The exception to this was the Arab and Islamic summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in November 2023. However, aside from declarations against Israel and calls for a diplomatic solution based on the two-state approach, with borders along the lines of 1967, this summit did not result in any practical action.

There are two explanations for the weak Arab response. First, there is the continuing decline of the Arab League as an institution for addressing Arab issues.

Since its formation – and that of the Arab Summit, its supreme body – it has experienced many failures, although it has also been credited with some significant achievements, such as thwarting Iraq’s threat to invade Kuwait in 1961, halting the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, and adopting the Arab Peace Initiative, among others.

The second reason is the general reluctance to intervene in Gaza until the war has ended. This is especially relevant to the Gulf states, which can contribute substantial funds toward the rebuilding of Gaza, but will not do so until the fighting is over.

The convening of the emergency summit on March 4 – symbolically called the “Palestine Summit”G – was an Arab response to US President Donald Trump’s idea for Palestinian emigration from Gaza. Though the idea is flawed and impracticable, it has forced the Arab states to formulate their own counterproposal.

What Trump did not take into account was that striking at the Arab holy cow – the Palestinian problem – would unite the Arab states, thus forcing the moderate Arab states to fall into line with more extreme positions.

Most of the leaders of the Arab states attended the summit, including the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was making his first appearance at the supreme Arab institution.

However, the Saudi crown prince and the president of the United Arab Emirates chose to send their foreign ministers, seemingly after they realized which way the wind was blowing. For Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the conference was an opportunity to give a show of Arab leadership.

Hamas is not mentioned

The concluding statement issued by the summit was worded in a rhetoric characteristic of Arab conferences and reflects the lowest common denominator on which Arab consensus could be achieved. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the statement includes condemnations of Israel. On the other hand, Hamas is not mentioned at all.

Ignoring the negative rhetoric toward Israel, the Arab proposals can be summarized as follows:

A call for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank; a reaffirmation of the Arab strategic decision to pursue peace, as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative, which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people through the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with east Jerusalem as its capital; a total rejection of all acts of violence, terrorism, and extremism; full opposition to any attempt to uproot Palestinians from their land; a warning against annexations in the West Bank that could lead the region into a renewed cycle of violence; adoption of the Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza (see below); a call to convene, at the earliest possible time, an international conference to discuss reconstruction and raise funds; and a call for the full implementation of the ceasefire, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.

Interestingly, the statement refers to a Palestinian agreement to establish a temporary, local, technocratic administration in Gaza, “under the umbrella of a Palestinian government,” alongside efforts to help restore the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, following necessary reforms within both the PA and the PLO. In the meantime, Egypt’s foreign minister has announced that the individuals who will serve in this administration have already been selected.

הפוסט Arab Leaders Unite on Paper, but Who Will Rebuild Gaza? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Building Networks in the Shadows of War: Mapping Challenges and Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trump’s proposals to transfer approximately two million Palestinians from Gaza to other countries, along with the United States assuming responsibility for Gaza, were presented as fresh, “outside-the-box” ideas. This framing gave them an air of innovation and creativity, presenting them as concepts previously unconsidered.

While it is certainly a new idea, not all new ideas are necessarily good ones – and some are best left well outside the box. Unlike the “Deal of the Century,” which was presented in January 2020 as a comprehensive 181-page plan, the current proposals emerged as a spontaneous whim announced by Trump just before his meeting with Netanyahu.

They are a mishmash of ideas, lacking any thorough planning that considers the interests and constraints of the various parties involved.

Trump’s proposals are often seen as an attempt to apply business principles to diplomacy – offering an extreme proposal in order to ultimately reach the desired outcome. As the late prime minister Levi Eshkol put it, “I compromise and compromise until I get what I want.”

Trump’s polarizing Gaza plan

However, Trump’s approach to Gaza deviates from the core principles of his election campaign, and it risks leading him into confrontations on both the domestic and international stages. This could be especially problematic in his relationships with key leaders like Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince bin Salman, Turkey’s President Erdogan, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II.

Apart from Israel, there appears to be little enthusiasm for this deal from other potential stakeholders. Trump can expect significant criticism from multiple fronts.

First, the American public, along with many across the political spectrum, is likely to oppose such a move. America’s appetite for involvement in overseas conflicts has diminished following the failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria – wars that claimed numerous lives and cost astronomical sums of money.

Second, the proposal is vehemently opposed by all Arab states, as it would force them to act against their own interests. More critically, if they were to accept it, they would risk undermining the legitimacy and stability of their regimes.

The Saudi Foreign Ministry was the first to respond on behalf of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, stating that Saudi Arabia would not back down from its position, which has been reiterated since October 7: the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.

As a leading power in the Arab world today, Saudi Arabia has set the benchmark for the position of other Arab states. The United Arab Emirates quickly followed suit, reaffirming Saudi Arabia’s stance.

AS FOR EGYPT and Jordan, both have repeatedly expressed strong opposition during the war to any attempt to relocate Palestinians from Gaza. They are concerned about the potential consequences of a population transfer into their territories and its impact on the internal stability of their regimes.

The fact that Trump’s proposal is intended to be implemented consensually, rather than by force, does not lessen their opposition in the slightest. Trump’s threat to use the US financial clout over Egypt and Jordan may backfire and might even damage Israel’s relations with these two important states.

Similarly, Morocco, which has been mentioned as another potential destination for refugees – an action framed as a gesture of gratitude for America’s recognition of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara – will also resist being involved. Morocco has long supported the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and has even hosted both public and covert meetings between Israeli and Palestinian representatives.

Moreover, cooperating with an American initiative would likely paint the Arab regimes as traitors to the Palestinian cause, undermining their legitimacy by appearing to contribute to the destruction of the Palestinian project.

While Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause has historically been expressed in rhetorical terms, it is deeply rooted in widespread support among the Arab public.

Over the years, surveys have consistently shown the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab public opinion and Arab leaders cannot afford to ignore it. It appears that Trump fails to grasp the symbolic importance of the Palestinian issue in the Arab world, mistakenly assuming that everything can be bought with money.

And what about the Palestinians themselves? Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, and a strong attachment to the land (known as sumud) are core values within the Palestinian ethos. Trump’s ideas risk turning the October 7 war into a second Nakba, deeply wounding this ethos. They represent an attempt to erase Palestinian identity and deny Palestinians their right to an independent state – a right that is recognized by the majority of countries around the world.

The focus on Gaza overshadowed another equally significant point made by Trump in his speech – his intention to revisit the issue of annexing territories in Judea and Samaria. This could reignite calls for the annexation of Area C, which had subsided following the release of the “Deal of the Century” in January 2020. Reviving these calls now would likely provoke widespread protests across the Arab world and in the Palestinian territories.

It is possible that Trump’s “outside-the-box” ideas were intentionally designed to shock, with the aim of achieving a more modest goal later on. However, there were never going to be any real buyers for these proposals. Moreover, even if these ideas are rejected, there remains an inherent danger in the legitimization, by the world’s most powerful nation, of actions that undermine international norms of behavior.

If Trump is truly interested in rebuilding Gaza, he might consider replicating the Marshall Plan (it could even be named after him!). The Marshall Plan helped restore Europe after the devastation of World War II, without relocating its residents, and involved an investment of an unimaginable $173 billion in today’s terms.

The storm that followed Trump’s announcement is just beginning, and its outcome remains uncertain. It could end up being little more than a “tempest in a teacup,” but if it turns out to be genuine, storms typically bring damage and destruction. The only question is how much damage and destruction will result.

הפוסט Trump’s Proposals for Gaza: A Political Gamble With Global Risks הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Delivering his opening remarks during their joint press conference, Trump announced that the United States “will take over the Gaza Strip” and refashion it as the “Riviera of the Middle East”. Key to Trump’s “long-term ownership” plan, which reportedly blindsided Netanyahu, would be the relocation of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to make way for American bulldozers and urban planners.

Trump’s declaration triggered strong international condemnation. British Foreign Minister Anneliese Dodds said that “there must be no forced displacement of Palestinians, nor any reduction in the territory of the Gaza Strip.” French President Emmanuel Macron and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sissi issued a joint statement calling any “forced displacement” of Gazans “a serious violation of international law”. Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its commitment to a Palestinian state. Germany, Russia, and China also took issue with the plan.

The criticism is justified. Trump appeared to unilaterally reject decades of diplomatic norms pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tabling the idea of a future Palestinian state. And while he may be right in insisting that the easiest way to end the intolerable cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas is by removing Gaza’s civilian population from the battlefield, international law on human rights and migration is clear when it comes to the forced relocation of civilians (except for military necessity). Without a cohesive plan for relocating Gaza’s approximately 2 million residents, identification of countries willing to serve as hosts, and a commitment that Gazans will eventually be able to return to their homes, Trump’s declaration—made in the midst of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas—may do more harm than good in the short run.

No wonder White House staff have been busy downplaying Trump’s commitment to employing US troops, permanently relocating Palestinians, or using US resources to finance the decades-long reconstruction effort.

Rather than disparage Trump’s vision, America’s partners in Europe and the Middle East should develop a feasible alternative that still captures its essence. This plan should prioritize replacing Hamas as a governing force in Gaza, designing an economically sound humanitarian model for international actors to host those Palestinians who wish to relocate, and establishing an international body that reimagines Gaza’s future and oversees the reconstruction process. These steps could eventually create the conditions for normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a coveted foreign policy goal for Netanyahu and Trump alike, and for future discussions of Palestinian sovereignty.

Like it or not, Trump has set the tone for negotiations on the future of Gaza and Palestine. If the United States’ partners truly desire an alternative ending, they must meet Trump in the middle with a vision of their own.

The article was published on February 11th on GMF.

הפוסט Don’t Like Trump’s Gaza Plan? Offer an Alternative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli public has been waiting for this for months, with consecutive public opinion polls indicating that a large majority supported ending the war in Gaza in return for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

As months went by, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing governing coalition worked to avoid such a deal — Hamas was doing the same. And the U.S. administration, although heavily invested in mediation efforts, simply didn’t apply effective pressure to make either party change course.

At the same time, the number of living Israeli hostages gradually decreased; casualties among Israeli soldiers increased; and the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population continued.

Today, Israelis are supportive of the cease-fire deal, but they also can’t help but ask why it wasn’t reached six, seven or eight months ago. The terms that were discussed and rejected at the time were nearly identical to the ones agreed upon now. Why was it necessary for additional hostages, soldiers and civilians to die before leaders finally took action?

Still, the deal brings with it a sigh of relief. We, Israelis, have all come to know and care so much about the hostages. Hope for their release and concern for their fate have become part of our daily lives. Their families have been leading a brave and furious struggle to bring them back home, sometimes in the face of unbearable, ugly attacks by the far right.

Many Israelis showed solidarity and support, feeling a basic Israeli principle had been jeopardized — the state’s responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring its people back home. And it was often claimed in recent months that until the hostages returned, Israeli society couldn’t heal from the trauma of Oct. 7.

Now, things are finally moving forward. The excitement upon the return of the first three hostages was felt in every corner. But we also receive the cease-fire announcement with a heavy heart. Not all of the 33 hostages who are to be gradually released in the deal’s first phase are said to be alive, and no one definitively knows which hostages will return on their feet.

More questions arise too: What will be the health condition of those returning? What will be the fate of the remaining 65 hostages who are to be released in later phases of the deal, which Netanyahu doesn’t seem eager to implement? What will be the future of Gaza after Israel’s withdrawal? And will residents of southern Israel finally be able to return home safely?

There are still many unknowns. But since the cease-fire was announced, they also carry a spark of optimism.

This deal shows that, eventually, diplomacy can work. International mediators can deliver. Sides to a bitter conflict can reach an agreement, and public pressure can make an impact. It shows that suffering can come to an end, that families can reunite and a better future can emerge.

Taking place in the context of many other regional changes, this cease-fire also creates new opportunities. From the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire in Lebanon to the transition in Syria and the weakening of Iran, all these developments improve Israel’s geopolitical situation. If only the country had a government that would seek to leverage this to advance a two-state solution, we could have witnessed a much more dramatic transformation — including normalization in Israeli-Saudi relations.

The window of opportunity for such change will still exist for a while to come, but its realization would require different, more moderate Israeli leadership, as well as curbing and sidelining far-right extremism, reversing anti-democratic trends within Israeli society and politics, and reviving pro-peace attitudes and practices.

The immediate priority, however, is fully implementing all phases of the cease-fire agreement, and setting in motion a constructive “day after” plan in the Gaza Strip — one involving the Palestinian Authority and regional countries, at the expense of Hamas. Israelis and Palestinians will need a continuous international helping hand to do this, especially from the U.S.

It’s time to turn the page on the dark chapter that Oct. 7 brought, and start charting the better, more peaceful future that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. The cease-fire inches us closer to that reality, and the mediators who, however belatedly, made it happen deserve appreciation and thanks, and they should follow the process through till it is fully implemented.

The article published on January 22nd 2025 in Politico.

הפוסט Gaza Cease-Fire: The View From Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A year after Hamas’s murderous surprise attack on October 7, Israel has succeeded in restoring its deterrent edge. All the main members of the “Axis of Resistance” – Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – have suffered major military setbacks, with the entire leadership echelons of Hezbollah and Hamas having been eliminated. Israel has proved that, militarily and technologically, it is superior to its enemies.

Alongside these achievements, an unexpected development has occurred in Syria, indirectly benefiting Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of Sunni Islamic rule have led to Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance, resulting in the removal of Iranian military presence and influence on Israel’s borders and the closure of the corridor through which Iran previously supplied arms and ammunition to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The fall of Assad also exposed the vulnerability of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, which, despite the geopolitical significance of Syria, were unable to prevent the regime’s downfall. However, this positive shift is tempered by concerns that Syria may now be controlled by extremist Islamic factions backed by Turkey, though it remains too early to fully assess the nature of the new Syrian regime.

On the other side, the camp of moderate states that have signed peace and/or normalization agreements with Israel, along with Saudi Arabia, has managed to maintain its cohesion, even if much of the activity has been conducted behind the scenes.

The cooperation between these states was publicly visible during the Iranian missile attack on Israel. With the exception of Jordan, none of these countries withdrew their ambassadors from Israel or severed diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia remains on the table, though the Saudis are now demanding a higher price for such an agreement.

Despite these achievements, Israel has so far failed in its handling of the hostages in Gaza. The military defeat inflicted on Hamas was expected to be Israel’s main bargaining chip, yet the insistence on not ending the war in Gaza is driven by political rather than operational considerations. This represents a moral failure that stands in stark contradiction to the core values of Judaism and humanity in general.

Moreover, the delay in securing an agreement for the release of the hostages, the humiliating treatment of the hostages’ families by ministers and Knesset members from the coalition, and the continuous attempts to push forward the judicial revolution while stalling on solutions for enlisting haredim (the ultra-Orthodox) into military service, have all exacerbated the divisions within Israeli society.

Alongside these failures, there has been growing criticism of Israel, including hate speech and antisemitism, particularly in relation to its policy toward the Palestinians. Israel has been accused of committing war crimes against Gaza’s civilian population.

The International Criminal Court’s issuance of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes seems to be only the tip of the iceberg.

While these accusations are politically motivated, even if they are primarily or partially unfounded – and opinions are divided on this, given the lack of reliable information in the Israeli media – they have severely damaged Israel’s standing in the international community as a law-abiding state.

“War is the continuation of diplomacy by other means,” as the famous quote from the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz suggests. In the current situation, one of the significant failures has been the inability to translate military successes into diplomatic achievements.

The ceasefire with Lebanon, which includes the removal of Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River and the deployment of UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese military in the area between the Litani and the Israeli border, might be considered a success. Yet, only time will tell if this achievement is sustainable, unlike the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

In contrast to the situation in Lebanon, a diplomatic resolution to the Palestinian problem appears to be a distant prospect. Numerous plans have been proposed for the “day after” the war, yet the Netanyahu government remains adamant not to engage in discussions about them.

It appears that the IDF has been instructed to establish a permanent presence in Gaza, at least in its northern part. Additionally, far-right elements within the government are actively considering the possibility of re-establishing Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Opposition to the continued control of Hamas over Gaza is justified, but resistance to the return of an upgraded Palestinian Authority or another recognized and legitimate Palestinian leadership is unwarranted. The vacuum created by the absence of governance is an open invitation for chaos or for Hamas to desperately cling to power. In any case, maintaining the current deadlock is a recipe for failure.

The main diplomatic goal that remains to be achieved is a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States have expressed interest in such an agreement, but they are waiting for the Trump presidency. The central issue revolves around the demands of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in exchange for normalization with Israel.

The key question is whether the current Saudi position, which insists on the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, is open for negotiations. Regardless, any Israeli government pursuing normalization will likely have to make concessions regarding the Palestinian issue, although the exact price remains uncertain.

Sinwar caused permanent changes

When Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar launched his murderous attack on Israel on October 7, he likely considered the possibility of becoming a martyr, but he could not have foreseen the profound and far-reaching changes it would trigger in the Middle East.

Despite the significant setbacks and failures suffered by the Axis of Resistance, Sinwar may be remembered for successfully bringing the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the international and regional agenda. This, however, came at an immense cost, particularly for the Palestinian people in Gaza, who have borne the brunt of the consequences of his actions.

In conclusion, Israel’s military successes must be translated into diplomatic achievements. The war has opened up a unique opportunity to reshape regional dynamics, but realizing this potential will require visionary leadership. The challenge, however, is that, at present, such leaders are not evident on either side of the conflict. After the calamity of October 7, failing to seize these new opportunities would amount to another profound tragedy.

The article was published on January 4th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s 2024 Military Successes Came at a Cost – Will It Pay in 2025? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While high tides are often seen as a positive sign, low tides can strain these connections.

As we mark the 30th anniversary of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, relations between the two appear to be nearing an unprecedented low – mirroring the current state of Israel’s ties with other countries in the region.

The bonds and shared interests linking Israel and Jordan are deeper than those Israel has with any other country with which it holds diplomatic relations.

Since its early days as Transjordan, the Hashemite Kingdom has been considered Israel’s “best of enemies.”

While Jordan participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel, its leaders maintained secret ties with Israeli counterparts throughout this period.

The existence of common enemies and Jordan’s reliance on Western allies (first Britain, later the United States) made Israel a valuable partner in preserving Hashemite rule.

King Hussein expressed gratitude to Israel for its support during Black September in 1970, when he was engaged in a struggle against the PLO.

In return, he warned Golda Meir of the impending war during their meeting at Glilot in September 1973.

Israel, in turn, could generally rely on the Jordanian army to secure the long-shared border, preventing terrorist incursions.

Over time, Jordan also developed additional strategic needs, such as water and gas, which Israel provides.

Before 1994, peace with Jordan had always been a possibility. However, unlike Egypt, Jordan lacked the strength to withstand opposition from the broader Arab world and the Palestinian population within its borders.

