Ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor gains momentum amidst geopolitical shifts and renewed diplomatic efforts.

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הפוסט Tomorrow’s Global Superhighway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Jordanian-Israeli Food Security: A Road Map of Potential Collaboration הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This perspective is not just an expression of deep pain – it is a testament to the destructive consequences of the events of October 7, 2023, on the perception of Israel’s future in the eyes of many liberals in Israel and the American Jewish community.

Hamas not only attacked, murdered, and raped Israelis, it also succeeded in causing many Jews to lose faith in a future in which Israel can exist as a Jewish and democratic state alongside a Palestinian state.

From Hamas’s perspective, this is a tremendous strategic victory. After all, its goal has never been Palestinian independence alongside Israel but rather the elimination of the Zionist idea.

If Israel completely rejects the two-state solution, it will be trapped in a predicament where it cannot be both democratic and Jewish in a sustainable manner – thus demolishing liberal Zionism.

The position of Rabbi Hirsch is also the result of years of systematic political messages from the Israeli Right and the conservative American Jewish establishment, which have succeeded in conflating the Palestinians as a national movement and Hamas as an extremist Islamist movement.

Netanyahu’s narrative 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, backed by organizations in the Jewish establishment in the US, promoted a narrative that associates every Palestinian with Hamas.

As a result, even moderate voices such as Rabbi Hirsch’s are now adopting an interpretation that absolves Israel from any responsibility for the failure of peace processes.

The Palestinian side is not exempt from responsibility, of course, but granting an exemption to Israeli governments throughout the generations from shared responsibility for the failure is not Zionism – since the purpose of Zionism is for the Jewish people to take responsibility for our fate.

It also reinforces the destructive stance of the “There’s no partner for peace” school, which is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Those who claim that the problem lies solely with the Palestinian side and the strengthening of Hamas that has been led by Netanyahu’s governments in the past 16 years are causing serious damage to our future.

Despite the pain, in light of Rabbi Hirsch’s words, I find comfort in the fact that the American Jewish community still largely holds a different position.

Most Jews in the US support the two-state solution and understand that the endless control over the Palestinians is not a recipe for Zionist prosperity but rather for Israel’s moral and strategic decline.

In Israel, polls indicate that the majority of the public would support a solution that included a demilitarized Palestinian state as part of a regional agreement.

Israel can make a reality of full peace relations with Sunni Arab countries as part of a moderate Middle Eastern bloc standing against both Iranian and jihadist Shi’ite and Sunni forces.

Saudi Arabia is leading this initiative among Arab countries, and it is possible that Indonesia and other non-Arab Muslim countries will join as well.

Biden tried to promote this vision and failed, but Donald Trump also wants to reach such an agreement for different reasons of prestige and money, which could make its realization more realistic.

Such an arrangement would not only solve the moral and demographic problem of controlling a foreign people but would also the solution to Israel’s security problem, as former senior officials from the IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet, and the Foreign Ministry have testified.

From a historical perspective, we know that – sometimes – it is precisely after severe shocks that a political breakthrough occurs.

After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli public became more hawkish – but shortly thereafter, peace was signed with Egypt.

After the First Intifada, which was a severe trauma for the Israeli public, the Oslo Accords were born, paving the way for peace with Jordan.

Today’s crisis is not necessarily a sign of losing our way – it could be a springboard to a new solution; if only the right leader can be found, with the ability to translate pain into hope.

The reality is indeed difficult. The current dynamics make the political discourse in Israel more extreme. But we do not have the privilege of despairing.

Zionism has never been an effortless project. Every significant achievement we have attained as a people and as a state has come through determination, despite opposition and fears.

הפוסט Israel cannot let Hamas win by abandoning the pursuit of peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Thus, Israel was the only country to withdraw its ambassador from Vienna in 1986, when Kurt Waldheim – the former UN secretary-general, who was later revealed to have been an officer in the Wehrmacht – was elected president of Austria.

Even in 2000, Israel recalled its ambassador from Vienna when the Austrian Freedom Party, with roots in the Nazi regime, joined the coalition government. Once again, we were among the few in the world who placed an ethical stance above cold political considerations – and we sent a clear message about what was acceptable and unacceptable when it came to Jewish safety.

This is how Israel has acted for years: a Jewish state with a historical memory that obliges it to take a stand for our people and against racism and xenophobia of any kind. But today, 25 years later, I’m concerned about the future of Israel’s moral compass and its Foreign Ministry. The excellent individuals in the Israeli Foreign Ministry are increasingly being asked to implement policies that contradict everything we believe in, everything Israel once represented.

When Israel voted at the UN against the proposal calling for the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – alongside countries like Russia, North Korea, and of course the United States under Donald Trump – it was another painful testament to the dark place into which we have descended.

But it doesn’t stop here.

New policy directives

The Israeli Foreign Ministry continues to receive new policy directives that shame its legacy. For example, the directive from Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to work on strengthening ties with far-right parties in Europe.

These are the same parties that continue the path of neo-Nazi movements. Today, they hide behind an anti-Muslim facade, which should be a reason to not legitimize them in any case. They cast a thin veil over the antisemitic undertone that simmers beneath the surface, waiting for the right moment to break out.

While in 2000, Israel’s government condemned Europeans for allying with right-wing extremists, in 2025, the Likud has made itself an “observer member” of a grouping of far-right European parties.

Government ministers are continuing to cozy up with those who are willing to downplay their hatred for Jews in order to gain legitimacy. This is alongside other activities that shame our nation, such as the support for the ethnic cleansing carried out by Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry is composed of good and dedicated individuals who chose a career primarily focused on representing their country and fighting for it. But today, every Israeli diplomat must take a moment for self-reflection: can they continue to serve a policy that contradicts the Jewish and democratic values for which they joined the Ministry? And if they do, shouldn’t they raise their opposition to the minister’s directive?

Israel was once a moral beacon. Our founding vision was to be a light among nations. It was core to our identity to never forget. We must not lose our way, and the responsibility for this does not lie solely with the leaders – it also falls on the public and our public servants, especially those in the Foreign Ministry. These are the individuals whose role is to implement the policies of the Israeli government on the international stage.

The legitimization of racist and antisemitic parties and support for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine are the diplomatic equivalents of an illegal order with a black flag flying above it. There are things that every principled person must stand against and say clearly: enough is enough.

The article was published on March 17th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Policy Has Lost Its Moral Compass הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The exception to this was the Arab and Islamic summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in November 2023. However, aside from declarations against Israel and calls for a diplomatic solution based on the two-state approach, with borders along the lines of 1967, this summit did not result in any practical action.

There are two explanations for the weak Arab response. First, there is the continuing decline of the Arab League as an institution for addressing Arab issues.

Since its formation – and that of the Arab Summit, its supreme body – it has experienced many failures, although it has also been credited with some significant achievements, such as thwarting Iraq’s threat to invade Kuwait in 1961, halting the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, and adopting the Arab Peace Initiative, among others.

The second reason is the general reluctance to intervene in Gaza until the war has ended. This is especially relevant to the Gulf states, which can contribute substantial funds toward the rebuilding of Gaza, but will not do so until the fighting is over.

The convening of the emergency summit on March 4 – symbolically called the “Palestine Summit”G – was an Arab response to US President Donald Trump’s idea for Palestinian emigration from Gaza. Though the idea is flawed and impracticable, it has forced the Arab states to formulate their own counterproposal.

What Trump did not take into account was that striking at the Arab holy cow – the Palestinian problem – would unite the Arab states, thus forcing the moderate Arab states to fall into line with more extreme positions.

Most of the leaders of the Arab states attended the summit, including the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was making his first appearance at the supreme Arab institution.

However, the Saudi crown prince and the president of the United Arab Emirates chose to send their foreign ministers, seemingly after they realized which way the wind was blowing. For Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the conference was an opportunity to give a show of Arab leadership.

Hamas is not mentioned

The concluding statement issued by the summit was worded in a rhetoric characteristic of Arab conferences and reflects the lowest common denominator on which Arab consensus could be achieved. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the statement includes condemnations of Israel. On the other hand, Hamas is not mentioned at all.

Ignoring the negative rhetoric toward Israel, the Arab proposals can be summarized as follows:

A call for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank; a reaffirmation of the Arab strategic decision to pursue peace, as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative, which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people through the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with east Jerusalem as its capital; a total rejection of all acts of violence, terrorism, and extremism; full opposition to any attempt to uproot Palestinians from their land; a warning against annexations in the West Bank that could lead the region into a renewed cycle of violence; adoption of the Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza (see below); a call to convene, at the earliest possible time, an international conference to discuss reconstruction and raise funds; and a call for the full implementation of the ceasefire, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.

Interestingly, the statement refers to a Palestinian agreement to establish a temporary, local, technocratic administration in Gaza, “under the umbrella of a Palestinian government,” alongside efforts to help restore the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, following necessary reforms within both the PA and the PLO. In the meantime, Egypt’s foreign minister has announced that the individuals who will serve in this administration have already been selected.

הפוסט Arab Leaders Unite on Paper, but Who Will Rebuild Gaza? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the dust begins to settle from the wars of the past decade, a growing realization emerges: From the ruins of Gaza, Bint Jbeil, and Aleppo will rise the new political order that will define the Middle East for the coming decades. Those leading the rebuilding efforts will be the ones shaping the region’s political future.

The struggle over the narrative of reconstruction places Israel at a critical crossroads – whether to remain in the role of a destroyer or take part in shaping the region as a builder.

The choice is between a future of instability, extremism, and chaos – allowing Iran to reenter the arena – or a future of Israeli-Palestinian partnership in a comprehensive reconstruction plan. In this vision, physical rebuilding could serve as a foundation for reshaping Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, its adversarial neighbors to the north, and the wider Arab world.

The western Middle East lies in ruins, on a scale reminiscent of post-World War II Europe. The devastation is concentrated in three key areas: Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

The cost of restoring basic life-sustaining infrastructure in Gaza alone is estimated at $20 billion, barely a third of what will be needed to fully rebuild Gaza over the next decade.

Yet, Gaza’s reconstruction pales in comparison to the enormous task of rebuilding Syria, where the destruction caused by the civil war is estimated at $500 billion.

In Lebanon, devastation is the direct result of governance failure – corruption and systemic inefficiency that led to economic and social collapse, with the war merely adding a layer of physical destruction.

What unites these three arenas is the dramatic political shifts brought about by war. All three are in transition between old regimes and new governments, whose capacity to rule will be determined largely by the reconstruction efforts.

This makes rebuilding a direct factor in Israel’s security, not just in terms of immediate threats but also in shaping Israel’s long-term security environment and its relationships with Palestinians and regional states.

For example, who rebuilds southern Lebanon will directly impact the security situation on Israel’s northern border for years to come. If Hezbollah leads the reconstruction using Iranian funds, it will retain, at least partially, its status among the Shi’ite population and their willingness to support it militarily.

However, if Lebanon’s new government takes charge, relying on international economic aid, it could restore its sovereignty and reduce the willingness of southern Lebanese communities to turn their homes into Hezbollah rocket depots.

Similarly, the way Syria is rebuilt will influence its future relations with Israel. If the reconstruction is led by a regional and international coalition, it could serve as leverage to push the new Syrian leadership away from conflict. More importantly, such an effort would prevent Iran from reestablishing its foothold, as Tehran is a global expert in exploiting chaos for strategic gains.

The urgency of reconstruction

Regional actors are beginning to grasp both the enormous potential and the pressing necessity of large-scale reconstruction. The sheer scale of destruction has transformed rebuilding into a challenge of historic proportions – akin to a regional Marshall Plan but led by the region itself, primarily the Gulf states.

The regional interest in reconstruction stems from a clear realization: Leaving the wounds of Gaza, Aleppo, and Lebanon open will create the conditions for the next regional war. For Arab states, rebuilding is first and foremost a matter of regional stability.

The recent war demonstrated how quickly shock waves from Gaza and Beirut can destabilize governments and disrupt trade routes across the Middle East. This vulnerability has created a sense of urgency among Arab states to intervene.

The release of Trump’s plan only intensified the urgency for these countries to present an alternative. This set the stage for the regional emergency summit held earlier this week in Cairo, initiated by Egypt to coordinate a joint reconstruction effort.

While momentum builds and plans take shape, Israel remains entirely absent from regional reconstruction efforts. Securing a place at the table – ensuring Israel has a say in shaping the post-war Middle East – requires it to forge a new kind of strategic partnership with those leading the rebuilding efforts, namely the Gulf states and other key Arab partners.

Yet at present, Israel is seen as an irrelevant spoiler – a military power capable of destroying any long-term reconstruction effort, but one that lacks a strategic vision or the willingness to plan for the future.

Above all, Israel’s messianic political vision for Gaza and the West Bank positions it as an obstacle. These policies run counter to the regional understanding that the long-term success of Gaza’s physical reconstruction is inseparable from establishing a stable political future for Gaza.

This is not just about Saudi or Emirati diplomatic sensitivities – it is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. There is no logic in investing billions in developing Gaza’s port and energy infrastructure or Lebanon’s economy if they are destined to be bombed in the next escalation.

Yet, instead of engaging with the serious regional discourse on reconstruction, Israel’s leadership remains preoccupied with fantasies about a Gaza Riviera without Palestinians and delusional visions that even Trump’s advisers have abandoned in recent weeks.

As of today, Israeli decision-makers are the only actors in the world clinging to Trump’s so-called reconstruction plan. It took Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states three hours to dismiss Trump’s statement and clarify that their involvement in Gaza’s rebuilding depends on transferring control to a Palestinian authority.

Ultimately, participating in the critical process of regional reconstruction and the reshaping of Israel’s relationships with its neighbors demands a price that Israel’s current government finds unbearable – giving up its messianic dreams of annexation and population transfer. It requires a fundamental shift from being a force of destruction to becoming a partner in designing the Middle East’s future.

The article was published on March 9th, 2025, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Gaza Reconstruction is Israel’s Chance to Shape the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In fact, under growing global friction, when fractures are clearly showing between the unpredictable and belligerent Trump administration and the rest of the West, the current far-right Israeli government finds itself in a more comfortable EU zone – that of interests and real-politic. The new Israeli foreign Minister, Gideon Saar, even said that some in Europe sees Israel as a potential bridge to the Trump administration.

Netanyahu was the first international leader to meet Trump at the White House and received more support than he could have expected. When EU’s new High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas, visited Washington, secretary of state Marco Rubio canceled the meeting with her without explanation or apology. Later that day, at his first cabinet meeting, Trump stated that the EU was created “to screw the US” and that he intends to impose 25% trade tariffs on the bloc.

In the rapidly shifting transatlantic relationship—where a Trump administration appears to be disengaging from Ukraine and Europe — the EU must choose its battles. It is clear to everyone that Ukraine comes first and is linked to strengthening the defence of Europe. Gaza is not even third. Perhaps reacting to Trump’s tariffs on Europe are? The EU’s internal interest of repatriating rejected asylum seekers to the new Syria and elsewhere? Stopping Iran from turning nuclear? Much is on the list. Under the current ceasefire, Gaza and the Palestinian issue ranks low in priority.

Thus, while the EU formulates a normative language that largely reflects its liberal-democratic values, its bark has no bite. This is not new. We’re back to the EU simultaneously condemning Israel while also considering deeper cooperation with it in research and innovation, energy, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and other fields.

Critical engagement

It’s important to remember that the convening of the Association Council is a commitment under the EU -Israel Association Agreement, setting a routine and institutionalized political dialogue once a year. Nowhere in the agreement does it say that meetings will only occur if relations are good or improving. The purpose of the Association Council is to facilitate dialogue — whether critical, friendly, or a mix of both.

Actually, it is precisely in times of crises that it is essential for the parties to engage in an open and candid dialogue – what EU calls critical engagement.

More than anything, the latest Association Council meeting reflected the shift from the previous Commission, where the former foreign policy chief Josep Borrell led a strongly critical tone – even confrontational – toward Israel, to the second von der Leyen Commission. President Ursula von der Leyen had always a friendlier stance toward Israel.

Borrell’s successor, Kaja Kallas, does not have a particularly defined position on Israel. She adheres to EU’s “agreed language” and promoted the meeting for the sake of engagement. She is now scheduled to visit Israel in late March. Borrell only visited Israel once in November 2023, six weeks after Hamas’s murderous terrorist attack on Israel, when he was still using acceptable language.

Soon afterwards he returned to harsh rhetoric against Israel. Later he amplified the positions of Spain and Ireland, who pushed to invoke Article 2 of the Association Agreement. The article stipulates that the agreement is based on shared democratic values and respect for human rights.

By now, the position of Spain and Ireland aimed at downgrading relations with Israel has been dropped. Article 2 was only generally mentioned in the EU position paper for the Association Council.

The new Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, has been tasked to plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. Similarly to Kallas, she does not have a specific approach to Israel – neither as favorable as Várhelyi, the former Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, nor as critical as Lenarčič, the former Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid. Together with von der Leyen, this trio of women is relatively neutral or even supportive of Israel.

Criticism, cooperation and challenges

Kallas must also represent the position of all 27 EU member states. As a result, the EU’s statement on the eve of the Association Council meeting was drafted as a 1+1 formula: both political and normative criticism, alongside an expressed willingness for deeper cooperation with Israel.

It is mainly diplomacy and security which stands in the center of this real-politic approach. In a world where global friction and internal Western fractures are intensifying – as highlighted by the Trump-Zelensky disastrous meeting in the Oval Office – Israel is both a burden and an asset to the EU.

It is a burden because when the EU engages with Israel in what appears to be business as usual, it faces allegations of double standards from the Global South, human rights organizations and part of the public in Europe. About 120 organizations have signed a protest letter calling for a review of the Association Agreement with Israel because of its alleged violations of international and humanitarian law. The protest would have probably been even stronger if they would have added settlers’ violence and de-facto annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank.

Israel is an asset because, like it or not, it got the upper hand in its multi-front war against Iran and its proxies in the region. As the EU has to rebuild and strengthen its defence capabilities and military know-how, Israel has valuable assets to offer.

The Israeli government is a liability because of its refusal to plan for a political exit strategy from Gaza which could lead to a political solution of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Israel can become an asset if it brings about a desired normalisation with Saudi Arabia, which will also advance peace with the Palestinians. Such a 1+1 approach is a direction that the EU would be willing to advance and take part in.

הפוסט The EU-Israel Association Council: Harsh Criticism of Israel Alongside Desire to Advance Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The UAE’s Foreign Policy Anchors and Their Influence on Israel and the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trump’s proposals to transfer approximately two million Palestinians from Gaza to other countries, along with the United States assuming responsibility for Gaza, were presented as fresh, “outside-the-box” ideas. This framing gave them an air of innovation and creativity, presenting them as concepts previously unconsidered.

While it is certainly a new idea, not all new ideas are necessarily good ones – and some are best left well outside the box. Unlike the “Deal of the Century,” which was presented in January 2020 as a comprehensive 181-page plan, the current proposals emerged as a spontaneous whim announced by Trump just before his meeting with Netanyahu.

They are a mishmash of ideas, lacking any thorough planning that considers the interests and constraints of the various parties involved.

Trump’s proposals are often seen as an attempt to apply business principles to diplomacy – offering an extreme proposal in order to ultimately reach the desired outcome. As the late prime minister Levi Eshkol put it, “I compromise and compromise until I get what I want.”

Trump’s polarizing Gaza plan

However, Trump’s approach to Gaza deviates from the core principles of his election campaign, and it risks leading him into confrontations on both the domestic and international stages. This could be especially problematic in his relationships with key leaders like Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince bin Salman, Turkey’s President Erdogan, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II.

Apart from Israel, there appears to be little enthusiasm for this deal from other potential stakeholders. Trump can expect significant criticism from multiple fronts.

First, the American public, along with many across the political spectrum, is likely to oppose such a move. America’s appetite for involvement in overseas conflicts has diminished following the failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria – wars that claimed numerous lives and cost astronomical sums of money.

Second, the proposal is vehemently opposed by all Arab states, as it would force them to act against their own interests. More critically, if they were to accept it, they would risk undermining the legitimacy and stability of their regimes.

The Saudi Foreign Ministry was the first to respond on behalf of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, stating that Saudi Arabia would not back down from its position, which has been reiterated since October 7: the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.

As a leading power in the Arab world today, Saudi Arabia has set the benchmark for the position of other Arab states. The United Arab Emirates quickly followed suit, reaffirming Saudi Arabia’s stance.

AS FOR EGYPT and Jordan, both have repeatedly expressed strong opposition during the war to any attempt to relocate Palestinians from Gaza. They are concerned about the potential consequences of a population transfer into their territories and its impact on the internal stability of their regimes.

The fact that Trump’s proposal is intended to be implemented consensually, rather than by force, does not lessen their opposition in the slightest. Trump’s threat to use the US financial clout over Egypt and Jordan may backfire and might even damage Israel’s relations with these two important states.

Similarly, Morocco, which has been mentioned as another potential destination for refugees – an action framed as a gesture of gratitude for America’s recognition of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara – will also resist being involved. Morocco has long supported the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and has even hosted both public and covert meetings between Israeli and Palestinian representatives.

Moreover, cooperating with an American initiative would likely paint the Arab regimes as traitors to the Palestinian cause, undermining their legitimacy by appearing to contribute to the destruction of the Palestinian project.

While Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause has historically been expressed in rhetorical terms, it is deeply rooted in widespread support among the Arab public.

Over the years, surveys have consistently shown the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab public opinion and Arab leaders cannot afford to ignore it. It appears that Trump fails to grasp the symbolic importance of the Palestinian issue in the Arab world, mistakenly assuming that everything can be bought with money.

And what about the Palestinians themselves? Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, and a strong attachment to the land (known as sumud) are core values within the Palestinian ethos. Trump’s ideas risk turning the October 7 war into a second Nakba, deeply wounding this ethos. They represent an attempt to erase Palestinian identity and deny Palestinians their right to an independent state – a right that is recognized by the majority of countries around the world.

The focus on Gaza overshadowed another equally significant point made by Trump in his speech – his intention to revisit the issue of annexing territories in Judea and Samaria. This could reignite calls for the annexation of Area C, which had subsided following the release of the “Deal of the Century” in January 2020. Reviving these calls now would likely provoke widespread protests across the Arab world and in the Palestinian territories.

It is possible that Trump’s “outside-the-box” ideas were intentionally designed to shock, with the aim of achieving a more modest goal later on. However, there were never going to be any real buyers for these proposals. Moreover, even if these ideas are rejected, there remains an inherent danger in the legitimization, by the world’s most powerful nation, of actions that undermine international norms of behavior.

If Trump is truly interested in rebuilding Gaza, he might consider replicating the Marshall Plan (it could even be named after him!). The Marshall Plan helped restore Europe after the devastation of World War II, without relocating its residents, and involved an investment of an unimaginable $173 billion in today’s terms.

The storm that followed Trump’s announcement is just beginning, and its outcome remains uncertain. It could end up being little more than a “tempest in a teacup,” but if it turns out to be genuine, storms typically bring damage and destruction. The only question is how much damage and destruction will result.

הפוסט Trump’s Proposals for Gaza: A Political Gamble With Global Risks הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Delivering his opening remarks during their joint press conference, Trump announced that the United States “will take over the Gaza Strip” and refashion it as the “Riviera of the Middle East”. Key to Trump’s “long-term ownership” plan, which reportedly blindsided Netanyahu, would be the relocation of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to make way for American bulldozers and urban planners.

Trump’s declaration triggered strong international condemnation. British Foreign Minister Anneliese Dodds said that “there must be no forced displacement of Palestinians, nor any reduction in the territory of the Gaza Strip.” French President Emmanuel Macron and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sissi issued a joint statement calling any “forced displacement” of Gazans “a serious violation of international law”. Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its commitment to a Palestinian state. Germany, Russia, and China also took issue with the plan.

The criticism is justified. Trump appeared to unilaterally reject decades of diplomatic norms pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tabling the idea of a future Palestinian state. And while he may be right in insisting that the easiest way to end the intolerable cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas is by removing Gaza’s civilian population from the battlefield, international law on human rights and migration is clear when it comes to the forced relocation of civilians (except for military necessity). Without a cohesive plan for relocating Gaza’s approximately 2 million residents, identification of countries willing to serve as hosts, and a commitment that Gazans will eventually be able to return to their homes, Trump’s declaration—made in the midst of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas—may do more harm than good in the short run.

No wonder White House staff have been busy downplaying Trump’s commitment to employing US troops, permanently relocating Palestinians, or using US resources to finance the decades-long reconstruction effort.

Rather than disparage Trump’s vision, America’s partners in Europe and the Middle East should develop a feasible alternative that still captures its essence. This plan should prioritize replacing Hamas as a governing force in Gaza, designing an economically sound humanitarian model for international actors to host those Palestinians who wish to relocate, and establishing an international body that reimagines Gaza’s future and oversees the reconstruction process. These steps could eventually create the conditions for normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a coveted foreign policy goal for Netanyahu and Trump alike, and for future discussions of Palestinian sovereignty.

Like it or not, Trump has set the tone for negotiations on the future of Gaza and Palestine. If the United States’ partners truly desire an alternative ending, they must meet Trump in the middle with a vision of their own.

The article was published on February 11th on GMF.

הפוסט Don’t Like Trump’s Gaza Plan? Offer an Alternative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This strategic meeting is poised to be transformative. A recent call between US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has set the groundwork for what could be a defining moment in US-India relations.

The meeting comes at a critical juncture in global security.

Beyond traditional defense considerations, both nations face evolving challenges from China’s expanding influence across multiple domains—cybersecurity, space technology, maritime trade, and artificial intelligence.

The $400 billion China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has heightened these concerns, particularly for US allies in the Middle East.

India and the United States are eager to deepen their strategic partnership across several key areas.

Defense technology sharing, joint military exercises, and cybersecurity cooperation are expected to feature prominently in their discussions.

Their partnership also extends to critical infrastructure initiatives, most notably the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

The IMEC represents far more than just a trade route—it serves as a strategic counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

While the BRI has enabled China to gain control over critical infrastructure through debt-trap diplomacy and state-directed investments, IMEC offers a transparent, market-driven alternative.

Spanning 4,500 kilometers and connecting India to Europe via the Middle East, IMEC significantly reduces shipping times and provides partner nations with infrastructure development opportunities while safeguarding their sovereignty.

What is the significance of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor?

The corridor’s strength lies in its diverse partnership structure: India’s technological and logistical capabilities, Israel’s innovation and strategic position in the Mediterranean via the Port of Haifa, the UAE’s financial resources and infrastructure expertise, and Europe’s market access and technological advancements.

Unlike the BRI, which promotes Chinese control over vital assets, IMEC ensures that infrastructure development benefits all participating nations while maintaining their strategic independence.

The corridor also enhances global supply chain resilience, mitigating the risks associated with economic coercion and over-reliance on Chinese-controlled trade routes.

Currently, crucial global trade arteries—such as the Malacca Strait, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandab—are increasingly vulnerable to Chinese influence.

Given China’s indirect support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels during the war in Gaza, Israel should be particularly concerned. By purchasing large quantities of Iranian oil, China indirectly funds the Houthis through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which channels resources to its proxies.

American intelligence sources have reportedly revealed that the Houthis are using Chinese weapons for their assaults on shipping in the Red Sea while refraining from attacking Chinese vessels.

The Houthis’ disruptions in the Bab el-Mandab Strait threaten global trade security.

Recent developments further highlight the urgency of countering China’s growing influence.

Senator Marco Rubio’s recent trip to Panama to counter China’s increasing presence in the Panama Canal, as well as the Panamanian government’s subsequent reassessment of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) commitments, indicate that the US is beginning to grasp the stakes and is prepared to confront the challenge.

Israel’s role in this evolving strategic landscape is significant. The Israel-India defense relationship, worth over $10 billion annually in military and cybersecurity technology, has become a crucial component of regional security architecture.

Private-sector engagement has further strengthened these ties, with multinational companies from India making strategic investments in Israeli infrastructure and technology sectors.

One such company, the Adani Group, is of strategic importance in the geopolitical triangle of US-India-Israel.

This Indian conglomerate holds a 70% stake in the Haifa port in northern Israel and is involved in ventures such as military drone production and plans to manufacture commercial semiconductors.

This group is also actively acquiring strategic ports across the Indo-Pacific, challenging China’s monopoly with independent infrastructure development and building alternative supply chains essential for preventing Chinese dominance.

Adani is one of the only private companies globally capable of simultaneously developing and operating key infrastructure—ports, power plants, airports, roads, data centers, transmission grids, and logistics chains.

Unlike China’s state-driven model, this entity operates independently of government control, making it a more reliable partner for nations wary of economic coercion.

The significance of this competition was underscored last year when the company faced an aggressive short-seller attack and legal challenges from the US Department of Justice—moves that directly benefited China.

What is the success of this alliance built upon?

The success of this alliance of US strategic partners depends on continued coordination between government policy and the private sector.

Companies capable of developing and operating strategic infrastructure while maintaining independence from state-directed economic imperialism are crucial partners in this effort and must be supported.

To effectively counter China’s dominance, the US and its allies will have to cultivate multiple Adani-like players across partner nations—companies capable of providing world-class infrastructure without falling under state-directed economic control.

These companies need strategic backing, policy support, and financial resources to scale against China’s subsidized expansion model.

Undermining firms like these through financial warfare, regulatory hurdles, or political miscalculations ultimately serves Beijing’s interests.

These initiatives should not be solely driven by the US but by Israel as well.

A wake-up call for Israel 

The Houthi attacks and their alliances with China and Iran should serve as a wake-up call for Israeli leadership. The realization of China’s BRI mega-project would place Israel in a significantly more difficult position during conflicts, disrupting trade not only for Israel but also for its allies while granting Iran substantial leverage.

The stakes are clear: The emerging partnership between democratic nations provides a crucial counterbalance to China’s expanding influence across multiple domains.

The US-India alliance, which includes key partners like Israel and the UAE, serves as a model for how democratic nations can collaborate to safeguard their strategic interests while promoting transparency and sovereignty.

The upcoming Trump-Modi meeting must enhance this strategic partnership, as it has the potential to significantly contribute to both regional and global security and prosperity.

The article was published on February 9th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Here’s Why Israel Should Care About the Modi-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

We owe it to ourselves to ask the question: Where did we go wrong? Why did we not allow the Biden administration to implement the detailed plan it had prepared for the day after the war in May, which included an alternative to Hamas in Gaza and the normalization of Israel’s relations in the region in a way that would provide security against Iran and its proxies? Why did the Biden administration fail to use the many levers the US has over the Israeli government to save us from the continuation of the catastrophe that has caused so much unnecessary suffering?

What allowed Trump, whose values could not be more contrary to those of the liberal camp in Israel and the United States, to succeed where the principled and Zionist Joe Biden failed?

One of the main reasons for this is the view, which still prevails among too many in our camp and the leadership of most Jewish organizations abroad, that there must be “no daylight” between the positions of the American administration and the Israeli government.

This approach is not only anachronistic but also truly harmful when Israel is led by a government whose main purpose is its own self-preservation. A purpose that often comes at the expense of Israel’s national interests. A purpose that goes against the position of the majority of the Israeli public and that of the liberal majority of American Jews, who have long supported the cessation of hostilities, the release of the hostages, and the defense of our democracy against attempts to destroy it.

Translating pressure

The Prevailing view is not only that it is forbidden to show a gap in positions, but even more so that it is forbidden to translate the gap into pressure on the Israeli government – even one as antagonistic and in need of reigning in as our current one.

A prominent example of this playing out was the criticism from some of the leaders of Israel’s liberal camp regarding the delay in supplying two-ton bombs ahead of the entry into Rafah. It was clear there was no operational need for these bombs, but it was a signal and a message to Israel that it must take the position of the American administration into consideration with regards to the risk of collateral damage.

Another example was the malicious attack in Israel and from many Jewish organizations in the US against the vote of 19 senators – all supporters of Israel and the special US relationship with Israel – who voted to disapprove of unrestricted weapons transfers and send a message to Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that American aid is not a “blank check.”

The position of the senators was unambiguous: The US should not unconditionally support a futile war without a strategic plan to get hostages home or for the day after – and should not do so in violation of US and international law and in a manner that harms both American and Israeli interests.

Biden and his secretary of state Antony Blinken invested monumental efforts in building plans that could have dramatically and positively changed Israel’s situation in the region and brought back the hostages, but they failed to implement them because they feared the political repercussions of pressuring the Israeli government. The Biden administration continued to declare at every opportunity that the prevention of the deal was Hamas’s fault, even though it was as clear as a bell that Netanyahu was the main obstacle to the deal. They removed political pressure that could have gotten hostages home and ended the war sooner, contrary to their own stated goals.

Netanyahu immediately understood the dynamic and Biden’s weakness, openly disregarding American requests.

Hamas is indeed responsible for the atrocities of October 7 and is an openly jihadist, barbaric terrorist organization, but its position over the halting of the fighting to free the hostages has not changed since the first day of the negotiations. After the IDF completed the majority of its military tasks many months ago, there was no reason to prevent the conclusion of the deal other than Netanyahu’s narrow political considerations, primarily the preservation of the coalition.

Jewish organizations in the US supported the release of the hostages, but due to those anachronistic and harmful constraints, they failed to use their influence to actually do something about it. The automatic backing of the Israeli government’s position proved both absurd and dangerous.

This is not the first time that the tendency of many Jewish organizations and leaders in the Israeli liberal camp to align with right-wing governments here has caused strategic damage to Israel. The opposition to the nuclear deal between the P5+1 superpowers and Iran is another example.

They aligned with Netanyahu’s position, leading to the eventual Trump withdrawal from the agreement that had stopped Iran from developing weapons. In hindsight, it is now abundantly clear that the agreement was the best option available, and Trump’s withdrawal from it has resulted in Iran becoming a threshold nuclear state. It also allowed China and Russia to extricate themselves from the international coalition designed to prevent Iran’s nuclearization, and they are now both in a strategic alliance with the ayatollahs’ regime.

Another example was the support of many Jewish organizations and centrist leaders in Israel for Trump’s and Netanyahu’s policies to abandon the Palestinian issue in the framework of the Abraham Accords. This weakened the Palestinian factions that support a settlement and strengthened Hamas. Together with other moves to strengthen Hamas and weaken the Palestinian Authority, this was among the factors that led to October 7.

There is no doubt that there is an Israeli interest in normalization with Arab countries, but the attempt to achieve this goal while bypassing the Palestinian issue dramatically harms Israel’s security interests. Here too, the voice of many Jewish organizations was not to be heard.

The time has come for the majority in the Jewish community in the US and the centrist politicians in Israel who claim to lead the liberal camp to realize that the “no daylight” approach in Israel-US interaction only serves the agenda of the messianic Right and the survival of governments that harm Israel’s vital national security interests. It is high time for collaboration between the opponents of the far Right, on both sides of the ocean, to enable an American foreign policy that supports the values we believe in instead of the survival of Netanyahu and his supporters.

The article was published on February 2nd 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Biden’s Failure and Trump’s Success הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the same day, in Riyadh, the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with the secretary general of the Arab League and representatives from the European Union and 11 Arab states, convened to discuss developments in Syria. A few days later, the Saudi foreign minister visited Syria.

This rapid response highlights the immense importance Saudi Arabia places on developments in Syria for the future of the region, particularly in light of the active involvement of Turkey and Qatar. It also reflects Saudi Arabia’s readiness to offer humanitarian and economic assistance if the new Syrian regime adopts a balanced policy – one that ensures the country’s territorial integrity, protects ethnic and religious minorities, and distances Iran’s proxies.

The two events mentioned above clearly demonstrate the prominent role Saudi Arabia has assumed under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), a role also evident during the Israel-Gaza War. For instance, on November 11–12, 2023, following a summit of African states, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit bringing together the Arab and Muslim worlds to discuss the wars in Gaza and Lebanon.

This summit convened both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – marking the first time in history that these two organizations met simultaneously in the same location. This move by the Saudis served as a clear statement of their intent and their leadership role in the Arab, Islamic, and African spheres.

However, it appears that the crown prince’s ambitions are not confined to the region but are also global, relating to both the diplomatic and economic spheres, as well as to softer areas such as sports and media.

Diplomatically, Saudi Arabia has established, in partnership with the European Union, the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, an international coalition with some 90 member states. The Saudi declaration that normalization with Israel will not be pursued without a Palestinian state – a significant change of position by the Saudis in the wake of the war – indicates their desire to lead an international process to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the economic sphere, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East. Its Vision 2030 development plan was designed to reduce the country’s dependence on oil incomes by developing new areas of economic activity. The Saudis want to develop other economic areas apart from oil, gas, and petrochemicals, and become a country that attracts tens of millions of tourists every year, with sports – and especially football – an important tool for advancing this policy.

Saudi Arabia has three key advantages in this regard. First, it holds the largest oil reserves in the world, producing approximately three million barrels a day, with the capacity to quickly increase production. In the event of a disruption to global oil supply, Saudi Arabia, alongside the United Arab Emirates, could produce an additional four million barrels daily, rapidly compensating for the shortfall.

Equally important, Saudi Arabia can do so at a relatively low cost, as its cost of producing a barrel of oil is the lowest in the world at just $10. The second advantage is its strategic location, allowing it to serve as a key transport hub between India and Europe, with Israel potentially playing an important role in facilitating this connection.

Saudi Arabia also serves as an important economic anchor for Egypt and Jordan. The tens of billions of dollars these countries have received over the last decade have played a crucial role in maintaining the stability of their regimes. One notable outcome of this economic aid was Egypt’s return of the Sanafir and Tiran islands to Saudi Arabia in 2017.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s economic leverage is expected to bolster its efforts to gain influence in Syria and Lebanon, particularly after the election of a new president in Lebanon who is not aligned with Hezbollah. It is no surprise that the Saudi foreign minister was quick to visit Lebanon after Joseph Aoun’s election on January 9.

In addition, Saudi Arabia plays an important role in terms of media in the Arab world, with its Al Arabiya network being no less popular than the Qatari Al Jazeera.

Last but not least, Saudi Arabi enjoys a unique status in Islam due to the location within its borders of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, to which more than two million Muslims make the Hajj pilgrimage each year.

Despite its relative military weakness – which it is supposed to overcome thanks to an American air defense umbrella – Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic, economic, religious, and media capabilities, alongside the charismatic leadership of MBS, position it as the natural leader of the Arab world.

These capabilities now face a new American president who seeks to economically pressure Iran while keeping oil prices low. If Trump aims to achieve his vision of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he will need full cooperation from Saudi Arabia. The first step in any process will, of course, be an agreement for the complete release of hostages and the end of the war, which would establish a post-conflict framework for governance in Gaza that is acceptable to both the United States and the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia.

For years, Egypt has been seen as the leader of the Arab world, or at least considered the “key player,” a term coined by Egyptian journalist Muhammad Husayn Haykal. While Egypt remains an important regional actor, particularly in relation to Gaza and Arab-Israeli relations, its demographic and economic challenges have weakened its position, creating a vacuum that has been filled by an increasingly assertive Saudi crown prince.

The article was published on Januart 31st 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Riyadh Is the Arab World’s New Real Leader הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

That vision, known as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, was launched on Sept. 9, 2023, when the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union, Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, and Italy to advance the transcontinental infrastructure project. The Biden administration hailed it as a major diplomatic and commercial breakthrough — a project that could compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

But Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel and the regional conflict that it triggered just weeks after the G20 summit has damned enthusiasm for the project and led to uneven investment in its future.

With the first phase of the ceasefire deal gradually being implemented, and President Donald Trump returning to the Oval Office, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor should enjoy a breath of new life. In order for that to happen, the Trump administration will need to tackle some of the region’s most complicated security challenges while simultaneously empowering partners along the economic corridor to take the lead in developing a cohesive commercial model. If performed successfully, the United States would both incentivize the establishment of a new regional architecture and take an important step towards reducing its role in the Middle East.

A 21st-Century Superhighway

When the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was first introduced, it was met with much fanfare. Sitting alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Biden told the G20 audience that the corridor was “a really big deal” and part of a collective effort to: “building sustainable, resilient infrastructure, making quality infrastructure investments; and creating a better future that represents greater opportunity, dignity, and prosperity for everyone.”

Few details about the corridor were shared at the time. From what can be understood from the memorandum of understanding, the project is meant to be composed of three elements: an eastern maritime corridor linking India and the Arabian Peninsula, a railway project designed to link all six Gulf Cooperation Council member states, and a northern corridor connecting the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Jordan and Israel. In addition to rapidly expanding transportation infrastructure, the corridor would incentivize the continued investment in undersea data cables and future energy projects such as green hydrogen pipelines and electricity interconnectors.

Each of the involved parties saw the corridor as a win-win scenario for its own reasons. For India, it offered a way to strengthen its role in global value chains and counter China’s growing influence. In Modi’s own words, “This corridor is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil.” For the Gulf states, the project offered a way to execute a clear hedging strategy between the United States and China, support East-West trade routes that maintained their role as middle powers, and diversify their energy markets. For Europe, the corridor would buoy its economic security and establish critical energy links with the Gulf states. For the Biden administration, the project was seen as a logical counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as an opportunity to facilitate greater interconnectivity and cooperation between key partners in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Trump administration might very well share the same view. For all the parties involved, establishing a land bridge across the Arabian Peninsula would reduce security risks for international shipping around the Horn of Africa as well as bottlenecking at the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal.

Just weeks after the G20 summit, enthusiasm about the corridor was replaced with realism. Hamas’ attack — and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza and Lebanon — derailed normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia and strained ties between Israel and the other Gulf states. Houthi attacks forced international shipping vessels to reroute away from the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. For Hamas, the prospect of Israeli-Saudi peace was seen as a threat to the Palestinian national cause. But for Iran, Hamas’ primary sponsor, the real concern was that Israel’s continued integration in the region and participation in projects like the corridor would further constrain the Islamic republic. As part of a televised address on Oct. 4, 2024, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told supporters that America and its allies were backing Israel so that it could become “a gateway for exporting energy from the region to the Western world while facilitating the import of goods and technology from the West to the region.” Encouraged by Tehran, Houthi attacks disrupted Red Sea shipping lanes, damaging global trade and contributing to Egypt’s economic woes. Seen as a way to bypass the region’s unstable corners, the war raised serious questions over how a transcontinental corridor can avoid the interference of a regional power like Iran.

Iran is not the only regional actor who expressed concern about being excluded from the economic corridor. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan famously responded to the corridor announcement by saying “there is no corridor without Turkey.” In the last year, Ankara has been championing the Development Road Project, a land-based trade corridor from the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Turkey. Since the fall of Assad, multiple plans — including energy pipelines — connecting the Gulf to Turkey via Syria have been floated.

Like Iran and Turkey, Egypt fears that the corridor will draw business away from the Suez Canal, which serves as a crucial revenue source for a country with limited foreign investment opportunities and an increasingly unstable economy. While Egypt’s limitations were part of the reason why it was left on the outside of the corridor looking in, many participating states appreciate the importance of Egyptian economic stability — both for the region as well as the corridor’s future.

Jockeying for participation in such a transformative mega project is not limited to Middle Eastern actors. While the war in Gaza dampened European interest in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, the EU’s Global Gateway is still operational and southern European states like France, Greece, and Italy have positioned themselves as potential landing points for the corridor.

Beyond the question of who will take part in the corridor’s main artery, other challenges remain. Member states have yet to articulate how the multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects associated with the corridor will be financed. There are also serious doubts as to whether an intermodal transportation network that combines maritime shipping, railways, and highways will be more cost-efficient and sustainable than existing transportation routes. Though energy projects and digital highways are touted as complementary but equally important components to the corridor’s future, no feasibility studies have been conducted to date that test the viability of these plans (e.g. green hydrogen pipelines).

But as Biden’s speech hinted, the corridor is far from dead. Bilateral trade between India and the United Arab Emirates increased by 93 percent since the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2022, and the diversification of trade beyond oil is keeping pace. The United Arab Emirates is now India’s third-largest trading partner after China and the United States. In February 2024, India and the United Arab Emirates signed a bilateral agreement designed to support the corridor’s establishment. The same month, U.S. transportation giant FedEx inaugurated a $350 million facility in Dubai. Regional investment in infrastructure has also continued. In September 2024, the United Arab Emirates signed a $2.3 billion railroad agreement with Jordan. Saudi investments in its railway network have increased to well over $4 billion as part of the government’s plans for Saudi Vision 2030. The same could be said for diplomatic activity between member states. Any observer of Indian diplomacy at the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil would confirm that the geopolitical disturbances of the past year have done little to dissuade Modi from advancing a front and center, corridor-friendly agenda.

In summary, the interests that helped establish the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor remain as prevalent today as they did when the mega project was first announced. What remains to be seen is whether enough trust and common interest required to achieve such a sophisticated degree of economic interconnectivity exists between the principal actors. This is at least partially dependent on how the United States chooses to engage the region under Trump.

Bridging East and West by Stabilizing the Middle East

If the United States is to continue supporting the corridor’s development, it will need to find a balance between supporting the construction of a new regional security architecture, empowering member states, and ensuring that certain regulatory and taxation policies are upheld. Trump, who ran on an America First agenda and will be occupied with a myriad of global issues, may not have the bandwidth to engage meaningfully in the corridor. Still, there are concrete steps his administration can take that would uphold the U.S. commitment to its international partners while directly and indirectly benefiting the corridor’s future.

First, the administration should articulate its continued commitment to the corridor, allaying any concerns that the United States will renege on past promises under Trump. One way of demonstrating this is by appointing a special envoy to the initiative. This would mirror the decision in February 2024 by French President Emmanuel Macron, who tapped energy industry veteran Gerard Mestrallet for the position. Committing a senior U.S. representative to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor would contribute to the project’s gradual institutionalization — a necessary step to create common policies on regulation, taxation, and customs procedures. The special envoy would engage diplomatically with member states as well as support American companies who wish to take part in the corridor’s development.

Trump should become an “empowerer-in-chief,” entrusting his cabinet appointments like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent to advance U.S. foreign policy interests without him needing to be in the room. It would be unsurprising if the corridor attracted the attention of Jared Kushner, a trusted voice during Trump’s first presidency.

That doesn’t mean there wouldn’t be a role for Trump himself. Arguably his greatest strength is the warm personal relations he enjoys with many heads of state who are involved in the corridor. From India’s Modi to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Trump would find himself in good company at a future India-Middle East-Europe Corridor summit. But rather than steal the spotlight, Trump should practice lateral leadership, empowering international partners with a readiness for the United States to step in when the project needs a bit of a nudge.

At the same time, the Trump administration should encourage the construction of additional East-West corridors if they benefit America’s international partners and are both economically and strategically viable. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East only strengthen the case for diversifying and multiplying economic corridors. The eggs of the global trade shouldn’t all be placed in one basket.

The most instrumental way in which the Trump administration can support the corridor, along with other potential East-West corridors, is by addressing Middle Eastern instability. That means stewarding the distinct ceasefire agreements brokered by the Biden administration between Israel and Hezbollah and Israel and Hamas and gradually turning them into more lasting political arrangements.

It may sound far-fetched today, nevertheless there are scenarios where elements of the corridor’s development are used to support Gaza’s rehabilitation. A revitalized Gaza port under international supervision, for example, would be a boon for Palestinians. The port could also serve as a supporting spur to Haifa Port — purchased by Indian-owned Adani Group in 2023 — where many of the corridor’s plans currently hinge. In short, by drawing inspiration from the corridor, the Trump administration could incentivize the parties to reach a durable resolution to the war that would create a window of opportunity to revisit normalization efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia and attract additional foreign investment to the region.

A similar logic could be applied when dealing with new governments in Lebanon and Syria. If leveraged in the right way, participation in East-West corridors could be a major incentive for new political actors to respect U.S. interests, maintain their commitment to keeping the peace, and further reduce Iranian, Russia, and Chinese influence.

In addition to these steps, the United States should devise a more effective mechanism for constraining Houthi aggression. The corridor is not a replacement for the Suez Canal, and therefore the secure passage of maritime traffic around the Horn of Africa and Red Sea should remain a top priority for America and its allies.

