This perspective is not just an expression of deep pain – it is a testament to the destructive consequences of the events of October 7, 2023, on the perception of Israel’s future in the eyes of many liberals in Israel and the American Jewish community.

Hamas not only attacked, murdered, and raped Israelis, it also succeeded in causing many Jews to lose faith in a future in which Israel can exist as a Jewish and democratic state alongside a Palestinian state.

From Hamas’s perspective, this is a tremendous strategic victory. After all, its goal has never been Palestinian independence alongside Israel but rather the elimination of the Zionist idea.

If Israel completely rejects the two-state solution, it will be trapped in a predicament where it cannot be both democratic and Jewish in a sustainable manner – thus demolishing liberal Zionism.

The position of Rabbi Hirsch is also the result of years of systematic political messages from the Israeli Right and the conservative American Jewish establishment, which have succeeded in conflating the Palestinians as a national movement and Hamas as an extremist Islamist movement.

Netanyahu’s narrative 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, backed by organizations in the Jewish establishment in the US, promoted a narrative that associates every Palestinian with Hamas.

As a result, even moderate voices such as Rabbi Hirsch’s are now adopting an interpretation that absolves Israel from any responsibility for the failure of peace processes.

The Palestinian side is not exempt from responsibility, of course, but granting an exemption to Israeli governments throughout the generations from shared responsibility for the failure is not Zionism – since the purpose of Zionism is for the Jewish people to take responsibility for our fate.

It also reinforces the destructive stance of the “There’s no partner for peace” school, which is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Those who claim that the problem lies solely with the Palestinian side and the strengthening of Hamas that has been led by Netanyahu’s governments in the past 16 years are causing serious damage to our future.

Despite the pain, in light of Rabbi Hirsch’s words, I find comfort in the fact that the American Jewish community still largely holds a different position.

Most Jews in the US support the two-state solution and understand that the endless control over the Palestinians is not a recipe for Zionist prosperity but rather for Israel’s moral and strategic decline.

In Israel, polls indicate that the majority of the public would support a solution that included a demilitarized Palestinian state as part of a regional agreement.

Israel can make a reality of full peace relations with Sunni Arab countries as part of a moderate Middle Eastern bloc standing against both Iranian and jihadist Shi’ite and Sunni forces.

Saudi Arabia is leading this initiative among Arab countries, and it is possible that Indonesia and other non-Arab Muslim countries will join as well.

Biden tried to promote this vision and failed, but Donald Trump also wants to reach such an agreement for different reasons of prestige and money, which could make its realization more realistic.

Such an arrangement would not only solve the moral and demographic problem of controlling a foreign people but would also the solution to Israel’s security problem, as former senior officials from the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet, and the Foreign Ministry have testified.

From a historical perspective, we know that – sometimes – it is precisely after severe shocks that a political breakthrough occurs.

After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli public became more hawkish – but shortly thereafter, peace was signed with Egypt.

After the First Intifada, which was a severe trauma for the Israeli public, the Oslo Accords were born, paving the way for peace with Jordan.

Today’s crisis is not necessarily a sign of losing our way – it could be a springboard to a new solution; if only the right leader can be found, with the ability to translate pain into hope.

The reality is indeed difficult. The current dynamics make the political discourse in Israel more extreme. But we do not have the privilege of despairing.

Zionism has never been an effortless project. Every significant achievement we have attained as a people and as a state has come through determination, despite opposition and fears.

הפוסט Israel cannot let Hamas win by abandoning the pursuit of peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The exception to this was the Arab and Islamic summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in November 2023. However, aside from declarations against Israel and calls for a diplomatic solution based on the two-state approach, with borders along the lines of 1967, this summit did not result in any practical action.

There are two explanations for the weak Arab response. First, there is the continuing decline of the Arab League as an institution for addressing Arab issues.

Since its formation – and that of the Arab Summit, its supreme body – it has experienced many failures, although it has also been credited with some significant achievements, such as thwarting Iraq’s threat to invade Kuwait in 1961, halting the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, and adopting the Arab Peace Initiative, among others.

The second reason is the general reluctance to intervene in Gaza until the war has ended. This is especially relevant to the Gulf states, which can contribute substantial funds toward the rebuilding of Gaza, but will not do so until the fighting is over.

The convening of the emergency summit on March 4 – symbolically called the “Palestine Summit”G – was an Arab response to US President Donald Trump’s idea for Palestinian emigration from Gaza. Though the idea is flawed and impracticable, it has forced the Arab states to formulate their own counterproposal.

What Trump did not take into account was that striking at the Arab holy cow – the Palestinian problem – would unite the Arab states, thus forcing the moderate Arab states to fall into line with more extreme positions.

Most of the leaders of the Arab states attended the summit, including the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was making his first appearance at the supreme Arab institution.

However, the Saudi crown prince and the president of the United Arab Emirates chose to send their foreign ministers, seemingly after they realized which way the wind was blowing. For Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the conference was an opportunity to give a show of Arab leadership.

Hamas is not mentioned

The concluding statement issued by the summit was worded in a rhetoric characteristic of Arab conferences and reflects the lowest common denominator on which Arab consensus could be achieved. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the statement includes condemnations of Israel. On the other hand, Hamas is not mentioned at all.

Ignoring the negative rhetoric toward Israel, the Arab proposals can be summarized as follows:

A call for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank; a reaffirmation of the Arab strategic decision to pursue peace, as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative, which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people through the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with east Jerusalem as its capital; a total rejection of all acts of violence, terrorism, and extremism; full opposition to any attempt to uproot Palestinians from their land; a warning against annexations in the West Bank that could lead the region into a renewed cycle of violence; adoption of the Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza (see below); a call to convene, at the earliest possible time, an international conference to discuss reconstruction and raise funds; and a call for the full implementation of the ceasefire, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.

Interestingly, the statement refers to a Palestinian agreement to establish a temporary, local, technocratic administration in Gaza, “under the umbrella of a Palestinian government,” alongside efforts to help restore the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, following necessary reforms within both the PA and the PLO. In the meantime, Egypt’s foreign minister has announced that the individuals who will serve in this administration have already been selected.

הפוסט Arab Leaders Unite on Paper, but Who Will Rebuild Gaza? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the dust begins to settle from the wars of the past decade, a growing realization emerges: From the ruins of Gaza, Bint Jbeil, and Aleppo will rise the new political order that will define the Middle East for the coming decades. Those leading the rebuilding efforts will be the ones shaping the region’s political future.

The struggle over the narrative of reconstruction places Israel at a critical crossroads – whether to remain in the role of a destroyer or take part in shaping the region as a builder.

The choice is between a future of instability, extremism, and chaos – allowing Iran to reenter the arena – or a future of Israeli-Palestinian partnership in a comprehensive reconstruction plan. In this vision, physical rebuilding could serve as a foundation for reshaping Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, its adversarial neighbors to the north, and the wider Arab world.

The western Middle East lies in ruins, on a scale reminiscent of post-World War II Europe. The devastation is concentrated in three key areas: Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

The cost of restoring basic life-sustaining infrastructure in Gaza alone is estimated at $20 billion, barely a third of what will be needed to fully rebuild Gaza over the next decade.

Yet, Gaza’s reconstruction pales in comparison to the enormous task of rebuilding Syria, where the destruction caused by the civil war is estimated at $500 billion.

In Lebanon, devastation is the direct result of governance failure – corruption and systemic inefficiency that led to economic and social collapse, with the war merely adding a layer of physical destruction.

What unites these three arenas is the dramatic political shifts brought about by war. All three are in transition between old regimes and new governments, whose capacity to rule will be determined largely by the reconstruction efforts.

This makes rebuilding a direct factor in Israel’s security, not just in terms of immediate threats but also in shaping Israel’s long-term security environment and its relationships with Palestinians and regional states.

For example, who rebuilds southern Lebanon will directly impact the security situation on Israel’s northern border for years to come. If Hezbollah leads the reconstruction using Iranian funds, it will retain, at least partially, its status among the Shi’ite population and their willingness to support it militarily.

However, if Lebanon’s new government takes charge, relying on international economic aid, it could restore its sovereignty and reduce the willingness of southern Lebanese communities to turn their homes into Hezbollah rocket depots.

Similarly, the way Syria is rebuilt will influence its future relations with Israel. If the reconstruction is led by a regional and international coalition, it could serve as leverage to push the new Syrian leadership away from conflict. More importantly, such an effort would prevent Iran from reestablishing its foothold, as Tehran is a global expert in exploiting chaos for strategic gains.

The urgency of reconstruction

Regional actors are beginning to grasp both the enormous potential and the pressing necessity of large-scale reconstruction. The sheer scale of destruction has transformed rebuilding into a challenge of historic proportions – akin to a regional Marshall Plan but led by the region itself, primarily the Gulf states.

The regional interest in reconstruction stems from a clear realization: Leaving the wounds of Gaza, Aleppo, and Lebanon open will create the conditions for the next regional war. For Arab states, rebuilding is first and foremost a matter of regional stability.

The recent war demonstrated how quickly shock waves from Gaza and Beirut can destabilize governments and disrupt trade routes across the Middle East. This vulnerability has created a sense of urgency among Arab states to intervene.

The release of Trump’s plan only intensified the urgency for these countries to present an alternative. This set the stage for the regional emergency summit held earlier this week in Cairo, initiated by Egypt to coordinate a joint reconstruction effort.

While momentum builds and plans take shape, Israel remains entirely absent from regional reconstruction efforts. Securing a place at the table – ensuring Israel has a say in shaping the post-war Middle East – requires it to forge a new kind of strategic partnership with those leading the rebuilding efforts, namely the Gulf states and other key Arab partners.

Yet at present, Israel is seen as an irrelevant spoiler – a military power capable of destroying any long-term reconstruction effort, but one that lacks a strategic vision or the willingness to plan for the future.

Above all, Israel’s messianic political vision for Gaza and the West Bank positions it as an obstacle. These policies run counter to the regional understanding that the long-term success of Gaza’s physical reconstruction is inseparable from establishing a stable political future for Gaza.

This is not just about Saudi or Emirati diplomatic sensitivities – it is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. There is no logic in investing billions in developing Gaza’s port and energy infrastructure or Lebanon’s economy if they are destined to be bombed in the next escalation.

Yet, instead of engaging with the serious regional discourse on reconstruction, Israel’s leadership remains preoccupied with fantasies about a Gaza Riviera without Palestinians and delusional visions that even Trump’s advisers have abandoned in recent weeks.

As of today, Israeli decision-makers are the only actors in the world clinging to Trump’s so-called reconstruction plan. It took Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states three hours to dismiss Trump’s statement and clarify that their involvement in Gaza’s rebuilding depends on transferring control to a Palestinian authority.

Ultimately, participating in the critical process of regional reconstruction and the reshaping of Israel’s relationships with its neighbors demands a price that Israel’s current government finds unbearable – giving up its messianic dreams of annexation and population transfer. It requires a fundamental shift from being a force of destruction to becoming a partner in designing the Middle East’s future.

The article was published on March 9th, 2025, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Gaza Reconstruction is Israel’s Chance to Shape the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trump’s proposals to transfer approximately two million Palestinians from Gaza to other countries, along with the United States assuming responsibility for Gaza, were presented as fresh, “outside-the-box” ideas. This framing gave them an air of innovation and creativity, presenting them as concepts previously unconsidered.

While it is certainly a new idea, not all new ideas are necessarily good ones – and some are best left well outside the box. Unlike the “Deal of the Century,” which was presented in January 2020 as a comprehensive 181-page plan, the current proposals emerged as a spontaneous whim announced by Trump just before his meeting with Netanyahu.

They are a mishmash of ideas, lacking any thorough planning that considers the interests and constraints of the various parties involved.

Trump’s proposals are often seen as an attempt to apply business principles to diplomacy – offering an extreme proposal in order to ultimately reach the desired outcome. As the late prime minister Levi Eshkol put it, “I compromise and compromise until I get what I want.”

Trump’s polarizing Gaza plan

However, Trump’s approach to Gaza deviates from the core principles of his election campaign, and it risks leading him into confrontations on both the domestic and international stages. This could be especially problematic in his relationships with key leaders like Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince bin Salman, Turkey’s President Erdogan, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II.

Apart from Israel, there appears to be little enthusiasm for this deal from other potential stakeholders. Trump can expect significant criticism from multiple fronts.

First, the American public, along with many across the political spectrum, is likely to oppose such a move. America’s appetite for involvement in overseas conflicts has diminished following the failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria – wars that claimed numerous lives and cost astronomical sums of money.

Second, the proposal is vehemently opposed by all Arab states, as it would force them to act against their own interests. More critically, if they were to accept it, they would risk undermining the legitimacy and stability of their regimes.

The Saudi Foreign Ministry was the first to respond on behalf of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, stating that Saudi Arabia would not back down from its position, which has been reiterated since October 7: the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.

As a leading power in the Arab world today, Saudi Arabia has set the benchmark for the position of other Arab states. The United Arab Emirates quickly followed suit, reaffirming Saudi Arabia’s stance.

AS FOR EGYPT and Jordan, both have repeatedly expressed strong opposition during the war to any attempt to relocate Palestinians from Gaza. They are concerned about the potential consequences of a population transfer into their territories and its impact on the internal stability of their regimes.

The fact that Trump’s proposal is intended to be implemented consensually, rather than by force, does not lessen their opposition in the slightest. Trump’s threat to use the US financial clout over Egypt and Jordan may backfire and might even damage Israel’s relations with these two important states.

Similarly, Morocco, which has been mentioned as another potential destination for refugees – an action framed as a gesture of gratitude for America’s recognition of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara – will also resist being involved. Morocco has long supported the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and has even hosted both public and covert meetings between Israeli and Palestinian representatives.

Moreover, cooperating with an American initiative would likely paint the Arab regimes as traitors to the Palestinian cause, undermining their legitimacy by appearing to contribute to the destruction of the Palestinian project.

While Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause has historically been expressed in rhetorical terms, it is deeply rooted in widespread support among the Arab public.

Over the years, surveys have consistently shown the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab public opinion and Arab leaders cannot afford to ignore it. It appears that Trump fails to grasp the symbolic importance of the Palestinian issue in the Arab world, mistakenly assuming that everything can be bought with money.

And what about the Palestinians themselves? Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, and a strong attachment to the land (known as sumud) are core values within the Palestinian ethos. Trump’s ideas risk turning the October 7 war into a second Nakba, deeply wounding this ethos. They represent an attempt to erase Palestinian identity and deny Palestinians their right to an independent state – a right that is recognized by the majority of countries around the world.

The focus on Gaza overshadowed another equally significant point made by Trump in his speech – his intention to revisit the issue of annexing territories in Judea and Samaria. This could reignite calls for the annexation of Area C, which had subsided following the release of the “Deal of the Century” in January 2020. Reviving these calls now would likely provoke widespread protests across the Arab world and in the Palestinian territories.

It is possible that Trump’s “outside-the-box” ideas were intentionally designed to shock, with the aim of achieving a more modest goal later on. However, there were never going to be any real buyers for these proposals. Moreover, even if these ideas are rejected, there remains an inherent danger in the legitimization, by the world’s most powerful nation, of actions that undermine international norms of behavior.

If Trump is truly interested in rebuilding Gaza, he might consider replicating the Marshall Plan (it could even be named after him!). The Marshall Plan helped restore Europe after the devastation of World War II, without relocating its residents, and involved an investment of an unimaginable $173 billion in today’s terms.

The storm that followed Trump’s announcement is just beginning, and its outcome remains uncertain. It could end up being little more than a “tempest in a teacup,” but if it turns out to be genuine, storms typically bring damage and destruction. The only question is how much damage and destruction will result.

הפוסט Trump’s Proposals for Gaza: A Political Gamble With Global Risks הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Delivering his opening remarks during their joint press conference, Trump announced that the United States “will take over the Gaza Strip” and refashion it as the “Riviera of the Middle East”. Key to Trump’s “long-term ownership” plan, which reportedly blindsided Netanyahu, would be the relocation of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to make way for American bulldozers and urban planners.

Trump’s declaration triggered strong international condemnation. British Foreign Minister Anneliese Dodds said that “there must be no forced displacement of Palestinians, nor any reduction in the territory of the Gaza Strip.” French President Emmanuel Macron and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sissi issued a joint statement calling any “forced displacement” of Gazans “a serious violation of international law”. Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its commitment to a Palestinian state. Germany, Russia, and China also took issue with the plan.

The criticism is justified. Trump appeared to unilaterally reject decades of diplomatic norms pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tabling the idea of a future Palestinian state. And while he may be right in insisting that the easiest way to end the intolerable cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas is by removing Gaza’s civilian population from the battlefield, international law on human rights and migration is clear when it comes to the forced relocation of civilians (except for military necessity). Without a cohesive plan for relocating Gaza’s approximately 2 million residents, identification of countries willing to serve as hosts, and a commitment that Gazans will eventually be able to return to their homes, Trump’s declaration—made in the midst of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas—may do more harm than good in the short run.

No wonder White House staff have been busy downplaying Trump’s commitment to employing US troops, permanently relocating Palestinians, or using US resources to finance the decades-long reconstruction effort.

Rather than disparage Trump’s vision, America’s partners in Europe and the Middle East should develop a feasible alternative that still captures its essence. This plan should prioritize replacing Hamas as a governing force in Gaza, designing an economically sound humanitarian model for international actors to host those Palestinians who wish to relocate, and establishing an international body that reimagines Gaza’s future and oversees the reconstruction process. These steps could eventually create the conditions for normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a coveted foreign policy goal for Netanyahu and Trump alike, and for future discussions of Palestinian sovereignty.

Like it or not, Trump has set the tone for negotiations on the future of Gaza and Palestine. If the United States’ partners truly desire an alternative ending, they must meet Trump in the middle with a vision of their own.

The article was published on February 11th on GMF.

הפוסט Don’t Like Trump’s Gaza Plan? Offer an Alternative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli public has been waiting for this for months, with consecutive public opinion polls indicating that a large majority supported ending the war in Gaza in return for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

As months went by, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing governing coalition worked to avoid such a deal — Hamas was doing the same. And the U.S. administration, although heavily invested in mediation efforts, simply didn’t apply effective pressure to make either party change course.

At the same time, the number of living Israeli hostages gradually decreased; casualties among Israeli soldiers increased; and the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population continued.

Today, Israelis are supportive of the cease-fire deal, but they also can’t help but ask why it wasn’t reached six, seven or eight months ago. The terms that were discussed and rejected at the time were nearly identical to the ones agreed upon now. Why was it necessary for additional hostages, soldiers and civilians to die before leaders finally took action?

Still, the deal brings with it a sigh of relief. We, Israelis, have all come to know and care so much about the hostages. Hope for their release and concern for their fate have become part of our daily lives. Their families have been leading a brave and furious struggle to bring them back home, sometimes in the face of unbearable, ugly attacks by the far right.

Many Israelis showed solidarity and support, feeling a basic Israeli principle had been jeopardized — the state’s responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring its people back home. And it was often claimed in recent months that until the hostages returned, Israeli society couldn’t heal from the trauma of Oct. 7.

Now, things are finally moving forward. The excitement upon the return of the first three hostages was felt in every corner. But we also receive the cease-fire announcement with a heavy heart. Not all of the 33 hostages who are to be gradually released in the deal’s first phase are said to be alive, and no one definitively knows which hostages will return on their feet.

More questions arise too: What will be the health condition of those returning? What will be the fate of the remaining 65 hostages who are to be released in later phases of the deal, which Netanyahu doesn’t seem eager to implement? What will be the future of Gaza after Israel’s withdrawal? And will residents of southern Israel finally be able to return home safely?

There are still many unknowns. But since the cease-fire was announced, they also carry a spark of optimism.

This deal shows that, eventually, diplomacy can work. International mediators can deliver. Sides to a bitter conflict can reach an agreement, and public pressure can make an impact. It shows that suffering can come to an end, that families can reunite and a better future can emerge.

Taking place in the context of many other regional changes, this cease-fire also creates new opportunities. From the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire in Lebanon to the transition in Syria and the weakening of Iran, all these developments improve Israel’s geopolitical situation. If only the country had a government that would seek to leverage this to advance a two-state solution, we could have witnessed a much more dramatic transformation — including normalization in Israeli-Saudi relations.

The window of opportunity for such change will still exist for a while to come, but its realization would require different, more moderate Israeli leadership, as well as curbing and sidelining far-right extremism, reversing anti-democratic trends within Israeli society and politics, and reviving pro-peace attitudes and practices.

The immediate priority, however, is fully implementing all phases of the cease-fire agreement, and setting in motion a constructive “day after” plan in the Gaza Strip — one involving the Palestinian Authority and regional countries, at the expense of Hamas. Israelis and Palestinians will need a continuous international helping hand to do this, especially from the U.S.

It’s time to turn the page on the dark chapter that Oct. 7 brought, and start charting the better, more peaceful future that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. The cease-fire inches us closer to that reality, and the mediators who, however belatedly, made it happen deserve appreciation and thanks, and they should follow the process through till it is fully implemented.

The article published on January 22nd 2025 in Politico.

הפוסט Gaza Cease-Fire: The View From Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Notably, he described the October 7 attack as “a barbaric act with no justification”—a clear condemnation that, for the vast majority of Israelis, is considered a minimum starting point for any dialogue with the Arab and Muslim worlds. This, in fact, is the most critical aspect of Alghashian’s remarks and serves as his call to action. As he stated, “I propose one starting point: a mid-level dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. Instead of striving for hollow declarations of victory, we must foster a more serious conversation. Alongside peace efforts from the top-down and bottom-up, we need an in-depth analytical dialogue based on a network of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics.”

We wholeheartedly welcome Alghashian’s call and suggest broadening its scope into practice.

From my perspective as an Orthodox Jewish rabbi, religion is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as to the broader challenges of the Middle East. My goal, and that of my rabbinical colleagues both in Israel and abroad, is to position religion on the other side of the equation: not as part of the problem but as part of the solution. Indeed, we go further: not only can and should religion be part of the solution, but a long-term resolution is likely impossible without incorporating the religious dimension. The reason is clear—religion and tradition play a pivotal role in shaping behavior at every level, from individuals and communities to states and diplomatic relationships in the Middle East. Ignoring the religious aspect and trying to resolve conflicts solely based on shared interests has not proven effective so far, and there is no reason to believe it will succeed in the future.

Of course, this does not mean we should neglect shared interests. Israelis and Saudis undeniably share common concerns—like those Alghashian articulated—about “a region engulfed in turmoil and conflict” and “regional instability.” It is worth stating the obvious: most Israelis seek peace and stability, not endless war. It’s also obvious that conspiracy theories suggesting Israeli expansionist ambitions in the Middle East are baseless. Our goal is to be accepted as an equal partner in the region—with formal, open relations—not relegated to a marginalized role, as Alghashian aptly described.

The first step, as Alghashian suggested, is indeed a mid-level dialogue. However, we propose adding religious leaders from both sides to the roster of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics. Many of us, in fact, wear multiple hats as scholars, experts, and more. A dialogue that excludes religious leaders will yield intriguing insights for certain elites, but it won’t facilitate deeper processes, shift attitudes, or persuade veto players on both sides—key actors without whom no agreement can be signed, or if signed, will hold little chance of enduring. This mistake—intentionally sidelining religious leaders—was made during the Oslo Accords, as the architects viewed them as part of the problem. They were correct, but they failed to recognize that without making religious leaders part of the solution, there could be no solution. We all know the result. Let us avoid repeating past mistakes and learn from them.

Alongside addressing shared interests, we must also care for our distinct identities. Neither side has any intention—or expectation—of relinquishing, altering, or compromising their ancient traditions and identities for short-term interests. Instead, we propose an opposite approach: one that focuses on deeply understanding our shared roots, enabling us to transform these different identities from sources of conflict into foundations for a better shared future. After years of deep dialogue with leaders across the Muslim world and a growing group of rabbis well-versed in Islam, the Quran, and fluent in Arabic, we are confident in the transformative potential of such conversations and believe the time has come to expand them.

The renowned Hebrew poet Rachel Bluwstein—so central to Israeli culture that she is simply called “Rachel the Poet”—asked in one of her famous works, “Why does an outstretched hand not meet a sister’s hand?” We see Alghashian’s article as an immensely important outstretched hand, and we respond simply: here is the sister’s hand. Let us meet.

הפוסט Will an Outstretched Hand Meet a Sister’s Hand? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In retrospect, we should have realized that we had ignored the fact that the Palestinians could alone not provide answers to significant parts of the core issues of the conflict—the refugee issue, the Jerusalem issue, and, of course, the security envelope—because each one of them requires a regional approach.

In Oslo, Camp David, and even in the very advanced talks of then-Prime Minister Olmert with Abu Mazen, there was a lack of understanding of the necessity for a broad regional framework, which would provide the Palestinians with the backing to make the necessary compromises—and provide the Israelis with the incentive of the fruits of regional peace.

The Israeli right tried to exploit the failure to achieve an agreement in order to promote opposing approaches—Sharon attempted unilateralism following Barak’s assertion that there was no partner for an agreement, and Netanyahu marketed the illusion that regional peace could be achieved without a Palestinian component. Both of these approaches tragically exploded in our faces on October 7.

The events of October 7 and the ongoing war since then have ended the fantasies of most Palestinians to become a majority in a single democratic state between the river and the sea. Long beforehand, they had given up their hope that negotiations would lead to the establishment of their own state.

The terrible massacre that Hamas committed hardened the hearts of many Israelis, who had previously believed in the moral imperative to end control over a foreign people. The walls of fear and hostility have risen among both Israelis and Palestinians, two peoples who have paid an unbearable price over the past fifteen months.

We must internalize that for the Israeli public, the most important issue is security. After October 7, the Israeli public is more frightened, more suspicious, and less willing to consider moral arguments. Therefore, even those of us who believe that the occupation must end to avoid moral and strategic harm to Israeli democracy must offer the citizens of Israel an arrangement that allows them to achieve what they desire most of all: security.

Security is brought by diplomatic arrangements, such as those we have with Jordan and Egypt. Security that is derived from a united regional front against the axis of Shiite jihadism led by Iran and the Sunni jihadism that may emerge with Turkey’s backing after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Surveys by the Accord Center for Social Psychology at the Hebrew University, conducted even during the most difficult periods of the fighting, reveal that the Israeli public is willing to accept a Palestinian state if it comes in the form of a comprehensive normalization agreement between Israel and Arab countries. The majority of the Israeli public (about 61%) prefers separation from the Palestinians over annexation. The data indicates that ultimately, even when the winds of war are blowing, the Israeli public is much more realistic than its current leadership. Israelis understand that the path to security passes through normalization, which will include the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Arab normalization of relations with the State of Israel.

The current reality necessitates the promotion of a regional solution—a 23-state plan—which includes all Arab states, a demilitarized Palestinian state, and Israel as an integral part of the region. Unfortunately, a large proportion of Israeli citizens are not interested enough in ending the occupation. However, agreements that will bring about security and prosperity for Israelis and that will end the occupation will receive public support.

The challenge for the Peace Camp is to implement the “Arab initiative,” which was first presented in 2002 as a Saudi initiative but has effectively become an initiative of the Arab League. The “Arab Initiative” offers full normalization between Arab countries and Israel in exchange for a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian conflict based on the 1967 borders. During Obama’s presidency, Arab countries added the principle of land swaps at the request of US Secretary of State John Kerry.

The Abraham Accords did open the door to regional normalization and economic cooperation, but their disregard for the Palestinian issue limited them to a small number of countries and did not resolve the fundamental issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, after October 7, no Arab country can afford to ignore the Palestinian issue, and it is very clear from Saudi Arabian declarations that normalization must include a Palestinian state.

The important lesson from the Abraham Accords is that the Israeli public preferred normalization over annexation, which was avoided thanks to the UAE, which made clear to Trump that this was a red line that could not be crossed. Moreover, since the accords, many Israelis now recognize the advantages of normalization. Many of those who saw Arabs only as enemies have found the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco to be their preferred tourist destinations and enjoy the ability to fly cheaply and in less time to the Far East.

Together with Arab countries, the Biden Administration prepared a regional framework—that includes a Palestinian state—as a way to end the war in Gaza and achieve a governance alternative to Hamas. This framework is also in the interest of the Trump Administration and the entire Sunni world led by Saudi Arabia, and they have a better chance of addressing the objections of the Israeli right than the outgoing Biden Administration.

The Israeli peace camp should adopt a discourse that emphasizes strengthening Israel’s security, economy, and international legitimacy, all of which resonate with the Israeli people.

This will not convince the current government, which has been taken over by the most extreme elements of the Israeli right, but if it is the public’s will, in the end, a sane government will be established here that will work to implement it.

We need to create responses that are suitable for Israel in 2025—practical solutions to everyday problems. To turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a minefield for Israel’s integration into the region into the key to its advancement.

The article was published on January 8th in The Times of Israel.

הפוסט The 23 State Solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the nature of Saudi Arabia is inherently challenging to comprehend, no one bears greater responsibility for your misunderstanding of it than your own prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. If you really want to understand Saudi Arabia’s position both with regard to normalization with Israel and on the Palestinian issue, then the best place to start is by examining Saudi discourse.

As a Saudi researcher of Saudi policy toward Israel, I have confronted the complexities of Israel. The complexities of a people – and its discourses – must always be respected.

This courtesy is something Netanyahu has not extended to the Saudi kingdom. Your political leadership has misled you by oversimplifying Saudi Arabia and its people – their logic, their beliefs, and their discourses.

Therefore, I want to make use of the opportunity to communicate with you, the Israeli people, directly as a Saudi who genuinely seeks peace.

I would like to dispel two key exaggerations that your country’s current political leadership has promoted.

The Iranian issue

The first has to do with the Iranian issue. Netanyahu has been promoting the idea that Saudi-Israeli normalization is the logical outcome of the shared Iranian threat. This idea is inaccurate to say the least. Netanyahu proposes that a major regional confrontation with Iran would lead the Saudi kingdom to move away from its traditional position, to set aside its grievances with Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, and to base normalization on a logic of mutual enmity. This is too simplistic, and the Saudi ruling elite thinks in a far more nuanced way than that.

It is true that the Saudis still view Iran as its primary security concern. Equally true, however, is that both Saudi Arabia and Israel fundamentally differ in how they strategically address that concern. While the Saudis have concluded that working with Iran is the best way to address its security grievances, Netanyahu’s robust approach is something the Saudis wish to avoid.

What we Saudis truly fear is a region embroiled in conflict. Saudi anxiety over regional turbulence stems from our concern about the restructuring of our economy, which we consider an existential issue, and we know we cannot achieve our ambitious economic goals in a turbulent region.

What the Saudi ruling elite fears most is the radicalization that is almost certain to arise from this ongoing war.

The images of death, destruction, and the loss of innocent Palestinian and Israeli lives are painful for all. Some members of the Israeli government talk of resettling Gaza and annexing more territory in the West Bank. This is not only repugnant to us but has two additional effects: It increases the sense of grievance toward Israel and the potential for further extremism in the region.

This leads to the second issue that Netanyahu has misled you on – the notion that the Saudis do not care about the Palestinian issue. Your government has misled you, the Israeli people, into believing that Saudis will willingly abandon their historical stance and normalize relations with Israel regardless of the Palestinian issue, which is now an inescapable reality.

Within Saudi Arabia, there is a sense of solidarity that perhaps has not been seen since the Second Intifada. What you will not see are pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli demonstrations taking to the streets of the kingdom, as that is not part of Saudi culture.

But I urge you not to measure the gravity of Saudi support by the absence of such demonstrations, which is about the fear of extremists trying to instrumentalize this pain. In that sense, I also want to communicate to you that October 7 was a barbaric atrocity that took the lives of innocent people. Too much innocent blood has been spilled in this conflict.

The Saudi-Palestinian relationship is not devoid of tensions. However, the reality is that sporadic tensions are part and parcel of deep, longstanding relations. I would suggest you avoid the perception that instances of tension with the Palestinians are signs of imminent Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Moving forward

How do we proceed? Our people have many interests in common, but there is nothing we share more, unfortunately, than the blood of our respective brethren spilled and mutual pain. We must empathize with each other and keep our eyes on the horizon of the necessary peace that will benefit us all.

There might be many possible points of departure, but I will present one: an Arab-Israeli “mid-level dialogue,” between analysts, think tanks, journalists, and academics with the aim of fostering healthier and more constructive Arab-Israeli discourse.

A discourse that speaks to the other, and not over or about the other. Mid-level Arab-Israeli discourse should be forward-thinking, presenting new, creative proposals that address the need for peace, while incentivizing political actors to remain invested in the process.

I know that there are people in Israel who desire real peace. We are ready to engage, but you need to help us by ensuring we jointly aim at solving this issue from its roots. Otherwise, and allow me to use a notion from the book From Mistress to Known Partner: Israel’s Secret Relations with States and Minorities in the Middle East, 1948-2020 by Elie Podeh: Israel and Israelis will once again become nothing more than the mistress of the region.

The Abraham Accords are indeed a milestone in Arab-Israeli relations. However, history has shown that even mistresses out in the open are still viewed as illegitimate and unacceptable. This can be seen in a range of polls from Abraham Accords countries, which indicate the lack of support by many for relations with Israel.

It is time we enter a process in which Israel moves from being considered a “mistress” into an open and legitimate partner for peace – and that can only happen through a two-state solution.

The article was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט Saudi perspective: The Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This axis includes Hezbollah, Shi’a militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and, to a certain extent, Syria.

The anniversary serves as a reminder, first and foremost, of the political, military, and intelligence failures that demand investigation by a state commission of inquiry.

It also offers an opportunity for reflection on the consequences and significance of what we have been through in the past year.

October 7 has caused a national trauma, marking yet another disaster in the long chain of tragedies experienced by the Jewish people.

Addressing this trauma is one of the most pressing tasks confronting Israeli society and its leadership.

 It has led to a loss of trust among many Israelis in the government; and while the war has diverted attention from the government’s judicial revolution, those plans do not appear to have been shelved.

The brutality of Hamas’s terrorist acts has also led to a process of dehumanization and delegitimization of Palestinians within Israeli society. While this may be a natural reaction to the events of October 7, it is likely to raise serious obstacles to renewing dialogue after the guns fall silent. Surveys indicate that a similar process has occurred among Palestinians toward Jews.

From a regional perspective, Israel has succeeded in rebuilding its deterrence, although only time will reveal the extent of this recovery.

The importance of Israel’s military and intelligence achievements lies not only in the outcomes but also in the way they are achieved – through ingenious military, technological, and intelligence-based subterfuges.

A heavy cost for deterrence 

The restoration of Israel’s deterrence has come at a heavy cost to Gaza’s civilian population. While it is hard to determine the exact number of casualties, estimates suggest a staggering toll, with figures around 40,000 deaths [of which Hamas recently admitted internally that 80% were combatants or their family members].

The primary challenge regarding deterrence lies in the nature of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, which are ideologically driven and therefore conventional deterrence is less effective against them.

Regionally, the Axis of Resistance has faced significant setbacks. Iran’s proxy doctrine has faltered, partly due to the lack of coordinated action, especially on October 7.

While Hamas’s attack marked a notable success for the organization, it ultimately led to the destruction of its forces and capabilities, signaling the end of its rule in Gaza.

Hezbollah, for its part, was able to initially claim a significant achievement, having launched thousands of missiles and rockets at northern Israel for an entire year, resulting in substantial economic damage and the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis.

However, this came at a high cost, including the elimination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and a chain of top commanders, alongside a severe blow to its operational capabilities.

Israel’s current operation in southern Lebanon is likely to inflict further damage on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, potentially forcing it to withdraw beyond the Litani River [as stated in the United Nations Resolution 1701].

While it is still too early to predict the war’s impact on Hezbollah’s domestic position in Lebanon, it is evident that the devastating consequences will lead to significant repercussions.

Tehran’s April 14 direct attack on Israel was a failure, with most of the missiles and drones launched intercepted by Israeli forces (or their allies) or landing in unpopulated areas.

The second Islamic Republic attack, on October 1, executed in retaliation for Nasrallah’s assassination, was larger and relatively more successful, but also resulted in no Israeli casualties, causing minor damage to property. This highlighted Israel’s significant technological advantage.

THE COALITION of moderate Middle Eastern states has remained stable. While Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and Arab public opinion generally supports the Palestinian cause, the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have maintained their relations with Israel – some covertly, others openly.

Certain countries even played an active role in countering the Iranian missile attack on Israel, as part of the cooperation in air defense systems that developed following the Abraham Accords and Israel’s integration into the US Central Command.

In its conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, Israel finds more allies in the Arab world due to the fierce rivalry rooted in the Sunni-Shi’a religious divide.

All the Sunni states perceive Shi’ite Iran and Hezbollah as a significant threat to their interests and therefore support Israel.

Conversely, Israel’s war with Hamas – a Sunni Palestinian organization – brings the issue of Palestinian independence to the forefront, which is widely supported by the Arab public. To maintain their fragile legitimacy, the Arab leaders publicly express pro-Palestinian rhetoric.

The United States remains the sole global power actively engaged in the region, though its involvement has so far been limited to defensive assistance, supplying weapons to Israel, and mediating between conflicting parties.

Additionally, the US has conducted limited operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea, constrained by a desire to avoid a regional war, especially given domestic pressures related to the upcoming presidential elections. Furthermore, recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have diminished US enthusiasm for ground interventions.

Meanwhile, Russia’s focus has shifted to its war with Ukraine, though it continues to maintain its stronghold in Syria. China’s involvement in diplomatic efforts has been minimal.

As a result, Middle Eastern states have largely been left to their own devices, a situation that has inadvertently bolstered Israel’s standing and role in the area.

One year later 

A year after October 7, the Palestinian issue has once again taken center stage. The Abraham Accords and the normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia may have pushed it to the sidelines, as Netanyahu intended, but Hamas’s attack redirected attention toward the urgent need for a solution.

The moderate states in the region advocate for a two-state solution and have even formed a coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, to promote it. Just as October 7 provided an opportunity to confront Hamas and Hezbollah – two significant threats to Israel’s borders that previous governments had neglected – it also created a renewed opportunity to settle the Palestinian issue.

Seemingly, the prospects for a solution have improved, as there is growing international acceptance of the idea that, given the presence of approximately seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, separation is the only viable option.

On the other hand, neither side of the conflict currently has capable leadership willing to pursue this direction. In addition, various polls indicate that the war has fueled increased extremism among both the Jewish and Palestinian populations.

However, a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed within a broader regional settlement, may serve as the most promising path toward resolving the Palestinian issue.

The political, military, and intelligence failures of October 7 are now compounded, a year later, by a moral failure – the failure to secure the release of the hostages.

While it remains uncertain whether Yahya Sinwar would have ultimately agreed to a deal, the real failure lies in the Netanyahu government’s apparent lack of effort to exhaust every possible means for reaching a deal.

There is currently no end in sight to the war across its various fronts. Its continuation will have significant costs for Israel, both diplomatically – with increasing international and regional isolation – and economically, resulting in a substantial budget deficit, further downgrades of Israel’s credit rating, a decline in foreign investment, and more.

Given that Israel does not desire war with Iran and cannot eradicate Hezbollah, it should focus on militarily achievable goals leading to a political settlement in Lebanon and Gaza.

The notion of “victory” is elusive, as all parties involved will likely frame the conflict as a success for themselves. Significant objectives could include inflicting substantial damage on Iran, pushing Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border, dismantling its military capabilities, restoring a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) in demilitarized Gaza, and securing the return of hostages. Achieving these goals would provide justifiable grounds for concluding the war.

The article was published on October 14th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s Restored Deterrence Comes at the Cost of Diplomatic and Moral Challenges הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For various reasons, including political considerations, there are limits at this moment to how the international community can push Israelis and Palestinians to adopt and fully implement Biden’s grand design. But it must not give up. This group of states – composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, other Western and European states, and Arab and Muslim states such as Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – can still play a crucial role in promoting this solution. They should assist local forces who are invested in advancing peace in two key ways: by countering Israel’s advancing annexation efforts in the West Bank, and by promoting transformative actions on the ground to support the future implementation of the two-state solution.

Israel’s government is taking steps towards annexation the West Bank, extending Israel’s sovereignty and erasing the Green Line that has separated it from the occupied territories. It supports violent settler actions to expel Palestinian communities from their lands, promotes settlement construction, allocates funds for settlement development and has transferred administration of the occupied territories from military to civilian control within the Defence Ministry Which is controlled by the ultra-right. The government aims to eliminate any distinction between Israel and the settlements, preventing future territorial compromise and the two-state solution. In the defensive battle against these efforts, the abovementioned states have potentially effective tools at their disposal that could prevent further deterioration of conditions in the West Bank.

