right-wing parties on how to conduct themselves vis-à-vis the far right in Europe. A recommendation to refrain from any interaction with the ministers of the Freedom Party was already formulated and accepted by the Prime Minister.

The aim of such a measure would be to prevent right-wing MKs from granting legitimacy to far right-wing ideology in Europe, contrary to the position of the MFA. Furthermore, it would also prevent the legitimizing of anti-Semitic elements in Europe by Israeli officials, regardless of the fact that such elements may currently focus on hating Muslims rather than Jews. The formulation of such criteria and guidelines should be led by the MFA, but should also involve other partners, including the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset Speaker, the Jewish Agency, the Union of Local Authorities, and MKs who head parliamentary friendship associations with relevant countries (such as the Israel-Austria Friendship Association headed by MK Amir Peretz). Additionally, it is vitally important that the recommendations formulated become public, in order to identify those who do not comply with the guidelines, and to ignite a public debate on the issue.

However, the purpose of diplomacy – both formal and parliamentary – is not to impose boycotts, but rather to promote interests through dialogue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to formulate a list of demands and conditions for far right-wing parties in Europe as a condition for policy change toward them. Such a list will also have to take into account the needs of the Jewish communities in Europe, and can be consolidated in cooperation with other groups in Europe who oppose far right-wing parties. It does not need to focus on one country or another, but must address the growing phenomenon throughout the continent, while including lessons from change processes that parties and institutions underwent in the past.

European far right-wing parties sometimes pretend to be pro-Israeli in order to develop ties with right-wing groups in Israel and receive a certificate of integrity from them. This was the case, for example, with the interactions between the head of the Austrian Freedom Party and members of Likud. The leaders of these parties sometime carry soft messages and talk of change, but do not back up this discourse with actions. Presenting a list of clear Israeli requirements and conditions – including, for example, ousting those who are infecting the party with anti-Semitism, changing ideological frameworks and documents, and demonstrating commitment to legislation and policy denouncing anti-Semitism – will produce concrete measures to examine the actual conduct of these parties and avoid a façade of moderation.

The rise of the far right-wing and populist elements is taking place simultaneously, albeit at different levels, in a number of EU member states – especially in the central and eastern Europe. In the EU, there are now countries led by governments that move away from liberal values and democratic norms. The Israeli government is sometimes tempted to see the governments of these countries – such as Hungary – as allies and friends. This is due to block EU initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and their readiness to stand by Israel in international forums. However, viewing these countries as friends is a mistake.

Israel’s foreign policy should indeed be distanced from far right-wing elements in Europe, but this is not enough. It must also emphasize the importance of democracy and show commitment and preference for establishing alliances with countries with a strong democratic regime, even if they disagree with the current policies of the Israeli government. Israel must belong to the family of democratic nations, and should not sacrifice this position for the sake of promoting ad-hoc interests.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Forward)

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Policy toward the Far-Right Party in Austria https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-policy-toward-the-far-right-party-in-austria/ Wed, 31 Jan 2018 08:14:43 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3029 The Israel-Austria Parliamentary Friendship Group, headed by MK Amir Peretz (Zionist Union), held a special meeting at the Knesset on 31 January 2018 to discuss Israel’s policy towards the far-right Freedom Party, which has recently joined the coalition government in Austria. The meeting was attended by Members of Knesset (MKs), the Ambassador of Austria to Israel, and representatives of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Jewish Agency, and the Mitvim Institute. This document summarizes the main points raised during the discussion.

הפוסט Israel’s Policy toward the Far-Right Party in Austria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Israel-Austria Parliamentary Friendship Group, headed by MK Amir Peretz (Zionist Union), held a special meeting at the Knesset on 31 January 2018 to discuss Israel’s policy towards the far-right Freedom Party, which has recently joined the coalition government in Austria. The meeting was attended by Members of Knesset (MKs), the Ambassador of Austria to Israel, and representatives of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Jewish Agency, and the Mitvim Institute. This document summarizes the main points raised during the discussion.

הפוסט Israel’s Policy toward the Far-Right Party in Austria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel Should Maintain its Boycott on Far-Right Parties in Europe https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-should-maintain-its-boycott-on-far-right-parties-in-europe/ Thu, 21 Dec 2017 07:38:20 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4029 The Austrian Freedom Party, which is known for its anti-Semitic and Nazi roots, is part of the new coalition government in Vienna. Its leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, is Austria’s new vice-chancellor. In the last time Strache’s party joined the Austrian government, Israel was quick to react: it called its ambassador from Vienna and lowered the level of relations. This time, the chances for a strong Israeli reaction are slim, since some Israeli politicians have already legitimized Strache and even created connections with his far-right party.