Last but not least, the Trump administration will need to identify the correct formula for containing Iran and severing supply chains between Tehran and its proxies. Without some kind of arrangement between the United States and Iran, it is safe to suspect that the Islamic regime will try to undermine efforts to develop an East-West corridor that leaves it out in the cold.

This would be a stiff task for the most competent of U.S. administrations, regardless of whether it had an interest in supporting the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’s fortunes. Considering some of the other pressing global issues that will draw Trump’s attention, such as a potential trade war with China and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, it is difficult to see how the Trump administration could achieve this feat alone. Perhaps that is the point. The corridor cannot succeed just by sheer American will. The project has so many diplomatic and commercial components that no single administration — or global actor — can take on such responsibility alone. Completing the corridor will require a coordinated effort over the course of decades. What the Trump administration can try to provide, however, is a commitment to empowering regional partners in a way that serves long-term U.S. national security and economic interests.

The article was published on January 28th 2025 in War On The Rocks.

הפוסט Making Deals, Building Corridors: Trump’s Middle East Moment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The normalization of the relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was close before October 7, 2023 but was shelved after the attack by Hamas. Indeed, one of the goals of the attack was to torpedo it.

The end of the Israel-Hamas War and the agreement for the release of the hostages present a new opportunity to bring this initiative to fruition. We are witnessing an ideal moment, combining two essential elements required for success: first, a significant change; second, the presence of an appealing idea or plan ready to be implemented.

The major change is marked by two significant events. First, the end of the war. History shows that wars often create opportunities for large-scale change due to their tectonic impact. This war has caused significant damage to Iran and its proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas – and has led to Syria’s removal from the Axis of Resistance.

However, such post-war opportunities are not always seized, often due to a lack of leadership or due to short-sightedness, stubbornness, or folly on the part of a country’s leaders.

The second major change is the new US administration, with Trump driven by personal ambition to leave a lasting legacy, possibly by securing a Nobel Peace Prize.

At the same time, there is an attractive proposal on the table: normalization with Saudi Arabia. For Israel, the appeal of this prospect lies in the fact that Saudi Arabia is a key player in the Gulf, the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as the international stage.

An agreement with Saudi Arabia would strengthen the regional coalition against Iran. Moreover, given that all previous peace and normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states have withstood the test of war, such an agreement would further solidify Israel’s integration into the region.

Riyadh’s influence

Saudi Arabia’s influence is evident in three main arenas. Diplomatically, it plays a leading role in both regional and international processes. For instance, in 2002, Saudi Arabia introduced the peace initiative that evolved into the Arab Peace Initiative. It is still ratified annually by the Arab League summit, though it has never received an official response from Israel.

Similarly, during the recent Israel-Hamas War, Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, hosted the 2023 Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit, bringing together in a joint meeting both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation for the first time.

In addition, Saudi Arabia, in partnership with the European Union, founded the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, an international coalition of approximately 90 member states.

Most recently, on January 12, 2025, Riyadh hosted the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with representatives from 11 Arab states, to discuss the situation in Syria. This indicates that Saudi Arabia is not willing to cede the Syrian arena to Turkey, Qatar, or extremist Islamic groups.

Economically, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, even surpassing Turkey. It holds the world’s largest oil reserves and has the capacity to increase production. This gives Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, the ability to swiftly compensate for any disruptions in the international oil supply – whether due to boycotts of countries like Iran or Russia, or natural disasters, such as those that have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico.

By doing so, Saudi Arabia can prevent a dramatic rise in oil prices, which otherwise would trigger shock waves throughout the global economy.

Saudi Arabia also serves as a crucial economic anchor for Egypt and Jordan. The tens of billions of dollars these countries have received over the past decade have been instrumental in maintaining the stability of their regimes.

This economic leverage is expected to play a significant role in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to exert influence in Syria following the formation of a new governing regime, as well as in Lebanon after the election of a new president not aligned with Hezbollah.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia holds considerable media influence in the Arab world, with its Al Arabiya network surpassing the popularity of the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera.

Finally, Saudi Arabia enjoys a unique status in Islam, as it is home to the two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, which host the annual Hajj pilgrimage attended by over two million Muslims annually.

For these reasons, normalization with Saudi Arabia opens the door for Israel to the large Saudi market and perhaps also to other Muslim countries, such as Indonesia.

The main challenge, however, lies in resolving the Palestinian issue. Prior to the war, it seemed that Saudi Arabia might settle for a symbolic concession on Palestine as a condition for normalization. However, statements made by senior Saudi officials during the war indicate that the price of normalization has risen significantly and now includes the establishment of a Palestinian state.

On the other hand, former US secretary of state Antony Blinken stated that normalization “is ready to go,” but two conditions must be met: the end of the war in Gaza and a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood.

Assuming that the war will indeed end, the main bone of contention is the Palestinian issue, especially given that the war has brought about a decline in the willingness of the Jewish public in Israel to agree to a Palestinian state.

However, a survey conducted in early January 2025 found that more than 70% of the Jewish public supports the return of the hostages and the end of the war, normalization with Saudi Arabia, a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians, and the formation of a regional security coalition against Iran.

The concept of a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians may be constructively ambiguous, but it raises several important questions: Will it satisfy the Saudis? Will there be a Palestinian partner? Can a diplomatic and security arrangement be reached in Gaza, potentially in partnership with moderate Arab states, that satisfies both sides?

While the answers to these questions are complex and uncertain, one thing seems clear: An opportunity exists for realizing the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Will it be seized? As Winston Churchill once said, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity; the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.”

The article published in January 23rd 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Normalizing Relations with Saudi Arabia Provides New Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli public has been waiting for this for months, with consecutive public opinion polls indicating that a large majority supported ending the war in Gaza in return for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

As months went by, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing governing coalition worked to avoid such a deal — Hamas was doing the same. And the U.S. administration, although heavily invested in mediation efforts, simply didn’t apply effective pressure to make either party change course.

At the same time, the number of living Israeli hostages gradually decreased; casualties among Israeli soldiers increased; and the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population continued.

Today, Israelis are supportive of the cease-fire deal, but they also can’t help but ask why it wasn’t reached six, seven or eight months ago. The terms that were discussed and rejected at the time were nearly identical to the ones agreed upon now. Why was it necessary for additional hostages, soldiers and civilians to die before leaders finally took action?

Still, the deal brings with it a sigh of relief. We, Israelis, have all come to know and care so much about the hostages. Hope for their release and concern for their fate have become part of our daily lives. Their families have been leading a brave and furious struggle to bring them back home, sometimes in the face of unbearable, ugly attacks by the far right.

Many Israelis showed solidarity and support, feeling a basic Israeli principle had been jeopardized — the state’s responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring its people back home. And it was often claimed in recent months that until the hostages returned, Israeli society couldn’t heal from the trauma of Oct. 7.

Now, things are finally moving forward. The excitement upon the return of the first three hostages was felt in every corner. But we also receive the cease-fire announcement with a heavy heart. Not all of the 33 hostages who are to be gradually released in the deal’s first phase are said to be alive, and no one definitively knows which hostages will return on their feet.

More questions arise too: What will be the health condition of those returning? What will be the fate of the remaining 65 hostages who are to be released in later phases of the deal, which Netanyahu doesn’t seem eager to implement? What will be the future of Gaza after Israel’s withdrawal? And will residents of southern Israel finally be able to return home safely?

There are still many unknowns. But since the cease-fire was announced, they also carry a spark of optimism.

This deal shows that, eventually, diplomacy can work. International mediators can deliver. Sides to a bitter conflict can reach an agreement, and public pressure can make an impact. It shows that suffering can come to an end, that families can reunite and a better future can emerge.

Taking place in the context of many other regional changes, this cease-fire also creates new opportunities. From the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire in Lebanon to the transition in Syria and the weakening of Iran, all these developments improve Israel’s geopolitical situation. If only the country had a government that would seek to leverage this to advance a two-state solution, we could have witnessed a much more dramatic transformation — including normalization in Israeli-Saudi relations.

The window of opportunity for such change will still exist for a while to come, but its realization would require different, more moderate Israeli leadership, as well as curbing and sidelining far-right extremism, reversing anti-democratic trends within Israeli society and politics, and reviving pro-peace attitudes and practices.

The immediate priority, however, is fully implementing all phases of the cease-fire agreement, and setting in motion a constructive “day after” plan in the Gaza Strip — one involving the Palestinian Authority and regional countries, at the expense of Hamas. Israelis and Palestinians will need a continuous international helping hand to do this, especially from the U.S.

It’s time to turn the page on the dark chapter that Oct. 7 brought, and start charting the better, more peaceful future that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. The cease-fire inches us closer to that reality, and the mediators who, however belatedly, made it happen deserve appreciation and thanks, and they should follow the process through till it is fully implemented.

The article published on January 22nd 2025 in Politico.

הפוסט Gaza Cease-Fire: The View From Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lebanon now has a leader after over two years of failed attempts to elect a president. Aoun is backed by the international bloc opposing Iran (primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France) and comes from the military establishment responsible for upholding the ceasefire with Israel. This is promising news – but realizing its potential depends also on Israel’s actions.

In the past year, Israel heavily struck Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel’s use of force during the summer and fall of 2024 – assisted by US mediation efforts – led the terror organization to agree in November to a 60-day ceasefire, relinquishing its commitment to continue fighting as long as Israel fought Hamas in Gaza. The weakening of Hezbollah also paved the way for the Syrian opposition’s successful campaign to overthrow the Assad regime in Damascus, an ally of Hezbollah and Iran.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is one of the few diplomatic achievements that Israel has managed to secure since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror attack, and it bears significant importance.

Since the ceasefire began, rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has almost entirely ceased. Although many northern residents still do not feel secure enough to return home, public opinion surveys indicate that most Israelis support the ceasefire, support which is echoed by regional states and Israel’s Western allies.

Israel’s interest should be in making permanent this temporary lull in fighting and seizing the opportunities it presents – the weakening of Hezbollah within Lebanon’s internal politics and the gradual reshaping of Israel-Lebanon relations.

Doubts about the future

However, as the 60-day ceasefire period draws to a close, doubts are growing about Israel’s commitment to the agreements reached and to ending the fighting on the northern front. To achieve this, Israel must act wisely on both military and diplomatic fronts to best serve its long-term strategic goals.

Although Hezbollah has been defeated (in this round) by Israel, while weakened domestically, it has not been defeated in that arena and is working hard to maintain its assets and status. Hezbollah is an authentic representative of significant portions of the Lebanese population – as reflected in its representation and influence in Lebanon’s parliament. A survey published by an American think tank in early 2024 revealed that 93% of Lebanon’s Shiite population – about a quarter of the country’s inhabitants – held a positive view of Hezbollah at the time.

On the other hand, ahead of the recent presidential election, Hezbollah’s preferred candidate withdrew from the race to avoid a possible defeat, which would have signaled the group’s weakening.

Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon see an opportunity to shift the balance of power and have successfully worked to elect a new president since the ceasefire began, viewing it as a chance to establish new leadership in Lebanon that opposes Hezbollah and aligns with the West and moderate Arab states.

Despite its military strength, Israel has limited influence over Lebanon’s internal politics and should avoid actions that portray it as attempting to dictate processes or appoint leaders there – much as in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, Israel’s actions do create a context that impacts Lebanon’s internal developments. In the past, Hezbollah gained support beyond Lebanon’s Shiite community by presenting itself as a defender of Lebanese sovereignty against a powerful Israel. Now, Israel should use its military power cautiously to avoid reigniting dwindling public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel should reduce its military footprint in Lebanon, including reported drone flights over Beirut. Israel should also make a special effort not to hit Lebanese army soldiers.

Formal apologies for any such hits, as Israel made in early December, are important signals to the Lebanese public.

According to the ceasefire agreement, the Lebanese army is supposed to play a key role in replacing Hezbollah, and Israel has an interest in empowering it. On a tactical level, continued IDF strikes on the Lebanese army would likely diminish its willingness to confront Hezbollah. Strategically, such actions could undermine Joseph Aoun’s position as he transitions from army chief to president.

In Lebanon, there are complaints about repeated Israeli violations of the ceasefire, with reports of over 1,000 such incidents since late November. This creates anger in Lebanon, portrays Israel as a heavy-handed aggressor harming civilians unnecessarily, and hinders the creation of mechanisms to promote shared interests between the two countries. Israel should stop these violations, in accordance with the self-determination clause mentioned in the ceasefire agreement, and cease the destruction of villages it has occupied in southern Lebanon. Israel’s current actions risk fueling support for Hezbollah and generating hostility among moderate factions in Lebanon, who could be crucial interlocutors in future efforts to demarcate the land border and redefine relations between the two countries.

Israel must learn from the experience of the First Lebanon War in 1982. Its swift military achievements then were gradually eroded when they were met with Lebanon’s complicated internal situation.

The Palestinian armed forces were exiled to Tunisia but were then replaced by an even stronger force, Hezbollah, which has become a strategic problem for Israel, partly due to its ties with Iran. We must not be blinded by Israel’s recent short-term military success. Lebanon is a complex and difficult country to influence, but the outcomes of the war have already sparked internal processes there that could align with Israel’s interests.

Israel must now avoid causing harm or disrupting Lebanon’s internal processes, express commitment to implementing the ceasefire – including withdrawing the IDF from southern Lebanon – declare its desire for a future peace with the Lebanese state, and invest diplomatically in expanding coordination and channels of communication with Lebanon, with the assistance of international actors such as the UN, the US, France, and Gulf states. This is even more important in light of the dramatic changes occurring in Syria, which are likely to shape the region’s future in the coming years.

Excessive and prolonged use of Israel’s military power against Lebanon could lead to the imminent collapse of the ceasefire, delay the return of northern residents to their homes, cause further harm to IDF soldiers, strengthen Hezbollah, increase hostility toward Israel among moderate elements in Lebanon, and erase Israel’s impressive military achievements.

Israel is now required to act wisely, both diplomatically and militarily, and not let the Lebanese opportunity slip away. The ceasefire must be implemented, preserved, and turned into a permanent arrangement.

The article was written by Dr. Ehud Eiran, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, and was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel Should Make the Ceasefire with Lebanon Permanent הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Notably, he described the October 7 attack as “a barbaric act with no justification”—a clear condemnation that, for the vast majority of Israelis, is considered a minimum starting point for any dialogue with the Arab and Muslim worlds. This, in fact, is the most critical aspect of Alghashian’s remarks and serves as his call to action. As he stated, “I propose one starting point: a mid-level dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. Instead of striving for hollow declarations of victory, we must foster a more serious conversation. Alongside peace efforts from the top-down and bottom-up, we need an in-depth analytical dialogue based on a network of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics.”

We wholeheartedly welcome Alghashian’s call and suggest broadening its scope into practice.

From my perspective as an Orthodox Jewish rabbi, religion is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as to the broader challenges of the Middle East. My goal, and that of my rabbinical colleagues both in Israel and abroad, is to position religion on the other side of the equation: not as part of the problem but as part of the solution. Indeed, we go further: not only can and should religion be part of the solution, but a long-term resolution is likely impossible without incorporating the religious dimension. The reason is clear—religion and tradition play a pivotal role in shaping behavior at every level, from individuals and communities to states and diplomatic relationships in the Middle East. Ignoring the religious aspect and trying to resolve conflicts solely based on shared interests has not proven effective so far, and there is no reason to believe it will succeed in the future.

Of course, this does not mean we should neglect shared interests. Israelis and Saudis undeniably share common concerns—like those Alghashian articulated—about “a region engulfed in turmoil and conflict” and “regional instability.” It is worth stating the obvious: most Israelis seek peace and stability, not endless war. It’s also obvious that conspiracy theories suggesting Israeli expansionist ambitions in the Middle East are baseless. Our goal is to be accepted as an equal partner in the region—with formal, open relations—not relegated to a marginalized role, as Alghashian aptly described.

The first step, as Alghashian suggested, is indeed a mid-level dialogue. However, we propose adding religious leaders from both sides to the roster of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics. Many of us, in fact, wear multiple hats as scholars, experts, and more. A dialogue that excludes religious leaders will yield intriguing insights for certain elites, but it won’t facilitate deeper processes, shift attitudes, or persuade veto players on both sides—key actors without whom no agreement can be signed, or if signed, will hold little chance of enduring. This mistake—intentionally sidelining religious leaders—was made during the Oslo Accords, as the architects viewed them as part of the problem. They were correct, but they failed to recognize that without making religious leaders part of the solution, there could be no solution. We all know the result. Let us avoid repeating past mistakes and learn from them.

Alongside addressing shared interests, we must also care for our distinct identities. Neither side has any intention—or expectation—of relinquishing, altering, or compromising their ancient traditions and identities for short-term interests. Instead, we propose an opposite approach: one that focuses on deeply understanding our shared roots, enabling us to transform these different identities from sources of conflict into foundations for a better shared future. After years of deep dialogue with leaders across the Muslim world and a growing group of rabbis well-versed in Islam, the Quran, and fluent in Arabic, we are confident in the transformative potential of such conversations and believe the time has come to expand them.

The renowned Hebrew poet Rachel Bluwstein—so central to Israeli culture that she is simply called “Rachel the Poet”—asked in one of her famous works, “Why does an outstretched hand not meet a sister’s hand?” We see Alghashian’s article as an immensely important outstretched hand, and we respond simply: here is the sister’s hand. Let us meet.

הפוסט Will an Outstretched Hand Meet a Sister’s Hand? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In retrospect, we should have realized that we had ignored the fact that the Palestinians could alone not provide answers to significant parts of the core issues of the conflict—the refugee issue, the Jerusalem issue, and, of course, the security envelope—because each one of them requires a regional approach.

In Oslo, Camp David, and even in the very advanced talks of then-Prime Minister Olmert with Abu Mazen, there was a lack of understanding of the necessity for a broad regional framework, which would provide the Palestinians with the backing to make the necessary compromises—and provide the Israelis with the incentive of the fruits of regional peace.

The Israeli right tried to exploit the failure to achieve an agreement in order to promote opposing approaches—Sharon attempted unilateralism following Barak’s assertion that there was no partner for an agreement, and Netanyahu marketed the illusion that regional peace could be achieved without a Palestinian component. Both of these approaches tragically exploded in our faces on October 7.

The events of October 7 and the ongoing war since then have ended the fantasies of most Palestinians to become a majority in a single democratic state between the river and the sea. Long beforehand, they had given up their hope that negotiations would lead to the establishment of their own state.

The terrible massacre that Hamas committed hardened the hearts of many Israelis, who had previously believed in the moral imperative to end control over a foreign people. The walls of fear and hostility have risen among both Israelis and Palestinians, two peoples who have paid an unbearable price over the past fifteen months.

We must internalize that for the Israeli public, the most important issue is security. After October 7, the Israeli public is more frightened, more suspicious, and less willing to consider moral arguments. Therefore, even those of us who believe that the occupation must end to avoid moral and strategic harm to Israeli democracy must offer the citizens of Israel an arrangement that allows them to achieve what they desire most of all: security.

Security is brought by diplomatic arrangements, such as those we have with Jordan and Egypt. Security that is derived from a united regional front against the axis of Shiite jihadism led by Iran and the Sunni jihadism that may emerge with Turkey’s backing after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Surveys by the Accord Center for Social Psychology at the Hebrew University, conducted even during the most difficult periods of the fighting, reveal that the Israeli public is willing to accept a Palestinian state if it comes in the form of a comprehensive normalization agreement between Israel and Arab countries. The majority of the Israeli public (about 61%) prefers separation from the Palestinians over annexation. The data indicates that ultimately, even when the winds of war are blowing, the Israeli public is much more realistic than its current leadership. Israelis understand that the path to security passes through normalization, which will include the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Arab normalization of relations with the State of Israel.

The current reality necessitates the promotion of a regional solution—a 23-state plan—which includes all Arab states, a demilitarized Palestinian state, and Israel as an integral part of the region. Unfortunately, a large proportion of Israeli citizens are not interested enough in ending the occupation. However, agreements that will bring about security and prosperity for Israelis and that will end the occupation will receive public support.

The challenge for the Peace Camp is to implement the “Arab initiative,” which was first presented in 2002 as a Saudi initiative but has effectively become an initiative of the Arab League. The “Arab Initiative” offers full normalization between Arab countries and Israel in exchange for a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian conflict based on the 1967 borders. During Obama’s presidency, Arab countries added the principle of land swaps at the request of US Secretary of State John Kerry.

The Abraham Accords did open the door to regional normalization and economic cooperation, but their disregard for the Palestinian issue limited them to a small number of countries and did not resolve the fundamental issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, after October 7, no Arab country can afford to ignore the Palestinian issue, and it is very clear from Saudi Arabian declarations that normalization must include a Palestinian state.

The important lesson from the Abraham Accords is that the Israeli public preferred normalization over annexation, which was avoided thanks to the UAE, which made clear to Trump that this was a red line that could not be crossed. Moreover, since the accords, many Israelis now recognize the advantages of normalization. Many of those who saw Arabs only as enemies have found the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco to be their preferred tourist destinations and enjoy the ability to fly cheaply and in less time to the Far East.

Together with Arab countries, the Biden Administration prepared a regional framework—that includes a Palestinian state—as a way to end the war in Gaza and achieve a governance alternative to Hamas. This framework is also in the interest of the Trump Administration and the entire Sunni world led by Saudi Arabia, and they have a better chance of addressing the objections of the Israeli right than the outgoing Biden Administration.

The Israeli peace camp should adopt a discourse that emphasizes strengthening Israel’s security, economy, and international legitimacy, all of which resonate with the Israeli people.

This will not convince the current government, which has been taken over by the most extreme elements of the Israeli right, but if it is the public’s will, in the end, a sane government will be established here that will work to implement it.

We need to create responses that are suitable for Israel in 2025—practical solutions to everyday problems. To turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a minefield for Israel’s integration into the region into the key to its advancement.

The article was published on January 8th in The Times of Israel.

הפוסט The 23 State Solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A year after Hamas’s murderous surprise attack on October 7, Israel has succeeded in restoring its deterrent edge. All the main members of the “Axis of Resistance” – Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – have suffered major military setbacks, with the entire leadership echelons of Hezbollah and Hamas having been eliminated. Israel has proved that, militarily and technologically, it is superior to its enemies.

Alongside these achievements, an unexpected development has occurred in Syria, indirectly benefiting Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of Sunni Islamic rule have led to Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance, resulting in the removal of Iranian military presence and influence on Israel’s borders and the closure of the corridor through which Iran previously supplied arms and ammunition to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The fall of Assad also exposed the vulnerability of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, which, despite the geopolitical significance of Syria, were unable to prevent the regime’s downfall. However, this positive shift is tempered by concerns that Syria may now be controlled by extremist Islamic factions backed by Turkey, though it remains too early to fully assess the nature of the new Syrian regime.

On the other side, the camp of moderate states that have signed peace and/or normalization agreements with Israel, along with Saudi Arabia, has managed to maintain its cohesion, even if much of the activity has been conducted behind the scenes.

The cooperation between these states was publicly visible during the Iranian missile attack on Israel. With the exception of Jordan, none of these countries withdrew their ambassadors from Israel or severed diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia remains on the table, though the Saudis are now demanding a higher price for such an agreement.

Despite these achievements, Israel has so far failed in its handling of the hostages in Gaza. The military defeat inflicted on Hamas was expected to be Israel’s main bargaining chip, yet the insistence on not ending the war in Gaza is driven by political rather than operational considerations. This represents a moral failure that stands in stark contradiction to the core values of Judaism and humanity in general.

Moreover, the delay in securing an agreement for the release of the hostages, the humiliating treatment of the hostages’ families by ministers and Knesset members from the coalition, and the continuous attempts to push forward the judicial revolution while stalling on solutions for enlisting haredim (the ultra-Orthodox) into military service, have all exacerbated the divisions within Israeli society.

Alongside these failures, there has been growing criticism of Israel, including hate speech and antisemitism, particularly in relation to its policy toward the Palestinians. Israel has been accused of committing war crimes against Gaza’s civilian population.

The International Criminal Court’s issuance of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes seems to be only the tip of the iceberg.

While these accusations are politically motivated, even if they are primarily or partially unfounded – and opinions are divided on this, given the lack of reliable information in the Israeli media – they have severely damaged Israel’s standing in the international community as a law-abiding state.

“War is the continuation of diplomacy by other means,” as the famous quote from the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz suggests. In the current situation, one of the significant failures has been the inability to translate military successes into diplomatic achievements.

The ceasefire with Lebanon, which includes the removal of Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River and the deployment of UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese military in the area between the Litani and the Israeli border, might be considered a success. Yet, only time will tell if this achievement is sustainable, unlike the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

In contrast to the situation in Lebanon, a diplomatic resolution to the Palestinian problem appears to be a distant prospect. Numerous plans have been proposed for the “day after” the war, yet the Netanyahu government remains adamant not to engage in discussions about them.

It appears that the IDF has been instructed to establish a permanent presence in Gaza, at least in its northern part. Additionally, far-right elements within the government are actively considering the possibility of re-establishing Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Opposition to the continued control of Hamas over Gaza is justified, but resistance to the return of an upgraded Palestinian Authority or another recognized and legitimate Palestinian leadership is unwarranted. The vacuum created by the absence of governance is an open invitation for chaos or for Hamas to desperately cling to power. In any case, maintaining the current deadlock is a recipe for failure.

The main diplomatic goal that remains to be achieved is a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States have expressed interest in such an agreement, but they are waiting for the Trump presidency. The central issue revolves around the demands of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in exchange for normalization with Israel.

The key question is whether the current Saudi position, which insists on the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, is open for negotiations. Regardless, any Israeli government pursuing normalization will likely have to make concessions regarding the Palestinian issue, although the exact price remains uncertain.

Sinwar caused permanent changes

When Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar launched his murderous attack on Israel on October 7, he likely considered the possibility of becoming a martyr, but he could not have foreseen the profound and far-reaching changes it would trigger in the Middle East.

Despite the significant setbacks and failures suffered by the Axis of Resistance, Sinwar may be remembered for successfully bringing the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the international and regional agenda. This, however, came at an immense cost, particularly for the Palestinian people in Gaza, who have borne the brunt of the consequences of his actions.

In conclusion, Israel’s military successes must be translated into diplomatic achievements. The war has opened up a unique opportunity to reshape regional dynamics, but realizing this potential will require visionary leadership. The challenge, however, is that, at present, such leaders are not evident on either side of the conflict. After the calamity of October 7, failing to seize these new opportunities would amount to another profound tragedy.

The article was published on January 4th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s 2024 Military Successes Came at a Cost – Will It Pay in 2025? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Carter, who passed away at the age of 100, was committed to the future of Israel and the region, and to promoting a two-state solution. It is very regrettable that too many people in Israel distort his legacy and blame him for being hostile, even though he understood earlier than others the danger of our descent into a bloody binational reality.

The Camp David Summit, which he initiated, was a personal project of his. Carter acted with persistence and determination, moving between the delegations’ rooms, proposing compromises, and pressing to reach the historic agreement between Israel and Egypt—the country that was then the leader of the Arab world.

Even then, Carter understood that a true solution to the conflict must include the Palestinian issue, and he pushed for Israeli recognition of Palestinian autonomy as part of the agreement, a recognition that ultimately came only with the Oslo Accords 15 years later.

Carter’s commitment to promoting a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to accompany him for decades after he left the White House in 1980. Many in Israel did not welcome his criticism of settlement policies and the preservation of the occupation. He indeed delivered pointed criticism, yet it was rooted in genuine care and a sincere aim to foster peace.

In his book “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid,” published in 2006, Carter expressed an approach that was not easy to digest but reflected a deep understanding of the reality here. Carter posed an equation that many here have since internalized: without peace, the occupation turns Israel into an apartheid state, where two different legal systems exist for people living in the same territory.

In October 2010, he attended the weekly demonstrations in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah against the takeover of homes in the neighborhood by settler organizations. He rightly told the protesters, “I don’t think it can be argued that demolishing homes or confiscating a house where a family has lived for several generations is a just, fair, or peace-loving act.”

Carter was probably the most progressive president the United States has ever known. A worldview that explains his deep commitment to Israel. His commitment drove him to make tremendous efforts to promote peace solutions and prevent Israel from descending into an apartheid reality.

He was an evangelist, however, a very different one from those who have taken over the Republican Party. The Republican evangelists believe that war will bring the second coming, while he believed that peace is the true redemption.

Sometimes he also displayed naivety, leading him to believe that diplomacy alone could change the fundamental perceptions of organizations like Hamas—a premise that proved to be incorrect. He failed to foresee the consequences of the Khomeinist revolution and later to rescue the Americans who were held hostage.

However, Carter’s belief in diplomacy as a tool for resolving conflicts was not misguided. Diplomacy does indeed sometimes require support from military and coercive tools, but in the end, there is no alternative to it.

His greatest achievement—the peace agreement with Egypt—is not only proof of the power of diplomacy but also the greatest gift Carter gave us all: an agreement that opened the door for Israel’s integration into the region and the subsequent agreements that followed.

Our leaders would have done well to listen to his warnings about the implications of the occupation on Israel’s moral and international standing. To accept his advice that the two-state solution is the only way to ensure both the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and the rights of the Palestinians.

Jimmy Carter passed away peacefully nearly 45 years after leaving the White House. But now, the Democratic Party, like many in the United States, who struggled to digest him and his views during his presidency, is embracing his ideological values more than ever, as well as his views on the conflict.

Even after his death, we should wisely listen to Jimmy Carter’s legacy regarding our region. A legacy that, at its core, serves as a reminder that the State of Israel must choose its future—to be an apartheid state or to remain a democracy and the safe, thriving national home of the Jewish people.

The article was published on January 2nd in The Times of Israel.

הפוסט President Carter Was a True Friend of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the nature of Saudi Arabia is inherently challenging to comprehend, no one bears greater responsibility for your misunderstanding of it than your own prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. If you really want to understand Saudi Arabia’s position both with regard to normalization with Israel and on the Palestinian issue, then the best place to start is by examining Saudi discourse.

As a Saudi researcher of Saudi policy toward Israel, I have confronted the complexities of Israel. The complexities of a people – and its discourses – must always be respected.

This courtesy is something Netanyahu has not extended to the Saudi kingdom. Your political leadership has misled you by oversimplifying Saudi Arabia and its people – their logic, their beliefs, and their discourses.

Therefore, I want to make use of the opportunity to communicate with you, the Israeli people, directly as a Saudi who genuinely seeks peace.

I would like to dispel two key exaggerations that your country’s current political leadership has promoted.

The Iranian issue

The first has to do with the Iranian issue. Netanyahu has been promoting the idea that Saudi-Israeli normalization is the logical outcome of the shared Iranian threat. This idea is inaccurate to say the least. Netanyahu proposes that a major regional confrontation with Iran would lead the Saudi kingdom to move away from its traditional position, to set aside its grievances with Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, and to base normalization on a logic of mutual enmity. This is too simplistic, and the Saudi ruling elite thinks in a far more nuanced way than that.

It is true that the Saudis still view Iran as its primary security concern. Equally true, however, is that both Saudi Arabia and Israel fundamentally differ in how they strategically address that concern. While the Saudis have concluded that working with Iran is the best way to address its security grievances, Netanyahu’s robust approach is something the Saudis wish to avoid.

What we Saudis truly fear is a region embroiled in conflict. Saudi anxiety over regional turbulence stems from our concern about the restructuring of our economy, which we consider an existential issue, and we know we cannot achieve our ambitious economic goals in a turbulent region.

What the Saudi ruling elite fears most is the radicalization that is almost certain to arise from this ongoing war.

The images of death, destruction, and the loss of innocent Palestinian and Israeli lives are painful for all. Some members of the Israeli government talk of resettling Gaza and annexing more territory in the West Bank. This is not only repugnant to us but has two additional effects: It increases the sense of grievance toward Israel and the potential for further extremism in the region.

This leads to the second issue that Netanyahu has misled you on – the notion that the Saudis do not care about the Palestinian issue. Your government has misled you, the Israeli people, into believing that Saudis will willingly abandon their historical stance and normalize relations with Israel regardless of the Palestinian issue, which is now an inescapable reality.

Within Saudi Arabia, there is a sense of solidarity that perhaps has not been seen since the Second Intifada. What you will not see are pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli demonstrations taking to the streets of the kingdom, as that is not part of Saudi culture.

But I urge you not to measure the gravity of Saudi support by the absence of such demonstrations, which is about the fear of extremists trying to instrumentalize this pain. In that sense, I also want to communicate to you that October 7 was a barbaric atrocity that took the lives of innocent people. Too much innocent blood has been spilled in this conflict.

The Saudi-Palestinian relationship is not devoid of tensions. However, the reality is that sporadic tensions are part and parcel of deep, longstanding relations. I would suggest you avoid the perception that instances of tension with the Palestinians are signs of imminent Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Moving forward

How do we proceed? Our people have many interests in common, but there is nothing we share more, unfortunately, than the blood of our respective brethren spilled and mutual pain. We must empathize with each other and keep our eyes on the horizon of the necessary peace that will benefit us all.

There might be many possible points of departure, but I will present one: an Arab-Israeli “mid-level dialogue,” between analysts, think tanks, journalists, and academics with the aim of fostering healthier and more constructive Arab-Israeli discourse.

A discourse that speaks to the other, and not over or about the other. Mid-level Arab-Israeli discourse should be forward-thinking, presenting new, creative proposals that address the need for peace, while incentivizing political actors to remain invested in the process.

I know that there are people in Israel who desire real peace. We are ready to engage, but you need to help us by ensuring we jointly aim at solving this issue from its roots. Otherwise, and allow me to use a notion from the book From Mistress to Known Partner: Israel’s Secret Relations with States and Minorities in the Middle East, 1948-2020 by Elie Podeh: Israel and Israelis will once again become nothing more than the mistress of the region.

The Abraham Accords are indeed a milestone in Arab-Israeli relations. However, history has shown that even mistresses out in the open are still viewed as illegitimate and unacceptable. This can be seen in a range of polls from Abraham Accords countries, which indicate the lack of support by many for relations with Israel.

It is time we enter a process in which Israel moves from being considered a “mistress” into an open and legitimate partner for peace – and that can only happen through a two-state solution.

The article was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט Saudi perspective: The Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The European Union’s response to the war in Gaza has been widely criticized as irrelevant and incoherent, casting doubt on its ability to become a credible player in the region. While the EU is indeed incoherent, it is not entirely irrelevant. Its chief relevance lies in the civil sphere, mainly through its efforts to sustain and encourage reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and its role as a capacity builder. These EU actions and capabilities have political significance for the “day after” the war. The EU has many tools it can use in the region but has yet to show a collective willingness to fully employ them, because of internal divisions and the multiplicity of voices within it. The paper reviews these spheres of cacophony and maps the realignment of camps within the EU in response to the war in Gaza.

This article was published in the Strategic Assessment of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Issue 27 (4), November 2024.

Introduction

Less than a week after October 7, some analysts were quick to argue that “the Israel-Hamas war exposed the EU’s irrelevance” (Karnitschnig, 2023). “No one cares what Europe thinks” continued the harsh assessment. “Europe has been relegated to the role of a well-meaning NGO, whose humanitarian contributions are welcomed but is otherwise ignored.” Many in Israel, Europe and around the world would agree, yet we wish to present a more nuanced picture. Unlike in Ukraine, Europe struggles to find a strong, united voice regarding the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The EU’s incoherence significantly reduces its capabilities as a credible player and prevents it from taking a meaningful role while the war expands. Yet Europe is relevant as a mid-level player in the reform of the Palestinian Authority, the rebuilding of Gaza, and in wider efforts to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict.

In 2018, then president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, asserted that it was not enough for Europe to exert its financial muscle. It also had to learn to act on the global stage: “The EU is a global payer, but must also become a global player” (European Parliament, 2018). Josep Borrell, the High Representative (HR) of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), argued in 2019 that Europe “must learn quickly to speak the language of power,” and not only rely on soft or normative power as it used to do (European Union External Action, 2020). Over the past three decades, the EU has been one of the main donors to the Palestinians. It became a significant actor in the civilian sphere, but not a meaningful political player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and certainly not in the realm of security (See Hollis, 1997, Bouris, 2014 for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the EU’s lack of actorness, see Toje 2008). What has changed (if at all) since October 7?

This paper focuses on the European response to the war in Gaza and the hostilities towards Israel in the wider region. Although it concentrates on the EU, there is also a brief discussion of actions taken by other European countries, mostly the United Kingdom (UK). It aims to give an empirical description and analysis of Europe’s responses, capabilities and actorness in this regional war. The article begins with the shifting European positions from strong support and solidarity with Israel after the October 7 massacre, to fierce criticism of Israel and its government. The second section maps where the EU is a mere payer and where it is a player. It reviews the EU’s decisions and actions in the humanitarian field, Palestinian state-building, the diplomatic arena, its employment of “sticks” and sanctions and the military sphere. The third section discusses the divisions afflicting the EU which have hampered its ability to act as a meaningful player in the region. It reviews the instances of discordant voices within the European Commission, between heads of EU institutions and mostly between member states on multiple issues, and maps the realignment of camps in Europe on the conflict. In the conclusions, the article evaluates the EU’s response to the war in Gaza, its capabilities and actorness in the Gaza war. It argues that the EU has been able to chalk up some accomplishments in less sensitive areas, most noticeably as a capacity builder in the Palestinian Authority. Its financial muscle has come to the fore in important humanitarian activity and especially in working to prevent the financial collapse of the PA. Europe has also carried out operations to enhance maritime security in the wake of attacks by the Houthis. Despite divisions which prevent it from becoming an effective actor in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, it still has an important role to play.

The EU and the War in Gaza: From Support to Criticism of Israel

Europe’s solidarity with Israel in the wake of the Hamas massacre of October 7 and kidnapping of more than 250 civilians and soldiers, was remarkable. It was immediate, extensive, and strong. Political support came from across Europe. There was fierce condemnation of Hamas from across the board. All EU member states supported Israel’s right to defend itself. The strong solidarity with Israel was demonstrated through numerous declarations, visits, and actions.

For a few weeks, the Gaza war took precedence over the war in Ukraine on the EU’s agenda. Manifold statements, speeches, Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) declarations, and European Council conclusions condemned the Hamas attack in the strongest terms (European Council, 2023). An unprecedented European Parliament (EP) resolution called for the elimination of Hamas with 500 votes in favor and 21 against (European Parliament, 2023a). These verbal expressions of support were important to Israel and gave it legitimacy for the war against Hamas.

Many heads of state as well as foreign and defense ministers from all across Europe visited Israel within a matter of weeks in an impressive show of solidarity. They travelled to the south of Israel to witness the devastated communities, they met with relatives of the hostages and restated Israel’s right to exercise self-defense. Among the first to arrive, on October 13, were the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and French President Emmanuel Macron all visited Israel between October 17-24 to express their solidarity with the Israeli people. Several weeks later HR Josep Borrell visited. This was his first visit to Israel since he assumed his mandate in 2019 (Lis, 2023). Between October 7, 2023 and May 2024, about 80 out of 100 high level visits to Israel were from Europe (Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe Division, June 23, 2024). Israelis felt they were not alone.

Yet, as the war in Gaza continued, European support for Israel gradually declined. Support for Israel’s right to defend itself is on condition that civilians are afforded protection in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law (IL & IHL). Amid the growing number of Palestinians killed in Gaza and the increasingly acute humanitarian situation there, the mood in Europe gradually turned against Israel. In addition, the refusal of Netanyahu’s government to accept a cease-fire, or discuss plans for the “day after” the war, its outright rejection of a role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an alternative to Hamas in Gaza and its fierce opposition to the possible establishment of a Palestinian State in the long run, have created great difficulties for Israel’s friends in Europe, since both the EU-27, the UK and Norway support the establishment of a Palestinian State.

The international legal cases against Israel make it more difficult for Europe to support it, especially under its current extreme right-wing government. In December, South Africa petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is now investigating claims that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. In May, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor applied for arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Gallant. In July, the ICJ published its advisory opinion on Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories (case opened in 2022). IL & IHL are normative pillars of the EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, in view of Europe’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war, where it has demanded that Russia adhere to IL & IHL and has imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow, and despite the major differences between the war in Ukraine and that in Gaza, the EU has been accused of applying double standards regarding Israel’s conduct in Gaza. This harms the EU’s reputation and interests in the Global South.

Europe’s solidarity with Israel and its delayed call for a ceasefire have strained its relations with countries in the Global South. Europe has worked hard since February 2022, reaching out to these countries in order to mobilize support for Ukraine. The alarming death toll in Gaza and the severe humanitarian situation sabotaged Europe’s efforts. Equating these two wars is problematic (Navon, 2024), but this doesn’t prevent some in the Global South and in Europe from doing so. As Konečný (2024) points out:

Efforts to convince [the Global South] that Europe’s… support for Ukraine against Russian aggression was based on universal principles of international law rather than the West’s geopolitical agenda, were squandered when the West veered off those same principles in Gaza.

Borrell concedes that this is a problem for the EU, and that he is regularly confronted with accusations of double standards:

What is now happening in Gaza has portrayed Europe in a way that many people simply do not understand. They saw our quick engagement and decisiveness in supporting Ukraine and wonder about the way we approach what is happening in Palestine… The perception is that the value of civilian lives in Ukraine is not the same as in Gaza, where more than 34,000 are dead, most others displaced, children are starving, and the humanitarian support [is] obstructed. The perception is that we care less if United Nations Security Council resolutions are violated, as it is the case by Israel with respect to the settlements, [as opposed to] when it is violated by Russia. (EEAS Press Team, 2024a).

Europe’s credibility and its ability to forge a wide international coalition against Russia is undermined by the perception of countries in the Global South that Europe’s attitude towards the war in Gaza is an embodiment of its double standards. Support for Israel by some European countries exacts a price for the whole EU, impacting its relations with the Global South, and its case for and reputation as a supporter of Ukraine.

The EU’s Role—From Payer to Player? 

The EU has taken concrete steps in several fields in an attempt to transform itself from a mere payer in the conflict to an actual player. It seeks to intervene and influence by applying leverage on some actors, especially by exerting its financial muscle. In addition, the EU has conducted a defensive operation to intercept Houthi attacks on ships, and has taken steps to crack down on the financing of Hamas. It adopted sanctions against violent Israeli settlers aimed at impacting the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But its main intervention comes in its significant role in financially sustaining the PA and conditioning its contributions on substantial and comprehensive PA reforms, alongside agreed US-EU conditions for the PA to return to rule in Gaza (see below).

The Humanitarian Field: Significant Payer, Attempts as a Player

There is no doubt that the EU is a significant payer. Humanitarian aid provided by the 27 member states to the Palestinians from October 7 until September 2024 was more than quadruple its level in the equivalent period preceding the war, reaching €678m, while EU aid increased ninefold from €28m to €262m (European Parliament, 2023b; Reuters, 2023). For comparison, in the same period the US donated $1 billion to the Palestinians. (USAID, 2024b).

The European Commission and a number of EU member states also tried to become more actively involved, by forging a multilateral force which facilitated a new pathway for humanitarian aid. In March, the European Commission, Cyprus, the US and the United Arab Emirates launched the Amalthea Initiative, operating a maritime route for emergency assistance from Cyprus to the northern part of the Gaza Strip. The initiative was proposed by Cyprus less than three weeks after October 7 (Politico, 2023) but was implemented only in March 2024 amid an increasingly acute humanitarian situation in Northern Gaza. The US was the key player in implementing the project in Gaza, building the jetty, while Europe established the Joint Rescue Coordination Center in Larnaca. Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK all participated in the operation ( ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2024).

The gap between expectations and implementation of the Amalthea Initiative was considerable. There were high expectations that at full capacity, the route could facilitate the transfer of humanitarian assistance for at least 500,000 people (USAID, 2024a), yet the quantities of aid delivered were very small (7000 tons, equivalent to only 350 trucks, or a day and a half of aid transferred by land). Between May and July, the jetty operated for only 12 days due to bad weather and the need for repairs, while its building costs were over $230 million. Several European ships delivered cargo to the jetty, which was distributed by aid organizations in the Strip. The jetty was eventually dismantled by the US at the end of July (Cleaver, 2024). The maritime route was diverted to Ashdod port and aid continued to enter Gaza via land crossings. In effect, the Amalthea initiative made only a cosmetic difference to humanitarian efforts and contributed little to Europe’s actual role.

Palestinian Statehood—Significant Payer and Possibly a Significant Player

The EU’s financial assistance to the Palestinians testifies to its potential to become a more significant player. In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to the PA, with over €1.2 billion originally planned for 2021-2024 (European Commission, 2023). This gives the EU potential leverage over the PA. While it has been reluctant to use it in the past, this now appears to be changing.

The PA depends upon Israel to collect import taxes on its behalf, which constitute 64 per cent of the Authority’s total income. The EU’s increased payments to the PA are an attempt to counter the Israeli government decision to confiscate parts of Palestinian tax revenue. This policy, led by Finance Minister Smotrich, dates back to January 2023 and is justified as a consequence of PA payments that incentivize terror by rewarding families of Palestinians in Israeli jails and those who killed Israelis. After October 7, the part of the budget that the PA routinely transferred to Gaza was also confiscated by Israel (Times of Israel, 2023; Gal, 2024). The PA has been in a dire financial situation for many years and the confiscation of funds could bring about its collapse. This would destabilize the West Bank and the region even further. After the EU and its member states invested so much in building the PA as the institutional backbone of a future Palestinian State and enhancing systems of governance, their role as payer has come to the fore and heightened their significance as a player. 

In July, the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), which oversees support programs in Europe’s Eastern and Southern areas, signed a “Letter of Intent” to the PA, announcing a €400m emergency package of aid to it to be paid until September, conditioned upon reforms in eight fields (DG NEAR, 2024a,b). In addition to playing a significant role in preserving the PA, the EU is using its financial leverage to pressure the PA to carry out reforms by employing conditions to the funding (as it does with states seeking to join the EU). The EU has significant experience and expertise in state building in general and with the PA in particular. It could use its financial muscle to help restore the independence of the Palestinian judicial system and de-radicalize and reform its education system (Tzoreff, 2024); although the latter is best done in cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. If its efforts to revitalize the PA succeed, the EU’s credibility as a player in the region would be strengthened. Such careful conditionality can build trust with Israel and could therefore enable the EU to play a more meaningful role not only vis à vis the PA, but also in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Capacity Builder for the Day After the War—Established Player 

The EU has been advancing Palestinian statehood via capacity building for a few decades. A month after October 7, the US, EU and UK were aligned regarding the basic conditions for a ceasefire leading to a long-term sustainable plan for the day after the war in Gaza. It included the return of the PA to Gaza (Gal and Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024). To date, the Israeli government has not agreed to their proposals, but preparations on the European side have begun nevertheless. For example, on May 27, the FAC agreed in principle to reactivate the civilian Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), which operated out of Rafah until Hamas took over the Strip in 2007. The EU appeared to be willing to reactivate it, but needs the approval of and coordination with the PA, Egypt and Israel (FAC 2024). According to reports, Israel rejected this option (Barel, 2024). To gain agency, the EU needs to prove itself as a credible player, and to engage and build trust with Israel.

The mandate of the EU police and rule of law capacity building operation in the PA (EUPOL COPPS), already includes the Gaza Strip but it too has stopped operating there since Hamas took over. Its operative plans may be expanded as part of the PA revitalization process ahead of its possible return to the Gaza Strip (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a). Through such missions, the EU can function not only as a payer but also a mid-level player. These missions can be a core component of EU civil boots on the ground in the Palestinian arena.

The (Failed) Diplomatic Front

Europe has been active on the diplomatic front, proposing several initiatives, none of which was acted upon. Only one tool was adopted by the European Council. On October 27, Spain pushed to include in the European Council conclusions support for convening a peace conference (European Council, 2023). Although the move appeared disconnected from reality on the ground, it was in accord with Borrell’s diplomatic objectives. Indeed, Borrell was the source of several diplomatic initiatives. They should be viewed in the context of his Peace Day Effort Initiative—trying to incentivize the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—that was launched in September 2023 but halted by the war (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a).