But Israel’s signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords with the PLO provided Jordan with the legitimacy it needed to formalize its own peace treaty a year later.

After years of attempting to represent Palestinian interests, Jordan relinquished this role to the PLO, while retaining its special role in the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, according to the peace treaty.

How to proceed? 

Since then, the failure to solve the Palestinian problem has presented the regime with a dilemma, of how to square its own interests, and those of the state, with the demands of its citizens.

The response has been to keep diplomatic relations with Israel on a low-profile while sustaining close, clandestine military, defense, and intelligence cooperation.

Thus, while public relations remain cool, covert ties have remained strong. A similar dynamic has unfolded with Egypt but with a significant difference: in Jordan, more than half the population is Palestinian.

Tensions on the Temple Mount and conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians have consistently strained relations between Israel and Jordan.

The Jordanian government has typically responded by recalling its ambassador and issuing strong condemnations of Israeli actions – measured responses that have not jeopardized the peace agreement itself.

However, as the current conflict endures, as Palestinians in Gaza face ongoing humanitarian hardships, and as Israel refrains from offering a political horizon, the voices in Jordan calling for more decisive actions against Israel are likely to grow louder and could increasingly impact Jordanian policymakers.

Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, exemplifies the duality of Jordan’s stance.

Throughout the conflict, he has issued strong condemnations of Israel’s actions, yet he has also emphasized that Jordan, along with the broader Arab world, seeks peace rather than war, advocating for a solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative.

Developments with Jordan may be more pronounced, but a similar pattern is evident in Israel’s relations with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

Despite a shared interest in countering Tehran, all these states condemned Israel’s recent attack on Iran.

Although these countries maintain varying levels of relationship with Israel, even the UAE – despite continuing flights to Israel and maintaining moderate statements – has made it clear that it will not participate in “the day after” in Gaza unless progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state.

This stance is also shared by Saudi Arabia, which has yet to normalize relations with Israel.

Taking peace with Arab states for granted 

Under the Netanyahu government, Israel appears to take its relations with peace and normalization with Arab states for granted.

The longevity of peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt – 30 and 45 years, respectively – may create the impression that these relationships are immune to crises. However, this assumption should not be put to the test.

Rational government policies should consider the circumstances, limitations, and risks associated with their implementation.

Israel’s limited strike on Iran was influenced, if not compelled, by American pressure to avoid complicating matters for the US administration ahead of the elections.

Similarly, an Israeli government acting with strategic foresight must weigh not only its own interests and those of its closest ally, the United States, but also the interests of other regional countries with shared concerns.

In this context, two key issues arise.

In the short term, priorities include ending the conflict, securing the release of hostages, securing Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the northern border, and establishing an alternative governing structure in Gaza.

In the longer term, a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue is essential, ideally through the formation of a state-like entity.

Resolving the first set of challenges could improve relations with the Arab states; however, only addressing the second will elevate these relationships to new heights.

This may currently seem like a fantasy, but so did peace with Egypt and Jordan just a few decades ago.

The article was published on November 11th in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט How Israel’s War Risks Destroying Ties with Jordan and Regional Allies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This axis includes Hezbollah, Shi’a militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and, to a certain extent, Syria.

The anniversary serves as a reminder, first and foremost, of the political, military, and intelligence failures that demand investigation by a state commission of inquiry.

It also offers an opportunity for reflection on the consequences and significance of what we have been through in the past year.

October 7 has caused a national trauma, marking yet another disaster in the long chain of tragedies experienced by the Jewish people.

Addressing this trauma is one of the most pressing tasks confronting Israeli society and its leadership.

 It has led to a loss of trust among many Israelis in the government; and while the war has diverted attention from the government’s judicial revolution, those plans do not appear to have been shelved.

The brutality of Hamas’s terrorist acts has also led to a process of dehumanization and delegitimization of Palestinians within Israeli society. While this may be a natural reaction to the events of October 7, it is likely to raise serious obstacles to renewing dialogue after the guns fall silent. Surveys indicate that a similar process has occurred among Palestinians toward Jews.

From a regional perspective, Israel has succeeded in rebuilding its deterrence, although only time will reveal the extent of this recovery.

The importance of Israel’s military and intelligence achievements lies not only in the outcomes but also in the way they are achieved – through ingenious military, technological, and intelligence-based subterfuges.

A heavy cost for deterrence 

The restoration of Israel’s deterrence has come at a heavy cost to Gaza’s civilian population. While it is hard to determine the exact number of casualties, estimates suggest a staggering toll, with figures around 40,000 deaths [of which Hamas recently admitted internally that 80% were combatants or their family members].

The primary challenge regarding deterrence lies in the nature of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, which are ideologically driven and therefore conventional deterrence is less effective against them.

Regionally, the Axis of Resistance has faced significant setbacks. Iran’s proxy doctrine has faltered, partly due to the lack of coordinated action, especially on October 7.

While Hamas’s attack marked a notable success for the organization, it ultimately led to the destruction of its forces and capabilities, signaling the end of its rule in Gaza.

Hezbollah, for its part, was able to initially claim a significant achievement, having launched thousands of missiles and rockets at northern Israel for an entire year, resulting in substantial economic damage and the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis.

However, this came at a high cost, including the elimination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and a chain of top commanders, alongside a severe blow to its operational capabilities.

Israel’s current operation in southern Lebanon is likely to inflict further damage on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, potentially forcing it to withdraw beyond the Litani River [as stated in the United Nations Resolution 1701].

While it is still too early to predict the war’s impact on Hezbollah’s domestic position in Lebanon, it is evident that the devastating consequences will lead to significant repercussions.

Tehran’s April 14 direct attack on Israel was a failure, with most of the missiles and drones launched intercepted by Israeli forces (or their allies) or landing in unpopulated areas.

The second Islamic Republic attack, on October 1, executed in retaliation for Nasrallah’s assassination, was larger and relatively more successful, but also resulted in no Israeli casualties, causing minor damage to property. This highlighted Israel’s significant technological advantage.

THE COALITION of moderate Middle Eastern states has remained stable. While Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and Arab public opinion generally supports the Palestinian cause, the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have maintained their relations with Israel – some covertly, others openly.

Certain countries even played an active role in countering the Iranian missile attack on Israel, as part of the cooperation in air defense systems that developed following the Abraham Accords and Israel’s integration into the US Central Command.

In its conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, Israel finds more allies in the Arab world due to the fierce rivalry rooted in the Sunni-Shi’a religious divide.

All the Sunni states perceive Shi’ite Iran and Hezbollah as a significant threat to their interests and therefore support Israel.

Conversely, Israel’s war with Hamas – a Sunni Palestinian organization – brings the issue of Palestinian independence to the forefront, which is widely supported by the Arab public. To maintain their fragile legitimacy, the Arab leaders publicly express pro-Palestinian rhetoric.

The United States remains the sole global power actively engaged in the region, though its involvement has so far been limited to defensive assistance, supplying weapons to Israel, and mediating between conflicting parties.

Additionally, the US has conducted limited operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea, constrained by a desire to avoid a regional war, especially given domestic pressures related to the upcoming presidential elections. Furthermore, recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have diminished US enthusiasm for ground interventions.

Meanwhile, Russia’s focus has shifted to its war with Ukraine, though it continues to maintain its stronghold in Syria. China’s involvement in diplomatic efforts has been minimal.

As a result, Middle Eastern states have largely been left to their own devices, a situation that has inadvertently bolstered Israel’s standing and role in the area.

One year later 

A year after October 7, the Palestinian issue has once again taken center stage. The Abraham Accords and the normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia may have pushed it to the sidelines, as Netanyahu intended, but Hamas’s attack redirected attention toward the urgent need for a solution.

The moderate states in the region advocate for a two-state solution and have even formed a coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, to promote it. Just as October 7 provided an opportunity to confront Hamas and Hezbollah – two significant threats to Israel’s borders that previous governments had neglected – it also created a renewed opportunity to settle the Palestinian issue.

Seemingly, the prospects for a solution have improved, as there is growing international acceptance of the idea that, given the presence of approximately seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, separation is the only viable option.

On the other hand, neither side of the conflict currently has capable leadership willing to pursue this direction. In addition, various polls indicate that the war has fueled increased extremism among both the Jewish and Palestinian populations.

However, a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed within a broader regional settlement, may serve as the most promising path toward resolving the Palestinian issue.

The political, military, and intelligence failures of October 7 are now compounded, a year later, by a moral failure – the failure to secure the release of the hostages.

While it remains uncertain whether Yahya Sinwar would have ultimately agreed to a deal, the real failure lies in the Netanyahu government’s apparent lack of effort to exhaust every possible means for reaching a deal.

There is currently no end in sight to the war across its various fronts. Its continuation will have significant costs for Israel, both diplomatically – with increasing international and regional isolation – and economically, resulting in a substantial budget deficit, further downgrades of Israel’s credit rating, a decline in foreign investment, and more.

Given that Israel does not desire war with Iran and cannot eradicate Hezbollah, it should focus on militarily achievable goals leading to a political settlement in Lebanon and Gaza.

The notion of “victory” is elusive, as all parties involved will likely frame the conflict as a success for themselves. Significant objectives could include inflicting substantial damage on Iran, pushing Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border, dismantling its military capabilities, restoring a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) in demilitarized Gaza, and securing the return of hostages. Achieving these goals would provide justifiable grounds for concluding the war.

The article was published on October 14th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s Restored Deterrence Comes at the Cost of Diplomatic and Moral Challenges הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For various reasons, including political considerations, there are limits at this moment to how the international community can push Israelis and Palestinians to adopt and fully implement Biden’s grand design. But it must not give up. This group of states – composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, other Western and European states, and Arab and Muslim states such as Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – can still play a crucial role in promoting this solution. They should assist local forces who are invested in advancing peace in two key ways: by countering Israel’s advancing annexation efforts in the West Bank, and by promoting transformative actions on the ground to support the future implementation of the two-state solution.

Israel’s government is taking steps towards annexation the West Bank, extending Israel’s sovereignty and erasing the Green Line that has separated it from the occupied territories. It supports violent settler actions to expel Palestinian communities from their lands, promotes settlement construction, allocates funds for settlement development and has transferred administration of the occupied territories from military to civilian control within the Defence Ministry Which is controlled by the ultra-right. The government aims to eliminate any distinction between Israel and the settlements, preventing future territorial compromise and the two-state solution. In the defensive battle against these efforts, the abovementioned states have potentially effective tools at their disposal that could prevent further deterioration of conditions in the West Bank.

For years, Western and Arab states have tried to influence Israel’s government by applying political and diplomatic pressure on it. At times, they have conditioned cooperation or other forms of support on halting actions that deepen the occupation and annexation. This was the case with the United States’ demands to stop settlement construction and to evacuate illegal outposts, and with the linkage between the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and halting the government’s annexation plans. Unfortunately, the actions of the international community have been little more than political and moral lip service. Examples include the European Union’s decision in 2016 to label products from settlements after years of discussions, which has remained largely symbolic, and the initiatives promoted at the United Nations to create a blacklist of companies supporting the occupation, which never led to coordinated action. In reality, the international community adopted Israel’s approach of conflict management (as opposed to trying and solve the conflict), and did not place real pressure on Israel to end the occupation or be held accountable for it as long as the region remained relatively quiet. Thus, despite these efforts, successive Israeli governments have continued to expand the settlement enterprise.

In early 2024, a new tool was introduced by the United States and other Western states: sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations promoting annexation. So far, these have affected a small number of violent settlers whom Israel’s political and legal system chose not to confront. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of this tool, but against a government indifferent to its international standing and to democratic-liberal values, when political and diplomatic pressure seems ineffective, sanctions could be a key tool. They have an immediate and significant impact on the functioning of these individuals and organizations, and they exert additional pressure on the Israeli government, which is committed to the settlers and is required to find solutions for them. The government’s support for the settlers therefore comes at the expense of all Israeli citizens – by taking capacity away from government planning in other sectors and by spending funds from public coffers. Thus, in the face of attempts by the government and the settlers to erase the Green Line, these sanctions accentuate it and present Israeli citizens with a clear choice — either the settlements or Israel. Sanctions can become more significant and effective by expanding them to include more central figures and organizations in the settlement movement, and by increasing coordination on them between Europe, the United States and Arab states.

The role of the international community is not only to keep the two-state solution alive but also to establish facts on the ground to promote it. Just as settlers have, for years, taken steps to obstruct peace, the international community must now actively promote an ‘evolving peace’. This should involve practical measures to advance the two-state solution across different areas. Such efforts are essential to avoid reverting to the pre-7 October conflict-management approach and to support instead the establishment of a stable, effective and moderate Palestinian state that can coexist peacefully and securely with a moderate Israel.

For example, as part of strengthening the Palestinian national movement, the international community should, at an appropriate time determined with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, recognize a Palestinian state with borders to be determined in future negotiations with Israel. This would help change the legal status of the occupied territories, bolster moderate Palestinians and Israelis who support compromise, and foster a more equitable negotiation process when the time comes. The international community should also be ready to support the Palestinian Authority and prevent its collapse in the face of Israeli retaliatory measures following such recognition.

Recognition alone will not be enough, however; changes on the ground will be essential. Arab states, Europe and the United States have the relevant tools and experience to support these changes. There is a need to build the institutions and infrastructure of the future Palestinian state, to foster peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians, to establish moderate approaches, to create mutual restraining interdependence and to strengthen in both societies the moderate forces that will support a political leadership in line with these goals. All these efforts must be pursued through cooperation, even in an environment where Israel’s government and terrorist organizations will attempt to undermine them.

One such effort must be to ensure that the Palestinian Authority is integrated in key regional projects that Israel’s government would not want to reject. For example, the United Arab Emirates could insist on including the Palestinian Authority in the water-for-energy exchange project between Israel and Jordan that it backs, or the European Union could similarly condition Israel’s connection to the European electricity grid through the EuroAsia Interconnector. In the longer term, it will be important to ensure that the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor includes the Palestinian Authority or state.

Reforms within the Palestinian Authority must be advanced, with closer monitoring of how resources are being translated into building effective institutions and improving the services provided to Palestinians. Investment in local governance is necessary, accompanied by the development of local physical and institutional infrastructure that will form the foundation for the Palestinian state. Israel was built in a similar manner – by connecting sub-centres that were founded and developed under the British mandate. To this end, for example, the EU’s Twinning and TAIEX programmes could be expanded and adapted for local Palestinian governance.

There must be support for civil society organizations in Israel and Palestine that encourages joint projects and strengthens the discourse and organizations that promote peace and equality. The expansion and implementation of the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act adopted by the US Congress in 2020 can serve as a platform for this. In the fight against fundamentalist Islam, tapping Indonesian civil society organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, that promote moderate Islam worldwide and the United Arab Emirates’ experience in promoting religious tolerance can lead to profound changes within Palestinian society. The Jewish diaspora in the United States should do the same for Israeli society.

Efforts should be made to promote Palestinian economic independence by connecting the Palestinian economy to the Arab world and developing local sources of income, alongside local solutions for energy and food security based on sustainable practices. A long-term planning effort is needed to lay the groundwork for building the Palestinian state. Rebuilding the Palestinian security and police forces, and much more, is necessary. In short, there is a lot of work to be done, and it must start.

Middle Eastern countries, Europe and the United States have a vested interest in promoting peace and stability in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. It is not viable for them to wait idly for Israeli and Palestinian political leaders to choose peace. The international community must actively establish facts on the ground to advance peace, protect the possibility of a two-state solution and create favourable conditions for nurturing peace-supportive leadership and implementing a political process when the time is right. This is the essence of ‘evolving peace’ and Israelis and Palestinians need the international community’s support to overcome their extremist leaderships.

The article was published on September 27th in Chatham House.

הפוסט The International Community’s Role in Moving From the Gaza War to Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians and Regional Stability הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Key points:

1. The Gaza war reignited the Two-State Solution, with the US, EU, and Arab countries working together to achieve it through a “reverse engineering” approach.

2. The EU’s potential role is outlined in three stages of “The Israeli Initiative”:

Political Horizon: Establish a political vision and international monitoring forum.

Transitional Phase (peace-building): Demilitarize the Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, hold elections, and begin regional projects.

Negotiation (peace-making): Final negotiations for Palestinian statehood and normalizing Israel-Arab relations.

The paper highlights the importance of the EU’s role in maintaining the viability of the Two-State Solution in the West Bank. In the short term, the EU should provide humanitarian aid, counter annexation efforts in the West Bank, stabilize the Palestinian Authority (PA), and address Iranian proxies. Its influence depends on trust-building with both sides and leveraging its status as both a financial and political player.

The conclusion calls on the EU to prepare for post-war diplomatic and economic opportunities, with a focus on revitalizing the PA, stabilizing the region, and gaining trust with Israel through continued engagement.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Deradicalization and Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation: Lessons and Recommendations Based on Past Conflicts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Regional Conference on the Infrastructural-Environmental Rehabilitation of the Gaza Area הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

I have been a lecturer in international relations and a peace scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for the last 31 years. I am always amazed at the naïve and misguided attitude we Israelis have toward the concept of “peace,” which has become a pejorative in the national lexicon. This is the consequence of a complex and tragic situation, disappointment regarding truncated peace processes and above all decades of Orwellian social engineering to the effect that “managing” the conflict is preferable to any political solution and that “total victory” supplants the vision of the prophet Isaiah.

Part of the confusion and the natural recoil to talking about the possibility of peace on the “day after” the war in Gaza stems from a binary and also naïve understanding of the concept. Many of us, who are still in the grip of trauma, for understandable reasons, tend to think that the Arabs as a whole and the Palestinians in particular want “to throw us into the sea” (we received clear proof of that intention in the horrific massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7). Others think that any talk of peace must refer to “true peace,” a la John Lennon, imagining a world suffused with harmony and love, in which the Palestinians have been transformed into ardent Zionists.

But there is another possibility. Peace in its “negative” sense – namely the absence of war, rather than of conflict – is achieved out of vested interests and a sober-eyed reading of reality. There need not be a necessary link between peace and love. Negative peace is made between enemies who reach the conclusion, after a war, out of selfish considerations, that it is in their own interests to reach a political solution. After all, war has no inherent value and it does not allow for a normal life.

Peace is also the normal state of affairs that characterizes relations between most of the countries in the world, including those that are hostile to each other, such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or even the United States and China nowadays. Costa Rica is a demilitarized, thriving country in Central America that does not constitute a threat to its neighbors. And as U.S. President Joe Biden constantly stresses, a completely demilitarized Palestinian state in the format of a two-state solution would bring Israel its coveted security (and peace), with the requisite guarantees.