For years, Western and Arab states have tried to influence Israel’s government by applying political and diplomatic pressure on it. At times, they have conditioned cooperation or other forms of support on halting actions that deepen the occupation and annexation. This was the case with the United States’ demands to stop settlement construction and to evacuate illegal outposts, and with the linkage between the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and halting the government’s annexation plans. Unfortunately, the actions of the international community have been little more than political and moral lip service. Examples include the European Union’s decision in 2016 to label products from settlements after years of discussions, which has remained largely symbolic, and the initiatives promoted at the United Nations to create a blacklist of companies supporting the occupation, which never led to coordinated action. In reality, the international community adopted Israel’s approach of conflict management (as opposed to trying and solve the conflict), and did not place real pressure on Israel to end the occupation or be held accountable for it as long as the region remained relatively quiet. Thus, despite these efforts, successive Israeli governments have continued to expand the settlement enterprise.

In early 2024, a new tool was introduced by the United States and other Western states: sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations promoting annexation. So far, these have affected a small number of violent settlers whom Israel’s political and legal system chose not to confront. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of this tool, but against a government indifferent to its international standing and to democratic-liberal values, when political and diplomatic pressure seems ineffective, sanctions could be a key tool. They have an immediate and significant impact on the functioning of these individuals and organizations, and they exert additional pressure on the Israeli government, which is committed to the settlers and is required to find solutions for them. The government’s support for the settlers therefore comes at the expense of all Israeli citizens – by taking capacity away from government planning in other sectors and by spending funds from public coffers. Thus, in the face of attempts by the government and the settlers to erase the Green Line, these sanctions accentuate it and present Israeli citizens with a clear choice — either the settlements or Israel. Sanctions can become more significant and effective by expanding them to include more central figures and organizations in the settlement movement, and by increasing coordination on them between Europe, the United States and Arab states.

The role of the international community is not only to keep the two-state solution alive but also to establish facts on the ground to promote it. Just as settlers have, for years, taken steps to obstruct peace, the international community must now actively promote an ‘evolving peace’. This should involve practical measures to advance the two-state solution across different areas. Such efforts are essential to avoid reverting to the pre-7 October conflict-management approach and to support instead the establishment of a stable, effective and moderate Palestinian state that can coexist peacefully and securely with a moderate Israel.

For example, as part of strengthening the Palestinian national movement, the international community should, at an appropriate time determined with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, recognize a Palestinian state with borders to be determined in future negotiations with Israel. This would help change the legal status of the occupied territories, bolster moderate Palestinians and Israelis who support compromise, and foster a more equitable negotiation process when the time comes. The international community should also be ready to support the Palestinian Authority and prevent its collapse in the face of Israeli retaliatory measures following such recognition.

Recognition alone will not be enough, however; changes on the ground will be essential. Arab states, Europe and the United States have the relevant tools and experience to support these changes. There is a need to build the institutions and infrastructure of the future Palestinian state, to foster peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians, to establish moderate approaches, to create mutual restraining interdependence and to strengthen in both societies the moderate forces that will support a political leadership in line with these goals. All these efforts must be pursued through cooperation, even in an environment where Israel’s government and terrorist organizations will attempt to undermine them.

One such effort must be to ensure that the Palestinian Authority is integrated in key regional projects that Israel’s government would not want to reject. For example, the United Arab Emirates could insist on including the Palestinian Authority in the water-for-energy exchange project between Israel and Jordan that it backs, or the European Union could similarly condition Israel’s connection to the European electricity grid through the EuroAsia Interconnector. In the longer term, it will be important to ensure that the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor includes the Palestinian Authority or state.

Reforms within the Palestinian Authority must be advanced, with closer monitoring of how resources are being translated into building effective institutions and improving the services provided to Palestinians. Investment in local governance is necessary, accompanied by the development of local physical and institutional infrastructure that will form the foundation for the Palestinian state. Israel was built in a similar manner – by connecting sub-centres that were founded and developed under the British mandate. To this end, for example, the EU’s Twinning and TAIEX programmes could be expanded and adapted for local Palestinian governance.

There must be support for civil society organizations in Israel and Palestine that encourages joint projects and strengthens the discourse and organizations that promote peace and equality. The expansion and implementation of the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act adopted by the US Congress in 2020 can serve as a platform for this. In the fight against fundamentalist Islam, tapping Indonesian civil society organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, that promote moderate Islam worldwide and the United Arab Emirates’ experience in promoting religious tolerance can lead to profound changes within Palestinian society. The Jewish diaspora in the United States should do the same for Israeli society.

Efforts should be made to promote Palestinian economic independence by connecting the Palestinian economy to the Arab world and developing local sources of income, alongside local solutions for energy and food security based on sustainable practices. A long-term planning effort is needed to lay the groundwork for building the Palestinian state. Rebuilding the Palestinian security and police forces, and much more, is necessary. In short, there is a lot of work to be done, and it must start.

Middle Eastern countries, Europe and the United States have a vested interest in promoting peace and stability in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. It is not viable for them to wait idly for Israeli and Palestinian political leaders to choose peace. The international community must actively establish facts on the ground to advance peace, protect the possibility of a two-state solution and create favourable conditions for nurturing peace-supportive leadership and implementing a political process when the time is right. This is the essence of ‘evolving peace’ and Israelis and Palestinians need the international community’s support to overcome their extremist leaderships.

The article was published on September 27th in Chatham House.

הפוסט The International Community’s Role in Moving From the Gaza War to Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians and Regional Stability הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Key points:

1. The Gaza war reignited the Two-State Solution, with the US, EU, and Arab countries working together to achieve it through a “reverse engineering” approach.

2. The EU’s potential role is outlined in three stages of “The Israeli Initiative”:

Political Horizon: Establish a political vision and international monitoring forum.

Transitional Phase (peace-building): Demilitarize the Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, hold elections, and begin regional projects.

Negotiation (peace-making): Final negotiations for Palestinian statehood and normalizing Israel-Arab relations.

The paper highlights the importance of the EU’s role in maintaining the viability of the Two-State Solution in the West Bank. In the short term, the EU should provide humanitarian aid, counter annexation efforts in the West Bank, stabilize the Palestinian Authority (PA), and address Iranian proxies. Its influence depends on trust-building with both sides and leveraging its status as both a financial and political player.

The conclusion calls on the EU to prepare for post-war diplomatic and economic opportunities, with a focus on revitalizing the PA, stabilizing the region, and gaining trust with Israel through continued engagement.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Deradicalization and Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation: Lessons and Recommendations Based on Past Conflicts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The current conflict has highlighted the tunnels’ critical role in Hamas’s military build-up. Moreover, taxes levied on goods smuggled through these passageways have significantly bolstered Hamas’s finances. One researcher estimated that as early as 2008, monthly tunnel-derived income reached $35 million.

While the exact number of tunnels and the volume of trade they facilitated remain unclear, the implications for Hamas – or any future governing entity in Gaza – underscores the need for rigorous oversight of border crossings.

The tunnel issue is longstanding, and Israel has consistently regarded it as a serious threat. Since disengaging from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005, and especially following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, Israel has regularly shared intelligence with Egypt about tunnel activities and smuggling operations.

WikiLeaks documents reveal repeated Israeli complaints, both directly to Egypt and through US channels, about insufficient Egyptian efforts to combat this phenomenon. In the summer of 2008, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak informed American officials that Egypt had destroyed over 280 tunnels, emphasizing that countering tunnels was “the job of Egypt and Israel, not just Egypt.”

Previous operations in Gaza

Following Operation Cast Lead in late 2009, Egypt reported destroying more than 200 tunnels, yet Israeli concerns persisted. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, upon assuming power in 2014, also intensified efforts to demolish and seal tunnels. Nevertheless, Hamas’s motivation to dig and profit evidently outpaced Egypt’s resolve to close these breaches.

Several factors contributed to this situation. The peace agreement and a 2005 addendum mandated that only border guards and police units, rather than well-trained and equipped army units, be stationed on the Egyptian border.

Egypt’s post-2011 Arab Spring upheaval spawned a jihadist threat in Sinai, demanding immediate military attention. Notably, Israel provided crucial military and intelligence support to Egypt in addressing this challenge. Local actors, including Bedouins and, potentially, some security elements, found financial incentives in cooperating with Hamas.

The possibility of ideological and political support for Hamas among certain factions cannot be dismissed.

Despite these complications, both Israel and Egypt shared a strategic interest in curbing Hamas’s military and economic capabilities. Following Operation Cast Lead, then-US assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern Affairs David Welch noted, “Egypt and Israel have a common problem: Hamas.”

The current Gaza war has presented numerous challenges for Israeli-Egyptian relations, particularly with the IDF’s incursion into Rafah and seizure of the crossing – a significant symbol of sovereignty for Hamas and Palestinians.

To date, both states have adeptly managed their diplomatic ties. Egypt continues to mediate between Israel and Hamas on hostage issues and war termination – with Israeli delegations frequently visiting Cairo.

If pre-war discrepancies existed between Egypt’s strategic interests and ground-level tactics, the conflict has underscored the interconnectedness of strategic and tactical concerns in securing the Egypt-Gaza border.

Recent reports indicate that Israel and Egypt are exploring the deployment of sensors and other technologies along the Gaza-Egypt border to enable Israeli monitoring of corridor and crossing activities, addressing tunnel and smuggling issues. Importantly, Israeli withdrawal doesn’t preclude its ability to thwart attacks or smuggling, as evidenced by its long-standing operations in Area A of the West Bank, nominally under Palestinian Authority (PA) security control.

The hostage issue is, fundamentally, a humanitarian and moral imperative that must take precedence. Presenting the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah Crossing as non-negotiable is not only ethically questionable but also strategically flawed, given that the security risks of Israeli withdrawal are not insurmountable.

This leads to the conclusion that Netanyahu’s opposition serves more as a pretext for rejecting a deal rather than a substantive argument.

The article was published on August 31st in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט The hostages should be prioritized over Philadelphi and Rafah הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document is one of a series of studies and policy documents that examine the relations between the local climate and foreign policy, as part of a project by the Mitvim Institute and with the support of the Glazer Foundation. The document was written in collaboration with SID-Israel, the umbrella organization of the Israeli professional community in the fields of humanitarian aid and international development. SID-Israel incorporates civil society organizations, government institutions, academic and research programs, private companies, consultants, and independent experts, and works to create a supportive professional environment, based on the exchange of knowledge and experience. Sid-Israel was established and operates thanks to the generous and ongoing support of Pears Foundation.

הפוסט Humanitarian Strategy in the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Regional Conference on the Infrastructural-Environmental Rehabilitation of the Gaza Area הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Palestine Is One Vote Short in the Security Council from Being Recognised as a State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM,) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met secretly in Bahrain in mid-June with senior figures in the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE,) Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

CENTCOM is a unified combatant command of the US military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a crucial role in coordinating military and security efforts among US allies. Such a meeting, particularly with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on?

Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is usually linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict.

In Israel, “normalization” has become a codeword for “warm” peace with other countries – as opposed to the situation between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, in which there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but not “normalization.”

By contrast, in the Arab world, the connotations of “normalization” (tatbi in Arabic) are negative, and thus the term usually preferred is “normal relations.”

Thus, “normalization” should reflect several levels of relations. The first is that of functional formal normalization. This model features cooperation on defense and intelligence, and occasionally also on economic issues. This kind of normalization is mainly based on the existence of common interests and enemies, and it takes place mainly behind the scenes, though it can also have public expressions stemming from the existence of diplomatic relations.

Cooperation is conducted between formal representatives in the royal court, the president’s office, the military, intelligence agencies, and relevant government ministries. This is the model of Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan.

The second model is unofficial normalization, characterized by bilateral relations – mainly secret – without the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is the situation in which Israel found itself for many years after independence, up until the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Oslo Accords, and the Abraham Accords.

The third model is that of legitimate normalization, characterized by cooperation not only at the government level but also between civil societies. The cooperation is held openly and publicly, albeit with some covert cooperation as well. This is the model of Israel’s relations with the Abraham Accord states – Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain.

Why do we need a formal agreement?

THE SECRET meeting in Bahrain raises an important question: If Israel is benefiting from military and intelligence cooperation during the war, even as it is being vilified in the Arab world, then what need is there for a formal agreement with Saudi Arabia, especially if Israel is required to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in return, or to take some concrete steps toward this outcome?

There are several answers to this question: First, in the absence of any real progress on the Palestinian issue, Israel is liable to return to its former status in the Middle East – that of a mistress with whom dealings are held behind the scenes, but without such transactions being publicly acknowledged.

Israel’s decision-makers had no choice but to accept this status because the rulers of Arab states feared for their lives and their legitimacy. Without any formal commitment, such relations are vulnerable and unstable, at the mercy of circumstances, interests, and the consequences of their own exposure.

Second, Israel’s ability to cooperate economically with Arab states is dependent on the existence of a warm legitimate peace. The relations that developed with the Abraham Accord countries are an example. Building significant diplomatic and economic ties is only possible when there is openness.

Thus, for example, the Negev Forum, created to combat Iran’s efforts to attain military nuclear capability, held its first meeting (and to date, its last meeting) in March 2022, with representatives in attendance from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE, while Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also invited.

Trade with the UAE had reached around three billion dollars before October 7. Moreover, according to the Abraham Accords Report, for the first five months of 2024, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE was $1.39 billion, constituting an 8% increase from the first five months of 2023.

A smaller increase also occurred in the volume of trade between Israel and Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain. A decrease in trade (17%) occurred with Jordan, while Turkey announced a complete ban, though figures are not yet available.

Economic cooperation of this kind with Saudi Arabia can only happen when diplomatic relations exist; the economic possibilities with Saudi Arabia are much greater. There is also the possibility of realizing President Joe Biden’s proposed economic corridor from India to the Mediterranean and Europe, via Saudi Arabia – an ambitious infrastructure project aimed at connecting India to Europe through the Middle East.

Third, Israel is already becoming a pariah state in the international arena. Moreover, there is a risk that further escalation would even damage the secret cooperation held with states in the region. Ending the war, with a linkage to a regional process vis-à-vis the Saudis, will halt and even reverse this process, and might expand the circle of countries that normalize relations with Israel.

And finally, it is in Israel’s interest to offer a vision for a solution to the Palestinian issue, as all attempts to bypass this problem have failed.

The fact that quiet normalization continues with the moderate Arab countries during the war is an important sign of the strong existing interests behind this alliance.

The article was publish on July 15th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Secret Meetings Prove Israel, Saudi Arabia Still Want Normalization Amid War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

I have been a lecturer in international relations and a peace scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for the last 31 years. I am always amazed at the naïve and misguided attitude we Israelis have toward the concept of “peace,” which has become a pejorative in the national lexicon. This is the consequence of a complex and tragic situation, disappointment regarding truncated peace processes and above all decades of Orwellian social engineering to the effect that “managing” the conflict is preferable to any political solution and that “total victory” supplants the vision of the prophet Isaiah.

Part of the confusion and the natural recoil to talking about the possibility of peace on the “day after” the war in Gaza stems from a binary and also naïve understanding of the concept. Many of us, who are still in the grip of trauma, for understandable reasons, tend to think that the Arabs as a whole and the Palestinians in particular want “to throw us into the sea” (we received clear proof of that intention in the horrific massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7). Others think that any talk of peace must refer to “true peace,” a la John Lennon, imagining a world suffused with harmony and love, in which the Palestinians have been transformed into ardent Zionists.

But there is another possibility. Peace in its “negative” sense – namely the absence of war, rather than of conflict – is achieved out of vested interests and a sober-eyed reading of reality. There need not be a necessary link between peace and love. Negative peace is made between enemies who reach the conclusion, after a war, out of selfish considerations, that it is in their own interests to reach a political solution. After all, war has no inherent value and it does not allow for a normal life.

Peace is also the normal state of affairs that characterizes relations between most of the countries in the world, including those that are hostile to each other, such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or even the United States and China nowadays. Costa Rica is a demilitarized, thriving country in Central America that does not constitute a threat to its neighbors. And as U.S. President Joe Biden constantly stresses, a completely demilitarized Palestinian state in the format of a two-state solution would bring Israel its coveted security (and peace), with the requisite guarantees.

From the time I was a doctoral candidate at Princeton University, in the late 1980s, I have been studying processes of “peaceful change” as a widespread alternative to war in international relations. The process implies a change in the existing situation, not by way of violence, but as a result of cooperation and negotiations between two or more parties. Territorially, it refers to cases of decolonization, transfer of territories between states (including as a solution for border disputes), the establishment of new states, and a change in the legal status of certain areas without the transfer of territory or sovereignty.

There are hundreds of examples of such peaceful change in the history of Europe, America, Africa and Asia, particularly in the context of decolonization. In the Israeli-Arab conflict, we can point to the successful cases of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt (1977-1979) and between Israel and Jordan (1993-1994). Imagine for a moment what our situation would be today in the absence of peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.

Conversely, the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, in 1991-2011, ultimately failed. Moreover, the negotiation process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was severed terminally, with the failure of the mediation effort by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2014 and the Palestinians’ application to participate in several international institutions, including the International Court of Justice. Nonetheless, as called for in the vilified Oslo Accords, there is still security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, a situation that assists the Israeli security forces in fighting terrorism.

Within the framework of my academic research, I developed a model that presents six background conditions that help to bring about successful peaceful change, together with variables in the process itself. Even if the model is primarily theoretical, it has already been used as part of the mediation efforts of the Organization of American States and the United States after the war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, which three years later led to a peace agreement between the two countries. If since then we have not heard anything about a territorial dispute between those two South American countries, that augurs well for the future.

The background conditions are: (1) An asymmetrical distribution of power that gives one side a reason to want to preserve the status quo; (2) similar political regimes; (3) normative agreement regarding the application of international law in relation to the territory in dispute; (4) diplomatic involvement of a third party; (5) a previous war; and (6) a third-party threat to one or both of the parties involved in the negotiations.

The variables in the process refer to the degree of cooperation and reciprocity between the parties, the negotiations themselves and the differences between the sides’ interests vis-à-vis the territory (for example, one side wants “national honor” and “economic benefits,” the other wants “security”).

The October 7 massacre and Israel’s justified counterattack in the Gaza Strip shattered the illusion that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could be “managed,” and brought about the most brutal war between the two peoples since 1947-1949. After the war – and assuming that Hamas does not continue to be sovereign in the Gaza Strip but is supplanted by an international entity for a transitional period – is a gradual process of peaceful change possible between Israel and the Palestinians?

As in the case of Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War, a few years would be required before a process of peaceful change becomes feasible – but not a generation. Ironically, a tragic situation of “mutually hurting stalemate” between the two sides has made them both “ripe” for a political process that could bring about a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israel. On the surface, it appears as if the current impasse might be a good candidate for the proposed model, with certain adjustments, per the following favorable condition for peaceful change:

1. The distribution of power between Israel and the Palestinians is clearly tilted in Israel’s favor. Israel possesses the military, economic and even moral shoulders that enable it to be “generous” in the pursuit of its national interest, according to which only a situation of peace can guarantee recognition of its borders, once such borders have been demarcated by agreement. As such, Israel will be able to become a “normal” state that integrates into the region and makes peace with Saudi Arabia and with all the moderate Arab states.

2. Israel is (still?) a liberal democracy, at least within the boundaries of the Green Line, whereas the Palestinian Authority is not a state in the full sense of the word, and its regime is (still) authoritarian (elections were last held there in 2006). Neither of the current leaders (Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively) possesses the domestic legitimacy or the willingness to move ahead in the direction of a political solution. Accordingly, we must surmise that only democratic elections in both Israel and the PA, and new leaderships, will allow for them to advance peaceful change in the coming years.

3. Both Israel and the PLO have recognized and accepted UN Resolution 181, which set out the partition plan of
November 29, 1947, and Security Council Resolution 242, from 1967, regarding “withdrawal… from territories” in exchange for peace, as expressed, among other places, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at Bar Ilan University in June 2009. It can be said that a normative agreement exists regarding the recognition of the mutual legitimate rights of the two peoples to part of the territory of the Land of Israel/Palestine.

4. The current war has led to a considerable internationalization of the conflict. The United States, the countries of the Arab League, Turkey, the European states and the vast majority of the international community support a solution based on Resolution 181 (a “two-state solution”) and are ready to mobilize for the diplomatic effort that would be required to advance it, following Gaza’s postwar rehabilitation. Renewed ratification by the Arab states, and Israeli recognition, of the Arab League’s 2002 peace initiative could assist in the process.

5. The current war between Israel and Hamas has demonstrated tragically that it will not be possible to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians by military means alone. Hence, the diplomatic path must be tried after not having been attempted substantively for the past 30 years, due to its being torpedoed by extremist elements on both sides, including Hamas and the Jewish messianic – all of whom view the political process and the division of the land as a substantive threat to their fundamentalist, maximalist visions.

6. The external threat posed by Iran and its proxies in the “resistance axis” constitutes an incentive for the moderates in the Middle East, and also for the Israelis and the Palestinians, to embark on a path to peace and compromise. In addition to the external threat, each of the two societies also faces a considerable domestic threat emanating from the extremist elements that demand exclusive ownership of the same land.

A year ago, inside a Salvation Army store in Washington, D.C., I saw an inscription on the wall, attributed to the writer Robert Ludlum: “Hope is stronger than fear.” There are moments in international relations in which a crisis can constitute an opening for a historic opportunity. The bulk of the background conditions for a process of peaceful change between Israelis and Palestinians exist already today, even if at the moment it is mainly fear and despair that prevails between them, rather than trust. May courageous and legitimate leaders arise, among both the Israelis and the Palestinians, who can transcend themselves and the agony of their peoples, and launch a political process after the war with massive third-party assistance. That is the life imperative for both peoples who inhabit this land, neither of which is going away.

Even if this academic model at the moment sounds a bit fanciful, we must talk about peace and about change by peaceful means as a road map for a better future, and demarcate an alternative to Israel’s becoming mired in the Gaza Strip in the wake of its military occupation and the continuation of a guerrilla war of attrition without any
achievable goals.

The article was published on June 21st, 2024 in Haaretz.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian Peace May Look Entirely Different From How We Imagine It הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now.

How is it that Hamas, not a particularly large or strong organization, is refusing to bend to the pressure from the United States, the main global power, and two major states in the Middle East, Egypt and Qatar?

Despite being under heavy military pressure from Israel, suffering large-scale casualties, and having lost most of its territorial strongholds, as well as its Philadelphi Corridor tunnel lifeline, Hamas remains unwilling to accept proposals that would seem to be relatively generous, considering its current situation.

To answer this question, one needs to go into Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s mind – a difficult, if not impossible, task, as the events of October 7 proved. Even if some psychologists might categorize his personality as psychotic or narcissistic, there is an element of rationality to his decision-making, even if this rationality is different from ours.

Despite this challenge, it is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now. The first explanation is that none of the mediators has sufficiently strong leverage against Hamas.

Of the three, Qatar would seem to have the three most significant assets: halting the financial aid it provides to Hamas (which in any case would seem not to be arriving at present); freezing the organization’s assets in Qatar; and closing Hamas’s offices in Qatar, which would mean exiling the organization’s leaders from its territory.

Qatar has threatened to expel the Hamas leadership from its territory, but this threat has not yet been carried out because Qatar understands that such a step would jeopardize its ability to mediate between Israel and Hamas.

Losing this role would damage Qatar’s regional and international status. In any case, hurting Hamas’s leadership’s standard of living is not of concern to Sinwar.

Egypt has even weaker leverage than Qatar. Though Egypt is considered in the Arab world as the “big sister,” it has few resources to deploy in mediation. It has even lost its last leverage – control of the Philadelphi Corridor.

Though its General Intelligence Service, responsible for relations with Hamas, provides a form of “bear hug” of the organization, there are more opposing than shared interests between the two.

US plays important role as mediator

The importance of the United States as a mediator lies in its ability to offer guarantees against any violation of the agreement by Israel after signing. Beyond this, President Joe Biden has no direct leverage against Hamas. The main, and perhaps only, indirect leverage at his disposal is to apply pressure to Qatar, a US ally that houses the largest American military base in the Middle East and enjoys special status as a non-NATO-member ally.

But the United States has no interest in harming itself by harming Qatar. In this context, it is possible that the United Nations has stronger leverage in the form of applying sanctions, under the terms of Article 7 of the UN Charter.

A second explanation relates to the fact that sanctions against uncooperative actors in the international arena are ineffective when those actors’ survival is at stake.

In other words, those in danger of being wiped out are not deterred by threats made by their allies or by mediators. Thus, any proposal that does not entail an unequivocal promise to end the war will be rejected, even at the cost of further casualties – which in any case, are not a factor for Hamas in considering whether to continue or end the fighting.

And finally, the pressure being applied to Israel by the international community, the military pressure being applied by Hezbollah on the northern border, and the pressure from Israeli society to reach a deal for the hostages have led Sinwar to conclude that his goals will be achieved eventually, even if it takes a long time. This policy involves risk-taking and brinkmanship, characteristic of leaders who are impetuous or extremely courageous.

What are the options?

If this assessment is accurate, then what can be done? There are three options:

The first is simply to accept Hamas’s demands. The advantage of this course of action is that it will bring the end of the war and the release of the hostages, and perhaps allow Israel to focus on the northern theater, which in any case requires a more robust policy, whether by diplomatic or military means.

The disadvantage is that Israel will be seen as not having achieved its military goals of toppling and removing Hamas, and Hamas will receive a boost to its self-image as having defeated Israel by surviving. In this sense, the war will be similar to the Suez War and the Yom Kippur War, which ended with military victories for Israel but with diplomatic victories for Nasser and Sadat, respectively.

The second option is to start working seriously on plans for the reconstruction of Gaza under alternative leadership – not an Israeli civilian or military administration, but on a body enjoying international legitimacy, such as the Palestinian Authority, albeit with a different leadership, enjoying local legitimacy. The return of the PA to Gaza, with backing from moderate Arab states, would be a real threat to the remnants of Hamas rule in Gaza.

This possibility also involves promoting normalization with Saudi Arabia, which in turn would be a catalyst for further security and economic integration of Israel in the region.

The third option is to continue the war until Hamas surrenders unconditionally, though presumably this goal is unattainable as long as Hamas continues to hold hostages.

The war in Gaza is asymmetrical: it is a war between a state and a non-state actor, between a large military deploying massive forces and advanced weaponry against an organization using limited (and sometimes primitive) means and guerrilla tactics.

In many ways, it is reminiscent of the Vietcong’s war against the United States in Vietnam, and we all know how that ended. Israel needs to choose a realistic option – that is, a combination of the first and second options described above.

The article was published on June 29th, 2024 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט How has Hamas kept its strength for so long without giving in to mediation pressure? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An important factor in every negotiation between states is the incentives put forward by one of the parties to the conflict or by the mediating party.

For example, Israel’s willingness to recognize the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was an incentive for Morocco to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. Similarly, the supply of F-35 warplanes by the United States was an incentive for the United Arab Emirates to sign a similar agreement with Israel.

Sometimes, there is a mega-incentive, one that cannot or should not be refused. Who, for instance, could have refused when Anwar Sadat proposed his historic visit to Jerusalem?

The idea of normalization with Saudi Arabia has featured prominently in recent headlines, following the Saudis’ willingness to pursue this idea in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state – or at the very least, significant progress in that direction. Israel’s opposition to such a deal stems from a combination of ideological, political, and security-related factors.

The idea is anathema to those who ideologically believe in the need to liberate all of the biblical Land of Israel and who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian national identity. Security-wise, there are fears over the shrinking of Israel’s borders. And politically, normalization could lead to the disintegration of the current government and possibly the end of the Netanyahu era. These are all very strong reasons for opposing such a deal.

But for those willing to act in a rational and considered manner, the Saudi proposal is an incentive to something much bigger than just a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. First, it opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world.

Second, it would be a blow to the “axis of resistance” led by Iran, as one of its main goals has been to derail this normalization process.

Third, it would strengthen the integration of Israel into the region’s security architecture, as was manifested during the April missile attack by Iran.

The fact that the Israeli, Saudi, Bahraini, Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian chiefs of staff met in Bahrain under the umbrella of the US Central Command earlier this month may attest to the possibilities inherent in this new security structure.

Fourth, normalization with Saudi Arabia would reduce antagonism toward Israel, regionally and globally, and would halt the process of Israel’s becoming a pariah state.

Fifth, it would reinforce Israel’s economic ties with other states in the Middle East, especially with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

And finally, it would lead to Israel’s integration into a new economic architecture that will link the Far East and India with Europe, via sea and land corridors passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

Should Israel agree to Saudi normalization?

In and of itself, normalization with Saudi Arabia would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. But the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state may elicit fierce opposition from the Israeli public. These fears are natural and logical, particularly after the October 7 attack. Yet, this disaster has in fact led to three important developments that make the creation of a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later.

First, it restored the Palestinian question to its “natural” place at the core of the conflict. Israel’s attempts to relegate it to the margins or make it disappear entirely by signing normalization agreements with Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East have failed. Like the idea that Hamas would not attempt a large-scale attack from Gaza, this has proved to be another misjudgment.

Second, the disaster has revived the two-state solution, which before October 7 had become irrelevant in the eyes of many due to the growth of Israeli settlements in Area C in the West Bank. The one-state idea had gained traction in many circles, but the disaster demonstrated that, despite everything, separation is a necessity, while a single state for Israelis and Palestinians is a recipe for violence and destruction. The re-emergence of the idea of a Palestinian state has occurred in the international arena at both the state level and among international organizations and institutions, as well as in general public opinion.

Third, actors in the international and Arab arenas have come to understand that they need to be part of the solution, by giving recognition and guarantees to both sides, possibly even including the deployment of troops. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel hands responsibility for its security to others, but that the solution requires regional and international partners who have an interest in the success and maintenance of any agreement.

A fateful decision is now required, of the kind that David Ben-Gurion made with the Declaration of Independence and that Menachem Begin made when agreeing the peace deal with Egypt. The problem is that Israel currently has a prime minister with a majority in the Knesset but without public legitimacy. No less serious is the fact that Palestinian leadership also suffers from legitimacy deficiency.

Moreover, Palestinian public opinion polls reveal widespread support for Hamas, and little support for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinian side will also have to undergo a process of sobering up to the realities of what is possible.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is a mega-incentive that presents Israel with a dilemma: Should it continue with its ghetto mentality and self-victimization, clinging to the belief that “in every generation, someone rises up to destroy us,” or should it forge a new regional partnership and alliance? What happens next is not a historical inevitability; it will be decided by Israeli society and its leaders.

The article was publish on June 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has missed quite a few opportunities over the years for normalization with the Arabs, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Those who hark back to the saying coined by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” should revisit the history books.

The first missed opportunity with the Saudis dates back to December 1977, when Crown Prince Fahd sent an emissary to Israel with a verbal message for Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan refused to meet him without knowing the content of the message in advance, and the messenger went home. In August 1981, Fahd proposed an initiative, which Israel scornfully rejected. In February 2002, Israel simply disregarded another Saudi outreach, this one by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, whereas the Arab League adopted it. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it came to be known, was particularly significant because it reflected broad consensus on recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, in return for Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel resisted the plan’s terms not only on political and ideological grounds, but also out of ignorance regarding Saudi Arabia’s importance in the Arab and Islamic world and a perception of its leadership as corrupt and religiously extreme. Had the Arab Peace Initiative been presented to Israel at earlier stages of the conflict, the leadership would likely have seen it as an acceptable basis for negotiations and an agreement. But the process of radicalization underway within Israel’s Jewish society with regard to the occupied territories prompted repeated efforts to circumvent the Palestinian problem. The 2020 normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco ostensibly signalled the ultimate justification of these efforts, but the event of Oct. 7 and its aftermath refute the claim that the Palestinian problem could be ignored.

Hamas’s murderous offensive and the ensuing war also created a unique opportunity, as do many wars that result in systemic overhauls. Such was the case with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that ultimately led to peace with Egypt. Exactly 50 years on, Israel is steadfastly refusing to take advantage of this cataclysm to initiate or accept plans for the day after the Gaza war, in keeping with its historic pattern. It has never initiated a peace plan – the one with Egypt was proposed by President Anwar Sadat.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is in itself politically and economically important, but its many regional and international ramifications are even more so. First, it will open the door to recognition by other countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Second, it will deliver a blow to the Iranian “resistance” axis, which aspires to undermine Muslim normalization with Israel. Third, it will anchor the process of Israel’s integration into the regional and global security architecture, with its benefits as evidenced by the coalition mounted to foil Iran’s April 2024 missile attack on Israel.

Fourth, it will take the sting out of at least some resistance to Israel in the world and in the region by those who oppose its policies but not its existence, thereby stopping its descent into pariahhood. Fifth, it will strengthen Israel’s economic ties with countries in the region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Trade between Israel and the UAE in 2023 soared to almost $3 billion and would have surpassed that figure had it not been for the war. And finally, normalization with the Saudis would result in Israel’s integration into the new economic architecture linking the Far East and India to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel through a sea and land corridor.

The Saudis have been successful in their efforts to moderate the Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza, as reflected in the May 16 Arab League summit in Bahrain, with the participation of almost all the kings and presidents of Arab countries, including Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. While denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza and calling for an end to the war and the deployment of international forces there, the joint concluding statement also called for an international conference and expressed support for the two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative. In other words, the war has not changed the strategic Arab adherence to the two-state solution.

Many in Israel view the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security threat, a logical concern especially after October 7. However, it is precisely this catastrophe that makes a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later, for the following three reasons. First, it restored the Palestinian problem to its “natural” place at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thwarting attempts to marginalize or eliminate it through normalization with Arab countries on the periphery of the Middle East. Second, the disaster has prompted renewed discourse on the two-state solution, which had seemed irrelevant before October 7 due to the massive increase in settlements throughout Area C of the West Bank. The idea of “one state” gained traction in many circles, but the Hamas massacre demonstrated that separation is nevertheless the only viable option, whereas one state is a recipe for calamity.

Third, international and Arab actors understand that they must be part of the solution by providing guarantees to both sides, including perhaps by sending peacekeeping forces to Gaza. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel entrusts its security to others, but rather that regional and international partners have an interest in offering and preserving solutions to the conflict.

The negative consequences of Israel’s refusal are already manifest. The announced recognition of a Palestinian state by Ireland, Norway and Spain signals the beginning of a political tsunami that will lead to recognition by other countries, in addition to the 140 that have already sone so over the years. This worldwide recognition of a Palestinian state would also further exacerbate international rejection of Israel’s rule over a foreign people. Instead of Israel eventually having to bend under international pressure, it could benefit right now through Saudi recognition and normalization, which would include a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The realization of this grandiose plan requires a fateful decision of the kind adopted 77 years ago by David Ben-Gurion. But Netanyahu is no Ben-Gurion, and despite the backing of a Knesset majority, lacks public legitimacy following the October 7 disaster, for which he and his government are responsible. Just as troubling, the Palestinian leadership also lacks public legitimacy, being perceived as corrupt and unfit to make fateful decisions. Reflecting its low standing, Palestinian polls demonstrate wide support for Hamas, especially following Oct. 7, and little backing for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinians, just like the Israelis, need to undergo a process of disillusionment – in Israel’s case with the limits of power, in the Palestinian case with the limits of ambition.

The current circumstances would seem to quash prospects of a two-state solution in the foreseeable future. However, should an Israeli government take the leap and accept the “Saudi move”, and the Palestinians would then reject it, for whatever reason, the Saudis would likely regard this as a sufficiently big fig leaf to move forward with their plan. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is clearly fed up with the Palestinians. In March 2018, he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinian leadership had missed opportunities and rejected all the offers it was given over the past 40 years. “It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining,” he reportedly told the closed-door meeting.

Prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia following the events of October 7 place Israel at a crossroads. It can either continue to adhere to its historic role as a victim persecuted throughout history and to this very day, or seize the opportunity as a powerful independent nation to break out of its ghetto into the region as a partner and ally. Either decision is down to Israel’s leaders and society, not a deus ex machina.

The article was published on June 1st in Haaretz. 

הפוסט The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan.

The flood of Western countries stepping up recently to recognize a Palestinian state should not have come as a surprise. In fact, 143 countries have already recognized it, most of them when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat announced its creation in Algiers in 1988. A steady drizzle of other states have joined over the years, such as Sweden, in 2014.

Two months ago, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States said their governments were considering such recognition. Now, with the imminent declaration of recognition of a Palestinian state by Norway, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia (with Malta and Belgium in the pipeline,) the trickle is starting to resemble a tsunami. Netanyahu’s political refusal to declare that at some future point he would be willing to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state, subject to international security guarantees, isolates and weakens Israel, with potentially disastrous results.

In numerous debates over the past three decades in parliamentary plenaries around the world and at various UN assemblies, the Palestinians have recorded several key achievements: deepening their diplomatic and economic ties with the countries that recognized them, as well as with other Western countries, and gaining recognition in 2012 of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an observer state (although not a member) of the UN General Assembly. But with this recognition, the Palestinians cannot go to the bank and “cash” a state. An actual Palestinian state cannot be established without Israel’s consent.

What does recognition of a Palestinian state mean for Israel?

If recognition stops with the above four to five European countries, the move will remain symbolic, similar to Sweden’s recognition a decade ago. But in another scenario, which is not far-fetched, given strong global support for the Palestinians these days, the floodgates would open for the 50 countries that have not yet done so to recognize a Palestinian state. These would include the leading members of the Euro-Atlantic “moral majority” (France, Germany, UK, and, first and foremost, the United States,) with dire consequences for Israel.

There is a consensus among the member states of the European Union and the US on the need to establish a Palestinian state, and that the only solution to the conflict is two states that allow the two peoples to live side by side in security and peace (or at least without violence). This is a worthy vision. However, the states that are about to recognize a Palestinian state do not understand or do not want to see, that unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state will not result in a de facto Palestinian state and will not achieve security for Palestinians or Israelis.

With the PA at an unprecedented nadir and Hamas enjoying peak popularity on the Palestinian street, unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by Western countries risks creating a state of “Hamastan.” Such an outcome would contradict the interests of those very same countries that seek to promote security, stability, and peace in the Middle East.

The Biden administration has made clear that it will not recognize a Palestinian state and that the issue should be settled in negotiations with Israel rather than unilaterally by third parties. Negotiations would allow Israel to present demands to the Palestinian side in order to ensure security, demilitarization, de-radicalization, an uncompromising fight to counter terrorism, and security coordination. However, such negotiations are unlikely under the hardline Netanyahu-Smotrich government.

Netanyahu’s refusal to engage in any discussion of a political solution on the day after the war precipitated the Norwegian, Irish, and Spanish decisions to recognize a Palestinian state. Such a step promises domestic political gains due to the broad support for it among their voters. Some leaders are trying to enhance their chances of securing an international position.

The price tag that the Netanyahu government can exact from these countries is low: The recall of ambassadors erodes Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering precisely when it is needed most – since there are high-level meetings that only ambassadors can conduct. At this difficult economic time for Israel, it would be irresponsible to harm arms sales or mutual intelligence transfers.

We must not forget the tremendous and unprecedented support Europe demonstrated for Israel in response to the October 7 Hamas massacre, including those member states critical of Israel. The current right-wing government has completely wasted this goodwill and credit, its policies alienating these governments rather than mobilizing their continued support through positive statesmanship. Norway, Ireland, and Spain directed their decision mostly against the Netanyahu-Smotrich government, prompted by a desire for Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side in peace and security.

Indeed, the idea of a Palestinian state is anathema for most Israelis. But with seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, separation from the Palestinians through political negotiations will make it possible to receive international guarantees of a demilitarized and de-radicalized Palestinian state. Such separation is vital to Israel’s national interest of remaining a democratic state and the home of the Jewish people.

Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan. Instead, Israel, the Palestinians, the states in the region, and the West must commit to a process of lengthy negotiations that will ensure the strengthening of the moderate camp that wants peace and security – and thwart the efforts of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to destabilize the Middle East.

The article was published on May 28th, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Netanyahu’s way of governance leads to unilateral recognition of Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט A Vision for Regional – International Partnership for Gaza Rebuilding and Palestinian Economic Leap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In a statement, EU’ foreign policy chief, High Representative Josep Borrell, acknowledged the result of the “momentous” UN vote.

He also recalled EU’s commitment to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two-state solution, “with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign, and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security and mutual recognition, and with Jerusalem serving as the future capital of both states”.

It is vital to restore a political horizon towards a two-state solution, he added. The EU stands ready to work with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and regional and international parties toward this goal. But the EU member states continue to be divided in UN votes and for Borrell, who repeatedly has complained about the lack of a common EU position, this must have come as a set-back.

Less than half of the member states voted for the upgrade of Palestine’s status in the UN (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). Two member states, the Czech Republic and Hungary, joined those few countries who voted against it. The rest abstained, claiming that time was not yet ripe for this step.