In January 2024, Borrell put forward a twelve-point non-paper for “creating a comprehensive peace plan,” proposing to hold a preparatory peace conference which would involve the pragmatic Arab states (Psara & Liboreiro, 2024). On January 22, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of four Arab states, Israel and the PA for separate discussions at the FAC. His initiative was discussed, but did not progress. Facing internal objections by member states, the initiative failed to get off the ground. In addition, the Biden Administration stayed silent regarding the plan, probably in part due to Israel’s rejection of the initiative. It didn’t help that Borrell was perceived as being strongly pro-Palestinian to the extent that some heads of state told him that he did not represent them (Moens et al., 2024), while others described him as “obsessed” with the issue.

In another diplomatic initiative on May 27, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (known as the “Arab Quint”) to the FAC. The discussion focused on finding a political solution to the conflict and potential pathways of cooperation as a means to resolve it. Borrell used these meetings and initiatives to strengthen EU-Arab relations, seemingly to enhance the EU’s actorness, though it was clear in advance to all sides that nothing concrete would come out of these sessions.

The next meeting took place in Madrid on September 13. It aimed to discuss “the need to reinforce the engagement of the international community on peace and security in the Middle East, and the challenge of creating an international consensus on a way forward based on the Two-State solution” (EEAS Press Team, 2024c). In effect, it demonstrated the lack of consensus, as only four European foreign ministers participated (Spain, Ireland, Slovenia and Norway) along with the PA and five Arab countries.

More serious efforts were made to prevent military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah. France played a leading role working for de-escalation. Europe has an interest in preventing Lebanon from becoming a failed state. It also wants to prevent the expected refugee flows resulting from a war between Israel and Lebanon. On June 13, President Macron said that France and the US had agreed in principle to establish a trilateral group with Israel to “make progress” on a French proposal to end the violence on the Lebanese border (Boxerman et al., 2024). Yet Israel has not always been willing to accommodate French or European diplomatic engagement in this sphere. Over the past year, Hezbollah argued that the key to ending the battle in Lebanon was the achievement of a ceasefire in Gaza, which in turn depends largely on agreement between Hamas and Israel on the release of all hostages. Later in the war in Lebanon, Israel sought to break this linkage. In summary, Europe is on the sidelines of diplomatic initiatives to resolve the war in Gaza and in Lebanon. What France and Europe did demonstrate was their financial role, gathering $1 billion for Lebanon in October 2024.

Employment of Sticks and Sanctions Regimes

President Macron’s proposal to build an international coalition against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), along the lines of the coalition against ISIS, did not gain traction (France 24, 2023). Yet France hosted a multilateral meeting in Paris on December 13, to enhance the financial war against them, by targeting the sources of their funding, and took action to stem the spread of terrorist content online (France Diplomacy, 2023). After the EU designated Hamas and PIJ as terrorist organizations in 2003, on January 19, 2024, the Council of the EU adopted a package of additional sanctions against them, including a freeze on the assets of several of their military leaders, among them Yahya Sinwar (Council of the EU, 2024a). This decision allowed the EU to take actions against additional individuals and entities supporting, facilitating, or enabling violent actions by Hamas and the PIJ. Yet enhancing its role through further intervention, for example, against straw companies in Turkey, did not ensue.

The EU did extend the sanctions list in June, adding six individuals and three entities (Council of the EU, 2024b). For the first time, sanctions were also imposed against violent Israeli settlers and some of their organizations in the West Bank. The process of imposition proved slower and more complicated politically for the EU than for its counterparts or its member states. The US imposed a first round of these sanctions on February 1, expanding them on March 14. The UK and France followed suit a couple of weeks later. It took the FAC until March 18 to cross the high threshold of unanimity and overcome Czech and Hungarian opposition. When the list of sanctions was published by the Council on April 19, it included four individuals and two organizations (Council of the EU 2024c,d ). The second round of EU sanctions came only on July 15, adding five individuals and three organizations (Council of the EU, 2024e). Those listed under the EU sanctions regime are “subject to an asset freeze, and the provision of funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly, to them or for their benefit, is prohibited.” Additionally, the EU imposed a travel ban on the sanctioned individuals. The slow pace of the sanctions adopted is indicative of the EU’s political difficulties in crossing what was considered a red line in its policy vis a vis Israel. Yet it was crossed.

The EU has considerable economic leverage with Israel as its largest trading partner. So far, the EU has shown little willingness to use its leverage vis à vis Israel inside the 1967 lines as the threshold of unanimity for such action in the FAC or European Council is too high (see disagreement regarding the Association Agreement below). The war has prompted the re- or over-politicization of relations in all areas of cooperation, in addition to the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli attitudes, including latent or vocal grassroots boycotts and lost opportunities. For example, it is unlikely that the EU would be able to sign a Partnership Priorities agreement with Israel anytime soon. It is also probable that a new UK-Israel trade agreement, currently under negotiation, would pose greater political challenges for the Labour government to sign.

The relative ease of taking decisions at the national level, in comparison to the EU level, is noticeable. Some European countries have shown greater readiness to impose bans on arms sales to Israel. In February, a Dutch court ordered the government to block the delivery of US-made F-35 fighter aircraft parts to Israel, over concerns they were being used to violate international law. Yet the government appealed, and meanwhile sent the parts to the US, where they were sent to Israel. Three European states took steps to fully suspend military exports to Israel: Spain, Italy and the Walloon part of Belgium. The UK, Denmark and Germany examine the export licenses on a case-by-case basis. Of the above, Germany’s stance is most significant: 30 per cent of Israel’s arms were imported from Germany and 69 per cent from the United States between 2019 and 2023 (Bermant 2024a; Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024d). Therefore, the damage caused by other European countries’ arms ban is felt less in the military-security sphere and much more in the political and diplomatic domain. This is illustrated by President Macron’s call in early October 2024 for a weapons embargo on Israel, although he referred only to the war in Gaza, not the one with Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies. In addition, France prevented Israeli companies from participating in the June 2024 Eurosatory international arms fair, although a number of Israeli companies did participate in the Euronaval defense exhibition which took place in November 2024.

Defensive Military Role

To the extent that Europe is even playing a military role, there is a clear distinction between the UK and the EU. Right after October 7, Britain joined the US in dispatching military forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to support Israel and deter Hezbollah and Iran from a full-scale attack on Israel. In addition, both Britain and France were involved in the interception of Iranian attacks against Israel in April and later in October (Times of Israel, 2024).

The EU’s military role emerged in response to the Houthis’ trade route disruption in the Red Sea. Since the Houthis began their offensive on November 19, they have attacked over forty ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Targeted strikes by the US and the UK against Houthi bases began on January 11. The EU launched operation EUNAVFOR Aspides on February 19. However, unlike the US and UK, the EU’s rules of engagement are defensive. They aim only to protect merchant shipping and restore freedom of navigation and exclude direct attacks on Houthi positions. This sea route from Asia through the Suez Canal to Europe accounts for twelve percent of global trade and is of special significance to Southern European Mediterranean countries. Alternative sea routes double shipment costs at a time when inflation has already been high in the EU and the cost of living is a sensitive social and political issue.

As of July, five European frigates had escorted over 170 merchant ships and intercepted nineteen Houthi missiles and drones (Al-Batati, 2024; EEAS Press Team, 2024b). By aiming to secure the Suez Canal route, the EU’s operation is also crucial for Egypt and the region’s economy. Through this operation, the EU enhances maritime security, furthers the protection of European, regional and international commercial interests, or at least mitigates to some extent the economic damage caused by the Houthis, while strengthening its joint military cooperation capabilities under EU command (Matoi & Caba-Maria, 2024). The success of the EU military operation as well as that of the US and the UK, is limited at best. Maritime traffic has stabilized since January at 50-60% of levels in equivalent months in 2023 (Gard, 2024).

Europe’s Tendency for Cacophony

Immediately after October 7, alongside the strong and widespread demonstrations of European solidarity with Israel and fierce condemnation of Hamas, there were many issues where the EU did not speak with one voice. The cacophony started within the European Commission, followed by open disagreement between heads of EU institutions and then between member states on issues such as funding for the Palestinians, calls for a ceasefire, recognition of a Palestinian state, South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel and the issue of payments to UNRWA. This cacophony hampers the ability of the EU to play a meaningful role.

Within the Commission, the difficulties started with the Hungarian commissioner for neighborhood policy, Olivér Várhelyi, who tweeted on October 9 that aid to the Palestinians would be cut. A few hours later, the Slovenian Commissioner for crisis management, Janez Lenarčič, tweeted that humanitarian aid would actually be doubled. He was echoed by HR Borrell who asserted that the EU should support the Palestinians “more, not less,” stating that this is the position of 95 percent of EU member states. Borrell stressed that the EU differentiates between terror organizations such as Hamas and the PIJ, and the PA and Palestinian civilians. Later that day, the Commissioner spokesperson clarified that there would be no aid cuts. Instead, the Commission decided to review its payments to the Palestinians, in order to ensure that no funding was reaching Hamas or the PIJ (Moens et al.2023). This review process ended in November 2023 with the decision to continue payments and, as mentioned, increase them (European Commission, 2023).

Between Heads of EU Institutions

The president of the European Council, Charles Michel, criticized the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for stating in her press conference with Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu in October 2023 that Israel had the right to defend itself, without adding that it must be done in accordance with IL & IHL. According to Michel and others, this failure to state the EU’s core values was a reflection of her pro-Israeli stance. She was accused of overstepping her powers, not representing the EU’s interests properly, “undermining the position of the EU as credible actor and honest broker between Israeli and Palestine,” projecting the image of double standards to the Global South (Borges de Castro, 2023). Also, in an unusual move, 850 employees of EU institutions published a letter complaining about von der Leyen’s omission (Agence Europe, 2023).

There are also significant differences between EU member states. On the issue of a ceasefire, on October 27, the heads of 27 member states in the European Council agreed on phrasing that called on Israel to allow “humanitarian corridors and pauses for humanitarian needs” (European Council, 2023). It took them hours to reach an agreement on “pauses,” in plural, to avoid the impression that they were calling for a permanent pause. On that very same day, the EU member states split into three camps over a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, calling for an “immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities” and condemning terrorism. Eight member states voted in favor, fifteen abstained and four voted against the text, as it did not mention Hamas or the October 7 massacre (UNGA, 2023; Alessandri & Ruiz, 2023). These divisions demonstrated once again the difficulties for the 27 member states to speak with one voice on the details of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Analysis of the EU’s UNGA voting on the Palestinian issue shows unanimous agreement among the 27 member states and the UK on the end goal of the “right of the Palestinians to self-determination” and “on permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories” (two decisions adopted on December 19). Yet when it came to the more practical vote calling for a ceasefire on December 12, or the admission of Palestine as a UN member state on May 10, the EU was split again into three camps. Overall, on eight resolutions between October 7 and May 10 relating to the Palestinian issue and the war in Gaza, the EU stayed united on only three occasions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024b). As this analysis suggests, Europe is united when it comes to supporting the two-state solution, yet it is divided on the translation of that goal into concrete policy.

In the wake of Israeli charges that some of UNRWA’s employees participated in the attacks of the October 7 massacre (UNRWA, 2024), EU member states were also split on the question of whether to freeze UNRWA’s funding. The EU and eleven European countries (among them the UK) briefly suspended the funding, while eight did not (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024c). Further cacophony continued upon the resumption of funding. The EU attached three conditions to renewed UNRWA funding, which could have served to apply its normative power, or at least lead a united voice for all the funders of UNRWA. Yet, the EU was unable to put its own house in order, the conditions adopted by each member state were different, and most did not adopt any.

South Africa’s case against Israel in the ICJ is another example of division. Germany announced it would intervene on Israel’s behalf as a third party. Another five EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary and France) expressed their support for Israel. The UK joined them. Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium and Spain joined in support of South Africa. Other member states only called on Israel to comply with its rulings and with IL and IHL (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024c).

On February 14, the prime ministers of Spain and Ireland sent a letter calling on von der Leyen to carry out an urgent review of whether Israel was complying with its obligations to respect human rights, which constitute “an essential element” of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. They requested that appropriate measures be taken if Israel was found to have breached them (Lynch, 2024). The Association Agreement is the basis for EU–Israel relations in all fields: trade, economic, political dialogue and participation in different EU programs, such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus. This was the first time such a demand had been made at the level of prime ministers. Nevertheless, differences of opinion meant that the request was shrugged off at the FAC which met on March 18.

On May 27, 2024 the FAC for the first time engaged in a “significant” discussion on steps against Israel if it didn’t comply with IHL (Weatherald, 2024). That was after the ICC submitted applications for arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant on May 20, and the ICJ intermediate ruling on May 24 that Israel should adhere to IHL in its operation in Rafah. According to the foreign minister of Ireland, Micheál Martin, “there was a very clear consensus about the need to uphold the international humanitarian legal institutions,” i.e. the ICJ and ICC. Yet the FAC’s sole conclusion was to hold an EU-Israel Association Council meeting with Foreign Minister Katz to address the EU’s serious concerns and seek Israel’s response on ICJ compliance. Despite the calls from Ireland and other member states, no sanctions paper against Israel was drawn up. So far, the letter achieved little more than headlines and an unpleasant invitation to Katz.

The recognition of a Palestinian state is a major point of division in Europe. While there is consensus on the two-state solution, opinions differ on how and when to advance it. On January 30, British Foreign Minister Cameron was the first to publicly consider recognizing a Palestinian state since October 7. French President Macron, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, and senior heads in Germany also indicated they were considering it, but no actions were taken. On May 28, Spain, Ireland, and Norway recognized Palestine, followed by Slovenia on June 5, making it the 147th state and the 11th in the EU to do so (excluding Sweden’s 2014 recognition, earlier recognitions date back to 1988 and were by former Communist states, and Cyprus which was not an EU member then). Belgium and Denmark chose not to recognize Palestine. While such recognition can yield domestic and international political benefits, it is largely symbolic for Palestinians and leave realities on the ground unchanged. This cacophony demonstrates again that Europe agrees on the concept of two states for two peoples, but remains divided on how and when to pursue this goal.

Realignment of Camps

A year after October 7, the Czech Republic and Hungary continue to express strong support for Israel. The UK, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, and some Central European countries, which offered firm support for Israel, adopted a more nuanced stance in the months that followed. All stressed the importance of complying with IL & IHL in the Gaza Strip. When Israel’s security was on the line, as happened in mid-April and again in early October, the UK and France actively participated in thwarting Iran’s missile attacks, underlining their position that Israel has the right to defend itself.

Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Slovenia, and Malta were quick to restate their critical position of Israel, with Spain and Ireland calling for a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Both formally recognized the Palestinian state with Norway and Slovenia.

Germany’s long-standing historic responsibility to Israel’s security, Germany’s Staatsraison or raison d’état, is being tested. This commitment has been inserted in coalition agreements in Germany since 2008, including by the current SPD-Green-Liberal government. Despite criticism of Israel, Germany has maintained support for the country. However, amid accusations that Israel has breached IL and IHL, Germany has shown a readiness to reexamine its continued sale of military exports to Israel, including the possibility of delaying the supply of certain items.

Ultimately, the normative traditions and narrow self-interests of the government in each European state are what count in the formulation of policy towards Israel and the Palestinians, rather than the need to maintain a united harmonious and coherent European response. Given the mix of normative and interest-based approaches, consensus has been hard to achieve in the FAC or European Council. This represents the “old” CFSP, in contrast to the brisk and assertive EU response to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Alignments may shift due to elections, as was seen in Belgium in June and the UK in July, where the new Labour government under the leadership of Keir Starmer has already dropped its opposition to an international arrest warrant for Netanyahu and Gallant. His government has also suspended 30 out of 350 arms export licenses to Israel (Bermant, 2024b). However, Starmer has ruled out a complete ban on UK arms exports to Israel, saying it “would be the wrong position for this government” (Hardman, 2024).

In the past years, under Netanyahu, Israel has strengthened ties with Greece, Cyprus, and some Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria, using these alliances to counter unfavorable EU votes. Netanyahu’s “divide and thwart” diplomacy harnessed the support of friendly member states to block or soften anti-Israel decisions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2021). This tactic has been effective when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured less prominently on the global agenda, or when initiatives with considerable implications come to the fore, such as reassessing the EU–Israel Association Agreement. However, during the war in Gaza, this strategy has been effective only up to a point. For example, it did not prevent sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The EU’s emphasis on IL & IHL is highlighted by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With the ICJ’s judgement on Israeli occupation, South Africa’s proceedings on Gaza, and the ICC request for warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, the EU and its member states’ room for maneuver vis à vis Israel in the Gaza war is shrinking.

* Change after general elections

The result, one year after the war is the following continuum, from the most critical of Israel to the most supportive:

The current realignment of camps regarding Israel is much more complicated than it was before October 7. It reflects not only the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Israeli occupation and settlement building; but now encompasses Israel’s security, its right to defend itself against Iran and its proxies, and its struggle for legitimacy.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of October 7, the EU initially showed strong solidarity with Israel in its darkest hour. Yet as the civilian death toll in Gaza rose and the humanitarian situation deteriorated, most of Europe’s leaders began distancing themselves from the Israeli government and expressed increasing criticism. Despite general agreement on the two-state solution, the divisions on how and when to proceed in this direction paralyze the EU. The Gaza War demonstrated once again the difficulties of the 27 member states in speaking with one voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to the need for consensus, the only agreed action by the EU was to impose sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The rest of the moves were taken by small groups of member states: some joined South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, four countries recognized Palestine as a state and a couple requested a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

The Gaza war has revealed once again the divisions, cacophony and ponderous decision-making characteristics of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In August, Borrell conceded that “the Palestine-Israel conflict is one of the most difficult issues to build EU27 consensus on, probably more than on any other issue” noting it as the stumbling-block to effective intervention (Scheindlin, 2024).

So what has changed (if at all) since October 7 in the EU’s actorness? Seemingly not much. The EU has a range of financial and civilian tools to offer today and for the day after the war. It is a considerable humanitarian payer, though less of a player on the ground. It is a significant actor in Palestinian capacity and state building, willing to reactivate EUPOL COPPS in Gaza and EUBAM at the Rafah border crossing. Their renewal could enhance the EU’s role alongside its participation in the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip the “day after”.

The EU is already playing a significant role in the West Bank. At a time when elements in the Netanyahu government are acting openly to bring about the financial collapse of the PA, the EU’s role as a stabilizer in funding the PA and preventing its collapse is vital. This is essential for preserving the two-state solution and helping to prevent a major conflagration in the West Bank.

Taking into consideration that the EU’s diplomatic initiatives have all failed internally and were usually ignored by the US, the EU should think anew about how to strengthen its actorness. The EU’s most significant potential leverage stems from being the largest donor to the PA. By using its financial muscle to revitalize the PA through conditionality, DG NEAR, which has the ability to act consistently, could strengthen the EU’s role and credibility. This is the EU’s main potential leverage asset, depending on the scope and depth of the implementation of PA reforms and could make the EU a more credible player in Israeli eyes.

It remains to be seen how powerful and effective this conditionality will be under the next European Commission. If successful, the EU could be viewed in time as a more significant player, which would prompt Israel to take Europe more seriously and pay more attention to European concerns, rather than dismissing them. However, for this to happen, the EU would also need to engage more positively and directly with Israel’s government. The new European Commission, which took office on December 1, appears better placed to do this.

The EU has potential leverage with Israel, as its biggest trade partner, yet divisions among member states have hampered its ability to use this effectively. The war caused a considerable realignment, and many European governments have distanced themselves from the current Israeli government. The proceedings in the ICJ and ICC are raising serious questions over whether Israel’s actions in Gaza comply with IL & IHL. Rulings against Israel would reduce Europe’s room for maneuver in supporting Israel, let alone advance relations. Indeed, this support is likely to shrink further as Europe’s normative emphasis on IL & IHL aligns with its geopolitical interests relating to the Russia-Ukraine war.

In the wider regional conflict, the EU is more than just a humanitarian actor or a payer. It also acts as a modest security provider, as in the EUNAVFOR Aspides operation, where the EU attempts to restore maritime security and freedom of navigation, operating as a defensive rather than offensive player, protecting its own economic interests and those of Egypt as well as other developing countries on this trade route.

This paper analyzed Europe’s attempts to develop its actorness in relation to the Gaza war and hostilities in the wider region. These efforts have been only partially successful, and have been achieved mainly on the sidelines of the Gaza war. As the EU navigates an increasingly unstable multipolar world, it is still searching for ways to align its political influence with its economic and financial weight. Unlike the geopolitical awakening prompted by the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza war has not triggered a similar response. Despite the region’s security challenges and the destabilizing actions taken by Iran, its proxies, and Israel, the war in Gaza does not pose a strategic threat to Europe as does Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The EU has sought support from the Global South for Ukraine against Russia, yet the war in Gaza has undermined these efforts, amid mounting criticism of perceived European double standards towards Israeli actions in Gaza. One way to restore credibility is by laying the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a future Palestinian state. By revitalizing the PA, the EU can also strengthen its credibility and regional influence. However, the EU’s incoherence regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict reduces significantly its credibility as an actor, yet accusations that it is an irrelevance in the Middle East are wide of the mark.

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הפוסט Europe’s Response to the War in Gaza: Capabilities and Actorness הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In contrast to its image as a stable regime, a quick look at the history of Syria shows that before the rise to power of the Alawite Assad dynasty in 1970, it was the least stable country in the Middle East. From 1949 to 1970, it experienced no fewer than 17 military coups, most of which failed. Hafez al-Assad learned from these earlier failures, gaining a clear understanding of the necessary conditions for establishing a lasting dictatorship.

Syria has long been a focus for regional and international tensions, leading the journalist and Assad’s biographer Patrick Seale to refer to the phenomenon as “the struggle for Syria.” Seale argued that whoever wants to control the Middle East from an international perspective, and whoever wants to lead the Arab world, must rule Syria, due to its geostrategic location and importance. While this thesis has not always stood the test of time, the idea of the struggle over Syria as a reflection of a broader struggle in the regional and international arenas remains entirely valid.

After it sided with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Syria became an important component of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. With the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League following its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, it was Syria – not Iran – that led this axis, and strove for “strategic equilibrium” with the Jewish state. However, the 1990 Gulf War and the collapse of his Soviet patron led Hafez to break off relations with Iran, forge new relations with the United States, and enter into negotiations for a peace treaty with Israel.

During the first decade of his rule, Bashar was courted by both sides, which he exploited to further his own interests and those of his regime. Yet the assistance he received from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah during the Arab Spring, which made a decisive contribution to his survival, carried a considerable military, economic, foreign policy, and civilian price tag: reliance on the Axis of Resistance to the point of dependence; the transformation of Syria into a Russian and Iranian base of influence in the Middle East; and the use of its territory as a staging post for supplying Hezbollah, Iran’s most important ally in Lebanon.

Not actively fighting Israel

SYRIA HAS not played an active role in the October 7 war, due to the severe consequences of its civil war, though its passive role placed it as part of the Axis of Resistance. However, there were many who hoped that the setbacks suffered by the Axis during the war would lead Bashar to follow his father and switch his military and foreign policy orientation, especially in light of the differences of opinion and concerns recently voiced about a possible Iranian takeover of the country.

The rebels’ assault, then, surprised everyone. They perfectly exploited the moment when Iran and Hezbollah were reeling from major blows inflicted by Israel, while Russia was bogged down in its war in Ukraine and distracted by the political conflict in Georgia. The external actors who saved Assad during the Arab Spring could not save him again this time around.

The problem is that the rebel forces are not a unified bloc. They came together in order to end the Assad regime, but the road to establishing a functioning Syrian national entity will be a long one, because each of the country’s ethnic and religious groups – Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, and Alawites – imagines a Syria in its own image, even if they are all currently united around the new-old Syrian flag (which was the flag of independence from the French Mandate).

There are several scenarios that present themselves in the Syrian arena, with the most optimistic being that the country maintains its recognized borders and establishes a representative government following elections. The pessimistic scenario is that it breaks up into separate entities along ethnic and religious lines.

Between these two extremes are several more realistic possibilities, ranging from the rise of an Islamist regime of some type or other, to armed conflicts between the different groups. Initial signs of this latter outcome are already visible in the north, with fighting between the Kurds and Turkish-backed rebels.

FROM A regional perspective, Syria has returned to its natural position in the Arab world. The alliance with Iran since 1980 has been rather unnatural, given that Syria, from its independence, was allied with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though it was Nasser’s Egypt that promoted Pan-Arabism, the roots of this ideology lie in Syria. Thus, even if Islamist ideology becomes a central feature, Syria will remain an important actor in the Arab world. The removal from power of the Alawites, who are viewed as either infidels or Shi’ites (depending on who is being asked), and the return of Sunni rule means that the alliance with Iran and Hezbollah is no longer relevant.

Israel, of course, has benefited from the changes in Syria, which has ceased to represent a strategic threat for the foreseeable future, due both to the military setbacks it has suffered and to the severe economic consequences of the civil war. Moreover, Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance has major regional implications, because the “Shia Crescent” has now been severed, which will make it much more difficult for Iran to transfer arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, the fact that the Axis of Resistance has become a purely Shi’ite axis creates a countering Sunni axis that shares many common interests with Israel.

The change in Syria is not just another regime change in the Middle East. It is significant because it means the renewal of the struggle in and for Syria, between regional and international forces. The country may have exited the Axis of Resistance, but this does not mean that it has automatically crossed to the opposing camp, especially given that Iran and Russia will try to act to maintain their control or influence there.

On the other hand, the United States is already in contact with the various rebel groups in Syria, and Israel is also not standing idly by. In other words, the struggle for Syria has begun again, with the potential to create new opportunities for Israel and the West.

The article was published on December 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט The Fall of Assad Is Just the Beginning: The Struggle for Syria Has Resumed הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has so far acted true to form, limiting its actions to the military sphere by creating a new buffer zone in Syria and destroying the offensive capabilities of Bashar al-Assad’s army, especially its missile and chemical weapons systems.

But if Israel is to have an impact on shaping this strategically positioned space, it must adopt a broad diplomatic initiative.

How can Israel reshape Syria?

At the current decision-making juncture, we must realize that the process of reshaping Syria is already underway. We must also recognize that in the emerging Syrian narrative, Israel is deemed to have played an integral part in liberating the country from the atrocities of the Assad regime and its Iranian patrons.

My conversations with Syrian colleagues clearly point to the perception that Israel’s victory over Hezbollah had a major impact on the Syrian army’s collapse and provides it with unique influence on future events.

However, resting on our laurels and reveling in the scenes of looting at the Iranian embassy in Damascus is a path fraught with risks. Anyone who thinks the Iranians have washed their hands of Syria probably does not understand the economic situation in Syria or does not know the Iranian regime.

As it has done in Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria itself at the end of the previous decade, Iran excels at exploiting political transitions. While currently perceived as a central pillar of Assad’s oppressive regime – having gambled on his survival and faced setbacks – Iran has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to shifting circumstances.

It has consistently demonstrated a talent for forging alliances, particularly in the face of domestic political vacuums and economic needs. The rebel takeover of Syria only deepens these needs. The Iranians have demonstrated impressive skills in building strategic ties with Syria’s non-Shi’ite population groups, such as the Sunnis and Druze in the south of Syria, and large Sunni tribes in the border area with Iraq.

Let us not forget, either, that the Iranians play a significant role in keeping Syria’s energy and electricity sector running. Iran therefore has significant cards to play against the forces trying to shape a new order in a devastated country despite the innate hostility between them and the rebels in Damascus. Iran’s leaders have, in fact, already expressed a desire to develop ties with the new Syrian regime.

ISRAEL MUST recognize that the current vacuum is temporary and therefore requires it to adopt a far more proactive approach than it did during the Syrian civil war. That includes two policy measures that point in opposite directions but seek to deal with the current uncertainty.

First, Israel must strengthen its relations with major political actors in Syria – the emphasis is, of course, on the Druze in the south, and on Rojava, the autonomous Kurdish state that has emerged over the past decade in the strategic space of northeastern Syria.

The ties should be enhanced through a quiet and cautious dialogue given both the sensitivity of building such ties while the issue of political unity is paramount in Syria, and Israel’s standing in the region is at an all-time low.

In the words of a Syrian-Kurdish friend: This is the worst time to have a public relationship with Israel, and the most important time to have a quiet dialogue with it. Tweets on this matter by reckless Israeli ministers are not helpful to this sensitive effort.

Israel has maintained an informal relationship with the Druze for years, based on a series of unwritten agreements. This was most recently demonstrated last week when the IDF defended the Syrian Druze village of Khader against attacks by local rebels.

The relationship with the Kurds is more complex, in part because of its implications for Israeli-Turkish relations. However, a model for an unofficial strategic relationship already exists in Israel’s long-standing relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. It is rooted, among other factors, in the Kurds’ perception of Israel as a role model for nation-building, survival, and prosperity in a hostile environment.

At the same time, Israel should actively encourage and support the international and regional economic rehabilitation of Syria. This reliance on foreign aid could serve as leverage to shape the future regime, conditioning assistance on the new government’s adoption of moderate policies both domestically and internationally.

Europe and the GCC countries previously refrained from engaging in Syria’s reconstruction because they did not want to strengthen the Assad regime, but that argument is now void.

A large-scale reconstruction process could encourage a return of refugees from Europe and the countries of the region to their homes, easing the burden on their host countries. Western nations and moderate Arab states also share a common interest in removing Russian and Iranian influence from Syria.

ISRAEL’S ROLE in Syria’s reconstruction would be modest but meaningful. Initially, it would focus on guaranteeing respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a commitment to cease attacks as long as the new regime ensures Iran’s exclusion. In the second phase, Israel could help facilitate reconstruction by allowing the use of its air and land routes for logistical support.

The past two years have highlighted the symbiotic relationship between developments in Gaza or the West Bank and events in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran.

Israel’s continued military presence in Gaza complicates its coordination with the Arab world on rebuilding Syria and undermines the legitimacy of local actors to collaborate with it, either publicly or covertly. Ending the destructive war in Gaza is therefore crucial for Israel’s ability to engage with regional partners in reshaping the future order in Syria.

The past two years have also taught us an important lesson about the failure of Israel’s “villa in the jungle” approach – the danger of burying one’s head in the sand and ignoring regional developments, leaving the initiative in the hands of meaningful and hostile others. This misguided approach resulted in Iranian entrenchment in Syria and the upgrading of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities.

Israel must seize the current opportunity to foster a stable and non-hostile relationship with its strategic neighbor to the north.

The article was published on December 18th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel has the chance to help reshape Syria and form stable ties הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For the region’s autocratic regimes – again, with the exception of Iran and its proxies – a Trump administration is preferable because, unlike the Democrats, he does not view human rights as an obstacle to maintaining relations. Leaders such as Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden, at various points, balanced their policies not only with national interests but also with liberal values.

While they did not expect these regimes to transform into democracies overnight, especially after the results of the Arab Spring, they promoted a spectrum of more liberal approaches toward minorities and opposition groups, as seen, for example, in Jordan.

Currently, no fewer than 10 Middle Eastern states rank in the bottom 20 of the 2024 Global Index of Freedom and Democracy, with another seven in the next two deciles. The trend is unmistakable.

Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was among the first leaders to congratulate Trump. Despite his distaste for Trump’s 2019 nickname “my favorite dictator,” he benefited from Trump’s practical support, including sustained annual aid with no conditions or restrictions related to domestic policy, and a 2017 visit to Washington.

Sisi also hopes Trump will assist in securing additional loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, especially as Egypt faces economic strain due to war-related declines in Suez Canal traffic and Sinai tourism revenues.

Morocco has similarly extended its congratulations to Trump, who became the first US president to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara – an acknowledgment exchanged for Morocco’s normalization of relations with Israel.

In the Gulf, Arab states are also pleased by Trump’s return. His first foreign trip in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia, where he signed over $100 billion in deals, though it remains unclear how fully these were realized.

More significantly, Trump’s past firm stance on Iran aligns well with Saudi interests. Although Riyadh struggled with the administration’s lack of response to the 2019 Houthi drone attack on the Aramco oil fields, Trump’s position is still viewed as more assertive than that of the Democrats.

Saudis continue to hope for normalization with Israel

The Saudis continue to hope for normalization with Israel. Trump, along with his son-in-law Jared Kushner, laid much of the groundwork for the 2020 Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, leading many to believe his administration could further this process.

However, the cost of normalization for Saudi Arabia has risen since the Israel-Hamas War began: they now seek the establishment of a viable Palestinian entity, if not an outright state – something Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to offer. The UAE and Bahrain would also welcome such steps, and both, along with Egypt, remain supportive of Trump.

Netanyahu has also expressed enthusiastic support for Trump’s return, calling it “the greatest comeback in history.” Israel, often regarded as the region’s only democracy, echoes the reaction of its autocratic neighbors, perhaps for similar reasons.

Conversely, Iran and its allies are apprehensive about Trump’s return. Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, his authorization of the strike that killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, and his generally firm stance against Tehran are still fresh in their minds. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s greatest fear is that Trump might grant Israel the green light to target Iran’s nuclear facilities – a stance the Biden administration has avoided.

All these expectations, hopes, and fears are based on Trump’s record from his first term. Now, without the pressure of reelection and with a strong influence over both houses of Congress, a second term could diverge significantly from the first.

Two main factors may drive this shift: a commitment to addressing America’s domestic issues and reducing US involvement abroad, as Trump pledged during his campaign, and a desire to leave behind a positive legacy to counter his divisive public image.

Ultimately, Trump’s actions are often unpredictable, making it challenging to foresee his course with certainty. The most sensible conclusion, then, is to “expect the unexpected.”

הפוסט Most Mideast autocrats welcome President-elect Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While high tides are often seen as a positive sign, low tides can strain these connections.

As we mark the 30th anniversary of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, relations between the two appear to be nearing an unprecedented low – mirroring the current state of Israel’s ties with other countries in the region.

The bonds and shared interests linking Israel and Jordan are deeper than those Israel has with any other country with which it holds diplomatic relations.

Since its early days as Transjordan, the Hashemite Kingdom has been considered Israel’s “best of enemies.”

While Jordan participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel, its leaders maintained secret ties with Israeli counterparts throughout this period.

The existence of common enemies and Jordan’s reliance on Western allies (first Britain, later the United States) made Israel a valuable partner in preserving Hashemite rule.

King Hussein expressed gratitude to Israel for its support during Black September in 1970, when he was engaged in a struggle against the PLO.

In return, he warned Golda Meir of the impending war during their meeting at Glilot in September 1973.

Israel, in turn, could generally rely on the Jordanian army to secure the long-shared border, preventing terrorist incursions.

Over time, Jordan also developed additional strategic needs, such as water and gas, which Israel provides.

Before 1994, peace with Jordan had always been a possibility. However, unlike Egypt, Jordan lacked the strength to withstand opposition from the broader Arab world and the Palestinian population within its borders.

But Israel’s signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords with the PLO provided Jordan with the legitimacy it needed to formalize its own peace treaty a year later.

After years of attempting to represent Palestinian interests, Jordan relinquished this role to the PLO, while retaining its special role in the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, according to the peace treaty.

How to proceed? 

Since then, the failure to solve the Palestinian problem has presented the regime with a dilemma, of how to square its own interests, and those of the state, with the demands of its citizens.

The response has been to keep diplomatic relations with Israel on a low-profile while sustaining close, clandestine military, defense, and intelligence cooperation.

Thus, while public relations remain cool, covert ties have remained strong. A similar dynamic has unfolded with Egypt but with a significant difference: in Jordan, more than half the population is Palestinian.

Tensions on the Temple Mount and conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians have consistently strained relations between Israel and Jordan.

The Jordanian government has typically responded by recalling its ambassador and issuing strong condemnations of Israeli actions – measured responses that have not jeopardized the peace agreement itself.

However, as the current conflict endures, as Palestinians in Gaza face ongoing humanitarian hardships, and as Israel refrains from offering a political horizon, the voices in Jordan calling for more decisive actions against Israel are likely to grow louder and could increasingly impact Jordanian policymakers.

Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, exemplifies the duality of Jordan’s stance.

Throughout the conflict, he has issued strong condemnations of Israel’s actions, yet he has also emphasized that Jordan, along with the broader Arab world, seeks peace rather than war, advocating for a solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative.

Developments with Jordan may be more pronounced, but a similar pattern is evident in Israel’s relations with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

Despite a shared interest in countering Tehran, all these states condemned Israel’s recent attack on Iran.

Although these countries maintain varying levels of relationship with Israel, even the UAE – despite continuing flights to Israel and maintaining moderate statements – has made it clear that it will not participate in “the day after” in Gaza unless progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state.

This stance is also shared by Saudi Arabia, which has yet to normalize relations with Israel.

Taking peace with Arab states for granted 

Under the Netanyahu government, Israel appears to take its relations with peace and normalization with Arab states for granted.

The longevity of peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt – 30 and 45 years, respectively – may create the impression that these relationships are immune to crises. However, this assumption should not be put to the test.

Rational government policies should consider the circumstances, limitations, and risks associated with their implementation.

Israel’s limited strike on Iran was influenced, if not compelled, by American pressure to avoid complicating matters for the US administration ahead of the elections.

Similarly, an Israeli government acting with strategic foresight must weigh not only its own interests and those of its closest ally, the United States, but also the interests of other regional countries with shared concerns.

In this context, two key issues arise.

In the short term, priorities include ending the conflict, securing the release of hostages, securing Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the northern border, and establishing an alternative governing structure in Gaza.

In the longer term, a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue is essential, ideally through the formation of a state-like entity.

Resolving the first set of challenges could improve relations with the Arab states; however, only addressing the second will elevate these relationships to new heights.

This may currently seem like a fantasy, but so did peace with Egypt and Jordan just a few decades ago.

The article was published on November 11th in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט How Israel’s War Risks Destroying Ties with Jordan and Regional Allies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This axis includes Hezbollah, Shi’a militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and, to a certain extent, Syria.

The anniversary serves as a reminder, first and foremost, of the political, military, and intelligence failures that demand investigation by a state commission of inquiry.

It also offers an opportunity for reflection on the consequences and significance of what we have been through in the past year.

October 7 has caused a national trauma, marking yet another disaster in the long chain of tragedies experienced by the Jewish people.

Addressing this trauma is one of the most pressing tasks confronting Israeli society and its leadership.

 It has led to a loss of trust among many Israelis in the government; and while the war has diverted attention from the government’s judicial revolution, those plans do not appear to have been shelved.

The brutality of Hamas’s terrorist acts has also led to a process of dehumanization and delegitimization of Palestinians within Israeli society. While this may be a natural reaction to the events of October 7, it is likely to raise serious obstacles to renewing dialogue after the guns fall silent. Surveys indicate that a similar process has occurred among Palestinians toward Jews.

From a regional perspective, Israel has succeeded in rebuilding its deterrence, although only time will reveal the extent of this recovery.

The importance of Israel’s military and intelligence achievements lies not only in the outcomes but also in the way they are achieved – through ingenious military, technological, and intelligence-based subterfuges.

A heavy cost for deterrence 

The restoration of Israel’s deterrence has come at a heavy cost to Gaza’s civilian population. While it is hard to determine the exact number of casualties, estimates suggest a staggering toll, with figures around 40,000 deaths [of which Hamas recently admitted internally that 80% were combatants or their family members].

The primary challenge regarding deterrence lies in the nature of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, which are ideologically driven and therefore conventional deterrence is less effective against them.

Regionally, the Axis of Resistance has faced significant setbacks. Iran’s proxy doctrine has faltered, partly due to the lack of coordinated action, especially on October 7.

While Hamas’s attack marked a notable success for the organization, it ultimately led to the destruction of its forces and capabilities, signaling the end of its rule in Gaza.

Hezbollah, for its part, was able to initially claim a significant achievement, having launched thousands of missiles and rockets at northern Israel for an entire year, resulting in substantial economic damage and the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis.

However, this came at a high cost, including the elimination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and a chain of top commanders, alongside a severe blow to its operational capabilities.

Israel’s current operation in southern Lebanon is likely to inflict further damage on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, potentially forcing it to withdraw beyond the Litani River [as stated in the United Nations Resolution 1701].

While it is still too early to predict the war’s impact on Hezbollah’s domestic position in Lebanon, it is evident that the devastating consequences will lead to significant repercussions.

Tehran’s April 14 direct attack on Israel was a failure, with most of the missiles and drones launched intercepted by Israeli forces (or their allies) or landing in unpopulated areas.

The second Islamic Republic attack, on October 1, executed in retaliation for Nasrallah’s assassination, was larger and relatively more successful, but also resulted in no Israeli casualties, causing minor damage to property. This highlighted Israel’s significant technological advantage.

THE COALITION of moderate Middle Eastern states has remained stable. While Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and Arab public opinion generally supports the Palestinian cause, the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have maintained their relations with Israel – some covertly, others openly.

Certain countries even played an active role in countering the Iranian missile attack on Israel, as part of the cooperation in air defense systems that developed following the Abraham Accords and Israel’s integration into the US Central Command.

In its conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, Israel finds more allies in the Arab world due to the fierce rivalry rooted in the Sunni-Shi’a religious divide.

All the Sunni states perceive Shi’ite Iran and Hezbollah as a significant threat to their interests and therefore support Israel.

Conversely, Israel’s war with Hamas – a Sunni Palestinian organization – brings the issue of Palestinian independence to the forefront, which is widely supported by the Arab public. To maintain their fragile legitimacy, the Arab leaders publicly express pro-Palestinian rhetoric.

The United States remains the sole global power actively engaged in the region, though its involvement has so far been limited to defensive assistance, supplying weapons to Israel, and mediating between conflicting parties.

Additionally, the US has conducted limited operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea, constrained by a desire to avoid a regional war, especially given domestic pressures related to the upcoming presidential elections. Furthermore, recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have diminished US enthusiasm for ground interventions.

Meanwhile, Russia’s focus has shifted to its war with Ukraine, though it continues to maintain its stronghold in Syria. China’s involvement in diplomatic efforts has been minimal.

As a result, Middle Eastern states have largely been left to their own devices, a situation that has inadvertently bolstered Israel’s standing and role in the area.

One year later 

A year after October 7, the Palestinian issue has once again taken center stage. The Abraham Accords and the normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia may have pushed it to the sidelines, as Netanyahu intended, but Hamas’s attack redirected attention toward the urgent need for a solution.

The moderate states in the region advocate for a two-state solution and have even formed a coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, to promote it. Just as October 7 provided an opportunity to confront Hamas and Hezbollah – two significant threats to Israel’s borders that previous governments had neglected – it also created a renewed opportunity to settle the Palestinian issue.

Seemingly, the prospects for a solution have improved, as there is growing international acceptance of the idea that, given the presence of approximately seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, separation is the only viable option.

On the other hand, neither side of the conflict currently has capable leadership willing to pursue this direction. In addition, various polls indicate that the war has fueled increased extremism among both the Jewish and Palestinian populations.

However, a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed within a broader regional settlement, may serve as the most promising path toward resolving the Palestinian issue.

The political, military, and intelligence failures of October 7 are now compounded, a year later, by a moral failure – the failure to secure the release of the hostages.

While it remains uncertain whether Yahya Sinwar would have ultimately agreed to a deal, the real failure lies in the Netanyahu government’s apparent lack of effort to exhaust every possible means for reaching a deal.

There is currently no end in sight to the war across its various fronts. Its continuation will have significant costs for Israel, both diplomatically – with increasing international and regional isolation – and economically, resulting in a substantial budget deficit, further downgrades of Israel’s credit rating, a decline in foreign investment, and more.

Given that Israel does not desire war with Iran and cannot eradicate Hezbollah, it should focus on militarily achievable goals leading to a political settlement in Lebanon and Gaza.

The notion of “victory” is elusive, as all parties involved will likely frame the conflict as a success for themselves. Significant objectives could include inflicting substantial damage on Iran, pushing Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border, dismantling its military capabilities, restoring a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) in demilitarized Gaza, and securing the return of hostages. Achieving these goals would provide justifiable grounds for concluding the war.

The article was published on October 14th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s Restored Deterrence Comes at the Cost of Diplomatic and Moral Challenges הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On May 26, 2000, during Hezbollah’s victory celebrations following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Nasrallah delivered a speech in which he famously declared that while Israel possesses nuclear weapons, it is “weaker than a spider’s web,” a phrase derived from the Quran.

Although the Second Lebanon War in 2006 led him to conclude that it would have been better for Hezbollah not to have initiated the military operation that sparked the war, it also resulted in the organization enhancing its military capabilities, thanks to substantial aid from Iran.  Additionally, the judicial upheavals in Israel further reinforced his perception – and that of many in the Arab world – that Israeli society is “weaker than a spider’s web.”

Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon has stemmed from its leadership in the struggle for the return of Lebanese territory still occupied by Israel and its central role in the “axis of resistance” aimed at undermining Israel, or at least reducing its power. This rhetoric may have compelled Hezbollah – possibly against its will – to enter the current war, albeit in a measured and calculated manner.

In other words, the rhetoric itself functioned as a powerful historical force that the organization no longer fully controlled. This situation is reminiscent of how Nasser was drawn into the 1967 conflict, despite his reluctance to engage in an all-out war with Israel.

Reinforcing self-image

Rhetoric is not only a powerful tool in the struggle against an enemy; it is also a tool for reinforcing self-image. During the current war, there have been instances in which Hezbollah’s media outlets have given false representations of its actions.

Thus, for example, after the assassination in July 2024 of the organization’s military commander in Beirut, Fuad Shukr, Nasrallah claimed that 340 rockets had been fired at Israel and that drones had hit two of Israel’s military bases, including Glilot. In actual fact, the bases were not attacked, and the large majority of the rockets were shot down. These boasts were intended to present a false impression of accomplishment for the Shi’ite audience in Lebanon and beyond, with the aim of restoring Hezbollah’s honor and averting humiliation.

This was surprising because, for years, Nasrallah has portrayed himself as a leader who operates in a measured manner and is capable of speaking the truth, even when it is not in his favor. This image was crucial for him in relation to both his external audience (Israel) and his internal audience (the Lebanese, particularly the Shi’ite population).

His willingness to lie in such a blatant manner was a clear indication of the pressure he was under. Furthermore, after the recent attacks, he promised that “Israel’s crime will lead to a severe response and appropriate punishment, from expected and unexpected quarters.” However, no such response materialized while he was still alive.

It is possible that Nasrallah interpreted the Israeli cabinet’s decision to include the return of residents in northern Israel to their homes as rhetoric aimed at internal purposes, akin to his own use of such rhetoric, rather than as a genuine expression of Israel’s determination to act against Hezbollah. It is particularly surprising that he failed to recognize this shift following the recent operation, which appeared to signal a significant change in Israel’s behavior.

In other words, Nasrallah did not take Israel’s declarations and actions seriously.

Similar expressions of bravado have emerged from Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. The Houthi spokesperson regularly boasts about fictitious achievements following missile launches at Israel. Another aspect of this behavior includes issuing exaggerated and empty threats, such as asserting that the Houthis are collaborating with Hezbollah and militias in Iraq to “close the Mediterranean,” or that maritime conflicts could escalate into unforeseen events that would cause Israel to “beg for peace.”

These declarations prompt many in Israel, as well as in the Arab world, to question whether the Houthis genuinely believe their own rhetoric. What is significant, however, is that this is the image they wish to project to their own public, most of whom may not have the means or inclination to verify the truth of such claims.

Iranian rhetoric shows similar patterns

Similar rhetoric can also be heard from Tehran, despite the significant setbacks faced by the axis of resistance. For instance, in response to Nasrallah’s assassination, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared, “The fate of the region will be decided by the forces of resistance,” and asserted that “the Zionists are too weak to inflict a meaningful blow on the strong structure of Hezbollah. Lebanon will make the enemy regret its actions.” Bragging statements came after Iran’s second missile attack against Israel, which caused some damage but only one fatality and a couple of light injuries.