הפוסט Israel Should Maintain its Boycott on Far-Right Parties in Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Austrian Freedom Party, which is known for its anti-Semitic and Nazi roots, is part of the new coalition government in Vienna. Its leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, is Austria’s new vice-chancellor. In the last time Strache’s party joined the Austrian government, Israel was quick to react: it called its ambassador from Vienna and lowered the level of relations. This time, the chances for a strong Israeli reaction are slim, since some Israeli politicians have already legitimized Strache and even created connections with his far-right party.

הפוסט Israel Should Maintain its Boycott on Far-Right Parties in Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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What do the German Election Results Mean for Israel, Europe, and the Peace Process? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/what-do-the-german-election-results-mean-for-israel-europe-and-the-peace-process/ Wed, 27 Sep 2017 07:06:44 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3974 On 27 September 2017, the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung held a policy roundtable on the German election results and their impact on Israel, Europe and the peace process. The roundtable commenced with remarks by former Ambassador Shimon Stein, former Member of Knesset (MK) Nitzan Horowitz, Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Dr. Gisela Dachs, Dr. Werner Puschra, and Dr. Nimrod Goren.

הפוסט What do the German Election Results Mean for Israel, Europe, and the Peace Process? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 27 September 2017, the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung held a policy roundtable on the German election results and their impact on Israel, Europe and the peace process. The roundtable commenced with remarks by former Ambassador Shimon Stein, former Member of Knesset (MK) Nitzan Horowitz, Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Dr. Gisela Dachs, Dr. Werner Puschra, and Dr. Nimrod Goren.

הפוסט What do the German Election Results Mean for Israel, Europe, and the Peace Process? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The 2017 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute https://mitvim.org.il/en/report/the-2017-israeli-foreign-policy-index-of-the-mitvim-institute/ Wed, 28 Jun 2017 09:20:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=report&p=4730 The annual public opinion of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted, for the fifth consecutive year in mid-September 2017. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute, and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (600 men and women, Jews and Arabs, aged 18 and above). The poll’s margin of error is 4%. This report includes the poll findings, grouped under five categories: The state of Israel’s foreign policy, Israel among the nations, foreign policy priorities and bilateral relations, regional cooperation, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

הפוסט The 2017 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The annual public opinion of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted, for the fifth consecutive year in mid-September 2017. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute, and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (600 men and women, Jews and Arabs, aged 18 and above). The poll’s margin of error is 4%. This report includes the poll findings, grouped under five categories: The state of Israel’s foreign policy, Israel among the nations, foreign policy priorities and bilateral relations, regional cooperation, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

הפוסט The 2017 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel needs good relations with Europe https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-needs-good-relations-with-europe/ Wed, 03 May 2017 08:22:34 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4072 The European Union EU is facing great turmoil. Russia’s aggression in the east, the political change in the US and Brexit are all major obstacles on its way forward. These dramatic developments significantly accelerate a series of processes, which have already been underway in Europe for the last few years, and which cast a cloud over the future of the European project. The upcoming elections in the two most important countries in the EU – France and Germany – intensify these tensions. In this context, European pressure on Israel to promote the peace process with the Palestinians – if such was ever actually really applied – is decreasing. Europe is now looking inward and is dealing with other conflicts and domestic challenges. It is not seeking to expand its role in the Middle East peace process. According to a senior European diplomat serving in Washington, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a low-intensity conflict, especially when compared to other conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, the region has more acute fault-lines, including the Sunni-Shi’a and the Arab-Iranian ones. “Given the internal problems of the EU and the changing international environment due to Trump and Putin, we currently do not have much interest in the Israeli issue”. “It is currently only number 10 on our priority list,” said a diplomat from a major European country, who is based in Tel Aviv. Europe does not expect the Netanyahu government to move forward on the peace process, and assumes that Netanyahu seeks to maintain the

הפוסט Israel needs good relations with Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The European Union EU is facing great turmoil. Russia’s aggression in the east, the political change in the US and Brexit are all major obstacles on its way forward.

These dramatic developments significantly accelerate a series of processes, which have already been underway in Europe for the last few years, and which cast a cloud over the future of the European project. The upcoming elections in the two most important countries in the EU – France and Germany – intensify these tensions.

In this context, European pressure on Israel to promote the peace process with the Palestinians – if such was ever actually really applied – is decreasing. Europe is now looking inward and is dealing with other conflicts and domestic challenges. It is not seeking to expand its role in the Middle East peace process.

According to a senior European diplomat serving in Washington, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a low-intensity conflict, especially when compared to other conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, the region has more acute fault-lines, including the Sunni-Shi’a and the Arab-Iranian ones.

“Given the internal problems of the EU and the changing international environment due to Trump and Putin, we currently do not have much interest in the Israeli issue”.