Furthermore, the European External Action Service (EEAS), which Borrell heads, seems not to have a clue about how to end the war and jumpstart a peace process towards a two-state solution. In his remarks before the start of the Foreign Affairs Council (Development) meeting a week ago, he was asked whether he had any peace plan to present.

הפוסט EU on Palestine: Is There a Credible Peace Plan? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli Initiative offers a three-phase plan. The first phase focuses on a shift from warfare to rehabilitation. The second phase aims to prepare the ground for a stable settlement. Finally, the third phase outlines a negotiation process over a two-state solution as part of a regional normalization process between Israel and the Arab World. The plan was created by the Foreign and Security Team of Mitvim and the Berl Katznelson Foundation, which was established 24 hours after the October 7th massacre, with the support of the New Israel Fund. It was crafted by a group of top-tier diplomatic and security experts with decades of experience.

The Initiative stands out as the first comprehensive alternative published by Israel since the beginning of the war, which provides a voice to the Israeli liberal majority. It aims to serve as a feasible policy plan for those who have long opposed the government’s policies and its unwillingness to offer, or even deal with, political planning for the day after.

The Israeli Initiative not only recognizes the importance of a two-state solution, but also emphasizes its significance in ensuring the safety and security of both Israelis and Palestinians. By presenting a pragmatic approach and considering the evolving dynamics on the ground, this publication sets a new benchmark for future discussions and negotiations.

הפוסט The Israeli Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Climate-Political Migration in Israel and Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Following an overview of guiding principles, the paper details recommendations by infrastructure type: energy, water, sewage, and health. Each chapter comprises several sections:

(1) Pre-war status quo.

(2) The present situation (after more than five months of war).

(3) Recommendations for immediate, medium, and long-term actions, including off-grid infrastructure.

(4) Proposed implementation mechanisms.

הפוסט Recommendations for Essential Infrastructure and Healthcare in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Under the leadership of Netanyahu’s Israeli government, the prevailing approach was to manage the conflict while maintaining security. The central assumption of this approach is that the conflict is unsolvable, and therefore, there is no need to exert effort to resolve it. Instead, resources were invested in managing it, ensuring that the cost borne by Israeli society would not be excessively high. This approach created a false sense of temporary security and control. However, in practice, it fueled a dangerous dynamic of Hamas’s empowerment and the expansion of cycles of violence that compromised Israel’s security.

As Netanyahu’s governments became more radical and messianic, the “conflict management” approach shifted. Rather than advancing a political solution, the government prioritized accelerating settlement construction in the West Bank. Instead of strengthening cooperation with the Palestinian Authority—the security and conflict resolution partner—the government favored bolstering Hamas, the perpetual war partner. Netanyahu even attempted to downplay the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, portraying it as a minor nuisance. He argued that Israel could integrate into the Middle East without resolving the conflict, bypassing Palestinian leadership through normalization processes with Arab countries. All of these, along with the government’s judicial overhaul, have harmed Israel’s national resilience, weakened the country, and undermined its deterrence in the region.

Despite the conflict management approach, there hasn’t been a strong alternative political strategy. Public figures from major center-left parties preferred to avoid presenting a two-state solution due to political concerns. Since Rabin’s assassination, public support for a political horizon leading to two-states reality has declined. The ongoing terror, incitement, and anti-Jewish sentiments in the Palestinian education system, coupled with disappointment from incomplete peace processes, have fueled despair among Israeli society regarding a political resolution to the conflict.

However, the idea of annexation and Jewish supremacy has never gained widespread support among Israeli citizens. In a July 2023, the Mitvim Institute for regional foreign policies in Israel discovered that 36% of Israelis view pursuing a two-state solution as the desired strategy for Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, while 28% support annexing the West Bank and establishing a single state with additional Jewish rights. Despite relatively low support for Israeli-Palestinian peace, the picture changes significantly when regional components are considered. The same survey found that 61% believe Israel should leverage normalization with other countries to promote peace with the Palestinians. This trend of increasing support for normalization-driven peace has persisted since the Abraham Accords were signed.

The Israeli Society After October 7^th: from Anger to Hope?

Until that tragic day, Israeli society was on the brink of dissolution. The judicial overhaul faced strong opposition from the liberal camp, which flooded the streets in protest against the erosion of Israel’s democratic core principles. Despite assurances, the “fully right-wing” government struggled to combat the wave of terror within the country and the simmering conflict in the north with Hezbollah, resulting in a diminishing sense of security among Israeli citizens.

However, before October 7th, it appeared that Israel’s strategic position in the Middle East was about to strengthen. The normalization process was reaching its peak, with the anticipated inclusion of Saudi Arabia—the most influential and powerful Muslim state in the world—recognizing Israel. The planned normalization agreement did not impose significant requirements on Israel regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state. Undoubtedly, Netanyahu was on the path to achieving a significant diplomatic milestone, with broad support from the Israeli public. But everything changed after October 7th.

Fifty years after the surprise attack by Arab forces on Yom Kippur in 1973, on October 7th, Hamas carried out the largest massacre against Jews since the Holocaust. For two years, Hamas meticulously plan a detailed operation: capturing as many Jewish towns around Gaza as possible, killing Israeli civilians and soldiers, and abducting hundreds of them into Gaza. Iranian support for Hamas fueled a long-term strategy against Israel, which was carefully shielded from Israeli political and military echelons. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar aimed to undermine Israel’s normalization talks with Arab countries, claiming that violent incidents in Al-Aqsa and the government’s West Bank policy were catalysts for the massacre.

Shortly after the October 7th tragedy, the words “peace” or “two-state solution” became charged terms in the Israeli public discourse. News of hundreds of Israelis being abducted and thousands of civilians, including elderly, women, and children, being killed shattered trust toward the Palestinians. Simultaneously, a lack of confidence emerged primarily against the government. The era of “time dragging on” for an Israeli-Palestinian resolution had ended on October 7th, and the public shifted toward supporting long-term decisions. For Israelis, the government must urgently restore the lost sense of security and release the hundreds held captive by Hamas.

As the war dragged on without full achievement of its goals, the Israeli public began losing patience. The delay in negotiating the release of captives, heightened insecurity, damage to Israel’s international standing due to the humanitarian crisis, and calls for annexing Gaza by extreme factions within the government pushed many Israelis to the streets. Slowly, Israelis are beginning to realize that their country is standing at a crossroads: annexation or a diplomatic solution. A perpetual war or a lasting agreement.

As Israeli society contemplates the consequences of each direction, civil society within the liberal camp is actively promoting greater Israeli backing for a political resolution. Israel’s democratic forces must capitalize on the opportunity arising from the October 7th tragedy to propose an alternative approach—one that considers Israel’s security imperatives and centers on justly resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a comprehensive regional framework.

The article was published on April 11th, 2024 in Settimana News.

הפוסט Between Annexation and Political Horizon: Israeli Society at a Crossroads for Conflict Resolution After October 7th הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Initiative – International Zoom Briefing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There are many aspects of Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza that have frustrated its closest allies. Ill-considered statements by ministers and other elected officials, a refusal to talk about the “day after” Hamas, and, especially, the civilian death toll have strained the unqualified support Israel enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 massacre by Hamas in southern Israel.

But it is the Netanyahu government’s approach to the complex and often desperate humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip that is truly endangering support for the continuation of the war, and is placing the “total victory” he promised in doubt.

For months, allies have been both quietly and publicly trying to get Israel’s war leadership to recognize how fundamental the aid situation is to the war effort.

Israel’s response has been to instinctively deny each request, then ultimately agree to those same demands when circumstances on the ground leave little choice. That approach, which seems built around domestic political calculations, is causing Israel to bleed support even as victory doesn’t seem especially imminent.

Tough talk

“I have ordered a complete siege on the Gaza Strip. There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed,” declared Defense Secretary Yoav Gallant two days after the October 7 massacre.

Less than two weeks later, the siege was lifted, as the first aid trucks bearing food and medicine were crossing in from Egypt.

By mid-November, pressure from the US and NGOs pushed Israel to reverse course on fuel as well, as trucks started bringing fuel tanks for hospitals, aid trucks, water pumps, desalination plants, bakeries and sewage plants.

Fuel would also go to the Paltel telecoms company so that Gazans could enjoy phone and internet service.

Now, COGAT boasts about how many fuel tankers it lets in every day.

Under the stated policy of disconnecting Israel from Gaza — trumpeted by Israeli leaders from the very start of the war — decision-makers also promised that no aid would go into the Strip from the Kerem Shalom crossing. The Biden administration and the broader international community pressured Israel for weeks to open Kerem Shalom, previously Gaza’s main goods crossing.

In December, Netanyahu and the government relented, and now it advertises how many trucks go through the crossing every day.

Israel wouldn’t let the Ashdod Port be used for the transfer of aid either. Finally, in January, Netanyahu gave in to American pressure and allowed a massive flour shipment to reach the docks. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich blocked the release of the flour for weeks to keep it from getting to UNRWA, predictably angering the Americans, before it was finally allowed into Gaza.

Now, in the wake of Monday’s deadly strike on the World Central Kitchen convoy, Israel continues to walk back its tough talk.

Ashdod Port will be open for aid from Sunday. Israel is also opening the Erez crossing into northern Gaza, the main crossing point into the Strip where many Israelis were killed and abducted by invading Hamas terrorists on October 7, after defying calls to do so for months.

It is also keeping the Kerem Shalom crossing open for longer hours and over the weekend. COGAT had dismissed the need for such a measure, saying that it processes more trucks every day than organizations in Gaza are able to handle. Now Israel is claiming that keeping the crossing open for longer will enable more aid to reach Gazans.

Instead of showing its allies that it is leading the aid effort, Israel is seen as dragging its feet as the humanitarian situation in the Strip gets worse.\

That perception — not at all unfounded — is putting the entire campaign in danger.

US President Joe Biden is no longer definitively conditioning a ceasefire on the release of hostages. He told Netanyahu in their tense phone call after the WCK strike that “an immediate ceasefire is essential to stabilize and improve the humanitarian situation and protect innocent civilians.”

A ceasefire imposed from the outside without any major concessions from Hamas would, of course, be a disaster for Israel, especially as it tries to figure out how to pull off the last stage of conquering Gaza.

The southern city of Rafah, insist Israel’s leaders across the political spectrum as well as its military chiefs, must be taken. Four Hamas battalions, plus the fighters that have fled south, remain in the city. The Philadelphi road, the route along the border between Gaza and Israel, under and over which Hamas arms flowed into Gaza since 2007, also needs to be in Israeli hands.

But humanitarian concerns, with more than a million displaced Palestinians sheltering in the city, are holding up that offensive as well, and it looks increasingly like the IDF won’t be able to carry out the operation it wants to.

Given the potential for a further deterioration of the situation for Gazans sheltering around Rafah, the Biden administration now opposes any major operation there, and won’t rule out consequences for Israel if it chooses to move ahead.  Israeli government sources tell The Times of Israel that there is a growing sense that the leadership is not actually going to carry out a meaningful operation there, despite its repeated promises.

Netanyahu’s aides presented a humanitarian plan to evacuate Rafah ahead of the military operation to their American counterparts this week, but the Americans were underwhelmed by what they saw, reportedly dismissing the plan as unimplementable.

“It’s because of the humanitarian issue that we are isolated from the world,” said Einav Levy, Founding Director of The Israeli School of Humanitarian Aid. “We already lost image-wise.”

Chaos

Even though Hamas is intentionally getting in the way of aid distribution and sees benefits in impending starvation in the Strip, Israel has to accept responsibility for the provision of aid there, argued Bar Rapaport of Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

This should have happened so long ago,” she told The Times of Israel, referring to the imperative for Israel to ensure sufficient humanitarian aid.

Levy said that there is currently chaos when it comes to aid in Gaza. “There is no real ability to know who is doing what and where they are doing it,” he said.

There is a shifting panoply of international NGOs, UN agencies and state-sponsored initiatives, operating alongside Hamas, local clans and the IDF. Territorial control changes all the time and civilians move as well.

Rapoport, who is in regular contact with aid agencies in Gaza, including the WCK, said they complain that working with the IDF isn’t an especially organized process: “It depends if you fall on someone in the IDF who is ready to listen, who knows you personally or not.”

The NGOs, she noted, also complained that they weren’t always sure exactly who to turn to.

The WCK declined to comment, saying it was not giving interviews at this time. COGAT did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

“There isn’t an orderly, coordinated mechanism for the crossings, for the distribution of aid, for the contacts between Israel and international actors,” lamented Rapoport. “Everyone does what he thinks is right.”

As long as there is chaos on the ground, Israel will struggle to achieve its long-term goals in Gaza.

Israel has ruled out UNRWA operating in Gaza moving forward, and obviously won’t let Hamas be involved in managing the Strip. Israel itself is not interested in reassuming responsibility for 2 million hostile Palestinians.

For now, Netanyahu is hoping that aid organizations will succeed in replacing UNRWA and Hamas’s civil functions, but killing workers from one of Israel’s most effective partners makes that aim even harder to achieve. The WCK has pulled out of Gaza, and it is unclear if it will return.

Netanyahu is hoping that pro-Western Arab states will eventually fund the reconstruction of Gaza, but they are not about to step into the violent bedlam there.

“The minute it is managed more effectively in Israel,” said Rapoport, “it will be easier for Israel to bring on board regional actors to help.

Initiative

In a macabre twist, the seven aid workers who lost their lives in the IDF strike might have done more in their deaths to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza than they could have dreamed of doing in their daily work.

Israel’s war leadership understood it had no more room for error. If Israel is seen as getting in the way, the US could well use its veto less at the UN and hold up weapons shipments.

But Netanyahu and his circle still don’t seem to have fully internalized the gravity of the situation. The measures they announced this week are still reactive and seem limited by a fear of upsetting the far-right flank of the government.

The statement announcing the new aid measures included a justification aimed at National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich and their supporters, explaining the measure by pointing out that they are crucial for the continuation of the war. The very decision on the aid was rushed through before Ben Gvir arrived at Thursday night’s cabinet meeting, the far-right minister claims.

Many Israelis point out that the hostages Hamas has been holding for six months don’t enjoy aid shipments. They also argue that the very same countries holding Israel’s feet to the fire have fought wars with far less regard for the suffering of enemy civilians.

That might be true, but Israel’s leaders have to operate within the expectations and standards its allies hold them to, even if they might seem unreasonable.

Netanyahu can show initiative on the humanitarian front, and regain some legitimacy to finish the job against Hamas. That would include opening all crossings, appointing a humanitarian aid czar, conducting regular meetings with aid organizations, laying water pipes into Gaza ahead of the summer, and even establishing Israeli field hospitals on the border.

There is no reason to wait until the US demands more measures and then be seen as callous toward the suffering of civilians.

“If Israel had shown from the beginning that the humanitarian issue is important to it,” said Rapoport, “that it is doing everything to make sure as few innocents as possible are being harmed, to publicize it, to show how much it is bringing in, we would be in a very different position now.”

This article was published in the Times of Israel on April 6th.

הפוסט Israel’s begrudging approach to humanitarian aid could cost it the war in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט How powerful is Hamas after 6 months of war with Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As I’ve come to learn from other Israelis, my experience of flourishing friendship with Majid is not unique. After the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israelis and Emiratis took to meeting one another on Zoom in high numbers. These remote introductions that defined global communication during the pandemic offered a kind of soft initial encounter between the two peoples. Since that time, professional interactions between Israelis and Emiratis have taken on an uncommon level of warmth. One Israeli CEO opened up to me about how his Emirati colleague affectionately calls him a “long-lost brother found,” a striking reflection of the familial resonance of the 2020 Abraham Accords and its namesake’s two sons.

It all might seem rather counterintuitive. Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan are far older. Yet they don’t exhibit anything close to the 120 business-to-business agreements and memoranda of understanding signed with the UAE. As a point of comparison, it was reported in 2022 that Egypt and Israel were aiming to achieve $700 million in annual trade by 2025. The United Arab Emirates saw $2.56 billion of trade with Israel in 2022, accompanied by investments exceeding $3.5 billion.

At 46 and 30 years, respectively, the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan have also begun to show signs of aging. The official reactions of both countries to Israel’s war with Hamas have been quite critical of Israel, with Jordan recalling its ambassador and Egypt publicly threatening to nullify the Camp David Accords. The UAE, by contrast, has exhibited a more balanced reaction. Lana Nusseibeh, a Palestinian Emirati and the UAE’s ambassador to the United Nations, has indeed issued condemnations of Israel’s actions and successfully led the adoption of Resolution 2712, which called for increased humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, her public statements have also included a dimension of sympathy and understanding for Israel, referring to the October 7 attacks as “horrific.” And the only Israeli ambassador to a Middle Eastern country who has remained in office throughout the war without recall or expulsion is Amir Hayek, Israel’s ambassador to the UAE.

Why? Because Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates stands on a stronger foundation of emerging shared values and may well develop into a true national friendship.

In 2016, the UAE government established a ministry of tolerance. The UAE’s commitment to religious toleration is a function of a broader cultural evolution that has been taking place in the country for several decades. On February 5, 2019, over a year before the signing of the Abraham Accords, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation Abdullah bin Zayed announced a plan to create the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi, an opulent complex containing the Imam Al-Tayeb Mosque, the St. Francis Church, and the Moses ben Maimon Synagogue — named in the spirit of interreligious dialogue. The announcement came during Pope Francis’s visit to the Arabian Peninsula, the first ever by a pontiff, when he referred to the UAE as “a land that is trying to be a model of coexistence, of human brotherhood, and a meeting place among diverse civilizations and cultures.” In keeping with the nature of the visit, the pope and Sheikh Ahamed al-Tayeb signed the Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, also known as the Abu Dhabi Declaration. Worth noting is that despite the Egyptian heritage of both Maimonides and al-Tayeb (admittedly not exactly a philosemite), such an initiative was taken in the UAE rather than Egypt. Egypt has not had a chief rabbi since the 1972 departure of Rabbi Haim Moussa Douek for France and then New York. The UAE, by contrast, announced Rabbi Yehuda Sarna as the country’s first chief rabbi in 2019.

Founded 23 years after Israel, the UAE is swiftly establishing itself as a technological focal point in the Arab world, marked by substantial investments in knowledge-based entrepreneurship. Such entrepreneurship cultivates a sense of curiosity about other points of view and an interest in learning from those who have similar drives. As is well known, Israel has long been recognized as a global hub for cutting-edge technology, contributing groundbreaking inventions and knowledge to the international community. It is therefore no surprise that both nations demonstrate pioneering advancements in space industries, renewable energy, and other advanced technological fields within the region. Even Israel’s entry into natural-gas production has not diminished its primary economic reliance on its intellectual human capital, a prioritization it shares with the UAE.

Another aspect of this cultural revolution has been educational. The Emirati government decided in 2021 to include Holocaust studies in its schools’ textbooks. In parallel, the organization Sharaka (Arabic for “partnership”), founded on the basis of the Abraham Accords, “is working to shape a new Middle East, built on dialogue, understanding, cooperation and friendship.” The organization has forged this path with its Holocaust Education Program, which brings joint Arab-Israeli delegations on an educational journey to Israel and Poland with the goal of learning the lessons of the Holocaust as an extreme expression of intolerance. The program aims to empower young leaders within these communities, nurturing them to become ambassadors of tolerance and coexistence.

As the first head of Middle East relations at the University of Haifa — a new position that would have been inconceivable a mere decade ago but emerged from the possibilities of the Abraham Accords — I can attest to the interest of scholars from both countries to work together. Nearly all Israeli universities have now engaged in some way with Emirati counterparts. The enthusiasm to join up with Israelis is even greater in Emirati think-tank institutes such as the Emirates Policy Center, the Anwar Gargesh Diplomatic Academy, Trends, and b’huth.

An Abu Dhabi workshop entitled “New Regionalism in the Middle East” in June of last year was a collaboration between four Emirati think tanks and Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center, and was attended by researchers from the UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. The discussions, in which I participated, were deep, honest, and intriguing, tackling sensitive issues — such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Israel’s current right-wing government, and social differences — head-on. My conversations with female colleagues from the region were among the most eye-opening and empathic I have experienced in an academic or professional context; they left me inspired to work together with them in regional sisterhood.

However, the educational and cultural evolution within the UAE is also reflected in political terms in ways that present opportunities as well as challenges to Israel. Careful observation of the UAE’s foreign policy reveals that the Abraham Accords are part of a larger campaign to promote regional reconciliation. Beginning with Syria under Basha al-Assad’s leadership before extending to Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Qatar, the UAE has pursued normalization with Israel’s enemies as well. There are, of course, pros and cons to this. On the pro side, any initiative toward genuine regional peace might help create conditions of mutual understanding and advance Israel’s vision of being a country like all others with safe and secure borders. The UAE’s formal ties with Syria have already proven beneficial to Israel, particularly since they allowed the Emirates to play a role as mediator during the war.

On the con side, this collaboration might ultimately impose limitations on Israel in the future. Israel has constructed a narrative for its relations with the Arab Gulf states based on the concept of a shared adversary: Iran. Without this common enemy, history suggests, regional actors will return to traditional factional lines, and the current phase of reconciliation in the Middle East may prove unsustainable in the long term. Owing to the evolving regional dynamics, Israel must explore new narratives to reinforce the legitimacy of its normalization with the Gulf countries, especially in light of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year. Needless to say, these attempts at reconciliation and understanding are unprecedented.

More work remains to be done. The question is, who will do it? It is an open secret that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not widely regarded as the most trustworthy partner in the Gulf. The strained personal relations Bibi shares with Gulf leaders are evident in almost all discussions I’ve had with regional counterparts, and in the well-known fact that he has not publicly met with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed. In contrast, bin Zayed has met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog twice, including once during the war, as well as with former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. During Bennett’s term as prime minister and Yair Lapid’s as foreign minister, they initiated the Negev Forum — a significant achievement for Israel’s integration in the Middle East. Under the renewed term of Netanyahu, the differences are widely felt within the Israeli government offices. UAE media portray the current government as “ultranationalist and ultra-Orthodox,” and a series of actions and statements by the Israeli government had already strained relations before October 7. The saving grace is that these primary tensions are quite possibly temporary.

The wellsprings of connection between the two countries run deep, deeper than some of those with whom Israel has enjoyed nonhostile relations for decades. The Israel-UAE partnership is still in its infancy, on a complicated journey toward maturity that holds known and unknown challenges. These challenges require ongoing commitment and collaboration. The partnership has proven durable thus far, weathering a perfect storm: the largest military conflagration for Israel in a generation. What has become clear is that both countries genuinely value prosperity for themselves and the other. Is there a stronger definition of regional friendship than that?

Moran Zaga is a policy fellow at Mitvim— the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy.

הפוסט Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates is a model for a new Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Over four months have elapsed since the start of the war against Hamas, yet Israel’s objectives and vision for the “day after” in Gaza remain a mystery. At the same time, the United States, the European Union, Arab states, and a host of civil society organizations in Israel and abroad are energetically formulating various blueprints for ending the war and moving toward an agreement.

Israel’s reluctance to offer a plan for the aftermath of the war stems from political considerations, but the current Israeli government or its successor will soon have to take a clear stand.

In examining the “day after” options, it is necessary to review the points of agreement among the relevant parties.

All (or most) agree that Hamas cannot control Gaza or be involved in the post-war settlement, that the Palestinian Authority (PA) must undertake reforms, that Israel must elect a new government, and that some Arab states will provide economic assistance to rebuild Gaza and strengthen the PA. However, there is no agreement on who will rule Gaza, whether a Palestinian state will be established, and whether such an arrangement will constitute part of a broader regional deal.

Judging by historical precedent, military and political cataclysms breed change. The deadly results of the Hamas offensive and the resultant Gaza war are thus creating an opportunity for change in the regional architecture and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, based on past experience with peace and normalization agreements, three components are missing at present on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides: legitimate leadership, political determination, and trust. That leaves two options. One is to despair and give up, and the other is to examine how progress can be achieved despite these complexities.

A trustworthy mediator is key to any prospect of success. President Joe Biden has taken on this task and is determined to produce a landmark achievement ahead of the November 2024 presidential election. To that end, the United States, in cooperation with 10 European and Arab states, is reportedly drawing up a three-track arrangement.

One is intended to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza and a return of the Israeli abductees; the second is aimed at “reshaping” the PA; the third is the establishment of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. A word of warning is warranted: the American Road Map for Peace plan of 2003 also consisted of stages but was halted at an early stage after the PA and Israel failed to fulfill their parts.

Incentives play an important role in optimizing the prospects of a settlement.

What are the incentives of each side?

The Palestinians’ main gain would be the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with agreed territorial swaps – something they were denied after the Oslo Accords. This would include the reunification of the West Bank and Gaza, its acceptance as a member of the UN, and recognition by most countries.

Israel also stands to gain, obtaining guarantees for an agreement designed to prevent a security threat from the Palestinian side, an agreement with the most important country in the Arab and Muslim world (Saudi Arabia); continued integration in the Middle East, opening of new markets; building bridges with distant Muslim countries (Pakistan, Indonesia, etc.); easing resistance to Israel in the region and around the world given the solution to the Palestinian problem, and, finally, greater Saudi involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction, at Qatar’s expense or at its side.

הפוסט Normalization with Saudi Arabia looks unlikely, but we should try anyway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other democracies sided with Israel’s war on Hamas from day one. Visits by world leaders in the middle of the war to express solidarity; shipments of ammunition; and formation of a coalition against the Houthis are among the prominent expressions of this support by our allies.

But Israel’s interest requires another step on the part of our friends, a step that UK Foreign Secretary Cameron and US Secretary of State Blinken have talked about in recent days: recognition of a Palestinian state. For the UK, this would serve as the ultimate realization of the Balfour Declaration, which envisioned a national home for the Jewish people because without a national home for the Palestinian people we will not be a free people in our land. Separation between these two national homes would allow us to maintain Israel as the democratic State of the Jewish people.

Recognizing a Palestinian state would underscore what the international community has been telling Israel for decades: the desired political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is separation into two states. It is incumbent upon the US, UK, and European Union to form a “coalition of sanity” against the coalition of extremists. Pro-Western Arab states will join them. The details of the separation will be worked out in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Israel, for example, should and will demand that Palestine be demilitarized.

A Palestinian state is recognized by 138 out of 193 countries UN member states. Most did so in 1988 after Palestinian Liberation Organization head Yasser Arafat’s landmark Algiers declaration establishing a Palestinian state. In his declaration, the PLO adopted the two-state solution, recognizing Security Council Resolution 242, based on the 1967 lines [calling for the withdrawal of Israel from territory gained in the Six Day War]. Some 30 additional countries recognized the Palestinian state in 2011 after Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas applied for UN membership.

However, some 50 states have so far refrained from recognizing a Palestinian state. These are the “moral majority” countries, as former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, Ron Prosor, called them in 2011, when he tried to convince as many states as possible to abstain from the vote.

In so doing, Israel sought to signal that the “moral majority” consisting of the world’s major democracies did not support Palestinian membership in the UN. In fact, democracies such as France and Spain joined the bloc of 138 states that voted in favor; Germany and the UK were among the 41 abstentions, and only nine states voted “nay”, led by the US, the Czech Republic, and Canada.

The Israeli public should call on other countries to recognize a Palestinian state

With Israel under the rule of an extremist government, Israeli citizens should call on the international “moral majority” to grant sweeping recognition of a Palestinian state in order to defeat extremism and create a political alternative to Hamas. Standing with Israel and its existential interests requires international leadership to steer the sides toward the only viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This separation into two states for two peoples will not only grant the Palestinians the right to self-determination – it will also save Israel from the binational catastrophe toward which we are heading.

The US, UK, Canada, and 19 members of the EU, including Germany, France, and Italy, have yet to recognize a Palestinian state, but all maintain diplomatic relations with Ramallah. It should be made clear that recognition of a Palestinian state is essentially a symbolic step. It will not automatically lead to its establishment nor determine its boundaries. It will send a clear signal to the State of Israel and those at its helm of the direction in which the international community is pointing them, after which the Israeli and Palestinian governments themselves will negotiate the details of the separation.

Such a move would encourage the PA to undertake the systemic reforms advocated by the international community, led by the US.

This is the direction desired by our allies for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for normalization with Saudi Arabia, for regional investment and prosperity (for example, the planned economic corridor from India to Europe, running through the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel), and for forming an effective regional anti-Iran coalition.

Such a move would create an “alliance of moderates” – the US, UK, the EU, the pro-western Arab countries, and Israel’s peace-loving citizens – against the axis of extremists who seek to fuel the conflict, not resolve it.

Broad international recognition of a Palestinian state will signal to the Israeli government the path it must choose – a path of dialogue and understanding that unless it distances itself from the dangerous hardliners advocating transfer and annexation, Israel will become a pariah state, like South Africa’s apartheid regime. Israel must choose to play a key role in the emerging world order of liberal democracies, led by the US, UK, and the EU, rather than being relegated to its boycotted margins.

The two-state solution enjoys broad international consensus. The two-state vision is one of the few issues on which the US can agree with Russia and China, which have already recognized a Palestinian state. This consensus can serve as the basis for an international initiative that will turn the tragedy of October 7 into a diplomatic opportunity.

US recognition of a Palestinian state would also have the added value of restoring President Joe Biden’s standing among progressive voters, damaged by his unequivocal support for Israel and its war on Hamas. We must not forget the terrible alternative. Donald Trump is a threat to the democratic world. The former president, who pledged to be a dictator “only for a day,” may return to the White House unchecked, propped up by fanatical supporters of a man who has proven countless times that he holds his personal interests far dearer than those of his country (like our prime minister).

Recognition by the international “moral majority” of a Palestinian state is a Zionist imperative if Israel is to ensure its future as the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people. It would serve as a lifeline against the nightmarish government of Benjamin Netanyahu, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Bezalel Smotritch and the world’s lifeline against Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Iran’s regional influence.

Recognition of a Palestinian state by the world’s leading democracies could finally provide more stability and calm to the bruised area in which we live.

The article was published in “the Jerusalem Post” on February 11.

הפוסט The way to defeat Hamas: Recognition of a Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The PA was established in 1994 as an outcome of the Oslo Accords, which envisioned it as a temporary body to be replaced by a permanent institution within five years. However, a permanent arrangement was not achieved, leaving the PA a “temporary” institution for over three decades, thereby contributing to its increasing weakness. While the Authority bears great responsibility for this weakness, it is not solely and accountable for the erosion of its standing. Israel, its Oslo Accords partner and main backer, has ignored the PA since 2009, clearly intent on dismantling it and rejecting all dialogue options. The PA today is an enfeebled body, lacking legitimacy and the capacity to enforce its authority and provide services for its people.

Reconstituting the PA would entail a lengthy process of reorganization, rehabilitation, and training to adapt its governance to the post-war era. Such a transformation would also necessitate the election of a new leadership that enjoys public legitimacy, enabling it to impose authority and enforce law and order. The PA will have to shed its corrupt image, proving that it can conduct its affairs transparently and use its tax revenues and international aid for the public good rather than the personal interests of its cronies. The education system will require revamping to rid it of anti-Israel content, and the judicial system will require restoration of its independence to provide a recourse for Palestinians seeking justice and protection from government arbitrariness. Israel must actively take part in the renewal process by outlining a real political horizon, declaring the PA a dialogue partner, and its existence as a vital interest. This commitment will require Israel to expand cooperation with the PA, unfreeze PA funds, coordinate measures to boost its economy, carry out confidence- building initiatives, and approve and coordinate reforms to strengthen its international standing.

An efficient and functioning PA is crucial to preserving Israel’s identity and security. The rehabilitation of the PA is feasible, as evidenced by its operation for over six years under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, which won Israeli and international praise. In 2012, the World Bank even ranked it higher than some established states in terms of the ease of doing business. A PA that undergoes the necessary reconstruction and reorganization could help Israel achieve security, take responsibility for the 5 million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, and form the basis for a lasting resolution of a century-old conflict.

הפוסט What is a Revitalized Palestinian Authority? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In order to prevent the election of extremists opposed to a political settlement, legitimate restrictions must be placed on the individuals and groups running for the post of president and for membership in the legislative council. These limitations will be based on the three conditions that the Quartet countries laid out for Hamas after its victory in the 2006 elections: abandoning the path of terrorism, recognizing Israel, and affirming the previous agreements it signed with the PLO.

The elections must take place in the context of an advanced political process offering hope to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and increasing their support for a settlement approach. To that end, Israel will have to declare its commitment to a political process designed to result in a two-state solution, and adopt confidence-building measures that demonstrate its intent to reach a political settlement, including a halt of construction in the settlements. At the same time, the international community, led by the United States and the European Union, will have to guarantee their recognition of a Palestinian state. The United States will also help train the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatuses, contribute to the development of its economy, and promote reforms in government institutions.

Israel and the international community must lay the groundwork for orderly, internationally supervised elections in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip that will ensure the election of a suitable national leadership for the Palestinian people. Having won the trust of the people, such a leadership will enjoy legitimacy and be able to promote a stable settlement with Israel. It will also contribute, over time, to strengthening the moderate elements in society and weakening extremist, religious, and nationalist opposition elements.

הפוסט Palestinian Elections: A Vital Step Toward a Stable Political Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the political unwillingness and/or inability of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace, the dire circumstances in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), the potential benefits of an International Peace Conference (IPC) immediately following the war should be explored.Such a conference could grant domestic and international legitimacy to drawing up a coherent road map for the de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, an IPC should also address the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on UNGA Resolution 181 (the 1947 Partition Resolution) and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on the basis of UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), and 2334 (2016).

International peace conferences usually take place in the aftermath of wars, though sometimes they are convened as a deliberated diplomatic effort to end wars in long and protracted conflicts. They serve as useful diplomatic tools for peacemaking in the form of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Moreover, they can serve as instruments of peacebuilding regarding issues such as reconstruction, governance, and transitional post-war security and civilian regimes. They also enable focused attention on the issues at hand, bringing together all relevant actors in a multilateral diplomatic setting sponsored by trusted conveners in order to foster diplomatic momentum, formally end wars and establish peace treaties, set road maps and timetables, and even firm deadlines for their implementation, and formulate an agenda to kickstart substantial and sustainable peace processes.

Various IPCs have been held in the aftermath of crises and wars in order to seekan end to the state of permanent conflict involving Israel, the Palestinians, and neighboring Arab States, with mixed results. These include the Lausanne Conference, 1949; the Geneva Conference, 1973; the Madrid Conference, 1991; the Annapolis Conference, 2007; and the Paris Conference, 2017. Past IPCs have not been resounding successes nor complete failures. The Lausanne Conference (1949) was a multilateral forum of negotiations that failed to transcend the limits of the Rhodes Armistices and reach a permanent peace between Israel and its neighbors. Similarly, the Geneva Conference of December 1973 did not result in any breakthrough after the Yom Kippur War (Syria did not even participate). The Paris Conference (2017) failed mainly due to the absence of both Israel and the Palestinians. In a more positive vein, Madrid (1991) and Annapolis (2007) established useful diplomatic frameworks for multilateral and bilateral negotiations rather than constituting negotiating fora in themselves. The logic of an IPC to produce a formal road map and agenda seems to be even more relevant these days, given the urgency of planning “the day after” even before the formal end of the Gaza war.

The Madrid Conference kickstarted negotiating processes that matured into a peace process with the Palestinians and an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement. Based on this relevant and successful precedent, an IPC following the Israel-Hamas War is a necessary, even if not sufficient, political-diplomatic componentof a road map for Gaza’s rehabilitation and negotiations on a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The immediate concerns regarding the reconstruction, governance, security, and demilitarization of the Gaza Strip are intrinsically linked to the eventual resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution, sincethe political vision (and future reality) is a pre-condition for mobilizing international actors in the immediate term for the reconstruction and governance of the Gaza Strip. Looking ahead, the Gaza Strip’s political future must be organically linked to the West Bank’s. An IPC could constitute a “threshold event” setting a diplomatic clock for transition from the immediate to the medium term, to be completed within 3-5 years of a ceasefire ending the Israel-Hamas war until the signing of peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority must participate in the IPC in the immediate aftermath of the war, ruling out the option of elections as a precondition for the event. Despite the need for new leaderships, the required domestic political changes for democratic elections in both Israel and the PA might take months, if not years.

The peace conference will be mostly a ceremonial and symbolic event (without substantive negotiations during its 4-5 day duration) attended by relevant members of the international community, led by the United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Its agenda should include:

As was the case in Madrid (1991), the peace conference will formally launch bilateral and multilateral negotiating channels in which Israel and the Palestinians (in the bilateral track) will take part under the supervision of Quartet members (the United States, the UN, the European Union, and Russia), in addition to China and the countries of the Regional Quartet (Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia). At the same time, multilateral negotiating channels will be devoted to discussing pressing issues of Gaza’s reconstruction and, in the longer term, cooperation on regional issues such as economic development, the environment, and arms control.

Absent a political horizon based on a peace conference producing immediate change, Israel may find itself mired for years in the Gaza quagmire, against its will. The peace conference proposed here is an integrated (hybrid) model. Itsagenda should include related issues of immediate humanitarian and logistical assistance to the Gaza Strip, the establishment and empowerment of a temporary international authority for the administration of the enclave during a transitional period of several years, and the empowerment and strengthening of the Palestinian Authority. The agenda should also include substantive negotiations ultimately leading to the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel, as well as additional peace agreements between Israel and the Arab states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia.

The article was printed in the Jerusalem Post on January 23.

הפוסט The Case for a Post-War International Peace Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the war is being prosecuted will determine the range of political options in its aftermath. Despite the reluctance of the current Israeli government to engage in any substantial long-term political discussion about the “day after” in terms of any significant blueprints or scenarios, it is imperative to draw a coherent road map regarding the feasible diplomatic options for the immediate and long-term perspectives regarding Israel’s exit from Gaza in the aftermath of the war, including the political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Taking into consideration the lack of political willingness and/or ability of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace after the war, the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic political repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), this paper examines the possible role and functions that an International Peace Conference (IPC) might fulfil in granting domestic and international legitimacy and the drawing of a coherent road map leading to de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, any IPC should also address the larger political issue regarding the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of the fulfillment of UNGA Resolution 181 (1947) and the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, following UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), 1850 (2008), and 2334 (2016).

The policy paper draws on historical precedents from other conflicts, as well as reflecting on examples and experiences from the Arab-Israeli conflict, first and foremost the relevant and successful example of the Madrid Conference of October 1991. The major insight to be drawn is that an IPC is a necessary but not sufficient political diplomatic ingredient in the road map leading to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war in the immediate term, as well as to peace negotiations towards the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State alongside Israel.

הפוסט An International Peace Conference in the Aftermath of the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This movement was registered at the beginning of October in the aftermath of the October 7 terrorist attack and is connected to former Knesset Member Avichai Boaron of the Likud party and some activists in pro-settlement and extreme right-wing movements. Not surprisingly, its content on social media is liked and shared by prominent Likud activists, such as Orly Lev, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s staunch supporters.

Uri Israel is not the only right-wing movement that speaks and acts against the PA and warns about the possible menace of its return to the Gaza Strip.

“I have investigated terrorists, and I say clearly, money drives terrorism! It is forbidden to transfer money to the Palestinian Authority,” said Lieutenant Colonel Attorney Maurice Hirsch, former head of the military prosecution in the West Bank, on November 6.

On the same day when the anti-Abbas campaign was launched by Uri Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu made a statement about the leader of the PA, too. Responding to the announcement of the PA Foreign Ministry that alleged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had killed the partygoers at the Nova music festival in Re’im on October 7, Netanyahu said on November 19: “He who denies the Holocaust denies the massacre. We will not allow him to rule Gaza.”

It seems that Netanyahu was also indirectly responding to the earlier statement of US President Joe Biden, who argued in a Washington Post op-ed on November 18 that the Palestinian Authority should ultimately govern the Gaza Strip and the West Bank following the Israel-Hamas war.

Two-state solution? 

A year ago, Netanyahu established a political alliance and formed a government with the most ultra right-wing political forces in Israel, including the Likud, which believes that a two-state solution is a doomsday scenario that should be prevented at any cost. Tellingly, Netanyahu objects to the PA ruling Gaza due to Abbas’s denial of the Holocaust and the PA’s denial of the October 7 massacre. However, he also believes the same PA should continue functioning in the West Bank.

In his remarks at the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee at the Knesset this summer, Netanyahu referred to the future of the PA as a day after the era of 88-year-old Abbas: “We need the Palestinian Authority, we will help it financially—we have no interest in it falling.” Netanyahu also said that “the Palestinian aspiration for a state must be suppressed.”