Older readers may recognize a striking similarity to the broadcasts of Radio “Voice of Thunder” from Cairo before and during the 1967 war. The station’s propaganda transmissions in Hebrew aimed to instill fear in Israeli society, while its broadcasts in Arabic sought to bolster morale among Egyptians and Arabs through exaggerated claims of victories over Israel.

Since 1967, the media landscape has undergone a radical transformation, with the internet and social media enabling the public to verify statements made by leaders and regimes. It is not surprising that media outlets in Lebanon and across the Arab world frequently critique and ridicule the distorted narratives presented by Hezbollah – often portraying Nasrallah as an attacker of chicken coops rather than military bases, as he had claimed.

The bluster emanating from Beirut, Tehran, and Sanaa reflects a broader issue: the inability of regimes and organizations to face failure, dishonor, and humiliation. Ultimately, this rhetoric can take on a life of its own, as the speakers begin to believe their own fabrications. In Nasrallah’s case, this delusion cost his life.

The article was published on October 8th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט At His End, Nasrallah Was a Victim of His Own Rhetoric הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Mitvim Institute’s 2024 Israeli Foreign Policy Index, compiled almost a year after the outbreak of the Gaza war, challenges the notion that the Israeli public moved sharply to the right. It reveals that when Israelis are asked to consider long-term strategies regarding Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Iran, a majority of them favor diplomatic solutions. This shift reflects not a leftward movement but rather a turn towards pragmatism. This emerging trend presents an opportunity for Europe to lead, together with Middle-Eastern partners, a bold, long-term vision for peace and stability in the Middle East. Outlining a vision becomes crucial as the region gradually transitions toward a regional conflict, with shockwaves likely to reverberate across the Mediterranean.

Mitvim’s survey reveals two main trends in the Israeli public – one of broad agreement and the other of deep polarization. The first trend is the rejection of the conflict management approach and the public ambition to seek decisive solutions. Only 12% said Israel should avoid strategic measures and adhere to the pre-war situation in its relations with the Palestinians. However, it is this recognition that strategic decisions can no longer be avoided that divides Israelis, leading to two radically different perceptions of what these decisions signify. Hence, the Index highlights polarization between two camps.

The pragmatists, comprising a small relative majority of about 40-50% of the public, support the setting of a political horizon with the Palestinians within a broad regional framework, recognize the limitations of military power, and seek diplomatic cooperation to solve Israel’s security problems. They back regional cooperation as a primary means of advancing an end to the war. They support a package deal that includes normalization with KSA, a US security umbrella, and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state (44%); see a regional coalition as the main solution to the Iranian threat (46%); and support the deployment of a multinational force as a temporary solution after hostilities in Gaza cease (46%).

The other camp, the fundamentalists, are a large minority (about 30%) that currently adopt positions which were the radical right domain prior to the war. This camp favors annexation of the West Bank and resettlement in Gaza (29%), independent Israeli military campaign against Iran (32%), and reliance on an independent military action.

While the survey was conducted before Nasrallah’s elimination and the escalation of the Iran-Israel war, it still reflects a significant preference among Israelis for diplomatic solutions. Even after 10 bitter months of Hezbollah’s shelling and failed diplomatic efforts to stop this unprovoked attack, not to mention the failure of the international community to fulfill UNSCR 1701 and prevent the armament of Hezbollah, a majority of the Israeli public still opt for a diplomatic solution if one could be found. 51% pavor a diplomatic solution whether in the form of an immediate negotiated withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani river, or a longer-term Israeli-Lebanese agreement. 60% opt for diplomatic options when examining long-term strategies to deal with Iran.

Mitvim’s index highlights that a majority of Israelis align with European policymakers on key issues, notably that the war’s end should coincide with broader Israeli-Palestinian-international efforts for a settlement. They also favor long-term diplomatic solutions with Iran and its proxies, provided Israel’s security remains intact. Most importantly – the public mindset in Israel is a mindset of decisive steps, offering a unique opportunity for the international community—especially Europe—to present a bold Middle East vision. As the U.S. approaches elections, the Biden administration is likely to avoid risky agenda-setting, making it crucial for Europe and MENA actors to lead a new coalition for peace and stability. At the brink of an uncontrolled regional conflict, Europe must lead the efforts to outline an alternative future for the Middle-East. It should channel this devastating year of warfare into an opportunity for generating new political momentum for long-term stability.

The article was publish on October 7th, 2024 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine.

הפוסט An Israeli Public Turn into Pragmatism a Year Into the War May Provide an Opening for a New International Vision for Ending the War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For various reasons, including political considerations, there are limits at this moment to how the international community can push Israelis and Palestinians to adopt and fully implement Biden’s grand design. But it must not give up. This group of states – composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, other Western and European states, and Arab and Muslim states such as Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – can still play a crucial role in promoting this solution. They should assist local forces who are invested in advancing peace in two key ways: by countering Israel’s advancing annexation efforts in the West Bank, and by promoting transformative actions on the ground to support the future implementation of the two-state solution.

Israel’s government is taking steps towards annexation the West Bank, extending Israel’s sovereignty and erasing the Green Line that has separated it from the occupied territories. It supports violent settler actions to expel Palestinian communities from their lands, promotes settlement construction, allocates funds for settlement development and has transferred administration of the occupied territories from military to civilian control within the Defence Ministry Which is controlled by the ultra-right. The government aims to eliminate any distinction between Israel and the settlements, preventing future territorial compromise and the two-state solution. In the defensive battle against these efforts, the abovementioned states have potentially effective tools at their disposal that could prevent further deterioration of conditions in the West Bank.

For years, Western and Arab states have tried to influence Israel’s government by applying political and diplomatic pressure on it. At times, they have conditioned cooperation or other forms of support on halting actions that deepen the occupation and annexation. This was the case with the United States’ demands to stop settlement construction and to evacuate illegal outposts, and with the linkage between the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and halting the government’s annexation plans. Unfortunately, the actions of the international community have been little more than political and moral lip service. Examples include the European Union’s decision in 2016 to label products from settlements after years of discussions, which has remained largely symbolic, and the initiatives promoted at the United Nations to create a blacklist of companies supporting the occupation, which never led to coordinated action. In reality, the international community adopted Israel’s approach of conflict management (as opposed to trying and solve the conflict), and did not place real pressure on Israel to end the occupation or be held accountable for it as long as the region remained relatively quiet. Thus, despite these efforts, successive Israeli governments have continued to expand the settlement enterprise.

In early 2024, a new tool was introduced by the United States and other Western states: sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations promoting annexation. So far, these have affected a small number of violent settlers whom Israel’s political and legal system chose not to confront. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of this tool, but against a government indifferent to its international standing and to democratic-liberal values, when political and diplomatic pressure seems ineffective, sanctions could be a key tool. They have an immediate and significant impact on the functioning of these individuals and organizations, and they exert additional pressure on the Israeli government, which is committed to the settlers and is required to find solutions for them. The government’s support for the settlers therefore comes at the expense of all Israeli citizens – by taking capacity away from government planning in other sectors and by spending funds from public coffers. Thus, in the face of attempts by the government and the settlers to erase the Green Line, these sanctions accentuate it and present Israeli citizens with a clear choice — either the settlements or Israel. Sanctions can become more significant and effective by expanding them to include more central figures and organizations in the settlement movement, and by increasing coordination on them between Europe, the United States and Arab states.

The role of the international community is not only to keep the two-state solution alive but also to establish facts on the ground to promote it. Just as settlers have, for years, taken steps to obstruct peace, the international community must now actively promote an ‘evolving peace’. This should involve practical measures to advance the two-state solution across different areas. Such efforts are essential to avoid reverting to the pre-7 October conflict-management approach and to support instead the establishment of a stable, effective and moderate Palestinian state that can coexist peacefully and securely with a moderate Israel.

For example, as part of strengthening the Palestinian national movement, the international community should, at an appropriate time determined with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, recognize a Palestinian state with borders to be determined in future negotiations with Israel. This would help change the legal status of the occupied territories, bolster moderate Palestinians and Israelis who support compromise, and foster a more equitable negotiation process when the time comes. The international community should also be ready to support the Palestinian Authority and prevent its collapse in the face of Israeli retaliatory measures following such recognition.

Recognition alone will not be enough, however; changes on the ground will be essential. Arab states, Europe and the United States have the relevant tools and experience to support these changes. There is a need to build the institutions and infrastructure of the future Palestinian state, to foster peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians, to establish moderate approaches, to create mutual restraining interdependence and to strengthen in both societies the moderate forces that will support a political leadership in line with these goals. All these efforts must be pursued through cooperation, even in an environment where Israel’s government and terrorist organizations will attempt to undermine them.

One such effort must be to ensure that the Palestinian Authority is integrated in key regional projects that Israel’s government would not want to reject. For example, the United Arab Emirates could insist on including the Palestinian Authority in the water-for-energy exchange project between Israel and Jordan that it backs, or the European Union could similarly condition Israel’s connection to the European electricity grid through the EuroAsia Interconnector. In the longer term, it will be important to ensure that the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor includes the Palestinian Authority or state.

Reforms within the Palestinian Authority must be advanced, with closer monitoring of how resources are being translated into building effective institutions and improving the services provided to Palestinians. Investment in local governance is necessary, accompanied by the development of local physical and institutional infrastructure that will form the foundation for the Palestinian state. Israel was built in a similar manner – by connecting sub-centres that were founded and developed under the British mandate. To this end, for example, the EU’s Twinning and TAIEX programmes could be expanded and adapted for local Palestinian governance.

There must be support for civil society organizations in Israel and Palestine that encourages joint projects and strengthens the discourse and organizations that promote peace and equality. The expansion and implementation of the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act adopted by the US Congress in 2020 can serve as a platform for this. In the fight against fundamentalist Islam, tapping Indonesian civil society organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, that promote moderate Islam worldwide and the United Arab Emirates’ experience in promoting religious tolerance can lead to profound changes within Palestinian society. The Jewish diaspora in the United States should do the same for Israeli society.

Efforts should be made to promote Palestinian economic independence by connecting the Palestinian economy to the Arab world and developing local sources of income, alongside local solutions for energy and food security based on sustainable practices. A long-term planning effort is needed to lay the groundwork for building the Palestinian state. Rebuilding the Palestinian security and police forces, and much more, is necessary. In short, there is a lot of work to be done, and it must start.

Middle Eastern countries, Europe and the United States have a vested interest in promoting peace and stability in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. It is not viable for them to wait idly for Israeli and Palestinian political leaders to choose peace. The international community must actively establish facts on the ground to advance peace, protect the possibility of a two-state solution and create favourable conditions for nurturing peace-supportive leadership and implementing a political process when the time is right. This is the essence of ‘evolving peace’ and Israelis and Palestinians need the international community’s support to overcome their extremist leaderships.

The article was published on September 27th in Chatham House.

הפוסט The International Community’s Role in Moving From the Gaza War to Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians and Regional Stability הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the Allenby Bridge Crossing attack diverted attention from another significant event in the kingdom – the House of Representatives elections held every four years. The timing of these elections was particularly inconvenient for King Abdullah, given the ongoing war in Gaza, the worsening economic crisis, and the terror attack just two days earlier. They were held in the context of a process of liberalization that the king has been leading in recent years, with three main goals.

First, the process primarily aimed at strengthening the political parties and integrating more of them into the political system. Of the 130 outgoing members of the House of Representatives, 118 were independents, while only 12 represented just four parties.

What lay behind this step were fears of an increase in the strength of the Islamic Action Front (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan). Thus, in the new electoral system, every citizen votes for two candidates: a representative from a national list and a representative from a regional list.

Two-thirds of the 138 seats in the House of Representatives are allocated to representatives from regional lists (97), with the remaining seats (41) awarded to those from national lists. This system was designed to dilute the power of the Islamist party. However, the intended outcome did not materialize.

While the new House includes 12 parties – three times more than before – the Islamic Action Front has tripled its number of representatives to 31 and now comprises around 23% of the House.

The second goal was to increase the representation of women and younger people, reflecting the ambitions of sectors traditionally underrepresented in Jordanian politics. King Abdullah has, in fact, been working to advance the status of women and youth for several years. On this front, significant progress was made compared to the past: 27 of the 138 members (nearly a fifth) in the new House of Representatives are women, up from 15 out of 130 (11.5%) in the previous House.

The third goal of the reforms was to increase public trust in politics. A survey conducted in May 2023 by the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman found that the majority of Jordanians do not trust political parties and believe they have failed. Only 2% follow party activities, and just 1% know the names of party leaders or would consider joining a party. Therefore, this third goal has not yet been achieved, as only a third of the electorate turned out to vote – just slightly more than in previous elections.

Overall, to the king’s credit, the elections were fair and transparent, as confirmed by EU supervisory commissions at the polling stations – no small feat in a region dominated by autocratic regimes that avoid unnecessary political risks.

The gains made by the Islamic Action Front were hardly surprising, however, as the past two years have seen a significant rise in support for political Islam across the Middle East. Many Jordanians favor greater inclusion of Islamic parties in national politics.

According to a May 2023 survey by the Arab Barometer, around 50% of Jordanians reported reading religious texts and praying daily as well as expressing a desire for Islamist parties to play a more prominent role in the country’s politics.

Muslim Brotherhood aligned with the Palestinian cause

Additionally, there has been substantial support for the Hamas movement despite it being legally banned. Around 57% of the Jordanian public demonstrate their sympathy for Hamas, even before the outbreak of the current war. When the Gaza war began, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan aligned itself with the Palestinians and expressed solidarity with Hamas. The Brotherhood organized pro-Hamas demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Amman and other locations, raised funds, and coordinated donations of food, clothing, and equipment for Palestinians in Gaza.

It maintained contact with Hamas leaders and supported both the continuation of the fighting and the recruitment of Jordanian volunteers for terror attacks against Israel. In this context, the timing of the war worked to the advantage of the Islamic Action Front, which was able to incorporate the Palestinian resistance into its election campaign messaging.

Support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, demonstrated by the elections, extends beyond the cities. It is deeper and more widespread, reaching towns in the periphery and even Bedouin tribes. Residents of weaker peripheral regions, often lacking proper infrastructure, have traditionally supported Islamic movements and, at times, expressed sympathy for Islamic terrorist organizations. One such region is Ma’an in southern Jordan, the hometown of Maher Diab Hussein Al-Jazi, the terrorist responsible for the murder of three Israelis at the Allenby Bridge Crossing.

In recent years, Bedouin Jordanian citizens have become more prominent within the Islamic Action Front, including as members of the House of Representatives.

In contrast, Palestinians in Jordan have shown greater loyalty to the Hashemite regime and refrained from engaging in subversive activities or mass protests against the government during and after the “Arab Spring.” Their strong participation in Jordan’s economy is one of the key factors behind this loyalty.

To what extent, then, should Israel be concerned about the election results?

Historically, it is important to note that this is not the first time the Muslim Brotherhood has garnered significant support in Jordan. The party reached the peak of its influence in the 1989 elections when it secured 22 seats in the House of Representatives, which at the time had only 80 members – meaning that the Brotherhood controlled about a quarter of the available seats.

Just as King Hussein skillfully managed Jordan’s foreign policy with a balanced approach, signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, despite the Brotherhood’s opposition, King Abdullah will also have to navigate between national strategic interests and local political pressures. The House of Representatives is likely to become more vocal and critical of Israel and the West.

Combative declarations, antisemitic slogans, and calls to revoke the peace treaty or expel the Israeli ambassador are expected to resurface.

The king is well aware that the threats he faces come not only from Iran but also from the growing strength of political Islam within his kingdom. In response to these challenges, King Abdullah will continue to rely on the West, Egypt, the Gulf states and Israel – an alliance crucial to the survival of the Hashemite regime.

The article was published on September 23rd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Islam’s Influence in Jordan Presenting Significant Challenges for the King הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Almost a year after the October 7th attack, the survey aimed to assess the public’s views on key issues concerning Israel’s foreign policy and strategy. It focused on immediate topics such as war objectives and potential exit strategies, while also exploring how the war has shaped the public’s strategic mindset on foreign policy issues. This document presents the findings of the survey, divided into five areas: Israel’s foreign relations, Israeli foreign policy, Israel and the Palestinians, Israel-United States relations, and Israel’s relations with regional actors.

This year the survey included, among other things, questions about the preferred outcome of the fighting in Gaza; Israel-US relations and the upcoming presidential elections; Israel’s policy towards Hezbollah in the short term, and towards Iran in the long term; Israel’s global status following the war and the danger of becoming a “pariah state”; the future of strategic relations with Egypt; Israel’s relation with the UN and international sanctions on violent settlers; The connection between the campaign against Iran and the conflict with the Palestinians; Israel’s role in the global struggle between the US, China and Russia; the humanitarian crisis in Gaza; and the future of Israel-Turkey
relations.

Main findings

A sharp drop in the Israeli public’s assessment of Israel’s situation in the world (4.31). This is a significant decrease from the relatively low score given by the public last year (5.03) and the second lowest assessment in the last decade. 70% of respondents describe Israel’s international situation as not good or not very good.

The majority of the public (57%) show great concern over the transformation of the State of Israel into a “pariah state” following the continuation of the war in Gaza and the government’s policies. This, compared to 43% who show little or no concern at all.

The public gives the government’s performance in the field of foreign relations since the beginning of the war a score of 3.84 – which is the lowest score since we started conducting the surveys in 2013. This is a drastic decrease from the relatively low score given by the public last year (4.89).

The public gives the state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a score of 3.94, which is also the lowest score since we started the survey a decade ago. This is a drastic decrease in the evaluation of the situation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from last year (5.00).

A relative majority of the Israeli public (44%) supports a package deal that includes normalization with Saudi Arabia, the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state that is not controlled by Hamas, and an American-led regional defense alliance. 37% oppose this deal. 19% have not yet formed an opinion on the subject.

A majority of the public (about half of the respondents) supports the international move to impose sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations that encourage violence in the territories, as long as it is limited to violent settlers only. This, compared to the 33% who oppose the move altogether.

Building a US-sponsored regional coalition is the public’s preferred strategy for dealing with the threat from Iran and its allies. 46% support this option, compared to 32% who support launching an independent military campaign against Iran and its proxies. 14% support the opening of diplomatic negotiations with Iran. Only 8% support the continuation of the existing situation of limited fighting against Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis.

44% of the public supports an all-out military operation in Lebanon as a preferred strategy to deal with Hezbollah in Lebanon. 25% of the respondents think that the international community should be harnessed to promote a diplomatic move that will lead to the withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani River. A similar percentage supports the promotion of a broad international arrangement to stabilize the internal system in Lebanon and delineate the land border between the countries. Only 5% support leaving the status quo with Hezbollah.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index of 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Key points:

1. The Gaza war reignited the Two-State Solution, with the US, EU, and Arab countries working together to achieve it through a “reverse engineering” approach.

2. The EU’s potential role is outlined in three stages of “The Israeli Initiative”:

Political Horizon: Establish a political vision and international monitoring forum.

Transitional Phase (peace-building): Demilitarize the Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, hold elections, and begin regional projects.

Negotiation (peace-making): Final negotiations for Palestinian statehood and normalizing Israel-Arab relations.

The paper highlights the importance of the EU’s role in maintaining the viability of the Two-State Solution in the West Bank. In the short term, the EU should provide humanitarian aid, counter annexation efforts in the West Bank, stabilize the Palestinian Authority (PA), and address Iranian proxies. Its influence depends on trust-building with both sides and leveraging its status as both a financial and political player.

The conclusion calls on the EU to prepare for post-war diplomatic and economic opportunities, with a focus on revitalizing the PA, stabilizing the region, and gaining trust with Israel through continued engagement.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Deradicalization and Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation: Lessons and Recommendations Based on Past Conflicts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The current conflict has highlighted the tunnels’ critical role in Hamas’s military build-up. Moreover, taxes levied on goods smuggled through these passageways have significantly bolstered Hamas’s finances. One researcher estimated that as early as 2008, monthly tunnel-derived income reached $35 million.

While the exact number of tunnels and the volume of trade they facilitated remain unclear, the implications for Hamas – or any future governing entity in Gaza – underscores the need for rigorous oversight of border crossings.

The tunnel issue is longstanding, and Israel has consistently regarded it as a serious threat. Since disengaging from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005, and especially following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007, Israel has regularly shared intelligence with Egypt about tunnel activities and smuggling operations.

WikiLeaks documents reveal repeated Israeli complaints, both directly to Egypt and through US channels, about insufficient Egyptian efforts to combat this phenomenon. In the summer of 2008, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak informed American officials that Egypt had destroyed over 280 tunnels, emphasizing that countering tunnels was “the job of Egypt and Israel, not just Egypt.”

Previous operations in Gaza

Following Operation Cast Lead in late 2009, Egypt reported destroying more than 200 tunnels, yet Israeli concerns persisted. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, upon assuming power in 2014, also intensified efforts to demolish and seal tunnels. Nevertheless, Hamas’s motivation to dig and profit evidently outpaced Egypt’s resolve to close these breaches.

Several factors contributed to this situation. The peace agreement and a 2005 addendum mandated that only border guards and police units, rather than well-trained and equipped army units, be stationed on the Egyptian border.

Egypt’s post-2011 Arab Spring upheaval spawned a jihadist threat in Sinai, demanding immediate military attention. Notably, Israel provided crucial military and intelligence support to Egypt in addressing this challenge. Local actors, including Bedouins and, potentially, some security elements, found financial incentives in cooperating with Hamas.

The possibility of ideological and political support for Hamas among certain factions cannot be dismissed.

Despite these complications, both Israel and Egypt shared a strategic interest in curbing Hamas’s military and economic capabilities. Following Operation Cast Lead, then-US assistant secretary of state for Middle Eastern Affairs David Welch noted, “Egypt and Israel have a common problem: Hamas.”

The current Gaza war has presented numerous challenges for Israeli-Egyptian relations, particularly with the IDF’s incursion into Rafah and seizure of the crossing – a significant symbol of sovereignty for Hamas and Palestinians.

To date, both states have adeptly managed their diplomatic ties. Egypt continues to mediate between Israel and Hamas on hostage issues and war termination – with Israeli delegations frequently visiting Cairo.

If pre-war discrepancies existed between Egypt’s strategic interests and ground-level tactics, the conflict has underscored the interconnectedness of strategic and tactical concerns in securing the Egypt-Gaza border.

Recent reports indicate that Israel and Egypt are exploring the deployment of sensors and other technologies along the Gaza-Egypt border to enable Israeli monitoring of corridor and crossing activities, addressing tunnel and smuggling issues. Importantly, Israeli withdrawal doesn’t preclude its ability to thwart attacks or smuggling, as evidenced by its long-standing operations in Area A of the West Bank, nominally under Palestinian Authority (PA) security control.

The hostage issue is, fundamentally, a humanitarian and moral imperative that must take precedence. Presenting the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah Crossing as non-negotiable is not only ethically questionable but also strategically flawed, given that the security risks of Israeli withdrawal are not insurmountable.

This leads to the conclusion that Netanyahu’s opposition serves more as a pretext for rejecting a deal rather than a substantive argument.

The article was published on August 31st in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט The hostages should be prioritized over Philadelphi and Rafah הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document is one of a series of studies and policy documents that examine the relations between the local climate and foreign policy, as part of a project by the Mitvim Institute and with the support of the Glazer Foundation. The document was written in collaboration with SID-Israel, the umbrella organization of the Israeli professional community in the fields of humanitarian aid and international development. SID-Israel incorporates civil society organizations, government institutions, academic and research programs, private companies, consultants, and independent experts, and works to create a supportive professional environment, based on the exchange of knowledge and experience. Sid-Israel was established and operates thanks to the generous and ongoing support of Pears Foundation.

הפוסט Humanitarian Strategy in the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hezbollah’s opponents have been criticizing it for decades for  serving foreign interests and undermining the stability and security of the Lebanese state. The events of the last ten months underscore their criticism, as the Shiite organization threatens to drag Lebanon into a destructive war against the basic interests of the crisis-stricken country.

Indeed, it seems that the ongoing war with Israel sharpens the constant tension within which Hezbollah exists – the tension between its Iranian-Shiite identity and the national image it tries to project as the “defender of Lebanon.” This tension is Hezbollah’s most prominent weakness.

Since the beginning of the war, Nasrallah has tried to walk between the raindrops and reconcile the conflicting interests in the hope that the war in Gaza will end soon and allow him to continue holding the stick at both ends. Despite the clear consensus within Lebanon against a full-scale war with Israel, including among the Shiite community, and the harsh criticisms leveled at him, Nasrallah has so far managed to avoid serious challenges to the legitimacy of Hezbollah. However, the event in Majdal Shams may now threaten his ability to continue doing so.

Hezbollah’s swift denial of involvement in the attack, despite widespread evidence of its responsibility, reflects a familiar tactic. The group and its allies are using a classic strategy: diverting attention away from their actions by accusing others of trying to incite inter-communal strife within Lebanon. By doing this, Hezbollah is attempting to frame any criticism or blame directed at it as an attempt to destabilize the Lebanese state.

However, despite this denial of responsibility, genuine anxiety has spread among Lebanese in the last day about an Israeli response that could very well drag the Land of Cedars into a full-scale war and bring destruction on a catastrophic scale. Accordingly, the criticism leveled at Hezbollah is intensifying.

The internal pressure on Hezbollah is a unique opportunity to end the undeclared war between Israel and Hezbollah on relatively favorable terms for Israel. Thus, the attack on Majdal Shams can have a similar impact to the attack on Qana Village during Operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996 – a game-changing event that leads to a cessation of hostilities. If Israel, with the help of the international community, leverages this pressure, it can push Hezbollah to end the fighting on terms that advance Israeli interests, particularly focusing on the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s forces from the south. Obviously, such an action would provide only a temporary solution, but it would allow for a significant achievement for Israel by enabling the return of northern residents and more effectively isolating the campaign in Gaza. In doing so, it can bring substantial issues back to the table, such as Hezbollah’s legitimacy to hold weapons outside the framework of the Lebanese state, and the question of its presence south of the Litani River. 

Cooperation with the international community has a significant role in promoting Israeli goals. The attack on Hezbollah came in response to the elimination of its field commanders in Kila village, a few kilometers from the Israeli border. Hezbollah’s presence and operations in the south are an affront to the international community and its decisions, standing in complete violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The Majdal Shams massacre can be a turning point for the level of international involvement. This should include clear conditions for any economic or other assistance to the Lebanese state, requiring the enforcement of the Resolution.

It is clear and obvious that even ending the current round of fighting with a diplomatic solution will not resolve all the standing issues between Israel and Hezbollah, including territorial contentions along the land border. The likelihood of a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the coming years remains high. However, it is better for Israel to act according to Sun Tzu’s ancient advice—to choose the arena and time for the war—rather than being dragged into a conflict without clear goals or an exit strategy, and less than optimal conditions.

Instead of trying to reshape “response equations,” Israel should act proactively to change the conditions in the north. The immediate goal should be providing security—albeit temporary—to the residents of the north and allowing them to return to their homes. Simultaneously, it should address the long-term necessity of preparing the state and the IDF for a military-political campaign against Hezbollah and Iran in the coming years. By doing so, Israel can ensure both the short-term safety of its citizens and strategically position itself for future conflicts under more favorable conditions. 

הפוסט The Majdal Shams Massacre – A Chance for a Diplomatic End to the War in the North on Favorable Terms for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Palestine Is One Vote Short in the Security Council from Being Recognised as a State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM,) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met secretly in Bahrain in mid-June with senior figures in the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE,) Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

CENTCOM is a unified combatant command of the US military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a crucial role in coordinating military and security efforts among US allies. Such a meeting, particularly with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on?

Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is usually linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict.

In Israel, “normalization” has become a codeword for “warm” peace with other countries – as opposed to the situation between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, in which there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but not “normalization.”

By contrast, in the Arab world, the connotations of “normalization” (tatbi in Arabic) are negative, and thus the term usually preferred is “normal relations.”

Thus, “normalization” should reflect several levels of relations. The first is that of functional formal normalization. This model features cooperation on defense and intelligence, and occasionally also on economic issues. This kind of normalization is mainly based on the existence of common interests and enemies, and it takes place mainly behind the scenes, though it can also have public expressions stemming from the existence of diplomatic relations.

Cooperation is conducted between formal representatives in the royal court, the president’s office, the military, intelligence agencies, and relevant government ministries. This is the model of Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan.

The second model is unofficial normalization, characterized by bilateral relations – mainly secret – without the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is the situation in which Israel found itself for many years after independence, up until the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Oslo Accords, and the Abraham Accords.

The third model is that of legitimate normalization, characterized by cooperation not only at the government level but also between civil societies. The cooperation is held openly and publicly, albeit with some covert cooperation as well. This is the model of Israel’s relations with the Abraham Accord states – Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain.

Why do we need a formal agreement?

THE SECRET meeting in Bahrain raises an important question: If Israel is benefiting from military and intelligence cooperation during the war, even as it is being vilified in the Arab world, then what need is there for a formal agreement with Saudi Arabia, especially if Israel is required to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in return, or to take some concrete steps toward this outcome?

There are several answers to this question: First, in the absence of any real progress on the Palestinian issue, Israel is liable to return to its former status in the Middle East – that of a mistress with whom dealings are held behind the scenes, but without such transactions being publicly acknowledged.

Israel’s decision-makers had no choice but to accept this status because the rulers of Arab states feared for their lives and their legitimacy. Without any formal commitment, such relations are vulnerable and unstable, at the mercy of circumstances, interests, and the consequences of their own exposure.

Second, Israel’s ability to cooperate economically with Arab states is dependent on the existence of a warm legitimate peace. The relations that developed with the Abraham Accord countries are an example. Building significant diplomatic and economic ties is only possible when there is openness.

Thus, for example, the Negev Forum, created to combat Iran’s efforts to attain military nuclear capability, held its first meeting (and to date, its last meeting) in March 2022, with representatives in attendance from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE, while Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also invited.

Trade with the UAE had reached around three billion dollars before October 7. Moreover, according to the Abraham Accords Report, for the first five months of 2024, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE was $1.39 billion, constituting an 8% increase from the first five months of 2023.

A smaller increase also occurred in the volume of trade between Israel and Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain. A decrease in trade (17%) occurred with Jordan, while Turkey announced a complete ban, though figures are not yet available.

Economic cooperation of this kind with Saudi Arabia can only happen when diplomatic relations exist; the economic possibilities with Saudi Arabia are much greater. There is also the possibility of realizing President Joe Biden’s proposed economic corridor from India to the Mediterranean and Europe, via Saudi Arabia – an ambitious infrastructure project aimed at connecting India to Europe through the Middle East.

Third, Israel is already becoming a pariah state in the international arena. Moreover, there is a risk that further escalation would even damage the secret cooperation held with states in the region. Ending the war, with a linkage to a regional process vis-à-vis the Saudis, will halt and even reverse this process, and might expand the circle of countries that normalize relations with Israel.

And finally, it is in Israel’s interest to offer a vision for a solution to the Palestinian issue, as all attempts to bypass this problem have failed.

The fact that quiet normalization continues with the moderate Arab countries during the war is an important sign of the strong existing interests behind this alliance.

The article was publish on July 15th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Secret Meetings Prove Israel, Saudi Arabia Still Want Normalization Amid War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A Blue Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Climate, Society and Regional Prosperity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

I have been a lecturer in international relations and a peace scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for the last 31 years. I am always amazed at the naïve and misguided attitude we Israelis have toward the concept of “peace,” which has become a pejorative in the national lexicon. This is the consequence of a complex and tragic situation, disappointment regarding truncated peace processes and above all decades of Orwellian social engineering to the effect that “managing” the conflict is preferable to any political solution and that “total victory” supplants the vision of the prophet Isaiah.

Part of the confusion and the natural recoil to talking about the possibility of peace on the “day after” the war in Gaza stems from a binary and also naïve understanding of the concept. Many of us, who are still in the grip of trauma, for understandable reasons, tend to think that the Arabs as a whole and the Palestinians in particular want “to throw us into the sea” (we received clear proof of that intention in the horrific massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7). Others think that any talk of peace must refer to “true peace,” a la John Lennon, imagining a world suffused with harmony and love, in which the Palestinians have been transformed into ardent Zionists.

But there is another possibility. Peace in its “negative” sense – namely the absence of war, rather than of conflict – is achieved out of vested interests and a sober-eyed reading of reality. There need not be a necessary link between peace and love. Negative peace is made between enemies who reach the conclusion, after a war, out of selfish considerations, that it is in their own interests to reach a political solution. After all, war has no inherent value and it does not allow for a normal life.

Peace is also the normal state of affairs that characterizes relations between most of the countries in the world, including those that are hostile to each other, such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or even the United States and China nowadays. Costa Rica is a demilitarized, thriving country in Central America that does not constitute a threat to its neighbors. And as U.S. President Joe Biden constantly stresses, a completely demilitarized Palestinian state in the format of a two-state solution would bring Israel its coveted security (and peace), with the requisite guarantees.

From the time I was a doctoral candidate at Princeton University, in the late 1980s, I have been studying processes of “peaceful change” as a widespread alternative to war in international relations. The process implies a change in the existing situation, not by way of violence, but as a result of cooperation and negotiations between two or more parties. Territorially, it refers to cases of decolonization, transfer of territories between states (including as a solution for border disputes), the establishment of new states, and a change in the legal status of certain areas without the transfer of territory or sovereignty.

There are hundreds of examples of such peaceful change in the history of Europe, America, Africa and Asia, particularly in the context of decolonization. In the Israeli-Arab conflict, we can point to the successful cases of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt (1977-1979) and between Israel and Jordan (1993-1994). Imagine for a moment what our situation would be today in the absence of peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.

Conversely, the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, in 1991-2011, ultimately failed. Moreover, the negotiation process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was severed terminally, with the failure of the mediation effort by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2014 and the Palestinians’ application to participate in several international institutions, including the International Court of Justice. Nonetheless, as called for in the vilified Oslo Accords, there is still security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, a situation that assists the Israeli security forces in fighting terrorism.

Within the framework of my academic research, I developed a model that presents six background conditions that help to bring about successful peaceful change, together with variables in the process itself. Even if the model is primarily theoretical, it has already been used as part of the mediation efforts of the Organization of American States and the United States after the war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, which three years later led to a peace agreement between the two countries. If since then we have not heard anything about a territorial dispute between those two South American countries, that augurs well for the future.

The background conditions are: (1) An asymmetrical distribution of power that gives one side a reason to want to preserve the status quo; (2) similar political regimes; (3) normative agreement regarding the application of international law in relation to the territory in dispute; (4) diplomatic involvement of a third party; (5) a previous war; and (6) a third-party threat to one or both of the parties involved in the negotiations.

The variables in the process refer to the degree of cooperation and reciprocity between the parties, the negotiations themselves and the differences between the sides’ interests vis-à-vis the territory (for example, one side wants “national honor” and “economic benefits,” the other wants “security”).

The October 7 massacre and Israel’s justified counterattack in the Gaza Strip shattered the illusion that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could be “managed,” and brought about the most brutal war between the two peoples since 1947-1949. After the war – and assuming that Hamas does not continue to be sovereign in the Gaza Strip but is supplanted by an international entity for a transitional period – is a gradual process of peaceful change possible between Israel and the Palestinians?

As in the case of Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War, a few years would be required before a process of peaceful change becomes feasible – but not a generation. Ironically, a tragic situation of “mutually hurting stalemate” between the two sides has made them both “ripe” for a political process that could bring about a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israel. On the surface, it appears as if the current impasse might be a good candidate for the proposed model, with certain adjustments, per the following favorable condition for peaceful change:

1. The distribution of power between Israel and the Palestinians is clearly tilted in Israel’s favor. Israel possesses the military, economic and even moral shoulders that enable it to be “generous” in the pursuit of its national interest, according to which only a situation of peace can guarantee recognition of its borders, once such borders have been demarcated by agreement. As such, Israel will be able to become a “normal” state that integrates into the region and makes peace with Saudi Arabia and with all the moderate Arab states.

2. Israel is (still?) a liberal democracy, at least within the boundaries of the Green Line, whereas the Palestinian Authority is not a state in the full sense of the word, and its regime is (still) authoritarian (elections were last held there in 2006). Neither of the current leaders (Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively) possesses the domestic legitimacy or the willingness to move ahead in the direction of a political solution. Accordingly, we must surmise that only democratic elections in both Israel and the PA, and new leaderships, will allow for them to advance peaceful change in the coming years.

3. Both Israel and the PLO have recognized and accepted UN Resolution 181, which set out the partition plan of
November 29, 1947, and Security Council Resolution 242, from 1967, regarding “withdrawal… from territories” in exchange for peace, as expressed, among other places, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at Bar Ilan University in June 2009. It can be said that a normative agreement exists regarding the recognition of the mutual legitimate rights of the two peoples to part of the territory of the Land of Israel/Palestine.

4. The current war has led to a considerable internationalization of the conflict. The United States, the countries of the Arab League, Turkey, the European states and the vast majority of the international community support a solution based on Resolution 181 (a “two-state solution”) and are ready to mobilize for the diplomatic effort that would be required to advance it, following Gaza’s postwar rehabilitation. Renewed ratification by the Arab states, and Israeli recognition, of the Arab League’s 2002 peace initiative could assist in the process.

5. The current war between Israel and Hamas has demonstrated tragically that it will not be possible to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians by military means alone. Hence, the diplomatic path must be tried after not having been attempted substantively for the past 30 years, due to its being torpedoed by extremist elements on both sides, including Hamas and the Jewish messianic – all of whom view the political process and the division of the land as a substantive threat to their fundamentalist, maximalist visions.

6. The external threat posed by Iran and its proxies in the “resistance axis” constitutes an incentive for the moderates in the Middle East, and also for the Israelis and the Palestinians, to embark on a path to peace and compromise. In addition to the external threat, each of the two societies also faces a considerable domestic threat emanating from the extremist elements that demand exclusive ownership of the same land.

A year ago, inside a Salvation Army store in Washington, D.C., I saw an inscription on the wall, attributed to the writer Robert Ludlum: “Hope is stronger than fear.” There are moments in international relations in which a crisis can constitute an opening for a historic opportunity. The bulk of the background conditions for a process of peaceful change between Israelis and Palestinians exist already today, even if at the moment it is mainly fear and despair that prevails between them, rather than trust. May courageous and legitimate leaders arise, among both the Israelis and the Palestinians, who can transcend themselves and the agony of their peoples, and launch a political process after the war with massive third-party assistance. That is the life imperative for both peoples who inhabit this land, neither of which is going away.

Even if this academic model at the moment sounds a bit fanciful, we must talk about peace and about change by peaceful means as a road map for a better future, and demarcate an alternative to Israel’s becoming mired in the Gaza Strip in the wake of its military occupation and the continuation of a guerrilla war of attrition without any
achievable goals.

The article was published on June 21st, 2024 in Haaretz.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian Peace May Look Entirely Different From How We Imagine It הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now.

How is it that Hamas, not a particularly large or strong organization, is refusing to bend to the pressure from the United States, the main global power, and two major states in the Middle East, Egypt and Qatar?

Despite being under heavy military pressure from Israel, suffering large-scale casualties, and having lost most of its territorial strongholds, as well as its Philadelphi Corridor tunnel lifeline, Hamas remains unwilling to accept proposals that would seem to be relatively generous, considering its current situation.

To answer this question, one needs to go into Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s mind – a difficult, if not impossible, task, as the events of October 7 proved. Even if some psychologists might categorize his personality as psychotic or narcissistic, there is an element of rationality to his decision-making, even if this rationality is different from ours.

Despite this challenge, it is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now. The first explanation is that none of the mediators has sufficiently strong leverage against Hamas.

Of the three, Qatar would seem to have the three most significant assets: halting the financial aid it provides to Hamas (which in any case would seem not to be arriving at present); freezing the organization’s assets in Qatar; and closing Hamas’s offices in Qatar, which would mean exiling the organization’s leaders from its territory.

Qatar has threatened to expel the Hamas leadership from its territory, but this threat has not yet been carried out because Qatar understands that such a step would jeopardize its ability to mediate between Israel and Hamas.

Losing this role would damage Qatar’s regional and international status. In any case, hurting Hamas’s leadership’s standard of living is not of concern to Sinwar.

Egypt has even weaker leverage than Qatar. Though Egypt is considered in the Arab world as the “big sister,” it has few resources to deploy in mediation. It has even lost its last leverage – control of the Philadelphi Corridor.

Though its General Intelligence Service, responsible for relations with Hamas, provides a form of “bear hug” of the organization, there are more opposing than shared interests between the two.

US plays important role as mediator

The importance of the United States as a mediator lies in its ability to offer guarantees against any violation of the agreement by Israel after signing. Beyond this, President Joe Biden has no direct leverage against Hamas. The main, and perhaps only, indirect leverage at his disposal is to apply pressure to Qatar, a US ally that houses the largest American military base in the Middle East and enjoys special status as a non-NATO-member ally.

But the United States has no interest in harming itself by harming Qatar. In this context, it is possible that the United Nations has stronger leverage in the form of applying sanctions, under the terms of Article 7 of the UN Charter.

A second explanation relates to the fact that sanctions against uncooperative actors in the international arena are ineffective when those actors’ survival is at stake.

In other words, those in danger of being wiped out are not deterred by threats made by their allies or by mediators. Thus, any proposal that does not entail an unequivocal promise to end the war will be rejected, even at the cost of further casualties – which in any case, are not a factor for Hamas in considering whether to continue or end the fighting.

And finally, the pressure being applied to Israel by the international community, the military pressure being applied by Hezbollah on the northern border, and the pressure from Israeli society to reach a deal for the hostages have led Sinwar to conclude that his goals will be achieved eventually, even if it takes a long time. This policy involves risk-taking and brinkmanship, characteristic of leaders who are impetuous or extremely courageous.

What are the options?

If this assessment is accurate, then what can be done? There are three options:

The first is simply to accept Hamas’s demands. The advantage of this course of action is that it will bring the end of the war and the release of the hostages, and perhaps allow Israel to focus on the northern theater, which in any case requires a more robust policy, whether by diplomatic or military means.

The disadvantage is that Israel will be seen as not having achieved its military goals of toppling and removing Hamas, and Hamas will receive a boost to its self-image as having defeated Israel by surviving. In this sense, the war will be similar to the Suez War and the Yom Kippur War, which ended with military victories for Israel but with diplomatic victories for Nasser and Sadat, respectively.

The second option is to start working seriously on plans for the reconstruction of Gaza under alternative leadership – not an Israeli civilian or military administration, but on a body enjoying international legitimacy, such as the Palestinian Authority, albeit with a different leadership, enjoying local legitimacy. The return of the PA to Gaza, with backing from moderate Arab states, would be a real threat to the remnants of Hamas rule in Gaza.

This possibility also involves promoting normalization with Saudi Arabia, which in turn would be a catalyst for further security and economic integration of Israel in the region.

The third option is to continue the war until Hamas surrenders unconditionally, though presumably this goal is unattainable as long as Hamas continues to hold hostages.

The war in Gaza is asymmetrical: it is a war between a state and a non-state actor, between a large military deploying massive forces and advanced weaponry against an organization using limited (and sometimes primitive) means and guerrilla tactics.

In many ways, it is reminiscent of the Vietcong’s war against the United States in Vietnam, and we all know how that ended. Israel needs to choose a realistic option – that is, a combination of the first and second options described above.

The article was published on June 29th, 2024 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט How has Hamas kept its strength for so long without giving in to mediation pressure? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An important factor in every negotiation between states is the incentives put forward by one of the parties to the conflict or by the mediating party.

For example, Israel’s willingness to recognize the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was an incentive for Morocco to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. Similarly, the supply of F-35 warplanes by the United States was an incentive for the United Arab Emirates to sign a similar agreement with Israel.

Sometimes, there is a mega-incentive, one that cannot or should not be refused. Who, for instance, could have refused when Anwar Sadat proposed his historic visit to Jerusalem?

The idea of normalization with Saudi Arabia has featured prominently in recent headlines, following the Saudis’ willingness to pursue this idea in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state – or at the very least, significant progress in that direction. Israel’s opposition to such a deal stems from a combination of ideological, political, and security-related factors.

The idea is anathema to those who ideologically believe in the need to liberate all of the biblical Land of Israel and who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian national identity. Security-wise, there are fears over the shrinking of Israel’s borders. And politically, normalization could lead to the disintegration of the current government and possibly the end of the Netanyahu era. These are all very strong reasons for opposing such a deal.

But for those willing to act in a rational and considered manner, the Saudi proposal is an incentive to something much bigger than just a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. First, it opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world.

Second, it would be a blow to the “axis of resistance” led by Iran, as one of its main goals has been to derail this normalization process.

Third, it would strengthen the integration of Israel into the region’s security architecture, as was manifested during the April missile attack by Iran.

The fact that the Israeli, Saudi, Bahraini, Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian chiefs of staff met in Bahrain under the umbrella of the US Central Command earlier this month may attest to the possibilities inherent in this new security structure.

Fourth, normalization with Saudi Arabia would reduce antagonism toward Israel, regionally and globally, and would halt the process of Israel’s becoming a pariah state.

Fifth, it would reinforce Israel’s economic ties with other states in the Middle East, especially with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

And finally, it would lead to Israel’s integration into a new economic architecture that will link the Far East and India with Europe, via sea and land corridors passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

Should Israel agree to Saudi normalization?

In and of itself, normalization with Saudi Arabia would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. But the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state may elicit fierce opposition from the Israeli public. These fears are natural and logical, particularly after the October 7 attack. Yet, this disaster has in fact led to three important developments that make the creation of a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later.

First, it restored the Palestinian question to its “natural” place at the core of the conflict. Israel’s attempts to relegate it to the margins or make it disappear entirely by signing normalization agreements with Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East have failed. Like the idea that Hamas would not attempt a large-scale attack from Gaza, this has proved to be another misjudgment.

Second, the disaster has revived the two-state solution, which before October 7 had become irrelevant in the eyes of many due to the growth of Israeli settlements in Area C in the West Bank. The one-state idea had gained traction in many circles, but the disaster demonstrated that, despite everything, separation is a necessity, while a single state for Israelis and Palestinians is a recipe for violence and destruction. The re-emergence of the idea of a Palestinian state has occurred in the international arena at both the state level and among international organizations and institutions, as well as in general public opinion.

Third, actors in the international and Arab arenas have come to understand that they need to be part of the solution, by giving recognition and guarantees to both sides, possibly even including the deployment of troops. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel hands responsibility for its security to others, but that the solution requires regional and international partners who have an interest in the success and maintenance of any agreement.

A fateful decision is now required, of the kind that David Ben-Gurion made with the Declaration of Independence and that Menachem Begin made when agreeing the peace deal with Egypt. The problem is that Israel currently has a prime minister with a majority in the Knesset but without public legitimacy. No less serious is the fact that Palestinian leadership also suffers from legitimacy deficiency.

Moreover, Palestinian public opinion polls reveal widespread support for Hamas, and little support for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinian side will also have to undergo a process of sobering up to the realities of what is possible.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is a mega-incentive that presents Israel with a dilemma: Should it continue with its ghetto mentality and self-victimization, clinging to the belief that “in every generation, someone rises up to destroy us,” or should it forge a new regional partnership and alliance? What happens next is not a historical inevitability; it will be decided by Israeli society and its leaders.

The article was publish on June 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has missed quite a few opportunities over the years for normalization with the Arabs, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Those who hark back to the saying coined by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” should revisit the history books.

The first missed opportunity with the Saudis dates back to December 1977, when Crown Prince Fahd sent an emissary to Israel with a verbal message for Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan refused to meet him without knowing the content of the message in advance, and the messenger went home. In August 1981, Fahd proposed an initiative, which Israel scornfully rejected. In February 2002, Israel simply disregarded another Saudi outreach, this one by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, whereas the Arab League adopted it. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it came to be known, was particularly significant because it reflected broad consensus on recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, in return for Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel resisted the plan’s terms not only on political and ideological grounds, but also out of ignorance regarding Saudi Arabia’s importance in the Arab and Islamic world and a perception of its leadership as corrupt and religiously extreme. Had the Arab Peace Initiative been presented to Israel at earlier stages of the conflict, the leadership would likely have seen it as an acceptable basis for negotiations and an agreement. But the process of radicalization underway within Israel’s Jewish society with regard to the occupied territories prompted repeated efforts to circumvent the Palestinian problem. The 2020 normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco ostensibly signalled the ultimate justification of these efforts, but the event of Oct. 7 and its aftermath refute the claim that the Palestinian problem could be ignored.