From the time I was a doctoral candidate at Princeton University, in the late 1980s, I have been studying processes of “peaceful change” as a widespread alternative to war in international relations. The process implies a change in the existing situation, not by way of violence, but as a result of cooperation and negotiations between two or more parties. Territorially, it refers to cases of decolonization, transfer of territories between states (including as a solution for border disputes), the establishment of new states, and a change in the legal status of certain areas without the transfer of territory or sovereignty.

There are hundreds of examples of such peaceful change in the history of Europe, America, Africa and Asia, particularly in the context of decolonization. In the Israeli-Arab conflict, we can point to the successful cases of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt (1977-1979) and between Israel and Jordan (1993-1994). Imagine for a moment what our situation would be today in the absence of peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.

Conversely, the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, in 1991-2011, ultimately failed. Moreover, the negotiation process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was severed terminally, with the failure of the mediation effort by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2014 and the Palestinians’ application to participate in several international institutions, including the International Court of Justice. Nonetheless, as called for in the vilified Oslo Accords, there is still security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, a situation that assists the Israeli security forces in fighting terrorism.

Within the framework of my academic research, I developed a model that presents six background conditions that help to bring about successful peaceful change, together with variables in the process itself. Even if the model is primarily theoretical, it has already been used as part of the mediation efforts of the Organization of American States and the United States after the war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, which three years later led to a peace agreement between the two countries. If since then we have not heard anything about a territorial dispute between those two South American countries, that augurs well for the future.

The background conditions are: (1) An asymmetrical distribution of power that gives one side a reason to want to preserve the status quo; (2) similar political regimes; (3) normative agreement regarding the application of international law in relation to the territory in dispute; (4) diplomatic involvement of a third party; (5) a previous war; and (6) a third-party threat to one or both of the parties involved in the negotiations.

The variables in the process refer to the degree of cooperation and reciprocity between the parties, the negotiations themselves and the differences between the sides’ interests vis-à-vis the territory (for example, one side wants “national honor” and “economic benefits,” the other wants “security”).

The October 7 massacre and Israel’s justified counterattack in the Gaza Strip shattered the illusion that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could be “managed,” and brought about the most brutal war between the two peoples since 1947-1949. After the war – and assuming that Hamas does not continue to be sovereign in the Gaza Strip but is supplanted by an international entity for a transitional period – is a gradual process of peaceful change possible between Israel and the Palestinians?

As in the case of Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War, a few years would be required before a process of peaceful change becomes feasible – but not a generation. Ironically, a tragic situation of “mutually hurting stalemate” between the two sides has made them both “ripe” for a political process that could bring about a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israel. On the surface, it appears as if the current impasse might be a good candidate for the proposed model, with certain adjustments, per the following favorable condition for peaceful change:

1. The distribution of power between Israel and the Palestinians is clearly tilted in Israel’s favor. Israel possesses the military, economic and even moral shoulders that enable it to be “generous” in the pursuit of its national interest, according to which only a situation of peace can guarantee recognition of its borders, once such borders have been demarcated by agreement. As such, Israel will be able to become a “normal” state that integrates into the region and makes peace with Saudi Arabia and with all the moderate Arab states.

2. Israel is (still?) a liberal democracy, at least within the boundaries of the Green Line, whereas the Palestinian Authority is not a state in the full sense of the word, and its regime is (still) authoritarian (elections were last held there in 2006). Neither of the current leaders (Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively) possesses the domestic legitimacy or the willingness to move ahead in the direction of a political solution. Accordingly, we must surmise that only democratic elections in both Israel and the PA, and new leaderships, will allow for them to advance peaceful change in the coming years.

3. Both Israel and the PLO have recognized and accepted UN Resolution 181, which set out the partition plan of
November 29, 1947, and Security Council Resolution 242, from 1967, regarding “withdrawal… from territories” in exchange for peace, as expressed, among other places, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at Bar Ilan University in June 2009. It can be said that a normative agreement exists regarding the recognition of the mutual legitimate rights of the two peoples to part of the territory of the Land of Israel/Palestine.

4. The current war has led to a considerable internationalization of the conflict. The United States, the countries of the Arab League, Turkey, the European states and the vast majority of the international community support a solution based on Resolution 181 (a “two-state solution”) and are ready to mobilize for the diplomatic effort that would be required to advance it, following Gaza’s postwar rehabilitation. Renewed ratification by the Arab states, and Israeli recognition, of the Arab League’s 2002 peace initiative could assist in the process.

5. The current war between Israel and Hamas has demonstrated tragically that it will not be possible to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians by military means alone. Hence, the diplomatic path must be tried after not having been attempted substantively for the past 30 years, due to its being torpedoed by extremist elements on both sides, including Hamas and the Jewish messianic – all of whom view the political process and the division of the land as a substantive threat to their fundamentalist, maximalist visions.

6. The external threat posed by Iran and its proxies in the “resistance axis” constitutes an incentive for the moderates in the Middle East, and also for the Israelis and the Palestinians, to embark on a path to peace and compromise. In addition to the external threat, each of the two societies also faces a considerable domestic threat emanating from the extremist elements that demand exclusive ownership of the same land.

A year ago, inside a Salvation Army store in Washington, D.C., I saw an inscription on the wall, attributed to the writer Robert Ludlum: “Hope is stronger than fear.” There are moments in international relations in which a crisis can constitute an opening for a historic opportunity. The bulk of the background conditions for a process of peaceful change between Israelis and Palestinians exist already today, even if at the moment it is mainly fear and despair that prevails between them, rather than trust. May courageous and legitimate leaders arise, among both the Israelis and the Palestinians, who can transcend themselves and the agony of their peoples, and launch a political process after the war with massive third-party assistance. That is the life imperative for both peoples who inhabit this land, neither of which is going away.

Even if this academic model at the moment sounds a bit fanciful, we must talk about peace and about change by peaceful means as a road map for a better future, and demarcate an alternative to Israel’s becoming mired in the Gaza Strip in the wake of its military occupation and the continuation of a guerrilla war of attrition without any
achievable goals.

The article was published on June 21st, 2024 in Haaretz.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian Peace May Look Entirely Different From How We Imagine It הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now.

How is it that Hamas, not a particularly large or strong organization, is refusing to bend to the pressure from the United States, the main global power, and two major states in the Middle East, Egypt and Qatar?

Despite being under heavy military pressure from Israel, suffering large-scale casualties, and having lost most of its territorial strongholds, as well as its Philadelphi Corridor tunnel lifeline, Hamas remains unwilling to accept proposals that would seem to be relatively generous, considering its current situation.

To answer this question, one needs to go into Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s mind – a difficult, if not impossible, task, as the events of October 7 proved. Even if some psychologists might categorize his personality as psychotic or narcissistic, there is an element of rationality to his decision-making, even if this rationality is different from ours.

Despite this challenge, it is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now. The first explanation is that none of the mediators has sufficiently strong leverage against Hamas.

Of the three, Qatar would seem to have the three most significant assets: halting the financial aid it provides to Hamas (which in any case would seem not to be arriving at present); freezing the organization’s assets in Qatar; and closing Hamas’s offices in Qatar, which would mean exiling the organization’s leaders from its territory.

Qatar has threatened to expel the Hamas leadership from its territory, but this threat has not yet been carried out because Qatar understands that such a step would jeopardize its ability to mediate between Israel and Hamas.

Losing this role would damage Qatar’s regional and international status. In any case, hurting Hamas’s leadership’s standard of living is not of concern to Sinwar.

Egypt has even weaker leverage than Qatar. Though Egypt is considered in the Arab world as the “big sister,” it has few resources to deploy in mediation. It has even lost its last leverage – control of the Philadelphi Corridor.

Though its General Intelligence Service, responsible for relations with Hamas, provides a form of “bear hug” of the organization, there are more opposing than shared interests between the two.

US plays important role as mediator

The importance of the United States as a mediator lies in its ability to offer guarantees against any violation of the agreement by Israel after signing. Beyond this, President Joe Biden has no direct leverage against Hamas. The main, and perhaps only, indirect leverage at his disposal is to apply pressure to Qatar, a US ally that houses the largest American military base in the Middle East and enjoys special status as a non-NATO-member ally.

But the United States has no interest in harming itself by harming Qatar. In this context, it is possible that the United Nations has stronger leverage in the form of applying sanctions, under the terms of Article 7 of the UN Charter.

A second explanation relates to the fact that sanctions against uncooperative actors in the international arena are ineffective when those actors’ survival is at stake.

In other words, those in danger of being wiped out are not deterred by threats made by their allies or by mediators. Thus, any proposal that does not entail an unequivocal promise to end the war will be rejected, even at the cost of further casualties – which in any case, are not a factor for Hamas in considering whether to continue or end the fighting.

And finally, the pressure being applied to Israel by the international community, the military pressure being applied by Hezbollah on the northern border, and the pressure from Israeli society to reach a deal for the hostages have led Sinwar to conclude that his goals will be achieved eventually, even if it takes a long time. This policy involves risk-taking and brinkmanship, characteristic of leaders who are impetuous or extremely courageous.

What are the options?

If this assessment is accurate, then what can be done? There are three options:

The first is simply to accept Hamas’s demands. The advantage of this course of action is that it will bring the end of the war and the release of the hostages, and perhaps allow Israel to focus on the northern theater, which in any case requires a more robust policy, whether by diplomatic or military means.

The disadvantage is that Israel will be seen as not having achieved its military goals of toppling and removing Hamas, and Hamas will receive a boost to its self-image as having defeated Israel by surviving. In this sense, the war will be similar to the Suez War and the Yom Kippur War, which ended with military victories for Israel but with diplomatic victories for Nasser and Sadat, respectively.

The second option is to start working seriously on plans for the reconstruction of Gaza under alternative leadership – not an Israeli civilian or military administration, but on a body enjoying international legitimacy, such as the Palestinian Authority, albeit with a different leadership, enjoying local legitimacy. The return of the PA to Gaza, with backing from moderate Arab states, would be a real threat to the remnants of Hamas rule in Gaza.

This possibility also involves promoting normalization with Saudi Arabia, which in turn would be a catalyst for further security and economic integration of Israel in the region.

The third option is to continue the war until Hamas surrenders unconditionally, though presumably this goal is unattainable as long as Hamas continues to hold hostages.

The war in Gaza is asymmetrical: it is a war between a state and a non-state actor, between a large military deploying massive forces and advanced weaponry against an organization using limited (and sometimes primitive) means and guerrilla tactics.

In many ways, it is reminiscent of the Vietcong’s war against the United States in Vietnam, and we all know how that ended. Israel needs to choose a realistic option – that is, a combination of the first and second options described above.

The article was published on June 29th, 2024 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט How has Hamas kept its strength for so long without giving in to mediation pressure? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An important factor in every negotiation between states is the incentives put forward by one of the parties to the conflict or by the mediating party.

For example, Israel’s willingness to recognize the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was an incentive for Morocco to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. Similarly, the supply of F-35 warplanes by the United States was an incentive for the United Arab Emirates to sign a similar agreement with Israel.

Sometimes, there is a mega-incentive, one that cannot or should not be refused. Who, for instance, could have refused when Anwar Sadat proposed his historic visit to Jerusalem?

The idea of normalization with Saudi Arabia has featured prominently in recent headlines, following the Saudis’ willingness to pursue this idea in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state – or at the very least, significant progress in that direction. Israel’s opposition to such a deal stems from a combination of ideological, political, and security-related factors.

The idea is anathema to those who ideologically believe in the need to liberate all of the biblical Land of Israel and who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian national identity. Security-wise, there are fears over the shrinking of Israel’s borders. And politically, normalization could lead to the disintegration of the current government and possibly the end of the Netanyahu era. These are all very strong reasons for opposing such a deal.

But for those willing to act in a rational and considered manner, the Saudi proposal is an incentive to something much bigger than just a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. First, it opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world.

Second, it would be a blow to the “axis of resistance” led by Iran, as one of its main goals has been to derail this normalization process.

Third, it would strengthen the integration of Israel into the region’s security architecture, as was manifested during the April missile attack by Iran.

The fact that the Israeli, Saudi, Bahraini, Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian chiefs of staff met in Bahrain under the umbrella of the US Central Command earlier this month may attest to the possibilities inherent in this new security structure.

Fourth, normalization with Saudi Arabia would reduce antagonism toward Israel, regionally and globally, and would halt the process of Israel’s becoming a pariah state.

Fifth, it would reinforce Israel’s economic ties with other states in the Middle East, especially with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

And finally, it would lead to Israel’s integration into a new economic architecture that will link the Far East and India with Europe, via sea and land corridors passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

Should Israel agree to Saudi normalization?

In and of itself, normalization with Saudi Arabia would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. But the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state may elicit fierce opposition from the Israeli public. These fears are natural and logical, particularly after the October 7 attack. Yet, this disaster has in fact led to three important developments that make the creation of a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later.

First, it restored the Palestinian question to its “natural” place at the core of the conflict. Israel’s attempts to relegate it to the margins or make it disappear entirely by signing normalization agreements with Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East have failed. Like the idea that Hamas would not attempt a large-scale attack from Gaza, this has proved to be another misjudgment.

Second, the disaster has revived the two-state solution, which before October 7 had become irrelevant in the eyes of many due to the growth of Israeli settlements in Area C in the West Bank. The one-state idea had gained traction in many circles, but the disaster demonstrated that, despite everything, separation is a necessity, while a single state for Israelis and Palestinians is a recipe for violence and destruction. The re-emergence of the idea of a Palestinian state has occurred in the international arena at both the state level and among international organizations and institutions, as well as in general public opinion.

Third, actors in the international and Arab arenas have come to understand that they need to be part of the solution, by giving recognition and guarantees to both sides, possibly even including the deployment of troops. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel hands responsibility for its security to others, but that the solution requires regional and international partners who have an interest in the success and maintenance of any agreement.

A fateful decision is now required, of the kind that David Ben-Gurion made with the Declaration of Independence and that Menachem Begin made when agreeing the peace deal with Egypt. The problem is that Israel currently has a prime minister with a majority in the Knesset but without public legitimacy. No less serious is the fact that Palestinian leadership also suffers from legitimacy deficiency.

Moreover, Palestinian public opinion polls reveal widespread support for Hamas, and little support for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinian side will also have to undergo a process of sobering up to the realities of what is possible.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is a mega-incentive that presents Israel with a dilemma: Should it continue with its ghetto mentality and self-victimization, clinging to the belief that “in every generation, someone rises up to destroy us,” or should it forge a new regional partnership and alliance? What happens next is not a historical inevitability; it will be decided by Israeli society and its leaders.

The article was publish on June 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has missed quite a few opportunities over the years for normalization with the Arabs, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Those who hark back to the saying coined by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” should revisit the history books.

The first missed opportunity with the Saudis dates back to December 1977, when Crown Prince Fahd sent an emissary to Israel with a verbal message for Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan refused to meet him without knowing the content of the message in advance, and the messenger went home. In August 1981, Fahd proposed an initiative, which Israel scornfully rejected. In February 2002, Israel simply disregarded another Saudi outreach, this one by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, whereas the Arab League adopted it. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it came to be known, was particularly significant because it reflected broad consensus on recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, in return for Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel resisted the plan’s terms not only on political and ideological grounds, but also out of ignorance regarding Saudi Arabia’s importance in the Arab and Islamic world and a perception of its leadership as corrupt and religiously extreme. Had the Arab Peace Initiative been presented to Israel at earlier stages of the conflict, the leadership would likely have seen it as an acceptable basis for negotiations and an agreement. But the process of radicalization underway within Israel’s Jewish society with regard to the occupied territories prompted repeated efforts to circumvent the Palestinian problem. The 2020 normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco ostensibly signalled the ultimate justification of these efforts, but the event of Oct. 7 and its aftermath refute the claim that the Palestinian problem could be ignored.

Hamas’s murderous offensive and the ensuing war also created a unique opportunity, as do many wars that result in systemic overhauls. Such was the case with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that ultimately led to peace with Egypt. Exactly 50 years on, Israel is steadfastly refusing to take advantage of this cataclysm to initiate or accept plans for the day after the Gaza war, in keeping with its historic pattern. It has never initiated a peace plan – the one with Egypt was proposed by President Anwar Sadat.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is in itself politically and economically important, but its many regional and international ramifications are even more so. First, it will open the door to recognition by other countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Second, it will deliver a blow to the Iranian “resistance” axis, which aspires to undermine Muslim normalization with Israel. Third, it will anchor the process of Israel’s integration into the regional and global security architecture, with its benefits as evidenced by the coalition mounted to foil Iran’s April 2024 missile attack on Israel.

Fourth, it will take the sting out of at least some resistance to Israel in the world and in the region by those who oppose its policies but not its existence, thereby stopping its descent into pariahhood. Fifth, it will strengthen Israel’s economic ties with countries in the region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Trade between Israel and the UAE in 2023 soared to almost $3 billion and would have surpassed that figure had it not been for the war. And finally, normalization with the Saudis would result in Israel’s integration into the new economic architecture linking the Far East and India to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel through a sea and land corridor.

The Saudis have been successful in their efforts to moderate the Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza, as reflected in the May 16 Arab League summit in Bahrain, with the participation of almost all the kings and presidents of Arab countries, including Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. While denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza and calling for an end to the war and the deployment of international forces there, the joint concluding statement also called for an international conference and expressed support for the two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative. In other words, the war has not changed the strategic Arab adherence to the two-state solution.

Many in Israel view the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security threat, a logical concern especially after October 7. However, it is precisely this catastrophe that makes a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later, for the following three reasons. First, it restored the Palestinian problem to its “natural” place at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thwarting attempts to marginalize or eliminate it through normalization with Arab countries on the periphery of the Middle East. Second, the disaster has prompted renewed discourse on the two-state solution, which had seemed irrelevant before October 7 due to the massive increase in settlements throughout Area C of the West Bank. The idea of “one state” gained traction in many circles, but the Hamas massacre demonstrated that separation is nevertheless the only viable option, whereas one state is a recipe for calamity.

Third, international and Arab actors understand that they must be part of the solution by providing guarantees to both sides, including perhaps by sending peacekeeping forces to Gaza. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel entrusts its security to others, but rather that regional and international partners have an interest in offering and preserving solutions to the conflict.

The negative consequences of Israel’s refusal are already manifest. The announced recognition of a Palestinian state by Ireland, Norway and Spain signals the beginning of a political tsunami that will lead to recognition by other countries, in addition to the 140 that have already sone so over the years. This worldwide recognition of a Palestinian state would also further exacerbate international rejection of Israel’s rule over a foreign people. Instead of Israel eventually having to bend under international pressure, it could benefit right now through Saudi recognition and normalization, which would include a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The realization of this grandiose plan requires a fateful decision of the kind adopted 77 years ago by David Ben-Gurion. But Netanyahu is no Ben-Gurion, and despite the backing of a Knesset majority, lacks public legitimacy following the October 7 disaster, for which he and his government are responsible. Just as troubling, the Palestinian leadership also lacks public legitimacy, being perceived as corrupt and unfit to make fateful decisions. Reflecting its low standing, Palestinian polls demonstrate wide support for Hamas, especially following Oct. 7, and little backing for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinians, just like the Israelis, need to undergo a process of disillusionment – in Israel’s case with the limits of power, in the Palestinian case with the limits of ambition.