“It is currently only number 10 on our priority list,” said a diplomat from a major European country, who is based in Tel Aviv.

Europe does not expect the Netanyahu government to move forward on the peace process, and assumes that Netanyahu seeks to maintain the status quo and continue managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Based on these assumptions, the EU is unlikely to take new initiatives and steps regarding the peace process over the coming period. The Israeli government is happy about this, and views EU disengagement from the peace process as a success of Israel’s policy. This is a narrow and distorted view.

Such a European policy is actually a major setback for Israeli interests:

  1. Israel is missing an opportunity to significantly upgrade its ties with Europe, which is still a close ally and Israel’s largest trade partner. Israel should aspire to deepen ties with Europe, as offered by the EU in return for Israeli-Palestinian peace;
  2. Without significant European involvement, it will be much more difficult to promote and operationalise the Arab Peace Initiative, which holds much potential for Israel’s future;
  3. A possible EU decision to cut aid to the Palestinians, due to disengagement from the conflict, might worsen the situation on the ground and will increase the burden on Israel;
  4. A European disengagement, coupled with American isolationism, will enable aggressive and less democratic actors (like Russia) to play a much larger regional role. Israel’s interests are not a priority for such actors.

In Israel, Europe is often portrayed – in the media and by politicians from the right – as hostile to Israel. This is not true.

Israel’s relations with European countries and with EU institutions are deep and multi-layered. They serve the needs of all sides involved.

The Israeli-European alliance is not merely an interest-based economic one. It is a deep strategic alliance, based on shared values and on a long and troubled history. Europe has always been an exceptional asset for Israel’s development and security.

Israel has a genuine interest in a strong EU. Instability in Europe, the weakening of EU institutions, and the rise of anti-democratic forces in Europe, all have negative consequences for Israel.

The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that in light of the challenges faced by Europe, a plurality of Israelis thinks that Israel will benefit more from a stronger Europe than from a weaker one.

Israel’s increased ties with Russia, China and other non-democratic countries cannot and should not be a substitute for relations with Europe. Israel’s belonging to the democratic camp, with Europe at its centre, promoted Israel’s international standing along the years and directly contributed to Israel’s prosperity.

In order to maintain the Zionist vision of a Jewish and democratic state, Israel needs to maintain good ties with democratic Europe. It should also work to promote the two state solution, in order to prevent a change in Israel’s national character will change, mounting tensions with Europe, and an intensified pivot towards non-democratic international actors.

Israel is a regional superpower. As such, it can play a leading role, alongside Europe, in promoting regional stability and prosperity. Israel’s existential need is to dismantle regional threats and to establish good relations with its neighbouring countries and peoples.

These goals are also shared by Europe, and Israel has no better partner than Europe to promote them with. The path towards peace and development in the Middle East is long and requires much commitment.

Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is an essential step in that direction. There is no way to bypass this path – which Israel currently chooses to avoid, and on which Europe is dragging its feet.

(originally published in EurActiv)

הפוסט Israel needs good relations with Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Briefing with Arne Lietz, Member of the S&D group in the EU Parliament https://mitvim.org.il/en/event/briefing-with-arne-lietz-member-of-the-sd-group-in-the-eu-parliament/ Thu, 12 Jan 2017 08:42:39 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=event&p=5509 A briefing by Member of European Parliament (S&D Group) Arne Lietz, January 2018

הפוסט Briefing with Arne Lietz, Member of the S&D group in the EU Parliament הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process following Trump’s Jerusalem Statement, a briefing by Member of European Parliament (S&D Group) Arne Lietz (January 2018).

הפוסט Briefing with Arne Lietz, Member of the S&D group in the EU Parliament הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index https://mitvim.org.il/en/report/the-2016-israeli-foreign-policy-index/ Thu, 15 Sep 2016 20:27:55 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=report&p=5100 Findings of the Mitvim Institute Poll, October 2016  The annual public opinion of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted, for the fourth consecutive year in late August – early September 2016. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute, and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (600 men and women, Jews and Arabs, aged 18 and above). The poll’s margin of error is 4%. This report includes the poll findings, grouped under five categories: Israel among the nations, the state of Israel’s foreign policy, foreign policy priorities and bi-lateral relations, regional belonging and cooperation, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  

הפוסט The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Findings of the Mitvim Institute Poll, October 2016

 The annual public opinion of the Mitvim Institute on Israel’s foreign policy was conducted, for the fourth consecutive year in late August – early September 2016. It was carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute, and in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population (600 men and women, Jews and Arabs, aged 18 and above). The poll’s margin of error is 4%. This report includes the poll findings, grouped under five categories: Israel among the nations, the state of Israel’s foreign policy, foreign policy priorities and bi-lateral relations, regional belonging and cooperation, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

 

הפוסט The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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