Hamas’s murderous offensive and the ensuing war also created a unique opportunity, as do many wars that result in systemic overhauls. Such was the case with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that ultimately led to peace with Egypt. Exactly 50 years on, Israel is steadfastly refusing to take advantage of this cataclysm to initiate or accept plans for the day after the Gaza war, in keeping with its historic pattern. It has never initiated a peace plan – the one with Egypt was proposed by President Anwar Sadat.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is in itself politically and economically important, but its many regional and international ramifications are even more so. First, it will open the door to recognition by other countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Second, it will deliver a blow to the Iranian “resistance” axis, which aspires to undermine Muslim normalization with Israel. Third, it will anchor the process of Israel’s integration into the regional and global security architecture, with its benefits as evidenced by the coalition mounted to foil Iran’s April 2024 missile attack on Israel.

Fourth, it will take the sting out of at least some resistance to Israel in the world and in the region by those who oppose its policies but not its existence, thereby stopping its descent into pariahhood. Fifth, it will strengthen Israel’s economic ties with countries in the region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Trade between Israel and the UAE in 2023 soared to almost $3 billion and would have surpassed that figure had it not been for the war. And finally, normalization with the Saudis would result in Israel’s integration into the new economic architecture linking the Far East and India to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel through a sea and land corridor.

The Saudis have been successful in their efforts to moderate the Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza, as reflected in the May 16 Arab League summit in Bahrain, with the participation of almost all the kings and presidents of Arab countries, including Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. While denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza and calling for an end to the war and the deployment of international forces there, the joint concluding statement also called for an international conference and expressed support for the two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative. In other words, the war has not changed the strategic Arab adherence to the two-state solution.

Many in Israel view the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security threat, a logical concern especially after October 7. However, it is precisely this catastrophe that makes a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later, for the following three reasons. First, it restored the Palestinian problem to its “natural” place at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thwarting attempts to marginalize or eliminate it through normalization with Arab countries on the periphery of the Middle East. Second, the disaster has prompted renewed discourse on the two-state solution, which had seemed irrelevant before October 7 due to the massive increase in settlements throughout Area C of the West Bank. The idea of “one state” gained traction in many circles, but the Hamas massacre demonstrated that separation is nevertheless the only viable option, whereas one state is a recipe for calamity.

Third, international and Arab actors understand that they must be part of the solution by providing guarantees to both sides, including perhaps by sending peacekeeping forces to Gaza. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel entrusts its security to others, but rather that regional and international partners have an interest in offering and preserving solutions to the conflict.

The negative consequences of Israel’s refusal are already manifest. The announced recognition of a Palestinian state by Ireland, Norway and Spain signals the beginning of a political tsunami that will lead to recognition by other countries, in addition to the 140 that have already sone so over the years. This worldwide recognition of a Palestinian state would also further exacerbate international rejection of Israel’s rule over a foreign people. Instead of Israel eventually having to bend under international pressure, it could benefit right now through Saudi recognition and normalization, which would include a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The realization of this grandiose plan requires a fateful decision of the kind adopted 77 years ago by David Ben-Gurion. But Netanyahu is no Ben-Gurion, and despite the backing of a Knesset majority, lacks public legitimacy following the October 7 disaster, for which he and his government are responsible. Just as troubling, the Palestinian leadership also lacks public legitimacy, being perceived as corrupt and unfit to make fateful decisions. Reflecting its low standing, Palestinian polls demonstrate wide support for Hamas, especially following Oct. 7, and little backing for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinians, just like the Israelis, need to undergo a process of disillusionment – in Israel’s case with the limits of power, in the Palestinian case with the limits of ambition.

The current circumstances would seem to quash prospects of a two-state solution in the foreseeable future. However, should an Israeli government take the leap and accept the “Saudi move”, and the Palestinians would then reject it, for whatever reason, the Saudis would likely regard this as a sufficiently big fig leaf to move forward with their plan. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is clearly fed up with the Palestinians. In March 2018, he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinian leadership had missed opportunities and rejected all the offers it was given over the past 40 years. “It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining,” he reportedly told the closed-door meeting.

Prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia following the events of October 7 place Israel at a crossroads. It can either continue to adhere to its historic role as a victim persecuted throughout history and to this very day, or seize the opportunity as a powerful independent nation to break out of its ghetto into the region as a partner and ally. Either decision is down to Israel’s leaders and society, not a deus ex machina.

The article was published on June 1st in Haaretz. 

הפוסט The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan.

The flood of Western countries stepping up recently to recognize a Palestinian state should not have come as a surprise. In fact, 143 countries have already recognized it, most of them when PLO chairman Yasser Arafat announced its creation in Algiers in 1988. A steady drizzle of other states have joined over the years, such as Sweden, in 2014.

Two months ago, the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States said their governments were considering such recognition. Now, with the imminent declaration of recognition of a Palestinian state by Norway, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia (with Malta and Belgium in the pipeline,) the trickle is starting to resemble a tsunami. Netanyahu’s political refusal to declare that at some future point he would be willing to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state, subject to international security guarantees, isolates and weakens Israel, with potentially disastrous results.

In numerous debates over the past three decades in parliamentary plenaries around the world and at various UN assemblies, the Palestinians have recorded several key achievements: deepening their diplomatic and economic ties with the countries that recognized them, as well as with other Western countries, and gaining recognition in 2012 of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an observer state (although not a member) of the UN General Assembly. But with this recognition, the Palestinians cannot go to the bank and “cash” a state. An actual Palestinian state cannot be established without Israel’s consent.

What does recognition of a Palestinian state mean for Israel?

If recognition stops with the above four to five European countries, the move will remain symbolic, similar to Sweden’s recognition a decade ago. But in another scenario, which is not far-fetched, given strong global support for the Palestinians these days, the floodgates would open for the 50 countries that have not yet done so to recognize a Palestinian state. These would include the leading members of the Euro-Atlantic “moral majority” (France, Germany, UK, and, first and foremost, the United States,) with dire consequences for Israel.

There is a consensus among the member states of the European Union and the US on the need to establish a Palestinian state, and that the only solution to the conflict is two states that allow the two peoples to live side by side in security and peace (or at least without violence). This is a worthy vision. However, the states that are about to recognize a Palestinian state do not understand or do not want to see, that unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state will not result in a de facto Palestinian state and will not achieve security for Palestinians or Israelis.

With the PA at an unprecedented nadir and Hamas enjoying peak popularity on the Palestinian street, unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state by Western countries risks creating a state of “Hamastan.” Such an outcome would contradict the interests of those very same countries that seek to promote security, stability, and peace in the Middle East.

The Biden administration has made clear that it will not recognize a Palestinian state and that the issue should be settled in negotiations with Israel rather than unilaterally by third parties. Negotiations would allow Israel to present demands to the Palestinian side in order to ensure security, demilitarization, de-radicalization, an uncompromising fight to counter terrorism, and security coordination. However, such negotiations are unlikely under the hardline Netanyahu-Smotrich government.

Netanyahu’s refusal to engage in any discussion of a political solution on the day after the war precipitated the Norwegian, Irish, and Spanish decisions to recognize a Palestinian state. Such a step promises domestic political gains due to the broad support for it among their voters. Some leaders are trying to enhance their chances of securing an international position.

The price tag that the Netanyahu government can exact from these countries is low: The recall of ambassadors erodes Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering precisely when it is needed most – since there are high-level meetings that only ambassadors can conduct. At this difficult economic time for Israel, it would be irresponsible to harm arms sales or mutual intelligence transfers.

We must not forget the tremendous and unprecedented support Europe demonstrated for Israel in response to the October 7 Hamas massacre, including those member states critical of Israel. The current right-wing government has completely wasted this goodwill and credit, its policies alienating these governments rather than mobilizing their continued support through positive statesmanship. Norway, Ireland, and Spain directed their decision mostly against the Netanyahu-Smotrich government, prompted by a desire for Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side in peace and security.

Indeed, the idea of a Palestinian state is anathema for most Israelis. But with seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, separation from the Palestinians through political negotiations will make it possible to receive international guarantees of a demilitarized and de-radicalized Palestinian state. Such separation is vital to Israel’s national interest of remaining a democratic state and the home of the Jewish people.

Israel must repudiate Netanyahu’s lack of statesmanship, which is leading Western countries to recognize a Palestinian state that could become a real Hamastan. Instead, Israel, the Palestinians, the states in the region, and the West must commit to a process of lengthy negotiations that will ensure the strengthening of the moderate camp that wants peace and security – and thwart the efforts of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to destabilize the Middle East.

The article was published on May 28th, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Netanyahu’s way of governance leads to unilateral recognition of Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט A Vision for Regional – International Partnership for Gaza Rebuilding and Palestinian Economic Leap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In a statement, EU’ foreign policy chief, High Representative Josep Borrell, acknowledged the result of the “momentous” UN vote.

He also recalled EU’s commitment to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two-state solution, “with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign, and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security and mutual recognition, and with Jerusalem serving as the future capital of both states”.

It is vital to restore a political horizon towards a two-state solution, he added. The EU stands ready to work with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and regional and international parties toward this goal. But the EU member states continue to be divided in UN votes and for Borrell, who repeatedly has complained about the lack of a common EU position, this must have come as a set-back.

Less than half of the member states voted for the upgrade of Palestine’s status in the UN (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). Two member states, the Czech Republic and Hungary, joined those few countries who voted against it. The rest abstained, claiming that time was not yet ripe for this step.

Furthermore, the European External Action Service (EEAS), which Borrell heads, seems not to have a clue about how to end the war and jumpstart a peace process towards a two-state solution. In his remarks before the start of the Foreign Affairs Council (Development) meeting a week ago, he was asked whether he had any peace plan to present.

הפוסט EU on Palestine: Is There a Credible Peace Plan? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Hydropolitics in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Addressing a December 2023 forum in Doha, he emphasized what is obvious to anyone concerned about Iran’s growing influence in the region – Israel’s refusal to discuss a political solution with the Palestinians is a boon for the leadership in Tehran. It serves as a catalyst for expanding Iran’s influence and expelling Israel from the region.

This unwillingness poses a major obstacle to seizing the opportunity of the October 7 and April 13 attacks on Israel to forge a regional alliance against Iran.

Iran’s combined missile and drone attack on Israel should have dealt a significant blow to Iran and its regional standing. It could even serve as a turning point in regional and global determination to confront the threat it poses, as it stands on the cusp of nuclear capacity. The offensive provides a clear illustration for the United States and the countries of the region of the need for a joint stand against a more aggressive, violent, and destabilizing Iran. This is an opportunity to turn the Iranian proxy network from an asset into a liability for Iran in the regional arena – to further overstretch Iran on multiple fronts.

The Gaza war has exacerbated the clash within the commitment of Iran’s Arab allies to Tehran’s directives and the interests of these host/captive countries. The growing criticism in Lebanon of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Israel-Hamas war, and the Assad administration’s refusal to allow an Iranian attack on Israel from its territory clearly illustrate these countries’ growing recognition of the price they pay for Iran’s intervention in their affairs.

Thus, the April 13 attack should serve as an impetus for an Israeli-regional alliance against Iran with American and international, and especially regional, support. The Gulf states, whose airspace was grossly violated by the Iranian missiles and drones, were provided with strong evidence of the tangible nature of the Iranian threat.

At the same time, the risk of the attack to regional stability is being compounded by Iran’s threats to block the Strait of Hormuz and shipping routes to the Red Sea. The Iranian threat thus directly affects the substantive interests of the international community. Iran has become, from an international perspective, a tangible regional threat with ripples that risk the stability in the Middle East and beyond. Ultimately, the attack increases the sense of urgency among the United States and Western countries of the need for a regional coalition.

However, the Gaza campaign has made clear that progress toward such a regional axis directly depends on Israeli agreement to discuss a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians. Recent Saudi statements make clear that the price of forging public strategic ties with Israel has gone up and now includes political progress on the Palestinian front as a condition for normalization.

Israeli willingness to discuss a two-state political horizon could have dealt Iran a decisive blow, but Israel is at grave risk of squandering this opportunity. Instead of leveraging October 7 for open and enhanced security cooperation with Arab states, thereby turning Hamas’s cognitive victory into a strategic defeat for Iran and its proxies, the Israeli government is serving Iran’s goals. In a January article of rare sincerity, former Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora noted that regional hands are now reaching out to Israel, but Israel refuses to hold them.

Israel’s regional partners came to its aid

Israel has celebrated the courageous regional participation of Jordan and other countries in the effort to defend it from Iran’s offensive. This rare moment of cooperation in the face of a common threat could create a false sense of renewed momentum in Arab-Israeli relations.

In fact, prospects of a renewed momentum are undermined by the deep frustration among current and potential partners in the region at Israel’s refusal to discuss the goals of the war. The April 13 cooperation obscured Israel’s deeply troubled relations with Jordan and the Gulf states and the implications for the future of cooperation vis-à-vis Iran.

It is important to distinguish between military-operational coordination under American auspices in the face of a specific attack, and the establishment of a regional, political, and public alliance against Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions.

A joint regional coalition cannot exist solely on the basis of a shared threat; it must be based on a convergence of interests to promote a common political vision, or at least agreement on the strategic direction of the partnership.

A wide chasm separates Israeli government positions and the vision of regional partners from Saudi Arabia to Egypt. The danger of sliding into this chasm has become more real for Arab leaders since October

Moreover, Iran’s attempts to erode the regional standing of Israel and the United States have deepened concern for the future relations between Israel and the region, let alone for a united front against Iran.

Thus, Iran’s April 13 attack coincides with its broad political-diplomatic offensive since the start of the war aimed at redefining the strategic balance of power in the Middle East by eroding Israeli and American influence in order to strengthen its own.

The Iranians are exploiting the war in order to roll back the assets Israel acquired through the Abraham Accords and reverse it to the status of a regional pariah. Iran’s move focuses on pressuring key countries to cancel or at least reduce diplomatic ties with the Zionist regime.

The intensive shuttle diplomacy by Iran’s foreign minister illustrates the map of Iranian interests. His schedule included a visit to India, a key component of the American-Gulf-Israeli alliance promoted by President Biden, ongoing contacts with the Saudis, frequent coordination meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and a call to sever Ankara’s economic relations with Israel.

The Iranian effort has had very limited success so far. Specifically, there is no evidence that it has had a direct impact on Saudi motivation to halt normalization or on Turkey’s decision to limit the scope of trade with Israel.

However, combined with Israel’s inability to present clear goals for the devastating war in Gaza, Iran’s effort could bear fruit, as Israel’s status erodes and its short-sighted failures become apparent to all.

The solid foundation of the Abraham Accords for the UAE and Bahrain was Israel’s integration into a long-term regional process that would provide security and economic stability. The war exposed Israel as a regional power firing from the hip, driven by political compromises with the far Right, rather than by a long-term perspective. It exposed to the Emiratis, Saudis, and Bahrainis the gaps between their own long-term thinking and Israel’s inability to think beyond the tactical military level and short-term political maneuvering.

This is exactly the vacuum Iran is targeting. The first sign of Iranian success has emerged in the weakest link of the normalization countries – Sudan. On October 9, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s government renewed diplomatic relations with Iran in order to obtain weapons for its war against a rival faction. This is a classic Iranian method familiar from Yemen and Syria – Iran identified an opportunity, a political vacuum created by a civil war in a country of strategic value, and filled it.

Iran’s effort to exploit the Gaza war in order to expel Israel from the region is not only interstate-oriented. It also exploits public anger in the Arab world against Israel over the protracted war in Gaza and the worsening humanitarian crisis there. The return of the resistance narrative allows Iran to ride the wave of sympathy for its allies – especially the Houthis in Yemen.

In the face of the ineffectual response by Arab states, Iran and its allies are portrayed as the only supporters of the Palestinian struggle in the current destructive war. Its efforts are also fueled by a desire to portray Iran on the regional and global stage as a representative of the struggle against American colonization in the Middle East rather than a foreign Shi’ite interloper in the Sunni Arab world.

The April 13 attack – despite its failure – is likely to be accepted in parts of the Arab world as evidence of Iran’s commitment to this struggle.

Israel’s research institutes and policy planners have dealt for an entire decade with the question of which threat is more dangerous – the Iranian or Palestinian. As expected, we were all wrong. The threats are intertwined and inseparable.

By weakening relatively moderate Palestinian elements and bolstering Hamas; eroding the fragile relations with Jordan and Egypt; creating a humanitarian crisis in Gaza and fomenting public anger in the Arab world, and stubbornly refusing to present a political vision for the “day after,” we are opening the door to greater Iranian influence in the region.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and the Middle East is no exception. The Iranians are experts at seizing opportunities created by extremism and conflict.

As long as we keep moving without a strategic vision, we are providing the Iranians with optimal conditions for influence.

Thus, while we prepare for direct war against Iran and its allies, the far-right architects of Israel’s colossal October 7 failure serve Iran’s strategic interests. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi could not have hoped for such predictable and effective allies as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Throughout this damned campaign, Israel has demonstrated once again that it never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

The article was published on April 21st in Jpost

הפוסט Israel’s lack of vision is a blessing for Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Climate-Political Migration in Israel and Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Under the leadership of Netanyahu’s Israeli government, the prevailing approach was to manage the conflict while maintaining security. The central assumption of this approach is that the conflict is unsolvable, and therefore, there is no need to exert effort to resolve it. Instead, resources were invested in managing it, ensuring that the cost borne by Israeli society would not be excessively high. This approach created a false sense of temporary security and control. However, in practice, it fueled a dangerous dynamic of Hamas’s empowerment and the expansion of cycles of violence that compromised Israel’s security.

As Netanyahu’s governments became more radical and messianic, the “conflict management” approach shifted. Rather than advancing a political solution, the government prioritized accelerating settlement construction in the West Bank. Instead of strengthening cooperation with the Palestinian Authority—the security and conflict resolution partner—the government favored bolstering Hamas, the perpetual war partner. Netanyahu even attempted to downplay the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, portraying it as a minor nuisance. He argued that Israel could integrate into the Middle East without resolving the conflict, bypassing Palestinian leadership through normalization processes with Arab countries. All of these, along with the government’s judicial overhaul, have harmed Israel’s national resilience, weakened the country, and undermined its deterrence in the region.

Despite the conflict management approach, there hasn’t been a strong alternative political strategy. Public figures from major center-left parties preferred to avoid presenting a two-state solution due to political concerns. Since Rabin’s assassination, public support for a political horizon leading to two-states reality has declined. The ongoing terror, incitement, and anti-Jewish sentiments in the Palestinian education system, coupled with disappointment from incomplete peace processes, have fueled despair among Israeli society regarding a political resolution to the conflict.

However, the idea of annexation and Jewish supremacy has never gained widespread support among Israeli citizens. In a July 2023, the Mitvim Institute for regional foreign policies in Israel discovered that 36% of Israelis view pursuing a two-state solution as the desired strategy for Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, while 28% support annexing the West Bank and establishing a single state with additional Jewish rights. Despite relatively low support for Israeli-Palestinian peace, the picture changes significantly when regional components are considered. The same survey found that 61% believe Israel should leverage normalization with other countries to promote peace with the Palestinians. This trend of increasing support for normalization-driven peace has persisted since the Abraham Accords were signed.

The Israeli Society After October 7^th: from Anger to Hope?

Until that tragic day, Israeli society was on the brink of dissolution. The judicial overhaul faced strong opposition from the liberal camp, which flooded the streets in protest against the erosion of Israel’s democratic core principles. Despite assurances, the “fully right-wing” government struggled to combat the wave of terror within the country and the simmering conflict in the north with Hezbollah, resulting in a diminishing sense of security among Israeli citizens.

However, before October 7th, it appeared that Israel’s strategic position in the Middle East was about to strengthen. The normalization process was reaching its peak, with the anticipated inclusion of Saudi Arabia—the most influential and powerful Muslim state in the world—recognizing Israel. The planned normalization agreement did not impose significant requirements on Israel regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state. Undoubtedly, Netanyahu was on the path to achieving a significant diplomatic milestone, with broad support from the Israeli public. But everything changed after October 7th.

Fifty years after the surprise attack by Arab forces on Yom Kippur in 1973, on October 7th, Hamas carried out the largest massacre against Jews since the Holocaust. For two years, Hamas meticulously plan a detailed operation: capturing as many Jewish towns around Gaza as possible, killing Israeli civilians and soldiers, and abducting hundreds of them into Gaza. Iranian support for Hamas fueled a long-term strategy against Israel, which was carefully shielded from Israeli political and military echelons. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar aimed to undermine Israel’s normalization talks with Arab countries, claiming that violent incidents in Al-Aqsa and the government’s West Bank policy were catalysts for the massacre.

Shortly after the October 7th tragedy, the words “peace” or “two-state solution” became charged terms in the Israeli public discourse. News of hundreds of Israelis being abducted and thousands of civilians, including elderly, women, and children, being killed shattered trust toward the Palestinians. Simultaneously, a lack of confidence emerged primarily against the government. The era of “time dragging on” for an Israeli-Palestinian resolution had ended on October 7th, and the public shifted toward supporting long-term decisions. For Israelis, the government must urgently restore the lost sense of security and release the hundreds held captive by Hamas.

As the war dragged on without full achievement of its goals, the Israeli public began losing patience. The delay in negotiating the release of captives, heightened insecurity, damage to Israel’s international standing due to the humanitarian crisis, and calls for annexing Gaza by extreme factions within the government pushed many Israelis to the streets. Slowly, Israelis are beginning to realize that their country is standing at a crossroads: annexation or a diplomatic solution. A perpetual war or a lasting agreement.

As Israeli society contemplates the consequences of each direction, civil society within the liberal camp is actively promoting greater Israeli backing for a political resolution. Israel’s democratic forces must capitalize on the opportunity arising from the October 7th tragedy to propose an alternative approach—one that considers Israel’s security imperatives and centers on justly resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a comprehensive regional framework.

The article was published on April 11th, 2024 in Settimana News.

הפוסט Between Annexation and Political Horizon: Israeli Society at a Crossroads for Conflict Resolution After October 7th הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In addition to the civilians on both sides of the border, the most significant victim of Hezbollah’s decision to engage in conflict, which could potentially escalate into a full-scale and destructive war, is the state of Lebanon. The recent events highlight Lebanon’s inherent weakness and raise fundamental questions about its functioning as a state entity. However, Lebanon’s weakness is actually the most effective restraint against Hezbollah and could potentially serve as a catalyst for resolving the conflict without resorting to war.

Those following Hezbollah know that the Shia movement struggles with a series of dilemmas and continuously fights to justify its existence within the Lebanese arena. These dilemmas occupy the organization during normal times and seem to become even more crucial during these days.

Hezbollah was established by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as part of a vision to export the Islamic revolution. This means the organization was born within Lebanon but not as part of it, serving a broader revolutionary-theological vision where, in the end, Islam (Shia) would rule the world. The Lebanese state, with its political mechanisms and sectarian arrangements, had no place in this vision. However, over the years, Hezbollah gradually changed its nature. Along with blurring its revolutionary Islamist dogmas, the organization began to adopt a Lebanese national identity and even integrated into the country’s political system.

This process is often described as the “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah, wherein its leaders emphasized their struggle as a national movement serving as “Lebanon’s protector” against dangers, especially from Israel. However, this “Lebanonization” is viewed with suspicion both inside and outside Lebanon. While some see it as a genuine process, many in Lebanon and abroad see it as a cynical facade meant to mask the organization’s true intentions.

This is the main dilemma occupying Hezbollah and troubling it, especially in these times—the dilemma between being an Iranian proxy and a patriotic Lebanese organization; and the dilemma between being a resistance movement committed to exporting the revolution and destroying Israel and being “Lebanon’s protector.”

Lebanon’s Internal Crisis

It seems that Hezbollah was caught off guard by Hamas’s attack on October 7 and was not prepared for its consequences. Indeed, the current time seems highly inconvenient for it to wage war against Israel. Over the past four years, Lebanon has been experiencing an unprecedented severe economic crisis. The local currency has undergone a historic collapse, GDP has plummeted, and inflation and unemployment rates are soaring. The economic crisis quickly translated into a real humanitarian crisis, with over 80% of Lebanese citizens living below the poverty line.

Moreover, Lebanon is in the midst of a complex and ongoing political crisis that exacerbates the economic collapse and fuels massive protests by desperate citizens. Since October 2022, Lebanon has had no sitting president, and since October 2021, a transitional government with no executive power has been in place. A destructive war with Israel is truly the last thing the Lebanese can afford.

Lebanon’s dire internal situation is closely linked to Nasrallah’s considerations and his choice to limit the conflict and avoid a full-scale war, at least for now. It is commonly believed that Hezbollah holds sway in Lebanon—that it dictates events, for better or worse. However, this statement is not entirely accurate. While Hezbollah is indeed the most powerful force in Lebanon, it is not omnipotent and is also subject to power limitations and restraining factors.

Internal Opposition

Even before October 7, Hezbollah suffered from a highly negative image within Lebanon. Alongside the perpetual suspicion towards it, the organization is seen by many as primarily responsible for the severe economic crisis and political stagnation, and as an obstacle preventing Lebanon from overcoming them. Since engaging in conflict with Israel on October 8, without any provocation from Israel, criticism of Hezbollah has been mounting. Public opinion in the country strongly opposes entering a war with Israel and fears its devastating consequences.

The opposition to war crosses sectarian lines and is also clear among Shias, Hezbollah’s base of support and power. As the campaign continues, criticism against Hezbollah grows for the severe damage caused by its policies and the high price Lebanon could pay if it doesn’t stop. The waves of refugees coming from the south and the growing destruction as Israel expands its attacks to more distant areas make the sense of fear increasingly palpable.

Various officials, including some considered Hezbollah’s allies, have clearly expressed their concern over the situation on the border and have not spared criticism of Hezbollah, opposing attempts to link Gaza’s events to Lebanon. More and more reports indicate that Lebanon’s official stance is to immediately return to implementing UN Resolution 1701, which includes, among other things, keeping Hezbollah fighters away from the border.

In civil society, the criticism is even harsher and more outspoken. This is evidenced by a popular campaign with the hashtag “Lebanon_does_not_want_war,” gaining significant momentum on social media. Every day, more and more statements are published criticizing Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into catastrophe for foreign interests without any logic or justification.

The situation is simple: the average Lebanese citizen may not hold much affection for Israel, but these days even Palestine is not a concern. The arguments about the necessity of the resistance’s mobilization alongside Gaza simply do not convince him, not when he is concerned about his family’s survival.

A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah would essentially be a mutual destruction— a bloody and destructive stalemate. No one is under the illusion that such a war would lead to the disappearance of the other side, but the devastation and destruction that would occur in both Israel and Lebanon serve as a deterrent for both sides. Hezbollah does not hide this, and since the conflict began, Nasrallah has repeatedly stated that he does not want war, and once the “aggression” in Gaza stops, calm will return to the Lebanon border.

However, the sides are caught in a dangerous trap, and a complex dynamic has developed over recent months, where despite no one wanting war, it may become inevitable. Nasrallah hears the voices within Lebanon and knows that dragging the country into war could undermine his claim to be “Lebanon’s protector.” However, it is difficult to see how he can back away from his promise to stand by Gaza until the war ends completely.

On the other hand, while tens of thousands of its citizens have become refugees in their own country, Israel needs to present a convincing narrative to them that the threat from the border has been eliminated. It seems that among Israel’s political and military leadership, the view is growing that a change in the situation can only be achieved through military action.

Weakness as an Opportunity

Meanwhile, external actors, both regional and international, are trying to prevent the escalation. According to reports, the United States submitted a proposal to resolve the issue of the land border, which will be agreed upon after a ceasefire; France presented a similar initiative, and Qatar has also been mentioned as a potential player in the settlement. Hezbollah has expressed a willingness behind the scenes to discuss a formula that would end the conflict, and recently it was reported that one of Hezbollah’s senior officials even traveled to the United Arab Emirates, with one of his objectives being to explore the possibility of Emirati mediation to end the fighting, despite the strained relationship between the parties.

However, it seems that the path to a solution is still long, and at this moment, the possibility of a war breaking out seems more likely than reaching a political settlement. At this point, the state of Lebanon, with its weaknesses and frequent crises, becomes a critical factor in the ability to resolve the issue without resorting to war. The ongoing crisis in Lebanon and the growing internal opposition to Hezbollah are the Shia organization’s point of weakness and an important factor in restraining its activities. Nasrallah, as mentioned, is constantly trying to reconcile the existential dilemmas that occupy him, and it is likely that he would be willing to make concessions. For now, it seems there is no conflict between the interests of the Lebanese state and Hezbollah’s patrons in Iran, as Tehran is also not interested in expanding the war.

Israel would do well to take advantage of this point of weakness. In cooperation with the international community, Israel can work to create an “improved Resolution 1701,” which would include measures to rescue Lebanon from its economic and political crisis, and even lay the groundwork for resolving more complex issues in the future. Israel has much to offer the Lebanese, and many are willing to listen.

It must be acknowledged that the threat posed by Hezbollah will not disappear peacefully, and we must be cautious about falling back into the “deterrence” equation, the flaws of which were horrifyingly exposed in the case of Hamas. However, given the growing internal opposition to it in Lebanon, Israel and its regional and international partners have an opportunity to sharpen Hezbollah’s dilemma between its Lebanese and pro-Iranian identity. A challenging political move of this kind could give Israel more room to maneuver in dealing with the organization and, not least, a better position against its patron, Iran.

הפוסט Lebanon’s Vulnerability: A Chance for Israel Amid Anti-War Sentiment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There are many aspects of Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza that have frustrated its closest allies. Ill-considered statements by ministers and other elected officials, a refusal to talk about the “day after” Hamas, and, especially, the civilian death toll have strained the unqualified support Israel enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the October 7 massacre by Hamas in southern Israel.

But it is the Netanyahu government’s approach to the complex and often desperate humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip that is truly endangering support for the continuation of the war, and is placing the “total victory” he promised in doubt.

For months, allies have been both quietly and publicly trying to get Israel’s war leadership to recognize how fundamental the aid situation is to the war effort.

Israel’s response has been to instinctively deny each request, then ultimately agree to those same demands when circumstances on the ground leave little choice. That approach, which seems built around domestic political calculations, is causing Israel to bleed support even as victory doesn’t seem especially imminent.

Tough talk

“I have ordered a complete siege on the Gaza Strip. There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed,” declared Defense Secretary Yoav Gallant two days after the October 7 massacre.

Less than two weeks later, the siege was lifted, as the first aid trucks bearing food and medicine were crossing in from Egypt.

By mid-November, pressure from the US and NGOs pushed Israel to reverse course on fuel as well, as trucks started bringing fuel tanks for hospitals, aid trucks, water pumps, desalination plants, bakeries and sewage plants.

Fuel would also go to the Paltel telecoms company so that Gazans could enjoy phone and internet service.

Now, COGAT boasts about how many fuel tankers it lets in every day.

Under the stated policy of disconnecting Israel from Gaza — trumpeted by Israeli leaders from the very start of the war — decision-makers also promised that no aid would go into the Strip from the Kerem Shalom crossing. The Biden administration and the broader international community pressured Israel for weeks to open Kerem Shalom, previously Gaza’s main goods crossing.

In December, Netanyahu and the government relented, and now it advertises how many trucks go through the crossing every day.

Israel wouldn’t let the Ashdod Port be used for the transfer of aid either. Finally, in January, Netanyahu gave in to American pressure and allowed a massive flour shipment to reach the docks. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich blocked the release of the flour for weeks to keep it from getting to UNRWA, predictably angering the Americans, before it was finally allowed into Gaza.

Now, in the wake of Monday’s deadly strike on the World Central Kitchen convoy, Israel continues to walk back its tough talk.

Ashdod Port will be open for aid from Sunday. Israel is also opening the Erez crossing into northern Gaza, the main crossing point into the Strip where many Israelis were killed and abducted by invading Hamas terrorists on October 7, after defying calls to do so for months.

It is also keeping the Kerem Shalom crossing open for longer hours and over the weekend. COGAT had dismissed the need for such a measure, saying that it processes more trucks every day than organizations in Gaza are able to handle. Now Israel is claiming that keeping the crossing open for longer will enable more aid to reach Gazans.

Instead of showing its allies that it is leading the aid effort, Israel is seen as dragging its feet as the humanitarian situation in the Strip gets worse.\

That perception — not at all unfounded — is putting the entire campaign in danger.

US President Joe Biden is no longer definitively conditioning a ceasefire on the release of hostages. He told Netanyahu in their tense phone call after the WCK strike that “an immediate ceasefire is essential to stabilize and improve the humanitarian situation and protect innocent civilians.”

A ceasefire imposed from the outside without any major concessions from Hamas would, of course, be a disaster for Israel, especially as it tries to figure out how to pull off the last stage of conquering Gaza.

The southern city of Rafah, insist Israel’s leaders across the political spectrum as well as its military chiefs, must be taken. Four Hamas battalions, plus the fighters that have fled south, remain in the city. The Philadelphi road, the route along the border between Gaza and Israel, under and over which Hamas arms flowed into Gaza since 2007, also needs to be in Israeli hands.

But humanitarian concerns, with more than a million displaced Palestinians sheltering in the city, are holding up that offensive as well, and it looks increasingly like the IDF won’t be able to carry out the operation it wants to.

Given the potential for a further deterioration of the situation for Gazans sheltering around Rafah, the Biden administration now opposes any major operation there, and won’t rule out consequences for Israel if it chooses to move ahead.  Israeli government sources tell The Times of Israel that there is a growing sense that the leadership is not actually going to carry out a meaningful operation there, despite its repeated promises.

Netanyahu’s aides presented a humanitarian plan to evacuate Rafah ahead of the military operation to their American counterparts this week, but the Americans were underwhelmed by what they saw, reportedly dismissing the plan as unimplementable.

“It’s because of the humanitarian issue that we are isolated from the world,” said Einav Levy, Founding Director of The Israeli School of Humanitarian Aid. “We already lost image-wise.”

Chaos

Even though Hamas is intentionally getting in the way of aid distribution and sees benefits in impending starvation in the Strip, Israel has to accept responsibility for the provision of aid there, argued Bar Rapaport of Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

This should have happened so long ago,” she told The Times of Israel, referring to the imperative for Israel to ensure sufficient humanitarian aid.

Levy said that there is currently chaos when it comes to aid in Gaza. “There is no real ability to know who is doing what and where they are doing it,” he said.

There is a shifting panoply of international NGOs, UN agencies and state-sponsored initiatives, operating alongside Hamas, local clans and the IDF. Territorial control changes all the time and civilians move as well.

Rapoport, who is in regular contact with aid agencies in Gaza, including the WCK, said they complain that working with the IDF isn’t an especially organized process: “It depends if you fall on someone in the IDF who is ready to listen, who knows you personally or not.”

The NGOs, she noted, also complained that they weren’t always sure exactly who to turn to.

The WCK declined to comment, saying it was not giving interviews at this time. COGAT did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

“There isn’t an orderly, coordinated mechanism for the crossings, for the distribution of aid, for the contacts between Israel and international actors,” lamented Rapoport. “Everyone does what he thinks is right.”

As long as there is chaos on the ground, Israel will struggle to achieve its long-term goals in Gaza.

Israel has ruled out UNRWA operating in Gaza moving forward, and obviously won’t let Hamas be involved in managing the Strip. Israel itself is not interested in reassuming responsibility for 2 million hostile Palestinians.

For now, Netanyahu is hoping that aid organizations will succeed in replacing UNRWA and Hamas’s civil functions, but killing workers from one of Israel’s most effective partners makes that aim even harder to achieve. The WCK has pulled out of Gaza, and it is unclear if it will return.

Netanyahu is hoping that pro-Western Arab states will eventually fund the reconstruction of Gaza, but they are not about to step into the violent bedlam there.

“The minute it is managed more effectively in Israel,” said Rapoport, “it will be easier for Israel to bring on board regional actors to help.

Initiative

In a macabre twist, the seven aid workers who lost their lives in the IDF strike might have done more in their deaths to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza than they could have dreamed of doing in their daily work.

Israel’s war leadership understood it had no more room for error. If Israel is seen as getting in the way, the US could well use its veto less at the UN and hold up weapons shipments.

But Netanyahu and his circle still don’t seem to have fully internalized the gravity of the situation. The measures they announced this week are still reactive and seem limited by a fear of upsetting the far-right flank of the government.

The statement announcing the new aid measures included a justification aimed at National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich and their supporters, explaining the measure by pointing out that they are crucial for the continuation of the war. The very decision on the aid was rushed through before Ben Gvir arrived at Thursday night’s cabinet meeting, the far-right minister claims.

Many Israelis point out that the hostages Hamas has been holding for six months don’t enjoy aid shipments. They also argue that the very same countries holding Israel’s feet to the fire have fought wars with far less regard for the suffering of enemy civilians.

That might be true, but Israel’s leaders have to operate within the expectations and standards its allies hold them to, even if they might seem unreasonable.

Netanyahu can show initiative on the humanitarian front, and regain some legitimacy to finish the job against Hamas. That would include opening all crossings, appointing a humanitarian aid czar, conducting regular meetings with aid organizations, laying water pipes into Gaza ahead of the summer, and even establishing Israeli field hospitals on the border.

There is no reason to wait until the US demands more measures and then be seen as callous toward the suffering of civilians.

“If Israel had shown from the beginning that the humanitarian issue is important to it,” said Rapoport, “that it is doing everything to make sure as few innocents as possible are being harmed, to publicize it, to show how much it is bringing in, we would be in a very different position now.”

This article was published in the Times of Israel on April 6th.

הפוסט Israel’s begrudging approach to humanitarian aid could cost it the war in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט How powerful is Hamas after 6 months of war with Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As I’ve come to learn from other Israelis, my experience of flourishing friendship with Majid is not unique. After the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israelis and Emiratis took to meeting one another on Zoom in high numbers. These remote introductions that defined global communication during the pandemic offered a kind of soft initial encounter between the two peoples. Since that time, professional interactions between Israelis and Emiratis have taken on an uncommon level of warmth. One Israeli CEO opened up to me about how his Emirati colleague affectionately calls him a “long-lost brother found,” a striking reflection of the familial resonance of the 2020 Abraham Accords and its namesake’s two sons.

It all might seem rather counterintuitive. Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan are far older. Yet they don’t exhibit anything close to the 120 business-to-business agreements and memoranda of understanding signed with the UAE. As a point of comparison, it was reported in 2022 that Egypt and Israel were aiming to achieve $700 million in annual trade by 2025. The United Arab Emirates saw $2.56 billion of trade with Israel in 2022, accompanied by investments exceeding $3.5 billion.

At 46 and 30 years, respectively, the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan have also begun to show signs of aging. The official reactions of both countries to Israel’s war with Hamas have been quite critical of Israel, with Jordan recalling its ambassador and Egypt publicly threatening to nullify the Camp David Accords. The UAE, by contrast, has exhibited a more balanced reaction. Lana Nusseibeh, a Palestinian Emirati and the UAE’s ambassador to the United Nations, has indeed issued condemnations of Israel’s actions and successfully led the adoption of Resolution 2712, which called for increased humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, her public statements have also included a dimension of sympathy and understanding for Israel, referring to the October 7 attacks as “horrific.” And the only Israeli ambassador to a Middle Eastern country who has remained in office throughout the war without recall or expulsion is Amir Hayek, Israel’s ambassador to the UAE.

Why? Because Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates stands on a stronger foundation of emerging shared values and may well develop into a true national friendship.

In 2016, the UAE government established a ministry of tolerance. The UAE’s commitment to religious toleration is a function of a broader cultural evolution that has been taking place in the country for several decades. On February 5, 2019, over a year before the signing of the Abraham Accords, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation Abdullah bin Zayed announced a plan to create the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi, an opulent complex containing the Imam Al-Tayeb Mosque, the St. Francis Church, and the Moses ben Maimon Synagogue — named in the spirit of interreligious dialogue. The announcement came during Pope Francis’s visit to the Arabian Peninsula, the first ever by a pontiff, when he referred to the UAE as “a land that is trying to be a model of coexistence, of human brotherhood, and a meeting place among diverse civilizations and cultures.” In keeping with the nature of the visit, the pope and Sheikh Ahamed al-Tayeb signed the Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, also known as the Abu Dhabi Declaration. Worth noting is that despite the Egyptian heritage of both Maimonides and al-Tayeb (admittedly not exactly a philosemite), such an initiative was taken in the UAE rather than Egypt. Egypt has not had a chief rabbi since the 1972 departure of Rabbi Haim Moussa Douek for France and then New York. The UAE, by contrast, announced Rabbi Yehuda Sarna as the country’s first chief rabbi in 2019.

Founded 23 years after Israel, the UAE is swiftly establishing itself as a technological focal point in the Arab world, marked by substantial investments in knowledge-based entrepreneurship. Such entrepreneurship cultivates a sense of curiosity about other points of view and an interest in learning from those who have similar drives. As is well known, Israel has long been recognized as a global hub for cutting-edge technology, contributing groundbreaking inventions and knowledge to the international community. It is therefore no surprise that both nations demonstrate pioneering advancements in space industries, renewable energy, and other advanced technological fields within the region. Even Israel’s entry into natural-gas production has not diminished its primary economic reliance on its intellectual human capital, a prioritization it shares with the UAE.

Another aspect of this cultural revolution has been educational. The Emirati government decided in 2021 to include Holocaust studies in its schools’ textbooks. In parallel, the organization Sharaka (Arabic for “partnership”), founded on the basis of the Abraham Accords, “is working to shape a new Middle East, built on dialogue, understanding, cooperation and friendship.” The organization has forged this path with its Holocaust Education Program, which brings joint Arab-Israeli delegations on an educational journey to Israel and Poland with the goal of learning the lessons of the Holocaust as an extreme expression of intolerance. The program aims to empower young leaders within these communities, nurturing them to become ambassadors of tolerance and coexistence.

As the first head of Middle East relations at the University of Haifa — a new position that would have been inconceivable a mere decade ago but emerged from the possibilities of the Abraham Accords — I can attest to the interest of scholars from both countries to work together. Nearly all Israeli universities have now engaged in some way with Emirati counterparts. The enthusiasm to join up with Israelis is even greater in Emirati think-tank institutes such as the Emirates Policy Center, the Anwar Gargesh Diplomatic Academy, Trends, and b’huth.

An Abu Dhabi workshop entitled “New Regionalism in the Middle East” in June of last year was a collaboration between four Emirati think tanks and Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center, and was attended by researchers from the UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. The discussions, in which I participated, were deep, honest, and intriguing, tackling sensitive issues — such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Israel’s current right-wing government, and social differences — head-on. My conversations with female colleagues from the region were among the most eye-opening and empathic I have experienced in an academic or professional context; they left me inspired to work together with them in regional sisterhood.

However, the educational and cultural evolution within the UAE is also reflected in political terms in ways that present opportunities as well as challenges to Israel. Careful observation of the UAE’s foreign policy reveals that the Abraham Accords are part of a larger campaign to promote regional reconciliation. Beginning with Syria under Basha al-Assad’s leadership before extending to Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Qatar, the UAE has pursued normalization with Israel’s enemies as well. There are, of course, pros and cons to this. On the pro side, any initiative toward genuine regional peace might help create conditions of mutual understanding and advance Israel’s vision of being a country like all others with safe and secure borders. The UAE’s formal ties with Syria have already proven beneficial to Israel, particularly since they allowed the Emirates to play a role as mediator during the war.

On the con side, this collaboration might ultimately impose limitations on Israel in the future. Israel has constructed a narrative for its relations with the Arab Gulf states based on the concept of a shared adversary: Iran. Without this common enemy, history suggests, regional actors will return to traditional factional lines, and the current phase of reconciliation in the Middle East may prove unsustainable in the long term. Owing to the evolving regional dynamics, Israel must explore new narratives to reinforce the legitimacy of its normalization with the Gulf countries, especially in light of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year. Needless to say, these attempts at reconciliation and understanding are unprecedented.

More work remains to be done. The question is, who will do it? It is an open secret that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not widely regarded as the most trustworthy partner in the Gulf. The strained personal relations Bibi shares with Gulf leaders are evident in almost all discussions I’ve had with regional counterparts, and in the well-known fact that he has not publicly met with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed. In contrast, bin Zayed has met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog twice, including once during the war, as well as with former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. During Bennett’s term as prime minister and Yair Lapid’s as foreign minister, they initiated the Negev Forum — a significant achievement for Israel’s integration in the Middle East. Under the renewed term of Netanyahu, the differences are widely felt within the Israeli government offices. UAE media portray the current government as “ultranationalist and ultra-Orthodox,” and a series of actions and statements by the Israeli government had already strained relations before October 7. The saving grace is that these primary tensions are quite possibly temporary.

The wellsprings of connection between the two countries run deep, deeper than some of those with whom Israel has enjoyed nonhostile relations for decades. The Israel-UAE partnership is still in its infancy, on a complicated journey toward maturity that holds known and unknown challenges. These challenges require ongoing commitment and collaboration. The partnership has proven durable thus far, weathering a perfect storm: the largest military conflagration for Israel in a generation. What has become clear is that both countries genuinely value prosperity for themselves and the other. Is there a stronger definition of regional friendship than that?

Moran Zaga is a policy fellow at Mitvim— the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy.

הפוסט Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates is a model for a new Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli Initiative offers a three-phase plan. The first phase focuses on a shift from warfare to rehabilitation. The second phase aims to prepare the ground for a stable settlement. Finally, the third phase outlines a negotiation process over a two-state solution as part of a regional normalization process between Israel and the Arab World. The plan was created by the Foreign and Security Team of Mitvim and the Berl Katznelson Foundation, which was established 24 hours after the October 7th massacre, with the support of the New Israel Fund. It was crafted by a group of top-tier diplomatic and security experts with decades of experience.

The Initiative stands out as the first comprehensive alternative published by Israel since the beginning of the war, which provides a voice to the Israeli liberal majority. It aims to serve as a feasible policy plan for those who have long opposed the government’s policies and its unwillingness to offer, or even deal with, political planning for the day after.

The Israeli Initiative not only recognizes the importance of a two-state solution, but also emphasizes its significance in ensuring the safety and security of both Israelis and Palestinians. By presenting a pragmatic approach and considering the evolving dynamics on the ground, this publication sets a new benchmark for future discussions and negotiations.

הפוסט The Israeli Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This policy paper, written in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), examines the concepts of inclusive and feminist foreign policy and seeks to suggest elements of these concepts that Israeli policymakers may adopt, whether in the short term or the long run.

הפוסט Inclusive Foreign Policy in Israel – Trends and Processes from a Gender Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Over four months have elapsed since the start of the war against Hamas, yet Israel’s objectives and vision for the “day after” in Gaza remain a mystery. At the same time, the United States, the European Union, Arab states, and a host of civil society organizations in Israel and abroad are energetically formulating various blueprints for ending the war and moving toward an agreement.

Israel’s reluctance to offer a plan for the aftermath of the war stems from political considerations, but the current Israeli government or its successor will soon have to take a clear stand.

In examining the “day after” options, it is necessary to review the points of agreement among the relevant parties.

All (or most) agree that Hamas cannot control Gaza or be involved in the post-war settlement, that the Palestinian Authority (PA) must undertake reforms, that Israel must elect a new government, and that some Arab states will provide economic assistance to rebuild Gaza and strengthen the PA. However, there is no agreement on who will rule Gaza, whether a Palestinian state will be established, and whether such an arrangement will constitute part of a broader regional deal.

Judging by historical precedent, military and political cataclysms breed change. The deadly results of the Hamas offensive and the resultant Gaza war are thus creating an opportunity for change in the regional architecture and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, based on past experience with peace and normalization agreements, three components are missing at present on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides: legitimate leadership, political determination, and trust. That leaves two options. One is to despair and give up, and the other is to examine how progress can be achieved despite these complexities.