The current circumstances would seem to quash prospects of a two-state solution in the foreseeable future. However, should an Israeli government take the leap and accept the “Saudi move”, and the Palestinians would then reject it, for whatever reason, the Saudis would likely regard this as a sufficiently big fig leaf to move forward with their plan. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is clearly fed up with the Palestinians. In March 2018, he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinian leadership had missed opportunities and rejected all the offers it was given over the past 40 years. “It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining,” he reportedly told the closed-door meeting.

Prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia following the events of October 7 place Israel at a crossroads. It can either continue to adhere to its historic role as a victim persecuted throughout history and to this very day, or seize the opportunity as a powerful independent nation to break out of its ghetto into the region as a partner and ally. Either decision is down to Israel’s leaders and society, not a deus ex machina.

The article was published on June 1st in Haaretz. 

הפוסט The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli Initiative offers a three-phase plan. The first phase focuses on a shift from warfare to rehabilitation. The second phase aims to prepare the ground for a stable settlement. Finally, the third phase outlines a negotiation process over a two-state solution as part of a regional normalization process between Israel and the Arab World. The plan was created by the Foreign and Security Team of Mitvim and the Berl Katznelson Foundation, which was established 24 hours after the October 7th massacre, with the support of the New Israel Fund. It was crafted by a group of top-tier diplomatic and security experts with decades of experience.

The Initiative stands out as the first comprehensive alternative published by Israel since the beginning of the war, which provides a voice to the Israeli liberal majority. It aims to serve as a feasible policy plan for those who have long opposed the government’s policies and its unwillingness to offer, or even deal with, political planning for the day after.

The Israeli Initiative not only recognizes the importance of a two-state solution, but also emphasizes its significance in ensuring the safety and security of both Israelis and Palestinians. By presenting a pragmatic approach and considering the evolving dynamics on the ground, this publication sets a new benchmark for future discussions and negotiations.

הפוסט The Israeli Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Under the leadership of Netanyahu’s Israeli government, the prevailing approach was to manage the conflict while maintaining security. The central assumption of this approach is that the conflict is unsolvable, and therefore, there is no need to exert effort to resolve it. Instead, resources were invested in managing it, ensuring that the cost borne by Israeli society would not be excessively high. This approach created a false sense of temporary security and control. However, in practice, it fueled a dangerous dynamic of Hamas’s empowerment and the expansion of cycles of violence that compromised Israel’s security.

As Netanyahu’s governments became more radical and messianic, the “conflict management” approach shifted. Rather than advancing a political solution, the government prioritized accelerating settlement construction in the West Bank. Instead of strengthening cooperation with the Palestinian Authority—the security and conflict resolution partner—the government favored bolstering Hamas, the perpetual war partner. Netanyahu even attempted to downplay the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, portraying it as a minor nuisance. He argued that Israel could integrate into the Middle East without resolving the conflict, bypassing Palestinian leadership through normalization processes with Arab countries. All of these, along with the government’s judicial overhaul, have harmed Israel’s national resilience, weakened the country, and undermined its deterrence in the region.

Despite the conflict management approach, there hasn’t been a strong alternative political strategy. Public figures from major center-left parties preferred to avoid presenting a two-state solution due to political concerns. Since Rabin’s assassination, public support for a political horizon leading to two-states reality has declined. The ongoing terror, incitement, and anti-Jewish sentiments in the Palestinian education system, coupled with disappointment from incomplete peace processes, have fueled despair among Israeli society regarding a political resolution to the conflict.

However, the idea of annexation and Jewish supremacy has never gained widespread support among Israeli citizens. In a July 2023, the Mitvim Institute for regional foreign policies in Israel discovered that 36% of Israelis view pursuing a two-state solution as the desired strategy for Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, while 28% support annexing the West Bank and establishing a single state with additional Jewish rights. Despite relatively low support for Israeli-Palestinian peace, the picture changes significantly when regional components are considered. The same survey found that 61% believe Israel should leverage normalization with other countries to promote peace with the Palestinians. This trend of increasing support for normalization-driven peace has persisted since the Abraham Accords were signed.

The Israeli Society After October 7^th: from Anger to Hope?

Until that tragic day, Israeli society was on the brink of dissolution. The judicial overhaul faced strong opposition from the liberal camp, which flooded the streets in protest against the erosion of Israel’s democratic core principles. Despite assurances, the “fully right-wing” government struggled to combat the wave of terror within the country and the simmering conflict in the north with Hezbollah, resulting in a diminishing sense of security among Israeli citizens.

However, before October 7th, it appeared that Israel’s strategic position in the Middle East was about to strengthen. The normalization process was reaching its peak, with the anticipated inclusion of Saudi Arabia—the most influential and powerful Muslim state in the world—recognizing Israel. The planned normalization agreement did not impose significant requirements on Israel regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state. Undoubtedly, Netanyahu was on the path to achieving a significant diplomatic milestone, with broad support from the Israeli public. But everything changed after October 7th.

Fifty years after the surprise attack by Arab forces on Yom Kippur in 1973, on October 7th, Hamas carried out the largest massacre against Jews since the Holocaust. For two years, Hamas meticulously plan a detailed operation: capturing as many Jewish towns around Gaza as possible, killing Israeli civilians and soldiers, and abducting hundreds of them into Gaza. Iranian support for Hamas fueled a long-term strategy against Israel, which was carefully shielded from Israeli political and military echelons. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar aimed to undermine Israel’s normalization talks with Arab countries, claiming that violent incidents in Al-Aqsa and the government’s West Bank policy were catalysts for the massacre.

Shortly after the October 7th tragedy, the words “peace” or “two-state solution” became charged terms in the Israeli public discourse. News of hundreds of Israelis being abducted and thousands of civilians, including elderly, women, and children, being killed shattered trust toward the Palestinians. Simultaneously, a lack of confidence emerged primarily against the government. The era of “time dragging on” for an Israeli-Palestinian resolution had ended on October 7th, and the public shifted toward supporting long-term decisions. For Israelis, the government must urgently restore the lost sense of security and release the hundreds held captive by Hamas.

As the war dragged on without full achievement of its goals, the Israeli public began losing patience. The delay in negotiating the release of captives, heightened insecurity, damage to Israel’s international standing due to the humanitarian crisis, and calls for annexing Gaza by extreme factions within the government pushed many Israelis to the streets. Slowly, Israelis are beginning to realize that their country is standing at a crossroads: annexation or a diplomatic solution. A perpetual war or a lasting agreement.

As Israeli society contemplates the consequences of each direction, civil society within the liberal camp is actively promoting greater Israeli backing for a political resolution. Israel’s democratic forces must capitalize on the opportunity arising from the October 7th tragedy to propose an alternative approach—one that considers Israel’s security imperatives and centers on justly resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a comprehensive regional framework.

The article was published on April 11th, 2024 in Settimana News.

הפוסט Between Annexation and Political Horizon: Israeli Society at a Crossroads for Conflict Resolution After October 7th הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel and Egypt share several strategic objectives. They aim to defeat Hamas or significantly diminish its political and military power. Egypt views Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood – an organization that had been outlawed and suppressed by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Both countries seek to restore stability to the Gaza Strip and the wider region. Egypt has suffered significant economic setbacks, including a sharp decline in tourism and in income from fees for transiting the Suez Canal, due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Israel and Egypt both aim to demonstrate to the Arab world the destabilizing effects of supporting the Shia axis. They envision a new Sunni-led regional order, supported by the United States, to counterbalance the influence of Iran and its allies.

At the same time, there are conflicts of interest between Israel and Egypt.

From the Egyptian perspective, Israel taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor while “encouraging the migration of Gazans to Egypt,” as several Israeli politicians have stated, constitutes a red line.

Similarly, the two states are in disagreement over what should happen after the war. While Egypt supports the return of an “upgraded” PA to rule Gaza, Israel has expressed opposition to the return of the PA in any form. Israel has also said that the IDF will not rule over the Gaza Strip – but has not specified who will.

Regarding the future of the West Bank. While Egypt, the Arab states, the United States, and the international community support the unification of the West Bank with the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a Palestinian state led by an upgraded PA, Israel remains opposed to such an outcome. These conflicts of interest, however, are not currently a threat to the stability of Egyptian-Israeli relations.

At present, the primary concern revolves around Rafah. From a military standpoint, Israel aims to eliminate the Hamas battalions in Rafah and gain control over the Philadelphi Corridor to block Hamas’s smuggling tunnels. Egypt seeks to broker a deal to secure the release of hostages and halt the war, at least temporarily, to ward off the nightmarish scenario of Palestinian refugees flooding Sinai. To this end, and with Israel’s participation, Cairo hosted an important meeting – which so far has not yielded any results.

With Israel unwilling to sign a deal at just any price, an Israeli military operation in Rafah following a collapse of negotiations is a very real and frightening possibility from an Egyptian perspective. Were it to occur, such a scenario would be viewed by the public and by certain governmental circles in Egypt as the outcome of an Israeli policy targeted at expelling the Palestinians from Gaza.

Egypt threatening Hamas and Israel

In the meantime, Egypt is attempting to solve the problem by threatening both Hamas and Israel. Egypt has told Hamas that Israel will attack Rafah if it does not agree to a deal within two weeks. This threat would seem to imply agreement with an Israeli attack on Rafah if a deal is not reached – a failure that would fall on the leadership of Hamas, as it is unlikely that this time frame has been decided without coordination with Israel.

In tandem, Egypt has warned Israel against the “disastrous consequences” of a military operation in Rafah. Yet, at the same time, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated that there was no threat to the peace treaty between the two countries as they are “actively dealing” with the pressing issues.

For Israel, launching a military operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor may create two problems. First, there are ethical concerns regarding the displacement of approximately 1.3 million Gazan refugees who would be forced, once again, to seek shelter elsewhere. Second, there are political and military implications for Egypt, particularly if masses of Palestinian refugees attempt to breach the fence and seek refuge in Sinai.

Although Egypt has been buttressing the fence recently, it would be difficult to control large numbers of desperate refugees looking to escape the fighting. In such a scenario, Egypt would face the dilemma of either resorting to the use of force against the crowds and risking accusations of betrayal and abandonment of the Palestinians or allowing them entry and placing the blame on Israel, leading to a crisis in diplomatic relations that could result in Egypt recalling its ambassador or even taking a more serious step.

Looking at it from another angle, Israel could potentially enhance its relationship with Egypt by facilitating aid from the international community and Arab states to bolster the Egyptian economy.

A historical precedent worth considering is the 1991 Gulf War, wherein Egypt’s participation led to the forgiveness of approximately $20 billion in debt and favorable repayment terms for other outstanding loans. Presently, Egypt faces significant economic challenges, further aggravated by the ongoing conflict. Significant international assistance to Egypt has the potential to impact its position on key security matters concerning Israel, such as the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah Crossing.

In essence, while an Israeli military operation in Rafah may be deemed necessary to eradicate Hamas, it also carries the risk of deteriorating Israeli-Egyptian relations. Avoiding this scenario will demand meticulous planning for the safe relocation of Gazan refugees and close coordination between Egypt and Israel.

Yet a sober analysis would lead to the conclusion that even with such measures in place, there’s no guarantee that the worst-case scenario can be entirely averted.

Prof. Elie Podeh teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

The article was published in the “Jerusalem Post” on February 20th.

הפוסט An Israeli offensive in Rafah could worsen relations with Egypt הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu is like a scorpion, trying to sting whoever tries to help us. But whereas the scorpion acts against its own interests, Netanyahu, in his attempts to save his own skin, sacrifices the country’s interests for his own.

At the height of the war, Netanyahu directed his “poison machine” at the leaders of the defense establishment, blaming them for the prewar protests and accusing them of misconduct. He continues to incite this hatred by blaming Qatar, the International Red Cross, President Biden, and even the families of hostages.

“Qatar serves Hamas” is a statement made by Netanyahu to families of captives and which was allegedly leaked by him, before he repeated it at a press conference. Really? It was Israel, led by the same Netanyahu, who asked Qatar to use its influence with Hamas in order to create mechanisms to end repeated cycles of violence between Hamas and Israel. It was the same Netanyahu-led Israel that asked Qatar to supply the money that strengthened Hamas in Gaza. This means that if Qatar served Hamas, Netanyahu himself served Hamas. But he has no use for truth, only for his personal interests.

The essence of his policy is “the Palestinian Authority is a burden and Hamas is an asset”, as stated in 2015 by Netanyahu’s collaborator Bezalel Smotrich. In those words, he expressed the declared policy of several Netanyahu governments, which were designed to weaken the PA and strengthen Hamas. Israel executed the first half by itself and Qatar was recruited to do the rest. Now, when a hostage deal threatens his extremist government, he has no inhibitions in attacking that country, even while it is making huge efforts to bring the hostages home.

Thus, the Red Cross, whose people risked their lives by entering the Gaza Strip in order to rescue hostages, also became a target of his poisoned arrows. At a special Knesset meeting with families of hostages, Netanyahu said: “Several days ago, I met with the president of the Red Cross and gave her a box of medication which the hostages require. I told her ‘Take this to the Rafah Crossing’, but she declined”.

The פresident of the Red Cross, Mariana Spoljaric apparently did not understand that she was dealing with a prime minister who has no qualms about using an organization that risks its workers’ lives to help the hostages in an ugly publicity stunt. He knows full well that the Red Cross is not able to visit the hostages or supply them with medication without Hamas approval. He also knows that in order to be able to function in Gaza, Red Cross personnel cannot criticize Hamas or support Israeli hasbara, even if that is how they feel. Doing so would prevent them from fulfilling their humanitarian tasks. Netanyahu knows all that, but nevertheless resorts to it to gain another pathetic round of self-promotion. This behavior conflicts with Israel’s interests.

Netanyahu seeks more and more targets for his poisoned arrows because he knows that the largest arrow of all is pointed at him. It is under his rule that we experienced the worst disaster in our history. It is he whose leadership and policy made Hamas grow economically and militarily. It is his army that moved more and more troops to the West Bank and failed to protect the Gaza envelope communities. He is the one who, for the past four months, has conducted a war with no exit plan and is preventing the most supportive American president from leading an international coalition to defeat Hamas and also promote regional normalization with Israel. It is none other than Netanyahu who has avoided attempts to free the hostages for fear that he will lose his coalition. He does so in order to pacify the far right, mainly Ben Gvir and Smotrich, whose disapproval he desperately fears.

In the face of such a massive failure, his attempt to escape responsibility, coupled with a lack of basic empathy and human decency, leads him to blame whomever he can and to further his own selfish interests including maliciously targeting the hostage’s families themselves.

His goal is to ensure that there is never a quiet moment here, during which his remaining supporters will see that the emperor has no clothes. He is naked of leadership, naked of concern for the country’s future, naked of responsibility for the lives of the hostages, and naked of concern for anyone and anything who is not Netanyahu.

The article was published in “The Times of Israel” on February 15.

הפוסט The­ scorpion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Indeed, under Netanyahu’s leadership, Israel maintains distorted and strange relations with Russia that join a wide range of Israeli behaviors in the past decade that increasingly distinguish Israel from the free world and lead us toward the bench of the world pariahs.  One would have thought it is reasonable to assume that in the face of Russian support of Hamas, we would have stopped veering in the direction of the nation whose people committed war crimes, including rape of civilians. However, it transpires that such an assumption is mistaken.

Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many western companies have abandoned Russia.  They have done so in order to stifle the economy of an aggressor nation that carries out war crimes and against the leader of which an international arrest warrant has been issued by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the Hague.  The Russian economy is in bad shape, but its size and huge domestic market, together with broad economic ties with countries such as China, Iran and Turkey, enable it to at least give an impression of business as usual, while it continues its aggression against Ukraine.

However, there are those who suggest that we should act like Russia. They want Israel to starve, destroy and kill as much as possible. And what will happen if we are sanctioned, they are asked?  If Russia has survived, we will also survive, they answer.  Those same people argue that we should adopt the Russian example of brutal conduct in war and simply ignore moral considerations, as if there are no basic norms to which Israel is obligated to follow as a liberal democracy, and a country that wishes to be part of the West and to earn international legitimacy from it.

A country like Russia can perhaps allow itself to break all the rules, to massacre and to destroy and without significant economic damage thanks to its political power, together with its being a central part of the axis of the autocratic countries. Countries that the Netanyahu government sought to flirt with, only to discover the bitter truth, that in a war against Hamas, they hurry to side with Hamas.

Our defense accords, both written and unwritten, are based on democratic principles shared with the United States, Germany and other western countries.  Our economy is based on commerce with the western nations.  Israel does not have the resources to become an autocratic island state, politically and economically, cut off from the West and banished from the East.

The Gaza War has also provided us with an important lesson regarding the limitations of our power and our true abilities and the supreme importance of preserving proper relationships with our allies, relationships based upon acceptance of and obedience to the international norms.  We have learned that we need the United States not only for purposes of its veto at the UN, but also in order to conduct the war.  We learned, and the entire world has seen, that Israel could not have fought as it did without the shipment of armaments from the US, without the military, economic and diplomatic backing that was extended to us and that saved and is still saving us from a bloody regional quagmire.

Preserving our humanity is not only a moral imperative, it is part of Israel’s defense wall.  If we fantasize about being like Russia in Ukraine or like China against the Uyghur minority, not only will we become an immoral nation, we will find ourselves isolated throwing off altogether the central strengths of Israel.

Russia can afford to behave in this manner, but we will become easy prey for our enemies who have already proven how well they are able to identify weakness and to exploit it.

The article was published in “The Times of Israel” on February 13.

הפוסט Spoiler – We are not Russia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other democracies sided with Israel’s war on Hamas from day one. Visits by world leaders in the middle of the war to express solidarity; shipments of ammunition; and formation of a coalition against the Houthis are among the prominent expressions of this support by our allies.

But Israel’s interest requires another step on the part of our friends, a step that UK Foreign Secretary Cameron and US Secretary of State Blinken have talked about in recent days: recognition of a Palestinian state. For the UK, this would serve as the ultimate realization of the Balfour Declaration, which envisioned a national home for the Jewish people because without a national home for the Palestinian people we will not be a free people in our land. Separation between these two national homes would allow us to maintain Israel as the democratic State of the Jewish people.

Recognizing a Palestinian state would underscore what the international community has been telling Israel for decades: the desired political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is separation into two states. It is incumbent upon the US, UK, and European Union to form a “coalition of sanity” against the coalition of extremists. Pro-Western Arab states will join them. The details of the separation will be worked out in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Israel, for example, should and will demand that Palestine be demilitarized.