In fact, this logic was always a significant part of “the conception”—that the PA should exist so that it will be able to govern the Palestinians in the West Bank but also remain weak so that it will be unable to fulfill any state-related ambitions. That’s why Hamas in Gaza was so instrumental in achieving this goal—it was a tactical ally in Netanyahu’s war against the PA.

On October 7, when Hamas terrorists crushed the fence and poured into Israeli towns and kibbutzim, slaughtered over 1,200, and kidnapped over 240 Israelis and foreigners, it became clear that this long-term strategy had exploded in Israel’s face and resulted in the most horrific terrorist attack and loss of human lives in Israel’s history.

At that moment, when the heads of all security services, as well as some Likud ministers, assumed responsibility for the disaster, and the official death of the “conception” was proclaimed in Israeli media, it seemed that it was time to reinvent the original idea of the two-state solution: Palestinian self-rule in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank; the construction of state institutions; negotiations; and an eventual political solution that would result in the establishment of a Palestinian state.

On October 19, Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s national security advisor, suggested that the Palestinian Authority will step in instead of Hamas in Gaza. A two-state solution or the creation of a Palestinian state wasn’t mentioned. Yet, Hanegbi was immediately attacked by Likud MKs; Tally Gotlib was one among them, writing on X (formerly known as Twitter) that Hanegbi’s idea was “delusional” before sending her condolences to those who believed that strengthening the PA would prevent terrorist attacks. Separately, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who represents an extreme right-wing party, said that installing Abbas in Gaza instead of Hamas was like “changing a cow for a donkey,” whatever that might mean.

The other side of the political map wasn’t thrilled about Abbas’s return to Gaza either but seemed to consider it the lesser evil to the continuation of Hamas rule or a security vacuum.

“Unfortunately, Abu Mazen [nickname for Abbas] is a well-known Holocaust denier, the Palestinian Authority’s statement denying the massacre on October 7 is a scoundrel, and the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to the families of martyrs infuriates anyone with a heart. And, yet, the Palestinian Authority is better than the murderous Hamas, and if we could get it back into the Gaza Strip, we would do it. Between the lesser evil and the greater evil, the lesser evil is better,” former deputy chief of staff and ex-member of Knesset Yair Golan wrote on X.

What’s next?

Weeks have passed since the horrific tragedy that shook every Israeli and led to the war against Hamas, which used to be considered a “strategic asset” in an attempt to prevent the creation of the Palestinian state. Currently, Netanyahu and the right-wing are back to their smear campaign against the PA and essentially back to the “conception” that any evil is better than the prospect of a Palestinian state.

Benny Gantz, the former defense minister in the Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett government—who is now rising quickly in the polls and is considered a possible candidate to replace Netanyahu—is now part of the emergency government and is mostly keeping quiet in an attempt not to jeopardize his chances of premiership. In 2021, Gantz met PA Chairman Abbas in his house in Rosh HaAyin to explore “political horizons”—something many Israelis saw at the time as his readiness to negotiate with and accept the PA.

Now, it seems that the Israeli government intentionally chooses to delay the inevitable discussion about the day after in Gaza, which, given the international pressure, might come sooner than Israeli officials hope. Netanyahu still hopes to safeguard his political future; the extremists around him believe that the war in Gaza presents them with a unique opportunity to get rid of not only Hamas but Palestinians, too (Gila Gamliel, the minister of intelligence who doesn’t have any authority over any of the intelligence services, had penned an article in the Jerusalem Post about the possible “exodus” of Palestinians from Gaza). Meanwhile, more moderate Likud seniors, such as Nir Barkat, keep to themselves, fearing the notorious “poison machine” of Netanyahu’s loyalists.

According to a November survey conducted by Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, 27 percent of the Israeli public supports the two-state solution. In comparison, 25 percent believe that Israel should opt for unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. Only 5 percent believe in the continuation of “conflict management” (Netanyahu’s strategy), while 28 percent support some form of annexation (19 percent of respondents didn’t have an answer), and 52 percent believe that Israel should disengage from the Palestinians, whether that be through some kind of agreement or unilaterally (in the way it was done in the Gaza Strip in 2005).

With that in mind, several things need to happen very soon so that the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel have a chance for peace and stability: elections in Israel, reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and a firm international position that puts the two-state solution on the table. Otherwise, the vacuum in Gaza will quickly fill with Hamas 2.0, the weak PA might collapse in the West Bank, and Israel will be trapped in an endless circle of hostilities in many of its frontiers. The “day after” discussion should start today before it’s too late.

The article was published December 6, on Atlantic Council.

הפוסט The Israeli right-wing is determined to prevent any discussion of a future Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Findings and recommendations in this paper cover:
● MEPPA’s first year, which revealed a stunning level of demand to implement peacebuilding projects.
● A breakdown and analysis of what to expect in MEPPA’s second year of grants, which has a framework that makes room for significant growth, leaning into conflict resolution, smaller grants for smaller local partners, and core new audiences.
● Challenges facing civil society peacebuilding work and responsive strategies. The current environment needs this work more than ever but rising extremists fear it and threaten it.
● The role that international public and private donors and allies can play in standing up for civil society, amplifying it, and scaling the impact for conflict-sized change. Indeed, despite otherwise contentious politics and despair, broad support for large- scale peacebuilding investments continues to grow in Washington and other capitals, including the UK, Canada, and the EU.

הפוסט Amid Crisis, Peacebuilding Advances with Smart Donor Strategies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The framework of the simulation was an emergency international summit convened at the initiative of the United States three days after the announcement of Abbas’ passing, and in light of the relevant actors’ need to confront this new reality. The opening scenario included the appointment of Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh and General Intelligence Chief Majed Faraj as interim PA co-chairs until elections are held. It was based on assumptions regarding the existing political reality in Israel following the establishment of a new government, tensions between Israeli security agencies and the political leadership of the settlement movement, as well as instability and violence on the ground. 

The agenda focused on ways of maintaining stability in the region, steps to restore calm and a road map for future relations between Israel and the PA. Participants in the summit included Israeli and PA officials and representatives of Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf states, and the European Union (EU). The three Israeli players were Benjamin Netanyahu (prime minister), IDF Chief Lt. Gen. Herzl Halevi (security establishment), and Minister Bezalel Smotrich (settlement leadership). On the Palestinian side, the three players were al-Sheikh and Faraj (interim PA leadership), Marwan Barghouti (rival Fatah leadership) and Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas).

The simulation was conducted as part of a research project funded by the British government, but the positions presented here do not necessarily represent the positions of the British government.

הפוסט The Day After Abu Mazen – Simulation Summary הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Leveraging Friction: Using Israel’s tensions with normalization countries to engage them in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Leveraging Friction: Using Israel’s tensions with normalization countries to engage them in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Virtual Briefing: Ramadan, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and the Netanyahu-Smotrich Government: Heading Towards an Inevitable Escalation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A series of indicators reflect heightened international attention to the conflict since the new government assumed power. The growing US involvement was manifested in visits by Secretary of State Blinken, National Security Advisor Sullivan, and CIA Director Burns, who met with the leaderships in Jerusalem and Ramallah, and in condemnations by senior US officials of the government policy on the settlements. This involvement includes unusual steps not seen in the past decade, namely mediation activity between the parties on formulating understandings (as a condition for withdrawing the Palestinian proposal to condemn Israel in the Security Council), and a decision to leave a team of administration officials in the region to monitor events and promote de-escalation. Until recently, the Palestinian issue seemed to be a very low priority for the administration, and it was only raised on the margins of President Biden’s visit to the region in July 2022. 

Similar dynamics are evident in the policies of other international actors. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain joined Blinken in issuing an unusual statement expressing “grave concern” over the government’s policy on the settlements; Senior officials from the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League initiated a special meeting in Brussels on the Palestinian issue; 94 countries signed a statement protesting the government’s punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority (PA); and 15 Security Council members issued a presidential statement (for the first time in eight years) condemning Israeli policy.  

These developments complement steps by regional actors – chief among them Jordan and Egypt –conveying public and secret messages of concern over the new Israeli government’s actions and fear of escalation. The United Arab Emirates, Israel’s partner in the 2020 Abraham Accords, also plays an important role in this process and initiated, as an UNSC member, a few Security Council meetings on the issue and worked with the Palestinians on drafting a UNSC statement condemning Israel, and it also canceled a planned visit by Netanyahu. 

The Feb. 26 Aqaba summit with the participation of Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and American representatives was a prominent expression of increasing international involvement in the conflict. A public meeting of senior Israeli and Palestinian officials, under regional or international auspices, has not taken place since the collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace initiative (2013-2014). In fact, the Aqaba Document agreed at the meeting is the first Israeli-Palestinian political memorandum of understanding since the Kerry era.  

These developments follow a decade of distinct lack of international involvement in the conflict, and a decline in the degree of international interest in the issue. The world was discouraged by the rounds of negotiations that failed to yield agreement, and did not detect political readiness for a breakthrough on either side. Other issues and arenas attracted greater international attention – both in the region (Iran, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan) and on the global stage (China, COVID-19, the rise of populism and, more recently, of course, the war in Ukraine). Additionally, the Quartet – the international group (US, Russia, UN and the European Union) that was created to sponsor the peace process, has been paralyzed in recent years. 

But these days the world is increasingly recognizing alarming signs and pushing for increased engagement. In many cases of conflicts around the world, international intervention begins, or increases, when escalation develops, or when there is a sense that the parties are approaching a confrontation. The world identifies that the Israeli-Palestinian arena is particularly explosive and sensitive. Indications of this on the ground are numerous and already during 2022 we witnessed a sharp increase in violence in the conflict. The focal points of friction and confrontation are intensifying and accumulating: from the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, through the Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, Nablus, Jenin, Hawara (in the West Bank), the Palestinian prisoners’ protest in Israeli jails, and the recent increase in Israel-Hamas hostilities in Gaza Strip. 

In the new Israeli government coalition, actors who served as extreme “spoilers” from outside of the system, are now working within the government in key positions. Radical ideas, such as annexation and violating the status quo on Jerusalem’s holy sites, are being openly discussed by senior coalition spokespersons, and steps once considered beyond the pale, such as legalizing illegal outposts in the West Bank, are becoming official policy. Indications of growing instability have also emerged on the Palestinian side, against the backdrop of the weakening and illegitimacy of the PA, along with increased attacks against Israelis, and the ongoing internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Added to all this is the constant fear of escalation during the month of Ramadan (starting March 22), and especially on the days it coincides with Passover (starting April 5). 

Many feel that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at a critical crossroads and is moving quickly towards an explosion. A dual policy is at play in Israel, with one government arm, led mainly by the security establishment, trying to calm tensions and strengthen the PA, while the other arm, led by representatives of the Religious Zionist party, contributes to unrest, backs up settler violence, and hopes for the dissolution of the PA and the opening it will provide to promote annexation. This duality was evident when National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi was dispatched to Jordan to sign the Aqaba document, while Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir publicly denied the Aqaba understandings. On the Palestinian side, the PA leadership is working to promote stability and improve governance. But it faces increased public opposition, including over its continued security coordination with Israel (as reflected in the growing Palestinian support for the Lion’s Den and the intensification of demonstrations), and efforts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to exploit its weakness in order to enhance their power. 

Under this backdrop, three main actors – the United States, Egypt, and Jordan – try hard to prevent a seemingly inevitable escalation and to create political and security understandings that will prevent deterioration. They identify a dangerous combination of elements generating the potential for a “perfect storm” and are trying to play the role of the child sticking its finger in the dam. This is an almost impossible task given the existing political conditions, the dangerous dynamics on the ground, and after many years of a prolonged stalemate in the peace process. We can hope that it is not too little, too late, and wish that the international efforts will move beyond ad-hoc preventive diplomacy, toward a more comprehensive strategy and the creation of a long-term political horizon. 

הפוסט On the Verge of an Abyss? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Virtual Briefing: Ramadan, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and the Netanyahu-Smotrich Government: Heading Towards an Inevitable Escalation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the coalition members’ plans to harden legal sanctions on Arab Israelis to the point of stripping them of their citizenship and expel them from Israel, and given the projects to extend the settlers’ presence in the occupied territories, the proposed plans are bound to raise tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel. This could set off actions of solidarity among Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Arab countries.

Meanwhile, the new coalition’s plans to expand the settlements and give them a better legal cover by exerting control over the High Court – through legislative override or change in the judges nomination process – is also bound to raise Israeli-Palestinian tensions in the West Bank.

One could rightly argue that the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and the harsh treatment of its population has gotten for a half-century did not wait for new rules to be enacted by a rightist government.

Tensions are bound to rise

But if the proposed legislation succeeds, particularly the override rule and the change in the judicial nomination process, any move would become possible as Prime Minister Netanyahu and his allies crave for total control of the West Bank. With Finance Minister and Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich in charge of civil affairs in the West Bank and with part of the powers of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, tensions are bound to raise.

These tensions may be contained for a while but for how long given Smotrich’s political aims in the West Bank, his political alliance with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, and the fact that these two men and their allies in the Knesset exert true control on the fate of Netanyahu’s government?

Then, yes, the message from the Israeli government would become clear: there is no Palestinian Authority and there will be no Palestinian state, even a demilitarized state as Palestinian leaders have agreed to as a condition for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace since the 1990s.

Given their possible consequences on the ground, on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and in the West Bank, the proposed rules are bound to provoke a deterioration of the relations between Israel and the Arab countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations – no fewer than six.

STOPPING THE projects of the annexation of the West Bank by the previous Netanyahu government was already a condition that made the Abraham Accords possible. The plans of the present Israeli coalition to expand settlements won’t benefit Israeli-Arab relations when progress is expected in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

This point is not only a diplomatic issue, it touches the very fabric of Arab public opinion. Normalization won’t be fully accepted if there is no progress and there is indeed a deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The moment is for building on the assets that the Abraham Accords represent for regional cooperation and peace. The present Israeli government needs to show political and diplomatic maturity. The Middle East has changed positively since the Camp David, Oslo and Abraham Accords, except for a majority of the Palestinian people.

It is time an Israeli and Arab leadership emerges that understands these issues and breaks with the politics of conflict and arrogance. The business communities are here and the civil societies, too, and the potential for shared initiatives and prosperity is real.

It may be that today the unlocking of this situation sits on the shoulders of one man: Netanyahu. The possibility that he does not go to court and avoids prison is completely linked to the fate that his governing coalition is preparing for the Israeli High Court. But by changing the legal rules and particularly by putting the override rule into law, Netanyahu might sacrifice the stability of this country and its relations with its neighbors for his singular benefit.

No one knows better than Netanyahu and the members of Knesset what is better for peace and their country, and their regional and international standing. If the United States and the United Kingdom have already expressed strong reservations about dealing with the present Israeli government and certainly with some of its members, what could be the position of Cairo, Amman, Abu Dhabi, Manama or Rabat?

The present legal issues before the Knesset and Israeli public opinion may be a matter of domestic politics but the way they are handled through votes in the Knesset, civil disobedience, the resignation of opposition MKs or an amnesty law will deeply affect the fate of Israeli-Palestinian relations, which are already at a very low point, and the status of Israeli Arabs, which, in fact, has been improving amid firm and continuous efforts after decades of stagnation.

Jamal Amiar is a Moroccan journalist and writer and a guest contributor to Mitvim Institute for Regional Policies.

The article was published in The Jerusalem Post on March 16.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian relations are deeply affected הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט From a space of conflict to a space of peace: The role of urban planners in advancing the peace process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The visit took place amidst a rise in violent incidents between Israelis and Palestinians. Both Washington and Amman have voiced concerns about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s new government, each for its own reasons. There are several concrete next steps that the two countries can now take to follow up on the visit and promote stability, peacemaking, and regional cooperation.

The U.S. and Jordan should prepare for the sensitive overlap between Ramadan and Passover this coming April by coordinating their efforts, dividing the labor, and utilizing their leverage over Israel and the Palestinian Authority, respectively, to lower the risk of escalation.

They should also work to bring together international actors willing to invest political capital in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Middle East Quartet, composed of the U.S., Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, has not been effective for years, and a new multilateral mechanism is needed, even if informally at first.

Jordan can bring on board France, Germany and Egypt — its partners in the Munich Group (which has convened periodically since 2020 to maintain the prospects for a two-state solution). Whereas, the U.S. can invite its Quartet allies — the EU and the U.N. Switzerland and Norway, whose special envoys to the region recently visited Jerusalem, can also be incorporated, alongside Turkey — given its recent rapprochement with Israel and good relations with the Palestinians.

At the regional level, the U.S. should respect Jordan’s decision to stay out of the Negev Forum until there is progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. In the meantime, it should make sure that the interests of Jordan and the Palestinians are considered during the upcoming Negev Summit, planned for March in Morocco. Additionally, Washington should link Jordan and the Palestinians as much as possible to regional projects enabled by the Abraham Accords.

The U.S. can also encourage Jordan and Saudi Arabia to work together on updating the Arab Peace Initiative, bringing it in line with recent regional developments and making it a more effective incentive for peace. Amman played a key role in the drafting of the initiative over 20 years ago, and it may want to do so again. The Saudis emphasize their commitment to the initiative and notably convened a multilateral gathering toward updating it on the sidelines of the 2022 U.N. General Assembly.

Finally, the U.S. can assist Israel and Jordan to put in place a crisis-management mechanism that will enable the two neighbors to deal effectively with the consequences of any Israeli-Palestinian escalation and prevent the collapse of their bilateral ties.

The article was published in MEI@75 on February 6.

הפוסט The US and Jordan can work closer together on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a key hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict claimed by Israelis and Palestinians and left under temporary Israeli responsibility by the Interim Agreement (1995). For almost three decades, Israel has been reducing the Palestinian living space in the area and deepening its hold, managing all planning and building processes, expanding settlement areas and so-called “state lands” and demarcating “military zones” and “nature reserves” for itself. The collapse of the peace process also encouraged the Palestinian Authority (since 2009) to act unilaterally on the ground. While Israel has assumed a “piecemeal” approach and sees Area C as a vital space for settlement and security, the Palestinians have taken a “holistic” approach, viewing the area as a necessary space for a contiguous and sustainable state. The campaign currently being waged on the ground perpetuates friction and a bloody struggle over land and infrastructure, distances the chance of a stable Israeli-Palestinian agreement, prevents development and construction for Palestinians, poses a tangible danger to nature and the environment, and deepens humanitarian and legal challenges of population expulsion and relocation.

Turning this important area into a foundation for Israeli-Palestinian progress requires two types of policies – a reactive policy in the short term to prevent further deterioration, and a long-term policy of practical cooperation. In light of the new radical right-wing government’s policy advocating the de facto annexation of Area C to Israel, the pro-peace camp must take preventive measures: promote a campaign to “unmask” the government’s moves and intentions and expose the dangers of annexation as a fatal blow to Israel’s identity, security, and political and economic standing; expand demonstrations in conjunction with the overall protest against the new government’s anti-democratic policies; file objections to settlement construction and to harmful measures against the Palestinians. Down the line, Israel and the Palestinians must abandon their “zero sum game” approach and instead formulate joint systemic planning and promote positive steps in Area C: approve outline plans for Palestinian construction that were already submitted to Israel for approval, prevent crime and piracy, and promote joint projects with international and Arab assistance. These include solar power fields, agricultural and food cultivation areas, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and industrial zones. Advancing these measures without a political horizon will result, at most, in some specific improvement. On the other hand, advancing measures with a view to a political settlement – including the transfer of parts of Area C to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the advancement of a comprehensive economic plan for the Palestinians – will lead to a real change, strengthen Palestinian ability and motivation to prevent terrorism, and make it possible to gradually advance the two-state vision based on the “Creeping Peace” strategy.

הפוסט Area C: From a Hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict to a Space for “Creeping Peace” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Benjamin Netanyahu begins his current term as prime minister with a domestic focus, and with a sense of urgency that relates to a personal, not national, issue. Seeking a way out of his corruption trial seems to be his top priority. This dictated which parties became part of the coalition, and which policy directives are advanced first.

In his first months in office, Netanyahu is likely to promote the judicial reforms announced by Justice Minister Yariv Levin. If approved, these reforms will dramatically undermine Israeli democracy, and that is already generating significant pushback and causing deep polarization within Israel.

Domestic escalation is therefore coming first. It seems to be a price Netanyahu is willing to pay to solve his personal legal problems and consolidate power. While doing so, he will be seeking international legitimacy and regional stability, to give him more room to maneuver domestically and to counter claims that the government damages Israel’s global standing. For that reason, Netanyahu may be willing to abide by certain redlines conveyed by the Biden administration (for example, on settlements and Jerusalem).

Things have initially been going Netanyahu’s way on the international front. Arab leaders have shown interest in continuing to cooperate with his government, a White House visit is reportedly in the works, and the European Union has expressed a desire to continue the high-level dialogue it launched with former Prime Minister Yair Lapid. While international actors are raising red flags and voicing genuine concerns, many of them are adopting an almost “business-as-usual” approach, waiting to see whether the new government takes actions on the Palestinian issue that will necessitate a response.

Netanyahu’s intention was seemingly to make sure that should escalation on the Palestinian front happen, it would only come second. The recent security deterioration, however, indicates that such an escalation is already taking place, even if that was unintended, and might quickly spiral. In any case, Netanyahu remains determined to block any prospect of a future Palestinian state and has handed authorities related to the West Bank to far-right politicians. Netanyahu may limit them somewhat at first — for the sake of avoiding international crises or regional troubles — but eventually they are likely to carry out provocations in Jerusalem and work to deepen and broaden Israeli control over the Palestinian territories. Such developments might lead to further escalation, especially during the sensitive overlap (in April) between Passover and Ramadan.

An Israeli-Palestinian flare-up could be a catalyst for the third type of escalation — the regional one. If this were to happen, Arab and Muslim countries would find it difficult to maintain their current level of relations with Israel. Regional countries are likely to respond in different ways, depending on the nature of the conflict that erupts, while trying to hold onto the benefits of increased ties with Israel.

Netanyahu, cherishing his regional achievements and seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, may utilize an Israeli-Palestinian escalation to shake up his coalition. If escalation occurs after his desired legal reform is approved, and if he can blame his far-right coalition partners for the flare-up, he may seek to replace an extremist party in his government with a centrist one. He will frame it as a step to restore security and safeguard Israel-Arab relations — a framing that security-oriented centrists, seeking to “save Israel,” might adhere to.

Considering these potential developments, and in an attempt to shape them for the better, the international community should already put in place de-escalation mechanisms, conceive of preventive and proactive diplomatic steps it can take, and step up its support for those in Israel pushing back against democratic erosion.

The article was published in MEI@75 on Janurary 30.

הפוסט Israel’s new government raises the likelihood of escalation on multiple fronts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a key hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict claimed by Israelis and Palestinians and left under temporary Israeli responsibility by the Interim Agreement (1995). For almost three decades, Israel has been reducing the Palestinian living space in the area and deepening its hold, managing all planning and building processes, expanding settlement areas and so-called “state lands” and demarcating “military zones” and “nature reserves” for itself. The collapse of the peace process also encouraged the Palestinian Authority (since 2009) to act unilaterally on the ground. While Israel has assumed a “piecemeal” approach and sees Area C as a vital space for settlement and security, the Palestinians have taken a “holistic” approach, viewing the area as a necessary space for a contiguous and sustainable state. The campaign currently being waged on the ground perpetuates friction and a bloody struggle over land and infrastructure, distances the chance of a stable Israeli-Palestinian agreement, prevents development and construction for Palestinians, poses a tangible danger to nature and the environment, and deepens humanitarian and legal challenges of population expulsion and relocation.

Turning this important area into a foundation for Israeli-Palestinian progress requires two types of policies – a reactive policy in the short term to prevent further deterioration, and a long-term policy of practical cooperation. In light of the new radical right-wing government’s policy advocating the de facto annexation of Area C to Israel, the pro-peace camp must take preventive measures: promote a campaign to “unmask” the government’s moves and intentions and expose the dangers of annexation as a fatal blow to Israel’s identity, security, and political and economic standing; expand demonstrations in conjunction with the overall protest against the new government’s anti-democratic policies; file objections to settlement construction and to harmful measures against the Palestinians. Down the line, Israel and the Palestinians must abandon their “zero sum game” approach and instead formulate joint systemic planning and promote positive steps in Area C: approve outline plans for Palestinian construction that were already submitted to Israel for approval, prevent crime and piracy, and promote joint projects with international and Arab assistance. These include solar power fields, agricultural and food cultivation areas, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and industrial zones. Advancing these measures without a political horizon will result, at most, in some specific improvement. On the other hand, advancing measures with a view to a political settlement – including the transfer of parts of Area C to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the advancement of a comprehensive economic plan for the Palestinians – will lead to a real change, strengthen Palestinian ability and motivation to prevent terrorism, and make it possible to gradually advance the two-state vision based on the “Creeping Peace” strategy.

הפוסט Area C: From a Hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict to a Space for “Creeping Peace” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This is the fifth in a series of papers of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the Davis Institute for International Relations at Hebrew University examining selected actors’ contribution to the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

הפוסט The Tower of David Museum: Venue for Co-Existence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Next to Barghouti’s portrait is that of the late Yasser Arafat. Placing these two figures together implies an obvious connection; both are revered for their struggles against Israel.

According to a poll of Palestinian public opinion conducted in September, if presidential elections were held for the Palestinian Authority and Mahmoud Abbas did not run, Barghouti would receive 41% of the vote; Ismail Haniyeh, the international leader of Hamas, would receive 17%; ex-Fatah leader Muhammad Dahlan, 5%; the leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya al-Sinwar, 4%; and Abbas’s confidant Hussein al-Sheikh only 2%.

It’s unclear when presidential elections for the P.A. will take place. Abbas, who was elected to office in 2005, postponed indefinitely the vote scheduled for May 2021. But this is not the only barrier facing Barghouti.

Once an energetic student leader from the West Bank village of Kobar, Barghouti rose to become a leader in Fatah’s military wing, and was arrested 20 years ago in Ramallah by the Israeli Defense Forces. He was tried and convicted on five counts of murder in an Israeli civilian court, unlike most Palestinians, who are tried in Israeli military courts.

He was found guilty of authorizing and organizing the murder of a Greek Orthodox monk, a shooting near the settlement of Givat Ze’ev in which an Israeli civilian was killed, and the 2002 Seafood Market restaurant attack in Tel Aviv in which three civilians were killed. Security sources in Israel said that among the documents the IDF found during raids on the Ramallah offices of the Tanzim (Fatah’s military branch) were memos that showed Barghouti’s direct involvement in planning terrorist attacks.

Barghouti claimed that he supported armed resistance to the Israeli occupation yet condemned attacks against civilians inside the 1967 Green Line. He refused to recognize the legitimacy of the court and waived his right to defend himself. The question of his release was widely discussed in Israel and the West Bank immediately after the trial. Yet in 2006, Knesset Member Avi Dichter, who had served as the director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), said sarcastically during a TV interview I conducted with him that “Barghouti can certainly expect an earlier release—after some 100 years or so.” Today his release seems no more likely than it did 16 years ago.

During the first years of his imprisonment, Barghouti remained active politically. He negotiated a unilateral truce declared by the main Palestinian factions in June 2003, during the Second Intifada. He drafted the so-called Prisoners’ Document in 2006 (in this document all imprisoned Palestinian leaders of all factions called to establish a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders and demanded the right of return for refugees). In 2007 Barghouti was involved in the creation of the Mecca Agreement that intended to heal the split between Fatah and Hamas.

In recent years, however, Barghouti has seldom made important statements on the burning issues that preoccupy the Palestinians. He often emphasizes in general terms the importance of national reconciliation, and just recently called for dates to be set for presidential and parliamentary elections. “The lack of elections for (almost) 20 years makes the Palestinians live in a dangerous political vacuum,” he explained in a letter to his wife Fadwa. Yet, he has not uttered a word about corruption or violations of civil rights in the P.A., the future of a two-state solution, or other issues.

While there is no doubt that for many Palestinians, including the youth, Barghouti is a powerful symbol of resistance, it is unclear how well the imprisoned leader would do in managing internal Palestinian politics. Sources in Ramallah say that while Barghouti has the sympathy of the street, he hasn’t been active or clear enough about his goals, ideology or agenda. Barghouti’s relations with the Fatah Party and the level of support that he enjoys there are also foggy.

According to senior analysts and friends who preferred to remain anonymous, “We knew who Barghouti was years ago. Little is known about his ideology today. He was a popular student leader and an aide of Arafat. But is he ready for the heavy burden of responsibility as president? Will he be able to unite the Fatah ranks? Or will he use this opportunity to just bargain his release out of jail?”

During the preparations for the parliamentary elections last year, Barghouti decided to run on an independent list with his wife Fadwa and Yasser Arafat’s nephew, Nasser al-Qudwa. Over the years, Abbas has successfully purged the leadership of both the Palestine Liberation Organization and the P.A. of Barghouti’s sympathizers. Apart from Barghouti, there are many Fatah contenders for the role of a successor to Abbas, such as Jibril Rajoub, Hussein al-Sheikh and probably Muhammad Dahlan, now based in the United Arab Emirates. Some Palestinian analysts predicted last year that parliamentary elections would lead to another victory for Hamas at the expense of Fatah.

From the Israeli perspective, Barghouti’s winning future Palestinian elections would be dangerous for several reasons. Since currently there is no scenario for his release, if Barghouti were elected president of the P.A., someone else would need to govern in his name. The chance of chaos and anarchy would increase and the P.A.’s legitimacy would continue to decrease, to the benefit of Hamas. At the same time, the international pressure on Israel would grow; Israel could find itself in the shoes of the South African regime that jailed Nelson Mandela. Interestingly, the Palestinian media rarely draw this comparison between the two men, while the international and Israeli press often make use of it.

In short, Israel would find itself in an impossible situation. The Palestinians also would be faced with the difficult reality of having a symbol of resistance instead of a political leader who is able to govern, negotiate and make deals. Combine this messy situation with the emerging far-right Israeli government and you get a perfect storm. In fact, a perfect storm may hit Israel and the P.A. whenever Abbas departs the scene and the battle for his succession officially starts.

This article is from, “Jewish Exponent” from December 14, 2022

הפוסט Will Marwan Barghouti Be the Next Palestinian President? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This is the fourth in a series of papers of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the Davis Institute for International Relations at Hebrew University examining selected actors’ contribution to the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

הפוסט Does the Road to Peace Pass Through Prisons? The role of former and current inmates in advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These practical steps include a unique set of tangible policies that have far-reaching significance for the gradual advancement of the two-state vision. In fact, support for these practical measures spans the political spectrum from the left to the center-right.

What did Mitvim’s survey show?

When Mitvim asked what policy the next Israeli government should implement vis-a-vis the Palestinians, only 36% supported actively promoting the two-state solution, compared to 39% who supported the status quo or refrained from expressing an opinion on the issue. Even on more specific issues, such as a long-term strategy vis-a-vis the Gaza Strip, the public is almost equally divided between the options of economic development, efforts to restore control of the Gaza Strip, and negotiations for a long-term arrangement with Hamas. A majority of respondents prefer the current stick-and-carrots policy vis-a-vis Hamas, at least as long as it yields effective results.

Some will say that the lack of decisiveness and commitment regarding long-term solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects an ideological shift within the public to the Right. But an in-depth examination of the public’s positions on policy measures toward the Palestinians presents a far more complex and nuanced picture. For example, more than 60% of those surveyed, including an overwhelming majority of Center-Right voters, support the establishment of a joint mechanism for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan to prevent escalation at the holy sites in Jerusalem.

Such a mechanism, if established, would have a direct impact on Israeli sovereignty in the Holy Basin, which was one of the core standing issues in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians regarding a two-state solution. Even if we assume that some of the supporters are not aware of or would not openly admit the full significance of this step, in practicality, a significant proportion of the public is willing to promote such a step in order to prevent escalation.

A similar willingness to accept measures that promote the two-state logic is also evident in the field of energy and the climate crisis. Mitvim’s survey reveals that more than half of Israelis (54%, including a majority of Center-Right voters) support Israeli aid for the development of independent energy and water infrastructure in the West Bank, which is a key tool for developing sovereign state capacities in the West Bank. Palestinian energy independence would have a significant impact, not only on the Palestinian quality of life but also on the power balance between Israel and the Palestinians.

How can we explain the public’s split personality regarding a political solution with the Palestinians, with skepticism and opposition to long-term solutions on one hand and support for practical steps conducive to a political solution on the other? One explanation could stem from the fact that practical steps do not require Israelis to develop broad trust in a Palestinian partner but only to address defined issues.

Another explanation relates to the growing awareness of the current political costs and structural obstacles of returning to negotiations, including the absence of political leadership in Israel willing to deal with such a hot-button issue, the crisis of legitimacy in the Palestinian Authority and the ongoing political split between the West Bank and Gaza.

At the same time, it can be argued that public awareness of the explosive nature of the Palestinian issue and the danger of it leaking into Israeli territory has increased since Operation Guardian of the Walls (May 2021), and even more so in recent months, with increasing security friction and erosion of Palestinian Authority control in the northern West Bank.

Israelis view Gaza and Jerusalem as possible focal points of escalation. They also support the need to prevent escalation and create positive dynamics on the ground, even at the cost of helping to build the infrastructure of a future Palestinian state.

Looking to the upcoming elections on November 1, the public’s distinction between skepticism over a solution to the conflict and support for practical measures is of political significance. An analysis of the findings shows that support for practical measures is a watershed between rooted right voters and the rest of the Israeli electorate. These measures enjoy clear support among Center-Right, Center, and left-wing voters, while those who describe themselves as right-wing voters reject them.

Practical measures of political significance enjoy broad support in exactly the same center field that can serve as a political game changer. They are supported by a large portion of the likely undecided or swing voters still weighing whether to vote for Likud or for the centrist parties.

Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s statement at the United Nations General Assembly on Israel’s commitment to a two-state solution is especially significant in light of these trends. Lapid has set a broad vision and public opinion suggests a way to implement it.

The establishment of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-regional mechanism to prevent escalation in Jerusalem and the promotion of energy independence in the West Bank are a good start. Additional practical measures with political implications, such as providing building permits and approving zoning plans for Palestinians in Area C and the Jerusalem area offer an additional direction.

The op-ed was published in October 2022 in JPost.

הפוסט Israelis prefer practicality in promoting peace with Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

At the time, peace talks had collapsed amid a series of stabbing attacks, many by young people (in some cases, in the very neighborhoods where these kids lived). Yet these Israelis and Palestinians talked about how they met regularly in Jerusalem to learn about each other, discuss the most difficult of issues, and build the most unlikely of friendships.

Their words in those meetings mattered. Based in part on their presentation, US officials made special efforts to ensure that the Quartet’s 2016 report concluded by calling for more investment in exactly these kinds of people-to-people encounters to “strengthen the foundations for peace and countering extremism.”

הפוסט In a tense Jerusalem, an inside look at the city’s youth movement for peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These intensifying bursts of acute violence terrorizing, wounding, and killing Israelis and Palestinians should remind everyone that the conflict is not over or managed. This is what the decades-long, constantly-deteriorating status quo looks like. Bloodshed rises and falls, but it’s always there, grinding on.

In moments of crisis, it’s tempting to think short-term and seek quick fixes. But that’s exactly how we got here in the first place. We must do more than apply band-aids and limp along until the next emergency. We need to direct the passion and outrage of the moment toward the serious, painstaking work of taking apart the structural factors that cause this to keep happening.

Easier said than done. Both Israelis and Palestinians feel stuck. Too many have accepted this as an unavoidable reality. Everyone knows that violence is an option, however futile. But few see any alternative. Both sides have spent the last two decades wondering: How can we make peace without a trustworthy partner?

As Huda Abuarquob and I wrote in January, that’s why hundreds of grassroots initiatives — and a recent US law, MEPPA — look beyond the stalemate du jour to focus on the long term. Today, there is no political-diplomatic leadership or vocal public constituency for peace. So, a growing ecosystem of peacebuilding NGOs is building the relationships and attitudes which the next generation of Israelis and Palestinians will need if they’re ever to exit this tragedy. MEPPA commits at least $250 million over five years to scale up such economic and civil society partnerships.

It’s been just one year since USAID’s flagship Partnership for Peace Fund opened its doors. Already, the US chose five major project investments at $2 to $5 million each (with more to come). Combined, they will touch thousands of Israelis and Palestinians across diverse sectors.

With these first grants, women entrepreneurs, major businesses, environmental researchers, youth activists, health care providers, and IT students will jointly access new financing, mentors, markets, trading partners, environmental advocacy training, healthcare partners, and IT skills. Importantly, they’ll do it together, building the channels of cooperation that any non-violent conflict solution will require.

But MEPPA is not just an annual budget line for each year’s most interesting projects. Its multi-year horizon, ambition for policy change, and call for international leverage set it apart. NGOs, US decision makers, other nations, and private philanthropists are all investing in parallel in the peacebuilding ecosystem. How can we all maximize these next few years together?

In a new paper published this month by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, I look back over what’s been accomplished in the last year and what exciting opportunities have opened up as MEPPA’s second year begins. The paper’s detailed considerations for stakeholders focus on three major questions.

First, how can we be most strategic? Where do we want to be in a decade’s time? If today’s peacebuilding programs engage tens of thousands of people, what will it take to reach millions? What would a balanced investment portfolio look like across different demographics and locales? How do we ensure that every project — including economic ones — leads to conflict transformation? How do we build one initiative upon another in a growing progression? What metrics will we use to know when it’s working?

This moment of big investment begs for a field-wide master plan, identifying concrete goals over the next five, ten, and twenty years. A group of conflict resolution and regional experts could add critical input. A new impact app and standardized metrics could help funders and practitioners alike measure progress and identify areas of need and opportunity.

The second major question: Who can be our partners, and who’s missing from the table? Both smaller NGOs and underserved communities come to mind. There are many small- and medium-size peacebuilding NGOs, which matured over the last two decades but are not yet ready for multi-million-dollar projects. They could really level up with smaller grants (perhaps $300,000 to $1.5 million), plus capacity-building support.

Likewise, more projects can engage “unusual suspects” in peacebuilding, including religious and more conservative communities. Though delicate and often quiet, this work has been growing and fills an important gap.

With a conflict so powerful and resourced, the third major question is how do we leverage this major five-year investment into even more? One way is for more projects to seek systemic change. When public schools adopt a curriculum developed by civil society, for example, the impact spreads exponentially as tens of thousands of students benefit.

Peacebuilding can also gain leverage by working more with program graduates, helping them navigate their home communities, connect with each other, and take action for change. With funder support, more programs can implement these high-leverage practices on the ground.

Yet, one year in, MEPPA’s greatest potential for leverage and impact still sits on the international stage. This bold, unprecedented US investment could be a cornerstone in building a $200 million-per-year International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. Indeed, the success of the International Fund for Ireland, which began tilling the soil for peace twelve years before the Good Friday Accord, underscores the power of this model.

Creating an institution with the mandate, resources, credibility, and expertise to change the dynamics of this conflict is a bigger project than any one nation or donor can do alone. As instability looms and time seemingly runs out, international support for such a fund is growing. Now is the moment to secure MEPPA’s longest-lasting legacy: launching a long-term push to help the next generation find their partners and their way out of this mess once and for all.

This article is from “Times of Israel“, from September 22, 2022

הפוסט One year in, how a US law is disrupting the status quo הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This is the third in a series of papers of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the Davis Institute for International Relations at Hebrew University examining selected actors’ contribution to the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

הפוסט Women’s Peace Groups in Formal Peace Processes: Benefits of Participation, Price of Exclusion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To understand MEPPA’s purpose and full potential, it helps to understand where it came from. MEPPA sprang from an even bigger idea: a global, decade-long campaign to create a $200 million-per-year International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. That effort, launched by the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP) in 2009, was inspired by lessons learned over the prior two decades: from the failed Oslo process, from the successful Northern Ireland peace, and from a small but growing field of initiatives building partnership and trust between Israelis and Palestinians.

הפוסט MEPPA’s Progress and Promise, One Year In הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The reason lies in the unprecedented fact that, over the course of the 55-hour-long military clashes between Israel and the militant Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas restrained itself from joining the fighting. In fact, not only did Hamas do everything it felt it could to avoid being dragged into this mini-war, it also exerted considerable pressure on PIJ to agree to the Egyptian-mediated ceasefire that ended it.

This non-belligerent approach by Hamas was a first. For the historic record, although Hamas refrained from actively joining a similar round between Israel and PIJ in November 2019—Israeli code-named Operation Black Belt—it launched a few rockets after a ceasefire had entered into force in a symbolic show of solidarity.

To be sure, while Hamas, which views PIJ as an ideological rival, had multiple reasons not to join the fighting, Israel proved astute and careful in denying Hamas any compelling reasons to do so. It carefully side-stepped Hamas-related targets, kept to a minimum the number of civilian casualties, and avoided targeting civilian infrastructure, etc.).