A trustworthy mediator is key to any prospect of success. President Joe Biden has taken on this task and is determined to produce a landmark achievement ahead of the November 2024 presidential election. To that end, the United States, in cooperation with 10 European and Arab states, is reportedly drawing up a three-track arrangement.

One is intended to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza and a return of the Israeli abductees; the second is aimed at “reshaping” the PA; the third is the establishment of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. A word of warning is warranted: the American Road Map for Peace plan of 2003 also consisted of stages but was halted at an early stage after the PA and Israel failed to fulfill their parts.

Incentives play an important role in optimizing the prospects of a settlement.

What are the incentives of each side?

The Palestinians’ main gain would be the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with agreed territorial swaps – something they were denied after the Oslo Accords. This would include the reunification of the West Bank and Gaza, its acceptance as a member of the UN, and recognition by most countries.

Israel also stands to gain, obtaining guarantees for an agreement designed to prevent a security threat from the Palestinian side, an agreement with the most important country in the Arab and Muslim world (Saudi Arabia); continued integration in the Middle East, opening of new markets; building bridges with distant Muslim countries (Pakistan, Indonesia, etc.); easing resistance to Israel in the region and around the world given the solution to the Palestinian problem, and, finally, greater Saudi involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction, at Qatar’s expense or at its side.

הפוסט Normalization with Saudi Arabia looks unlikely, but we should try anyway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s success in stabilizing the humanitarian situation in Gaza correlates with minimizing harm to non-combatants. This provides greater flexibility for Israeli troops to defeat Hamas.

Preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza is an overriding Israeli security interest, directly affecting the achievement of its war objectives, including returning the hostages and toppling the Hamas regime.

However, even if the severity of the war has dulled Israeli compassion for the non-combatant Palestinians in Gaza, it is important to recognize that providing humanitarian aid correctly will enhance Israel’s security. It will protect the life and health of the abductees and soldiers in Gaza, prevent the spillover of infections and disease into Israel, grant international political and legal legitimacy to the war, and help topple the Hamas regime.

The humanitarian crisis endangers hostages, soldiers, and Israeli citizens

A severe humanitarian crisis is already developing in Gaza. The dire shortage of potable water and edible food, unprecedented sewage and waste overflows, shortages of vaccines and medicines, and terrible overcrowding have resulted in the spread of serious diseases and widespread hunger, especially among children.

Infections and epidemics not only directly impact abductees and soldiers in the field, but also pose a growing threat to residents of the Gaza border communities in Israel and in other parts of the country. Aid agencies are already reporting outbreaks of respiratory diseases, hepatitis, scabies and typhus, and increasing concern about the outbreak of polio and measles epidemics. Stray animals and pests that have emerged from the piles of rubble pose a real threat of transmitting diseases such as rabies or Q-fever, potentially reaching Israeli territory.

Meanwhile, untreated sewage in Gaza, flowing directly into the sea during rainfall, creates pollution that affects operations of the Ashkelon desalination plant. The health of both humans and the environment on one side of the border is interconnected with that on the other side.

The humanitarian crisis undermines Israel’s standing in the international legal arena

South Africa’s prosecution at the International Court of Justice in The Hague relies heavily on the extensive killing and destruction in Gaza, the lack of distinction between Hamas terrorists and non-combatants, and the severe humanitarian crisis in the beleaguered coastal enclave.

The accusations, bolstered by key Israeli figures calling for a comprehensive erasure of Gaza, make cynical use of the term “genocide,” but emphasize the harsh living conditions endured by Gazans. Clearly demonstrating the lack of intention to harm non-combatant Gazans and commitment to preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip will help Israel refute accusations of genocide and relegate South Africa’s claims to the dustbin of history.

The humanitarian crisis  constrains Israel’s use of military force

We are in the midst of a complex war against a barbaric enemy. The State of Israel, with the objective of toppling the Hamas regime, has initiated a protracted military campaign conducted in densely populated urban areas, both above and below ground. Since the start of the war, military necessity has clashed with human suffering in the Gaza Strip.

The deeper the humanitarian crisis created by Israel’s fighting, the more legitimacy it loses, and the stronger the international demands become to shorten or halt the war.

Israel’s success in managing and stabilizing the humanitarian situation in Gaza directly correlates with minimizing harm to non-combatants and improving living conditions for residents. This, in turn, provides greater flexibility for Israeli troops to fight Hamas.

Proper humanitarian aid  will contribute to the collapse of Hamas

Israel has the potential to enhance health conditions in Gaza by implementing several key measures. Firstly, it should resume power supply to medical facilities, and water and sewage infrastructure. Additionally, allocating some incoming fuel for the removal of waste and raw sewage from population centers is essential. Approving the introduction of chlorine to disinfect all water sources, most of which may be contaminated, is another crucial step. Furthermore, repairing water pipelines from Israel to the southern Gaza Strip is necessary to ensure a daily minimum water supply. Managing vaccination campaigns is also vital.

This leaves the question: Who will carry out these measures, and how? This challenge is an obstacle to any significant progress in humanitarian aid efforts. Gaza’s residents rely entirely on Hamas for aid distribution, which the October 7 massacre perpetrator exploits by diverting goods and equipment from aid trucks entering the enclave, and thereby perpetuating its power.

To weaken Hamas, it must be excluded from civilian life in the Gaza Strip. To that end, humanitarian aid, operation of critical infrastructure, and administration of health and education must be transferred to alternative actors. Israel must promptly support the design of an alternative system of government to the Hamas regime as a complementary measure to its military operations. Failure to act now creates a governmental vacuum (for example, in areas where Israel has defeated Hamas), allowing Hamas forces to swiftly return and reclaim territory.

Israel must capitalize on regional and international mobilization for this purpose. An unprecedented range of international forces, states, and aid organizations are willing to operate on the ground in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA funders are pressing for reforms in the organization’s mechanisms, and the PA is willing to undergo reforms with American backing. This presents a crucial opportunity to establish an alternative to the civilian administration of the Gaza Strip, which would also serve as governmental infrastructure for the day after.

A political strategy, which has been sorely lacking since the beginning of this war, is critical to advance the collapse of Hamas and the establishment of an alternative regime in Gaza. Israel should collaborate with the international community to seize the opportunity to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and strengthen local and regional forces that will assume responsibility for Gaza in the future. A pilot project to provide humanitarian and civilian services to refugees could be launched immediately in the northern Gaza Strip in a designated shelter managed by the WHO in collaboration with Palestinian Authority professionals under the auspices of the UAE.

Humanitarian aid, like a military campaign, cannot achieve its goals independently of political action. The humanitarian perspective mirrors the military one: Just as the absence of a political framework for the day after the war significantly undermines the IDF’s achievements and allows Hamas to resume control, so piecemeal solutions to the humanitarian crisis and the lack of a political decision also harm Israel’s goals and interests, enabling Hamas to retain power through humanitarian aid.

Both military and humanitarian actions serve Israel’s security objectives, but without an alternative to Hamas control, the organization continues to benefit, once again.

IN CONCLUSION, a significant easing of the humanitarian situation in Gaza will safeguard Israel’s interests and help oust the Hamas regime through the introduction of an alternative civil-governmental mechanism. Furthermore, the humanitarian, health, and infrastructural conditions will improve significantly only if Gaza is administered by governmental mechanisms with which Israel can engage. These two conditions are interdependent.

Calls are being heard in Israel to withhold humanitarian aid for Gaza as a means of pressuring Hamas to release the hostages. The safe return of the hostages is the most urgent and important goal of the war, and only after their return will we be able to begin rehabilitating our society.

However, the situation in Gaza has not been a priority for Hamas, which tends to strengthen as blame is placed on Israel for the worsening conditions. Therefore, blocking humanitarian aid does not increase pressure on Hamas to release the hostages.

On the contrary, it harms Israel’s war objectives and strengthens the terrorist group. Israel must do the opposite of what Hamas wants – instead of contributing to the humanitarian crisis and drawing international accusations of crimes against humanity and genocide, it must advocate for the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, leveraging it to topple Hamas.

Bar Rapaport is the project manager for climate diplomacy at the Mitvim Institute. She is currently working to earn her PhD on regional cooperation in the midst of the climate crisis, with an emphasis on conflict and the Middle East, at the Hebrew University’s Harry S. Truman Research Institute.

הפוסט Why it’s essential to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel and Egypt share several strategic objectives. They aim to defeat Hamas or significantly diminish its political and military power. Egypt views Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood – an organization that had been outlawed and suppressed by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Both countries seek to restore stability to the Gaza Strip and the wider region. Egypt has suffered significant economic setbacks, including a sharp decline in tourism and in income from fees for transiting the Suez Canal, due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Israel and Egypt both aim to demonstrate to the Arab world the destabilizing effects of supporting the Shia axis. They envision a new Sunni-led regional order, supported by the United States, to counterbalance the influence of Iran and its allies.

At the same time, there are conflicts of interest between Israel and Egypt.

From the Egyptian perspective, Israel taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor while “encouraging the migration of Gazans to Egypt,” as several Israeli politicians have stated, constitutes a red line.

Similarly, the two states are in disagreement over what should happen after the war. While Egypt supports the return of an “upgraded” PA to rule Gaza, Israel has expressed opposition to the return of the PA in any form. Israel has also said that the IDF will not rule over the Gaza Strip – but has not specified who will.

Regarding the future of the West Bank. While Egypt, the Arab states, the United States, and the international community support the unification of the West Bank with the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a Palestinian state led by an upgraded PA, Israel remains opposed to such an outcome. These conflicts of interest, however, are not currently a threat to the stability of Egyptian-Israeli relations.

At present, the primary concern revolves around Rafah. From a military standpoint, Israel aims to eliminate the Hamas battalions in Rafah and gain control over the Philadelphi Corridor to block Hamas’s smuggling tunnels. Egypt seeks to broker a deal to secure the release of hostages and halt the war, at least temporarily, to ward off the nightmarish scenario of Palestinian refugees flooding Sinai. To this end, and with Israel’s participation, Cairo hosted an important meeting – which so far has not yielded any results.

With Israel unwilling to sign a deal at just any price, an Israeli military operation in Rafah following a collapse of negotiations is a very real and frightening possibility from an Egyptian perspective. Were it to occur, such a scenario would be viewed by the public and by certain governmental circles in Egypt as the outcome of an Israeli policy targeted at expelling the Palestinians from Gaza.

Egypt threatening Hamas and Israel

In the meantime, Egypt is attempting to solve the problem by threatening both Hamas and Israel. Egypt has told Hamas that Israel will attack Rafah if it does not agree to a deal within two weeks. This threat would seem to imply agreement with an Israeli attack on Rafah if a deal is not reached – a failure that would fall on the leadership of Hamas, as it is unlikely that this time frame has been decided without coordination with Israel.

In tandem, Egypt has warned Israel against the “disastrous consequences” of a military operation in Rafah. Yet, at the same time, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated that there was no threat to the peace treaty between the two countries as they are “actively dealing” with the pressing issues.

For Israel, launching a military operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor may create two problems. First, there are ethical concerns regarding the displacement of approximately 1.3 million Gazan refugees who would be forced, once again, to seek shelter elsewhere. Second, there are political and military implications for Egypt, particularly if masses of Palestinian refugees attempt to breach the fence and seek refuge in Sinai.

Although Egypt has been buttressing the fence recently, it would be difficult to control large numbers of desperate refugees looking to escape the fighting. In such a scenario, Egypt would face the dilemma of either resorting to the use of force against the crowds and risking accusations of betrayal and abandonment of the Palestinians or allowing them entry and placing the blame on Israel, leading to a crisis in diplomatic relations that could result in Egypt recalling its ambassador or even taking a more serious step.

Looking at it from another angle, Israel could potentially enhance its relationship with Egypt by facilitating aid from the international community and Arab states to bolster the Egyptian economy.

A historical precedent worth considering is the 1991 Gulf War, wherein Egypt’s participation led to the forgiveness of approximately $20 billion in debt and favorable repayment terms for other outstanding loans. Presently, Egypt faces significant economic challenges, further aggravated by the ongoing conflict. Significant international assistance to Egypt has the potential to impact its position on key security matters concerning Israel, such as the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah Crossing.

In essence, while an Israeli military operation in Rafah may be deemed necessary to eradicate Hamas, it also carries the risk of deteriorating Israeli-Egyptian relations. Avoiding this scenario will demand meticulous planning for the safe relocation of Gazan refugees and close coordination between Egypt and Israel.

Yet a sober analysis would lead to the conclusion that even with such measures in place, there’s no guarantee that the worst-case scenario can be entirely averted.

Prof. Elie Podeh teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

The article was published in the “Jerusalem Post” on February 20th.

הפוסט An Israeli offensive in Rafah could worsen relations with Egypt הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu is like a scorpion, trying to sting whoever tries to help us. But whereas the scorpion acts against its own interests, Netanyahu, in his attempts to save his own skin, sacrifices the country’s interests for his own.

At the height of the war, Netanyahu directed his “poison machine” at the leaders of the defense establishment, blaming them for the prewar protests and accusing them of misconduct. He continues to incite this hatred by blaming Qatar, the International Red Cross, President Biden, and even the families of hostages.

“Qatar serves Hamas” is a statement made by Netanyahu to families of captives and which was allegedly leaked by him, before he repeated it at a press conference. Really? It was Israel, led by the same Netanyahu, who asked Qatar to use its influence with Hamas in order to create mechanisms to end repeated cycles of violence between Hamas and Israel. It was the same Netanyahu-led Israel that asked Qatar to supply the money that strengthened Hamas in Gaza. This means that if Qatar served Hamas, Netanyahu himself served Hamas. But he has no use for truth, only for his personal interests.

The essence of his policy is “the Palestinian Authority is a burden and Hamas is an asset”, as stated in 2015 by Netanyahu’s collaborator Bezalel Smotrich. In those words, he expressed the declared policy of several Netanyahu governments, which were designed to weaken the PA and strengthen Hamas. Israel executed the first half by itself and Qatar was recruited to do the rest. Now, when a hostage deal threatens his extremist government, he has no inhibitions in attacking that country, even while it is making huge efforts to bring the hostages home.

Thus, the Red Cross, whose people risked their lives by entering the Gaza Strip in order to rescue hostages, also became a target of his poisoned arrows. At a special Knesset meeting with families of hostages, Netanyahu said: “Several days ago, I met with the president of the Red Cross and gave her a box of medication which the hostages require. I told her ‘Take this to the Rafah Crossing’, but she declined”.

The פresident of the Red Cross, Mariana Spoljaric apparently did not understand that she was dealing with a prime minister who has no qualms about using an organization that risks its workers’ lives to help the hostages in an ugly publicity stunt. He knows full well that the Red Cross is not able to visit the hostages or supply them with medication without Hamas approval. He also knows that in order to be able to function in Gaza, Red Cross personnel cannot criticize Hamas or support Israeli hasbara, even if that is how they feel. Doing so would prevent them from fulfilling their humanitarian tasks. Netanyahu knows all that, but nevertheless resorts to it to gain another pathetic round of self-promotion. This behavior conflicts with Israel’s interests.

Netanyahu seeks more and more targets for his poisoned arrows because he knows that the largest arrow of all is pointed at him. It is under his rule that we experienced the worst disaster in our history. It is he whose leadership and policy made Hamas grow economically and militarily. It is his army that moved more and more troops to the West Bank and failed to protect the Gaza envelope communities. He is the one who, for the past four months, has conducted a war with no exit plan and is preventing the most supportive American president from leading an international coalition to defeat Hamas and also promote regional normalization with Israel. It is none other than Netanyahu who has avoided attempts to free the hostages for fear that he will lose his coalition. He does so in order to pacify the far right, mainly Ben Gvir and Smotrich, whose disapproval he desperately fears.

In the face of such a massive failure, his attempt to escape responsibility, coupled with a lack of basic empathy and human decency, leads him to blame whomever he can and to further his own selfish interests including maliciously targeting the hostage’s families themselves.

His goal is to ensure that there is never a quiet moment here, during which his remaining supporters will see that the emperor has no clothes. He is naked of leadership, naked of concern for the country’s future, naked of responsibility for the lives of the hostages, and naked of concern for anyone and anything who is not Netanyahu.

The article was published in “The Times of Israel” on February 15.

הפוסט The­ scorpion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While Israel has generally provided effective military response to threats in its immediate maritime domain, such as curbing armed Palestinian terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the 1970s, it has failed to provide a significant naval response in the distant areas of the Red Sea.

It did not resolve Egypt’s obstruction since 1947 of Israeli passage through the Suez Canal by maritime force, nor did it remove the Egyptian blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Straits during the Yom Kippur War, although such options were examined, at least in 1973.

At the same time, Arab threats to these shipping lanes have created a rare opportunity for Israel to mobilize international support over the years. The blockade imposed on the passage of vessels or goods through the Suez Canal (1947-1967), and the current attacks on vessels in Bab-el-Mandeb threaten not only Israel but the fundamental international principle of freedom of navigation and, in the case of the Suez Canal, the specific international treaty anchoring its operations. Moreover, damage to vessels imposes an economic burden on all commercial maritime activity in the area, not only on shipping to and from Israel, due to increased insurance costs and circuitous shipping routes.

These circumstances generated international support for Israel whenever threats emerged in the Red Sea maritime space. In 1951, for example, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling on Egypt to allow the passage of goods and vessels to and from Israel through the Suez Canal. In 1957, president Dwight D. Eisenhower provided Israel with what it interpreted as a commitment to employ US naval assets to protect the freedom of navigation if the Egyptians once again blocked the Straits of Tiran from shipping to and from Israel.

However, these diplomatic achievements proved insufficient in the absence of international enforcement. The UN Security Council’s firm 1951 support for Israel did not prevent Egypt from hampering the passage of Israel-related shipping in subsequent years, with the issue ultimately resolved only by the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The 1957 American commitment regarding the Straits of Tiran did not translate into the use of international military force to open the waterway in the May 1967 crisis.

THE RENEWED threats and attacks on Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea, this time by the Houthis from Yemen, have prompted international concern at this violation of the international freedom of navigation, with a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on the rebels to stop the attacks, and condemnation by at least 40 countries. The two superpowers – the United States and China – appealed directly to Iran to exert its influence over the Houthis to end the attacks. Even Russia avoided imposing a veto on the Security Council resolution.

Hesitating to attack the Houthis

This time, the declarations were translated into action. In December 2023, the United States announced the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian by an international coalition of forces to protect traffic in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The United States and Britain also attacked targets in Yemen in a bid to force an end to the Houthi attacks at sea.

But even the US-led coalition’s effort to defend freedom of navigation is being overshadowed by the same kind of international hesitation demonstrated in the past. Many Operation Prosperity Shield partners provide only symbolic assistance, which usually includes the deployment of a limited number of staff officers.

Most US allies in Western Europe did not join the coalition, translating their concern over the infringement of freedom of navigation into the dispatch of limited forces that would not operate under the US umbrella. Even Spain, an important NATO partner with a proud maritime heritage, refused to send troops, citing the need to avoid undermining “international peace.”

So far, the coalition has not achieved its objectives and the Houthi attacks continue. The escalation of the US response, which included a large-scale attack on Houthi targets together with UK forces, also failed to achieve its objective.

Nonetheless, over a month since the launch of the coalition’s activity, several insights can be gleaned with relevance for Israel.

FIRST, DEFENDING its interests requires increasing Israeli dependence on its allies, especially on the US, in addition to the dependence it has developed since the 1970s for the supply of weapons and political backing in the international arena. The current coalition includes, for the first time since 1991, the use of international, and particularly American, military force to defend Israeli interests (inter alia). The US naval force in the region, while trying to protect commercial shipping, is also intercepting missiles fired by the Houthis towards Israel. In fact, the Gaza war appears to have deepened the Israel-US military cooperation not only at sea, with Pentagon officials reportedly involved in top-level military discussions in Israel immediately after October 7.

Second, as was the case in 1991, such direct military dependence could be used by Washington as a lever to advance its preferences, for example on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Even if Israel’s incumbent prime minister seeks to repel such pressure and a different US president is elected in November, the potential for US leverage remains significant, given Israel’s reliance on US munitions.

Third, while Israel finds itself attacked in terms of its “international legitimacy” in arenas such as The Hague, it enjoys military protection from the international system in the Red Sea, and its interests are consistent with the Security Council’s resolution.

Moreover, China, which prides itself on good relations with all sides, implicitly holds Iran responsible for the infringement on freedom of navigation. The Chinese stance and Russia’s decision to refrain from vetoing the anti-Houthi Security Council resolution highlight the limitations of Iran’s strategy of confronting Israel on multiple fronts (its so-called “unity of arenas” strategy), for example by creating a potential wedge between Tehran and Beijing.

Planners in Jerusalem should examine the current Red Sea challenge in the broader context of chess with Tehran, and not only through the lens of a boxing match with Hamas in Gaza. Such a review could identify additional opportunities for Israel given the breadth, not to mention overload, of Iranian activity.

Fourth, coalition action is also significant in terms of Israeli force structure and its deployment. Israel is not a formal member of the maritime coalition, but it presumably coordinates with the US on certain aspects of the use of force in the Red Sea. The more this coalition (and perhaps similar ones in the future) contributes to protecting Israel, the better the conditions for Israeli participation in future coalition frameworks, including regional ones. This would require some adjustment to improve the suitability of Israeli forces to coalition action. Questions are also expected to re-emerge regarding Israeli military engagement in missions other than those for its own defense, such as the Western expectation in the 1950s that Israel would assist the coalition fighting in Korea at the time.

Finally, Israel’s adversaries clearly understand the harmful potential for Israel of a naval threat. The sea has traditionally been a secondary arena in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but recent developments in Bab-el-Mandeb have led Iran and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to declare that, under certain circumstances, they may threaten Israeli maritime interests in other areas as well, especially the Mediterranean Sea and Israeli ports.

The sea, therefore, may develop into an arena requiring greater Israeli effort, but could also create additional opportunities for international cooperation, and not only in the Red Sea.

The article was published in “The Jerusalem Post” on February 14.

הפוסט What Israel can learn from the US-led coalition’s attacks on the Houthis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Indeed, under Netanyahu’s leadership, Israel maintains distorted and strange relations with Russia that join a wide range of Israeli behaviors in the past decade that increasingly distinguish Israel from the free world and lead us toward the bench of the world pariahs.  One would have thought it is reasonable to assume that in the face of Russian support of Hamas, we would have stopped veering in the direction of the nation whose people committed war crimes, including rape of civilians. However, it transpires that such an assumption is mistaken.

Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many western companies have abandoned Russia.  They have done so in order to stifle the economy of an aggressor nation that carries out war crimes and against the leader of which an international arrest warrant has been issued by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the Hague.  The Russian economy is in bad shape, but its size and huge domestic market, together with broad economic ties with countries such as China, Iran and Turkey, enable it to at least give an impression of business as usual, while it continues its aggression against Ukraine.

However, there are those who suggest that we should act like Russia. They want Israel to starve, destroy and kill as much as possible. And what will happen if we are sanctioned, they are asked?  If Russia has survived, we will also survive, they answer.  Those same people argue that we should adopt the Russian example of brutal conduct in war and simply ignore moral considerations, as if there are no basic norms to which Israel is obligated to follow as a liberal democracy, and a country that wishes to be part of the West and to earn international legitimacy from it.

A country like Russia can perhaps allow itself to break all the rules, to massacre and to destroy and without significant economic damage thanks to its political power, together with its being a central part of the axis of the autocratic countries. Countries that the Netanyahu government sought to flirt with, only to discover the bitter truth, that in a war against Hamas, they hurry to side with Hamas.

Our defense accords, both written and unwritten, are based on democratic principles shared with the United States, Germany and other western countries.  Our economy is based on commerce with the western nations.  Israel does not have the resources to become an autocratic island state, politically and economically, cut off from the West and banished from the East.

The Gaza War has also provided us with an important lesson regarding the limitations of our power and our true abilities and the supreme importance of preserving proper relationships with our allies, relationships based upon acceptance of and obedience to the international norms.  We have learned that we need the United States not only for purposes of its veto at the UN, but also in order to conduct the war.  We learned, and the entire world has seen, that Israel could not have fought as it did without the shipment of armaments from the US, without the military, economic and diplomatic backing that was extended to us and that saved and is still saving us from a bloody regional quagmire.

Preserving our humanity is not only a moral imperative, it is part of Israel’s defense wall.  If we fantasize about being like Russia in Ukraine or like China against the Uyghur minority, not only will we become an immoral nation, we will find ourselves isolated throwing off altogether the central strengths of Israel.

Russia can afford to behave in this manner, but we will become easy prey for our enemies who have already proven how well they are able to identify weakness and to exploit it.

The article was published in “The Times of Israel” on February 13.

הפוסט Spoiler – We are not Russia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other democracies sided with Israel’s war on Hamas from day one. Visits by world leaders in the middle of the war to express solidarity; shipments of ammunition; and formation of a coalition against the Houthis are among the prominent expressions of this support by our allies.

But Israel’s interest requires another step on the part of our friends, a step that UK Foreign Secretary Cameron and US Secretary of State Blinken have talked about in recent days: recognition of a Palestinian state. For the UK, this would serve as the ultimate realization of the Balfour Declaration, which envisioned a national home for the Jewish people because without a national home for the Palestinian people we will not be a free people in our land. Separation between these two national homes would allow us to maintain Israel as the democratic State of the Jewish people.

Recognizing a Palestinian state would underscore what the international community has been telling Israel for decades: the desired political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is separation into two states. It is incumbent upon the US, UK, and European Union to form a “coalition of sanity” against the coalition of extremists. Pro-Western Arab states will join them. The details of the separation will be worked out in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Israel, for example, should and will demand that Palestine be demilitarized.

A Palestinian state is recognized by 138 out of 193 countries UN member states. Most did so in 1988 after Palestinian Liberation Organization head Yasser Arafat’s landmark Algiers declaration establishing a Palestinian state. In his declaration, the PLO adopted the two-state solution, recognizing Security Council Resolution 242, based on the 1967 lines [calling for the withdrawal of Israel from territory gained in the Six Day War]. Some 30 additional countries recognized the Palestinian state in 2011 after Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas applied for UN membership.

However, some 50 states have so far refrained from recognizing a Palestinian state. These are the “moral majority” countries, as former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, Ron Prosor, called them in 2011, when he tried to convince as many states as possible to abstain from the vote.

In so doing, Israel sought to signal that the “moral majority” consisting of the world’s major democracies did not support Palestinian membership in the UN. In fact, democracies such as France and Spain joined the bloc of 138 states that voted in favor; Germany and the UK were among the 41 abstentions, and only nine states voted “nay”, led by the US, the Czech Republic, and Canada.

The Israeli public should call on other countries to recognize a Palestinian state

With Israel under the rule of an extremist government, Israeli citizens should call on the international “moral majority” to grant sweeping recognition of a Palestinian state in order to defeat extremism and create a political alternative to Hamas. Standing with Israel and its existential interests requires international leadership to steer the sides toward the only viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This separation into two states for two peoples will not only grant the Palestinians the right to self-determination – it will also save Israel from the binational catastrophe toward which we are heading.

The US, UK, Canada, and 19 members of the EU, including Germany, France, and Italy, have yet to recognize a Palestinian state, but all maintain diplomatic relations with Ramallah. It should be made clear that recognition of a Palestinian state is essentially a symbolic step. It will not automatically lead to its establishment nor determine its boundaries. It will send a clear signal to the State of Israel and those at its helm of the direction in which the international community is pointing them, after which the Israeli and Palestinian governments themselves will negotiate the details of the separation.

Such a move would encourage the PA to undertake the systemic reforms advocated by the international community, led by the US.

This is the direction desired by our allies for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for normalization with Saudi Arabia, for regional investment and prosperity (for example, the planned economic corridor from India to Europe, running through the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel), and for forming an effective regional anti-Iran coalition.

Such a move would create an “alliance of moderates” – the US, UK, the EU, the pro-western Arab countries, and Israel’s peace-loving citizens – against the axis of extremists who seek to fuel the conflict, not resolve it.

Broad international recognition of a Palestinian state will signal to the Israeli government the path it must choose – a path of dialogue and understanding that unless it distances itself from the dangerous hardliners advocating transfer and annexation, Israel will become a pariah state, like South Africa’s apartheid regime. Israel must choose to play a key role in the emerging world order of liberal democracies, led by the US, UK, and the EU, rather than being relegated to its boycotted margins.

The two-state solution enjoys broad international consensus. The two-state vision is one of the few issues on which the US can agree with Russia and China, which have already recognized a Palestinian state. This consensus can serve as the basis for an international initiative that will turn the tragedy of October 7 into a diplomatic opportunity.

US recognition of a Palestinian state would also have the added value of restoring President Joe Biden’s standing among progressive voters, damaged by his unequivocal support for Israel and its war on Hamas. We must not forget the terrible alternative. Donald Trump is a threat to the democratic world. The former president, who pledged to be a dictator “only for a day,” may return to the White House unchecked, propped up by fanatical supporters of a man who has proven countless times that he holds his personal interests far dearer than those of his country (like our prime minister).

Recognition by the international “moral majority” of a Palestinian state is a Zionist imperative if Israel is to ensure its future as the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people. It would serve as a lifeline against the nightmarish government of Benjamin Netanyahu, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Bezalel Smotritch and the world’s lifeline against Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Iran’s regional influence.

Recognition of a Palestinian state by the world’s leading democracies could finally provide more stability and calm to the bruised area in which we live.

The article was published in “the Jerusalem Post” on February 11.

הפוסט The way to defeat Hamas: Recognition of a Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the fiscal year ending in June 2023, Egypt generated $8.776 billion from the Suez Canal. However, since the beginning of 2024, revenues from transit fees, paid by ships navigating the canal, have experienced a sharp decline of 40% to 50%. Ongoing Houthi attacks are discouraging many shipping companies from using the Suez Canal. For those that do choose the Red Sea route, substantial increases in insurance premiums are adding to the economic challenges.

The decline in Egyptian tourism income is striking amid the current conflict. It’s hard to imagine vacationing in Sinai with Houthi missiles and drones flying overhead toward Israel. In the 2022-2023 fiscal year, tourism contributed a record $13.63 billion to Egypt’s revenue. At present, it’s challenging to fully assess the extent of the damage inflicted on Egyptian tourism by the ongoing conflict, but reports indicate a significant and alarming decline. This unfavorable situation is likely to persist as long as the war continues.

The tourism industry in Sinai supports hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, and this new crisis, coming on the heels of the COVID pandemic, poses a risk of causing irreparable damage.

The effects on the Suez Canal and the tourism sector have reduced foreign currency revenues, resulting in a significant impact on the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound. Currently valued at 31 pounds to the US dollar, it is expected to reach approximately 40 pounds to the dollar by the end of the year.

Inflation on the rise in Egypt

The rising inflation rate is further exacerbating the cost of living. Regrettably, the Egyptian government is unable to offset this rise by subsidizing essential goods, leading to a further deterioration in the standard of living for Egyptian citizens, which has already been declining in recent years.

Another substantial source of foreign currency income for Egypt is the remittances from its millions of expatriate workers. In the first half of 2023, these transfers experienced a significant 23% decrease, declining from $15.6 billion to $12 billion. The main reason for this decline is the expectation of an Egyptian pound devaluation, as the official dollar exchange rate significantly lags behind the black-market rate.

The ongoing crisis resulting from the war in Gaza compounds the challenges Egypt has been grappling with following two major global crises: the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Adding to these concerns is Egypt’s status as the world’s largest grain importer, with 80% of its imports originating from Ukraine and Russia.

This heavy dependence has led to a substantial surge in prices and inflation. In June 2023, annual inflation peaked at 36.8%, accompanied by a 65% increase in food and drink prices. Given that approximately one-third of the 110 million population lives below the United Nations-defined poverty line of $2.15 per day, these significant price hikes are likely to have far-reaching political and social consequences. It’s important to remember that the January 2011 revolution was largely triggered by the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent rise in prices.

THE POOR economic conditions are anticipated to contribute to increased unemployment. A pronounced downturn in tourism activities in Sinai and across Egypt, coupled with the persistent devaluation of the Egyptian pound leading to rising inflation, is likely to elevate unemployment rates. It is worth noting that high youth unemployment was one of the primary factors behind the onset of the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

The challenging economic conditions are expected to lead to a rise in unemployment. The significant decline in tourism both in Sinai and throughout Egypt, combined with the continuous devaluation of the Egyptian pound resulting in rising inflation, is likely to elevate unemployment rates. It is worth noting that high youth unemployment played also a major role in sparking the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

Israeli-Egyptian relations have gained attention amid reports of a strain between the two leaderships, coupled with tensions and disagreements concerning the governance of Gaza, post-war. Issues such as Israel’s desire to regain control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah Crossing, along with Egyptian concerns over potential Palestinian expulsion from Gaza by Israel, have added complexity to the situation.

However, the Houthi attacks from Yemen present an equally severe challenge directly threatening Egypt’s economy.

In economic terms, Egypt is enduring more significant repercussions than any other Arab state, including Jordan. Therefore, it is crucial for Israel to recognize that Egypt’s decision-making regarding the Gaza conflict is influenced not only by military and political considerations but also by the prevailing economic circumstances.

The article was published in “The Jerusalem Post” on February 6.

הפוסט Egypt needs to consider its economy in Gaza war outlook הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The PA was established in 1994 as an outcome of the Oslo Accords, which envisioned it as a temporary body to be replaced by a permanent institution within five years. However, a permanent arrangement was not achieved, leaving the PA a “temporary” institution for over three decades, thereby contributing to its increasing weakness. While the Authority bears great responsibility for this weakness, it is not solely and accountable for the erosion of its standing. Israel, its Oslo Accords partner and main backer, has ignored the PA since 2009, clearly intent on dismantling it and rejecting all dialogue options. The PA today is an enfeebled body, lacking legitimacy and the capacity to enforce its authority and provide services for its people.

Reconstituting the PA would entail a lengthy process of reorganization, rehabilitation, and training to adapt its governance to the post-war era. Such a transformation would also necessitate the election of a new leadership that enjoys public legitimacy, enabling it to impose authority and enforce law and order. The PA will have to shed its corrupt image, proving that it can conduct its affairs transparently and use its tax revenues and international aid for the public good rather than the personal interests of its cronies. The education system will require revamping to rid it of anti-Israel content, and the judicial system will require restoration of its independence to provide a recourse for Palestinians seeking justice and protection from government arbitrariness. Israel must actively take part in the renewal process by outlining a real political horizon, declaring the PA a dialogue partner, and its existence as a vital interest. This commitment will require Israel to expand cooperation with the PA, unfreeze PA funds, coordinate measures to boost its economy, carry out confidence- building initiatives, and approve and coordinate reforms to strengthen its international standing.

An efficient and functioning PA is crucial to preserving Israel’s identity and security. The rehabilitation of the PA is feasible, as evidenced by its operation for over six years under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, which won Israeli and international praise. In 2012, the World Bank even ranked it higher than some established states in terms of the ease of doing business. A PA that undergoes the necessary reconstruction and reorganization could help Israel achieve security, take responsibility for the 5 million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, and form the basis for a lasting resolution of a century-old conflict.

הפוסט What is a Revitalized Palestinian Authority? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In order to prevent the election of extremists opposed to a political settlement, legitimate restrictions must be placed on the individuals and groups running for the post of president and for membership in the legislative council. These limitations will be based on the three conditions that the Quartet countries laid out for Hamas after its victory in the 2006 elections: abandoning the path of terrorism, recognizing Israel, and affirming the previous agreements it signed with the PLO.

The elections must take place in the context of an advanced political process offering hope to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and increasing their support for a settlement approach. To that end, Israel will have to declare its commitment to a political process designed to result in a two-state solution, and adopt confidence-building measures that demonstrate its intent to reach a political settlement, including a halt of construction in the settlements. At the same time, the international community, led by the United States and the European Union, will have to guarantee their recognition of a Palestinian state. The United States will also help train the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatuses, contribute to the development of its economy, and promote reforms in government institutions.

Israel and the international community must lay the groundwork for orderly, internationally supervised elections in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip that will ensure the election of a suitable national leadership for the Palestinian people. Having won the trust of the people, such a leadership will enjoy legitimacy and be able to promote a stable settlement with Israel. It will also contribute, over time, to strengthening the moderate elements in society and weakening extremist, religious, and nationalist opposition elements.

הפוסט Palestinian Elections: A Vital Step Toward a Stable Political Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the political unwillingness and/or inability of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace, the dire circumstances in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), the potential benefits of an International Peace Conference (IPC) immediately following the war should be explored.Such a conference could grant domestic and international legitimacy to drawing up a coherent road map for the de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, an IPC should also address the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on UNGA Resolution 181 (the 1947 Partition Resolution) and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on the basis of UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), and 2334 (2016).

International peace conferences usually take place in the aftermath of wars, though sometimes they are convened as a deliberated diplomatic effort to end wars in long and protracted conflicts. They serve as useful diplomatic tools for peacemaking in the form of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Moreover, they can serve as instruments of peacebuilding regarding issues such as reconstruction, governance, and transitional post-war security and civilian regimes. They also enable focused attention on the issues at hand, bringing together all relevant actors in a multilateral diplomatic setting sponsored by trusted conveners in order to foster diplomatic momentum, formally end wars and establish peace treaties, set road maps and timetables, and even firm deadlines for their implementation, and formulate an agenda to kickstart substantial and sustainable peace processes.

Various IPCs have been held in the aftermath of crises and wars in order to seekan end to the state of permanent conflict involving Israel, the Palestinians, and neighboring Arab States, with mixed results. These include the Lausanne Conference, 1949; the Geneva Conference, 1973; the Madrid Conference, 1991; the Annapolis Conference, 2007; and the Paris Conference, 2017. Past IPCs have not been resounding successes nor complete failures. The Lausanne Conference (1949) was a multilateral forum of negotiations that failed to transcend the limits of the Rhodes Armistices and reach a permanent peace between Israel and its neighbors. Similarly, the Geneva Conference of December 1973 did not result in any breakthrough after the Yom Kippur War (Syria did not even participate). The Paris Conference (2017) failed mainly due to the absence of both Israel and the Palestinians. In a more positive vein, Madrid (1991) and Annapolis (2007) established useful diplomatic frameworks for multilateral and bilateral negotiations rather than constituting negotiating fora in themselves. The logic of an IPC to produce a formal road map and agenda seems to be even more relevant these days, given the urgency of planning “the day after” even before the formal end of the Gaza war.

The Madrid Conference kickstarted negotiating processes that matured into a peace process with the Palestinians and an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement. Based on this relevant and successful precedent, an IPC following the Israel-Hamas War is a necessary, even if not sufficient, political-diplomatic componentof a road map for Gaza’s rehabilitation and negotiations on a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The immediate concerns regarding the reconstruction, governance, security, and demilitarization of the Gaza Strip are intrinsically linked to the eventual resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution, sincethe political vision (and future reality) is a pre-condition for mobilizing international actors in the immediate term for the reconstruction and governance of the Gaza Strip. Looking ahead, the Gaza Strip’s political future must be organically linked to the West Bank’s. An IPC could constitute a “threshold event” setting a diplomatic clock for transition from the immediate to the medium term, to be completed within 3-5 years of a ceasefire ending the Israel-Hamas war until the signing of peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.

Israel and the Palestinian Authority must participate in the IPC in the immediate aftermath of the war, ruling out the option of elections as a precondition for the event. Despite the need for new leaderships, the required domestic political changes for democratic elections in both Israel and the PA might take months, if not years.

The peace conference will be mostly a ceremonial and symbolic event (without substantive negotiations during its 4-5 day duration) attended by relevant members of the international community, led by the United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Its agenda should include:

As was the case in Madrid (1991), the peace conference will formally launch bilateral and multilateral negotiating channels in which Israel and the Palestinians (in the bilateral track) will take part under the supervision of Quartet members (the United States, the UN, the European Union, and Russia), in addition to China and the countries of the Regional Quartet (Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia). At the same time, multilateral negotiating channels will be devoted to discussing pressing issues of Gaza’s reconstruction and, in the longer term, cooperation on regional issues such as economic development, the environment, and arms control.

Absent a political horizon based on a peace conference producing immediate change, Israel may find itself mired for years in the Gaza quagmire, against its will. The peace conference proposed here is an integrated (hybrid) model. Itsagenda should include related issues of immediate humanitarian and logistical assistance to the Gaza Strip, the establishment and empowerment of a temporary international authority for the administration of the enclave during a transitional period of several years, and the empowerment and strengthening of the Palestinian Authority. The agenda should also include substantive negotiations ultimately leading to the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel, as well as additional peace agreements between Israel and the Arab states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia.

The article was printed in the Jerusalem Post on January 23.

הפוסט The Case for a Post-War International Peace Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the war is being prosecuted will determine the range of political options in its aftermath. Despite the reluctance of the current Israeli government to engage in any substantial long-term political discussion about the “day after” in terms of any significant blueprints or scenarios, it is imperative to draw a coherent road map regarding the feasible diplomatic options for the immediate and long-term perspectives regarding Israel’s exit from Gaza in the aftermath of the war, including the political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Taking into consideration the lack of political willingness and/or ability of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace after the war, the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic political repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), this paper examines the possible role and functions that an International Peace Conference (IPC) might fulfil in granting domestic and international legitimacy and the drawing of a coherent road map leading to de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, any IPC should also address the larger political issue regarding the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of the fulfillment of UNGA Resolution 181 (1947) and the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, following UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), 1850 (2008), and 2334 (2016).

The policy paper draws on historical precedents from other conflicts, as well as reflecting on examples and experiences from the Arab-Israeli conflict, first and foremost the relevant and successful example of the Madrid Conference of October 1991. The major insight to be drawn is that an IPC is a necessary but not sufficient political diplomatic ingredient in the road map leading to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war in the immediate term, as well as to peace negotiations towards the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State alongside Israel.

הפוסט An International Peace Conference in the Aftermath of the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the prominent areas in which local government engages and cooperates with others today is the environmental and climate field, notably in light of the foot-dragging of nation-states around these issues.

Given this reality, the paper examines whether relationships and cooperation on the environment might be built between local authorities when their respective nation-states maintain no relations or only cold ones, or are in ongoing conflict. The paper analyses three theoretical axes: 1) the rising political power of local authorities vis-à-vis their nation-states, and as significant actors in global diplomacy; 2) growing local involvement with environmental problems; and 3) the promotion of environmental peacebuilding.

The paper analyses the feasibility of joining these axes, and gives relevant examples, focussing on the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian space. The main argument arising from the analysis is that local government has the tools and the effective opportunity to advance environmental cooperation as a stimulus to making peace; and further, that processes of this sort are particularly important when there is no political horizon. While Israel and its region are indeed the focus of this paper’s examination of local government and its potential for building relationships, the general insights derived are applicable to other regions of conflict.

הפוסט On the Role of Local Government in Promoting Peace and Political-Environmental Sustainability הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Yom Kippur War (1973) saw dramatic rises in oil prices, especially after the declaration by the oil-producing states of a boycott against countries supporting Israel, headed by the United States. The same occurred after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was even a price increase during the first days of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, although neither Israel nor Lebanon are neither oil producers nor major junctions for the transportation of oil. And finally, oil prices climbed sharply after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, last year. The reason behind such price increases in response to wars is clear: fear of disruption of the production and/or transportation of oil. But this time, after a few days of moderate rises, oil prices fell to below where they were before the war.

In addition to the oil market, the general public has also responded with moderation. Since the beginning of the war and despite the actions of the Houthis (who also launched a drone attack on Abu Dhabi airport in January 2022), there has not been a noticeable effect on the number of tourists traveling to Dubai and Abu Dhabi; or to Doha, the capital of Qatar. Indeed, the last quarter of 2023, all of it overshadowed by the war in Gaza, was the best so far for tourism to the Gulf – better even than the equivalent quarter of 2019, just before the COVID-19 pandemic.

The lack of negative impact on holiday bookings or flights to the Gulf for the coming months indicates that the “world’s citizens,” along with the large international tourist agencies, believe that the war is not set to expand and that Iran, which borders the United Arab Emirates (UAE), will not join the fray. Similarly, the forecast for the Qatari economy published at the end of November by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mentions neither the war itself nor the impact of the Houthis’ actions on economic trends in the Persian Gulf – the world’s most important oil production and transportation region.

It is not only the oil and tourism markets that are predicting that the war will not spread to other theaters. The Israeli stock market, it would seem, is behaving in a similar manner. During wartime, November saw sharp rises in share prices after some major falls in October. The first three weeks of December also brought continued increases on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, and the TA-35 Index climbed by almost 3% over this period. In addition, the past month has seen a more moderate trend in the scale of withdrawals from funds invested in bonds issued by Israeli companies.

The value of the shekel

AND THIS is not all. On the eve of the war, the dollar-to-shekel exchange rate stood at 3.86. On October 27, the day after the beginning of Israel’s ground offensive into Gaza, the dollar climbed to NIS 4.08, its highest rate for 11 years. It is entirely logical for market uncertainty to drive investors to the safer shores of the dollar. Yet the dollar rate has now fallen far below where it was before the war, reaching NIS 3.65 shekels on December 19, 40 agorot lower than before the ground offensive.

Credit card purchases by Israeli consumers, which dropped by 25% in October relative to the previous month, are also now joining the trend for improvement. In November, they climbed steeply from October levels, and the same will seemingly be the case for December.

All this data indicates that since the beginning of the ground operation, and increasingly over the last two weeks, more and more institutions and Israeli citizens have reached the conclusion that the war will not expand into additional theaters.

What are the reasons behind the seemingly relaxed response of the markets? There are several possible explanations: First, the markets and the citizens of countries around the world, including Israel, are behaving as if this is a limited war – just another round of fighting against Hamas, like Operation Protective Edge in 2014, but at a higher intensity. Thus, the economic impact, in their assessment, will also be limited.

Second, the statement by United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announcing the formation of an international naval force headed by the United States to prevent the Houthis from closing Bab el-Mandeb will restrain rises in oil prices and shipping costs. Closing the strait would constitute a declaration of war, not only against Israel but against the Western economy, after it has only recently managed to rein in the inflation that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And finally, a war in the North against Hezbollah does not currently seem to be on the cards, and it would appear – at least according to the behavior of the financial markets – that the confrontation between Hezbollah and the IDF will remain restricted to daily clashes close to the border fence.

Still, if one of these threats is indeed realized – if the northern front expands into an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah, or if the Red Sea is closed to shipping by the Houthis – then the energy market will respond with sharp increases in fuel prices. It seems safe to assume that President Joe Biden will make every effort to prevent such an outcome during an election year.

The article was published on January 2, in the Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Economically, Israel is not facing multi-front war yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The lack of focus and the inability to materialize the dozens of signed agreements is evident these days, emphasizing what has not yet been implemented. For instance, an agreement for employing Moroccan migrant workers in Israel has not yet been signed, despite the statement made by the former interior minister Ayelet Shaked in July 2022. Nor has the economic infrastructure to enable business between the countries been completed, namely agreements on customs, double taxation avoidance, promotion and protection of investments, and other systems to enhance the attractiveness and competitiveness of the trade channel between Morocco and Israel.

Moroccan decision makers, for their part, appear to regard the ongoing war with Hamas, and no less so the current Israeli government, as detrimental to the resumption of relations between the countries to its positive course. Statements by senior Israeli officials calling for the destruction of Gaza, while vehemently opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state, echo in the Moroccan media, damage Israel’s image, and mainly serve opposition parties who wish to harm the special relations between the two countries.

Nevertheless, Morocco’s official position regarding relations with Israel as a strategic interest remains intact. This was evidenced by the results of the extraordinary Arab Islamic Conference held in Riyadh in November, in which Morocco – alongside other key Arab and Muslim countries – was reluctant to embrace actual decisions or actions against their relations with Israel. Morocco’s decision to keep its ambassador in Tel Aviv – despite the Israeli mission staff being evacuated from Rabat – is a significant statement in itself.