A Palestinian state is recognized by 138 out of 193 countries UN member states. Most did so in 1988 after Palestinian Liberation Organization head Yasser Arafat’s landmark Algiers declaration establishing a Palestinian state. In his declaration, the PLO adopted the two-state solution, recognizing Security Council Resolution 242, based on the 1967 lines [calling for the withdrawal of Israel from territory gained in the Six Day War]. Some 30 additional countries recognized the Palestinian state in 2011 after Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas applied for UN membership.

However, some 50 states have so far refrained from recognizing a Palestinian state. These are the “moral majority” countries, as former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, Ron Prosor, called them in 2011, when he tried to convince as many states as possible to abstain from the vote.

In so doing, Israel sought to signal that the “moral majority” consisting of the world’s major democracies did not support Palestinian membership in the UN. In fact, democracies such as France and Spain joined the bloc of 138 states that voted in favor; Germany and the UK were among the 41 abstentions, and only nine states voted “nay”, led by the US, the Czech Republic, and Canada.

The Israeli public should call on other countries to recognize a Palestinian state

With Israel under the rule of an extremist government, Israeli citizens should call on the international “moral majority” to grant sweeping recognition of a Palestinian state in order to defeat extremism and create a political alternative to Hamas. Standing with Israel and its existential interests requires international leadership to steer the sides toward the only viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This separation into two states for two peoples will not only grant the Palestinians the right to self-determination – it will also save Israel from the binational catastrophe toward which we are heading.

The US, UK, Canada, and 19 members of the EU, including Germany, France, and Italy, have yet to recognize a Palestinian state, but all maintain diplomatic relations with Ramallah. It should be made clear that recognition of a Palestinian state is essentially a symbolic step. It will not automatically lead to its establishment nor determine its boundaries. It will send a clear signal to the State of Israel and those at its helm of the direction in which the international community is pointing them, after which the Israeli and Palestinian governments themselves will negotiate the details of the separation.

Such a move would encourage the PA to undertake the systemic reforms advocated by the international community, led by the US.

This is the direction desired by our allies for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for normalization with Saudi Arabia, for regional investment and prosperity (for example, the planned economic corridor from India to Europe, running through the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel), and for forming an effective regional anti-Iran coalition.

Such a move would create an “alliance of moderates” – the US, UK, the EU, the pro-western Arab countries, and Israel’s peace-loving citizens – against the axis of extremists who seek to fuel the conflict, not resolve it.

Broad international recognition of a Palestinian state will signal to the Israeli government the path it must choose – a path of dialogue and understanding that unless it distances itself from the dangerous hardliners advocating transfer and annexation, Israel will become a pariah state, like South Africa’s apartheid regime. Israel must choose to play a key role in the emerging world order of liberal democracies, led by the US, UK, and the EU, rather than being relegated to its boycotted margins.

The two-state solution enjoys broad international consensus. The two-state vision is one of the few issues on which the US can agree with Russia and China, which have already recognized a Palestinian state. This consensus can serve as the basis for an international initiative that will turn the tragedy of October 7 into a diplomatic opportunity.

US recognition of a Palestinian state would also have the added value of restoring President Joe Biden’s standing among progressive voters, damaged by his unequivocal support for Israel and its war on Hamas. We must not forget the terrible alternative. Donald Trump is a threat to the democratic world. The former president, who pledged to be a dictator “only for a day,” may return to the White House unchecked, propped up by fanatical supporters of a man who has proven countless times that he holds his personal interests far dearer than those of his country (like our prime minister).

Recognition by the international “moral majority” of a Palestinian state is a Zionist imperative if Israel is to ensure its future as the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people. It would serve as a lifeline against the nightmarish government of Benjamin Netanyahu, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Bezalel Smotritch and the world’s lifeline against Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Iran’s regional influence.

Recognition of a Palestinian state by the world’s leading democracies could finally provide more stability and calm to the bruised area in which we live.

The article was published in “the Jerusalem Post” on February 11.

הפוסט The way to defeat Hamas: Recognition of a Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the fiscal year ending in June 2023, Egypt generated $8.776 billion from the Suez Canal. However, since the beginning of 2024, revenues from transit fees, paid by ships navigating the canal, have experienced a sharp decline of 40% to 50%. Ongoing Houthi attacks are discouraging many shipping companies from using the Suez Canal. For those that do choose the Red Sea route, substantial increases in insurance premiums are adding to the economic challenges.

The decline in Egyptian tourism income is striking amid the current conflict. It’s hard to imagine vacationing in Sinai with Houthi missiles and drones flying overhead toward Israel. In the 2022-2023 fiscal year, tourism contributed a record $13.63 billion to Egypt’s revenue. At present, it’s challenging to fully assess the extent of the damage inflicted on Egyptian tourism by the ongoing conflict, but reports indicate a significant and alarming decline. This unfavorable situation is likely to persist as long as the war continues.

The tourism industry in Sinai supports hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, and this new crisis, coming on the heels of the COVID pandemic, poses a risk of causing irreparable damage.

The effects on the Suez Canal and the tourism sector have reduced foreign currency revenues, resulting in a significant impact on the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound. Currently valued at 31 pounds to the US dollar, it is expected to reach approximately 40 pounds to the dollar by the end of the year.

Inflation on the rise in Egypt

The rising inflation rate is further exacerbating the cost of living. Regrettably, the Egyptian government is unable to offset this rise by subsidizing essential goods, leading to a further deterioration in the standard of living for Egyptian citizens, which has already been declining in recent years.

Another substantial source of foreign currency income for Egypt is the remittances from its millions of expatriate workers. In the first half of 2023, these transfers experienced a significant 23% decrease, declining from $15.6 billion to $12 billion. The main reason for this decline is the expectation of an Egyptian pound devaluation, as the official dollar exchange rate significantly lags behind the black-market rate.

The ongoing crisis resulting from the war in Gaza compounds the challenges Egypt has been grappling with following two major global crises: the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Adding to these concerns is Egypt’s status as the world’s largest grain importer, with 80% of its imports originating from Ukraine and Russia.

This heavy dependence has led to a substantial surge in prices and inflation. In June 2023, annual inflation peaked at 36.8%, accompanied by a 65% increase in food and drink prices. Given that approximately one-third of the 110 million population lives below the United Nations-defined poverty line of $2.15 per day, these significant price hikes are likely to have far-reaching political and social consequences. It’s important to remember that the January 2011 revolution was largely triggered by the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent rise in prices.

THE POOR economic conditions are anticipated to contribute to increased unemployment. A pronounced downturn in tourism activities in Sinai and across Egypt, coupled with the persistent devaluation of the Egyptian pound leading to rising inflation, is likely to elevate unemployment rates. It is worth noting that high youth unemployment was one of the primary factors behind the onset of the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

The challenging economic conditions are expected to lead to a rise in unemployment. The significant decline in tourism both in Sinai and throughout Egypt, combined with the continuous devaluation of the Egyptian pound resulting in rising inflation, is likely to elevate unemployment rates. It is worth noting that high youth unemployment played also a major role in sparking the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

Israeli-Egyptian relations have gained attention amid reports of a strain between the two leaderships, coupled with tensions and disagreements concerning the governance of Gaza, post-war. Issues such as Israel’s desire to regain control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah Crossing, along with Egyptian concerns over potential Palestinian expulsion from Gaza by Israel, have added complexity to the situation.

However, the Houthi attacks from Yemen present an equally severe challenge directly threatening Egypt’s economy.

In economic terms, Egypt is enduring more significant repercussions than any other Arab state, including Jordan. Therefore, it is crucial for Israel to recognize that Egypt’s decision-making regarding the Gaza conflict is influenced not only by military and political considerations but also by the prevailing economic circumstances.

The article was published in “The Jerusalem Post” on February 6.

הפוסט Egypt needs to consider its economy in Gaza war outlook הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The PA was established in 1994 as an outcome of the Oslo Accords, which envisioned it as a temporary body to be replaced by a permanent institution within five years. However, a permanent arrangement was not achieved, leaving the PA a “temporary” institution for over three decades, thereby contributing to its increasing weakness. While the Authority bears great responsibility for this weakness, it is not solely and accountable for the erosion of its standing. Israel, its Oslo Accords partner and main backer, has ignored the PA since 2009, clearly intent on dismantling it and rejecting all dialogue options. The PA today is an enfeebled body, lacking legitimacy and the capacity to enforce its authority and provide services for its people.

Reconstituting the PA would entail a lengthy process of reorganization, rehabilitation, and training to adapt its governance to the post-war era. Such a transformation would also necessitate the election of a new leadership that enjoys public legitimacy, enabling it to impose authority and enforce law and order. The PA will have to shed its corrupt image, proving that it can conduct its affairs transparently and use its tax revenues and international aid for the public good rather than the personal interests of its cronies. The education system will require revamping to rid it of anti-Israel content, and the judicial system will require restoration of its independence to provide a recourse for Palestinians seeking justice and protection from government arbitrariness. Israel must actively take part in the renewal process by outlining a real political horizon, declaring the PA a dialogue partner, and its existence as a vital interest. This commitment will require Israel to expand cooperation with the PA, unfreeze PA funds, coordinate measures to boost its economy, carry out confidence- building initiatives, and approve and coordinate reforms to strengthen its international standing.

An efficient and functioning PA is crucial to preserving Israel’s identity and security. The rehabilitation of the PA is feasible, as evidenced by its operation for over six years under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, which won Israeli and international praise. In 2012, the World Bank even ranked it higher than some established states in terms of the ease of doing business. A PA that undergoes the necessary reconstruction and reorganization could help Israel achieve security, take responsibility for the 5 million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, and form the basis for a lasting resolution of a century-old conflict.

הפוסט What is a Revitalized Palestinian Authority? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the political unwillingness and/or inability of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace, the dire circumstances in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), the potential benefits of an International Peace Conference (IPC) immediately following the war should be explored.Such a conference could grant domestic and international legitimacy to drawing up a coherent road map for the de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, an IPC should also address the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on UNGA Resolution 181 (the 1947 Partition Resolution) and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on the basis of UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), and 2334 (2016).

International peace conferences usually take place in the aftermath of wars, though sometimes they are convened as a deliberated diplomatic effort to end wars in long and protracted conflicts. They serve as useful diplomatic tools for peacemaking in the form of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Moreover, they can serve as instruments of peacebuilding regarding issues such as reconstruction, governance, and transitional post-war security and civilian regimes. They also enable focused attention on the issues at hand, bringing together all relevant actors in a multilateral diplomatic setting sponsored by trusted conveners in order to foster diplomatic momentum, formally end wars and establish peace treaties, set road maps and timetables, and even firm deadlines for their implementation, and formulate an agenda to kickstart substantial and sustainable peace processes.

Various IPCs have been held in the aftermath of crises and wars in order to seekan end to the state of permanent conflict involving Israel, the Palestinians, and neighboring Arab States, with mixed results. These include the Lausanne Conference, 1949; the Geneva Conference, 1973; the Madrid Conference, 1991; the Annapolis Conference, 2007; and the Paris Conference, 2017. Past IPCs have not been resounding successes nor complete failures. The Lausanne Conference (1949) was a multilateral forum of negotiations that failed to transcend the limits of the Rhodes Armistices and reach a permanent peace between Israel and its neighbors. Similarly, the Geneva Conference of December 1973 did not result in any breakthrough after the Yom Kippur War (Syria did not even participate). The Paris Conference (2017) failed mainly due to the absence of both Israel and the Palestinians. In a more positive vein, Madrid (1991) and Annapolis (2007) established useful diplomatic frameworks for multilateral and bilateral negotiations rather than constituting negotiating fora in themselves. The logic of an IPC to produce a formal road map and agenda seems to be even more relevant these days, given the urgency of planning “the day after” even before the formal end of the Gaza war.

The Madrid Conference kickstarted negotiating processes that matured into a peace process with the Palestinians and an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement. Based on this relevant and successful precedent, an IPC following the Israel-Hamas War is a necessary, even if not sufficient, political-diplomatic componentof a road map for Gaza’s rehabilitation and negotiations on a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The immediate concerns regarding the reconstruction, governance, security, and demilitarization of the Gaza Strip are intrinsically linked to the eventual resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution, sincethe political vision (and future reality) is a pre-condition for mobilizing international actors in the immediate term for the reconstruction and governance of the Gaza Strip. Looking ahead, the Gaza Strip’s political future must be organically linked to the West Bank’s. An IPC could constitute a “threshold event” setting a diplomatic clock for transition from the immediate to the medium term, to be completed within 3-5 years of a ceasefire ending the Israel-Hamas war until the signing of peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority must participate in the IPC in the immediate aftermath of the war, ruling out the option of elections as a precondition for the event. Despite the need for new leaderships, the required domestic political changes for democratic elections in both Israel and the PA might take months, if not years.

The peace conference will be mostly a ceremonial and symbolic event (without substantive negotiations during its 4-5 day duration) attended by relevant members of the international community, led by the United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Its agenda should include:

As was the case in Madrid (1991), the peace conference will formally launch bilateral and multilateral negotiating channels in which Israel and the Palestinians (in the bilateral track) will take part under the supervision of Quartet members (the United States, the UN, the European Union, and Russia), in addition to China and the countries of the Regional Quartet (Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia). At the same time, multilateral negotiating channels will be devoted to discussing pressing issues of Gaza’s reconstruction and, in the longer term, cooperation on regional issues such as economic development, the environment, and arms control.

Absent a political horizon based on a peace conference producing immediate change, Israel may find itself mired for years in the Gaza quagmire, against its will. The peace conference proposed here is an integrated (hybrid) model. Itsagenda should include related issues of immediate humanitarian and logistical assistance to the Gaza Strip, the establishment and empowerment of a temporary international authority for the administration of the enclave during a transitional period of several years, and the empowerment and strengthening of the Palestinian Authority. The agenda should also include substantive negotiations ultimately leading to the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel, as well as additional peace agreements between Israel and the Arab states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia.

The article was printed in the Jerusalem Post on January 23.

הפוסט The Case for a Post-War International Peace Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Click here to watch the playlist of the conference

Opening Remarks

– Attorney Hagai Meirom, Chairman of the Berl Katznelson Foundation

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– Dr. Gil Murciano, CEO of the Mitvim Institute

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– Dr. Ralf Melzer, Director of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Israel

Spotlight

Interviews

– Interview with MK Yair Lapid

Eviatar Oren, Deputy Editor of Telem Magazine, interviewed MK Naama Lazimi from the Labor party to discuss the link between political-security issues to social-welfare priorities on the ‘day after’.

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Panels

– The Role of Israeli Civil Society in the Design of the ‘Day After’

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– What international and Regional Policies Should Israel Embrace for the ‘Day After’?

הפוסט Six O’clock After the War’: A political Vision for the Day After the Gaza Campaign הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the war is being prosecuted will determine the range of political options in its aftermath. Despite the reluctance of the current Israeli government to engage in any substantial long-term political discussion about the “day after” in terms of any significant blueprints or scenarios, it is imperative to draw a coherent road map regarding the feasible diplomatic options for the immediate and long-term perspectives regarding Israel’s exit from Gaza in the aftermath of the war, including the political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Taking into consideration the lack of political willingness and/or ability of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace after the war, the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic political repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), this paper examines the possible role and functions that an International Peace Conference (IPC) might fulfil in granting domestic and international legitimacy and the drawing of a coherent road map leading to de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, any IPC should also address the larger political issue regarding the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of the fulfillment of UNGA Resolution 181 (1947) and the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, following UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), 1850 (2008), and 2334 (2016).

The policy paper draws on historical precedents from other conflicts, as well as reflecting on examples and experiences from the Arab-Israeli conflict, first and foremost the relevant and successful example of the Madrid Conference of October 1991. The major insight to be drawn is that an IPC is a necessary but not sufficient political diplomatic ingredient in the road map leading to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war in the immediate term, as well as to peace negotiations towards the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State alongside Israel.

הפוסט An International Peace Conference in the Aftermath of the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Yom Kippur War (1973) saw dramatic rises in oil prices, especially after the declaration by the oil-producing states of a boycott against countries supporting Israel, headed by the United States. The same occurred after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was even a price increase during the first days of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, although neither Israel nor Lebanon are neither oil producers nor major junctions for the transportation of oil. And finally, oil prices climbed sharply after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, last year. The reason behind such price increases in response to wars is clear: fear of disruption of the production and/or transportation of oil. But this time, after a few days of moderate rises, oil prices fell to below where they were before the war.

In addition to the oil market, the general public has also responded with moderation. Since the beginning of the war and despite the actions of the Houthis (who also launched a drone attack on Abu Dhabi airport in January 2022), there has not been a noticeable effect on the number of tourists traveling to Dubai and Abu Dhabi; or to Doha, the capital of Qatar. Indeed, the last quarter of 2023, all of it overshadowed by the war in Gaza, was the best so far for tourism to the Gulf – better even than the equivalent quarter of 2019, just before the COVID-19 pandemic.

The lack of negative impact on holiday bookings or flights to the Gulf for the coming months indicates that the “world’s citizens,” along with the large international tourist agencies, believe that the war is not set to expand and that Iran, which borders the United Arab Emirates (UAE), will not join the fray. Similarly, the forecast for the Qatari economy published at the end of November by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mentions neither the war itself nor the impact of the Houthis’ actions on economic trends in the Persian Gulf – the world’s most important oil production and transportation region.

It is not only the oil and tourism markets that are predicting that the war will not spread to other theaters. The Israeli stock market, it would seem, is behaving in a similar manner. During wartime, November saw sharp rises in share prices after some major falls in October. The first three weeks of December also brought continued increases on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, and the TA-35 Index climbed by almost 3% over this period. In addition, the past month has seen a more moderate trend in the scale of withdrawals from funds invested in bonds issued by Israeli companies.

The value of the shekel

AND THIS is not all. On the eve of the war, the dollar-to-shekel exchange rate stood at 3.86. On October 27, the day after the beginning of Israel’s ground offensive into Gaza, the dollar climbed to NIS 4.08, its highest rate for 11 years. It is entirely logical for market uncertainty to drive investors to the safer shores of the dollar. Yet the dollar rate has now fallen far below where it was before the war, reaching NIS 3.65 shekels on December 19, 40 agorot lower than before the ground offensive.

Credit card purchases by Israeli consumers, which dropped by 25% in October relative to the previous month, are also now joining the trend for improvement. In November, they climbed steeply from October levels, and the same will seemingly be the case for December.

All this data indicates that since the beginning of the ground operation, and increasingly over the last two weeks, more and more institutions and Israeli citizens have reached the conclusion that the war will not expand into additional theaters.

What are the reasons behind the seemingly relaxed response of the markets? There are several possible explanations: First, the markets and the citizens of countries around the world, including Israel, are behaving as if this is a limited war – just another round of fighting against Hamas, like Operation Protective Edge in 2014, but at a higher intensity. Thus, the economic impact, in their assessment, will also be limited.

