● Hezbollah and Iran’s Regional Strategy

● Remarks on the Trump relocation proposal

● Analysis of the Saudi strategy and U.S. Relations

● Insights on the Iran Nuclear issue and U.S. diplomacy under Trump

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הפוסט Dr. GIL Murciano discusses the latest developments. Middle East Now, i24NEWS, April 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren Discusses the Trump-Netanyahu Meeting | BBC | February 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren Breaks Down the Ceasefire: Israel, Hamas, and Gaza’s Future, The New Arab, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren on the Breakthrough Regarding the Ceasefire Negotiations, The Monocle Daily, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas is agreed after 15 months of war, Ksenia Svetlova and Prof. Yossi Mekelberg join Emma Nelson from The Monocle Daily to discuss.

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הפוסט Ksenia Svetlova and Prof. Yossi Mekelberg on the Ceasefire Deal, The Monocle Daily, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט ‘Not just Hamas’: What’s Behind the Failed Hostage Negotiations? – Former Amb. Daniel Shek’s Interview with Ynet, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But one of the most – if not the most – pressing issue has yet to be solved. One hundred people kidnapped by Hamas and other militants in Gaza remain in captivity, over 450 days later. Each week, their families and supporters protest for their release, pleading for a deal that will see their loved ones come home and the fighting cease. But why hasn’t this happened yet, and why do the negotiations keep falling apart?

Haaretz reporter Linda Dayan spoke to Daniel Shek, a former Israeli ambassador and the head of diplomacy for the Hostages and Missing Families Forum, about the negotiations, why the Israeli government won’t end the war, the international community’s failures and what the future might hold.

“What really counts is the political will of both sides, and unless both sides, at the same moment in time, are really motivated to succeed, this is not going to happen. My impression is that since at least April, this is what’s keeping us from a deal,” says Sheck. “It’s an absurd situation that the only party to these negotiations that is really motivated are the mediators.”

Click here to listen the entire podcast.

הפוסט Former Amb. Daniel Shek on the Failures in Releasing the Hostages, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Mitvim’s Annual Conference 2024 – Strategies of Hope: i24’s Coverage, November 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט How the Hamas terror attack changed Israeli society?- Dr. Gil Murciano on the Israeli Foreign Policy Index, DW, October 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Dr. Maya Sion -Tzidkiyahu, KAN English, Far-Right in France on Cusp of Power, July 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Can Hamas Be Defeated? – Interview with Dr. Gil Murciano on DW News, June 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Dr. Gil Murciano, CBC Listen, on the day after of the Iranian missiles attack, April 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Read Gil’s point of view here.

The article was published in March 2022.

הפוסט Defensive Cooperation Against Iran Discussed at Israel’s Mideast Summit הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

View the interview here.

הפוסט A New Chapter in Turkish-Israeli Relations? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Read it here.

הפוסט What does Putin think he’s doing? An expert’s primer on why he invaded, what’s next הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With the prospect of a sustained ISIS presence in Iraq and Syria, the option of prolonged US military re-engagement in the region has essentially become an expectation. The pressure to reorient US policy could not be more evident, as Obama himself opted for military strikes in northern Iraq on August 9—a first for the US since it pulled out in 2011.  Moreover, he later warned Americans that US military involvement to quell ISIS and work in other ways to restore stability to Iraq, including working with nominated Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, would likely have to continue for the long run.

Obama’s August 9 decision also came on the heels of criticism from leaders in both parties for not having done more to stymie the advances of ISIS in northern Iraq.  Even as Obama authorized the strikes, ranking Senator John McCain called for more military action.  Pouncing on the administration’s perceived fecklessness on Middle East policy—a perception reinvigorated by the subsequent ISIS beheading of American journalist, James Foley—McCain repeated this call, this time along with senior Senator Lindsey Graham in a New York Times opinion article.  Tea Party stalwart Senator Ted Cruz also piped in, linking Russian and ISIS aggression to Obama’s alleged projection of weakness.

The most crushing critique, however, came from Hillary Clinton, who in what many consider an attempt to put distance between her and the president for her own anticipated 2016 president bid endorsed the idea that stronger prior US intervention in Syria would have prevented the rise of ISIS and that Obama erroneously has no foreign policy doctrine.

For the coming month, the most significant development to look for has already been outlined in a key article penned by Secretary Kerry in the New York Times on August 29. In this telling piece, he reveals the administration’s blueprint for a “global coalition” to beat back ISIS, involving support from NATO, the UN and the “countries that are most directly threatened.” At its core, this blueprint signals Obama’s intention to maintain a refocused US attention on the Middle East while holding firm to his principle of international security cooperation.

This strategy seems set to overshadow all other issues in the near future, including the Israeli-Palestinian one.  However, with the termination of the recent Israel-Hamas conflict bringing new ripeness for prospects of Israeli-PA cooperative efforts on managing Gaza, Obama could greatly profit by attempting to convert these prospects into renewed peace talks.  Such talks would likely come up against stiff resistance from Israel if Abbas follows through with plans to seek an internationally-backed time limit on Israel’s occupation.  It should be recalled, though, that in June the US was able to cajole Abbas into abandoning a similar endeavor. An opportunity is present.  After months of strained US-Israeli ties, including the recent missile shipment episode, the Obama administration is in a position to utilize its upcoming collaboration with regional Middle East states to additionally garner support and cooperation in bringing greater stability to Gaza.