In the economic field, businesses more or less continue as usual. Israeli companies come to Morocco or meet their partners in third-country destinations such as France and Spain. This discreet arrangement seems convenient for everyone.

Tourism has almost completely stopped between the countries

Tourism is the most affected sector, with direct flights between Tel Aviv and Rabat still on hold, and a travel warning in effect with a rating of three out of four, advising Israelis to avoid non-essential travel to Morocco. As a result, Israeli and international Jewish tourism to Morocco has almost entirely stopped. This situation is exacting a price from Israeli tourism agencies and Moroccan hotels and service providers. While tourism is a key to people-to-people connections, most civil and cultural partnerships are currently on hold and in a “waiting” situation until the end of the war.

Despite the challenges, some joint initiatives can be preserved, finding creative ways to sustain them, such as transferring them from a bilateral framework to a multi-sided one under an American, European, Emirati, or other umbrella, or conducting activities online whenever possible.

One of the main challenges in the civil context is the sentiment among Israelis of Moroccan descent regarding Morocco. It ranges from disappointment to astonishment and a lack of understanding in light of images of mass protests from Rabat and other cities in Morocco and even antisemitic incidents that do not receive official condemnation.

Here, it should be noted that Israeli frustration is partly due to cultural and behavioral differences between Israel and Morocco, despite their close cultural connection. According to the Moroccan perspective, including that of decision-makers, it is preferable to avoid conflicts, make explicit statements, and deal with matters quietly behind the scenes. In their view, the secrecy of action is a key to success, preserving internal stability and advancing a wishful agenda. That’s because, according to their understanding, one cannot resist what one does not see or know, so ultimately, maintaining quiet preserves the status quo as if nothing has been done. In Morocco, non-action is considered, in practice, equivalent to any action, and perhaps even the most proper and challenging action to execute.

Three years after the resumption of official ties, and in the shadow of the Gaza war challenges, the crisis also provides a new opportunity for regional and bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Morocco’s relatively neutral position may in fact enable it to play an important role in the aftermath of the war as part of a broader coalition dedicated to rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. It could help in the reconstruction and in implementing local and regional programs to deal with and prevent extremism and violence.

Morocco could assist in the training of Palestinian public employees deployed in Gaza. Morocco could also host forums, meetings, and conferences to support and promote a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The good relations that Morocco maintains with both sides – Israeli and Palestinian – and the religious authority of King Mohammed VI, including his role as the chairman of the Al-Quds Committee in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, are just some of the assets Morocco can bring to this complex task.

The connection with Morocco is a significant asset for Israel in times of peace and war alike. It is important that we learn and derive insights from the past three years towards the new chapter in relations that will unfold once the war is over.

The article was published on Janurary 1, 2024 in the Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Morocco and resolving the Gaza crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The disappointment within Hamas stems primarily from what it regards as the lax response by Iran and Hezbollah. Not only did the two deny any connection to its decision to attack Israel on October 7, but their military response has been limited.

Iran activated its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen against Israel and the United States, but did not take any military or other action itself.

High expectations

Hamas expected a more significant Hezbollah response given the group’s military capabilities and proximity to Israel. But Hezbollah faces strong domestic opposition to war with Israel that would spell disaster for Lebanon.

Syria – Iran’s proxy and ally – has also largely remained aloof, as a result of domestic constraints and previous animosities with Hamas.

Moussa Abu Marzouk, a member of the Hamas political bureau, expressed his disappointment in an interview with Al Jazeera, saying “we had high hopes for Hezbollah and our brothers in the West Bank, but we are amazed at the shameful position of our brothers in the Palestinian Authority.”

With the exception of Qatar, Hamas may not have had particularly high expectations of Arab countries, especially since some have even outlawed the organization (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or expelled its representatives (Jordan).

However, the concluding statement of the November 11 Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh, while harshly condemning Israel, made no mention of Hamas and reiterated the decision of the 1974 Rabat summit – that the PLO, of which Hamas is not a member, is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Hamas does not regard condemnation of Israel and humanitarian aid to Gaza as substitutes for a proactive stance, which would include suspending peace and normalization agreements with Israel, economic sanctions on the West and Israel, and other punitive measures available to the wealthy Gulf States.

ARAB OIL and gas producers could have announced an embargo on the countries that support Israel, as they did after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, or at least threatened to reduce their output, thus raising prices. Such a move is not in the cards, however. In fact, this is the first regional war that has led to sharp price declines for the benefit of major oil consumers with the cost of a barrel dropping from $82 to just $74 (as of December 20).

Though Jordan has recalled its ambassador from Israel, the move was predictable given four precedents during previous wars. Saudi Arabia also froze the normalization talks with Israel, but this, too, was not a surprise. Egypt and the other normalization countries did not recall their ambassadors.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry made an explicit statement with regard to Israel, saying “we have a very solid foundation in terms of the peace agreement that has shown its resilience; its ability to overcome challenges. And we are fully committed to maintaining the peace and continuing to have a normal relationship and the channels of communications that are deep and have been productive to both countries.”

His country’s condemnation of Hamas has been low-key, while the rulers of Bahrain and the UAE have called the October 7 massacre a “barbaric” act.

A notable exception was the Houthi response, escalating the conflict in the Red Sea and posing a threat to Israel and global maritime traffic in the Bab al-Mandeb straits. Yet, the Houthi response only serves to underscore the feeble Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza.

THIS HAS prompted Palestinian frustration and rage. One of Hamas leaders, Khaled Mashaal, urged Islamic representatives in Morocco on November 23 to press their government to sever relations with Israel, calling such relations a “mistake.” He added that “it would be real support for Palestine that would put pressure on Israel and its allies… What is needed today is a political front that says ‘no’ to Israeli aggression, transcends differences of opinion and unites against Israel.”

Mashaal’s statement backfired, being perceived in Morocco as interference in its internal affairs.

Arab media have also echoed the Palestinian frustration. Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst Marwan Bishara, for example, characterized the Arab states’ response to the war as “dim and weak” – just as it had been in Israel’s four previous rounds of war with Hamas – and called for the de-normalization of relations with the Jewish state. He was particularly virulent in criticizing rich countries that “have the means to influence events, but don’t mean what they say.”

Palestinian journalist and lecturer Khaled Abu Toameh accused the Arabs of “betraying” the Palestinians. Palestinian researcher Mohsen Muhammad Saleh, meanwhile, described the Arab position on the fighting in Gaza as a “new low.” A majority of Palestinian intellectuals expect the Arab states to take concrete steps against Israel and the West, refusing to settle for hollow declarations and humanitarian aid.

THE PALESTINIANS have a long history of bitter disappointment with their Arab brethren. It goes back to the failed intervention of the Arab states in preventing Israel’s independence in the 1948 war, followed by the Palestinian refugees’ feelings of humiliation at their treatment in the Arab countries where they sought asylum. Subsequent developments deepened their anger: their sense of abandonment by Sadat when he made peace with Israel (1979), and Arab failure to prevent the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon (1982).

In their two uprisings (intifadas) against Israel (1987-1991 and 2000-2005), the Palestinians railed at the Arab world for failing to provide them with military and diplomatic aid. Then came the 2020 Abraham Accords that bypassed and ignored the Palestinians.

While certain Arab countries have assisted over the years with funding, hosting, training and diplomacy, among them Syria, Iraq, Libya and Algeria, the aid was limited and fell far short of furthering their struggle for independence.

Palestinian disappointment with the Arab states is well reflected in Khalil Shikaki’s opinion polls. In 2017, the 50th anniversary of Israel’s occupation of the territories, two-thirds of West Bank and Gaza residents claimed the Arabs had not stood by them. For most, the 2020 normalization agreements with Israel were also a stinging betrayal.

Most Arab media supports the Palestinian cause as do many citizens of Arab states. The mass Arab protests against the war might well have been far more widespread had it not been for government-imposed restrictions, reflecting the decades’ long disparity between public Arab attitudes toward Israel and the policy of Arab rulers.

THE RULERS of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco see Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood by extension, as a threat. Thus, just as the Arab states applauded behind the scenes when the Begin government destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, so Israel’s attack on Hamas in Gaza largely serves Arab interests.

These countries also have vested interests in economic and security ties with the United States, which they are reluctant to jeopardize by turning on Israel. In particular, Egypt and Jordan cannot afford a return to a state of war with Israel for economic and demographic reasons, even at the cost of domestic dissatisfaction with their position.

Thus, many Arab states are driven by political and economic interests incompatible with plunging the region into war.

What, then, would moderate Arab states be willing to do to advance a political solution to the Palestinian problem after the war? The proposed deployment of an Arab peacekeeping force in Gaza appears to be a non-starter.

Humanitarian, economic, and financial assistance to the residents of Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, which would also help reduce Qatar’s influence in Gaza, is feasible albeit a heavy financial undertaking.

If Israel moves toward a two-state solution, it will find a full partner in the moderate Arab states, facilitating Israel’s coveted goal of normalization with Saudi Arabia, which was abandoned due to the war.

The article was published on December 25 on the Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Palestinians feel the Arab world has let them down הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From within Hamas, particularly among its leadership outside Gaza, there have been calls for the organization’s integration into the PLO. While this isn’t a new objective for Hamas, it appears that its external leaders now perceive integration with the PLO not only as a means to eventually seize control of the PLO and, consequently, the PA, but also as a strategy for securing political survival post the catastrophic events that Hamas has brought upon Gaza.

PA’s recurring willingness to seek agreements with Hamas is a consistent mistake

The PA’s recurring willingness to seek agreements with Hamas has proven to be a consistent mistake. This trend first surfaced during the Oslo Accords era when Arafat declined to disband Hamas and Islamic Jihad, despite their engagement in acts of terrorism that significantly contributed to the breakdown of the political process with Israel. Furthermore, during the uprising from 2000 to 2005, Fatah’s own factions, including Al-Aqsa Brigades, became involved in terror attacks against Israel.

The subsequent incident was Abbas’s choice not to dismantle the Palestinian ‘resistance’ organizations, but rather to broker an agreement with them, establishing a suspension of hostilities (tahdiya) in March 2005. This move aimed to secure calmness preceding Sharon’s plan for disengagement from Gaza in the summer of 2005. However, this decision starkly contradicted the positions of both Israel and the United States. Abbas prioritized preserving the appearance of Palestinian unity over other critical interests. Notably, the use of the term ‘tahdiya,’ instead of ‘hudna’ which signifies a ‘ceasefire’ with binding Islamic implications, indicated that the resistance movements had no intention of disarming. Instead, they sought to create an illusion of acceptance to prevent undermining the Israeli retreat from Gaza.

However, in the six months leading up to the disengagement, terror attacks persisted, particularly by Islamic Jihad. Consequently, Hamas could claim that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, akin to its retreat from Lebanon, resulted from armed struggle rather than a diplomatic process. This stance, coupled with widespread public discontent over Fatah’s corruption, led to Hamas’s electoral triumph in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections of January 2006.

The third repetition of this error was the 2007 agreement brokered in Mecca between Hamas and Fatah, mediated by Saudi Arabia. This accord resulted in the formation of a Palestinian unity government led by Ismail Haniyeh. However, just five months later, Hamas forcibly ousted the PA from Gaza in a violent coup. This act blatantly violated the Mecca Agreement, which expressly mandated a “ban on the shedding of Palestinian blood… and adoption of the language of dialogue as the sole basis for solving political disagreements in the Palestinian arena.”

The fourth event was the deal inked between Fatah and Hamas in October 2017 in Cairo, mediated by Egypt. The primary point of contention that caused the collapse of this agreement stemmed from Hamas’s resistance to disarmament. Their stance was rooted in the assertion that their arms were aimed at Israel rather than the PA.

The PA’s inclination to incorporate Hamas into its power structures post-war contradicts its own self-interest for two critical reasons. Firstly, this move could pave the way for Hamas to eventually seize control of the PA, akin to the historical precedent of Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and expulsion of the PA in 2007. Secondly, due to staunch opposition from the United States and Israel, such a proposal lacks any political feasibility.

Why does the Palestinian Authority pursue a policy that contradicts its own interests?

Why does the Palestinian Authority pursue a policy that contradicts its own interests? One explanation could be its vulnerability or a lack of internal legitimacy, compelling Abbas and Fatah leaders to adopt a stance that aligns with public sentiment. According to a survey conducted by Khalil Shikaki’s respected Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research following the outbreak of the conflict, support for Hamas in the West Bank surged threefold in response to the attack, while trust in Abbas and Fatah dwindled significantly, with around 90% of the public favoring Abbas’s resignation. Additionally, approximately 60% of Palestinians view armed struggle as the most effective means in the conflict with Israel.

In this regard, Abbas and the PA leadership resemble leaders of several Arab states, notably Jordan, who have condemned Israel rather than Hamas, occasionally employing strong rhetoric in their statements. However, while Jordan has upheld its peace treaty with Israel, Abbas’s current commitment to the political process remains uncertain. His adviser, Mahmoud al-Habbash, asserts that Abbas has consistently condemned Hamas in meetings with world leaders, but refrains from doing so publicly during the war. Yet, this assertion remains unverified.

An emerging perspective in Israel posits that the fundamental disparity between Fatah and Hamas lies solely in the methods employed to achieve their shared ultimate objective: the elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state encompassing the entire region from the river to the sea. However, it’s important to note that the historical actions taken by the PA, especially by Abbas himself, do not align with this assertion. This viewpoint, supported by the Netanyahu government, seemingly stems from its reluctance to involve the PA in Gaza post-war. This stance contradicts Israel’s policy in the West Bank, where efforts are made to strengthen the PA under the leadership of Abbas and Fatah.

Irrespective of Israel’s current stance, if the PA aspires to play a role in the post-war scenario in Gaza, as desired by the United States and various states in the Arab world and beyond, it must disavow Hamas and refuse to give it a role in post-war Gaza. Failure to do so risks undermining the PA’s credibility as a feasible negotiating partner. A step in this direction was the statement by Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary General of the executive committee of the PLO, that “all Palestinian factions including Hamas must take a serious look at the failure of their policies to achieve freedom for their people.”

The primary challenge lies in the lack of substantial popular support for the current PA leadership. Hence, any prospective agreement may necessitate engaging with a different leadership – one that is democratically elected, enjoys legitimacy, remains dedicated to a political resolution, and is both capable and willing to confront any Palestinian entity resorting to violence.

The article was published on the Jerusalem Post on December 20.

הפוסט The Palestinian leadership keeps making the same past mistakes הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Providing clean drinking water and treatment of wastewater, along with the supply of food, shelter, and medicine, are critical security considerations for the following reasons:

● Granting legitimacy to the military action- Ensuring a humanitarian situation that is in line with international humanitarian law in the Gaza Strip is a key condition for mobilizing internal, international, and regional legitimacy for military action.

● Ensuring the safety of Palestinian civilians, Israeli hostages, and soldiers in Gaza – An outbreak of infectious diseases will directly endanger civilians, kidnapped Israeli citizens, and IDF soldiers in the Strip. In addition, there is concern that an outbreak of epidemics would likely spread into Israel and Egypt.

● Preventing long-term pollution that damages natural resources – A humanitarian disaster in Gaza will lead to long-term pollution damaging natural water sources such as the coastal aquifer and the many wells both in Gaza and in Israel.

●Conserving financial resources by preventing a humanitarian disaster – Prevention is always less costly.

● Maintaining Israel’s values and upholding its moral standing. Given Israel’s interests as detailed above, to prevent a humanitarian disaster occurring in Gaza, Israel must take concrete actions to improve the immediate humanitarian situation in the southern Gaza Strip. This requires that Israel:

– Allow the entry or provision of sufficient basic water supply for the civilian population, while protecting water/wastewater infrastructure and the operation of desalination facilities, supply of chlorine into the water systems, and maintenance equipment needed.

– Facilitate maximum sewage treatment by providing fuel for sewage pumping systems, and, as much as possible, operating treatment plants in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) professional bodies.

– Permit sufficient energy supply for water and sewage treatment needs by considering to re-activate parts of the power lines in the south of Gaza, (monitoring the transmission of electricity), supplying fuel under the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), and renewable energy systems that are disconnected from the grid.

– Open the Kerem Shalom crossing for the transfer of essential humanitarian aid – water, fuel, food, shelter, and medicine – in order to overcome the backlog at Raffa Crossing in the provision of humanitarian aid.

– Promote a framework that connects relevant factors in Israel to their counterparts in the UN in order to create a comprehensive mapping and status report of needs, locations, bottlenecks, contributions, assistance funding, and the like.

– Promotion of a vaccination program and health monitoring – support for monitoring disease in Gaza and promotion of a vaccination program under the auspices of an international organization in accordance with health developments in the Gaza Strip.

הפוסט Securing Critical Infrastructure in Gaza is a Necessity for Israeli National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, Qatar also hosts Hamas leaders on its territory, the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera network and its leaders frequently criticize and demonize Israel, while Qatari money funds Hamas and other terrorist organizations as well as leading academic institutions around the world to promote Islamic messages. What, then, is Qatar – an enemy or a friend of Israel?

In order to answer this question, let us travel back in time three decades.

The history of formal and secret relations between Israel and Qatar

Clandestine ties were first established between Israel and Qatar immediately after the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993. That same month, the Qataris initiated the first secret meeting between then-foreign minister Shimon Peres and his Qatari counterpart at the home of Qatar’s ambassador to the United Nations. This relationship continued intermittently until April 1996, when formal relations were established. These were designated a “trade office,” but functioned as embassies in all but name.

Even before the establishment of formal relations. Israel examined the possibility of purchasing gas from Qatar in 1994-1995. The contacts were secret, but Qatar did not deny them when leaked to the media. The two sides even signed a memorandum of understanding, although Israel ultimately opted for Egyptian gas, which was also cheaper. Nonetheless, Israel played the Qatari card in order to exert pressure on Egypt, which was dragging its feet on signing the gas deal. Netanyahu’s election as prime minister in May 1996 lowered the profile of relations, but high-level behind-the-scenes meetings continued, mainly on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Qatar, like Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia, closed its diplomatic mission in Israel in 2000 in response to the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada. However, unlike the other three countries, it quickly restored relations, which even improved in terms of coordination, and then-foreign minister Tzipi Livni maintained excellent relations with the Qatari leadership.

Qatar suspended official ties once again during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009. It put out feelers on resuming them after the war, but Netanyahu and then-foreign minister Liberman rejected the idea in light of what they called “duplicitous” Qatari policy – hinting at Qatar’s continued financial assistance to terrorist organizations. In tandem, however, Israeli officials and business people continued to visit Qatar in secret, and messages were exchanged. Arab media reported that Netanyahu met secretly with the Qatari prime minister in May 2011 in Paris.

Qatar’s ties with Hamas, especially after its takeover of Gaza in 2007, enabled it to play a mediating role during Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012. The fact that Egypt was then ruled by Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood helped achieve a quick ceasefire. Soon after, Qatar appointed Mohammed al-Amedi as ambassador to Gaza. In this capacity he established good rapport with politicians and military figures in Israel. Following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, an official and orderly mechanism was established (called the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism) to transfer Qatari money to finance civilian projects in Gaza. It is assumed that some of these funds found their way into the Hamas coffers to finance terrorism.

Occasional clandestine contacts continued. For example, Mossad chief Yossi Cohen and the then-head of the IDF’s Southern Command Herzi Halevi visited Qatar in February 2020 and met with the heads of security and intelligence agencies. And in March 2022, then-IDF chief Aviv Kohavi reportedly met in Bahrain with his Qatari counterpart to examine cooperation against the threat of Iranian drones.

Qatar’s connection with Israel is part of a broader range of ties with the West in general, and with the United States in particular. The main headquarters of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which has responsibility for the Middle East, is located in Qatar. Thousands of US troops are also deployed in the Al Udeid Air Base southwest of Doha and the US military also has access to the Hamad seaport. In January 2022, US President Joe Biden granted Qatar non-NATO status as a major ally – a status that even Saudi Arabia still does not enjoy. Qatar has also signed several defense deals with the United States totaling billions of dollars.

Thus, Qatar’s foreign and security policy seeks to maintain good ties with diverse countries in the region and around the globe in order to achieve two main goals. The first is to ensure maximum security for the small wealthy country in an arena fraught with risks and potential enemies. The second goal is to gain global and regional influence and prestige through the enormous wealth generated by the gas fields located in its territory. To achieve its goals, Qatar uses “soft” diplomacy by funding sports, culture, education, academia and providing mediation services. Indeed, Qatar’s relations with many players have made it a valuable mediator in multiple arenas: Afghanistan (between the United States and the Taliban), Lebanon (in local politics), Sudan and Somalia (among civil war rivals), in the Palestinian arena (Fatah and Hamas), and, of course, between Israel and Hamas.

The most appropriate term for describing Israel-Qatar relations is the academic term “frenemies” – a combination which encompasses friendly but also antagonistic policies. Some interpret this relationship as a camouflage and dangerous deception. However, a closer look reveals that it has served both countries well in the past, and continues to serve them during this war in obtaining hostage releases.

Qatar would exert a lot of influence to maintain its role in Gaza in the “day after,” yet Israel should seek to diminish this role as far as possible. Saudi Arabia may look as a possible alternative, but it is unclear whether Crown Prince bin Salman is interested at all in embroiling himself in the Gaza quagmire.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on December 15th.

הפוסט Are Israel and Qatar allies or enemies? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On that same day, a Democratic senator named Joseph R. Biden, along with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff director Antony Blinken, staff member Puneet Talwar, and US ambassador to Israel Richard Jones met with veteran Israeli politician Shimon Peres. The ensuing discussion, buried in piles of Wikileaks documents, testifies to the misconceptions and mistaken assessments of the time.

When Biden asked about the role Hamas might assume in the post-election period, Peres was dismissive.

What does Hamas have to do with victory?” he asked rhetorically and answered, “If they win, they face a dilemma. If they enter the government, they must change or (risk) endangering other Palestinians. They won’t get the financial support they need to deliver results if they don’t stop terror. That will put pressure on them to moderate.” Peres pointed to a possible paradox, whereby “the more Hamas wins, the stronger the position of Fatah [will be] in Palestinian politics.”

Witnessing the rise of Hamas in Gaza

Peres was not concerned about the rise of Hamas. He thought Israeli policymakers would refuse to work with the group if it remained a terrorist organization. On the other hand, he suggested that Israeli pundits should criticize Israeli politicians rather than the absence of strong Palestinian leadership. “They don’t have a Ben-Gurion or a Lincoln, but the Palestinians are still a people,” he said.

Biden also asked about the prospects of Gaza’s economy following Israel’s pullout in September 2005. Peres emphasized that Gaza needed regional cooperation between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in order to survive. Yet, he lamented the fact that Israel took it upon itself to export Gazan produce, referring to the undertaking as “a blessing that has become a curse: We must x-ray every tomato. Why should we torture them?”

Peres expressed his preference for Gaza to export its produce through Egypt.

Biden then asked whether the Gazan economy was large enough to attract foreign investment, to which Peres responded that Saudi and Palestinian billionaires were interested in joint ventures. In a prophetic judgment, Peres added, “The Saudis are becoming more pragmatic as they realize how important Jordan is as a buffer state with an Iraq dominated by the Shi’a.”

ASKED WHY Israel had not done more after the disengagement to unfetter the Gazan economy, Peres cited Palestinian rocket fire but did not offer any suggestions on how to deal with this problem. Pressing on the economic issue, Biden asked what could be done to prevent the disintegration of the Gazan economy. Peres lauded the possible nomination of former Palestinian finance minister Salam as prime minister (which indeed occurred in June 2007), but then offered another solution: Jordan would administer the West Bank economy, while Egypt administered the Gaza economy. He ended on an arrogant note, telling Biden that the Palestinians should understand that they could make money from business, not only from corruption.

The Peres-Biden conversation is illuminating. First, it demonstrates the absence of Israeli strategy for “the day after” its disengagement from Gaza.

The ideas put forth for an airport, seaport, and safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank were not implemented for security reasons, leaving the Gaza economy isolated, even before Hamas seized power in June 2007, and bearing out the PA’s concern that the enclave would become a de facto prison.

Second, the talk reveals flawed judgment regarding the meaning of the elections, which reflected structural, ideological, and political changes in Palestinian society. Hamas won not only because of PA corruption but also because the unilateral disengagement was perceived as a victory of its armed struggle – much like Hezbollah’s victory resulted in Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.

Third, Peres clearly reflected an optimistic Israeli school of thought that Hamas could change its stripes and become more moderate as a result of outside pressure. What is more, some in Israel believed that certain Arab states would seriously consider administrating Gaza or the entire Palestinian territories.

Some of these flawed judgments are still prevalent in the conduct of the 2023 Gaza war.

During his recent visit to Israel at the start of the war, Biden reminisced about his meeting with prime minister Golda Meir when he was a young freshman senator in 1973. Biden did not mention his conversation with Peres that took place more than three decades later, and it is doubtful he has any clear memories of it. Yet the protocol exposes the problem of Israel’s decades-long Gaza conception, which has come back to bite it and has now been dumped at Biden’s door as president.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on December 12th.

הפוסט Biden saw the rise of Hamas – now he has to annihilate it הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed?

This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality.

Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank.

We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels.

To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas.

As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar.

In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners.

Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.

הפוסט Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system.

Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy.

An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

הפוסט A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This movement was registered at the beginning of October in the aftermath of the October 7 terrorist attack and is connected to former Knesset Member Avichai Boaron of the Likud party and some activists in pro-settlement and extreme right-wing movements. Not surprisingly, its content on social media is liked and shared by prominent Likud activists, such as Orly Lev, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s staunch supporters.

Uri Israel is not the only right-wing movement that speaks and acts against the PA and warns about the possible menace of its return to the Gaza Strip.

“I have investigated terrorists, and I say clearly, money drives terrorism! It is forbidden to transfer money to the Palestinian Authority,” said Lieutenant Colonel Attorney Maurice Hirsch, former head of the military prosecution in the West Bank, on November 6.

On the same day when the anti-Abbas campaign was launched by Uri Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu made a statement about the leader of the PA, too. Responding to the announcement of the PA Foreign Ministry that alleged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had killed the partygoers at the Nova music festival in Re’im on October 7, Netanyahu said on November 19: “He who denies the Holocaust denies the massacre. We will not allow him to rule Gaza.”

It seems that Netanyahu was also indirectly responding to the earlier statement of US President Joe Biden, who argued in a Washington Post op-ed on November 18 that the Palestinian Authority should ultimately govern the Gaza Strip and the West Bank following the Israel-Hamas war.

Two-state solution? 

A year ago, Netanyahu established a political alliance and formed a government with the most ultra right-wing political forces in Israel, including the Likud, which believes that a two-state solution is a doomsday scenario that should be prevented at any cost. Tellingly, Netanyahu objects to the PA ruling Gaza due to Abbas’s denial of the Holocaust and the PA’s denial of the October 7 massacre. However, he also believes the same PA should continue functioning in the West Bank.

In his remarks at the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee at the Knesset this summer, Netanyahu referred to the future of the PA as a day after the era of 88-year-old Abbas: “We need the Palestinian Authority, we will help it financially—we have no interest in it falling.” Netanyahu also said that “the Palestinian aspiration for a state must be suppressed.”

In fact, this logic was always a significant part of “the conception”—that the PA should exist so that it will be able to govern the Palestinians in the West Bank but also remain weak so that it will be unable to fulfill any state-related ambitions. That’s why Hamas in Gaza was so instrumental in achieving this goal—it was a tactical ally in Netanyahu’s war against the PA.

On October 7, when Hamas terrorists crushed the fence and poured into Israeli towns and kibbutzim, slaughtered over 1,200, and kidnapped over 240 Israelis and foreigners, it became clear that this long-term strategy had exploded in Israel’s face and resulted in the most horrific terrorist attack and loss of human lives in Israel’s history.

At that moment, when the heads of all security services, as well as some Likud ministers, assumed responsibility for the disaster, and the official death of the “conception” was proclaimed in Israeli media, it seemed that it was time to reinvent the original idea of the two-state solution: Palestinian self-rule in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank; the construction of state institutions; negotiations; and an eventual political solution that would result in the establishment of a Palestinian state.

On October 19, Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s national security advisor, suggested that the Palestinian Authority will step in instead of Hamas in Gaza. A two-state solution or the creation of a Palestinian state wasn’t mentioned. Yet, Hanegbi was immediately attacked by Likud MKs; Tally Gotlib was one among them, writing on X (formerly known as Twitter) that Hanegbi’s idea was “delusional” before sending her condolences to those who believed that strengthening the PA would prevent terrorist attacks. Separately, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who represents an extreme right-wing party, said that installing Abbas in Gaza instead of Hamas was like “changing a cow for a donkey,” whatever that might mean.

The other side of the political map wasn’t thrilled about Abbas’s return to Gaza either but seemed to consider it the lesser evil to the continuation of Hamas rule or a security vacuum.

“Unfortunately, Abu Mazen [nickname for Abbas] is a well-known Holocaust denier, the Palestinian Authority’s statement denying the massacre on October 7 is a scoundrel, and the transfer of funds from the Palestinian Authority to the families of martyrs infuriates anyone with a heart. And, yet, the Palestinian Authority is better than the murderous Hamas, and if we could get it back into the Gaza Strip, we would do it. Between the lesser evil and the greater evil, the lesser evil is better,” former deputy chief of staff and ex-member of Knesset Yair Golan wrote on X.

What’s next?

Weeks have passed since the horrific tragedy that shook every Israeli and led to the war against Hamas, which used to be considered a “strategic asset” in an attempt to prevent the creation of the Palestinian state. Currently, Netanyahu and the right-wing are back to their smear campaign against the PA and essentially back to the “conception” that any evil is better than the prospect of a Palestinian state.

Benny Gantz, the former defense minister in the Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett government—who is now rising quickly in the polls and is considered a possible candidate to replace Netanyahu—is now part of the emergency government and is mostly keeping quiet in an attempt not to jeopardize his chances of premiership. In 2021, Gantz met PA Chairman Abbas in his house in Rosh HaAyin to explore “political horizons”—something many Israelis saw at the time as his readiness to negotiate with and accept the PA.

Now, it seems that the Israeli government intentionally chooses to delay the inevitable discussion about the day after in Gaza, which, given the international pressure, might come sooner than Israeli officials hope. Netanyahu still hopes to safeguard his political future; the extremists around him believe that the war in Gaza presents them with a unique opportunity to get rid of not only Hamas but Palestinians, too (Gila Gamliel, the minister of intelligence who doesn’t have any authority over any of the intelligence services, had penned an article in the Jerusalem Post about the possible “exodus” of Palestinians from Gaza). Meanwhile, more moderate Likud seniors, such as Nir Barkat, keep to themselves, fearing the notorious “poison machine” of Netanyahu’s loyalists.

According to a November survey conducted by Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, 27 percent of the Israeli public supports the two-state solution. In comparison, 25 percent believe that Israel should opt for unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. Only 5 percent believe in the continuation of “conflict management” (Netanyahu’s strategy), while 28 percent support some form of annexation (19 percent of respondents didn’t have an answer), and 52 percent believe that Israel should disengage from the Palestinians, whether that be through some kind of agreement or unilaterally (in the way it was done in the Gaza Strip in 2005).

With that in mind, several things need to happen very soon so that the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel have a chance for peace and stability: elections in Israel, reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and a firm international position that puts the two-state solution on the table. Otherwise, the vacuum in Gaza will quickly fill with Hamas 2.0, the weak PA might collapse in the West Bank, and Israel will be trapped in an endless circle of hostilities in many of its frontiers. The “day after” discussion should start today before it’s too late.

The article was published December 6, on Atlantic Council.

הפוסט The Israeli right-wing is determined to prevent any discussion of a future Palestinian state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Adapting the foreign system to the challenge of the climate crisis requires, first and foremost, a profound conceptual change. It calls for a shift from the logic of dealing with the climate issue as a “foster child” of secondary importance to core strategic issues to a new approach of climate diplomacy that sees the climate crisis as a political strategic game changer of prime importance to foreign policy and its implementation. Dealing with the climate crisis as a political issue challenges traditional thinking about the practices shaping foreign relations and about the actors expected to lead these processes. For example, it redefines the importance of non-governmental actors – civil society organizations, the scientific technological community, and the business sector – and positions them as active participants in shaping foreign policy. More broadly, adopting climate diplomacy provides an opportunity to reexamine the relationship between the government and non-governmental sectors in shaping Israel’s foreign relations as a whole.

Based on a review of the structure and activities of Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus on climate issues and case studies from other countries and interstate bodies, the aim of this policy paper is to propose recommendations for conceptual and structural-systemic changes to upgrade Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus handling of climate change challenges. Implementation of conceptual change in the field of climate diplomacy at the national level relies on three main components: a) anchoring and defining the role of Israel’s foreign policy within the framework of Israel’s national effort to confront climate change; b) a structural change in the foreign affairs system itself – defining a strategic integrating actor to deal with the international pillar of Israel’s climate policy; a clear internal division of roles within the system and improvement of inter-ministerial coordination through a permanent government forum; and substantial increase of resources and managerial inputs devoted to the field within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, we see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a national integrator in shaping Israel’s climate diplomacy. c) the creation of new multisectoral systems of cooperation between Israel’s governmental and non-governmental sectors.

הפוסט Upgrading the Capacity of Israel’s Foreign Policy Apparatus to Deal with the Climate Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The participants – from the normalization states, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority, the United States and the European Union – would meet at the rehabilitated Kibbutz of Be’eri, a symbol of revival from the unspeakable Hamas atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023. The summit would also kick off a negotiation process with the Palestinian Authority in order to achieve what Hamas, Iran and its proxies sought to prevent: normalization between Israel and the Arab world, renewal of the political process with moderate Palestinians willing to live alongside Israel, and the establishment of a broad US-backed regional front against Iran.

The current discussions by decision makers, pundits, and self-appointed experts about the objectives of the war have thus far focused mainly on its military outcomes, on the minute Israel silence its guns. They have not dealt with the aftermath. Assassinating senior Hamas figures, destroying the organization’s vast tunnel network and other important operational targets all refer to exhausting a bank of targets, inflicting kinetic damage on Hamas instead of enhancing Israel’s strategic standing. When Israeli officials and top brass are asked about the day after, they mumble some inanity about civil-local control of the enclave, but decline to elaborate. And for good reason – it’s simply not their area of responsibility (or expertise).

The Israeli public has come to expect every war or military operation to culminate in the ultimate depiction of Israel’s victory (such as the historic photo of Israeli paratroopers arriving at the Western Wall in 1967), a visual representation responding to a deep-rooted psychological need for affirmation that personal and collective security have been achieved. That need is an uncompromising imperative in this war, which undermined Israelis’ sense of security at its most fundamental level. Yet we tend to forget that asymmetrical warfare against terrorist organizations rarely affords absolute decisiveness. When a weaker enemy can claim victory simply by its ability to remain standing once the fighting ends, a visual portrayal of victory is elusive.

Israel’s best chance of illustrating its victory therefore lies mainly in the political-strategic field, in defeating the idea that the enemy sought to snatch from its hands, advancing along the routes it tried to block, and providing Israelis with real security for the longest possible term. A look at Israel’s partial past victories demonstrates that the images of victory were never taken on the battlefield. During the second intifada (2000-2005), for example, it was the amnesty agreement that allowed thousands of wanted Tanzim activists to become toy dealers in the Nablus market that was considered the final chord of the uprising. During the Second Lebanon War (2006), it was the filled–to–capacity Israeli guest houses along the Lebanon border that testified to Israel’s victory.

The depiction of Israel’s victory in the current campaign should reflect a changed political reality, a game-changing strategic effect. As such, it cannot be limited to Gaza. It must affect regional and global circles. It must deal with the optimal conditions for shaping the day after based on two main parameters: ensuring Israelis’ security and blocking Iran and its so-called axis of resistance. A political decision at the present time should aspire to establish an Israeli-regional political-security alliance based on two pillars: a renewed political process with the Palestinians defining the future Israeli relationship with the successors of Mahmoud Abbas, and security agreements between the United States and the countries of the region. For this ambitious vision to be realized, work must be carried out simultaneously on three levels – global, regional and Israeli-Palestinian, with each level based on the other.  

Resolving the conflict with the Palestinians is necessary in order to mount an effective struggle against Iran. The events of Oct. 7 shattered the illusion that Israel’s integration in the region, or regional stability vis-à-vis the Iranian proxies, could be accomplished without resolving the Palestinian issue. The ability of a relatively small terrorist organization such as Hamas to set off a large-scale regional confrontation makes it abundantly clear that an effective struggle against Iran is only possible by neutralizing its influence in the Palestinian arena. This is a key condition for building defense alliances with the countries of the region, for ensuring the support of the Western world, and above all for defending the residents of Israel.    

The need for a diplomatic settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to fight Iran exposes the main obstacle to victory. The challenge lies not only in the Hamas tunnel system, its vicious captivity of hundreds of Israeli civilians, or the threat of Hezbollah’s intervention. It stems first and foremost from the current Israeli government’s inability to advance even the slightest progress vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Most Israelis want to bring down the government, justifiably so, because of its failure to govern and the societal divisions it sowedin the past. But the most egregious damage by the hard right government in the current campaign stems from the impasse to which it is leading. More than ever, this is the wrong government at the wrong time. Conducting a war without offering any reward on the strategic level is like waging a campaign with two hands and one leg tied. This government, which failed to consider even symbolic concessions vis-à-vis the Palestinians to promote normalization with Saudi Arabia, which preferred to bribe Hamas so as to avoid renewing the political process with the Palestinians, and whose messianic extremists are setting the West Bank on fire these very days, is the most fundamental obstacle to a real Israeli victory.

The article was published in German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on November 20th and in Hebrew in N12 on November 11th.

הפוסט The Be’eri Summit: A victory over Hamas lies around the negotiating table, not on the battlefield הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hamas’s murderous attack on 7 October shattered many longstanding convictions. It brought the Palestinian issue back to centre stage; challenged the notion that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be managed at a low cost; and undermined the belief that Israel could pursue integration in the Middle East while ignoring Palestinian demands. In its place, there is now a commonly held view across Israeli society that “managing the conflict” hasn’t worked, and that there instead must be a permanent resolution.

At the same time, there are reasons why management of the conflict, rather than a protracted attempt at a resolution, would suit some of the main players. The US and UK governments both face elections in 2024, and are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine due to the need for stability and lower energy prices. Meanwhile, Arab leaderships are dealing with a range of internal challenges, and relative calm in the Palestinian arena may be enough to appease them. Hamas would be happy to continue to struggle with Israel without facing a diplomatic process that could provide legitimacy to the Palestinian Authority, strengthen moderate politicians and ultimately undermine its power.

Netanyahu would also be content with managing the conflict, as any attempt to solve it would threaten the stability of his coalition and the continuation of his rule. His coalition, and consequently his leadership, relies on the support of the extremist settler movement. This faction adamantly opposes any compromises with the Palestinians and viewed Hamas as an “asset”, because its existence hinders the possibility of a peace process.

It is therefore easy to imagine both sides sliding back into managing a low-intensity conflict. Under this scenario, the IDF would remain in Gaza for an extended period, continuing the fight against Hamas. The conflict would be confined to the Gaza Strip. The public would adjust to it. It would no longer be news, and the world would move its attention elsewhere – until the next eruption occurs in Gaza, the West Bank or in Lebanon.

Alternatively, absent the will or the ability of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority to bring about meaningful change, the international community, led by the US, could push toward a resolution of the conflict. To achieve that, the international community needs to promote several key steps.

First and foremost, it must define the ultimate goal – which should be to commit to the implementation of the two-state solution and an embrace of the Arab Peace Initiative – and a timeline within which to achieve it. This can be done by via a resolution of the UN security council (UNSC). To overcome the tension between the US and Russia, it may require a representative of the Arab world such as the UAE to champion the proposal in the UNSC. If this path is blocked, a regional peace summit convened by the US would be a satisfactory alternative.

Secondly, and of utmost importance, it is vital that Joe Biden leads the recognition of a Palestinian state by the US and other major countries, as part of a comprehensive diplomatic process. Such a step will ensure that there is no turning back. It will change the dynamic in Gaza and in the West Bank, making it difficult for Israel to continue its creeping annexation, and strengthen the Palestinian Authority against Hamas. Furthermore, such a move could boost Biden electorally, helping him to potentially regain support that he lost when backing Israel’s operation in Gaza.

Knowing that the creation of a Palestinian state is the endgame will enable the third critical step to be taken by the international community: the formulation of an interim international-Palestinian regime. With a clear and recognised goal of achieving the two-state solution, an international force drawn from Arab and western countries could then be recruited to gradually replace the IDF in Gaza and take responsibility for security and development efforts. If the path to a two-state solution is defined, European and Arab countries will agree to invest in building the physical and institutional infrastructure of what Biden called a “revitalised Palestinian Authority”, leading the way to a Palestinian state. No one wants to continue pouring money into Gaza if the strategy of managing the conflict continues and its infrastructure needs to be rebuilt every few years after another round of war.

The absence of worthy leadership in Israel and the Palestinian territories means that securing peace falls on the shoulders of Biden and the international community. He must step up and deliver.

The article was published on the Gurdian on November 23rd.

הפוסט A lasting peace in Gaza is now within reach – here’s how it can be achieved הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip.

An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border.

An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks.

Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial.

Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control.

Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages.

Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.

הפוסט The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With all these unprecedented challenges mounting, Israelis generally stick to a positive mindset. The Israeli resilience and deep-down belief that ‘it will be OK’ are evidently at play. An Israel Democracy Institute poll conducted in early November showed that 64 per cent of Israelis are optimistic regarding the future of their country (compared to 27 per cent who are not). But this optimism is not yet apparent when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, even though the Israel-Hamas war may dismantle some major obstacles that have prevented progress towards the two-state solution in recent years. Additional polls conducted by the Mitvim Institute and Tel Aviv University show that Israelis currently tend to define themselves as right-wing, are sceptical towards the Palestinian Authority and to negotiations with it, do not believe that Israeli-Palestinian peace can be achieved and are less supportive than before of the two-state solution.

Overall, this is a grim picture for the pro-peace camp, alas not a surprising one, given how Israeli attitudes shift rightwards during times of war, and given the public perception, before the Hamas terror attack, that maintaining the status quo is better than making concessions for peace. Nevertheless, major events – such as the one that Israel is currently experiencing – often shatter public beliefs, lead to a reassessment of deep-rooted concepts, ignite political change and help new ideas emerge.

This has already happened in Israel following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which has also been a national trauma. Then, it took a few years for change to materialise, but eventually a dramatic political change occurred, and previously-unthinkable compromises for peace (with Egypt) were made. Positive twists in the plot can also occur following the Israel-Hamas war, possibly at a faster pace.

They will not happen by themselves. Diplomatic optimists and agents of positive changes – in Israel and beyond – should step up, impact the public discourse and stir things in a good direction. It was Israel’s late President Shimon Peres who claimed that optimism is not just a way to perceive the world, but a way to impact the world. When we embrace hope and optimism, he used to say, good things happen. Some ingredients for progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace are already emerging these days, as paradoxically as it sounds given the scope of warfare and atrocities, and they should not go unnoticed.

In Israel, there is a growing understanding that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have failed. Netanyahu advocated that the Palestinian issue can be sidelined, that Israel can genuinely find its place in the Middle East without advancing the two-state solution, that the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip works to Israel’s advantage, and that Hamas is deterred and should be sustained in the Gaza Strip. These concepts have collapsed since 7 October. It is still not clear which new concepts will become dominant instead, but a change is coming, and there is an opportunity to shape it. There is also an opportunity for political change. Most Israelis currently see Netanyahu as responsible for the failure and as unfit for leadership and the Israelis mainstream sees his extremist coalition as causing even more damage.

While Israeli politics are difficult to predict, Israelis are seemingly ready for a new leadership, although it will probably not be a left-wing one. According to the polls, former Chief of Staff Benny Gantz is the most fit for office. He is a potentially more moderate, responsible, security-oriented leader, committed to good governance. He is not a peacenik, and is likely to align with right-leaning parties mostly, but he is someone who can nevertheless resume negotiations and make some pragmatic progress with the Palestinians and the region.

Israelis are generally united around the war objective of dismantling Hamas’ governing and military power. Looking at the day after, there is increased openness towards international involvement in the Gaza Strip as an interim phase, while the Palestinian Authority will hopefully be empowered and revitalised, and, later on, towards a return of the Palestinian Authority to rule Gaza (as was the case prior to 2007, when Hamas violently took  over).

The recent activism of the international community may also open some new opportunities. Western countries, which generally shied away from the Israeli-Palestinian issue in recent years, became more active during the war, individually and multilaterally. Many of them pledged to continue this engagement after the war is over, in support of the two-state solution. In parallel, regional countries have showcased that they are intending to maintain ties with Israel, despite their heavy criticism of its actions in Gaza. But they are linking further advancement in bilateral ties with Israel to taking steps towards peace with the Palestinians. Also on the international front, in September 2023, the EU, Saudi Arabia, the Arab League, Jordan and Egypt have launched the Peace Day Effort. It is a multilateral initiative, joined by dozens of countries, to devise an international package of incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. This forward-looking initiative should continue even during the dire times of war. It could generate hope on both sides, by spelling out tangible future benefits of peace, which were not previously put on the table.

So, there are some reasons for optimism. New leadership may take office, on both sides to the conflict, the intra-Palestinian division may come to an end, Israelis and Palestinians may be given more reasons to want peace, and the international community may a play a more important role than before. These opportunities will not be fulfilled overnight, and will not bring peace on their own. However, they hold potential, and if articulated and advanced properly, they can generate some much-needed hope and help make good things happen.

However, a major ingredient is still missing. Israelis and Palestinians need to meet each other more, engage in dialogue and learn to cooperate. People-to-people endeavours were meaningful in the past, but have gradually become scarce. Physical barriers, anti-normalisation trends in the Palestinian society, indifference in the Israeli society, and international donor fatigue have all taken their toll. Now is the time to change course. A major effort is needed to increase constructive interaction between Israelis and Palestinians, from diverse walks of life.

The US is contributing to this through the relatively new Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA). But this is not enough. Europe has a vital role to play in this, as it did in the better days of the peace process. For years, Israelis and Palestinians have been meeting for dialogue in European cities, studying together at European universities and were even undergoing joint training at the European Parliament. This should not remain a distant memory. Policymakers, NGOs and donors should prioritise these types of endeavours once the war ends, and help pro-peace Israelis and Palestinian create a fresh start, despite the hardships involved. This will provide more reasons for optimism, assist in fulfilling the potential of new opportunities and support a transition from conflict to peace.

This article is dedicated to peace activist Vivian Silver, murdered on 7 October during the Hamas terror attack. Vivian was an inspiring and optimistic civil society leader, who worked wholeheartedly for decades to advance a future of peace for both Israelis and Palestinians.

The article was published on November 14th in the Progressive Post.

הפוסט Despite the unprecedented Israeli-Palestinian crisis, new opportunities for peace emerge הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This is the sad reality that Israeli citizens must confront. While the attack on the World Trade Center brought with it widespread international shock and condemnation, many Israelis feel deserted by global public opinion and are suffering an unfathomable blow watching anti-Israel demonstrations around the world and diminishing international support, as they are forced to deal with the tragedy almost on their own.

The State of Israel is not the United States, with 33 times fewer residents and 440 times less land. The kibbutzim in the southern part of the country, where the Hamas terrorists infiltrated, are no more than a two-hour drive from the homes of over 70 per cent of Israeli citizens.

Israelis have experience with wars and acts of terror, but the events of the Black Sabbath changed something deep within each of us. We lost the almost imperceptible sense of personal security that we had until 7 October, the feeling of protection granted to us by the strong State of Israel.

There is almost no Israeli citizen who has not been personally and painfully affected by this catastrophe. The incomprehensible disaster is almost indigestible; children were murdered and kidnapped, parents were brutally killed in front of their children, and families waited for hours in safe rooms as parents tried to quiet their children in order to not be heard by the murderers. An incomprehensible cruelty reminding us of the deepest trauma of every Jew, the Holocaust.