Second, the statement by United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announcing the formation of an international naval force headed by the United States to prevent the Houthis from closing Bab el-Mandeb will restrain rises in oil prices and shipping costs. Closing the strait would constitute a declaration of war, not only against Israel but against the Western economy, after it has only recently managed to rein in the inflation that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And finally, a war in the North against Hezbollah does not currently seem to be on the cards, and it would appear – at least according to the behavior of the financial markets – that the confrontation between Hezbollah and the IDF will remain restricted to daily clashes close to the border fence.

Still, if one of these threats is indeed realized – if the northern front expands into an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah, or if the Red Sea is closed to shipping by the Houthis – then the energy market will respond with sharp increases in fuel prices. It seems safe to assume that President Joe Biden will make every effort to prevent such an outcome during an election year.

The article was published on January 2, in the Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Economically, Israel is not facing multi-front war yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The disappointment within Hamas stems primarily from what it regards as the lax response by Iran and Hezbollah. Not only did the two deny any connection to its decision to attack Israel on October 7, but their military response has been limited.

Iran activated its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen against Israel and the United States, but did not take any military or other action itself.

High expectations

Hamas expected a more significant Hezbollah response given the group’s military capabilities and proximity to Israel. But Hezbollah faces strong domestic opposition to war with Israel that would spell disaster for Lebanon.

Syria – Iran’s proxy and ally – has also largely remained aloof, as a result of domestic constraints and previous animosities with Hamas.

Moussa Abu Marzouk, a member of the Hamas political bureau, expressed his disappointment in an interview with Al Jazeera, saying “we had high hopes for Hezbollah and our brothers in the West Bank, but we are amazed at the shameful position of our brothers in the Palestinian Authority.”

With the exception of Qatar, Hamas may not have had particularly high expectations of Arab countries, especially since some have even outlawed the organization (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or expelled its representatives (Jordan).

However, the concluding statement of the November 11 Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh, while harshly condemning Israel, made no mention of Hamas and reiterated the decision of the 1974 Rabat summit – that the PLO, of which Hamas is not a member, is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Hamas does not regard condemnation of Israel and humanitarian aid to Gaza as substitutes for a proactive stance, which would include suspending peace and normalization agreements with Israel, economic sanctions on the West and Israel, and other punitive measures available to the wealthy Gulf States.

ARAB OIL and gas producers could have announced an embargo on the countries that support Israel, as they did after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or at least threatened to reduce their output, thus raising prices. Such a move is not in the cards, however. In fact, this is the first regional war that has led to sharp price declines for the benefit of major oil consumers with the cost of a barrel dropping from $82 to just $74 (as of December 20).

Though Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel, the move was predictable given four precedents during previous wars. Saudi Arabia also froze the normalization talks with Israel, but this, too, was not a surprise. Egypt and the other normalization countries did not recall their ambassadors.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry made an explicit statement with regard to Israel, saying “we have a very solid foundation in terms of the peace agreement that has shown its resilience; its ability to overcome challenges. And we are fully committed to maintaining the peace and continuing to have a normal relationship and the channels of communications that are deep and have been productive to both countries.”

His country’s condemnation of Hamas has been low-key, while the rulers of Bahrain and the UAE have called the October 7 massacre a “barbaric” act.

A notable exception was the Houthi response, escalating the conflict in the Red Sea and posing a threat to Israel and global maritime traffic in the Bab al-Mandeb straits. Yet, the Houthi response only serves to underscore the feeble Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza.

THIS HAS prompted Palestinian frustration and rage. One of Hamas leaders, Khaled Mashaal, urged Islamic representatives in Morocco on November 23 to press their government to sever relations with Israel, calling such relations a “mistake.” He added that “it would be real support for Palestine that would put pressure on Israel and its allies… What is needed today is a political front that says ‘no’ to Israeli aggression, transcends differences of opinion and unites against Israel.”

Mashaal’s statement backfired, being perceived in Morocco as interference in its internal affairs.

Arab media have also echoed the Palestinian frustration. Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst Marwan Bishara, for example, characterized the Arab states’ response to the war as “dim and weak” – just as it had been in Israel’s four previous rounds of war with Hamas – and called for the de-normalization of relations with the Jewish state. He was particularly virulent in criticizing rich countries that “have the means to influence events, but don’t mean what they say.”

Palestinian journalist and lecturer Khaled Abu Toameh accused the Arabs of “betraying” the Palestinians. Palestinian researcher Mohsen Muhammad Saleh, meanwhile, described the Arab position on the fighting in Gaza as a “new low.” A majority of Palestinian intellectuals expect the Arab states to take concrete steps against Israel and the West, refusing to settle for hollow declarations and humanitarian aid.

THE PALESTINIANS have a long history of bitter disappointment with their Arab brethren. It goes back to the failed intervention of the Arab states in preventing Israel’s independence in the 1948 war, followed by the Palestinian refugees’ feelings of humiliation at their treatment in the Arab countries where they sought asylum. Subsequent developments deepened their anger: their sense of abandonment by Sadat when he made peace with Israel (1979), and Arab failure to prevent the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon (1982).

In their two uprisings (intifadas) against Israel (1987-1991 and 2000-2005), the Palestinians railed at the Arab world for failing to provide them with military and diplomatic aid. Then came the 2020 Abraham Accords that bypassed and ignored the Palestinians.

While certain Arab countries have assisted over the years with funding, hosting, training and diplomacy, among them Syria, Iraq, Libya and Algeria, the aid was limited and fell far short of furthering their struggle for independence.

Palestinian disappointment with the Arab states is well reflected in Khalil Shikaki’s opinion polls. In 2017, the 50th anniversary of Israel’s occupation of the territories, two-thirds of West Bank and Gaza residents claimed the Arabs had not stood by them. For most, the 2020 normalization agreements with Israel were also a stinging betrayal.

Most Arab media supports the Palestinian cause as do many citizens of Arab states. The mass Arab protests against the war might well have been far more widespread had it not been for government-imposed restrictions, reflecting the decades’ long disparity between public Arab attitudes toward Israel and the policy of Arab rulers.

THE RULERS of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco see Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood by extension, as a threat. Thus, just as the Arab states applauded behind the scenes when the Begin government destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, so Israel’s attack on Hamas in Gaza largely serves Arab interests.

These countries also have vested interests in economic and security ties with the United States, which they are reluctant to jeopardize by turning on Israel. In particular, Egypt and Jordan cannot afford a return to a state of war with Israel for economic and demographic reasons, even at the cost of domestic dissatisfaction with their position.

Thus, many Arab states are driven by political and economic interests incompatible with plunging the region into war.

What, then, would moderate Arab states be willing to do to advance a political solution to the Palestinian problem after the war? The proposed deployment of an Arab peacekeeping force in Gaza appears to be a non-starter.

Humanitarian, economic, and financial assistance to the residents of Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, which would also help reduce Qatar’s influence in Gaza, is feasible albeit a heavy financial undertaking.

If Israel moves toward a two-state solution, it will find a full partner in the moderate Arab states, facilitating Israel’s coveted goal of normalization with Saudi Arabia, which was abandoned due to the war.

The article was published on December 25 on the Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Palestinians feel the Arab world has let them down הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From within Hamas, particularly among its leadership outside Gaza, there have been calls for the organization’s integration into the PLO. While this isn’t a new objective for Hamas, it appears that its external leaders now perceive integration with the PLO not only as a means to eventually seize control of the PLO and, consequently, the PA, but also as a strategy for securing political survival post the catastrophic events that Hamas has brought upon Gaza.

PA’s recurring willingness to seek agreements with Hamas is a consistent mistake

The PA’s recurring willingness to seek agreements with Hamas has proven to be a consistent mistake. This trend first surfaced during the Oslo Accords era when Arafat declined to disband Hamas and Islamic Jihad, despite their engagement in acts of terrorism that significantly contributed to the breakdown of the political process with Israel. Furthermore, during the uprising from 2000 to 2005, Fatah’s own factions, including Al-Aqsa Brigades, became involved in terror attacks against Israel.

The subsequent incident was Abbas’s choice not to dismantle the Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations, but rather to broker an agreement with them, establishing a suspension of hostilities (tahdiya) in March 2005. This move aimed to secure calmness preceding Sharon’s plan for disengagement from Gaza in the summer of 2005. However, this decision starkly contradicted the positions of both Israel and the United States. Abbas prioritized preserving the appearance of Palestinian unity over other critical interests. Notably, the use of the term ‘tahdiya,’ instead of ‘hudna’ which signifies a ‘ceasefire’ with binding Islamic implications, indicated that the resistance movements had no intention of disarming. Instead, they sought to create an illusion of acceptance to prevent undermining the Israeli retreat from Gaza.

However, in the six months leading up to the disengagement, terror attacks persisted, particularly by Islamic Jihad. Consequently, Hamas could claim that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, akin to its retreat from Lebanon, resulted from armed struggle rather than a diplomatic process. This stance, coupled with widespread public discontent over Fatah’s corruption, led to Hamas’s electoral triumph in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections of January 2006.

The third repetition of this error was the 2007 agreement brokered in Mecca between Hamas and Fatah, mediated by Saudi Arabia. This accord resulted in the formation of a Palestinian unity government led by Ismail Haniyeh. However, just five months later, Hamas forcibly ousted the PA from Gaza in a violent coup. This act blatantly violated the Mecca Agreement, which expressly mandated a “ban on the shedding of Palestinian blood… and adoption of the language of dialogue as the sole basis for solving political disagreements in the Palestinian arena.”

The fourth event was the deal inked between Fatah and Hamas in October 2017 in Cairo, mediated by Egypt. The primary point of contention that caused the collapse of this agreement stemmed from Hamas’s resistance to disarmament. Their stance was rooted in the assertion that their arms were aimed at Israel rather than the PA.

The PA’s inclination to incorporate Hamas into its power structures post-war contradicts its own self-interest for two critical reasons. Firstly, this move could pave the way for Hamas to eventually seize control of the PA, akin to the historical precedent of Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and expulsion of the PA in 2007. Secondly, due to staunch opposition from the United States and Israel, such a proposal lacks any political feasibility.

Why does the Palestinian Authority pursue a policy that contradicts its own interests?

Why does the Palestinian Authority pursue a policy that contradicts its own interests? One explanation could be its vulnerability or a lack of internal legitimacy, compelling Abbas and Fatah leaders to adopt a stance that aligns with public sentiment. According to a survey conducted by Khalil Shikaki’s respected Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research following the outbreak of the conflict, support for Hamas in the West Bank surged threefold in response to the attack, while trust in Abbas and Fatah dwindled significantly, with around 90% of the public favoring Abbas’s resignation. Additionally, approximately 60% of Palestinians view armed struggle as the most effective means in the conflict with Israel.

In this regard, Abbas and the PA leadership resemble leaders of several Arab states, notably Jordan, who have condemned Israel rather than Hamas, occasionally employing strong rhetoric in their statements. However, while Jordan has upheld its peace treaty with Israel, Abbas’s current commitment to the political process remains uncertain. His adviser, Mahmoud al-Habbash, asserts that Abbas has consistently condemned Hamas in meetings with world leaders, but refrains from doing so publicly during the war. Yet, this assertion remains unverified.

An emerging perspective in Israel posits that the fundamental disparity between Fatah and Hamas lies solely in the methods employed to achieve their shared ultimate objective: the elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state encompassing the entire region from the river to the sea. However, it’s important to note that the historical actions taken by the PA, especially by Abbas himself, do not align with this assertion. This viewpoint, supported by the Netanyahu government, seemingly stems from its reluctance to involve the PA in Gaza post-war. This stance contradicts Israel’s policy in the West Bank, where efforts are made to strengthen the PA under the leadership of Abbas and Fatah.

Irrespective of Israel’s current stance, if the PA aspires to play a role in the post-war scenario in Gaza, as desired by the United States and various states in the Arab world and beyond, it must disavow Hamas and refuse to give it a role in post-war Gaza. Failure to do so risks undermining the PA’s credibility as a feasible negotiating partner. A step in this direction was the statement by Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary General of the executive committee of the PLO, that “all Palestinian factions including Hamas must take a serious look at the failure of their policies to achieve freedom for their people.”

The primary challenge lies in the lack of substantial popular support for the current PA leadership. Hence, any prospective agreement may necessitate engaging with a different leadership – one that is democratically elected, enjoys legitimacy, remains dedicated to a political resolution, and is both capable and willing to confront any Palestinian entity resorting to violence.

The article was published on the Jerusalem Post on December 20.

הפוסט The Palestinian leadership keeps making the same past mistakes הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, Qatar also hosts Hamas leaders on its territory, the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera network and its leaders frequently criticize and demonize Israel, while Qatari money funds Hamas and other terrorist organizations as well as leading academic institutions around the world to promote Islamic messages. What, then, is Qatar – an enemy or a friend of Israel?

In order to answer this question, let us travel back in time three decades.

The history of formal and secret relations between Israel and Qatar

Clandestine ties were first established between Israel and Qatar immediately after the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993. That same month, the Qataris initiated the first secret meeting between then-foreign minister Shimon Peres and his Qatari counterpart at the home of Qatar’s ambassador to the United Nations. This relationship continued intermittently until April 1996, when formal relations were established. These were designated a “trade office,” but functioned as embassies in all but name.

Even before the establishment of formal relations. Israel examined the possibility of purchasing gas from Qatar in 1994-1995. The contacts were secret, but Qatar did not deny them when leaked to the media. The two sides even signed a memorandum of understanding, although Israel ultimately opted for Egyptian gas, which was also cheaper. Nonetheless, Israel played the Qatari card in order to exert pressure on Egypt, which was dragging its feet on signing the gas deal. Netanyahu’s election as prime minister in May 1996 lowered the profile of relations, but high-level behind-the-scenes meetings continued, mainly on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Qatar, like Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia, closed its diplomatic mission in Israel in 2000 in response to the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada. However, unlike the other three countries, it quickly restored relations, which even improved in terms of coordination, and then-foreign minister Tzipi Livni maintained excellent relations with the Qatari leadership.

Qatar suspended official ties once again during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009. It put out feelers on resuming them after the war, but Netanyahu and then-foreign minister Liberman rejected the idea in light of what they called “duplicitous” Qatari policy – hinting at Qatar’s continued financial assistance to terrorist organizations. In tandem, however, Israeli officials and business people continued to visit Qatar in secret, and messages were exchanged. Arab media reported that Netanyahu met secretly with the Qatari prime minister in May 2011 in Paris.

Qatar’s ties with Hamas, especially after its takeover of Gaza in 2007, enabled it to play a mediating role during Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012. The fact that Egypt was then ruled by Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood helped achieve a quick ceasefire. Soon after, Qatar appointed Mohammed al-Amedi as ambassador to Gaza. In this capacity he established good rapport with politicians and military figures in Israel. Following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, an official and orderly mechanism was established (called the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism) to transfer Qatari money to finance civilian projects in Gaza. It is assumed that some of these funds found their way into the Hamas coffers to finance terrorism.

Occasional clandestine contacts continued. For example, Mossad chief Yossi Cohen and the then-head of the IDF’s Southern Command Herzi Halevi visited Qatar in February 2020 and met with the heads of security and intelligence agencies. And in March 2022, then-IDF chief Aviv Kohavi reportedly met in Bahrain with his Qatari counterpart to examine cooperation against the threat of Iranian drones.

Qatar’s connection with Israel is part of a broader range of ties with the West in general, and with the United States in particular. The main headquarters of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which has responsibility for the Middle East, is located in Qatar. Thousands of US troops are also deployed in the Al Udeid Air Base southwest of Doha and the US military also has access to the Hamad seaport. In January 2022, US President Joe Biden granted Qatar non-NATO status as a major ally – a status that even Saudi Arabia still does not enjoy. Qatar has also signed several defense deals with the United States totaling billions of dollars.

Thus, Qatar’s foreign and security policy seeks to maintain good ties with diverse countries in the region and around the globe in order to achieve two main goals. The first is to ensure maximum security for the small wealthy country in an arena fraught with risks and potential enemies. The second goal is to gain global and regional influence and prestige through the enormous wealth generated by the gas fields located in its territory. To achieve its goals, Qatar uses “soft” diplomacy by funding sports, culture, education, academia and providing mediation services. Indeed, Qatar’s relations with many players have made it a valuable mediator in multiple arenas: Afghanistan (between the United States and the Taliban), Lebanon (in local politics), Sudan and Somalia (among civil war rivals), in the Palestinian arena (Fatah and Hamas), and, of course, between Israel and Hamas.

The most appropriate term for describing Israel-Qatar relations is the academic term “frenemies” – a combination which encompasses friendly but also antagonistic policies. Some interpret this relationship as a camouflage and dangerous deception. However, a closer look reveals that it has served both countries well in the past, and continues to serve them during this war in obtaining hostage releases.

Qatar would exert a lot of influence to maintain its role in Gaza in the “day after,” yet Israel should seek to diminish this role as far as possible. Saudi Arabia may look as a possible alternative, but it is unclear whether Crown Prince bin Salman is interested at all in embroiling himself in the Gaza quagmire.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on December 15th.

הפוסט Are Israel and Qatar allies or enemies? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed?

This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality.

Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank.

We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels.

To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas.

As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar.

In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners.

Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.

הפוסט Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system.

Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy.

An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

הפוסט A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A Regional-Political Perspective on the Gaza Campaign הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The participants – from the normalization states, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority, the United States and the European Union – would meet at the rehabilitated Kibbutz of Be’eri, a symbol of revival from the unspeakable Hamas atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023. The summit would also kick off a negotiation process with the Palestinian Authority in order to achieve what Hamas, Iran and its proxies sought to prevent: normalization between Israel and the Arab world, renewal of the political process with moderate Palestinians willing to live alongside Israel, and the establishment of a broad US-backed regional front against Iran.

The current discussions by decision makers, pundits, and self-appointed experts about the objectives of the war have thus far focused mainly on its military outcomes, on the minute Israel silence its guns. They have not dealt with the aftermath. Assassinating senior Hamas figures, destroying the organization’s vast tunnel network and other important operational targets all refer to exhausting a bank of targets, inflicting kinetic damage on Hamas instead of enhancing Israel’s strategic standing. When Israeli officials and top brass are asked about the day after, they mumble some inanity about civil-local control of the enclave, but decline to elaborate. And for good reason – it’s simply not their area of responsibility (or expertise).

The Israeli public has come to expect every war or military operation to culminate in the ultimate depiction of Israel’s victory (such as the historic photo of Israeli paratroopers arriving at the Western Wall in 1967), a visual representation responding to a deep-rooted psychological need for affirmation that personal and collective security have been achieved. That need is an uncompromising imperative in this war, which undermined Israelis’ sense of security at its most fundamental level. Yet we tend to forget that asymmetrical warfare against terrorist organizations rarely affords absolute decisiveness. When a weaker enemy can claim victory simply by its ability to remain standing once the fighting ends, a visual portrayal of victory is elusive.