In so doing, it suspended its usual policy, stubbornly held by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that holds Hamas responsible for any violence coming out of the Gaza Strip, giving Hamas the opportunity to decide for itself if and how to respond to the fighting between PIJ and Israel.

Israel’s policy change and Hamas’s response have created a new reality—one that reflects political maturity on both sides and, however unlikely this may sound, also a new level of mutual trust.

This new reality presents an opportunity for advancing far-reaching arrangements between the two sides, first and foremost those involving the reconstruction of Gaza (as per the Egyptian initiative of 2021) and prisoner exchange. The responsibility that both Israel and Hamas demonstrated during this last round may encourage regional and international countries, including Qatar and other Gulf governments, to make good on their past pledges for this purpose. And the current Israeli prime minister, Yair Lapid, has himself championed the need for Israeli cooperation in Gaza reconstruction efforts less than a year ago.

At the same time, a prisoner swap, which the Israeli leadership have increasingly stressed is a precondition for enabling reconstruction projects, will remove a major political and psychological stumbling block to moving forward.

That said, even as Israel develops a more constructive modus vivendi with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the real battleground remains the West Bank, where both the PIJ and Hamas are increasing their efforts to strengthen their presence, especially ahead of a possible leadership challenge within the Palestinian Authority the day after the longtime presidency of Mahmoud Abbas ends.

From the Israeli standpoint, the West Bank should remain in focus not only for the security challenges it poses but for the centerpiece of an eventual agreement on a two-state solution. To this end, Israel should seek to leverage its non-violent dynamic with Hamas to advance the message that non-violence pays off and to demonstrate that point by adopting a proactive and sustained policy aimed at improving material and political conditions in the West Bank. In the context of the Abraham Accords, moreover, such actions may yield additional benefits from regional parties that have been hesitant until now to normalize relations with Israel.

Last but not least, although the caretaker government under Lapid has neither the political will nor the public mandate to renew peace negotiations with the Palestinian leadership, it should signal its aspirations of reaching an eventual peace agreement by empowering the pragmatic and Fatah-led forces in the Palestinian Authority. And it should encourage rather than undermine the U.S. and other regional and international stakeholders in doing the same.

This article is from “Newsweek“, from August 8, 2022

הפוסט Is this a turning point in Israel- Hamas relations? – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Biden expressed his hope that such a moment will someday be reached. This statement reflects Biden’s approach to the Palestinian issue as expressed during his visit to the region: on the one hand, empathy and the outline of a long-term political vision, on the other hand, skepticism about progress in the short term and avoidance of discussing a tangible peace plan.

What can we learn from Biden’s visit about the administration’s policy on the Palestinian issue? Israeli commentators explained that the Palestinian issue had disappeared, while senior figures on the Palestinian side expressed disappointment with the visit. But the Palestinian angle of the visit requires a more complex analysis.

A discussion of the issue is, of course, influenced by the point of reference, whether we compare Biden’s policy to those of Trump or Obama or to the expectations of Israel and the Palestinians. A distinction must also be made between the declarative level of the visit and the measures discussed.

An analysis of Biden’s rhetoric shows that the administration reaffirms support for the two state solution and the importance of maintaining a political horizon. Biden emphasized, in his remarks in Bethlehem, that the solution should be based on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps. In other words, he reiterated American policy that preceded Trump, which was supported by Presidents Bill Clinton, George Bush and Barak Obama. Biden expressed solidarity with the suffering of the Palestinians (referring, among other things, to restrictions on movement), and stressed that both sides deserve equal measure of freedom and dignity.

On the other hand, Biden’s statements made it clear that the US does not believe prospects for political negotiations have matured at this time, and in remarks he delivered upon landing in Israel, he said that while he advocated the two state solution, he was aware it would not materialize anytime soon. The lack of urgency of the issue was also reflected in the ambiguous wording of the Jerusalem Declaration, signed by Biden and Prime Minister Yair Lapid (with a commitment to “discuss challenges and opportunities in Israeli-Palestinian relations”). The Palestinians were discouraged by Biden’s failure to address the settlements and the occupation.

On the question of Jerusalem, Biden took a cautious stance and spoke of a city for all its people, central to both sides’ national visions. He noted that the US recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, but added that the division of sovereignty over the city would be determined by negotiations.

His visit to a Palestinian hospital in east Jerusalem, unaccompanied by any Israeli official, was unusual (he was preceded by a Blinken visit to America House in east Jerusalem), but Biden was careful to present it as a private humanitarian visit, and he did not repeat his promise to open the US consulate in Jerusalem, which served as the liaison with the Palestinians but was closed during the Trump era.

Therefore, given that the Biden administration clearly does not intend to advance any peacemaking effort in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in the near term, where is it going? Biden’s statements and actions suggest several policy directions. First, since taking office, Biden has renewed ties between Washington and Ramallah (after a rift created during the Trump era) and restored the economic aid that had been discontinued. In this context, on his visit Biden announced an aid package for hospitals in east Jerusalem, for UNRWA, and for food security.

These measures are part of an American policy aimed at improving Palestinians’ daily lives. Support for initiatives to strengthen the Palestinian economy are also mentioned in the Jerusalem Declaration, which is in keeping with the shrinking-the-conflict approach supported by senior Israeli government officials.

New economic and civil measures

IN THIS context, Biden took advantage of the visit to announce a number of economic and civil measures, with Israeli consent, including upgrading the cellular phone network in the West Bank and Gaza to 4G technology, opening the Allenby Crossing (between the Occupied Territories and Jordan) 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and reviving the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Committee (JEC). These and other measures were discussed in the past, but did not materialize.

Palestinians have been critical of Biden’s focus on the economic context, without promoting a structural change in the current situation. A Palestinian nurse who attended the president’s speech at Augusta Victoria thanked him for supporting the hospital, but added, “We need more justice, more dignity.”

In his remarks in Bethlehem, Biden tried to link these steps to a political vision, portraying them as measures that could feed the flame of hope, but they appear to be disconnected from a political context. This is compounded by Palestinian anger at the administration for failing to re-open the consulate in Jerusalem and the PLO’s offices in Washington.

Second, Biden pointed to an additional interim goal of steps to bring Israelis and Palestinians closer together. That includes measures to promote dialogue at the leadership level (such as between Lapid and Abu Mazen) and to encourage people-to-people ties. During his visit, Biden announced two additional grants within the framework of the MEPPA (Middle East Partnership for Peace Act) initiative for joint civil society projects in healthcare and technology.

Third, Biden presented another policy direction of using the normalization process in the region as a tool to renew the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This was reflected in part by Morocco’s involvement in the contacts between Israel, the US and the Palestinians on expanding the Allenby Crossing hours of operation and in reported American efforts to integrate the Palestinians into regional forums being created in the wake of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Summit.

On the other hand, Mahmoud Abbas stressed to Biden that the process had to be reversed, starting with an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and then moving on to a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative (2002). Senior Saudi officials backed this position, despite the aviation normalization measures, and declared during Biden’s visit that normalization would be possible only after the two state solution was implemented. In doing so, Saudi Arabia reiterated its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative and made clear that its relations with Israel are limited by a glass ceiling.

At the same time, the administration has been drawing red lines regarding Israeli policy on the ground. While Biden did not refer publicly to the settlements, he made it clear behind closed doors to his colleagues in Jerusalem that he expects zero surprises on the Palestinian issue, including measures in east Jerusalem and the expansion of West Bank settlements.

This stance continues the Biden administration’s involvement in issues such as foiling the plan to build a neighborhood in Atarot or preventing the evacuation of Palestinian families in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. The current administration is clearly acting quietly on these matters, avoiding public statements, apparently as a lesson from the Obama era. What is more, Biden does not want to politically hurt the current government and; therefore, prefers to deal with these issues behind closed doors.

In conclusion, the Biden administration has signaled from the start that the Palestinian issue is not a high priority on its agenda and while it boasts of reversing various moves made by Trump, in other areas it has not undone the changes he made. The administration has taken a two-pronged approach, promoting measured civil-economic steps and actions to prevent escalation, and offering a distant political vision of two states, and an equal measure of freedom and dignity.

With the visit over, the administration must work to connect the two components and formulate a strategy that connects the near-term steps to the long-range vision. Although we are under a transitional government and in the midst of another election campaign, the administration should take advantage of this stage to translate the declarations on a political horizon into an action plan for the day when hope and history rhyme.

This article was posted in “JPost” on July 26th, 2022

הפוסט Biden’s Israel visit reiterates his views on the two state solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

No to a nuclear Iran

“Consistent with the longstanding security relationship between the United States and Israel and the unshakeable US commitment to Israel’s security, and especially to the maintenance of its qualitative military edge, the United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to preserve and strengthen Israel’s capability to deter its enemies and to defend itself by itself against any threat or combination of threats” – the Jerusalem US-Israel StrategicPartnership Joint Declaration.

While there were no surprises in President Joe Biden’s references to Iran during his visit − after all, then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett already heard a firm American commitment not to let the Islamic Republic turn nuclear during his visit to Washington a year ago, the so- called Jerusalem Declaration now signed by President Biden and Prime Minister Yair Lapid both cemented the oral promise and presented a new opportunity to Israel.

“Anchoring this principle in a declaration of partnership and defining it as bipartisan, inviolable and in the American interest of national security − this is a step up,” Col. (res.) Udi Evental, an expert in political-military policy and strategic planning, tells The Media Line. “The direct linking of the QME [qualitative military edge] clause to the commitment not to allow Iran to ever have nuclear weapons – is another step up which implies a willingness to arm Israel accordingly,” he continues. Evental also stresses the importance of a commitment to another Memorandum of Understanding on US aid by 2028. “These commitments are very important. Now Israel has to do the hard work and pour some real substance into them,” Evental says.

However, if someone in Israel had hoped to hear from the American president a bolder statement regarding the military option vis-à-vis preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, they were disappointed as President Joe Biden resorted to the vague promise that the US would “use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”

On Sunday, soon after the Jeddah summit and the presidential visit to the Middle East were over, Kamal Kharrazi, a senior foreign policy aid to Iran’s Supreme leader Ali Khamenei, said that “Iran has the technical capabilities to produce a nuclear bomb.” He added that Iranian scientists have the tools to enrich uranium to the military level of 90%.

In a televised interview on Qatar’s Al Jazeera channel, Kharrazi also stressed that his country has yet to decide whether to build such weapons.

“13 min in Augusta Victoria [Hospital in East Jerusalem] is all what Palestinians have got from Biden. Visiting Church of Nativity was pilgrimage, not politics. [PA President Mahmoud] Abbas meeting was business (the 4G [telephony frequencies]) not politics. Abass [sic] was informed previously by [Secretary of State Antony] Blinken & Barabara leaf [Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara A. Leaf] not to talk politics when receiving Biden” – that’s how Samer Sinjilawi, a Palestinian political activist and chairman of Jerusalem Development Fund, described the dynamics of the presidential visit to Palestinian Authority on Twitter. A quick look at Palestinian social media shows that Sinjilawi’s words are an accurate expression of the sentiment on the Palestinian street. Expectations were not high to begin with, as many Palestinian, Israeli, and international media had stressed in previous weeks that President Biden’s visit to the PA would not carry any substance and is in fact be a mere formality.

While in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, President Biden took a cautious approach, saying that a two-state solution is still America’s preferred way to resolve the conflict, but that this was impossible to achieve in the near future. According to Gershon Baskin, a veteran peace activist and an expert on the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, this was expected due to current political circumstances.

“The Americans are unable to do much, due to a political system that is dysfunctional in both Israel and the PA. The only positive thing that happened in regards to the Israeli- Palestinian problem is the Saudi statement that binds together normalization with Israel and the two-state solution. In regards to the Americans, I believe that if they were truly serious about the two-state solution, they would recognize the Palestinian state in order to at least preserve this option,” Baskin tells The Media Line. According to Nidal Fuqaha, who heads the Palestinian Peace Coalition, although there is disappointment with the visit and its outcome among the broader public, there are some definite positive points for the PA.

“This visit was conducted against the background of four tough years of Donald Trump’s presidency. President Biden clearly spoke about the two-state solution, and although we know that nothing will happen prior to the Israeli elections [on November 1], this is still a positive development. Also, the financial support for Palestinian hospitals, the issue of 4G, the permits for Gazans who reside in the West Bank – all these small initiatives that took place as a result of Biden’s visit and his meeting with Abu Mazen [Abbas] are definitely positive steps in the sphere of American-Palestinian relations,” Fuqaha tells The Media Line. “Naturally, we all need the political horizon – the PLO office in DC, the American Consulate in East Jerusalem – these issues are still not progressing, and we are looking forward that the administration will fulfill its promises to the Palestinian people in this regard,” says Fuqaha.

Dr. Lior Lehrs, director of the program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, adds to the list of Palestinian accomplishments the issue of the Allenby crossing, the only international border available to the Palestinians with Jordan, which will now work 24 hours a day.

Yet, he indicates that Palestinian society doesn’t see a big achievement in these small but very visible improvements. “Abu Mazen today is in his weakest position, and it is doubtful that the 4G, the permits or the funding to hospitals in East Jerusalem will strengthen him politically, even if they will positively impact the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank. The Palestinians understand that these steps are part of ‘minimization of the conflict’ rather than of its solution,” says Lehrs.

This article is from “JPost“, from July 19, 2022

הפוסט Israelis, Palestinians both got something from Biden visit despite low expectations- analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since its inauguration, the Biden administration avoided prioritizing the Middle East on its full agenda for several understandable reasons. The US no longer needed the Arabian/Persian Gulf energy reserves, having itself become an energy exporter and aspiring to curb the use of polluting energy.

The administration was also mindful of the disappointing results of US military interventions in the Middle East in recent decades – the war in Iraq that strengthened the Iranians and ISIS, the policy of “leading from behind” in Libya that failed, as did the huge investment in Afghanistan and in attempts to turn it into a democracy, which ended in a justified albeit ignominious American withdrawal.

On the Iranian issue, the administration was determined, rightly so, to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in order to stop Iran’s progress toward military-level uranium enrichment for its nuclear program, which accelerated significantly since Trump violated the agreement. However, the Iranians have upped the ante and negotiations between the sides are deadlocked.

Biden also realized the futility of advancing the two-state solution, in which he believes, when Israel’s government is unable to move forward on the Palestinian issue while the Palestinian Authority’s leadership has lost internal and external legitimacy. Due to the low priority given to Middle East issues, it took the administration a long time to appoint an ambassador to Israel, and the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs only assumed office on May 31 after the Senate finally confirmed her appointment.

Two factors have restored the Middle East to the administration’s priorities, leading to Biden’s planned visit next month to Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Saudi Arabia. One is the war in Ukraine, which has once again raised the need for the Middle East’s energy resources in order to provide an alternative to sanctioned Russian gas for Europe and ease the oil price hikes impacting inflation and exacerbating the US economic downturn born of the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine has been a salve for the domestically weakened leader unable to push reforms through Congress, presenting Biden as an international figure successfully leading NATO to unity and weakening Russia.

The second factor prompting the visit is the midterm elections for the House of Representatives and a third of the seats in the Senate. The Democrats are projected to lose their slim majority in both houses and a presidential visit to Israel never hurts, as politicians have found through the decades, although the government Biden meets here will be a transitional one.

His visit to Israel is supposed to “legitimize” his scheduled meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), ostracized by Democrats for his alleged role in ordering the assassination of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and for his country’s troubling human rights record. Administration officials are justifying the visit and meeting with MBS by citing its importance to Israel’s security and to bolstering the regional front against Iran.

The mistake of neglecting the Palestinian issue

THE AMERICAN and Israeli Right are satisfied with the Biden Administration for mobilizing to strengthen the Abraham Accords, thereby reaffirming their belief that Israel can normalize relations in the region even without a breakthrough in the Palestinian context. They are completely wrong.

Biden, who indeed has Israel’s best interests at heart, is also wrong because neglecting the Palestinian issue is much more dangerous for Israel than the military threats that our politicians and media love to highlight. Israel is a military power able to deal with all external threats, including the Iranian threat (according to uncensored foreign experts). However, its military might does not provide the State of Israel with any response to the grave threat posed by the continued status quo with the Palestinians to its identity, morality and the future of Zionism.

The return of the Middle East to the US administration’s list of priorities provides a challenging opportunity to create a political horizon and thereby avert the inevitable catastrophic outcome of the status quo – a binational state, or a country in which Jews are minority in an Arab state, or worse, in which a Jewish minority controls an Arab majority by undemocratic means.

American pressure on Israel to avoid thwarting the prospects of a two-state solution by building in the settlements, especially in strategic locations such as E1 or Givat Hamatos, is important but insufficient. Most Israelis prefer the two-state solution but do not believe it can be achieved.

If Biden wants to help Israel and also hand Saudi Arabia an achievement in exchange for lower oil prices, he must announce acceptance of the parameters of the Arab Peace Initiative, launched by the Saudis in 2002 and reaffirmed since numerous times by all Arab leaders, including the Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian ones.

The original initiative was enhanced at an Arab League foreign ministers’ summit under pressure from then-Secretary of State John Kerry by including the principle of land swaps, which could leave the vast majority of settlers in their homes and also waives the full realization of the “right of return” by Palestinians to what is now the Jewish state. American recognition of these parameters as the basis for negotiations could jumpstart an initiative to advance the existing international consensus on a future arrangement.

There is widespread international agreement that such an arrangement should comprise the 1967 borders with land swaps, a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem (enabling the establishment of an American embassy there without having to obtain Israeli permission to resume the operation of a consulate), and a just and agreed-upon resolution of the refugee problem (meaning giving Israel veto power over the number of refugees who would return).

Such a political horizon could bolster support in Israel for the two-state solution and pave the way for turning it into a political reality, thus securing Israel’s future and fulfilling the Zionist vision. A political horizon would also advance a regional front against Iran, but should be viewed as an essential goal in itself because it addresses the threat to our identity that is much more dangerous than Iran.

The op-ed was published in JPost in July 2022.

הפוסט Biden should bolster a Palestinian political horizon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since its inauguration, the Biden administration avoided prioritizing the Middle East on its full agenda for several understandable reasons. The US no longer needed the Arabian/Persian Gulf energy reserves, having itself become an energy exporter and aspiring to curb the use of polluting energy.

The administration was also mindful of the disappointing results of US military interventions in the Middle East in recent decades – the war in Iraq that strengthened the Iranians and ISIS, the policy of “leading from behind” in Libya that failed, as did the huge investment in Afghanistan and in attempts to turn it into a democracy, which ended in a justified albeit ignominious American withdrawal.

On the Iranian issue, the administration was determined, rightly so, to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in order to stop Iran’s progress toward military-level uranium enrichment for its nuclear program, which accelerated significantly since Trump violated the agreement. However, the Iranians have upped the ante and negotiations between the sides are deadlocked.

Biden also realized the futility of advancing the two-state solution, in which he believes, when Israel’s government is unable to move forward on the Palestinian issue while the Palestinian Authority’s leadership has lost internal and external legitimacy. Due to the low priority given to Middle East issues, it took the administration a long time to appoint an ambassador to Israel, and the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs only assumed office on May 31 after the Senate finally confirmed her appointment.

Two factors have restored the Middle East to the administration’s priorities, leading to Biden’s planned visit next month to Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Saudi Arabia. One is the war in Ukraine, which has once again raised the need for the Middle East’s energy resources in order to provide an alternative to sanctioned Russian gas for Europe and ease the oil price hikes impacting inflation and exacerbating the US economic downturn born of the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine has been a salve for the domestically weakened leader unable to push reforms through Congress, presenting Biden as an international figure successfully leading NATO to unity and weakening Russia.

The second factor prompting the visit is the midterm elections for the House of Representatives and a third of the seats in the Senate. The Democrats are projected to lose their slim majority in both houses and a presidential visit to Israel never hurts, as politicians have found through the decades, although the government Biden meets here will be a transitional one.

His visit to Israel is supposed to “legitimize” his scheduled meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), ostracized by Democrats for his alleged role in ordering the assassination of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and for his country’s troubling human rights record. Administration officials are justifying the visit and meeting with MBS by citing its importance to Israel’s security and to bolstering the regional front against Iran.

The mistake of neglecting the Palestinian issue

THE AMERICAN and Israeli Right are satisfied with the Biden Administration for mobilizing to strengthen the Abraham Accords, thereby reaffirming their belief that Israel can normalize relations in the region even without a breakthrough in the Palestinian context. They are completely wrong.

Biden, who indeed has Israel’s best interests at heart, is also wrong because neglecting the Palestinian issue is much more dangerous for Israel than the military threats that our politicians and media love to highlight. Israel is a military power able to deal with all external threats, including the Iranian threat (according to uncensored foreign experts). However, its military might does not provide the State of Israel with any response to the grave threat posed by the continued status quo with the Palestinians to its identity, morality and the future of Zionism.

The return of the Middle East to the US administration’s list of priorities provides a challenging opportunity to create a political horizon and thereby avert the inevitable catastrophic outcome of the status quo – a binational state, or a country in which Jews are minority in an Arab state, or worse, in which a Jewish minority controls an Arab majority by undemocratic means.

American pressure on Israel to avoid thwarting the prospects of a two-state solution by building in the settlements, especially in strategic locations such as E1 or Givat Hamatos, is important but insufficient. Most Israelis prefer the two-state solution but do not believe it can be achieved.

If Biden wants to help Israel and also hand Saudi Arabia an achievement in exchange for lower oil prices, he must announce acceptance of the parameters of the Arab Peace Initiative, launched by the Saudis in 2002 and reaffirmed since numerous times by all Arab leaders, including the Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian ones.

The original initiative was enhanced at an Arab League foreign ministers’ summit under pressure from then-Secretary of State John Kerry by including the principle of land swaps, which could leave the vast majority of settlers in their homes and also waives the full realization of the “right of return” by Palestinians to what is now the Jewish state. American recognition of these parameters as the basis for negotiations could jumpstart an initiative to advance the existing international consensus on a future arrangement.

There is widespread international agreement that such an arrangement should comprise the 1967 borders with land swaps, a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem (enabling the establishment of an American embassy there without having to obtain Israeli permission to resume the operation of a consulate), and a just and agreed-upon resolution of the refugee problem (meaning giving Israel veto power over the number of refugees who would return).

Such a political horizon could bolster support in Israel for the two-state solution and pave the way for turning it into a political reality, thus securing Israel’s future and fulfilling the Zionist vision. A political horizon would also advance a regional front against Iran, but should be viewed as an essential goal in itself because it addresses the threat to our identity that is much more dangerous than Iran.

This article is from “JPost“, from July 1, 2022

הפוסט Biden should bolster a Palestinian political horizon- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But something is missing. While the Mediterranean Games bring together athletes from countries which are at odds with each other, and while the list of participating countries expands to include some non-Mediterranean countries – Israelis and Palestinians are left out. They are not competing in the 2022 games, nor were they invited to compete in any of the previous Mediterranean Games.

Sports has the power of narrowing gaps between parties to conflicts, and sporting events have been used throughout the years to tone down political tensions (such as the U.S.-China Ping Pong Diplomacy of the early 1970s), to foster new diplomatic ties (such as the participation of Israeli athletes in sports events in Morocco and Persian Gulf states) and to increase international recognition of contested entities (such as Palestine’s participation of in the Olympic Games).

In the Mediterranean, however, sports are lagging. Israel and the Palestinian Authority already take part, as equal members, in regional mechanisms such as the Union for the Mediterranean, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does play out in these settings and often creates hardships, but both sides agree to sit with each other and their participation is accepted by regional actors who recognize neither Israel nor a Palestinian state.

In the 1950s and ‘60s, Israel tried to join the Mediterranean Games to protest the Arab boycott, lobbying the International Olympic Committee and friendly host countries. It even sought assistance from members of the U.S. Congress, some of whom publicly intervened. But these efforts did not bear fruit. Arab states objected and stressed that should they be forced to compete alongside Israeli athletes, that will be the end of the Mediterranean Games.

Times have changed. As progress in Israel-Arab relations was made in the 1990s, following the Oslo Accords, so did the framing of possible Israeli participation. It was not only about Israelis anymore, but also about Palestinians. Once the Palestinians were admitted to the Olympics (in Atlanta, 1996), the option was raised of Israelis and Palestinians joining the Mediterranean Games together, as a sign of peace. Israel hoped that the inclusion of the Palestinian team in the Olympics would help Israel’s bid to join the Mediterranean Games. However, Arab opposition to Israel’s participation continued also in the late 1990s.

Toward the 2005 Mediterranean Games in Spain, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos stated – in a joint press conference with Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom – that he will do whatever he can to have Israelis and Palestinians compete. Moratinos indeed tried to get an invitation for both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but according to an Israeli official “the Egyptians had effectively blocked the move. … The Egyptians do not want us to feel that there is no longer pressure on us, so we do not stop dealing with the Palestinians.”

The next edition of the Games, in 2009, was held in Italy, the most active supporter of Israeli and Palestinian participation. Toward the Games, to which Israel and the Palestinian Authority were not invited – Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said that “the inclusion of Israeli and Palestinian athletes in the [2013] edition “would complete a region of peace.” He also stated that the 2009 Games “will be the last played without the Israeli national team and, I might add, without the Palestinian [team.”

Frattini hoped to sponsor an official public meeting during the Games’ opening ceremony, during which the heads of the Israeli and Palestinian National Olympic Committees will declare their readiness to participate together in the next Games.

It took a bit longer than expected, but eventually such a joint message was voiced. It was in the context of negotiations that took place in 2011 between the Israeli and Palestinian NOCs. The negotiations were held mostly in Lausanne, Switzerland. They focused on multiple issues, including Israeli travel restrictions on Palestinian athletes, but also dealt with the Mediterranean Games. “Israel and the Palestinians want entry to the 2013 Mediterranean Games being staged in Turkey,” reported the media following the second round of talks in May 2011.

A month earlier, the leaders of the Israeli and Palestinian NOCs were honored in Rome with a “Sport for Peace” concert. At the event, the Italian vice president of the International Olympic Committee Mario Pescante referred to their participation in the Games and said that “it is a battle that has been going on for nearly twenty years, it is not very optimistic. Someone will take my place and continue the pursuit, I did not succeed for the Games of Bari (1997), nor for those of Pescara (2009).”

Later in 2011, optimism did emerge. The IOC announced that it was pleased to learn that the Executive Committee of the International Committee of Mediterranean Games has unanimously called upon all its members to do their utmost to ensure Israeli and Palestinian participation in the next edition of the Games (in Turkey, 2013). Jacques Rogge, then-president of the IOC, called it “a great step forward” and emphasized that the IOC has “the moral duty to use sport as a tool for peace and development.” A decision regarding Israeli and Palestinian participation was anticipated in June 2012, but at the last minute the issue was dropped from the Executive Committee’s agenda, apparently due to unrelated internal affairs of the International Committee of Mediterranean Games.

In the decade that has passed, no progress was made and the issue was off the ICMG’s agenda. The stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, international campaigns to recognize a Palestinian state led by the Palestinian Authority and pro-settlement policies of Benjamin Netanyahu’s governments have taken their toll on relations between the Israeli and Palestinian NOCs. Negotiations and attempts for cooperation were replaced with disconnect, quarrels and calls for boycott.

While Mediterranean athletes compete in Algeria, efforts toward future Israeli and Palestinian participation should be relaunched. The goal should be full participation in the 2026 Mediterranean Games in Italy and symbolic participation already in the 2023 Mediterranean Beach Games in Greece. Italy’s long-standing support for Israeli and Palestinian participation, coupled with its being the host of the 2026 Games and with the fact that the current president of the International Committee of Mediterranean Games is Italian (Davide Tizzano) should help stir developments in the right direction, assuming Israel and the PA decide to formally apply.

Should that happen, a three-fourths majority of International Committee of Mediterranean Games countries will be required, and current regional developments make this goal more feasible than ever before.

Inclusion and integration are keys for the success of the Mediterranean as a region, and sports is a tool that can contribute to their advancement. Should the countries of the Mediterranean want to help Israelis and Palestinians advance toward peace, a symbolic step could be to invite them to compete.

But currently there may be a window of opportunity to finally make progress. The Israeli and Palestinian interest to participate in the Games seems to still be in place; under Israel’s current government, there has been renewed engagement between top-level Israeli and Palestinian officials and government ministries; and Israel’s relations with some countries in the Mediterranean have been improved (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey) and renewed (Morocco).

Running, swimming and jumping will not bring the two-state solution on their own, but they may help in fostering a sense of shared regional identity and belonging among the conflicting parties. This is the Olympic spirit, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict needs some more of it.

This article is from “Haaretz“, from June 30, 2022

הפוסט Sports for peace: let Israelis and Palestinians compete in Mediterranean games הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper is the second in a series of a joint project between the Mitvim Institute and the Davis Institute for International Relations.

הפוסט Environmental Organizations as Potential Players in the Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Energy as a Tool for Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Rudolf Virchow, physician and father of social medicine (1821-1902) ^[1]

Abstract

“Peace through Health” is a theoretical and applied approach that sees humanitarian health initiatives as a primary basis for dialogue and cooperation between adversaries. This approach posits that health initiatives can spawn increased discourse and dialogue between parties to a conflict, build trust and promote cooperation on various issues, eventually facilitating the transition from conflict to peace. Based on interviews with representatives of an Israeli human rights organization that provides health services in the Occupied Territories, this article examines the implementation of the “peace through health” approach in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Under the Oslo Accords, Israel handed responsibility for the health of the Palestinian population to the Palestinian Authority (PA).However, continued Israeli control and absence of full Palestinian sovereignty have resulted in a weakened and poor Palestinian health system. The severe shortage of health resources has created growing Palestinian dependence on local and international humanitarian health organizations, including health professionals from the Israeli side. An analysis of the interviews conducted for this article indicates that the humanitarian assistance by Israeli health professionals provides an opportunity to develop dialogue, achieve logistical cooperation, and establish trust between the peoples.At the same time, the article discusses the possible disadvantages of this approach in the Israeli-Palestinian test case as an example of humanitarian work that fosters normalization and preserves the status quo of occupation.

[1] Pinto, Andrew D. “Peace through health.” University of Toronto Medical Journal  80, no. 2 (2003): 158-60.

הפוסט ‘Peace through Health’ in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Ground for dialogue or guise for continued occupation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Naqrachi, a Moroccan woman who is president of the Amal Arab Group for the Elimination of Child Marriage (AAGEEM) and of the Nour Foundation for Solidarity with Rural Women (ANSFR), sounded deeply while speaking with The Media Line from Auschwitz.

She arrived in Poland on Wednesday to take part in the annual International March of the Living along with Arab participants from Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and other countries, as part of a delegation that was organized by Sharaka (“Partnership”), an Israeli-Emirati NGO established in 2020 to promote dialogue between Israel and the Arab world.

Almost a hundred Arab youth from Israel also took part in the March of the Living this year.

Until very recently talking about the Holocaust was practically taboo in the Arab-speaking world, where Shoah denial is still common. Sitcoms about the “fake Holocaust” have been hits in Egypt and Gulf countries, hundreds of books that denied the Nazi genocide were and still are sold in bookshops across the Arab world. In 2009, a quarter of Israeli Arab citizens denied the Holocaust, according to a survey carried out by the University of Haifa.

A quick search on Twitter and Facebook yields many thousands of results that link to Holocaust denial articles and many angry posts claiming that the extermination of six million Jews is not more than “another Jewish hoax, meant to extort the world.” Activists who tried to teach the Holocaust and organize visits of Palestinians and Israeli Arab citizens to Nazi death camps were condemned.

In March 2014, Professor Muhammad Dajani of Al-Quds University took a group of 27 students to Auschwitz. Upon their return Dajani was labeled a “collaborator” by Palestinian media and activists.

The situation appears to have changed in recent years, especially following the signing of the Abraham Accords normalization agreements.

Exploring the Holocaust in the Gulf

A year ago, a permanent Holocaust memorial exhibition, the first of its kind in the Arab world, opened in Dubai. The “We Remember” exhibition at the Crossroads of Civilizations Museum includes testimonies of survivors and photos and objects from that time.

This year Ahmed Obeid AlMansoori, the man who founded the exhibit and the museum, led a historic delegation from the United Arab Emirates in the March of the Living, along with Eitan Neishlos, the newly appointed ambassador of the International March of the Living in the Gulf states.

International Holocaust Remembrance Day this year was marked in many cities across the Arab world – from Manama to Abu Dhabi to Rabat. The US embassy in Cairo cosponsored the city’s first-ever official Holocaust commemoration.

In 2020, Muhammad al-Issa, the secretary-general of the World Muslim League, led a delegation to Auschwitz composed of Muslim religious leaders who repeated the words “Never again” and performed a prayer for the six million Jewish victims.

“I believe that there is a gradual change, the rhetoric of the Abraham Accords. To many in the region the whole story today looks different, no more sharp dichotomy between Jews and Arabs, Shia and Sunni, but rather a win-win situation,” Dr. Nir Boms, a research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, and the coordinator of the TAU

Workshop on Israel and the Middle East and the Hiwar Forum for Intra-Regional Dialogue, told The Media Line.

“We are here in Poland, surrounded by three million Ukrainian refugees who can be seen everywhere. It is another powerful reminder of why we are here,” Boms continued.

“We are all acute observers of our own history. Our region has seen much hate and lives were taken and are being taken easily still. It is up to us to bring some understanding and tolerance as an alternative. This message is our lesson from the March of the Living. It is the most important legacy we can carry from here,” he said.

The Arab sector in Israel: Holocaust education and empathy are key

Despite the impressive representation of Arab youth from Israel at the March of the Living, Colette Avital, chairperson of the Center Organizations of Holocaust Survivors in Israel umbrella organization, a Holocaust survivor and a former Israel Knesset member, believes that for now there is no significant change in studying and understanding the Holocaust in the Arab sector in Israel.

“I know that there are many initiatives abroad. Project Aladdin is doing a great job [countering Holocaust denial] in the wider Middle East. But here in Israel, it’s tough,” she told The Media Line.

“And the problem is certainly not only among Israeli Arab citizens who don’t stand in silence during the siren [on Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day]. Many people have different reasons why not to stand up. Some say that it’s merely an Ashkenazi issue, that it doesn’t concern them and unfortunately, for many Arabs, it is still something very foreign,” Avital said.

Jalal Banna, a columnist and an expert on Arab affairs, said the State of Israel doesn’t do enough to promote understanding of the Holocaust among Arabs.

“The Holocaust is a human issue, not only Jewish and certainly not only Israeli. Yet the State of Israel appropriates the issue almost entirely and thereby creates antagonism,” Banna told The Media Line.

“The Arabs in Israel are first exposed to the Holocaust in high school; it is a part of the curriculum. But it is not presented as a significant historical event, one of the cruelest and most awful in history. It seems that those who wrote this curriculum just wanted to be done with it, to check off a box,” he said.

“It also seems that they were afraid to evoke emotion and empathy among the Arab students, fearing that someday –without making comparisons and parallels – these students will also demand some empathy and solidarity with their pain,” Banna said.

The situation in the Palestinian Authority is even worse since the textbooks do not include any mention of the Holocaust. However, in social networks, the word is often used in the context of denial or fake news.

Despite the positive changes taking place in some Arab countries today, Israel, the Yad Vashem memorial and other organizations still have a lot of work to do to explain, show and teach the Holocaust, not far from home, but in Israel, and in the PA.

This article is from “JPost“, from April 28, 2022

הפוסט Holocaust denial still common in the Arab world, but views are changing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

“The whole tribe condemns this attack. We do not support it at all. We also despise ISIS. This deed and this guy, even though he was my nephew, do not represent us,” said Abu al-Qiyan. He repeated this message several times, speaking to the Hebrew media to explain how it could be that his relative – a father of five – was suspected of loyalty to ISIS, was arrested, served four years in an Israeli jail, and then one day woke up and slaughtered four Israeli citizens, two men and two women. But as tension mounted, many in Israel expressed doubts about the sincerity of his condemnations.

It was not only the heads of the Abu al-Qiyan tribe that denounced the Beersheba terror attack, as well as the next terrorist attack that took place in the northern Israeli city of Hadera and was carried out by residents of the Israeli Arab city of Umm al-Fahm.

At a conference earlier this month of the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, Mansour Abbas, the leader of the United Arab List-Ra’am party, the first Arab party to become a member of a ruling government coalition in Israel in the last three decades, said, “The whole of Arab society has come out against the latest wave of terrorist attacks – even people who are in opposition to me. It does not detract from the severity that Israeli Arab citizens carried out the attacks that opened this wave. It is inconceivable for someone to come and decide that he is taking the lives of innocent people – this must be a basic value rule that has nothing to do with anything else. Secondly, there is a citizenship contract between us of living together – such acts violatethe contract.”

Abbas’ words also correlate with a recent survey conducted by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s aChord Center, which specializes in the social psychology of intergroup relations. According to this survey, 98% of Arab citizens of Israel oppose acts of violence against Jews. Some 93% of Arab citizens think that the perpetrators do not representArab society.

The researchers also examined the gap between attitudes in Arab society and in Jewish public opinion. It showed that only 56% of Jews in Israel believe that the majority of Arabs oppose violence against Jews. At the same time, 44% of Jews said they believe that the perpetrators are representative of Arab society in Israel as a whole.

“There is a lot of hypocrisy there. The Jews, or at least some of them, always demand that we condemn these acts. And we do it – I do it – without being forced by anyone, simply because we believe that it is right. But the Arab public is not a condemnation machine. Also, I almost never see Jewish politicians rushing to condemn after Arabs are being beaten or killed by Jews,” Afif Abu Much, a political analyst and a columnist for Arab media outlets, told the Media Line.

But despite the explicit condemnations of the terror wave by the leaders of Israeli Arabs, and by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and the heads of several Arab states, the situation in Israel remains tense. Thirteen men and women, Jews and Arabs among them, as well as foreign nationals, have been killed in four terror attacks during the last two weeks.

Two out of four attacks were carried out by Israeli Arabs. Following the attacks, social media was filled with expressions of joy over the killing of Israeli citizens, including by residents of Umm al-Fahm and other Arab cities in Israel.

“There is great anxiety about the fact that, in the current wave, Israeli citizens have a very dominant presence and in fact this time they were the ones who provided inspiration for other attacks. That’s why Mansour Abbas and others were fast to condemn. Also, there is a lot of concern among the Arab leadership in Israel and among everyone who is considered an enemy by ISIS – women, Christians, LGBTQ, and even the Muslim Brotherhood,” Dr. Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, and a senior analyst at the Institute for Policy and Strategy, told The Media Line.

“I and many others continue to argue that ISIS is a marginal phenomenon in Arab society.” Milshtein believes that very few individuals or activists are genuinely affiliated with ISIS.

“The attitude of the majority of the public is complete denial and even nausea of thesetypes, but the effect of their deeds is very harmful,” he says.

According to Israeli security services, adherence to ISIS among the Arab sector in Israel has never been significant. However, during the Israeli military operation against Hamas in May, one of the most popular figures among the Arab youth in Israel was none other than Hamas leader Muhammad Deif, as well as Abu Obeida, the spokesperson for Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas.

At the beginning of the week, Samir Saadi, deputy mayor of the northern Israeli city of Nazareth, wrote a Facebook post in which he expressed condolences over the death of the Islamic Jihad operative who was killed by Israeli troops during clashes in Jenin on Saturday. “Our condolences to the cousins in the Jenin camp. I ask Allah to receive him with the martyrs, the righteous and good friends,” read the post.

he post provoked many angry emotions in Israel, where the people have not yet recovered from the long manhunt after the terrorist who killed three Israeli citizens and wounded several others on the streets of Tel Aviv on Thursday night. In addition, the mass funeral of two terrorists in Umm al-Fahm made many Israelis wonder whether their heinous act of hate was a reason for pride and happiness in some Arab citizens of Israel.

Then, Ayman Odeh, the head of the opposition Joint List of predominantly Arab parties made a statement near the Old City of Jerusalem’s Damascus Gate that added more fuel to the fire.

“It is humiliating for one of our sons to join the security forces of the occupation. The forces here are humiliating our people, humiliating our families, and humiliating everyone who comes to pray. Our position is that we will be with our people to end the murderous occupation so that Palestine will rise, Palestinian flags will be hoisted on thewalls of Jerusalem and peace will spread on the land of peace. The young people must not join the occupying forces. Throw your weapon in their face and tell them that our place is not with you. We will not be part of the injustice and the crime,” Odeh said in avideo statement posted to social media.

While the Knesset House Committee said it will convene “as soon as possible” to discuss Likud lawmaker Shlomo Karhi’s request to dismiss Odeh from the Knesset, some Arab leaders were openly blaming him for hypocrisy.