The US appears to already have enjoyed a legitimacy boost among regional states for its military operations against ISIS, and now the Kerry article indicates that he and Obama remain undeterred from the tongue-lashings they had received during the Gaza crisis to pursue other cooperative efforts with the same leaders who dished out the criticism.  This legitimacy will be critical for any future US initiatives for regional involvement, including perhaps in advancing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations if the parties express a willingness for them down the road.

On the horizon, a main obstacle for revisiting the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be the divisive politics of the regional Cold War.  An informal alliance of “moderate” states led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been competing for regional influence against an alliance of the so-called Shia Crescent states—Iran, Syria and Lebanon—at times, and against Hamas friendly Turkey and Qatar, during others. These divisions contributed in no small part to the failure to bring the Gaza conflict to an end in a timely manner.  Moreover, they revealed the limits of US influence in the region, and led Israel and various Arab States to cold-shoulder it in favor of their own de facto alliance. As Martyn Indyk recently discussed in an interview, this snubbing of the US may become the norm.  It will be up to the Obama administration to prove in the coming months that the US can lead in the fight to neutralize ISIS if it is to have a chance at restoring its standing as a leader in peace efforts, as well.

This article was originally published in The US and US: The Mitvim-DC Monthly

הפוסט US Policy Offensive Against ISIS May Offer Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Re-engagement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US attempts for a ceasefire in Gaza this past month were a disaster. Despite working endlessly to incorporate the efforts of regional and European actors, Secretary Kerry’s efforts were repeatedly dashed, only to be replaced by a tenuous 72-hour ceasefire.

Although it has fallen short, the US has chosen the right course.  A strategy of encouraging greater participation from these self-appointed Middle Eastern mediators and others represents the surest way the US can expect to broker a ceasefire.  Moreover, this option can satisfy the large swath of Americans weary of the toll that a protracted involvement in the Middle East has taken but who worry about the prospect of a declining US influence around the world.

Dr. Galia Press-Barnathan at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem once argued in an academic article that by allowing greater intra-regional European security cooperation after the Cold War, the US was able to mitigate its costs of maintaining stability there while still preserving its hegemonic position. This theory of “security regionalization,” as she calls it, may be extrapolated to a US option in the Middle East of “diplomacy regionalization,” whereby the US would encourage regional third party states to engage more actively in negotiations with the conflicting parties—Hamas, Fatah, and, at least indirectly, Israel.

Unfortunately, rather than exhibiting regional cooperation the ceasefire talks—and inter-Arab relations in general—have been characterized by competition. This competition has manifested itself in a clash between a Saudi- and Israeli-backed Egyptian ceasefire initiative, on the one side, and Turkish and Qatari efforts to vouch for Hamas, on the other.

Making matters worse for itself, in the search to find a more palpable offer for Hamas after it rejected the former’s terms, the US appears to have swung a full 180˚, adopting almost entirely those of the latter. Kerry’s lopsided proposals have stirred feelings of betrayal and mistrust from all sides.

To this end, both Israeli and moderate Palestinian leaders alike have rebuked his last major proposal on July 26, released to the parties after a meeting in Paris between Western leaders and Turkey and Qatar. It was soundly rejected by Israel’s cabinet, as well as the Palestinian Authority, which ridiculed the US for having discarded the Egyptian initiative in favor of a “friends of Hamas” outlook.  Two weeks on, despite various Obama officials having come to Kerry’s aid, not to mention Israeli Ambassador to the US Ron Dermer, Kerry’s most recent remark that Netanyahu is a “stubborn head” has left few to wonder whether the diplomatic spat is still ongoing.

For the US to rebound from this series of diplomatic blunders, it must make a more concerted effort to juggle the demands of all parties.  It should devise an international mechanism combining regional cooperation within the divergent camps and the various conflict party-mediator relationships that allow, for example, the US to circumvent having to speak with Hamas directly.  Though a daunting task, only a year ago Kerry pulled off another admirable feat by convincing the Arab League to amend the Arab Peace Initiative to allow for negotiation on minor land swaps.  Such endeavors for compromise are helpful, and align with the spirit of diplomacy regionalization.

The US must also see to it that Abbas and the Palestinian Authority be placed at the center of all Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, including over Gaza. The surest way for the US to bolster the PA’s voice over that of Hamas is to countenance the Fatah-Hamas “technocratic government,” which retains Abbas’ leading role. Plus its contact with both Israel and Hamas can be exploited as a primary mediating source.

In short, greater regional diplomatic involvement under this international mechanism could prevent another fissure within the Palestinian ranks, would act as a confidence-building measure between Israel and the Arab parties, and would provide international (US or EU) monitoring for the implementation of (and against breaches to) agreements.  A Middle Eastern diplomacy regionalization is the US’ most secure, comprehensive, and cost-effective path out of the current mess, and onto the road to a two-state solution.

Article was originally published in the Mitvim-DC Monthly, August edition.  An earlier version was also published in the Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט Future US mediation should involve more regional diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.