Israel’s best chance of illustrating its victory therefore lies mainly in the political-strategic field, in defeating the idea that the enemy sought to snatch from its hands, advancing along the routes it tried to block, and providing Israelis with real security for the longest possible term. A look at Israel’s partial past victories demonstrates that the images of victory were never taken on the battlefield. During the second intifada (2000-2005), for example, it was the amnesty agreement that allowed thousands of wanted Tanzim activists to become toy dealers in the Nablus market that was considered the final chord of the uprising. During the Second Lebanon War (2006), it was the filled–to–capacity Israeli guest houses along the Lebanon border that testified to Israel’s victory.

The depiction of Israel’s victory in the current campaign should reflect a changed political reality, a game-changing strategic effect. As such, it cannot be limited to Gaza. It must affect regional and global circles. It must deal with the optimal conditions for shaping the day after based on two main parameters: ensuring Israelis’ security and blocking Iran and its so-called axis of resistance. A political decision at the present time should aspire to establish an Israeli-regional political-security alliance based on two pillars: a renewed political process with the Palestinians defining the future Israeli relationship with the successors of Mahmoud Abbas, and security agreements between the United States and the countries of the region. For this ambitious vision to be realized, work must be carried out simultaneously on three levels – global, regional and Israeli-Palestinian, with each level based on the other.  

Resolving the conflict with the Palestinians is necessary in order to mount an effective struggle against Iran. The events of Oct. 7 shattered the illusion that Israel’s integration in the region, or regional stability vis-à-vis the Iranian proxies, could be accomplished without resolving the Palestinian issue. The ability of a relatively small terrorist organization such as Hamas to set off a large-scale regional confrontation makes it abundantly clear that an effective struggle against Iran is only possible by neutralizing its influence in the Palestinian arena. This is a key condition for building defense alliances with the countries of the region, for ensuring the support of the Western world, and above all for defending the residents of Israel.    

The need for a diplomatic settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to fight Iran exposes the main obstacle to victory. The challenge lies not only in the Hamas tunnel system, its vicious captivity of hundreds of Israeli civilians, or the threat of Hezbollah’s intervention. It stems first and foremost from the current Israeli government’s inability to advance even the slightest progress vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Most Israelis want to bring down the government, justifiably so, because of its failure to govern and the societal divisions it sowedin the past. But the most egregious damage by the hard right government in the current campaign stems from the impasse to which it is leading. More than ever, this is the wrong government at the wrong time. Conducting a war without offering any reward on the strategic level is like waging a campaign with two hands and one leg tied. This government, which failed to consider even symbolic concessions vis-à-vis the Palestinians to promote normalization with Saudi Arabia, which preferred to bribe Hamas so as to avoid renewing the political process with the Palestinians, and whose messianic extremists are setting the West Bank on fire these very days, is the most fundamental obstacle to a real Israeli victory.

The article was published in German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on November 20th and in Hebrew in N12 on November 11th.

הפוסט The Be’eri Summit: A victory over Hamas lies around the negotiating table, not on the battlefield הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hamas’s murderous attack on 7 October shattered many longstanding convictions. It brought the Palestinian issue back to centre stage; challenged the notion that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be managed at a low cost; and undermined the belief that Israel could pursue integration in the Middle East while ignoring Palestinian demands. In its place, there is now a commonly held view across Israeli society that “managing the conflict” hasn’t worked, and that there instead must be a permanent resolution.

At the same time, there are reasons why management of the conflict, rather than a protracted attempt at a resolution, would suit some of the main players. The US and UK governments both face elections in 2024, and are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine due to the need for stability and lower energy prices. Meanwhile, Arab leaderships are dealing with a range of internal challenges, and relative calm in the Palestinian arena may be enough to appease them. Hamas would be happy to continue to struggle with Israel without facing a diplomatic process that could provide legitimacy to the Palestinian Authority, strengthen moderate politicians and ultimately undermine its power.

Netanyahu would also be content with managing the conflict, as any attempt to solve it would threaten the stability of his coalition and the continuation of his rule. His coalition, and consequently his leadership, relies on the support of the extremist settler movement. This faction adamantly opposes any compromises with the Palestinians and viewed Hamas as an “asset”, because its existence hinders the possibility of a peace process.

It is therefore easy to imagine both sides sliding back into managing a low-intensity conflict. Under this scenario, the IDF would remain in Gaza for an extended period, continuing the fight against Hamas. The conflict would be confined to the Gaza Strip. The public would adjust to it. It would no longer be news, and the world would move its attention elsewhere – until the next eruption occurs in Gaza, the West Bank or in Lebanon.

Alternatively, absent the will or the ability of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority to bring about meaningful change, the international community, led by the US, could push toward a resolution of the conflict. To achieve that, the international community needs to promote several key steps.

First and foremost, it must define the ultimate goal – which should be to commit to the implementation of the two-state solution and an embrace of the Arab Peace Initiative – and a timeline within which to achieve it. This can be done by via a resolution of the UN security council (UNSC). To overcome the tension between the US and Russia, it may require a representative of the Arab world such as the UAE to champion the proposal in the UNSC. If this path is blocked, a regional peace summit convened by the US would be a satisfactory alternative.

Secondly, and of utmost importance, it is vital that Joe Biden leads the recognition of a Palestinian state by the US and other major countries, as part of a comprehensive diplomatic process. Such a step will ensure that there is no turning back. It will change the dynamic in Gaza and in the West Bank, making it difficult for Israel to continue its creeping annexation, and strengthen the Palestinian Authority against Hamas. Furthermore, such a move could boost Biden electorally, helping him to potentially regain support that he lost when backing Israel’s operation in Gaza.

Knowing that the creation of a Palestinian state is the endgame will enable the third critical step to be taken by the international community: the formulation of an interim international-Palestinian regime. With a clear and recognised goal of achieving the two-state solution, an international force drawn from Arab and western countries could then be recruited to gradually replace the IDF in Gaza and take responsibility for security and development efforts. If the path to a two-state solution is defined, European and Arab countries will agree to invest in building the physical and institutional infrastructure of what Biden called a “revitalised Palestinian Authority”, leading the way to a Palestinian state. No one wants to continue pouring money into Gaza if the strategy of managing the conflict continues and its infrastructure needs to be rebuilt every few years after another round of war.

The absence of worthy leadership in Israel and the Palestinian territories means that securing peace falls on the shoulders of Biden and the international community. He must step up and deliver.

The article was published on the Gurdian on November 23rd.

הפוסט A lasting peace in Gaza is now within reach – here’s how it can be achieved הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip.

An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border.

An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks.

Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial.

Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control.

Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages.

Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.

הפוסט The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite Israel’s military successes in the Gaza campaign, the achievement of political victory remains elusive. Indeed, the current Israeli government has steered clear of addressing the political objectives for the post-war period and has, in fact, made statements undermining future efforts to attain them. Prime Minister Netanyahu has recently announced that Israel will have “overall security responsibility” for the Gaza strip “for an indefinite period”, while radical right-wing Knesset Members have demanded the reestablishment of Jewish settlements after the military campaign in Gaza is over.

The role of the international community in crafting and promoting a political roadmap for Israelis and Palestinians post-war is now more critical than ever. The international community possesses the capacity and influential power needed to chart the political trajectory toward a two-state reality.

The briefing delved into the opportunities and challenges facing the international community in advancing this cause, encompassing the rehabilitation of Gaza as part of a political process, the role of a multinational task force in Gaza, and the leadership of a defensive coalition in the Middle East.

The briefing featured:

Dr. Omer Zanany | Director of the Israel-Palestinian Peacemaking program at Mitvim

        – The day-after task force and the political roadmap

Dr. Nir Arieli | Associate Professor of International History at the University of Leeds

        – Multinational task force after the Gaza Campaign

Yitzhak Gal | Economic and Business consultant for the Middle East and research fellow in the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and Mitvim

        – Rehabilitation of Gaza as part of a political process

Dr. Maya Sion – Tzidkiyahu | Director of the Israel – Europe Relations at Mitvim

         – The European role in the rehabilitation of Gaza

Shira Efron | Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Senior Director of Policy Research at Israel Policy Forum

         – The American Perspective of ‘the day after’

הפוסט Roadmap to a Political Horizon After the Gaza Campaign: The Role of the International Community הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With all these unprecedented challenges mounting, Israelis generally stick to a positive mindset. The Israeli resilience and deep-down belief that ‘it will be OK’ are evidently at play. An Israel Democracy Institute poll conducted in early November showed that 64 per cent of Israelis are optimistic regarding the future of their country (compared to 27 per cent who are not). But this optimism is not yet apparent when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, even though the Israel-Hamas war may dismantle some major obstacles that have prevented progress towards the two-state solution in recent years. Additional polls conducted by the Mitvim Institute and Tel Aviv University show that Israelis currently tend to define themselves as right-wing, are sceptical towards the Palestinian Authority and to negotiations with it, do not believe that Israeli-Palestinian peace can be achieved and are less supportive than before of the two-state solution.

Overall, this is a grim picture for the pro-peace camp, alas not a surprising one, given how Israeli attitudes shift rightwards during times of war, and given the public perception, before the Hamas terror attack, that maintaining the status quo is better than making concessions for peace. Nevertheless, major events – such as the one that Israel is currently experiencing – often shatter public beliefs, lead to a reassessment of deep-rooted concepts, ignite political change and help new ideas emerge.

This has already happened in Israel following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which has also been a national trauma. Then, it took a few years for change to materialise, but eventually a dramatic political change occurred, and previously-unthinkable compromises for peace (with Egypt) were made. Positive twists in the plot can also occur following the Israel-Hamas war, possibly at a faster pace.

They will not happen by themselves. Diplomatic optimists and agents of positive changes – in Israel and beyond – should step up, impact the public discourse and stir things in a good direction. It was Israel’s late President Shimon Peres who claimed that optimism is not just a way to perceive the world, but a way to impact the world. When we embrace hope and optimism, he used to say, good things happen. Some ingredients for progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace are already emerging these days, as paradoxically as it sounds given the scope of warfare and atrocities, and they should not go unnoticed.

In Israel, there is a growing understanding that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have failed. Netanyahu advocated that the Palestinian issue can be sidelined, that Israel can genuinely find its place in the Middle East without advancing the two-state solution, that the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip works to Israel’s advantage, and that Hamas is deterred and should be sustained in the Gaza Strip. These concepts have collapsed since 7 October. It is still not clear which new concepts will become dominant instead, but a change is coming, and there is an opportunity to shape it. There is also an opportunity for political change. Most Israelis currently see Netanyahu as responsible for the failure and as unfit for leadership and the Israelis mainstream sees his extremist coalition as causing even more damage.

While Israeli politics are difficult to predict, Israelis are seemingly ready for a new leadership, although it will probably not be a left-wing one. According to the polls, former Chief of Staff Benny Gantz is the most fit for office. He is a potentially more moderate, responsible, security-oriented leader, committed to good governance. He is not a peacenik, and is likely to align with right-leaning parties mostly, but he is someone who can nevertheless resume negotiations and make some pragmatic progress with the Palestinians and the region.

Israelis are generally united around the war objective of dismantling Hamas’ governing and military power. Looking at the day after, there is increased openness towards international involvement in the Gaza Strip as an interim phase, while the Palestinian Authority will hopefully be empowered and revitalised, and, later on, towards a return of the Palestinian Authority to rule Gaza (as was the case prior to 2007, when Hamas violently took  over).

The recent activism of the international community may also open some new opportunities. Western countries, which generally shied away from the Israeli-Palestinian issue in recent years, became more active during the war, individually and multilaterally. Many of them pledged to continue this engagement after the war is over, in support of the two-state solution. In parallel, regional countries have showcased that they are intending to maintain ties with Israel, despite their heavy criticism of its actions in Gaza. But they are linking further advancement in bilateral ties with Israel to taking steps towards peace with the Palestinians. Also on the international front, in September 2023, the EU, Saudi Arabia, the Arab League, Jordan and Egypt have launched the Peace Day Effort. It is a multilateral initiative, joined by dozens of countries, to devise an international package of incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. This forward-looking initiative should continue even during the dire times of war. It could generate hope on both sides, by spelling out tangible future benefits of peace, which were not previously put on the table.

So, there are some reasons for optimism. New leadership may take office, on both sides to the conflict, the intra-Palestinian division may come to an end, Israelis and Palestinians may be given more reasons to want peace, and the international community may a play a more important role than before. These opportunities will not be fulfilled overnight, and will not bring peace on their own. However, they hold potential, and if articulated and advanced properly, they can generate some much-needed hope and help make good things happen.

However, a major ingredient is still missing. Israelis and Palestinians need to meet each other more, engage in dialogue and learn to cooperate. People-to-people endeavours were meaningful in the past, but have gradually become scarce. Physical barriers, anti-normalisation trends in the Palestinian society, indifference in the Israeli society, and international donor fatigue have all taken their toll. Now is the time to change course. A major effort is needed to increase constructive interaction between Israelis and Palestinians, from diverse walks of life.

The US is contributing to this through the relatively new Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA). But this is not enough. Europe has a vital role to play in this, as it did in the better days of the peace process. For years, Israelis and Palestinians have been meeting for dialogue in European cities, studying together at European universities and were even undergoing joint training at the European Parliament. This should not remain a distant memory. Policymakers, NGOs and donors should prioritise these types of endeavours once the war ends, and help pro-peace Israelis and Palestinian create a fresh start, despite the hardships involved. This will provide more reasons for optimism, assist in fulfilling the potential of new opportunities and support a transition from conflict to peace.

This article is dedicated to peace activist Vivian Silver, murdered on 7 October during the Hamas terror attack. Vivian was an inspiring and optimistic civil society leader, who worked wholeheartedly for decades to advance a future of peace for both Israelis and Palestinians.

The article was published on November 14th in the Progressive Post.

הפוסט Despite the unprecedented Israeli-Palestinian crisis, new opportunities for peace emerge הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Mitvim Institute Survey Findings: A Month into the Fighting

Conducting a survey among Israeli citizens during wartime is like building bridges during an earthquake, given the seismic mood swings and constantly shifting public attitudes. Nonetheless, understanding public perceptions is imperative in light of the critical military and political decisions being made by policy makers in the campaign against Hamas, Iran and its proxies.

To understand how the public views the core issues related to the fighting and its aftermath, and especially the sea change in Israeli perceptions wrought by the events of Oct. 7, the Mitvim Institute commissioned a survey one month to the day the war broke out. The November 6-7 survey was carried out by the Smith Institute, in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, among a representative sample of Israel’s adult population.

הפוסט Public Attitudes Regarding the Day After The War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This is the sad reality that Israeli citizens must confront. While the attack on the World Trade Center brought with it widespread international shock and condemnation, many Israelis feel deserted by global public opinion and are suffering an unfathomable blow watching anti-Israel demonstrations around the world and diminishing international support, as they are forced to deal with the tragedy almost on their own.

The State of Israel is not the United States, with 33 times fewer residents and 440 times less land. The kibbutzim in the southern part of the country, where the Hamas terrorists infiltrated, are no more than a two-hour drive from the homes of over 70 per cent of Israeli citizens.

Israelis have experience with wars and acts of terror, but the events of the Black Sabbath changed something deep within each of us. We lost the almost imperceptible sense of personal security that we had until 7 October, the feeling of protection granted to us by the strong State of Israel.

There is almost no Israeli citizen who has not been personally and painfully affected by this catastrophe. The incomprehensible disaster is almost indigestible; children were murdered and kidnapped, parents were brutally killed in front of their children, and families waited for hours in safe rooms as parents tried to quiet their children in order to not be heard by the murderers. An incomprehensible cruelty reminding us of the deepest trauma of every Jew, the Holocaust.

Around 130,000 Israeli citizens from communities near the Gaza Strip, where the massacre occurred, and even further away have fled their homes and are not expected to return soon. The residents who lived closest to the border will not return to their homes until the State of Israel can guarantee their security. And the State has to provide this sense of security because they have no other land.

The need for a political solution

All my life, I have struggled for peace, for an end of the occupation and the promotion of a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many other residents of the kibbutzim in the south have also done so. I believed, and still do, in the right of the Palestinians to self-determination in their own state, with all my heart. I continue to believe in our need as Israeli citizens to fight against the occupation and expose the injustices it creates. I have criticised and continue to criticise the Israeli governments that weakened the Palestinian Authority and expanded the settlements in the West Bank. I did this as an Israeli fighting for the character of his state and its future. It is this belief that leads me to support the continuation of the Israeli military operation in Gaza, while at the same time making every effort to minimize any harm inflicted on innocent Palestinians.

I am not indifferent to the difficult scenes, the casualties – including many children – and the unimaginable suffering of the residents of Gaza. But I am fighting for my home, for my mere existence. It is not a war of choice. If brave citizens, along with the Israel Defense Forces, had not stopped them, Hamas terrorists would have continued to murder every Israeli they could. They attacked their victims like a hate-fueled mob, Jews and Arabs alike, showing no mercy for anyone, not even children and infants.

For years, despite countless rocket attacks from Gaza on Israeli settlements and cities, Israeli policy has been one of ‘containment’ — responding with limited force, giving work permits to the approximately 20,000 laborers from Gaza entering Israel daily and turning a blind eye to Qatari support for Hamas. But no country, especially not a small one like Israel, can tolerate such a broad and ruthless terrorist attack on its citizens.

We have no choice. If we do not win the war against Hamas, the residents of the towns, villages and kibbutzim who fled will not be able to return to their homes. Not only them but also the residents of northern Israel, living close to Lebanon, will not be able to return to the towns and kibbutzim that are attacked every day by Hezbollah terrorists supported by Iran. If they do not return, Hamas and Hezbollah, who are also enemies of the Palestinians and the Lebanese, drunk on their success, will continue to strike until no one – Jews and Arabs alike – can live in Israel anymore.

Reality is complex

Calls for an unconditional ‘immediate ceasefire’ may sound good in theory, but in practice, they are calls for surrender to the Hamas terrorists and for the abandonment of Israeli citizens to a reality in which those who have harmed them so severely will be able to regain their strength to harm them again in the future. Humanitarian pauses are justified if they assist in releasing the kidnapped and providing aid to innocent Gazans. Israel has no choice but to defeat Hamas, and, sadly, when the enemy operates from residential areas, setting up their command centres under hospitals, civilians get hit, too.

The world has become accustomed to painting a simplistic picture of good versus evil, weak versus strong, David versus Goliath. But the reality is more complex. Israel is not Goliath, and Hamas is not David. The reality is not black and white — it has many shades, and we would all do well to inspect it more meticulously and in a distinguishing manner.