In an interview with Israel’s Reshet Bet public radio station, Faez Abu Sahiban, the mayor of Rahat, a Bedouin city in southern Israel, said, “Odeh is living in a completelydifferent country; he must wake up. He must support this government and help the bloody Arab population.” During the interview, Abu Sahiban also suggested that Odeh come to Rahat and collect the illegal weapons there “by himself.”

Experts believe that this spring does not have to be a repeat of the dramatic events of last year. “A lot of what happened last year was triggered by the events in Al-Aqsa Mosque. That is what boils the blood of the Arabs – in the West Bank, Gaza, Israel, and beyond. As long as nothing happens in Al-Aqsa, it will not develop into a wave of violent events like the ones that shook our lives a year ago,” according to Abu Much.

הפוסט Arab-Israelis have no appetite for another wave of violence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The API, conceived by Saudi Arabia, offered Israel regional belonging, normal ties with all Arab countries, and a sense of security in exchange for resolving conflicts with the Palestinians and Syria. It presented the Israeli leadership and public with an incentive to make peace, addressing Israel’s long-standing yearning to shake off its regional isolation and to be accepted in its neighborhood.

The API, however, did not bring the desired peace. A large majority of Israelis never heard of it. Most of those who did, were not aware of its actual content. And many of those who are aware, tended to focus on reasons to reject it or question its credibility. Consecutive Israeli governments never formally responded to the initiative. Despite occasional behind-the-scenes overtures, Israeli leaders generally chose to ignore the API. Some of them even spoke out against it, because of their opposition to the two state solution it entailed.

The Arab League ratified the API repeatedly over the years and emphasized its commitment to it, even during periods of Israeli-Palestinian escalation, instability in the Arab world, and the rise of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa. However, Arab states did invest much in marketing it to Israelis and displayed only limited willingness to adapt its wording to changing circumstances.

The international community, for its part, welcomed the API and recognized its potential, but failed to incorporate it into a broader international package of peace incentives, which could have also included US security guarantees and an upgrade of ties with the EU.

And so, the API turned along the years into a missed opportunity, with mounting questions about its relevance. First, it was the Syrian civil war, which made the initiative’s clause calling for Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights unrealistic under the circumstances. Second, the 2020 normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries reflected an Israeli right-wing success of significantly de-linking the normalization of ties with Arab states from progress towards the two state solution.

The Negev Summit, held exactly on the 20th anniversary of the API, expresses the type of normal relations envisioned by the initiative. However, the Palestinians were not invited to the event and the Palestinian issue is not high on its agenda. This led Jordan to skip the festive meeting. The summit coincides with a particularly low period for the Palestinians, with delays in European aid to the Palestinian Authority, US calls for internal Palestinian reforms, widespread Palestinian distrust of its leadership, and the continuation of the ongoing split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip although the government in Jerusalem no longer wishes to preserve it.

This is not a cause for Israeli celebration and should not be seen in Israel as a victory over the spirit of the API. Alongside international incentives and peacemaking efforts, Israeli-Palestinian peace is first and foremost in the interest of the two peoples engaged in the conflict. Thus, Israel should try to attract global interest in the peace process, even if the world appears uninterested. Israeli-Palestinian peace will serve Israel’s objectives, enhance its security, increase its ability to breach additional diplomatic glass ceilings, and assist to fulfill national and regional potential for economic prosperity.

Efforts to advance peace will benefit from an update to the API, as well as to other key proposals related to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, written some 20 years ago and often referred to until today, such as the Clinton parameters and the Quartet roadmap. Changed circumstances require new policy plans. Even if the goal of achieving a two state solution remains unchanged, the way to achieve it should be relevant to today’s changing and renewed Middle East.

A new peace plan formulated by the Arab League could be based on preliminary consultations with Israel, which were not possible 20 years ago but are certainly feasible in today’s new regional realities. A preliminary Israeli-Arab discourse on a new Arab Peace Initiative could result in an initiative that provides a better response to needs, sensitivities and political capabilities.

A new Arab Peace Initiative could more accurately spell out the glass ceiling in Israeli-Arab relations set by the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It could present Israel with a roadmap for expanding the normalization cycle to other Arab and Muslim countries. And it could serve as an incentive for the Palestinians, increasing the likelihood that the future leadership there, in the post-Abbas period, will be pro-peace and moderate, and will not be shaped by extremists.

The Negev Summit, participated by Israeli and Arab foreign ministers, is historic and symbolizes a new, positive and very different regional reality from the one to which Israel had grown accustomed for decades. These changes should now also be leveraged to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, with the active help of Israel’s new Arab partners. Even if many of them do not prioritize this issue at the moment, which is likely to change in the future – hopefully in constructive circumstances, rather than as a result of another Israeli-Palestinian escalation.

Distrust of the Arab world and a conviction that the API might be a trap, shaped Israeli attitudes towards the API along the years and was an obstacle to its realization. Today, with growing trust and a sense of partnership between Israel and key Arab countries, this obstacle can be removed. If framed correctly, a new Arab Peace Initiative, could be seen in a more positive light. It could be presented as a joint regional aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which will complete the transformation of Israel’s standing in the Middle East and which will open new horizons for regional cooperation, prosperity and security.

The op-ed was published in The Jerusalem Post on March 2022.

הפוסט After 20 years, time for a new Arab peace initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper attempts, in particular, to analyze the Palestinians’ expectations of the of the Biden Administration, as articulated by high officials and leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): a legitimate authority representing the Palestinian people recognized by Israel in 1993.^[1] An approach that aims to understand Palestinian expectations can yield major benefits: it can contribute to making progress toward better conflict resolution, help advance the peace process, and likely revive the two-state solution. In fact, ignoring Palestinian expectations might lead to misunderstanding, miscommunication and could perhaps interrupt or even thwart the peace process entirely.

To identify these expectations, this paper relies on Palestinian and international news sources, along with open governmental data published by the US government and the Palestinian Authority. This paper is divided into four sections. The first section presents the efforts that different US administrations made to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The second section summarizes President Trump’s policy towards the Palestinians, highlighting actions that provoked strong condemnation by the Palestinians. The third section presents President Biden’s policy toward the Palestinians in the first year of his administration, emphasizing the main differences between Biden and Trump’s decisions. The fourth and final part presents the overarching Palestinian expectations from the Biden administration.

The Essential Role of the US in Promoting Israeli-Palestinian Peace

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been of great importance to the US and at the front lines of its foreign policy. Despite the challenges and difficulties of negotiating a final solution and the skepticism about the chances of successful mediation, the US has had and will likely continue to have a crucial role as an active provider of state mediation and shepherding the peace process. In essence, there is still no country in the world that can compete with the unprecedented efforts made by the US in promoting the peace initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians. The US is a country weighted with a tremendous responsibility, a longstanding commitment, and well-established mediation practices that has been proven effective in some occasions.

For decades, with the exception of President Trump, American mediators exerted tremendous efforts using different approaches to conflict resolution that led to either holding negotiation meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, or to producing interim agreements as in the case of agreements reached in the Oslo Accords between 1993 and 2000. Although the US was not actively involved in the direct negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians in this case, it invested a vast amount of time and resources to implement the agreements, during which the Oslo 1 Accord was signed in the White House in the presence of President Clinton. It was a significant first agreement that outlined steps whereby the Palestinian Authority would be granted de jure recognition, rights to self-determination and limited autonomy, along with investment plans for economy and development, in exchange for which the Israelis were to be given the security guarantee under the peace deal.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is largely possible as a result of US mediation efforts that have transcended multiple administrations.

Reviewing President Trump’s Policies towards the Palestinians

During his administration (2017-2021), President Trump invested significant diplomatic efforts in establishing and advancing Israel’s relations with neighboring countries, leading up to the Abraham Accords. During this process, he managed to help Israel reach normalization agreements with Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. Nevertheless, President Trump’s attempts to mediate the conflict between Israel and Palestine resulted in dismal failure.

From the very beginning of his presidency, Trump characterized his policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “the ultimate deal”, an approach that blocked the negotiations and avoided a middle ground perspective that could mediate between the parties’ interests, subsequently compromising peace efforts and increasing injustices. In regards to the Palestinians, Trump pursued contentious policies and a provocative plan regarding key issues of the conflict, most notably recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (2017), leading the Palestinians to cut their diplomatic relations with Washington; closing the PLO’s Washington office (2018) and moving the embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem (2018), serving as an outright dismissal of Palestinian aspirations for statehood; reshaping decades of US policy on settlements in the West Bank and the Golan Heights, affording more favorable treatment to Israeli settlement in the West Bank; and cutting off aid, particularly from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a pressure tactic for Palestinians to accept his plan (2018).

The Trump administration did not engage with the Palestinians or include their narratives when making regional decisions, in contrast to previous US mediators who recognized the Palestinian entity as a crucial partner to the peace process with Israel. These mediators managed to bring Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiation table in an attempt to reconcile their interests, assist in finding a resolution to the conflict, and to encourage an agreement without imposing one.

Trump’s tough stance on the peace process has aggravated the Palestinians and produced further disenchantment with the prospect of a settlement. Hostilities between Washington and the Palestinians have mounted, both hindering and creating uncertainty for future negotiations. Trump’s first misconception was believing that he could impose a peace plan on the Palestinians without their involvement.

From Trump to Biden – A Shift in the Approach

On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden began his tenure as the 46^th President of the United States. Since his inauguration, the Biden Administration has acted on a number of fronts to reverse Trump’s policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Below is an overview of the key issues that the Biden Administration has addressed that diverge from Trump’s policies:

• Prioritizing and promoting diplomatic relations with the Palestinians and preparing to reopen the Palestinian office in Washington.^[1]
• Resuming aid to Palestinians and exhibiting willingness to help Palestinians create economic opportunities and address infrastructure challenges.^[2]
• Supporting an eventual two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.^[3]
• Returning to the UN Human Rights Council and engaging in efforts to restore international law.^[4]
• Supporting the Israel-Hamas ceasefire during the recent violent escalation in May 2021 after the East Jerusalem eviction battle.^[5]
• Recognizing Palestinian entitlement to assert its interests, receive equal guarantees of rights, security, freedom, opportunity and dignity.^[6]
• Advocating against settlement expansion in the West Bank.

Given the aforementioned policy shifts, it is clear that even in President Biden’s first year, he has enacted a distinctly different and nuanced approach, characterized by a willingness to accommodate Palestinian needs, particularly those that were ignored during the Trump presidency.  Biden is not pushing his agenda the same way as Trump, instead taking gradual and calculated actions that will be critical to repairing the broken trust in US-Palestinian relations. Mending these relations will create the conditions for Israeli-Palestinian negotiation and will increase the prospect for peace and stability in the future.

Nevertheless, President Biden maintained a number of policies enacted by former President Trump, notably keeping the American embassy in Jerusalem. It is unlikely that the Biden Administration is going to roll back the decision of relocating the embassy to Jerusalem – a decision made in 1995, but suspended by previous presidents. Furthermore, Biden has not yet fulfilled his promise to reopen the consulate in East Jerusalem, which provides the Palestinians with a direct liaison to Washington. This would send a clear message that the US is truly intending to advance the two-state solution. Biden is facing some pressure from Israel to not reopen the consulate, asserting that Jerusalem is the undivided capital for Israel. As a result, it is still unclear whether Biden will keep or break his promise. In addition, there is no telltale sign that Biden intends to take upon himself the task of mediating the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Much of the Biden administration’s current foreign policy is focused on other critical and immediate priorities such as COVID-19 recovery, US-China relations, and more recently the Ukraine crisis.

With that said, Biden signaled continued US engagement in the latest escalation that broke out between Israelis and Palestinians in May 2021 after the eviction battle in East Jerusalem.^[7] The joint cooperation and the coordination of US efforts helped both the Gaza Strip and Israel seal the ceasefire deal that resulted in a significant de-escalation of violence and reduction of tensions.

Expectations for President Biden to Reverse Trump Policies towards the Palestinians

“We do not expect miraculous transformation, but at least we expect the dangerous destructive policies of Trump to totally stop,” said Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Executive Committee, as reported in Al-Quds news.^[8] In line with Ashrawi, quite a few Palestinian leaders indicated on numerous occasions their expectations for Biden’s policies and actions.

To overcome setbacks from the Trump presidency, revive negotiations, and get the peace process back on track, there is a critical need to understand the overarching expectations Palestinians have for the Biden Administration. These expectations have been explicitly articulated by high-level officials and leaders of the PLO, although this analysis does not include Palestinian public opinions.^[9] It is worth mentioning that while the PLO has the legitimacy and capacity to represent the Palestinian people, in effect the Palestinian people as well as Hamas’s leaders may hold different expectations for the Biden Administration as well as divergent attitudes regarding the resumption of Palestinian-US relations.

The Palestinian expectations for President Biden can be described as consisting of the four following elements outlined below.

Restoring Relations with Washington

The Palestinian Authority is seeking for ways to upgrade its status and restore its relations with Washington. Mohamed A-shtayyeh, the Palestinian Prime Minister, who announced the renewal of contact with the Biden Administration after his call with the White House, as reported in Al-Quds news, stated, “We discussed ways to restore Palestinian-American relations, especially in terms of opening diplomatic offices and the consulate, returning US aid, supporting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and ways to advance the political process.”^[10]

Recently, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price reported that Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, stating, “They discussed the importance of strengthening the US relationship with the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people, as well as the need to improve quality of life for Palestinians in tangible ways. They also discussed the challenges facing the Palestinian Authority and the need for reform.”^[11]

“Restoring the Palestinian leadership’s relations with the administration of US President-elect Joe Biden is a step in the right direction, especially with the role that America aspires to be as one of the sponsors of the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis,” clarified Zaid Al-Ayoubi, Fatah movement leader, in his statement to Sputnik Arabic.^[12] Similarly, the PLO Executive Member Ahmed Majdalni indicated that the two-state solution is the only way to resolve the conflict.^[13]

Boosting the Palestinian Economy and Improving Welfare

The Palestinians prioritize the Biden Administration’s efforts to revitalize their economy, which has deteriorated following a Trump policy that cut more than 200 million USD in humanitarian aid to the Palestinians as a means to impose his “peace plan”. Furthermore, the Israeli Knesset passed a law in 2018 to deduct the tax payment from the Palestinian Authority, on the grounds that this amount is being paid to families of Palestinians who were killed or imprisoned by Israel for carrying out terror attacks against Israeli targets.^[14] In addition, financial contributions and funds from Arab countries dropped in 2020, according to data published by the Palestinian Finance Ministry and reported in Al-Quds.^[15] Consequently, Palestinians have been dealing with financial difficulties and insurmountable economic challenges.

The Biden Administration announced the resumption of economic and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians. In response, the Palestinian News and Info Agency reported that Abbas is appreciative of the US aid efforts to the Palestinian people and of the support for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip.^[16] It was also reported that President Abbas expressed readiness to coordinate joint Arab and international efforts to rebuild the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinians are also seeking to improve the economic wellbeing and the quality of life for the public. To match their expectations and to respond to their needs, the US-Palestinian Economic Dialogue (USPED) was renewed. A meeting was held between senior US and Palestinian officials on December 14, 2021, marking the first of such meetings in five years. According to a joint statement on the United States and Palestinian Authority Renewal of the US-Palestinian Economic Dialogue: “The two sides discussed key topics, including infrastructure development, access to US markets, US regulations, free trade, financial issues, renewable energy and environmental initiatives, connecting Palestinian and American businesses, and addressing obstacles to Palestinian economic development”.^[17]

Gaining economic power and strengthening prospects for cooperation with the US can serve as a foundation for Palestinians to assert their autonomy and encourage the adoption of beneficial policies for the Palestinian people.

Taking a Stand against Israeli Settlements and Promoting Compliance with Human Rights and International Law

Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank, which is in defiance with international law and the Roman Statute, is considered one of the primary issues facing Palestinians today. Palestinian leaders consistently affirm that they will not accept a settlement that infringes on their fundamental and historical rights. Accordingly, the Palestinians stress the issue of halting the construction of settlements in the West Bank.

The settlement issue and other violations of Palestinian rights have been continuously raised by President Abbas in his meetings and calls with the Biden Administration. For example, in a recent telephone conversation between President Mahmoud Abbas and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, as reported by Aljazeera, Abbas emphasized, “The importance of ending the Israeli occupation, halting of the settlement activity, and putting an end to settler’s attacks and terror, as well the importance of respecting the situation in the Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), ending the eviction of Palestinians from their neighborhoods in Jerusalem, stopping the abuse of prisoners and detaining bodies, and stopping the tax deductions stifling the Palestinian economy”.^[18]

Abbas’s statement conveys Palestinian expectations that the Biden Administration protect human rights, respect the principles of international law, and take appropriate measures to halt Israeli settlement expansion and other violations of Palestinian rights.

Commitment to the Two-State Solution and Avoiding a One-Sided Approach to Resolving the Conflict 

Despite the daunting reality for Palestinians and the challenges and difficulties of negotiating   a final solution, the Palestinians seem to be willing to support a long-lasting peace with Israel, understanding that a two-state solution is significantly important.

In a meeting between President Abbas and US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, the Palestinian News and Info Agency reported that Abbas expressed the importance of a two-state solution and said that, “Israel must stop unilateral measures that undermine the two state solution”.^[19] In another meeting with Secretary of State Blinken, Abbas stated that he is ready to work with international parties, specifically with the Middle East Quartet, to reach peace and security in the region. He also aspires to establish a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, living side by side with Israel.

These statements from Palestinian leadership demonstrate that the Palestinians are depending on the US, as well as other international partners, to advance the peace process and the two-state solution.

Conclusion

One year ago, during the contentious and decisive 2020 US presidential election, the Palestinians anxiously awaited the results that would determine their future. Biden’s victory signified the end of four turbulent years under President Trump, and revived a palpable sense of hope that Biden would reverse unfavorable policies that led to injustices against the Palestinians. Today, a little over one year into Biden’s tenure, the Palestinians seem to be willing to take a leap of faith with Biden. They continue to hold high hopes for Biden to turn back Trump’s policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, albeit mixed with a degree of skepticism and caution.

Despite this renewed hope, the Palestinians do not expect Biden to make the conflict his utmost priority, nor to make a sharp turn in the American traditional position that has been criticized as favoring Israel over them. Moreover, given the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the US’s limited scope because of the sensitive issues of conflict, there is no expectation that Biden will produce a comprehensive peace plan immediately or find a panacea solution. Instead, the understanding is that the administration will revive the temporary demise of the previously-negotiated peace agreement and re-commit to the two-state solution.

In addition, the Palestinians have been looking for a way out from their economic and financial crisis, and trust that the Biden Administration can bring about transformation, stable economic growth and prosperity. They are looking to revitalize their relationship with Washington under the Biden Administration and to consolidate their condition and status, expecting the Biden Administration to open the consulate in East Jerusalem and the PLO mission in Washington. The Palestinians continue to stress their rights and aspirations, as they are concerned about the expansion of the Israeli settlements and expect the Biden Administration to take a more active role in pressuring Israel to halt expansion and construction in the West Bank.

[1] Watttan News. It is possible to have an all-in-one of the United States of America in order to reach the end of the world, and to be able to reach 75 people in all countries. الرئيس يثمّن إعلان وزير الخارجية الأمريكي إعادة فتح القنصلية العامة في القدس وتقديم مساعدات تنموية بقيمة 75 مليون دولار.

[2] U.S. State Department. Press Statement. The United States Restore Assistance for Palestinians. April 7, 2021.

[3] The White House. Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, May 15, 2021.

[4] U.S. State Department. State Department spokesman Ned Price speaks at the State Department in Washington, DC, U.S. August 18, 2021.

[5] Palestinian News and Info Agency. 25 May, 2021. The President receives the US Secretary of State. رئيس الجمهورية يستقبل وزيرة الخارجية الأمريكية.

[6] Palestinian News and Info Agency. 25 May, 2021. The President receives the US Secretary of State. رئيس الجمهورية يستقبل وزيرة الخارجية الأمريكية.

[7] Cook, Steven, A., How Eviction in Jerusalem led to Israeli-Palestinian Violence. Council on Foreign Relations.

[8] Alquds, 7 November, 2020.  The Palestinians welcome the loss of Trump, but are being careful of Biden الفلسطينيون يرحبون بخسارة ترامب لكن يتوخون الحذر من بايدن.

[9] Palestinian Center for Policy Survey Research, conducts regularly public opinion polls and survey research.

[10] Alquds, 01 February, 2021. Shtayyeh Odeh announces liaison with the US.

[11] United States Department of State. Secretary Blinkens Call with Palestinian President Abbas. January 21, 2022.

[12] Suptnik Arabic. The return of contacts between Palestine and America… Why and what are the guarantees?  عودة الاتصالات بين فلسطين وأمريكا.. لماذا وما هي الضمانات؟

[13] Reuters, February 1, 2021. The Palestinian Prime Minister announces the return of contacts with the new American administration. رئيس الوزراء الفلسطيني يعلن عودة الاتصالات مع الإدارة الأمريكية الجديدة.

[14] Knesset. March 5, 2018. Approved on first reading: offsetting funds transferred by the Palestinian Authority to terrorists.

[15] Alquds, Observers: blocking the foreign government.  مراقبون: عرقلة الحكومة الأجنبية

[16] Palestinian News and Info Agency. 25 May.2021. The President receives the US Secretary of State. رئيس الجمهورية يستقبل وزيرة الخارجية الأمريكية.

[17] U.S Department of State.  Joint Statement on United States and Palestinian Authority Renewal of the U.S.-Palestinian Economic Dialogue. December 14,2021.

[18] Aljazera, 1 February,2020. The Palestinian Prime Minister announces the return of contacts with the new American administration. خلال مكالمة هاتفية.. بلينكن يبحث مع عباس ضرورة إحداث إصلاحات داخل السلطة الفلسطينية.

[19] Palestinian News and Info Agency. 25 May, 2021. In a meeting with a US official, President Abbas says Israel must stop measures that undermine two-state solution.

[1] United Nations, Security Council. Letter from Prime Minister Rabin to Yasser Arafat, September 9, 1993.

הפוסט Palestinian Expectations from The Biden Administration הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Introduction

Since mid-70-s Saudi Arabia had exercised a role of a regional coordinator between various Middle Eastern states and between them and the USA, competing with other middle eastern powers and looking for ways to establish its own position. Twice in the past it had put on the table a peace initiative that was aimed at finding an acceptable solution for Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and both times these initiatives didn’t take off for various reasons. Saudi Arabia traditionally stood by the Palestinians and supported financially the PA and its institutions. The reality of the Arab spring and Iran domination, as well as the rise of the crown-prince Muhammad Bin-Salman and Abraham accords had radically altered the regional dynamics. During the last few years Saudi Arabia moved closer to Israel and further away from the Palestinians, it became more preoccupied with Iranian threat and domestic reforms and it seemed unable to present and pursue an independent policy on Israel and Palestine, while still aspiring to play a significant place in regional decision-making. How can Saudi Arabia facilitate peace or contribute for peace-making between Israel and Palestinians and what needs to happen first to allow this scenario?

1. Historical background

Two Peace Initiatives

The Arab Peace initiative (API) that was first presented by then Saudi crown prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz in 2002 is a well-known story that was widely covered and discussed, however Saudi Arabia’s engagement in Arab Israeli peacemaking starts much earlier than API. On August 7,1981, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz announced a plan for peace in the Middle East. It affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 as well as the right of all states in the region to live in peace.

In 1982 Israel firmly rejected Fahd’s initiative, claiming that it doesn’t differ substantially from the traditional Arab position and the reference of PLO makes it impossible for Israel to embrace it. The Saudi leadership as well as its American allies continued to stick to Fahd’s plan for a few years, until it was mostly forgotten.

After Fahd’s plan it took the Saudis two more decades to initiate another plan based on solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in return for full Arab recognition and normalization with Israel.

In 2002, during the Arab Peace Summit in Beirut then crown prince Abdullah abd al-Aziz launched his peace initiative that was soon embraced by all Arab countries, and later by all Islamic countries during OIC conference in 2007. The Palestinians who depended on the Saudis for contributions, supported the API, while Israel never provided an official response to the initiative (vast majority of Israelis never heard of the Arab Peace Initiative).^[1]

Regional Changes – Irrelevant of the API?

Jerusalem and Riyadh share common concerns regarding Iranian expansion and the withdrawal of US from the region, but it seems for now that the unresolved Palestinian issue will continue standing in the way of any attempt to bring the parties closer together.

20 years later all Arab states still officially support the API, but few of them decided to go ahead with normalization process regardless of progress made between Israel and Palestinians. In 2020 UAE, and then Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan signed peace treaties with Israel. Their actions drew harsh criticism on behalf of the Palestinians, as well as Iran, Turkey and some Arab countries. Saudi Arabia didn’t join “the normalizers club”, however, it was clear that without KSA’s consent, the other Arab states would probably not opt for full recognition and normalization of relations with Israel.

Saudi Arabia still stands by 2002 plan and recently its representatives reaffirmed during a session in UN that the API is the basis for any further normalization between the countries.

Waiting with Normalization

Saudi Arabia traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, yet at the same time it feared the revolutionary dynamic of the PLO and its criticism of Arab monarchies. In the nineties, Riyad mostly stayed away from Oslo accords dynamics, it didn’t open a diplomatic office in Tel-Aviv as Qatar, Oman and other countries did. In 1993 newly established Palestinian Autonomy launched its embassy in Riyad, however Saudi Arabia never opened its embassy in Ramallah. One of the reasons to this reluctance to promote bilateral Saudi-Palestinian ties was Yasser Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during his invasion to Kuwait in 1990. Throughout the years it allocated millions of dollars to PA as financial aid, while some of its royals openly supported Islamic armed movements in Palestine, including HAMAS through charity funds and aid organizations.

Is Saudi Arabia able or willing to facilitate any dialogue or cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians to the benefit of all parties? For now, the country refrained from any concrete attempt to promote and implement the API so that it will transform from a theoretical concept to reality. What are the possible spheres where cooperation is possible and desirable? And what are the pitfalls that should be considered? How can Saudi Arabia, a traditional religious leader and a country with significant financial possibilities promote the moderate approach to future political compromise and peace making through its religious, political and economic institutions?

1. All roads lead to peace?

Saudi-Palestinian sulha is needed first

In May 2020 when Palestinians around the world mark Nakba (Catastrophe) day that symbolize the beginning of exile for many thousands of Palestinians from their homes, an internet campaign was waged in the Saudi segment of the internet. Saudi pro-governmental researches, pundits and influencers were posting posts that were critical of Palestinians and their leadership. Many used hashtags, such as “this is not my fight” (referring to Nakba) or “ungrateful Palestinians”. Later in fall, prince Bandar bin-Sultan, one of the most senior Saudi royals said in an interview to Al-Arabiya channel that Palestinian leaders were “cheats, liars and ungrateful”. It seemed as if Saudi leadership was trying to prepare the public opinion to the possibility of normalization with Israel, paving the way to public support through bashing the Palestinians. The Palestinians, and specifically the PA leadership accused the Gulf states, namely UAE and Saudi for “selling off the Palestinians and their struggle”.

A year later a Saudi ambassador to Jordan, Naef bin-Bandar as-Sudairi paid a public visit to Palestinian refugee camp Wahdat in Amman as what was described by some Palestinian political analysts as the first step to defrost the relations between the two parties.

If Saudi Arabia will promote any projects designed to improve the state of relations between Israel and the PA, the thick ice that accumulated in the relations between Riyad and Ramallah, should be melted first. The visit of the Saudi ambassador to Wahdat refugee camp is a positive move, but it’s just the first step in the long road to reconciliation. As of today, the Palestinians are still very wary of Emiratis, Bahrainis and Saudis, even if the latter didn’t proceed with establishing formal relations with Israel. If the Palestinian side will feel that the Saudis approach them only to whitewash their cooperation with Israel, the likelihood of their participation will remain extremely low.

Saudi-led multi-lateral peace conference – phantom or reality?

Back in 2016, when Benjamin Netanyahu was desperately seeking another partner to join his 61-fingers coalition, he and MK Yitzhak Herzog, the head of the Zionist Union faction in the Knesset, discussed a regional peace plan that included embrace of the Arab Peace Initiative and renewal of negotiations with Palestinians. This initiative was proposed to Netanyahu during a February 2016 secretive meeting in Aqaba by foreign secretary John Kerry.  Later John Kerry met Netanyahu in Rome and proposed to arrange a regional conference that will be attended by the heads of the Arab Sunni states, such as Egypt and Jordan, as well as Saudi Arabia and UAE.

This initiative never materialized as Netanyahu decided to include a right-wing party Israel Beytenu in his coalition instead of center-left Zionist Union. The PM eventually took a right turn and buried the idea of negotiations with Palestinians. In 2020 he promoted the idea of West Bank annexation, and then dropped it for the sake of signing a peace agreement with UAE and Bahrain (and later with Morocco and Sudan). Also, Yair Lapid, today a minister of foreign affairs, had mentioned favorably the idea of regional peace conference that will include the Saudis or even be led by them.

As the fight for primacy in the Middle East between Arab and non-Arab powers is ongoing, Saudi Arabia might be interested in hosting and arranging such an event that will relaunch the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, but only in case if its success will be guaranteed. A failure of such an initiative will further distance the Saudis from Israel and support the bias of the radical camp in KSA and other countries. Currently, when the coalition of right, center, left and the Arabs in Israel is shaky and the influence of PA keeps diminishing, the possibility of arranging such an event in the near future is doubtful. The leadership might change soon in Ramallah, also a political change in Jerusalem is always possible. Until both parties will have enough support at home for this move (or become desperate enough to risk it), it’s hard to imagine this initiative coming to live.

Nevertheless, in the future this kind of scenario might enable all parties to benefit: the Saudis will get a place at the negotiation table, the Israelis will win the recognition of Riyad and the Palestinians will enjoy the economic benefits, aid and renewal of negotiations.

Economy, ecology and academy

The crown prince Muhammad Bin-Salman has ambitious plans for his country. He wants to turn Riyad and Jeddah into regional and international technological and business hubs, and the futuristic city of Neom grows fast despite the complications caused by the outbreak of coronavirus. He is dreaming of Saudization of the work force, but as of today Saudi Arabia still needs a lot of working hands and bright heads to make this transformation happen.

Well-educated Palestinian professionals always worked in the kingdom, but due to recent tensions as well as a few cases in which Palestinians were involved with HAMAS or Muslim Brotherhood and ended in Saudi jails had significantly diminished their numbers in KSA. Joint Israeli-Palestinian-Saudi projects aimed at “green” urban development, cleantech and protection of environment in the region might produce the necessary cohesion and synergy without causing the inevitable uproar on the Palestinian side. Saudi investment in Palestinian-Israeli startups will provide another connection between the younger generation who today mainly exist in parallel worlds, never meeting or interacting with each other. The creation of QIZ (Qualified Industrial Zones) mechanism, similar to one that was created by the USA for the sake of promotion of cooperation between Israel, Jordan and Egypt, might be useful. The QIZ initiative allows Egypt and Jordan to export products to the United States duty-free, as long as these products contain inputs from Israel. Saudi Arabia may offer similar privileges for Palestinian and Israeli companies to boost cooperation to follow-up some political developments on the ground (currently, it’s hard to imagine a direct Saudi involvement with Israeli businesses, even if the purpose of it is to help the Palestinians or to boost cooperation)

In regards to opportunities in academic sphere, they are quite limited as of today, since there are no diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, while the Palestinian universities are off limits for both Saudis, Emiratis or Bahrain due to increased animosity caused by Abrahamic accords that were largely rejected by the Palestinian society. However, academic collaborations that do not need actual meetings or student exchanges are actually possible, especially if they will be initiated by a fourth party – a Western university, especially in scientific and technological fields.

One aspect of regional relations is particularly important today: ecology. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has launched a comprehensive national development strategy to support the diversification of energy sources to achieve the goal of increasing the use of renewable energy. Cooperation with Israel, Palestine and probably Jordan in this sphere might be better accepted by Saudi society, as it fits well the “Green initiative” that is meant to protect the environment and the ecological balance for the sake of future generations.

It’s important to keep in mind that the idea of “economic peace” is rejected by the Palestinians, and if these initiatives will happen without any prospect of political progress, they will die before being born or draw sharp criticism in the PA.

Culture, religion and society

A few years ago, when some Israeli and American officials implied that Riyad might take over Jordan’s role as the guardian of the holy Muslim places in Jerusalem, the reaction in PA was extremely negative and suspicious. Not that Jordan that normalized relations with Israel in 1994 is very popular among the Palestinians today, but Saudi Arabia was considered to be a hostile and anti-Palestinian and the statements of the crown prince Muhammad Bin-Salman regarding possible compromise in Jerusalem just further strengthened their bias. After 2020 elections in US the rumors about Riyad pushing out Amman from Jerusalem had stopped, but the suspicions remained. Therefore, any move in religious sphere made by Saudis will probably draw a wave of criticism, especially since in the past Saudi donations and contributions to mosques across the Middle East had ignited a wave of radicalization. It can of course, promote its moderate image through inter-religious dialogue (something that is happening already for the last few years), although it seems that the current Saudi leadership is also uninterested in promoting its soft power via preachers, minbars and mosques.

As of today, Saudi Arabia is going through massive transformation and liberalization of its religious, cultural and social sphere, due to series of reforms introduced by the crown prince Muhammad Bin-Salman. Once an ultraconservative and suffocating place, Saudi Arabia is opening up to the tourists, displays its historical, pre-Islamic antiquities (such as Al-Ula) and fights with Dubai for primacy in business, sport shows, book fairs and film festivals. It remains to be seen how the Saudis can involve both Israelis and Palestinians in various project in sphere of culture, but there is no doubt that the Saudi facelift attracts both Israelis and Palestinians. Without making the grand move, such as recognizing Israel or signing a peace treaty with it, Saudi Arabia can engage Israelis and Palestinians in its large book fairs, initiate tele-bridges (as was done in Soviet Union during the Perestroika when people from Soviet Union and USA were first brought together) and promote other similar activities. The Saudi World Muslim League had undertaken a trip to Aushwitz in 2019 and it is already active in promoting the “wasatiya” (moderation) in Muslim societies abroad.

1. Conclusion

Saudi Arabia is currently looking for its place in the regional system where new, bold actors, such as neighboring Dubai operate fast and change facts on the ground. It has to decide, whether it’s interested to play a role in bringing the Israelis and the Palestinians closer together in order to stabilize the system and avoid another dangerous spiral of violence. If it will choose to do so, it will have to improvise and take risks, which seems to fit the current mood of its young leadership. It can start with taking the “baby steps” in various fields – from allowing joint academic researches with other companies, to economic initiatives that will boost Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, such as the QIZ mechanism. Saudi Arabia can use its religious influence to promote “wasatiya” (moderation), and it already does so today through its World Muslim League.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia as a regional heavy weight, cannot risk failure. It will get involved if it can benefit from the process and if the necessary guaranties are provided, something that will be difficult to achieve in today’s unstable regional climate. Currently it might concentrate on smaller steps behind the scenes in order to improve the chances for peace building in the future.

[1] “The Arab Peace Initiative at 15 Years,” Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, July 2017.

הפוסט Saudi Arabia’s Engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace NGOs sector, which was at its peak – in terms of scope of activity – during the Oslo process in the 1990s, has been losing ground over the last two decades. The failure to reach a final-status agreement, repeated rounds of escalation, and political leaderships with other priorities and contrasting ideologies have led both the international community and local organizations to take a step back.

Donor fatigue became evident, as foreign governments and major foundations provided less funding to Israeli and Palestinian peace NGOs. This was coupled with a growing public indifference in Israel regarding the Palestinian issue and a rise in Palestinian opposition to interact with Israelis, even for the cause of peace (the anti-normalization movement). The results were fewer joint projects, less interaction, and less understanding between Israelis and Palestinians. Cross-border work was shrinking, and many civil society organizations, which used to bring Israelis and Palestinians together on a regular basis, turned inwards and focused more on working with their domestic constituencies.

Two and three decades ago, the average Israeli student interested in politics and international relations would have had multiple opportunities to participate in dialogue projects with Palestinian counterparts, either locally or abroad. Later in their careers, participants (who were still a small segment of society) would utilize the network and insights gained through such projects to advance positive change. This is not the case anymore, as such opportunities have become rare. Civil society cross-border peacebuilding activities are currently being carried out by relatively few organizations, most of them too small to make a significant impact.

This reality, which according to opinion polls had a negative impact on attitudes of Israelis and Palestinians towards each other and towards prospects of peace, was noticed by the international community. The 2016 Middle East Quartet’s report, which identified obstacles on the way to a two-state solution and devised a set of recommendations on how to overcome them, called to increase “interaction and cooperation in a variety of fields – economic, professional, educational, cultural – that strengthen the foundations for peace and countering extremism.”

However, the report did not lead to tangible actions or to a positive change in the dynamics on the ground. On the contrary. The Trump administration limited U.S. funding for cross-border Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. An opportunity for improvement emerged in December 2020, when Congress passed MEPPA. In the legislation, it was decided that the U.S. will allocate $250 million over a period of five years to promote “economic cooperation, people-to-people peacebuilding programs,” and to advance “shared community building, peaceful coexistence, dialogue and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.”

The legislation, lobbied for by the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP) for over a decade as part of a campaign to establish an International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, came into force as a new U.S. Administration – once again committed to the two-state solution after four years of Trump – took office. A few months later, in June 2021, another positive development took place. A new Israeli Government was formed, with participation – after many years – of parties that openly support the two-state solution and ministers who actively seek to engage and cooperate with their Palestinian counterparts.

This is not likely to lead to renewed peace negotiations but is positively altering ties between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. When ministers and senior officials from both sides meet and interact, as has been happening since mid-2021, ordinary citizens feel a growing legitimacy to do so themselves; the heavy criticism voiced by previous Netanyahu governments towards those working for peace has disappeared from official rhetoric; Israeli peace activists have begun to feel that they have supporters in government who can back them and provide assistance as needed; and regional developments – chief among them the normalization agreements – have made Israeli-Arab cooperation much more widespread.

It is in this context that a potentially game-changing amount of new American funding is entering the scene, providing a unique opportunity to rebuild and restructure the pro-peace community, so it can become more visible, influential, and effective. For this to happen, the new funding should not be distributed to specific projects in a more-of-the-same manner, but should rather be utilized in an innovative, multifaceted and flexible way that will foster a broader structural change in the field. The U.S. Administration should carry out an in-depth strategic planning process on how to best allocate the new resources. This article recommends that such a process should lead to official involvement of Israelis and Palestinians in the implementation of MEPPA (not just as grant recipients), set up diverse funding tracks and priorities, and specify actions to elevate the peacebuilding field (including a broader international commitment to support pro-peace NGOs).

Official Involvement of Israelis and Palestinians

Efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace are too often driven and led by external actors, without enough consultation and involvement of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. This limits the effectiveness of such efforts and makes it more difficult for third parties to intervene in a way that addresses local needs, fits realities on the ground, and is in line with political interests, capabilities, and limitations. An effort to bring about structural change in the Israeli-Palestinian civil society peacebuilding sphere requires the involvement of Israelis and Palestinians in the strategic planning, decision making, and implementation processes.

First and foremost, Congress should appoint an Israeli and a Palestinian as members of the MEPPA Advisory Board. The Advisory Board is required by law and will have 13-15 seats, appointed by the USAID administrator and specific congressional leaders. The Advisory Board, which will advise on the types of projects to be funded, is legally open to membership of foreign nationals and could benefit from the inclusion of senior pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian civil society representatives.

In addition, a working group of Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilding experts (who are not related to organizations seeking funds) can be set up by the local USAID mission. This working group can at first conduct a study that maps and assesses the current state of affairs in the peacebuilding field, identifies needs and lacunas, and points out promising and impactful initiatives that are worthy of scaling up. At the later phase, the working group should be invited to advise USAID through involvement in the external reviewing process of applications submitted, the monitoring and evaluating progress of selected initiatives, and the annual updating of funding priorities based on changing realities, best practices, and lessons learned.

Diverse Funding Tracks and Priorities

The nature of MEPPA – providing large amounts in a multiannual framework – enables to go beyond the traditional models of grantmaking. For example, the common projects-based funding model poses a major obstacle to NGOs. While enabling specific activities to take place, it provides only limited resources for the organizational infrastructure that is necessary for effective project implementation. Projects-based funding also limits organizational capacities for long-term planning, human resource development, and flexible adaptations to new opportunities and developments. MEPPA should include a funding track that provides general organizational support to NGOs that excel at their peacebuilding work, address a major need or fill an important niche, and demonstrate high potential for impact if scaled up.

In addition, MEPPA could allocate a certain amount for proactive unsolicited funding – not in response to proposals submitted but as a result of a certain program or organization being identified by the selection committee as especially worthy, or in an attempt to launch a new initiative that answers an existing lacuna in the peacebuilding field. MEPPA should also encourage organizations to apply as a consortium of multiple partners. This will help foster a much-needed culture of cooperation among the propeace NGO community, known for internal rivalries and competition, and will create new synergies that can help overcome limited organizational capacities and lead to a bigger impact.

It could also be beneficial to enable emerging initiatives and small-sized organizations to apply for small-scale funding, in as much a bureaucracy-free manner as possible. This will help ensure that funding is not granted only to the usual recipients of USAID grants, to well-established institutions (which may have a proven track record but are not always the most effective at adapting to changing realities on the ground), or to American entities that are adept at securing big USAID contracts. It will enable funding to also benefit innovative and risk-taking initiatives that might still lack institutional capacity but have the potential to chart new paths of impact.

Funding priorities should also be diversified and not focus only on grassroots activities. Pro-peace policy planning and advancement, as well as track-two dialogue channels, should also be encouraged and supported. Moreover, recent regional developments – between Israel and Arab countries, in the Mediterranean, and between the Middle East and Europe – open a space for multilateral and inter-regional projects (as well as joint funding mechanisms) that also serve the cause of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and in which there is involvement and leadership of Israelis and Palestinians. Such initiatives that innovate the peacebuilding field, are in line with current events, and prove capacity to fulfill new opportunities should be defined as eligible for funding and evaluated positively.

Actions to Elevate the Peacebuilding Field

MEPPA funding can be utilized in a way that benefits civil society peacebuilding as a whole, not only specific organizations or projects. It could provide structural responses to needs and challenges faced by many NGOs working to increase interaction and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

There is a need to professionalize the peacebuilding field. Many organizations are led or run by volunteers or staff who have the best of intentions but not enough formal expertise and skills. Providing tailormade training sessions and workshops to members of pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian organizations, funded through MEPPA and delivered via USAID and via existing service-providing platforms in the pro-peace ecosystem, can make a genuine impact. Relevant topics can include mediation and facilitation skills, project and financial management, theories of change in conflict resolution, overcoming asymmetries and cultural differences, ways to promote inclusivity in peacemaking, paths to policy impact, and better understanding regional developments and their impact on Israeli-Palestinian relations.

It will also be beneficial to invest in documenting lessons learned by key figures in the Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding ecosystem, so these can help guide a new generation of changemakers. Israeli-Palestinian civil society peacebuilding efforts have been taking place for more than three decades, through ups and downs in the peace process; alas, apart from a few books and memoirs, there is no accumulation of collective knowledge. In addition, a mentoring program could be set up to enable peacebuilders to benefit from MEPPA-funded one-on-one consultations with highly experienced professionals in relevant organizational and content-related fields.

MEPPA could also assist organizations to overcome technical and political difficulties involved in bringing Israelis and Palestinians together by ensuring backing from the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority for its funded programs (for example, to ease issues related to cross-border travel and entry permits), by providing accessible and safe physical spaces for bilateral meetings to take place in, and by assisting organizations that face domestic opposition to their work. MEPPA could also empower its grantees by providing them with international visibility (when this is desired by the grantees), connecting them to each other, and assisting them in formulating international partnerships with peers in the U.S. and beyond.

In conclusion, the increased funding to be allocated over the next years by the U.S. to support Israeli and Palestinian civil society peacebuilding efforts has the potential to be a game changer. It can elevate a field of action that dwindled down over the last two decades, reignite it, and turn it into a catalyst for increased interaction and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians, also on the policy and political levels. For this to happen, MEPPA should be carried out in a strategic and innovative manner, which also ensures long-term multilateral funding to civil society peacebuilding. The benefits of doing so will exceed the successful implementation of selected projects. It will also help rebrand the peacebuilding field, strengthen institutional capacities, and possibly encourage additional countries to follow the U.S. and increase support for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. This is well worth the effort.

The op-ed was published in Palestine-Israel Journal in February 2022.

הפוסט Making the Middle East Partnership for Peace Act a Game Changer in Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In January 2001, US President Bill Clinton met with President-elect George W. Bush and presented him with a priority list of the most important global security issues. At the top were two issues – Osama bin Laden/al Qaeda and “the absence of peace in the Middle East.” The meeting took place shortly after Clinton’s intensive efforts to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement had failed. Twenty years later, the position of the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the US priority list, and that of the international community in general, has changed dramatically. International interest and engagement have faded during the last decade while the peace process has been paralyzed since the collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace initiative in 2013–14.

The Biden administration has not appointed a special envoy on Israeli-Palestinian affairs and has shown only low-level engagement with the conflict. Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained at his confirmation hearing that the new administration supports a two-state solution, but added: “I think realistically it’s hard to see near-term prospects for moving forward on that.” There seems to be a lack of urgency and no clear international strategy on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, as evidenced by the fact that the Quartet (the US, Russia, UN and EU) is not playing an active role, despite broad expectations that the Biden administration would revitalize the group’s activity after its paralysis during the Trump years. The 2020 normalization agreements between Israel and UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan are further proof that the prominence of the Palestinian issue in some parts of the Arab world has declined.

Many international actors criticized Trump’s policy toward the conflict, especially regarding issues such as Jerusalem and settlements. They also welcomed the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation plans were shelved as part of the Israeli-UAE normalization agreement, and that the US, under President Biden, has returned to international consensus. The Biden administration has stressed its alignment with international law and the well-known parameters for resolving the conflict, renewed the dialogue with the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah (after a three-year rift) and resumed US aid to the Palestinians (and to UNRWA). But it did not reverse some of Trump’s actions, and in particular, despite its promises, did not reopen the US consulate in Jerusalem, which conducted contact with the Palestinians over the years and was folded into the embassy by Trump. Most importantly, it has failed to pursue diplomatic initiatives to get the parties to the table.

Explanations for this lack of US attention are easy to find in the bigger crises occupying this administration: the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, China, Ukraine, as well as more pressing regional issues in Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Yemen. Yet the Israeli-Palestinian context itself offers ample reasons: the repeated failures of past rounds of negotiations tell a cautionary tale for any international actor hoping to advance talks, leading them to focus resources elsewhere. It is easy to conclude from the realities on the ground that the time is not ripe for talks. On the Palestinian side, the deep rift between the Hamas ruling Gaza and the Palestinian Authority (PA), with its own deficits in democracy, raise the question of who could credibly negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. While the international policy of isolating Hamas has not diminished its grip on power in the Gaza Strip, the PA’s approval ratings have reached historic lows, the 2021 elections have once again been postponed and a whopping 74% of respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip now say they would welcome the resignation of PA President Abu Mazen, who’s in his sixteenth year in office. On the Israeli side, four consecutive elections between Spring 2019 and Spring 2021 finally brought a “change” government to power. Yet this government, united only in its desire to end Benjamin Netanyahu’s long tenure, comprises coalition partners from across the ideological spectrum – and even includes a Palestinian party for the first time – and is thus not in a position to take any bold steps in possible negotiations. Furthermore, rightwing and hawkish positions continue to dominate the Israeli discourse on the Palestinian issue; both Israeli and Palestinian public opinions have gradually lost faith in the peace process and in the possibility of a two-state agreement. International hesitancy to invest political capital in attempts to kickstart talks under these conditions thus comes as no surprise.

The escalation of violence and war in Gaza in May 2021 briefly brought the conflict back into the headlines and social media channels, and to the forefront of international politics. Initially centered around evictions of Palestinians from their homes in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood and clashes between Palestinians and Israeli police at the Damascus Gate and the Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa compound, violence quickly escalated across towns with mixed Jewish and Palestinian populations throughout Israel proper and culminated in an 11-day war between Hamas and Israel. However, following international involvement in brokering a ceasefire, led by the Biden administration and Egypt, even this war failed to generate lasting international engagement.

Signals emanating from the new Israeli government, formed in June 2021, are mixed. While some of its leaders, such as Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, express support for a two-state solution and the resumption of the peace process, others, among them Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, oppose peace negotiations and a Palestinian state. After years of political disconnect, the new government renewed high-level dialogue among Israeli and Palestinian officials – including meetings between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and PA President Abu Mazen and between Lapid and PA Civil Affairs Minister Hussein Al-Sheikh – and agreed on certain confidence-building measures addressing civil and economic issues. Nevertheless, the situation on the ground has not meaningfully changed; the expansion of settlements proceeds; de facto annexation inches closer to reality; settler violence is on the rise; the eviction of Palestinian residents from their homes in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan neighborhoods continues apace; and the Israeli government has criminalized the work of Palestinian civil society groups.

The reluctance of international actors to get involved in attempts to renew Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking is accompanied by a misleading sense of stability and calm. The world should pay attention to forces inherent in the status quo that are anything but stable. Ongoing settlement expansion and gradual de facto annexation undermine any prospects of a viable two-state negotiated outcome, which is still the official international consensus; tensions continue to rise at various points of friction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, with settler groups’ increased use of violence and efforts to create new outposts; the deep political and economic crisis in the Palestinian Authority, together with continued Hamas-Fatah strife and Hamas’ efforts to ignite the West Bank, raises concerns over the stability of the PA and potential chaos in the West Bank; and given the explosive situation and humanitarian crisis in Gaza, another Israel-Hamas flare-up is always possible.

Against this background, the US and the international community cannot afford to ignore the conflict, nor focus only on small-scale de-escalation and economic measures; conditions call for addressing the structural and deep-rooted problems directly while working toward a long-term political vision that includes a real transformation of the situation on the ground. On Jan. 19 of this year, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor Wennesland crystallized this point in an address to the UN Security Council: “Piecemeal approaches and half measures will only ensure that the underlying issues perpetuating the conflict continue to fester and worsen over time” and “efforts by the parties and the international community to stabilize and improve conditions on the ground should be linked to a political framework.” While it’s easy to surmise that the Biden administration is focused on preventing war and not brokering peace, history exposes the pitfalls of this short-sighted vision – short-term efforts at preventing escalations will not suffice to stop the forces at play, which over time increasingly mitigate against an agreement. Without a political vision, confidence-building measures and economic incentives aimed at “shrinking the conflict” are unsustainable. The war in May 2021 made clear that when they so desire, international actors can pressure Israelis and Palestinians and achieve results. The world should not wait for the next escalation to put this into practice.

Dana Landau is a senior researcher focusing on mediation and peace processes at swisspeace, the Swiss Peace Foundation. She teaches political science at the University of Basel.

The op-ed was published in The Security Times in February 2022.

הפוסט That other crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s alternative to two-state solution is apartheid regime הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Birzeit University students are demanding that the administration be replaced, since it was unable to protect students and guarantee their safety following the arrest of five students by Israel Defense Forces soldiers on the campus, located near the West Bank city of Ramallah.

On Tuesday, hundreds of students protested against the Israeli raid that took place on the campus the previous day. The five arrested students belong to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and two of them were released the same day. The arrests took place during a student strike over tuition fees that began days earlier.

Many Palestinian activists both online and at the university protest accused the administration of collaboration with Israel and attempts to normalize relations with Israel while students are being arrested on campus. Others stressed that the arrests occurred while students were in the midst of fighting against the rising costs of studying and living on campus.

According to a statement released by the university on Monday night, all disciplinary measures against student activists over activities during the previous weeks were suspended. According to sources at the university, its president, Professor Beshara Doumani, who was appointed to his position in October 2021, is currently abroad.

The arrests are definitely not the first to take place at Birzeit, Mohammed Daraghmeh, a bureau chief of Asharq News, told The Media Line. “There were also arrests on campus in December 2021, as well as in October 2021. It seems that this time the situation was also aggravated due to internal tensions between different Palestinian factions on the campus.”

According to the Birzeit University website, Israeli forces in 2020 arrested 58 of its students, including six females. In October of that year, Israel’s military declared the Democratic Progressive Student Pole (DPSP), the leftist student body on campus, to be an “unlawful association.” Last month, Israeli soldiers staged a late-night raid on the faculty buildings of the university and searched the area.

The IDF is not the only force that performs arrests on Birzeit’s campus. After recurring violent outbreaks between Fatah and Hamas activists on the campus, PA security forces last month arrested a few students who were directly involved in the violence. This development brought waves of criticism against the university administration.

A Birzeit student who spoke to The Media Line on condition of anonymity, describes the atmosphere at the university as “toxic” and emphasizes that the tension between the factions has grown significantly since Palestinian parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2021 were postponed indefinitely. Experts believe that Hamas is currently the strongest and the most popular movement at Birzeit, which was once a stronghold of the ruling Fatah movement. The decision by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to postpone parliamentary and presidential elections was highly criticized by Palestinian political and human rights activists, and by Hamas and other Palestinian movements, as well as by some ex-Fatah leaders who planned to run against both Fatah and Hamas.

Violent events also have taken place at other Palestinian universities. Dozens were injured during clashes at Al-Quds University, which has campuses in Jerusalem, Abu Dis and al-Bireh, while Mahran Khaliliyeh, a nursing student at Arab American University in Jenin, was stabbed to death at the entrance to the campus on December 4 during a brawl between politically active students.

Sam Bahour, a Palestinian businessman who used to be a member of the Birzeit University board of trustees, is concerned about the absence of a reaction by the PA education minister, as well as the prime minister.

“Birzeit is a 16,000-student-strong university. Its doors have been shut, the students are on strike and the atmosphere is toxic. I keep asking: Where is the minister of higher education? Where is the government to mediate and interfere? Also, after a few days of strike, a prime minister could also say a few words, I believe,” Bahour told The Media Line.

Dr. Ghassan Khatib, vice president of Birzeit, told The New Arab that the current conflict also derives from the fact that the Palestinian Authority “doesn’t comply with its financial commitments to the university,” but insisted that the university stands united with the students to condemn Israeli raids and arrests of students.

This article is from “The Media Line“, from January 11, 2022

הפוסט Students Accuse Birzeit University Administration of Collaboration Following IDF Campus Arrest הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In 2006, Israeli reporters were banned from entering the Gaza Strip and doing their job there – reporting on events in Gaza.

At first, the ban that was introduced 15 years ago by the Israel Defense Forces Southern Command seemed temporary; in June 2006, Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was kidnapped into Gaza, and during that turbulent year a few reporters were kidnapped by terrorists, as well. But the following year Hamas took full control of Gaza, and the ban was never lifted.

Since then, Israeli reporters and foreign reporters with Israeli nationality are not permitted to enter Gaza. They can observe the Strip from nearby cities and kibbutzim near the border in southern Israel – and during military operations there often are long lines of cameras and reporters based there. But, despite its geographical proximity and importance to life in Israel, the Strip has become a kind of Forbidden City. While Israeli reporters do recognize the dangers inherent in reporting from Gaza, they admit that Gaza is currently underreported in the Israeli media and dream about returning there to do their job again.

Away From the Public Eye, Away From the Agenda

“Certainly, today Gaza is very low on the media’s agenda, largely because we, the Israeli reporters, cannot work there. Once, until mid-2006, it was easier; you went there to report not only on security but also on other aspects of life. Not through the ‘security lens.’ All this is gone now,” Ohad Hemo, Palestinian Affairs correspondent for Israel’s Channel 12, told The Media Line.

According to Jacky Hugi, Arab affairs editor and host at Israeli broadcaster Galei Tzahal, the absence of Israeli reporters on the ground has hurt significantly the spread of information about the severe humanitarian crisis in the Strip and has affected Israeli public opinion about what is really happening in Gaza.

“The fact that journalists and officials in various positions, such as doctors, academics and politicians, are barred from entering the Gaza Strip, has been very damaging to both sides, especially in the humanitarian aspect. Gaza is experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis. It cried out for years, and no one in Israel listened, because those who were outspoken about it were mainly Hamas leaders, and their statements were perceived as propaganda,” Hugi told The Media Line. “If Israeli journalists had entered there and seen the reality with their own eyes, the suffering of the population would have been presented to the Israeli public in voice and image. It did not happen. Both sides, each for his own reasons, prevented the safe entry of journalists and others, thereby harming the interest of the residents of the Gaza Strip and contributing to the exclusion of their suffering from Israeli public opinion,” he also said.

In the absence of civil reporting on Gaza, many Israelis rely on questionable resources upon which to draw knowledge about life in the coastal strip, such as viral videos on WhatsApp and Facebook that present a rosy picture of life in Gaza and focus on lovely villas, manicured lawns, and trendy malls. This, despite the fact that every reporter that has ever covered the Strip knows that these photos represent the tiny minority of Gazan millionaires, while the vast majority live well below the poverty line and over 50% of Gazans are unemployed.

At the same time, Gideon Levy, a veteran journalist at the left-wing daily Haaretz newspaper who has reported on Palestinian affairs for many decades, believes that the ban on Israeli reporters didn’t change much the public perspective of the conflict and human suffering in the Strip.

“Personally, for me, this ban was extremely dramatic. It took away most of the work that I could do. If you’ll offer me now to go anywhere, I would choose Gaza. However, publicly, I know that there wouldn’t be much of a difference. Military reporters would mostly go there, while only a few would read my reports from there. How do I know that? The West Bank is open, and it is severely under-covered today. People just don’t want to know, they don’t want to be bothered with the facts,” Levy told The Media Line.

The Fear Factor

It is not clear how dangerous Gaza would be today for Israeli reporters, given that Hamas has controlled all aspects of life in the Strip for the last 15 years. While all of the journalists interviewed would love to have a chance to visit Gaza again, many admit that the situation there is far from being stable or secure for Israeli citizens armed only with pens, pencils and cameras.

“The last time I was in Gaza was during the disengagement period, just before Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip. The last visits were very, very tense, and for the first time I felt a certain insecurity, and once I even said that I was a foreign and non-Israeli journalist, something I had never done before, in many years of covering the Strip,” said Anat Saragusti, a veteran Israeli journalist and director of Press Freedom Projects for the Union of Journalists in Israel. “Foreign journalists can enter Gaza, but they too are under some cloud and have to resort to local fixers. Can local fixers be completely independent? Is there any journalistic approach to decision-making centers in the Gaza Strip? What I am trying to say is that it is not just because of the ban on journalists, but also because the situation in the Gaza Strip is so problematic on so many levels,” she added.

In the past, Saragusti says she often traveled to the hottest spots, such as Gaza during the first and the second Intifada, as well as to besieged Beirut during the 1980s.

Hemo believes that the concerns of the Israeli army are not farfetched. “They tried to kidnap me there,” he said of his time in Gaza. Despite this, Hemo asked Hamas authorities again for a permit to enter the Strip but was flatly denied. “They told me: ‘You are not welcome here,’” he said.

Gideon Levy says that many foreign journalists work in Gaza and, despite the presence of Hamas are able to successfully do very good work there. “I understand the army’s concern. However, we, the Israeli reporters, could also be kidnapped in the West Bank, and we are still allowed to go there. The thing is that Gaza, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at large, is not part of the agenda anymore. Not only Israelis; the world had lost interest in the conflict, everything is stuck. No one knows what to do with them [the Palestinians] so we prefer to act as if there is no elephant in the room,” he said.

Levy says that he is happy with every piece of reporting that re-humanizes the Palestinians and Gaza. “Unfortunately, there are very few of those,” he said.

“Gaza is the real thing,” added Hemo. “I would love to go back there, of course, if given a chance.”

For now, as Israel moves in circles between the rounds of cross-border violence, interest in what is happening in the Strip only arises when the rockets fall again on Israeli cities.

This article is from “The Media Line“, from January 9, 2022

הפוסט With No Israeli Reporters on the Ground, Gaza Remains Invisible to Public הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Recently, Israel increased the number of Gazans allowed to work in Israel under “merchant permits” to 10,000, although 90% of them are not engaged in trade. After the recent meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, it was rumored that Israel would increase the quota even more to calm poverty-struck Gaza and improve the well-being of its population. Why did Jerusalem change its policy after 15 years of blockade and how will this decision influence life in Gaza and in Israel?

‘Like winning the lottery’

“These days it’s impossible to approach the Chamber of Commerce in Gaza. Thousands of desperate men wait there every day to apply for ‘merchant permits,’” Issam Ghazaleh, a resident of Gaza City, tells The Media Line. “Today this is the only way to get to Israel, to have an opportunity to earn some money and provide for your family.”

Ghazaleh used to work in Israel, until 2000. Then the Second Intifada broke out, and soon the number of labor permits was significantly reduced.

Since the Hamas coup d’état in 2007, only a few dozen Gazans – mostly large-scale traders and patients at Israeli hospitals who carried special permits – were able to cross into Israel each day. Ghazaleh, who by then was 60 years old, never returned to work in Israel. Now some men in his family hope to acquire a coveted permit. Only a few will succeed.

“I personally thank everyone who was involved in this decision [by Israel to issue more permits],” says Fayyez, a Palestinian who currently works in Ashkelon. “We want to work; we don’t want to depend on food cards or charity packages. Palestinians from Gaza always worked in Israel, and both sides benefited.”

He and his brothers and sons worked for many years in Kibbutz Kerem Shalom, where they developed excellent ties with local families.

The unemployment rate in the Strip exceeded 50% in 2021, which is why many Gazans equal an Israeli work permit to a winning lottery ticket. In Israel, some decision-makers believe that by allowing Gazans to pass through the Erez crossing, Israel can postpone the next wave of hostilities with Hamas.

“Israel doesn’t have any other option but to let the Gazans work here,” Maj. Gen. (res.) Kamil Abu Rukun, the former head of COGAT, the Israel Defense Ministry unit that deals with civilian issues in Gaza and in Area C of the West Bank, tells The Media Line.

“That’s what we have tried to do since 2014. We succeeded in delaying the next war. Instead of an outbreak of violence once every three to four years, it happened [in May 2021] after seven and a half years. The economy is the key factor here. Also, Hamas is afraid of economic hardships as the population might turn against them,” Abu Rukun says.

A place under the sun

“We are ready to work hard, and every Israeli knows this,” says Fayyez, who now spends more time in Ashkelon than in his hometown in Gaza.

“Gazans’ only concern today is that they will be deceived by dishonest people in Israel. They need to know that at the end of the day they will get their money. Today they can’t even turn to the police, since they have a merchant permit and not a regular one,” he continues.

Fayyez adds that it’s harder to find work in Israel than before. “The Gazans were absent for 15 years, and their places were taken by others,” he says.

Pepe Marzipar, a member of Kerem Shalom, tells The Media Line that for now there are no laborers from Gaza in the kibbutz, although in the past it relied heavily on them in its factories and fields.

“Since they’ve been gone, laborers from the South Hebron Hills [in the West Bank] were brought here to work,” says Marzipar, who decorates his home with art made of parts of Qassam rockets that often strike the kibbutz and its vicinity. He speaks fondly of Palestinian families from Gaza whom he knows well from the old times. “Some of them worked in the factory, others in construction or as movers. I know that some already found work in [Kibbutz] Nitzanim, Ashkelon and other places around here,” he says.

Unlike the 100,000 Palestinians from the West Bank who enter Israel legally every day with regular work permits, Gazans can only get to Israel with a merchant’s permit. This reality creates many problems, says Abu Rukun.

“When the laborer is going through the standard procedure, he is protected, health- and salary-wise. If he falls and hurts himself, there is insurance. He knows where to go if his salary is delayed. But the ‘merchants’ do not have an address to complain to or report maltreatment,” he says.

Even 10,000 work permits will inject approximately NIS 1 billion ($323 million) into the Gazan economy, Abu Rukun says. He believes there is no problem with demand for the workers, as the majority work in construction and other sectors that always need more people.

Security challenge

For years Israeli authorities hoped that economic pressure would strengthen the anti-Hamas sentiment in the Strip and eventually help bring about a revolt against the Islamist movement. Some experts also said that laborers from the Strip could be dangerous since Hamas operatives might hide among them.

Just a few weeks ago, the Shin Bet security service announced that a Palestinian and an Israeli citizen had been arrested in Jaffa on suspicion of espionage, and indictments were filed against them. According to the indictment, the pair tried to locate and photograph locations of Iron Dome rocket defense units and IDF bases.

But Abu Rukun dismisses such fears. “I do not believe that these laborers will constitute a threat. Only a few ever used this framework to harm Israel. They are breadwinners and each one provides for many others. Israel has no choice but to let them work; we must do a good job facilitating this,” he says.

Meanwhile, Fayyez, Ghazaleh and thousands of others in Gaza hope and pray that the current stability will continue and allow them to work and provide for their families back home.

“If there will be work, there will be no war,” says Fayyez. “People will be busy with their work and ways of making more money. We really need this today. I hope that there will not be another war.”

This article is from “The Media Line“, from January 5, 2022

הפוסט In Hopes of Postponing the Next War, Israel Lets Gazans Back in After 15 Years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been locked in a stalemate since the 2014 collapse of the US mediation initiative led by then-Secretary of State John Kerry. The relations between the parties have been all but severed and characterized by a series of crises and tensions that peaked over Israel’s 2020 West Bank annexation plan. While the Israeli-Arab normalization agreements removed the annexation idea from the agenda, this did not change the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Developments in recent months in the Israeli-Palestinian arena pose challenges and risks but also new opportunities and possibilities. Special attention should be paid to the impact of the May 2021 escalation, the deep crisis in the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the establishment of a new government in Israel.

This paper maps the international discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace under the current conditions, and constitutes a follow-up to the paper we published in April 2021. It is based on a series of dialogues held by Mitvim Institute experts in August and September 2021 with European, American and Palestinian diplomats and experts, as well as UN officials, and also on a series of discussions among a team of Israeli experts formed by Mitvim.^[1] The paper offers an analysis of the positions and perceptions of international actors regarding the effects of the latest developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and their insights and conclusions about the feasible and desired measures that could be undertaken to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace.

^[1] The dialogues were conducted under Chatham House rules. Accordingly, this article does not mention participants’ names and does not attribute direct quotes to them. The dialogues were led on the part of the Mitvim Institute by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Gil Murciano and Dr. Nimrod Goren.

הפוסט One step forward, one step back: International discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Ministry of Regional Cooperation was established in 1999 as a product of political bargaining. Then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak sought to find a job for Shimon Peres, the peace advocate whom he did not want as his foreign minister. Peres used the new ministry as a platform to advance his vision of a new Middle East, while Barak led an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

The Ministry was subsequently shut down (2003), reconstituted in 2009 and has been led since by various Likud party ministers whose agenda did not include advancing a two-state solution. These office holders directed most of their energy to largely futile efforts to advance projects with Jordan. “My ministry was born in sin and should have been shuttered long ago,” declared Likud’s Ofir Akunis upon ending his term as Minister of Regional Cooperation in mid-2021.

The appointment of Esawi Frej of Meretz as Minister of Regional Cooperation in June 2021 was a breath of fresh air. For the first time in years, the Minister heading the office is wholly identified with advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and relations with Arab and Muslim countries. “The Palestinian issue is the most central to Israel and must receive full priority,” Frej said after taking office. He added that although a 2009 government resolution tasked the ministry with handling key economic components of ties with the Palestinians, his predecessors from Likud had neglected the issue.

Frej announced plans to visit Ramallah and renew the work of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) with the Palestinians, founded within the framework of the Oslo Accords. His ministry stated that it will “formulate and implement measures to remove barriers and strengthen the economic, civilian, social and cultural ties with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and enhance trust between Israel and the PA”. More specifically, the ministry targets “managing and accompanying infrastructure, environmental, tourism, economic, trade, culture, education and sports projects; initiating investment plans; and identifying and lifting barriers to the movement of goods and people, and in the field of infrastructure”.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ avoidance of significant dealings with the PA left a more open field for the Ministry of Regional Cooperation. During his first six months in office, Frej focused on economic aspects related to the PA and to Israel’s relations with it. These issues were handled in the past by the ministers of finance and the economy. The Ministry of Defense and Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) continue to play a significant role in this regard. The activity of Frej in this field included moves on the domestic Israeli front and in the international arena, and bilateral steps vis-à-vis the PA.

Within Israel, the Ministry of Regional Cooperation made efforts to raise public and political awareness of the severe economic crisis in the PA and of the need to alleviate it in order, inter alia, to prevent negative repercussions on Israel. Frej raised the issue with Defense Minister Benny Gantz ahead of his meeting in Ramallah with Mahmoud Abbas, promoted Israeli loans to the PA to be repaid from the tax revenues that Israel collects for the PA, spoke publicly of the need to strengthen the PA to prevent its collapse, and declared his intention to encourage Israeli chambers of commerce to accelerate economic activity with the Palestinians and with Jordan.

In the international arena, Frej represented the Government of Israel at a November 2021 meeting of the international donor group for Palestine (AHLC) in Oslo, where he encouraged participants to financially support the PA. Frej also called on foreign businesspeople and corporations to invest in the Palestinian economy, in cooperation with Israel, and held international meetings to discuss economic issues.

The bilateral Israeli-Palestinian moves taken by the Ministry of Regional Cooperation, usually in cooperation with other Israeli government entities, included preparations for renewing the work of the JEC and implementation of the Paris Protocol (the economic annex of the Oslo Accords), issuing 500 work permits for Palestinians in Israeli high-tech companies, expanding the quota of permits for Palestinian construction workers in Israel, attempts to ease the passage of people and goods at border crossings, and support for establishing industrial zones in the West Bank.

Upon taking office, Frej declared that “everything possible must be done – by the government, on the civilian and public diplomacy levels – to bring about the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and advancement of the two-state solution”. Indeed, the Ministry of Regional Cooperation appears, to be trying to promote improved economic relations with the Palestinians. While six months are not sufficient time for extensive achievements, the ministry seems to have a set an agenda in this field, which could make its mark in 2022.

However, to make a larger impact towards Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, the ministry needs to step up its activity in the political-public, policy and civilian fields, including in linking Israeli-Arab normalization processes to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The ministry has only taken limited action in these fields to date, focusing in 2021 on renewing ties between Israeli ministers (among them Frej, Gantz, Nitzan Horowitz, Tamar Zandberg and Omer Bar-Lev) and senior PA officials, on meetings with foreign diplomats and special envoys, and on calls for local government and civil society funding to create links with neighboring states and the PA. These measures will have to be continued in 2022, in addition to the following new directions:

In the political-public field, Frej should continue to clearly advocate for the two-state solution and for urgent action in that direction. He would do well to ask for periodic hearings on the Israeli-Palestinian issue at the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In addition, the ministry could launch a ministerial forum for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace and coordinate its activities, lead staff work in preparation for the future resumption of the peace process, follow developments on the ground and their effect – whether positive or negative – on prospects of peace, and establish an experts’ forum to formulate recommendations on how to mobilize the normalization agreements with Arab countries for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace (the Israeli Climate Forum, recently formed by President Herzog could serve as an example).

In the policy field, it is incumbent on the Ministry of Regional Cooperation to expand the framework of meetings between Israeli and Palestinian ministers. Specifically, the ministries of foreign affairs, finance and economy, should be encouraged to develop ties with their Palestinian counterparts. Frej and his staff could initiate and facilitate such activity, making sure that meetings between ministers lead to an effective follow-up and produce tangible results. The ministry can also appoint a special envoy for contact with the PA, for example a diplomat with ambassadorial rank on loan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such an appointment would fill the vacuum resulting from the lack of official ties between the Israeli and Palestinian foreign ministries. Frej could also initiate a joint move with the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs to create a partnership with Jews around the world who are active in promoting peace and ties with the region. During the past decade, such Jewish activists have been often criticized by the Israeli right-wing leadership, and the new government should reach out to them and treat them as partners on the road to peace.

On the regional level, the Ministry should link Israel’s improving ties with Arab states to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. Frej should raise the Palestinian issue and its importance in meetings with Arab representatives, work to integrate the Palestinians into the emerging Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati coordination on electricity and water, and meet regularly with international envoys tasked with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Frej should also encourage other governments to follow in the footsteps of the US and enhance financial support for peace organizations. Moreover, his office should leverage regional frameworks in which Israel and the PA are members – such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, the Union for the Mediterranean, UN institutions, and parliamentary diplomacy forums. International organizations often serve as a sparring arena between Israelis and Palestinians; they should be turned instead into spaces for advancing cooperation.

In the civilian field, the Ministry of Regional Cooperation should assist pro-peace civil society organizations. Under the Netanyahu governments, these organizations were often de-legitimized and attempts were made to curtail their freedom. Frej should work to lift barriers, support organizations, help entrepreneurs, ease Israeli-Palestinian shared activities, give visibility to successful projects and influential organizations, and create an ongoing framework for engagement with peace NGOs. The former UN Special Coordinator Mladenov adopted such an approach in his work to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, and it could serve as a model. This should also be reflected in the ministry’s operations – for example prioritizing project proposals submitted to the ministry that include Palestinian participants, launching small-scale, bureaucracy-free funding for specific activities of peace organizations, and encouraging involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in promoting peace. The ministry could also help the Israeli and Palestinian Olympic Committees end the exclusion of Israelis and Palestinians from the Mediterranean Games – the “regional Olympics” – and promote a shared event by the Israeli and PA pavilions at the Dubai Expo.

In conclusion, despite the structural limitations in which the Ministry of Regional Cooperation operates, it currently has an opportunity to positively influence Israeli-Palestinian relations and contribute to peacemaking efforts. The ministry is being led, in a rare occurrence, by a minister committed to the two-state solution, who identifies the urgent need to advance the matter, who is attentive to the needs of the Palestinian side, who hails from the Arab population of Israel, and whose staff is well acquainted with Israeli peace organizations. What is more, Frej is serving at a unique time in which political, regional and international circumstances enable the advancement of new initiatives vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Not only in the economic field, but also in the political-public, policy and civilian fields. Advancing such initiatives should be the leading task for the ministry in 2022. While doing so, Frej should make sure that his efforts are not used as fig leaves to cover actions on the ground by the Israeli right-wing that jeopardize the two-state solution.

A shorter version of this article was published by The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט The Ministry of Regional Cooperation<br> and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

‘It is worth remembering,” Prof. Elyakim Rubinstein wrote five years ago on the 25th anniversary of the Madrid Conference, the multilateral event that launched the Israeli-Arab peace process of the 1990s. Rubinstein, who served at the time as head of the Israeli delegation to the bilateral talks with Jordan and the Palestinians, stated that the conference “was the start of all the diplomatic moves that ensued, and in that sense constituted a historic milestone.”

However, the Israeli public memory of the 1991 Madrid Conference, to the extent that it even exists, often focuses on the blistering speeches delivered by Israeli and Arab speakers – speeches bearing no resemblance to the tidings of peace that emerged following Yitzhak Rabin’s rise to power in 1992. Israelis who participated in the conference even like to recall tales of bravery about disrupting the Syrian speakers’ speeches with a noisy banging of spoons against glasses.

Indeed, the Madrid Conference is worthy of being remembered, but in a different light. There is much to be learned from it about advancing peace initiatives, and some lessons are relevant to our times: How global and regional changes create new opportunities for diplomacy and conflict resolution; how a determined US administration can overcome strenuous objections and concoct an international breakthrough toward peace; how a stubborn right-wing Israeli leader can be persuaded to take part in an event opposed to his worldview and how Arab states can display a willingness to engage with Israel even prior to according it official recognition.

This year, the multilateral aspect of the Madrid Conference is particularly relevant to the collective memory of the event. Multilateralism has become a buzzword in the international diplomatic discourse of recent years. It denotes combined action by several countries to achieve certain joint goals. The multilateral discourse gained traction as a counterweight to former president Donald Trump and his isolationist approach toward the rest of the world. France and Germany formed the Alliance for Multilateralism and were joined by 70 countries (Israel was not among them), which called for shared solutions to global problems. The intensification of the climate crisis and the coronavirus pandemic drove in the understanding that the challenges facing humanity require international partnerships. This, in turn, prompted growing international calls to strengthen existing multilateral institutions (with the UN at their head) and to establish new ones, governmental and non-governmental alike.

הפוסט Multilateralism is the key to peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Ninety-six Israeli Arab citizens, men, women and children, have been murdered since the beginning of 2021. Some were targeted in their car or home; others became accidental victims of other peoples’ fights. Today the wave of crime is also hitting the “mixed cities” where Jews and Arabs live together, and in some of these places, Jews, losing faith in the police, are organizing self-defense groups.

Why is Israel, a country with one of the ablest security forces in the Middle East, losing its battle against crime?

‘We know who will be killed by the end of the year’

“Once I was at a wedding in my city when one of the top criminals entered the hall. The singer immediately started praising him, and a few young men reached out to him and arranged a place of honor for him. It seemed that they respected him a lot,” Thabet Abu Rass, co-director of the Abraham Initiatives, which promotes Jewish-Arab coexistence, told The Media Line.

Abu Rass resides in Qalansuwa, an Arab city in central Israel. He knows some of the victims who were shot or threatened in recent years personally; in fact – everybody does.

“They shot a municipal general manager a few months ago, and during the last municipal elections, the leading candidate was threatened. In the end, he decided to withdraw his candidacy. Actually, sometimes we know who is going to get killed by the end of the year,” Abu Rass says.

Today, when hardly a day goes by without a shooting, a homicide, or a violent fight, it’s impossible to ignore this terrifying phenomenon. It’s widely reported in the Israeli media and occasionally the news from the raging crime in the Arab sector opens the news reports. Then the hashtag #Arab_Lives_Matter trends on the Israeli Twitter segment for a few days.

However, many social activists, members of Knesset and residents of Arab cities bitterly say that for years the government preferred to look the other way and ignore the growing problem.

“It was building up for quite a few years. Ten years ago I heard my friends say, ‘You must intervene in this matter before it’s too late,’” says Mossi Raz, a Meretz MK and longtime peace and coexistence activist. “We did not fully understand how fast the situation would deteriorate, and Israeli and Jewish society, in general, was less concerned. Only today that is starting to change.”

Raz rejects the claim often voiced in Israel that the killings have roots in Arab culture.

“If it is a cultural issue, why was the situation entirely different 30 years ago? Why is the situation different in Jordan or the occupied territories?” he asks, speaking to The Media Line.

“We are talking about powerful criminal gangs that thrive on extortion and protection, about neglect that lasted for too many years. In fact, some of these gangs also got involved in violent events this year, mainly in Acre and other cities in the North in May [at the time of the most recent Israel-Gaza war – K.S.]. I heard that they were burning the businesses of the Jews who declined to pay protection,” Raz says.

During the 1990s, organized crime thrived in Israel. Netanya, Ashdod, Lod and Nahariya became battlefields as Jewish criminal gangs settled their scores. It took years of struggle and investment of human and financial resources, but eventually, the state got the upper hand.

However, the situation in the Arab sector is and was always different. And today the state that is bombing nuclear facilities in neighboring countries is unable to prevent the next killing in Umm al-Fahm or Ramla.

“Many of the Arab municipalities are in fact exterritorial and the state doesn’t operate there. After the fateful events of October 2000 [13 Arab protesters were fatally shot by the Israeli police] and the report of the Or Commission [of Inquiry] that clearly stated that the Israeli police treats Arabs as enemies, the police decided to practically withdraw from the Arab sector,” says Abu Rass.

“After a few years, we realized that the vacuum that was left was quickly filled by crime. Today it is a catastrophe. When the police are interested – they get results. When they enforce the corona regulations, suddenly we see that they are focusing on Arab cities, but hardly act on crime and murders. The Arab society refuses to believe that the State of Israel is incapable of figuring out this issue and finding a solution,” he says.

Not all crime is organized

Afif Abu Much, a publicist and political activist, tells The Media Line, “According to the state comptroller’s recent report, over 30% of the Arab youth in the Negev area are school dropouts. Where do these kids go? They are certainly not going to work in car repair. They use social media, they see how other people live, and they want fast money.”

“We have a new generation of young people who do not work or study. They are sitting in the cafés and just spend their time there. It’s very easy to lure an unemployed young person into working for organized crime. They get them a car, a weapon, a salary, and now we have a generation of takhikha [Arabic for ‘shooters’],” says Abu Much.

However, not all shootings and murders in the Arab sector are related to organized crime. Sometimes fights erupt because of families fighting over a plot of land or even smaller issues, Abu Much continues.

“I believe that there is a problem with education. A person who disrespects the law, who is not taught respect and recognizes no authority, will easily break the law. Our society is changing, our cities are changing. We are not the same society we were 30-40 years ago. There is a process of modernization, and the traditional authority is no longer working,” he says.

“Also, the population of our cities is changing – suddenly families of collaborators [with the Shin Bet or the police] are settling down in some places in large numbers, and other families are running away from feuds and conflicts.”

Abu Much, as well as many Arab educators, members of Knesset and social activists, calls for the government and the police to act as soon as possible. He says somberly, however, that the problem will probably only be solved when the violence spills over sufficiently to the Jewish sector.