Those who, 80 years after the Holocaust, do not see the justification for the existence of the State of Israel and call for freeing Palestine ‘from the River to the Sea’ are not people with whom I can find a common ground. But those who seek to fight for a better future for the Middle East must understand that without the ability to ensure basic security for its citizens, Israel cannot continue to exist. Right now, to achieve this, there is no choice but to eliminate Hamas’ military capacities and rule in Gaza and deter Hezbollah. Currently, it is primarily the Israelis who are in danger, but some are already looking to the next stage. It is no coincidence that Putin and Erdoğan rushed to stand by Hamas. They understand that if the State of Israel is defeated, it will be just the first step in their war against international liberal values.

From this tragedy, a positive outcome could occur in the form of a turning point. Ultimately, the understanding that the existence of a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel is an Israeli interest must be spread in Israeli policy circles. Despite years of weakening the Palestinian Authority, it was and remains an important partner. Strengthening it and promoting a political solution that will also return it to rule Gaza must be a central component of the Israeli security concept.

In addition to the demand for and support of elections in Palestine, which, if held alongside a credible diplomatic horizon, will create a legitimate and supportive Palestinian address for a diplomatic solution. It won’t be Hamas.

Victory must be political. The military operation will yield a purely tactical win at best. A political, regional and international diplomatic strategy is needed.

The article was published in IPS on November 9th.

הפוסט A sense of security – gone הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Looking at the broader context it is clear that the Hamas massacre was also prompted by a perceived Israeli weakness stemming from deep internal divisions, as well as the organization’s desire to enhance its standing in the Palestinian arena given the declining popularity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) headed by its president Mahmoud Abbas.

No less important was the intention of Hamas, backed and encouraged by Iran, to torpedo the fast-moving normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. US President Joe Biden put it succinctly, saying, “One of the reasons Hamas moved on Israel… [was because] the Saudis wanted to recognize Israel.”

Even before Biden’s explanation, a Hamas spokesman in Lebanon admitted that the goals of the terrorist attack were to destroy Israel, liberate Palestine, and deal a blow to normalization between Israel and the Arab world. Leading Iranian officials repeated this argument as well. Saudi Arabia’s announcement of a freeze in the US-mediated normalization negotiations with Israel appeared to have been a step toward this goal of Hamas.

However, the US and Saudi leaders have now affirmed that, as soon as the war is over, they will work toward a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians and continue the steps towards Israel-Saudi normalization already underway.

Why were Iran and Hamas so determined to torpedo the normalization process? 

The Iranian-led “resistance” axis regards the US-sponsored Israeli-Saudi normalization as a strategic move designed to change the regional balance of power by advancing a Saudi defense pact with the United States and strengthening Israel’s standing in the Middle East, by dint of the special Saudi role as custodian of Islam’s holy sites – Mecca and Medina – and its attendant influence on other Arab and Muslim countries regarding ties with Israel.

In these respects, Israeli-Saudi normalization would likely be a game-changer in the Middle East. Normalization was also supposed to bolster the PA, undermining the popularity and legitimacy of rival Hamas. Iran clearly had good reason to fear that these developments threatened its influence and goals in the region.

HAMAS HAS a history of mounting terror attacks intended, among other things, to undermine political moves. Thus, for example, a string of Hamas terror attacks against Israel in 1994-1995 were intended to torpedo the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and were undoubtedly a major factor in this outcome.

Seven years on, in 2002, on March 27, Hamas sought to sabotage the peace process by targeting the Park Hotel in the city of Netanya, murdering 29 Israeli civilians and wounding hundreds, then too, choosing the date of a major Jewish holiday celebration, Passover, to strike at those seated at the festive meal.

The attack was also intended to torpedo the Arab Peace Initiative scheduled for approval by the Arab League summit in Beirut the following day, March 28, 2002. Four days later, Hamas carried out another terrorist attack, killing 15 civilians in a Haifa restaurant and wounding some 40.

These mass casualty attacks resulted in an Israeli military operation, codenamed Defensive Shield, intended to wipe out Palestinian terrorist organizations in the West Bank. Needless to say, the Israeli government was disinclined to consider the Arab Peace Initiative following these brutal attacks.

The common thread tying together these attacks of the past three decades is the indication of strategic thinking on the part of all the parties involved in planning them. Even if there were other contributing factors to the failures of the peace negotiations, the Hamas attacks succeeded in achieving their goal of derailing peace.

At the end of this war, a supreme effort must be made to renew the US-mediated negotiations on an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement. The war has made clear that such an agreement would have to include a significant Palestinian “component,” offering a political horizon for the Palestinians’ aspirations.

The normalization agreement is of course important in itself, but it is also of paramount interest in order to highlight the failure of Iran and its allies to sabotage it.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on October 31.

הפוסט What are key goals in the war for Hamas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The severe crisis in which we find ourselves may be an opportunity to impel Saudi Arabia to take a much more active role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip and Hamas. Saudi Arabia, under its de facto leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, aspires to position itself as a regional leader that plays a constructive role in the international arena. This was demonstrated, for example, in its hosting of an international peace summit on the Russia-Ukraine war last August.

Saudi Arabia and Israel’s shared goals

Saudi Arabia and Israel have many shared interests, chief among them the struggle against radical Islam propagated by groups such as ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood. This struggle is consistent with Saudi Arabia’s desire to keep improving and strengthening its image as a country friendly to tourism, investment, and business.

Saudi Arabia was by and large uninvolved in past mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas and did not take a significant part in the effort to eradicate Hamas. Saudi Arabia, like Israel, thought it was possible to rein in Hamas.

However, the recent tragic events have proven that Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas have identified a strategic opportunity to strike a blow against Israel – to take over the West Bank once and for all and unite the Palestinians under extremist Islamist rule.

The intense fighting in the Middle East, so close to the Egyptian border and not very far from the border between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, is projecting negatively on all countries in the region, and the risk of regional war is growing. It also presents Israel with a historic opportunity to join the moderate Arab camp against its sworn rival Iran (along with Qatar, which hosts Hamas leaders, and Turkey, which also supports Hamas).

In order to bring about the collapse of Hamas, we must work together, especially vis-à-vis decision-makers in the United States and other allies such as France, Germany, England, and others.

Normalization could help fight extremism 

The main obstacle to normalization with Saudi Arabia and a regional coalition to fight Islamic terrorism is the Israeli government’s opposition to promoting the two-state solution. What is more, to the extent that Israel signals a desire to control the Gaza Strip, while continuing to weaken the Palestinian Authority, it distances prospects of enlisting Saudi Arabia as a partner.

On the other hand, adopting the spirit of the 2002 Saudi peace initiative for renewing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations under American and Saudi auspices would serve American (and Israeli) national security interests of drawing Saudi Arabia closer and distancing it from the Chinese-Russian-Iranian axis. It should be remembered that the Saudis also have important levers regarding global oil prices, which affect the fighting between Russia and Ukraine.

While residents of Arab countries do not enjoy the full freedom of expression enjoyed by residents of Western democracies, their leaders are mindful of public opinion. The Saudi Crown Prince’s supreme interest is to maintain and consolidate his rule, a goal for which he needs public support.

This issue is his top priority, and he does not want to risk it, especially in light of the harsh scenes of harm to uninvolved civilians, which is an inseparable part of any war. Public opinion in Saudi Arabia, which only a few months ago reported that support for business and sports ties with Israelis had reached a record of almost half its residents, will find it difficult to accept an alliance with Israel without advancing the two-state solution.

The bottom line is that the likelihood of advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia and enlisting it in a joint struggle against radical Islam will diminish as we continue to avoid advancing the two-state solution.

Choosing the components of the one-state solution, such as occupying the Gaza Strip, controlling it, and continuing to weaken the Palestinian Authority, could lead the Abraham Accords countries (which are already forced to fend off harsh criticism against normalization) to sever relations with Israel. It would severely damage Israel’s international legitimacy and thus limit its leeway in fighting Hamas. It would also miss out on a historic opportunity to forge a joint regional camp against Iran and its proxies.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on October 31.

הפוסט What could a Saudi perspective on the Israel-Hamas war look like? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Babies, children, and entire families were slaughtered. No eye can stay dry at the sight of the pictures of the kidnapped children. The state of Israel went through the hardest day in its history, a day that will take us a long time to overcome.

The crimes against humanity committed by Hamas are the most horrible tragedy that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has produced. But even in times of catastrophe, there is a window for progress.

This was one lesson from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where the national trauma eventually led to a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. It was also the First Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, that led to the Oslo Peace Accords. War and bloodshed are often the greatest motivation for compromise.

Now it is time to understand that the Palestinian conflict — including the reign of terror of Hamas in the Gaza Strip — will not be solved by war only. As the U.S. learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, even the strongest military in the world cannot solve such challenges with guns and bombs alone. 

The opportunity for President Biden to lead a major change of course in the Middle East arises as well after a year-long protest movement inside Israel to protect and preserve our democracy. The general failure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government to function during the Hamas attack and its aftermath opens a door to connect the protest movement with the no-less-significant threat to Israel’s democracy posed by its ongoing occupation of the West Bank.

The Biden administration can and should push the Palestinian issue to the forefront of the Israeli public agenda and instill hope among moderate Palestinians that they can achieve statehood by diplomacy and not terror, to lead the Israeli government to a policy based on the understanding that strengthening the Palestinian Authority as a governing body is an Israeli and international interest. 

This moment also comes amid aspiration for a U.S.-Saudi Arabia defense alliance and the normalization of Israel-Saudi relations. While these are hardly close to creating a two-state solution, they could provide leverage for Washington on both Israel and the region — leverage that at its core is the promotion of the belief that the fruits of normalization will be shared by everyone in the region, including the Palestinians.

The first response of the Biden Administration following the Hamas attack rightly focused on military support for Israel. Now, the U.S. can act diplomatically by initiating an international effort for a long-term solution. It should mobilize the United Nations Security Council to recognize a Palestinian state based on the 2002 Saudi Arab Peace Initiative for a two-state solution, and demand Palestinian elections that will provide one legitimate leadership representing both Gaza and the West Bank for negotiations. 

Except for the governments of Israel, Iran, and Hamas in Gaza, there is an overwhelming international consensus for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and Palestine can easily be accepted as a full member of the U.N. if the U.S. does not use its Security Council veto.

This is good for Washington as well as the Middle East. Given the impact of rising oil prices on the global economy, the U.S. wants to mobilize countries in the region that export energy to exert pressure against Russia. Biden has an opportunity here to promote global interests and to arrive at an agreement with China and Russia on a two-state solution.

American leadership is the best way to prevent Russia and China from taking advantage of the vacuum created by Washington’s justified withdrawal from the “boots on the ground” approach of the Bush Administration. 

Despite Biden’s clear and principled support for a two-state solution, he has in his first three years as president largely avoided the issue. Now that a catastrophe has occurred so tragically, it is time to take strategic action. And it could help him win reelection next year.

The Democratic Party is riper than ever to support a move on the Palestinian issue. For many years, the party was influenced by American Jews who supported the status quo of Israel’s occupation. Now a new generation of Democratic lawmakers have come to realize that there are no military solutions to the conflict. No less significant is the growth of organizations like mine, J Street, that support Israel, democracy and peace, and believe in the power of courageous diplomacy to promote both Israeli and U.S. interests. 

President Biden has a unique opportunity to be remembered in history as the one who saved the Zionist vision of liberty, justice and peace, along with Israel’s fragile democracy. He would be building on the legacies of giants before him — President Harry S. Truman, who recognized the state of Israel; President Jimmy Carter, who led Israel to peace with Egypt; and President Bill Clinton, who signed the Oslo Peace Accords.

Biden described the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel as an act of sheer evil and an atrocity on an appalling scale. His empathy for our anger, pain and hopelessness has, more than ever before, earned him the trust of Israelis. He can now leverage this trust with a move that would save Israel from the biggest threat to its mission as the democratic homeland of the Jewish people — which is the continuing occupation.

This article was published in Forward, on October 17th.

הפוסט Can Biden transform a human tragedy into a diplomatic opportunity? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A hint of Washington’s impatience with Israel’s failure to spell out its intentions was already evident in President Biden’s remarks in Tel Aviv on October 18, when Biden publicly noted that wartime success “requires clarity about the objectives and an honest assessment about whether the path you’re on will achieve those objectives.” Since then, but for a vaguely worded statement by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant that Israel seeks “the creation of a new security regime in the Gaza Strip, the removal of Israel’s responsibility for day-to-day life in the Gaza Strip, and the creation of a new security reality for the citizens of Israel,” no clear vision for what Israel aims to achieve has been presented.

The apparent absence of an Israeli vision for how to realize its goals and the growing escalation of the conflict across the region require urgent international intervention aimed at preparing the diplomatic off-ramp that must be the end of all wars.

The off-ramp would need to contend with multiple challenges, including those underlying Israel’s own war objectives.

First, the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, which Israel has repeatedly declared to be its main objective, lacks the clarity of purpose and the certainty of its achievability. Hamas is an organization deeply embedded in Gaza’s social and civilian life, and destroying it would require not only the killing of tens of thousands of armed men affiliated with Hamas, but also dismantling its wide array of civilian mechanisms—mechanism that employ upwards of 40,000 civilians and which are essential if Gaza is to function after the war ends.

Second, even as Israel’s war objective of dismantling Hamas is probably unrealistic, it is also, paradoxically, not ambitious enough. This is because disarming Hamas would create a power vacuum into which other militant and terrorist groups would enter – principally Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but potentially also other militant groups, including Salafi-jihadist ones. These groups are no less committed to waging endless war on Israel, and their weakness relative to Hamas thus far has been due to Hamas’s ability to rein them in. If Hamas is weakened, let alone dismantled, they will likely take its place.

And finally, a war whose goal is destroying Hamas does not necessarily go in hand with securing the release of the roughly 240 Israeli hostages in Gaza. If anything, the kind of brutal and bloody fighting required to achieve the dismantling of Hamas would only endanger the lives and safety of the Israeli hostages rather than expedite or assure their release.

The fact, moreover, that third-party negotiations can bring about the release of hostages, as has already been demonstrated by the release of four hostages in two separate deals brokered by both Qatar and Egypt, underscores the availability of an alternative to the use of sheer military force.

The diplomatic off-ramp must be nothing less than a regional grand bargain—one that would address Israel’s necessary and legitimate strategic needs; strengthen the pragmatic Palestinian forces who are willing to reach a permanent agreement with Israel; avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip; and prevent a wider regional war.

The challenge, admittedly, is enormous and may well be beyond what regional and international diplomacy can pull off. Competing interests among some of the key regional stakeholders (such as between longtime rivals Saudi Arabia and Qatar) and powerful spoilers—notably Iran, Hamas’s chief sponsor—are bound to get in the way. Yet given the enormous stakes at hand, the effort must be made, with these two primary components at its core:

First and immediately, an “all-for-all” hostages for prisoners exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. Under such a deal, Hamas and the other Palestinian groups would release all Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip in exchange for a blanket release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, estimated at around 6,000. The Israeli hostages would include the two civilians who have been held by Hamas before October 7. Even if Hamas were to release several dozen captives in the days to come, the staggering number of Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip renders any precedents to prisoner exchange deals—notably that of the 2011 deal for the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, where the identity and severity of each and every prisoner’s security crimes were factored in—moot.

Second, and in the longer term, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. This should be Israel’s ultimate goal, but it is also one that only a concerted regional and international effort might be able to bring about without a full-scale ground invasion.

In practical terms, this would require the disarming of Hamas and the other Palestinian militant groups and would ideally apply to these and other militant groups in the West Bank as well. While such efforts have failed in the past, conditions this time are different. Achieving this goal, however, would depend on the creation of a coalition of regional stakeholders united by the understanding that Hamas must be eliminated—indeed, that failure to destroy Hamas would deal a major victory to their arch enemy, Iran. Such a potential coalition exists in the region, with key players being Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.

Tragically, the military disarmament of Hamas and all other Palestinian factions will probably not be achieved without additional military pressure, with all the implications for the civilian population of Gaza, along with some kind of a (literally) life-saving deal for Hamas’s and PIJ’s leaderships, whoever among them survives. Historical examples for such arrangements are none too inspiring, but the 1982 evacuation of Yasser Arafat and the PLO from Beirut, Lebanon, could serve as a model.

The military disarmament of Hamas and all other Palestinian factions must also mean the readiness of the Palestinian Authority, under the leadership of the PLO (and its main faction, Fatah) to assume control over the Gaza Strip. Such a development would require considerable political and financial resources, and might necessitate the establishment of a multinational Arab peacekeeping force that would, under optimal circumstances, receive its mandate from a U.N. Security Council resolution. As for the financial component, the wealthy Arab states, principally Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and the European donor countries, would need to foot the bill.

These are only the two basic components of the regional bargain required right now. A broader deal, one that would truly redefine the regional security architecture (and also go a long way in checking Iran’s regional ambitions) might also include American defense pacts with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Israeli normalization, and a joint U.S. and Saudi sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a two-state solution.

The prospect for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a two-state solution might seem extremely distant under present circumstances. Yet the trauma of October 7 and the pain engendered by the ongoing crisis may create the kind of willingness, on both sides, that has been lacking in the past 20 years. To be sure, good-faith negotiations would require new leaderships in both Jerusalem and Ramallah that enjoy broad public support. In Israel, that might possible even with the current parliamentary makeup (provided Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stepped down and a new coalition is formed). In Palestine, where elections in the Palestinian Authority have not taken place since 2006 and are unlikely to take place any time soon, the legitimacy would need to be achieved through internal organizational reforms as well as through major economic reconstruction and assistance by way of a Marshall Plan-like support from the outside. Meanwhile, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and the consolidation of a Palestinian polity would mean the removal of one of the main obstacles to such negotiations since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007.

There is no easy path forward, but the urgency for regional and global diplomacy cannot be overstated. Failure to create an off-ramp from this war would mean not simply more of the same, but a precipitous fall into the abyss.

The article was published on October 31 on TIME.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Off-Ramp After Israel’s Invasion of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On October 26th Mitvim hosted a virtual briefing to discuss the regional-political perspective on the Gaza campaign. The briefing was based on a collection of analyses by Mitvim experts, offering an initial regional view of the Gaza campaign.

Watch the briefing Here.

Link to the compilation by Mitvim experts: https://mitvim.org.il/en/9915/ 

The briefing featured:

Dr. Gil Murciano- CEO, Mitvim.

Dr. Roee Kibrik- Director of Research, Mitvim.

Dr. Omer Zanany- Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program, Mitvim.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu- Director of the Israel–Europe Relations Program, Mitvim.

Dr. Moran Zaga- Expert on the Gulf States, University of Haifa • Policy Fellow, Mitvim.

Prof. Elie Podeh-  Professor in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem • Board Member, Mitvim.

Nadav Tamir- Executive Director, JStreet Israel •  Board Member, Mitvim.

הפוסט Zoom Briefing: A Regional-Political Perspective on the Gaza Campaign הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.