No magic remedy in hand

MK Ghaida Rinawie Zoabi (Meretz) places the blame squarely on the government for the failure in fighting crime in the Arab sector. Her colleague Raz believes it’s still too early to tell whether the efforts of the current government that is led by Naftali Bennett will bear fruit, but says that Public Security Minister Omer Bar-Lev of the Labor Party is dedicated and involved.

“He cares; there is no doubt about that. And they started collecting the illegal weapons here and there already. However, it is clear that the pace should be much faster. The police should prepare for tons of criticism because they will be enacting unpopular policies,” Raz says.

Abu Much suggests that the solution should come not only from the police but also through addressing difficult social issues, for example improving education, employment options and housing.

He also rejects the involvement of the Shin Bet security service in fighting crime in the Arab sector.

“Do they really need the Shin Bet to collect an illegal weapon from a 20-year-old? We need equality, and we need a police force that treats us equally,” Abu Much says.

Abu Rass, whose Abraham Initiatives organization has been monitoring the situation in the Arab sector for many years, believes in synergy among three partners – the state, the police and the Arab leaders.

“This is a complex issue, and that’s how it should be treated. There is already a program to fight crime that was approved by the previous government, budgeted at NIS 2.5 billion [$775 million, over five years]. Now we are waiting for the budget to get started. But everyone has to understand that this is only the beginning. After the neglect that lasted for many years, it’s time to act. If we don’t, people will continue to pay the price,” says Abu Rass.

The Knesset has until November 4 to approve the state budget, or else early elections will be automatically triggered.

The coalition, with its razor-thin majority, fears that the fierce criticism expressed by its own members such as Rinawie Zoabi regarding its policies on the novel coronavirus and violence in the Arab sector will result in destabilization and even revolt during the fateful budget votes.

Many Israeli citizens, both Jews and Arabs, are hugely skeptical of the ability of the police to fight crime.

One symptom of this is the WhatsApp anti-crime groups recently created lately in the city of Beersheba, where people report violence and sexual harassment, and others come to their aid. Another symptom is seen in the Arab cities, where gangsters often serve as mediators between families who prefer not to turn to the police.

The government needs to address this situation quickly, before the violence once again spills over into street fighting between groups of Jews and Arabs, as happened in May, during IDF’s Operation Guardian of the Walls against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

**The article was published on The Media Line, 30.9.2021

הפוסט Tsunami of Crime in Israel’s Arab Sector Has People Losing Faith in the Police הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The issue of negotiations with the Taliban ties in with a spirited debate taking place among scholars of international relations, around the dilemma of which Prof. Robert Mnookin describes as Bargaining with the Devil. The scholarship discusses the question of whether, and when, one should negotiate with terrorist organizations or “rogue states” and try to reach agreements with them. Scholars are divided on the issue, presenting a complex picture. They distinguish between tactical negotiations (e.g. on exchanges of prisoners) and strategic ones (on a long-term political agreement) and offer various distinctions regarding organizations that can be considered potential partners and those that cannot. Opponents argue that negotiations with such actors are both immoral and dangerous, legitimizing terror organizations and potentially encouraging the use of violence. They also contend that promises made by such organizations are not reliable, and even if their leadership accepts compromises it will be unable to enforce them on all the group’s activists. However, advocates of negotiations argue that certain circumstances require dialogue with terrorist organizations in order to end a conflict and bring an end to violence, and that such groups must be offered political alternatives in order to lay down their arms (as was the case with the IRA in Northern Ireland and with FARC in Colombia). Researchers advocating such an approach insist that it is particularly apt when dealing with organizations that enjoy broad public support, alluding to the adage that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.

Policymakers and scholars have struggled with the dilemma over whether to engage in dialogue with the Taliban throughout the war years in Afghanistan. Back in the Obama Administration, some officials (such as the special US envoy on Afghanistan Richard Holbrook) argued that even as the US was carrying out military activity in Afghanistan, it should undertake diplomacy to reach a political agreement that includes the Taliban and would enable a US pullout. Trump believed the Americans should get out of Afghanistan at almost any cost, and acted on this campaign promise by initiating public talks with the Taliban after he came to power. The 2020 agreement between the sides called for a 14-month withdrawal (ending in May 2021), release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners and lifting of sanctions on senior organization officials. The Taliban, for its part, committed to avoid attacks on US and NATO forces and prevent operations by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State organization in areas under its control.

The agreement did not include the government of Afghanistan, and while the Taliban agreed to talks with the government, the US withdrawal was not conditioned on domestic political arrangements (such as anchoring women’s rights and other constitutional issues). The agreement was designed to stop the attacks on international forces deployed in Afghanistan but did not prevent an escalation of Taliban terrorism and gradual takeover of various parts of the country. Critics of the agreement argued that once a pullout date was set, the Taliban launched preparations to retake control of the country, making peace talks with the government irrelevant. Supporters of the agreement argued that it would bring an end to 20 years of war.

The Afghan arena is particularly unique and complex, requiring a cautious approach when comparing it with others and drawing any conclusions. It is obviously very different from the Israel-Gaza arena. Nonetheless, let us examine, cautiously, what similarities can be found between Trump-Taliban agreement and the arrangements made by former Prime Minister Netanyahu and Hamas in recent years and how these cases relate to the debate among scholars over negotiations with terrorist organizations. In both cases one can point to a radical change in policy – from one of all-out war intended to bring down a regime to one of dialogue and search for accommodation. Both cases illustrate the limits of power and the process of learning in conflict arenas (by both sides). They also highlight the gap between government declarations against negotiating with terrorist organizations and de facto policy. In Netanyahu’s case, the gap was particularly wide given the deeply held principles he described in his books ruling out dialogue with terror organizations and his 2009 election campaign promise to bring down Hamas’ rule in Gaza. It should also be noted that the Trump Administration did not conceal its contacts with the Taliban. The meetings between senior representatives of both sides and the agreements they reached were made public (although claims were made of secret appendixes), unlike the Netanyahu government that kept the contacts and understanding reached with Hamas secret and never revealed their contents to the world (a policy that suited both sides).

The two cases reflect precisely the dilemma arising from the scholarly literature in this field: Trump and Netanyahu came to realize that Hamas and Taliban are an integral part of the conflict arena and cannot be ignored, and sought to formulate new game rules with them. However, their critics argued that the negotiations with these groups legitimized and empowered them, while the agreements reached with them failed the test of time. In conducting this discussion, one must also ask what alternatives were available to the sides at each stage, if any, and why these were not chosen.

Both the Biden Administration and the Bennett-Lapid government inherited arrangements with these organizations from their predecessors and had to decide whether to adhere to them once they came to power. The Trump Administration had already signed the deal with the Taliban and Netanyahu had maintained a framework of understandings with Hamas for several years. President Biden, as we know, made a decision. While he did delay the withdrawal from Afghanistan by several months, he completed it in full as determined in the agreement. The Israel-Hamas case is different. While Israel has not reached a long-term public agreement with Hamas, a certain set of expectations has been put in place over time. Following the most recent round of fighting with Gaza, elements in Israel and elsewhere urged a change in approach. While the Netanyahu governments sought to exploit the dialogue with Hamas in order to deepen the divide between Gaza and the West Bank and weaken the Palestinian Authority (PA), some in the new government and the international community are seeking to change the rules of the game in order to strengthen the PA and restore its involvement in the Gaza Strip.

The negotiating process between the US and the Taliban could teach Israel about the risks that inherent in such moves. Even when it becomes obvious that dialogue is required with such “rogue” players, the diplomatic strategy must not focus solely on this dimension; contacts with them must be part of a broader policy move that includes additional international and local elements and be guided by long-term political thinking.

הפוסט What lessons does the Trump-Taliban deal hold for Israel, Hamas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Palestinian leader’s first formal meeting with a top-level Israeli minister in more than a decade was held at a particularly sensitive political moment for both sides. The Palestinian Authority is consistently losing public support, President Abbas is perceived as an authoritarian leader holding onto power by dint of his ability to impose sanctions and his heavily armed security forces, and many Palestinians blame him for the failure of his strategy to achieve Palestinian independence by diplomatic means.

The Palestinian Authority failure in the diplomatic arena is particularly egregious given the Hamas movement’s challenge to its rule. In the absence of negotiations, Hamas has devised an alternative modus operandi, which while not advancing the quality of life for residents of Gaza, paradoxically bolsters popular support for the movement. Hamas is positioning itself successfully as the heir to Fatah in leading the armed Palestinian struggle against Israel, honing the message that armed struggle is the only way to achieve Israeli concessions. The Hamas policy proved effective during Operation Keeper of the Walls (May 2021), helping it link the distress of the enclave’s residents, which Abbas has tried to isolate, with developments in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and even sparking violence by Israel’s Palestinian population.

The attacks to which Abbas is being subjected by his domestic rivals in the Fatah movement and by Hamas require that he take action to bolster his standing as President of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has a vested interest in strengthening his standing, greatly eroded during the Netanyahu years, but the complex makeup of the government coalition are not conducive to renewed negotiations on a permanent status solution with the Palestinian Authority. Renewed negotiations would invariably result in a speedy dismantling of the Israeli coalition and renewed elections. This was the backdrop for the Abbas-Gantz meeting, which was to all intents and purposes political-diplomatic in nature although it was portrayed publicly as a discussion of civilian-economic issues. In fact, the discussion dealt with a series of security and diplomacy issues that take on special significance given the protests against Abbas and weakening PA control over certain areas of the West Bank. This unraveling control stems not only from the absence of a diplomatic horizon but also from the economic crisis undermining the Palestinian Authority.

The renewed Israeli-Palestinian dialogue is also of significance to regional stability, especially at a time of growing security instability with Gaza and the ongoing campaign to stem the coronavirus spread. Renewed negotiations against the backdrop of the change in administrations in Washington are also important for generating fresh winds of hope. Israel’s willingness for a dialogue channel is manifested, inter alia, in its offer of a loan to tide the PA over a rough patch. Nonetheless, Abbas is aware of the heavy criticism against him on the Palestinian street, intensified since renewal of the dialogue with Israel, the ongoing security coordination with Israel and his refusal to undertake reconciliation measures with Hamas invariably resulting in elections to the Palestinian national institutions and parliament. In response to the criticism, Abbas has adopted an aggressive tone in the discourse on Israel both domestically and in international forums, led primarily by Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Abbas’s Fatah movement deputy and Tanzim leader Mahmoud al-Aloul.

The most effective way for Abbas to try nonetheless to enter into discourse with Israel involves a joint front with Jordan and Egypt, both troubled by the rise of political Islam and strengthened position of Hamas. Abbas is aware of the need to form a united front with King Abdallah and President al-Sisi. He does not want to find himself isolated once more, as he was by the signing of the Abraham Accords. Jordan and Egypt could open doors for the Palestinians with the international community, which has despaired of the Palestinian unwillingness to adopt more flexible positions on the launch of negotiations.

It is incumbent on Abbas to take pragmatic steps to ensure the stability of his regime in its waning years given the threats to the PA not only from the rise of Hamas but also from battles of succession within Fatah, its economic downturn exacerbated by the coronavirus, and the despair of the younger generations for all of the above reasons.

Forging a united Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian front to promote renewed dialogue with Israel and commit to unconditional support of the two-state solution could once again place the Palestinian issue on the desks of international decision makers. Such a course also serves Israel’s interests, with Egypt leading humanitarian and economic measures to ease the distress of daily life in Gaza and freeing it from having to adopt such measures itself and risk domestic criticism.

Such a move also serves the Palestinian interest and bolsters Fatah’s standing versus Hamas. Abbas is nearing the end of his rule and has nothing to lose. Having realized that the Arab world of the 21^st century is no longer committed to pan-Arab slogans and no longer willing to wait for resolution of the Palestinian issue as a condition for normalization with Israel, it is incumbent on the PLO leadership to make a difficult decision. Should it return to the negotiating table and try to achieve an end to the conflict and establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, or should it maintain the status quo, which could eventually sink the moderate Fatah forces and pave the way for others to replace them. Israel has an interest in bolstering moderate Fatah forces in the PA in the face of the militant, religious Hamas position. Continued confidence building measures with the PA, especially in economic and civilian areas, could encourage continued dialogue on diplomatic issues, too. This is clearly in the interests of the region because strengthening the PA at the expense of Hamas would help strengthen further the alliance with moderate Sunni states in the face of the Iranian threat and Iran’s entrenchment efforts in our region.

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’s moment of truth: The road to renewed diplomacy traverses Amman and Cairo הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hamas has never been this popular since the crucial 2006 Palestinian Authority (PA) elections, especially in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Gaza’s residents continue to pay the price of its popularity as they struggle with four to six hours of power a day and very little potable water in the stifling summer heat.

This dangerous blend of unusual admiration on the Palestinian and Arab street, on the one hand, and the ongoing humanitarian disaster in the Strip, on the other, poses a clear and imminent threat to the latest Egyptian-mediated ceasefire.

Cocky, self-assured Hamas officials walk the streets of Gaza, some even becoming Arab media and network stars, but they know time is not on their side – they must obtain significant funding to rebuild the Strip or plunge into another escalation unless their demands are met, as they promised their supporters. International donors are not in any rush to hand Hamas the $500 million required to rebuild the ruins of Operation “Keeper of the Walls”.

Israel, for its part, wants to avoid another escalation, which could undermine political stability and even dismantle the Bennett-Lapid government. Since the end of the May fighting, Egypt has been sending in significant quantities of building supplies and aid – and Israel is not kicking up a fuss although it is unclear what has been going in and how much of it. In recent days, an arrangement is being finalized for Qatari funding to reach needy Gaza residents – but not in cash. However, Israel keeps the crossings into Gaza closed, it has not expanded Gaza’s fishing zone and is not responding to the incendiary balloons launched from the Strip. On the other hand, everyone realizes that the calm achieved in May is extremely fragile and the IDF continues to prepare for a potential renewal of fighting. It’s the same old refrain.

Given the current stalemate, with a terrorist organization applying a chokehold on Gaza and stopping its rehabilitation and development, Israel, along with the US, European Union and Arab states must recalibrate its course on Gaza. For the past 12 years, Israel has assumed that the split between the West Bank and Gaza and Fatah and Hamas and a “divide and control” approach toward it serves its interests.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believed Hamas could be contained and even be bought with economic goodies in return for extended ceasefires, if not peace. None of this panned out, and Israel realized during Operation Keeper of the Walls that Hamas cannot be contained nor understandings reached with it because of its underpinning ideology and clear goals, the first of which is breaching the Gaza borders. Hamas wants to expand its control to the West Bank, it has linked itself naturally with Jerusalem, and even with some among the Israeli Arab public, and is brings together diverse pieces of the puzzle despite Israel’s best attempts to divide them. Hamas wants to control the PLO and achieve international recognition, but its overarching goal is to inflict ruin on Israel. It has not abandoned this goal, especially under the ideological fundamentalist leadership of Yahya Sinwar.

Therefore, the next round of fighting with Hamas is inevitable. It could occur now at the height of the heavy summer heat or at another point in time, but we must understand that Hamas will use the time to accelerate its rocket production, restock its depleted arsenals and re-dig its destroyed tunnels. Israel, along with its external partners, must adopt a new ideology vis-à-vis both Gaza and the West Bank in order to prevent the entrenchment of Hamas in the PA.

These days, with the world taking on the Muslim Brotherhood, it makes little sense for Israel, of all countries, to let its offshoot Hamas gain power in the arena between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. A return to a dialogue with pragmatic elements in the PA is a must, as is preventing the collapse of the PA (despite the recurrent mistakes it makes, it is still the better default option) by implementing confidence-building measures. At the same time, optimal international pressure must be exerted on Hamas in Gaza, cutting off its funding sources and eventually stripping it of its control of Gaza.

Israel must define clear targets and formulate a new policy on the Palestinian territories and their future, and abandon the useless and harmful “divide and conquer” principle. Otherwise, we will find ourselves in an endless loop of rounds of violence at shorter and shorter intervals.

הפוסט Israel’s ‘divide and conquer’ Palestinian policy does not serve its interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The dangerous game of the Jerusalem flag march הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Many Americans ask me how I can be so very satisfied with the new government led by a right-wing ideologue, which declares outright that it will not embark on significant moves with the Palestinians. My answer is to ask them to imagine 12 years under a harmful leader such as Trump, but far more sophisticated, who is determined to do away with democracy in order to remain in power. I explain that this outcome was scuttled by a determined public campaign and rare cooperation among a wide variety of parties and groups that came together despite their different agendas in order to save the state.

I then add that we in the peace camp have many allies in the government after years of having none. That the new government includes nine women and 10 women directors general of government ministries. While still insufficient, it’s the best gender balance we’ve ever had. This is a government that includes an Arab party, for the first time, albeit one not guided by the liberal values we would have liked to see. A government open to the liberal streams of Judaism. A government trying to renew Israel’s alliance with the US Democratic Party and with liberal governments in Europe, and, of course, to prioritize links with the American Jewish community ahead of ties with nationalist populists in the US and Europe.

This is a government whose foreign minister, for the first time in Israeli history, is also its dominant political figure and can therefore give diplomacy the place it deserves in Israel’s national security as it strives to prioritize negotiated solutions. A foreign minister who immediately upon taking office set about rehabilitating relations with Jordan, Brussels and Washington. A government whose members come to their office to work rather than to stir up discord and prop up a cult of personality aimed at saving a corrupt leader from legal proceedings – as was the case in recent years.

I have also been asked why we are so pleased with the changing of the guard in Washington even though the Biden Administration has made clear that the Palestinian problem is hardly its top priority. Well, after four years during which Trump spared no effort to turn the US into a third world country, which does not believe in science nor in its duty to lead the free world, it’s hard not to be impressed with Biden’s leadership. His moves on important domestic issues, such as the coordinated campaign against Covid-19 and ambitious plans to save the economy and make it more equal and environmentally sustainable. His determination to renew alliances with liberal democracies. His global leadership on climate change, which is obviously the greatest challenge facing humanity. Yes, refreshing, joyous sanity has also been restored across the ocean.

On the other hand, we must not allow our satisfaction to divert us from our mission – saving Zionism from the malignant status quo of continued occupation leading us to a binational state and to the moral and strategic elimination of the Zionist vision. There is much we can do even under the new governments in Israel and the US which, while having much to commend them, are not seized with a sense of urgency to resolve our existential threat.

Sadly, there are no prospects of a breakthrough in bilateral Israeli-Palestinian initiative, not only because of the neutralizing balance of the Bennett-Lapid government, but also because of the Palestinian leadership crisis. There are many reasons why Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have sunk to such unprecedented lows. The corruption that has spread throughout the PA and the obstacles to any attempt to instill democracy certainly play a role. But the weakness is linked no less to the fact that Abu Mazen’s willingness to achieve an independent state without resorting to violence came up against an Israeli side uninterested in agreement and preferring to bolster Hamas. By definition, anyone ignoring the pragmatic forces strengthens fundamentalist ones. That has been Israel’s approach toward the PA for many years and this is the poison fruit it has cultivated.

Despite all of the above, the international community can create a new tangible, concrete vision of a two-state solution in tandem with activity to strengthen moderate elements on the ground and prevent unilateral measures hampering a solution once conditions are ripe.

The Quartet (the US, EU, UN and Russia), together with Arab states that have diplomatic relations with Israel and with the help of other important countries in the world and the region, such as Saudi Arabia and China, could advance a UN Security Council resolution setting parameters for a permanent status agreement that would serve as the basis for negotiations once they become feasible.

Such parameters could include, inter alia, the international consensus on the 1967 lines as the border between Israel and Palestine with land swaps to be agreed in negotiations. The Palestinian capital will be in East Jerusalem and special arrangements will be made for the Holy Basin under international auspices. The settlements excluded from the land swaps will be vacated, or their residents could decide to remain there under Palestinian sovereignty. The solution to the refugee problem will combine a return to the Palestinian state and rehabilitation and equal rights for refugees who choose to remain in Syria and Lebanon. All of the above subject to security arrangements guaranteeing Israel’s security, such as a demilitarization, early warning systems, and more.

Based on these parameters, the international community will recognize a Palestinian state and also declare an international consensus recognizing Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people whose non-Jewish citizens enjoy full equality, de facto.

Such an international move would also affect domestic Israeli and Palestinian politics. Hope of a diplomatic solution would weaken the radicals and strengthen the pragmatists. The public on both sides, most of which backs the two-state solution but does not believe it is feasible will have their faith in peace restored and vote accordingly. Once political conditions are ripe for a return to negotiations, we will not have to start from scratch.

Israeli and Palestinian peace advocates have an important role in influencing the international community to advance such a move and refusing to abandon the vision of peace despite the current difficulties. It’s possible to be pleased with the favorable changes in the US and Israel, but not to fully satisfied. The energy that led to the hoped-for changes in the US and Israel must be translated into a move that saves us from despair. Leadership is the ability to combine a critical mind that identifies what needs to be done with a hopeful heart that believes change is possible. Let us become leaders on the road to peace.

הפוסט Now that we’re rid of Trump and Bibi, what’s next? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The recent violent outbreak in the mixed Jewish and Arab cities is a wake-up call for those who chose not to think about the Palestinian issue or those who believed it existed only beyond the pre-1967 Green Line border.

If the West Bank settlements are an integral part of the state, then Israeli law must be applied to them and more Jewish Israelis must be encouraged to live there.

Infrastructure must be developed to accommodate the increase in Jewish population and any international boycott of products emanating from them must be rejected.

Supporters of this view believe Israelis who speak out against the occupation of the West Bank must be branded traitors and those abroad who oppose Israeli policies must be branded anti-Semitic.

The Green Line, they say is to be erased and the territorial integrity – of Israel, as one country – enshrined in law.

Proponents of the opposite view see the Green Line as the future international border between Israel and Palestine.

These left-wing Zionists oppose the constructions of new settlements that are meant to prevent a future Palestinian state, reject land expropriation and the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes and land and fight the piecemeal annexation efforts of the Israeli government.

The territories, the left-wing Zionists say, are not part of Israel, and the occupation – with all that it entails – is polluting the country. They see Israel and the West Bank as different territories separated by the Green Line. The settlers also want a separation. But theirs is not a political-territorial one, it is one based on an ethnic separation of Jews and Arabs.

Between these opposing views is the silent Israeli majority. This group is made up of people who prefer to leave the Green Line as a partition. They seek a two-state solution but are unwilling to pay the price for it.

They don’t want one state with equal rights for all of its citizens, but reject an “apartheid” state as well. In fact, they want the Green Line to be an insurmountable barrier that protects them from the sights and sounds of the land beyond it.

This silent majority objects to groups like Breaking the Silence, an NGO made up of former members of the IDF who testify to the ills of the military rule over the Palestinian civilian population. Breaking the Silence bring the stories of the West Bank to Israelis who do not want to hear them.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu banked on the extreme right-wing political parties to keep him in power, thereby empowering those who want the Green Line erased.

Life on the West Bank for Jews and Palestinians is often violent.

Attacks by Jewish settlers there are not a rare occurrence, as Palestinians farmers can attest. Many, especially those whose land borders the more extreme settlements, often suffer from the violence of Jewish neighbors empowered by the protection of the military.

The recent violent events inside Israel show that the West Bank reality has now seeped into Israel. Settlers from Yitzhar went to Lod, bearing weapons and tires to burn, and were not stopped by any authority on their way. They went, they claimed, to protect Jews.

The violent images from Lod, Jaffa, Bat Yam, Acre and Jerusalem were sights Israelis had grown accustomed to seeing on the West Bank.

It is now clear that the Palestinian issue is still with us, the occupation toxic and the Green Line fallible.

It is time for the silent majority to wake up, see reality as it is in the West Bank and demand peace, even at the cost of removing settlements.

Israelis and Palestinians deserve to separation so they can live in peace as neighbors.

**The article was published on ynetnews, May 6 2021

הפוסט Israel and Palestinians Need Separation for Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Gabi Ashkenazi should meet with <br> Palestinian leaders in Ramallah הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The two organizations — the IDF and the Foreign Ministry — are executing their tasks. The army demonstrates capabilities in the field of air force strikes on Hamas targets and also in the protection of the country’s citizens by the Iron Dome and warning systems. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has succeeded in its diplomatic efforts in providing the Israeli government with a wide range of latitude and international legitimacy for action.

In both cases, however, this tactical success fails to translate into sustainable achievement due to a lack of strategy. The IDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not set the policy, but they should boldly say to the political leadership that they are unable to achieve the long-term goals that are expected of them.

As long as the issue at hand is the narrow-angle of Israel’s right to defend itself against missile terrorism aimed at its citizens, there are successes, because it is a worthy and legitimate goal. But strategically there are no solutions to the Palestinian issue, of which Hamas is a part, neither in the military nor in PR.

We always use our sophisticated army as someone who holds a hammer in their hand and sees every problem as a nail. We nurture this army and each time we send it to another round with Hamas in which it demonstrates its formidable capabilities, but solves nothing. Military officers are constantly interviewed in the media today and detail in masculine voice techno-tactical issues and excite the public’s imagination about military capabilities.

On the other hand, we do not invest at all in the diplomacy and at the same time make allegations to the diplomats that there is criticism of Israel in world public opinion. So let me tell you a secret, there is no way to explain our policy. Not the lack of diplomatic action, not the prolonged occupation without a horizon, not the deliberate weakening of the pragmatic elements in Palestinian society, not the discriminatory law of absentee property in Jerusalem and not the violation of the status quo on the Temple Mount that is used by settler associations under government auspices that set the entire region on fire.

The Israeli public treats this campaign like its predecessors from a narrow-angle of a legitimate democracy’s confrontation with a terrorist organization, but the world sees shocking images from Gaza of the victims of these repeated rounds – dead and wounded civilians including many children (who for some reason the Israeli public does not see) and asks – what did you do to prevent this round of violence? What have you done in the diplomatic sphere? What did you do to prevent the continued occupation? What did you do to achieve justice for the residents of East Jerusalem and equality for the Arabs of Israel?

I feel very connected to our army as a former officer and parent of children who do and have done meaningful service. My heart also goes out to my former colleagues the diplomats, who are not less talented than the generals of the army and work around the clock in the current campaign and throughout the year. Meet, for example, the head of the Foreign Ministry’s public diplomacy division, Noam Katz, and the speaker, Lior Hayat, and you will quickly understand that these are super talented people, whom any foreign ministry would be blessed with. This is also true of all “anonymous soldiers” who deal with public opinion and media at the headquarters in Jerusalem and at about 100 of our missions abroad. They are forced to engage in useless “hasbara” (the Hebrew term for advocacy or propaganda) of unexplained policies.

Let them engage in true diplomacy and you will see results. Give them a political directive to engage in peace agreements with our neighbors as the Foreign Ministry did during the Rabin and Peres governments and you will see them demonstrate their impressive capabilities.

Both the best military in the region nor the weakened Foreign Ministry will not be able to prevent another round, will not be able to substantially weaken Hamas and will not bring peace and security to Israelis and the region without a coherent foreign policy to promote long-term arrangements. We must not fall into the trap of right-wing elements trying to convince us that we are doomed to live on our sword while maintaining a two-generation occupation regime for millions and that this baseless policy, which primarily harms our existence as a democracy, can be explained.

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 25 May 2021

הפוסט There’s no military nor public diplomacy solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Solving the issue of a divided Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The US played a particularly prominent role in the May 2021 mediation efforts, marking President Joe Biden’s first foray into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After signaling for months that the issue was not high on the administration’s agenda, Washington was seeking a win, and wanted to be the one to broker the ceasefire. To achieve this, the US blocked three attempts by UN Security Council members to publish a statement during the fighting and was willing to face criticism on this by key international actors. This criticism was a price that Biden was uncomfortable to pay, as the American conduct in the Security Council contradicted his multilateral foreign policy approach, which speaks highly of cooperation with international organizations and US allies.

Biden nonetheless provided Israel with backing and additional time to continue its military operation against Hamas, at the same time while senior officials in his administration were critical of Israel’s operation (its destruction of the Gaza building housing foreign media outlets, for example), and were issuing statements using new language – that stresses the equal rights of Israelis and Palestinians to security, freedom and prosperity.

The US took the lead in mediation efforts and sought the credit. Biden, Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin were in constant touch with their Israeli counterparts, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hady Amr was sent on his first visit to the region The US proceeded with its mediation mission in consultation with Arab states. Blinken reported almost daily on talks with his counterparts in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Morocco and Qatar. As expected, Egypt was the US ally that eventually nailed down the ceasefire. Qatar, which played a key mediating role in previous rounds of violence, was more marginal this time, as was the UN envoy, who had filled the US vacuum during the Trump Administration. The EU failed, once again, to overcome internal dissent and speak in one voice.

The successful US involvement is good news for Israel. The American absence from Israeli-Palestinian mediation efforts due to the Trump Administration’s rift with the Palestinians, damaged prospects of peace and undermined stability. Biden’s success, for which he was quick to take credit in a special address from the White House, could serve as a springboard for significant American engagement in advancing peace. This round of fighting obviously helped the administration realize the need to appoint senior diplomatic representatives to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian issue, both from the US Embassy and Consulate in Jerusalem and from the State Department in Washington.

In his comments following the ceasefire, President Biden made two interesting points regarding his administration’s future policy. The first was that humanitarian aid and reconstruction of Gaza would be carried out “in full partnership with the Palestinian Authority (PA) – not Hamas.” This clearly suggests the US desire for increased PA involvement and influence in Gaza, and runs counter to Netanyahu’s persistent effort to encourage the split between the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, in order to weaken the PA and to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. It remains to be seen what impact this US policy will have on the arrangement between Netanyahu and Hamas that included Qatari payments to the organization.

Biden’s second point relates to his vision of the future. While he omitted to mention the term “two-state solution”, to which his administration is committed, he stressed both people’s “equal” rights to security, freedom, prosperity and democracy. This language has been used in several official statements since he took office, offering new parameters that deviate from the traditional discourse on a two-state solution (although they do not contradict or replace it) and reflecting the US commitment to the rights of both sides. Biden argued that “a genuine opportunity” has presented itself for progress in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and expressed his commitment to seizing it. These remarks contradict the spirit conveyed in the initial months of his administration, which reflected grave doubts about prospects of a breakthrough in resolution of the conflict.

The latest round of fighting underscored the cost of the protracted diplomatic stalemate between Israel and the Palestinians. Peace supporters in Israel, the PA and the US should be encouraged by the US return to its mediation role. As Blinken is touring the Middle East, for the first time as Secretary of State, they should make clear to the administration that its involvement is welcome and necessary, and that it must now advance broader diplomatic moves toward Israeli-Palestinian peace, beyond its commitment to bolstering the ceasefire with Gaza.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian mediation: Welcome back, America הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Efforts to avoid discussion of the issue have been made repeatedly during the peace process. Authors of the 1993 Oslo Accord agreed the issue was volatile and would be best postponed for future discussion on a permanent status agreement. When talks began on a permanent status agreement, under the Barak government, negotiators were directed to delay discussion of the issue. It finally came up at the Camp David Summit (in July 2000), where it naturally became a major bone of contention. Israel also tried to evade the issue at the 2007-08 Annapolis talks with the Palestinians, with then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni under instructions not to talk about Jerusalem. Prime Minister Netanyahu also refused to engage in a serious discussion of Jerusalem during the US-mediated 2013-14 peace talks, insisting repeatedly that the matter was not up for negotiation. Repeated attempts to ignore and delay discussing this sensitive matter undermined negotiations even when leaders were willing to move toward an agreement.

The current round of violence in Jerusalem, just like previous ones, should be analyzed on two levels: The immediate triggers that set it off and the deeper causes arising from the situation in the city in the absence of a political solution to the conflict. The Israeli discourse tends to focus on the immediate causes, discussing tactical aspects and ignoring the structural problems that underpin this explosive reality. East Jerusalemites are orphans. Comprising some 40% of the city’s population, the Palestinian residents nonetheless have no political institutions or representation, no Israeli citizenship (except for a small minority, most of whom are Israeli Arab citizens who moved to the city) and no Palestinian citizenship, and they suffer from discriminatory policies in terms of services, infrastructure and planning. Due to their status as permanent residents, they are not entitled to vote for the Knesset, and while they are entitled to vote in municipal elections, most boycott them (arguing that participation in the election will legitimize the Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem) and therefore the Palestinians have never had representation on the Jerusalem city council.

Over time, an artificial separation has been made in the Israeli discourse on Jerusalem between discussion of “improving the lot of the residents” and dealing with the fundamental problems, but anyone familiar with the hardships in East Jerusalem realizes that the residents’ problems cannot be de-linked from the fundamental anomaly in the city. Much has been discussed over the past decade in Israeli media of the “Israelization” of East Jerusalem Palestinians following construction of the Separation Fence. One can undoubtedly identify a stronger affinity on the part of East Jerusalem residents to the city’s West in terms of employment, education, leisure and entertainment, but these processes are only part of the complex picture in the divided city. Since the events of summer 2014, the government has realized that ignoring East Jerusalem is dangerous, and a decision was made on a five-year plan to bridge gaps (Plan No. 3790). But while one hand is working to promote employment and improve infrastructure, the other continues with evictions, razing of homes and creating a “no man’s land” in the neighborhoods on the other side of the fence.

The case of Sheikh Jarrah is a good example of a dangerous situation stemming from the city’s structural problems. The eviction threat facing Palestinian families stems from a discriminatory legal framework formulated after 1967, which provides Jews with the “right of return” to East Jerusalem land owned by Jews prior to 1948. The Palestinian Jerusalemites, on the other hand, including those evicted from their homes, are barred from demanding a similar return of property owned by their families in the western parts of Jerusalem. This situation undermines the Israeli position against the Palestinian claims to a “right of return” and re-open the discussion on property abandoned in the 1948 war. As has become obvious in recent days, this situation severely undermines Israel’s international standing and threatens relations with its new allies in the Arab world. Right-wing groups, with government support, are taking advantage of the legal framework to promote a process of “Hebronization” in East Jerusalem with a view to thwarting any future solution.

The superficial Israeli political discourse on Jerusalem’s future has boiled the question down to the question of whether the city should be divided, yes or no. But this framing is misleading. The goal of finding a political solution to the city is to recognize fully both its Israeli and Palestinian residents, the existence of both Jerusalem and al-Quds, and to find a path to partnership in the shared city, ensuring political representation and equality for all residents.

A recently published biography of former Secretary of State James Baker (by Susan Glasser and Peter Baker) recounts Baker’s statement upon taking office that he would not deal with the conflict in the Middle East as his predecessor had done, to which diplomat Dennis Ross replied: “You can ignore the Middle East – but it will not ignore you.” The same applies to Jerusalem: Even if the parties to the conflict and the international community try to avoid dealing with this sensitive issue, the problem will not go away and will make its presence felt over and over. Resolution of the problem cannot be delayed further and addressing the situation in the city must relate to both levels – to the triggers of the unrest and to its underlying causes.

In the immediate term, calm must be restored, escalation avoided and dangerous provocations curbed. In this context, diverting the Jerusalem Day Flag Parade from Damascus Gate and the intervention of the Attorney General in the Supreme Court’s session on Sheikh Jarrah evictions were steps in the right direction. Efforts by international actors, including the Biden Administration, to restore calm at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and block the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah are also welcome. Previous US administrations played similar roles at times of crisis in the city. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton demanded a halt to the eviction of families in Sheikh Jarrah when the issue arose in 2009-2010, and Secretary of State John Kerry intervened to prevent escalation and preserve the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in 2014-15. But beyond management of the current crisis, in order to avoid finding ourselves in the same place next time, diplomatic efforts are required to achieve a more substantive change for the long term and an understanding that Jerusalem remains on the table and cannot be ignored.

הפוסט No, Jerusalem is not off the table הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The announcement by Abbas, on 15 January 2021, of elections to the Palestinian parliament, presidency and PLO institutions, to take place between May and August 2021, surprised the regional and international community. Abbas and his associates viewed the leadership change in Washington as an opportunity to restore relations with the US. After being ostracized by Trump, the PA believed that announcing elections and undertaking a democratic process would build trust with Biden.

The intention to hold elections was also prompted by domestic needs. Since his term ended officially in 2009, Abbas has been running the PA using executive orders. The ongoing division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and absence of elections to the PA’s institutions have gradually eroded his legitimacy. Public support for Abbas has declined continuously, a situation exacerbated by the prolonged stalemate in negotiations on establishment of a Palestinian state and by the global coronavirus crisis that affected the PA, too.

The announcement of general elections was well received among Palestinians, especially by the young generation that grew up under an authoritarian political system and was deprived of the right to participate in national elections since 2006. The expectations Abbas created by setting election dates generated a sense in the Palestinian political arena that national reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas was also at hand and that Palestinian society was heading for a true process of democratization.

These sentiments were bolstered by the understandings reached between Hamas and Fatah on the elections, and the conciliatory messages emanating from talks led by Jibril Rajoub with the heads of the various Palestinian factions. These talks even included a September 2020 meeting in Turkey between Rajoub and Hamas leaders Salah Al-Arouri and Ismail Haniyeh, to discuss a joint campaign against normalization between the Gulf States and Israel.

Abbas felt that he was embarking on the election process from a position of strength. The PA had become increasingly authoritarian and centralized and its security agencies were mobilized not only to thwart the development of Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank but also to oppress Abbas’ political rivals at home and curtail free speech.

However, despite the power emanating from control of the Palestinian agencies in the West Bank, Abbas’ political party is plagued by splits and internal power plays. Unlike previous announcements of impending elections (that never materialized), this time Fatah found itself split into three different factions. Abbas’ inability to unite with supporters of Marwan Barghouti and of Nasser al-Kidwa, both of whom have decided to challenge him, attests to the de-facto launch of a war of succession undermining the authority of the 85-year-old leader. The challenge by Barghouti was a warning to the Fatah leadership, and Abbas’ failure to forge a unified coalition points to the weakening of his standing within Fatah and to the twilight of his rule.

The decision to cancel the elections stemmed from substantive concerns by all the Fatah factions over losing to Hamas. The divisions within Fatah and the personal rivalries within its factions contrasted with the united front Hamas presented ahead of the scheduled elections. To avoid embarrassment, Abbas chose to delay the elections, pointing an accusing figure at Israel for preventing the voting by refusing to allow the participation of East Jerusalem residents. Abbas is also blaming actors in the international arena, such as the EU, for not exerting sufficient pressure on Israel to allow voting in East Jerusalem. Abbas’ move and argumentation generated anger among European decision makers.

Unlike Fatah, Hamas learned the lessons of the 2006 elections, but it has also failed along the years to manage the Gaza Strip in the face of ongoing cycles of violence, a prolonged humanitarian crisis and the results of the coronavirus epidemic. Despite the desire to integrate into PLO institutions, Hamas is not keen to take on the running of daily life in the PA at this stage, and would actually be happy to drag the PA into the Gaza Strip in order to share with it responsibility for the ongoing crises there.

It should therefore come as no surprise that Hamas opted for a measured response to the election delay. It avoided direct attacks on the PA, but at the same time complained that the PA had gone back on previous agreements and warned that the Palestinian political arena could not remain subordinated solely to Fatah interests. Like Abbas, Hamas focused its reaction on Jerusalem. The movement urged young Palestinians to learn from the successful popular struggle they mounted in the city during this month of Ramadan and continue clashing with Israeli security forces, but at the same time to intensify political efforts to achieve internal reconciliation and unity. Hamas has responded differently to Israel and to the PA over the scrapping of the elections.

While billed as a delay in elections, no one is under any illusion that they have been scrapped. Abbas’ reluctance to introduce political reform and move toward reconciliation with Hamas has led the Palestinian political system to the brink of chaos. The elections delay and the events that preceded it signal that whereas most of the attention was focused until now on the Fatah-Hamas power struggle, the impact of the internal Fatah turf wars on decision making at the national level is just as significant. The developments clearly indicate that the entire Palestinian political system has begun staking out positions for the day after Abbas.

When that day arrives, Fatah will have to reorganize and institute reforms, to allow the return of key figures expelled from its ranks, such as al-Kidwa (who was banished from the movement during the preparation of candidate lists for the elections) and Mohammed Dahlan. The Palestinian public has thus far been silent over Abbas’ decision upending the voting, but this could be the calm before the storm, allowing anyone who wants to run for the presidency after the Abbas era to prepare his party and camp for the moment of truth.

Israel must familiarize itself with the in-depth processes affecting the Palestinian society and must respect the desire for change and the democratization process on the other side of the Green Line. These could legitimize efforts by the next Palestinian generation to resume negotiations with Israel and reach historic decisions in the future.

הפוסט Thoughts on the Postponement of the Palestinian Elections הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Assessing Operation Guardian of the Walls: Did it change any opinions? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.