Around 130,000 Israeli citizens from communities near the Gaza Strip, where the massacre occurred, and even further away have fled their homes and are not expected to return soon. The residents who lived closest to the border will not return to their homes until the State of Israel can guarantee their security. And the State has to provide this sense of security because they have no other land.

The need for a political solution

All my life, I have struggled for peace, for an end of the occupation and the promotion of a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many other residents of the kibbutzim in the south have also done so. I believed, and still do, in the right of the Palestinians to self-determination in their own state, with all my heart. I continue to believe in our need as Israeli citizens to fight against the occupation and expose the injustices it creates. I have criticised and continue to criticise the Israeli governments that weakened the Palestinian Authority and expanded the settlements in the West Bank. I did this as an Israeli fighting for the character of his state and its future. It is this belief that leads me to support the continuation of the Israeli military operation in Gaza, while at the same time making every effort to minimize any harm inflicted on innocent Palestinians.

I am not indifferent to the difficult scenes, the casualties – including many children – and the unimaginable suffering of the residents of Gaza. But I am fighting for my home, for my mere existence. It is not a war of choice. If brave citizens, along with the Israel Defense Forces, had not stopped them, Hamas terrorists would have continued to murder every Israeli they could. They attacked their victims like a hate-fueled mob, Jews and Arabs alike, showing no mercy for anyone, not even children and infants.

For years, despite countless rocket attacks from Gaza on Israeli settlements and cities, Israeli policy has been one of ‘containment’ — responding with limited force, giving work permits to the approximately 20,000 laborers from Gaza entering Israel daily and turning a blind eye to Qatari support for Hamas. But no country, especially not a small one like Israel, can tolerate such a broad and ruthless terrorist attack on its citizens.

We have no choice. If we do not win the war against Hamas, the residents of the towns, villages and kibbutzim who fled will not be able to return to their homes. Not only them but also the residents of northern Israel, living close to Lebanon, will not be able to return to the towns and kibbutzim that are attacked every day by Hezbollah terrorists supported by Iran. If they do not return, Hamas and Hezbollah, who are also enemies of the Palestinians and the Lebanese, drunk on their success, will continue to strike until no one – Jews and Arabs alike – can live in Israel anymore.

Reality is complex

Calls for an unconditional ‘immediate ceasefire’ may sound good in theory, but in practice, they are calls for surrender to the Hamas terrorists and for the abandonment of Israeli citizens to a reality in which those who have harmed them so severely will be able to regain their strength to harm them again in the future. Humanitarian pauses are justified if they assist in releasing the kidnapped and providing aid to innocent Gazans. Israel has no choice but to defeat Hamas, and, sadly, when the enemy operates from residential areas, setting up their command centres under hospitals, civilians get hit, too.

The world has become accustomed to painting a simplistic picture of good versus evil, weak versus strong, David versus Goliath. But the reality is more complex. Israel is not Goliath, and Hamas is not David. The reality is not black and white — it has many shades, and we would all do well to inspect it more meticulously and in a distinguishing manner.

Those who, 80 years after the Holocaust, do not see the justification for the existence of the State of Israel and call for freeing Palestine ‘from the River to the Sea’ are not people with whom I can find a common ground. But those who seek to fight for a better future for the Middle East must understand that without the ability to ensure basic security for its citizens, Israel cannot continue to exist. Right now, to achieve this, there is no choice but to eliminate Hamas’ military capacities and rule in Gaza and deter Hezbollah. Currently, it is primarily the Israelis who are in danger, but some are already looking to the next stage. It is no coincidence that Putin and Erdoğan rushed to stand by Hamas. They understand that if the State of Israel is defeated, it will be just the first step in their war against international liberal values.

From this tragedy, a positive outcome could occur in the form of a turning point. Ultimately, the understanding that the existence of a sovereign Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel is an Israeli interest must be spread in Israeli policy circles. Despite years of weakening the Palestinian Authority, it was and remains an important partner. Strengthening it and promoting a political solution that will also return it to rule Gaza must be a central component of the Israeli security concept.

In addition to the demand for and support of elections in Palestine, which, if held alongside a credible diplomatic horizon, will create a legitimate and supportive Palestinian address for a diplomatic solution. It won’t be Hamas.

Victory must be political. The military operation will yield a purely tactical win at best. A political, regional and international diplomatic strategy is needed.

The article was published in IPS on November 9th.

הפוסט A sense of security – gone הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Looking at the broader context it is clear that the Hamas massacre was also prompted by a perceived Israeli weakness stemming from deep internal divisions, as well as the organization’s desire to enhance its standing in the Palestinian arena given the declining popularity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) headed by its president Mahmoud Abbas.

No less important was the intention of Hamas, backed and encouraged by Iran, to torpedo the fast-moving normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia. US President Joe Biden put it succinctly, saying, “One of the reasons Hamas moved on Israel… [was because] the Saudis wanted to recognize Israel.”

Even before Biden’s explanation, a Hamas spokesman in Lebanon admitted that the goals of the terrorist attack were to destroy Israel, liberate Palestine, and deal a blow to normalization between Israel and the Arab world. Leading Iranian officials repeated this argument as well. Saudi Arabia’s announcement of a freeze in the US-mediated normalization negotiations with Israel appeared to have been a step toward this goal of Hamas.

However, the US and Saudi leaders have now affirmed that, as soon as the war is over, they will work toward a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians and continue the steps towards Israel-Saudi normalization already underway.

Why were Iran and Hamas so determined to torpedo the normalization process? 

The Iranian-led “resistance” axis regards the US-sponsored Israeli-Saudi normalization as a strategic move designed to change the regional balance of power by advancing a Saudi defense pact with the United States and strengthening Israel’s standing in the Middle East, by dint of the special Saudi role as custodian of Islam’s holy sites – Mecca and Medina – and its attendant influence on other Arab and Muslim countries regarding ties with Israel.

In these respects, Israeli-Saudi normalization would likely be a game-changer in the Middle East. Normalization was also supposed to bolster the PA, undermining the popularity and legitimacy of rival Hamas. Iran clearly had good reason to fear that these developments threatened its influence and goals in the region.

HAMAS HAS a history of mounting terror attacks intended, among other things, to undermine political moves. Thus, for example, a string of Hamas terror attacks against Israel in 1994-1995 were intended to torpedo the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and were undoubtedly a major factor in this outcome.

Seven years on, in 2002, on March 27, Hamas sought to sabotage the peace process by targeting the Park Hotel in the city of Netanya, murdering 29 Israeli civilians and wounding hundreds, then too, choosing the date of a major Jewish holiday celebration, Passover, to strike at those seated at the festive meal.

The attack was also intended to torpedo the Arab Peace Initiative scheduled for approval by the Arab League summit in Beirut the following day, March 28, 2002. Four days later, Hamas carried out another terrorist attack, killing 15 civilians in a Haifa restaurant and wounding some 40.

These mass casualty attacks resulted in an Israeli military operation, codenamed Defensive Shield, intended to wipe out Palestinian terrorist organizations in the West Bank. Needless to say, the Israeli government was disinclined to consider the Arab Peace Initiative following these brutal attacks.

The common thread tying together these attacks of the past three decades is the indication of strategic thinking on the part of all the parties involved in planning them. Even if there were other contributing factors to the failures of the peace negotiations, the Hamas attacks succeeded in achieving their goal of derailing peace.

At the end of this war, a supreme effort must be made to renew the US-mediated negotiations on an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement. The war has made clear that such an agreement would have to include a significant Palestinian “component,” offering a political horizon for the Palestinians’ aspirations.

The normalization agreement is of course important in itself, but it is also of paramount interest in order to highlight the failure of Iran and its allies to sabotage it.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on October 31.

הפוסט What are key goals in the war for Hamas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The severe crisis in which we find ourselves may be an opportunity to impel Saudi Arabia to take a much more active role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip and Hamas. Saudi Arabia, under its de facto leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, aspires to position itself as a regional leader that plays a constructive role in the international arena. This was demonstrated, for example, in its hosting of an international peace summit on the Russia-Ukraine war last August.

Saudi Arabia and Israel’s shared goals

Saudi Arabia and Israel have many shared interests, chief among them the struggle against radical Islam propagated by groups such as ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood. This struggle is consistent with Saudi Arabia’s desire to keep improving and strengthening its image as a country friendly to tourism, investment, and business.

Saudi Arabia was by and large uninvolved in past mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas and did not take a significant part in the effort to eradicate Hamas. Saudi Arabia, like Israel, thought it was possible to rein in Hamas.

However, the recent tragic events have proven that Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas have identified a strategic opportunity to strike a blow against Israel – to take over the West Bank once and for all and unite the Palestinians under extremist Islamist rule.

The intense fighting in the Middle East, so close to the Egyptian border and not very far from the border between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, is projecting negatively on all countries in the region, and the risk of regional war is growing. It also presents Israel with a historic opportunity to join the moderate Arab camp against its sworn rival Iran (along with Qatar, which hosts Hamas leaders, and Turkey, which also supports Hamas).

In order to bring about the collapse of Hamas, we must work together, especially vis-à-vis decision-makers in the United States and other allies such as France, Germany, England, and others.

Normalization could help fight extremism 

The main obstacle to normalization with Saudi Arabia and a regional coalition to fight Islamic terrorism is the Israeli government’s opposition to promoting the two-state solution. What is more, to the extent that Israel signals a desire to control the Gaza Strip, while continuing to weaken the Palestinian Authority, it distances prospects of enlisting Saudi Arabia as a partner.

On the other hand, adopting the spirit of the 2002 Saudi peace initiative for renewing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations under American and Saudi auspices would serve American (and Israeli) national security interests of drawing Saudi Arabia closer and distancing it from the Chinese-Russian-Iranian axis. It should be remembered that the Saudis also have important levers regarding global oil prices, which affect the fighting between Russia and Ukraine.

While residents of Arab countries do not enjoy the full freedom of expression enjoyed by residents of Western democracies, their leaders are mindful of public opinion. The Saudi Crown Prince’s supreme interest is to maintain and consolidate his rule, a goal for which he needs public support.

This issue is his top priority, and he does not want to risk it, especially in light of the harsh scenes of harm to uninvolved civilians, which is an inseparable part of any war. Public opinion in Saudi Arabia, which only a few months ago reported that support for business and sports ties with Israelis had reached a record of almost half its residents, will find it difficult to accept an alliance with Israel without advancing the two-state solution.

The bottom line is that the likelihood of advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia and enlisting it in a joint struggle against radical Islam will diminish as we continue to avoid advancing the two-state solution.

Choosing the components of the one-state solution, such as occupying the Gaza Strip, controlling it, and continuing to weaken the Palestinian Authority, could lead the Abraham Accords countries (which are already forced to fend off harsh criticism against normalization) to sever relations with Israel. It would severely damage Israel’s international legitimacy and thus limit its leeway in fighting Hamas. It would also miss out on a historic opportunity to forge a joint regional camp against Iran and its proxies.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on October 31.

הפוסט What could a Saudi perspective on the Israel-Hamas war look like? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Babies, children, and entire families were slaughtered. No eye can stay dry at the sight of the pictures of the kidnapped children. The state of Israel went through the hardest day in its history, a day that will take us a long time to overcome.

The crimes against humanity committed by Hamas are the most horrible tragedy that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has produced. But even in times of catastrophe, there is a window for progress.

This was one lesson from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where the national trauma eventually led to a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. It was also the First Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, that led to the Oslo Peace Accords. War and bloodshed are often the greatest motivation for compromise.

Now it is time to understand that the Palestinian conflict — including the reign of terror of Hamas in the Gaza Strip — will not be solved by war only. As the U.S. learned in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, even the strongest military in the world cannot solve such challenges with guns and bombs alone. 

The opportunity for President Biden to lead a major change of course in the Middle East arises as well after a year-long protest movement inside Israel to protect and preserve our democracy. The general failure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government to function during the Hamas attack and its aftermath opens a door to connect the protest movement with the no-less-significant threat to Israel’s democracy posed by its ongoing occupation of the West Bank.

The Biden administration can and should push the Palestinian issue to the forefront of the Israeli public agenda and instill hope among moderate Palestinians that they can achieve statehood by diplomacy and not terror, to lead the Israeli government to a policy based on the understanding that strengthening the Palestinian Authority as a governing body is an Israeli and international interest. 

This moment also comes amid aspiration for a U.S.-Saudi Arabia defense alliance and the normalization of Israel-Saudi relations. While these are hardly close to creating a two-state solution, they could provide leverage for Washington on both Israel and the region — leverage that at its core is the promotion of the belief that the fruits of normalization will be shared by everyone in the region, including the Palestinians.

The first response of the Biden Administration following the Hamas attack rightly focused on military support for Israel. Now, the U.S. can act diplomatically by initiating an international effort for a long-term solution. It should mobilize the United Nations Security Council to recognize a Palestinian state based on the 2002 Saudi Arab Peace Initiative for a two-state solution, and demand Palestinian elections that will provide one legitimate leadership representing both Gaza and the West Bank for negotiations. 

Except for the governments of Israel, Iran, and Hamas in Gaza, there is an overwhelming international consensus for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and Palestine can easily be accepted as a full member of the U.N. if the U.S. does not use its Security Council veto.

This is good for Washington as well as the Middle East. Given the impact of rising oil prices on the global economy, the U.S. wants to mobilize countries in the region that export energy to exert pressure against Russia. Biden has an opportunity here to promote global interests and to arrive at an agreement with China and Russia on a two-state solution.

American leadership is the best way to prevent Russia and China from taking advantage of the vacuum created by Washington’s justified withdrawal from the “boots on the ground” approach of the Bush Administration. 

Despite Biden’s clear and principled support for a two-state solution, he has in his first three years as president largely avoided the issue. Now that a catastrophe has occurred so tragically, it is time to take strategic action. And it could help him win reelection next year.

The Democratic Party is riper than ever to support a move on the Palestinian issue. For many years, the party was influenced by American Jews who supported the status quo of Israel’s occupation. Now a new generation of Democratic lawmakers have come to realize that there are no military solutions to the conflict. No less significant is the growth of organizations like mine, J Street, that support Israel, democracy and peace, and believe in the power of courageous diplomacy to promote both Israeli and U.S. interests. 

President Biden has a unique opportunity to be remembered in history as the one who saved the Zionist vision of liberty, justice and peace, along with Israel’s fragile democracy. He would be building on the legacies of giants before him — President Harry S. Truman, who recognized the state of Israel; President Jimmy Carter, who led Israel to peace with Egypt; and President Bill Clinton, who signed the Oslo Peace Accords.

Biden described the Hamas terrorist attack in Israel as an act of sheer evil and an atrocity on an appalling scale. His empathy for our anger, pain and hopelessness has, more than ever before, earned him the trust of Israelis. He can now leverage this trust with a move that would save Israel from the biggest threat to its mission as the democratic homeland of the Jewish people — which is the continuing occupation.

This article was published in Forward, on October 17th.

הפוסט Can Biden transform a human tragedy into a diplomatic opportunity? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A hint of Washington’s impatience with Israel’s failure to spell out its intentions was already evident in President Biden’s remarks in Tel Aviv on October 18, when Biden publicly noted that wartime success “requires clarity about the objectives and an honest assessment about whether the path you’re on will achieve those objectives.” Since then, but for a vaguely worded statement by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant that Israel seeks “the creation of a new security regime in the Gaza Strip, the removal of Israel’s responsibility for day-to-day life in the Gaza Strip, and the creation of a new security reality for the citizens of Israel,” no clear vision for what Israel aims to achieve has been presented.

The apparent absence of an Israeli vision for how to realize its goals and the growing escalation of the conflict across the region require urgent international intervention aimed at preparing the diplomatic off-ramp that must be the end of all wars.

The off-ramp would need to contend with multiple challenges, including those underlying Israel’s own war objectives.

First, the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, which Israel has repeatedly declared to be its main objective, lacks the clarity of purpose and the certainty of its achievability. Hamas is an organization deeply embedded in Gaza’s social and civilian life, and destroying it would require not only the killing of tens of thousands of armed men affiliated with Hamas, but also dismantling its wide array of civilian mechanisms—mechanism that employ upwards of 40,000 civilians and which are essential if Gaza is to function after the war ends.

Second, even as Israel’s war objective of dismantling Hamas is probably unrealistic, it is also, paradoxically, not ambitious enough. This is because disarming Hamas would create a power vacuum into which other militant and terrorist groups would enter – principally Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but potentially also other militant groups, including Salafi-jihadist ones. These groups are no less committed to waging endless war on Israel, and their weakness relative to Hamas thus far has been due to Hamas’s ability to rein them in. If Hamas is weakened, let alone dismantled, they will likely take its place.

And finally, a war whose goal is destroying Hamas does not necessarily go in hand with securing the release of the roughly 240 Israeli hostages in Gaza. If anything, the kind of brutal and bloody fighting required to achieve the dismantling of Hamas would only endanger the lives and safety of the Israeli hostages rather than expedite or assure their release.

The fact, moreover, that third-party negotiations can bring about the release of hostages, as has already been demonstrated by the release of four hostages in two separate deals brokered by both Qatar and Egypt, underscores the availability of an alternative to the use of sheer military force.

The diplomatic off-ramp must be nothing less than a regional grand bargain—one that would address Israel’s necessary and legitimate strategic needs; strengthen the pragmatic Palestinian forces who are willing to reach a permanent agreement with Israel; avert a humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip; and prevent a wider regional war.

The challenge, admittedly, is enormous and may well be beyond what regional and international diplomacy can pull off. Competing interests among some of the key regional stakeholders (such as between longtime rivals Saudi Arabia and Qatar) and powerful spoilers—notably Iran, Hamas’s chief sponsor—are bound to get in the way. Yet given the enormous stakes at hand, the effort must be made, with these two primary components at its core:

First and immediately, an “all-for-all” hostages for prisoners exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. Under such a deal, Hamas and the other Palestinian groups would release all Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip in exchange for a blanket release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, estimated at around 6,000. The Israeli hostages would include the two civilians who have been held by Hamas before October 7. Even if Hamas were to release several dozen captives in the days to come, the staggering number of Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip renders any precedents to prisoner exchange deals—notably that of the 2011 deal for the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, where the identity and severity of each and every prisoner’s security crimes were factored in—moot.

Second, and in the longer term, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. This should be Israel’s ultimate goal, but it is also one that only a concerted regional and international effort might be able to bring about without a full-scale ground invasion.

In practical terms, this would require the disarming of Hamas and the other Palestinian militant groups and would ideally apply to these and other militant groups in the West Bank as well. While such efforts have failed in the past, conditions this time are different. Achieving this goal, however, would depend on the creation of a coalition of regional stakeholders united by the understanding that Hamas must be eliminated—indeed, that failure to destroy Hamas would deal a major victory to their arch enemy, Iran. Such a potential coalition exists in the region, with key players being Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.

Tragically, the military disarmament of Hamas and all other Palestinian factions will probably not be achieved without additional military pressure, with all the implications for the civilian population of Gaza, along with some kind of a (literally) life-saving deal for Hamas’s and PIJ’s leaderships, whoever among them survives. Historical examples for such arrangements are none too inspiring, but the 1982 evacuation of Yasser Arafat and the PLO from Beirut, Lebanon, could serve as a model.

The military disarmament of Hamas and all other Palestinian factions must also mean the readiness of the Palestinian Authority, under the leadership of the PLO (and its main faction, Fatah) to assume control over the Gaza Strip. Such a development would require considerable political and financial resources, and might necessitate the establishment of a multinational Arab peacekeeping force that would, under optimal circumstances, receive its mandate from a U.N. Security Council resolution. As for the financial component, the wealthy Arab states, principally Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and the European donor countries, would need to foot the bill.

These are only the two basic components of the regional bargain required right now. A broader deal, one that would truly redefine the regional security architecture (and also go a long way in checking Iran’s regional ambitions) might also include American defense pacts with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Israeli normalization, and a joint U.S. and Saudi sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a two-state solution.

The prospect for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a two-state solution might seem extremely distant under present circumstances. Yet the trauma of October 7 and the pain engendered by the ongoing crisis may create the kind of willingness, on both sides, that has been lacking in the past 20 years. To be sure, good-faith negotiations would require new leaderships in both Jerusalem and Ramallah that enjoy broad public support. In Israel, that might possible even with the current parliamentary makeup (provided Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stepped down and a new coalition is formed). In Palestine, where elections in the Palestinian Authority have not taken place since 2006 and are unlikely to take place any time soon, the legitimacy would need to be achieved through internal organizational reforms as well as through major economic reconstruction and assistance by way of a Marshall Plan-like support from the outside. Meanwhile, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and the consolidation of a Palestinian polity would mean the removal of one of the main obstacles to such negotiations since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007.

There is no easy path forward, but the urgency for regional and global diplomacy cannot be overstated. Failure to create an off-ramp from this war would mean not simply more of the same, but a precipitous fall into the abyss.

The article was published on October 31 on TIME.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Off-Ramp After Israel’s Invasion of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These anti-liberal forces do not operate only through institutional frameworks. They are frighteningly effective in permeating broad sectors of society and generating moral deterioration.

Israel, for example, has seen a sharp increase in the exclusion of women from the public sphere, along with an increase in crimes by Jewish West Bank settlers against Palestinians. In the US, the repeal of the landmark Roe v. Wade ruling has encouraged conservative organizations to promote a civil surveillance strategy against women who have undergone or intend to undergo an abortion. In Germany, the recent gains of the far-Right Alternative for Germany (AfD) have given rise to a growing number of dialogue circles in which party supporters engage the general public in a bid to mainstream their radical views.

Western democracies are displaying pronounced helplessness in the face of these anti-liberal trends and activism. They have refrained from efforts to root out the phenomenon of democratic withdrawal for a variety of reasons, neglecting their vital normative role. Poland and Hungary continue to pursue anti-liberal policies, while the EU, fearing internal collapse, is crippled by indecision over its response other than imposing economic sanctions.

The West has also responded with considerable inconsistency to the drastic anti-democratic measures adopted by the current Netanyahu government. The deepening occupation carried out under cover of the regime coup roiling the country has prompted, at best, clear White House condemnation and warnings about the future of US-Israel relations; at worst, it has generated stuttered statements from Brussels.

After years of trying to contain these anti-liberal forces, we can no longer escape the realization that we are in the midst of a global campaign that requires a decisive victory, and we can no longer wait for Western leaders to make the first move. Given the leadership and ideological vacuum afflicting Western political-liberal echelons, and the public’s mistrust of them, civil society activity is more vital than ever. Liberal organizations in the West must rise above the obstacles posed by forces on the right and establish an international partnership to lead a global campaign for democracy, leaving no country behind.

The current government

THE CURRENT government’s planned regime coup has given rise to a widespread liberal awakening, which has recorded impressive achievements over the past eight months. Despite the anemic reaction of Western governments to the Netanyahu government’s attempted democratic withdrawal, the world has not remained indifferent to the power of Israel’s emerging liberal camp. At the same time, and unlike Hungary and Poland, the protest movement has gained considerable support among leading economic, defense, and cultural circles, while continuing to learn from similar struggles around the world.

The rise of the Israeli liberal camp is particularly unique and impressive given the innate handicaps facing the struggle for democracy. The continued occupation, the rise of Jewish nationalism, and the widespread and deep impact of ultra-Orthodox political influence have long been a hallmark of the state’s identity. Therefore, the consequences of the democratic withdrawal will be much more severe in Israel than in Poland and Hungary if the democratic struggle fails to achieve its goals. The emergence of the liberal camp and its effective stand against the handicaps it faces, the great support it enjoys at home, its success in exporting the protest to Jewish-Israeli communities around the world, and the extensive global coverage of its struggle – all pave the way for driving an international liberal partnership.

The Israeli liberal camp must showcase its struggle to the world as the pivot of a global ideological campaign, the success of which could set a precedent for civil protest overcoming the worst restrictions and conditions imposed by governments in democratic retreat. The Western world must understand that the success of the liberal camp in Israel is most likely the best textbook example for which it could ask. In fact, Israel’s democratic struggle may emerge as the country’s most important and effective export sector, more so than its arms deals, and perhaps even more than its high-tech or agricultural innovations.

IN THE absence of sufficient action by Western political echelons, the power of civil society can serve as a significant asset for the struggle of the global liberal camp. The democratic struggle in Israel, and elsewhere in the world, presents us with a bleak picture regarding the liberal camp’s growing sense of alienation from its representatives. Civil society, endowed with key research and action capacity, can bridge that gap between them.

Research institutes specialize in cross-border mutual learning, developing concepts and generating knowledge relevant to political action. Think tanks and activist organizations seek to promote political influence, based on existing knowledge and to develop effective practices. Political influence may be exerted on the institutional level, such as drafting and publishing policy papers vis-à-vis elected officials in parliamentary committees, or on the public level, through demonstrations, social campaigns, the media, etc.

Two avenues are open to political cooperation among liberal organizations around the world. The first is promoting joint action against global illiberal developments, such as the undermining of judicial systems, weakening of the media, and shrinking the space of civil society. The democracy defense campaign requires an organizational coordination mechanism (a kind of war room) promoting a number of significant steps: creating pressure on the political echelon in the West and international institutions to oppose escalating measures of democratic retreat, awakening public awareness through designated protests, and mobilizing various resources, such as the business sector.

The Mitvim Institute took on the challenge. It is currently working to establish a network of liberal pro-democracy think tanks and policies around the world to promote these goals of learning and joint action. In this context, it held a briefing in February with civil society organizations in Turkey, issuing nine recommendations for the pro-democracy struggle in Israel. In April, a panel discussion with Czech experts discussed the successful opposition to the right-wing populist Babiš government. On October 11, the Mitvim Institute, together with civil society organizations from Eastern Europe, will hold  a joint conference in the European Parliament in Brussels to discuss the future of the struggle for democracy.

The conference will deal with the importance of democratic solidarity and ways to strengthen it. The conference will launch a new platform of civil society organizations from Israel and around the world, Democrisis: Civic Action Network, linking protest organizations as they work together to ensure the resilience of liberal democracy against those working to weaken it. This platform will serve as the foundation stone for building an international liberal-democratic war room.

THE SECOND channel available to political cooperation among liberal organizations is the formulation of liberal-democratic ideas and concepts relevant to the reality of the struggle in which we find ourselves. These will provide the narrative and tools necessary for those fighting for freedom and equality around the world. Likewise, discussions among liberal civil society organizations on a global level, through strategic dialogues and international conferences, could serve as an up-to-date conceptual foundation for the Western political echelon in a variety of areas, such as inclusive foreign policy, entrenchment of the rule of law, and protection of human and minority rights.

Much of the Israeli public is beginning to understand the importance of cross-border liberal ties in achieving democratic victory. According to Mitvim’s 2023 Foreign Policy Index, 45% of the public has been influenced to a great or very great extent by international criticism of the regime coup in shaping their positions on the issue. In other words, while steadfast for years in the face of criticism from the Western world, with an emphasis on the Palestinian issue, many Israelis seem to have realized the relevance of warnings about the broader consequences of local democratic regression. Many survey respondents appear to have gradually realized that regime change processes in Israel are intimately linked to the global struggle for democracy.

As a result, the emerging liberal camp in Israel is increasingly appreciative of the demonstrated international engagement with its goals, but above all, it knows that its success at home depends on expressing mutual concern for similar struggles in the Western world. Therefore, only a broad liberal-civil partnership, not limited to countries where democracy is collapsing, can advance one more step to a substantive democratic victory.

We are in the throes of a new cold war: the democratic struggle is occurring everywhere, including countries considered strongholds of democracy. The protest leaders and civil society organizations in Israel must reach out to their partners around the world and create a liberal-democratic bloc, just as Western countries united against the Communist bloc. They must act in close coordination, both in terms of learning and political cooperation, just as the anti-liberal camp has succeeded in cross-border affiliations. Above all, they must understand that the “end of history” will never happen. The forces struggling for democracy can never let down their guard.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on September 26th.

הפוסט Israel’s most important export is its democratic struggle הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This year the survey included, among other topics, questions about the implications of the “full-fledged right-wing” government’s policies on Israel’s foreign relations, both in regard to the Judicial Reform as well as its policy in the West Bank; the future of the Arab-Israeli normalization process, with emphasis on Saudi Arabia, and the potential of leveraging it to promote Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking; Iran’s growing nuclear threat; international cooperation on the climate crisis; Israel’s policy in Lebanon; China’s growing involvement in the Middle-East; and Israel’s stance on the war in Ukraine.

הפוסט The Israeli Foreign Policy Index of 2023 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This is a skewed, false message formulated by those seeking to task Israeli diplomats with whitewashing what is essentially a regime coup championed by an extremist government that is leading Israel to the brink of dictatorship. In other words, the Foreign Ministry is demanding that Israel’s official representatives around the world portray Israel as a “strong democracy” even as the government is removing the checks and balances of the democratic system and severely undermining the independence of the judiciary. This is a genuine Orwellian attempt to portray a campaign to crush the judiciary as “preserving the independence of the courts.”

These messages make it incumbent on all diplomats to ask themselves whether this was the reason they joined the foreign service and whether they really want to describe a coup d’état as a measure to “strengthen democracy.” Our representatives abroad who are anxious about what amounts to a regime coup should refrain from defending a policy that endangers themselves, their families, and their country. This is not a call for their resignation; it is a call for soul-searching and for establishing boundaries.

After all, the diplomats are not being asked to ignore a policy disagreement on a specific issue. They are being told to soft-pedal a fundamental contradiction between the foreign service of a country that purports to be based on democratic values that are articulated in our Declaration of Independence – and the direction in which the government of Yariv Levin, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich, and Benjamin Netanyahu is leading us.

These extremists are aiming to eliminate the separation of powers that is the underpinning of the democratic system, destroy judicial review, promote discrimination and misogyny, divert state budgets to serve ultra-Orthodox and nationalist constituencies and shatter the Zionist ethos on the basis of which the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people was established.

The role of diplomats is to represent their country, including the government and its policies, but also the cultural, economic, and political totality of the society and country they serve, in all its diversity. As long as the government adheres to its basic contract with the public, diplomats can do both, despite the challenges involved. Such is the case in all democratic countries, and the same is true in Israel.

The role of diplomats, like all other civil servants, is not only to broadcast the government’s messages to the world but also to clarify to the government in a professional and courageous manner the implications of the policies it adopts for its interests in the international arena.

Those applying for foreign service training know that they will be called upon at some point in their career to represent policies with which they disagree. Diplomats are civil servants serving democratically elected governments that come and go. Therefore, the ability to serve different governments is a prerequisite for anyone who wishes to represent the State of Israel. Such service involves a willingness to represent and promote the policies of any government, not necessarily the one for which they voted as long as the basis of our democracy is maintained

This challenge faces anyone sent to represent Israel abroad. I myself faced it when I served as Israel’s consul general to the states of New England (at the consulate in Boston). When I disagreed with the Israeli government’s handling of its relations with the US administration, I voiced my criticism behind closed doors in internal forums (although they turned out to be more porous than I thought and my criticism was leaked to the media).

However, I always knew that I would draw the line when I felt that my views were no longer just a policy disagreement, but a fundamental rejection of the messages I was told to convey and of the policies I was required to promote. I did take early retirement from the Foreign Ministry, partly because I felt I could promote my country’s interests better from outside the system. My decision was right for me personally, but may not necessarily be the right choice for all of my many friends at the Foreign Ministry who have achieved wonderful accomplishments for many years from within the system.

Deepening tensions between government policy and civil servants’ personal beliefs can pose a heartbreaking dilemma. They require difficult personal decisions that involve complicated implications for lives and livelihoods, and therefore no one has a right to judge them. Moreover, when a government undermines democratic values, it makes no sense for those who seek to promote such values from within the system to resign, since they will clearly be replaced by officials willing to help the government crush our democracy.

Notwithstanding this argument, civil servants have both the right and the duty to voice their opinions forcefully and describe the implications of government policy on the matters under their purview. Those who can influence from within should do so and make their voices heard.

A large liberal democratic camp has emerged in Israel in recent months under the current government, a citizenry unwilling to sacrifice its future and that of its children and grandchildren for a dictatorship in the making. Right now, the role of democracy lovers is to help preserve the basic values of democracy, if possible, from within the government and if not, from the outside

The current government’s policy cannot and must not be justified or “explained,” not even in diplomatic language.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on August 8th.

הפוסט Diplomats should represent the country, not the government הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This trend, together with progress in Israel-Arab relations following the Abraham Accords, creates new opportunities for regional environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. However, these opportunities’ full potential cannot be realized prior to a breakthrough toward Israeli-Palestinian peace. Moreover, the composition and policies of Israel’s current government pose additional challenges to Israel-Arab relations and have led existing cooperation to slow down. Nevertheless, and despite being limited in scope, regional cooperative endeavors are taking place and efforts to sustain them are underway.

The convening of the 27th (2022) and 28th (2023) United Nations Climate Change Conference summits in the Middle East – in Egypt, and in the United Arab Emirates respectively – helps such cooperation evolve. In addition, Israel and several Arab states (such as Morocco and the UAE) have signed bilateral agreements for cooperation on environmental-related issues. Minilateral endeavors, like the Israel-Jordan-UAE water-electricity swap deal and the Israel-Morocco-EU water dialogue, have been launched; and multilateral mechanisms and initiatives – including the Union for the Mediterranean, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and the East Mediterranean & Middle East Climate Change Initiative – enable Israel and its neighbors to jointly engage in tackling climate change.

President Isaac Herzog has called for regional environmental cooperation during visits to neighboring countries and introduced a visionary concept of a “renewable Middle East,” based on inclusive regional frameworks. The international community has a clear interest in enhancing such regional environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors, also with the aim of advancing Israel-Arab normalization and Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. The US and Europe are best positioned to achieve this advancement and can do so via the following pathways:

How can the US and Europe promote Israel-Arab environmental cooperation?

First, by providing third-party support: The US and Europe should further encourage and enable environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. They can be formal partners in cooperative endeavors, provide funding and technological assistance, convene support, assist with training and expertise, and serve as benefactors to ensure success. Third-party involvement is necessary to spark new cooperation and reach agreements, but also to ensure that understandings reached are implemented in a concrete way. Such involvement can increase the motivation of Israel and its neighbors to work together and can assist the countries involved in overcoming political, bureaucratic, and public opinion obstacles.

Second, by focusing on tangible benefits: When seeking to encourage regional environmental cooperation, the US and Europe should focus on initiatives that are likely to bring tangible benefits in the near term. This will make cooperation more likely and legitimate. Selected initiatives should be those that address the concrete needs of the countries involved – and play to their added value – but also have a potential global scale impact, beyond just the region. Relevant issues to engage in could include renewable energy, food security, innovative technologies, sustainable tourism, water desalination and reclamation, public health, and the blue economy.

Third, by including the Palestinians: Israelis and Palestinians share similar environmental challenges but do not formally cooperate on most of them, due to the political circumstances. The US and Europe should advance the inclusion of the Palestinians in Israel-Arab cooperative endeavors, with a political horizon of advancing the two-state solution.

Messages underscoring the US and European interest in seeing this happen should be conveyed to relevant countries in the region, to make it clear that they do not see the advancement of Israel-Arab cooperation as a way to sideline the Palestinian issue. This could also assist in fostering some mutual trust between Israelis and Palestinians and in creating joint interest in stability and de-escalation. Efforts should be made to ensure that existing regional projects (such as the Israel-Jordan-UAE water-electricity swap deal) also benefit the Palestinians (including those in Gaza) and to include Palestinian interests and needs in new projects that may be developed via mechanisms such as the Negev Forum. An effort should be made to leverage the joint and equal participation of Israel and Palestine in the EMGF and the UfM as well as to increase their cooperation – under a multilateral umbrella – on environmental issues.

Fourth, by encouraging multilateralism and inclusivity: Multilateral initiatives dealing with climate change have already proven their ability to bring rival parties to the same table. This is likely to continue, given the forecasts about the increasing negative implications of climate change for the region. The US and Europe need to empower regional and multilateral frameworks, making them more effective, ensuring coordination between them to avoid duplication of efforts, enhancing their inclusivity by bringing in additional countries (such as enabling Turkish and Lebanese involvement in the EMGF), fostering interregional connectivity (by providing observer status to relevant countries from other sub-regions), and enhancing engagement without recognition between rivals (as was the case with the Israel-Lebanon maritime border deal).

The US and Europe can also work to ensure that existing regional mechanisms – such as the EMGF and the Negev Forum – develop a specific focus on climate and the environment, and encourage the participation of civil society actors, not just officials.

Fifth, by investing in civil society: Parallel to efforts toward enhancing cooperation between governments and officials, the US and Europe should also acknowledge the important role that civil society organizations can play in fostering regional environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. Examples of this are already mounting and having a concrete impact, in terms of content and of fostering constructive societal engagement. The US and Europe should therefore increase their investment in supporting such cooperation. They can do so by linking environmental activists and professionals from regional countries, providing them with opportunities for joint learning, training, strategizing, and sharing best practices and lessons learned, as well as developing cross-border or regional projects.

The US and the EU can ensure that existing funding schemes related to civil society cooperation in the region also include beneficiaries working on climate change, or seeking to enter the field. Finally, they should elevate environmental cooperation between regional NGOs and think tanks to also advance peace, security, stability, and prosperity.

COP28 in the UAE is already around the corner (November 30-December 12). Israel plans to be represented there by both its president and prime minister and is already involved in planning and preparation. However, the far-right composition of its current government and its policies on the Palestinian issue are taking a toll on Israel’s regional foreign policy and causing the development of Israel-Arab relations to significantly slow down.

Even this year’s Negev Forum ministerial meeting, originally slated to take place in Morocco in March, is being repeatedly postponed due to Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Climate change is presenting Israel with numerous opportunities for enhanced regional cooperation and the international community can help in realizing them.

But, should the Netanyahu government continue its current policies toward the Palestinian issue – the potential will not be realized, and missed opportunities will mount. In that case, as regional countries enhance their cooperation on environmental issues, Israel might be left out.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on July 17th.

הפוסט 5 ways the US, Europe can push for Israel-Arab environmental cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel remains at the heart of the region’s energy discussions. Since 2020 it has been successfully exporting natural gas to Jordan and Egypt, the latter providing an important export route to the global energy market by way of its two LNG terminals in Idku and Damietta.

Through a combination of intentional diplomacy and structural changes to the international order, Israel has leveraged its position to strengthen bilateral ties with Greece and Cyprus, reach a historic maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon, play a central role in the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and attract foreign investment from supermajors and the Gulf States.

Still, more heavy lifting is required for Israel to advance beyond its current achievements. Despite signing a joint MOU with Egypt and the EU in June 2022 to deliver more gas to Europe, Israel’s export options for delivering gas into the global energy market still remain constrained.

Israel enjoys cooperative ties with Cairo, but even with additional pipelines in the works there is a commercial and technical bottleneck when it arrives in Egypt. Past shortages in Egyptian gas supply often resulted in the consumption of gas delivered from Israel. But even if Israel’s gas was earmarked for export – as is intended – Idku and Damietta have limited capacity and it doesn’t appear as if Egypt’s LNG capacity will be expanded in the near term. In order to increase its energy security, Israel must therefore continue to seek ways of diversifying its export options and regional partners.

This explains why there has been so much diplomatic activity around Cyprus in recent weeks, where the newly minted Christodoulides government is trying to attract foreign investment and international interest. Christodoulides’s strategy is clear: create a pathway for Cyprus to finally become a meaningful player in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy architecture.

There are two distinct initiatives that Cyprus is pursuing to achieve this goal, both of which depend on Israeli cooperation. The first is resolving the outstanding Aphrodite-Ishai dispute. According to a recent MEES report, Chevron and the other invested partners in Cyprus’s Aphrodite field (estimated 129 BCM) are close to buying out the four firms with stakes in the Ishai license, thus removing a key obstacle that has prevented the field’s development.

The same report indicates that following recent meetings between Energy Minister Israel Katz and his counterpart George Papanastasiou, Israel and Cyprus’s ministries of energy are working on a parallel intergovernmental agreement that will help expedite Aphrodite’s development.

The second initiative underway is Nicosia’s push to develop a pipeline that would deliver Israel’s natural gas to a Cyprus-based LNG facility, either land-based or a floating LNG facility near Vasilikos port, which could then be sold on the global market. This “Plan B” version of the infamous East Med pipeline is attractive, especially as it falls within the EU’s broader ambition to diversify its energy sources (reducing its dependency on Russian gas) and earns Project of Common Interest status. Paired with the steady progress on the EuroAsia electricity interconnector project, Israel and Cyprus have multiple reasons to work together.

The creation of a new LNG terminal is a costly and time-consuming affair. And there is no clarity on who would fund such an enterprise, though as the operator of both Aphrodite and Leviathan Chevron would likely need to foot the bill to spearhead such efforts along with NewMed, Shell, and potentially newcomers like BP and Adnoc.

Will Israel, Cyprus cooperate to resolve gas crisis?

There are two questions here: Is Israel prepared to cooperate with Cyprus in such an intimate way, and is Cyprus really committed to becoming a hub? After all, the headlines out of Nicosia may be designed as a way of baiting Turkey into direct talks over the divided island. When push comes to shove, would Christodoulides pursue regional energy projects at the expense of restarting negotiations with Turkey, a much bigger geopolitical prize?

Turkey understands this, which is why it is almost guaranteed that the prospect of Israel-Turkey gas cooperation will be raised during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s anticipated meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan later this month. Turkey is the largest gas consuming market in the region, and like Egypt and Cyprus, wishes to become an energy hub. Despite all of the geopolitical disputes between Ankara and the EU, it has generally been a reliable partner for delivering energy from the Caucasus and the Middle East.

For strategic reasons, Netanyahu will neither rule out nor endorse this option, which is also paved with complications. How would cooperation with Turkey impact relations with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and other regional actors? If Erdogan utilized cooperation with Israel in order to sideline Cyprus, how would that serve Israel’s interests?

And who is to say whether Turkey’s foreign policy will be more predictable during Erdogan’s final term as president than it was in the past 15 years? International energy projects are dependent on trust. While Israel and Turkey are starting to turn a new leaf, pipelines aren’t going to feature in the relationship anytime soon.

Israel’s export problem isn’t going away. But between now and the end of the year, offshore drilling will continue, and bid rounds in Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon may provide companies even greater incentive to invest. The region’s interplay of geopolitics, economics, and energy demand suggests that with the right balance of political and commercial interests a win-win outcome is still attainable.

If Katz manages to develop and execute a cohesive policy in that time, he could potentially see the fruits of his labor as foreign minister when he and Eli Cohen switch positions. The Eastern Mediterranean’s great gas game isn’t over. Quite the opposite is true.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on July 12th.

הפוסט The East Mediterranean great gas game isn’t over הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In previous instances, similar developments have led to harsh rhetoric and criticism of Israel by Erdogan, and to a de facto downgrade of ties but this time – things kept on moving forward, albeit at a slower pace than under Israel’s previous government.

Maintaining this will be a key objective of both countries in the coming months. But, their goal should be to look beyond a more-of-the-same approach, and seek new advances by involving new societal sectors, setting up cooperative endeavors in new fields, and leveraging positive geopolitical developments. This, while acknowledging that relations between the states are not limited to those between heads-of-state and governments. There is also much space for others in Israel and Turkey, who share different sets of values than their leaders, to find common ground and work together.

First and foremost, Israel and Turkey should increase the scope of their bilateral ministerial meetings, which have not taken place often during the last six months. Beyond meetings and photo-ops, it will be crucial to ensure that sustained working relations are set between the professional levels at relevant ministries – especially those dealing with foreign affairs, energy, economy, environment and defense.

Climate change is important to Israel, but less for Turkey

Of special importance is the issue of climate change, which is central in Israel’s regional ties, but around which only limited cooperation with Turkey exists. It is an issue that is of utmost importance to President Isaac Herzog, who set up the Israeli Climate Forum and who is advocating an inclusive regional approach toward a “Renewable Middle East.” The trust established between Herzog and Erdogan in recent years should be utilized to ensure the sustainability of Israel-Turkey ties, even should political conditions create renewed tensions, and climate change is an agenda item through which this could be done.

Relations could also be improved in terms of parliamentary cooperation – whether through direct engagement between the speakers of parliament (as has recently happened between Israel and Morocco), through the exchange of parliamentary delegations, or via cooperation between sister parties (including via multilateral groupings such as the Socialist International). The fact that Turkey’s former ambassador to Israel Namik Tan has recently been voted into parliament, can give a boost to parliamentary cooperation.

WHILE THE Israeli and Turkish political leaderships, diplomatic echelons and private sectors are already cooperating rather well, an emphasis should be put on enhancing civil society cooperation, which is still lagging. The Turkish-Israeli Civil Society Forum, which managed to create and maintain NGO ties during the years of bilateral political crisis, can be a central pillar of this. It should now be empowered as a focal point for non-governmental cooperation. A specific emphasis should be placed on academic cooperation, enhancing exchange of students and faculty – whether through relevant EU programs (such as Erasmus+), bilateral agreements between universities, and governmental investment (such as was done in the past with the Süleyman Demirel Program for Contemporary Turkish Studies at Tel Aviv University).

On the domestic fronts, as pro-democrats in both Turkey and Israel are stepping up their efforts to safeguard their democracy, there is much room for bilateral exchanges between them, on best practices and lessons learned. This type of cooperation has increased in recent months, with Turkish and Israel experts sharing insights and recommendations with audiences in each other’s countries.

It may grow in importance in the coming months, as municipal elections in both countries approach (October 2023 in Israel, and March 2024 in Turkey). They are seen as significant political tests for those committed to liberal democracy and can create a new space for exchange of expertise and new collaborations between pro-democracy candidates and mayors.

Developments in the region and their importance

Regional developments are also creating new opportunities for innovative Israel-Turkey cooperation. Turkey is stepping up its rapprochement with Arab countries with which Israel already has good relations. Just after the Turkish election, further progress was evident in Egypt-Turkey rapprochement as well as in UAE-Turkey ties.

As these relations continue to improve, new tripartite and minilateral modalities of cooperation – also involving Israel – could be envisioned, on issues such as energy, water, security, climate change, conflict resolution, and improving the situation in Gaza. This can also enable more inclusivity in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the convening of a regional conference (an idea promoted by the EU, but which has not yet happened also due to Egypt-Turkey tensions) and Turkish involvement (even if short of membership) in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Turkey and Israel relations should also focus on improving Israeli-Palestinian ties and advancing peacebuilding. The issues of Gaza and Jerusalem caused tensions between the countries in the past, and this can happen again – especially if the extremist nature of Israel’s current government leads to another flare-up.

In the absence of dramatic escalation, Turkey and Israel should aim – as part of their strategic dialogue – to identify concrete contributions that Turkey can make to improve the situation. This can include the establishment by Turkey and other international actors a dialogue house on the seamline in Jerusalem, which will enable pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians a safe and convenient space to convene and advance joint civil society endeavors. Turkey is relevant to this as it has already set up a cultural center in Jerusalem, and can also share lessons learned from the Home of Cooperation established in the buffer zone in Cyprus to improve ties between the Turkish and Greek communities there.

Turkey-Israel relations might face renewed challenges in the near future given the deep ideological differences between their leaderships on the Palestinian issue. In the meantime, both countries can benefit from advancing shared bilateral and regional interests, that will broaden Israel-Turkey ties and assist in preventing another crisis if and when political tensions increase. In parallel, Israelis and Turks who hold beliefs and ideologies that differ from their leaders, should utilize the improved official ties to step up their value-based cooperation, and enhance bilateral and international liberal partnerships

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on June 18th.

הפוסט Advancing Israel-Turkey relations, new regional cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The attack, unprecedented in its nature in over two decades, rattled the Israeli security but it is not expected to boil over and shake the core of the security relationship cemented in the 1979 peace treaty. According to Haaretz, citing security sources, Saturday’s incident caused considerable embarrassment on the Egyptian side.

The incident took place early Saturday morning. An Egyptian policeman infiltrated the security fence on the Israel-Egypt border in the Sinai Peninsula. After passing the border, the policeman shot dead two soldiers while they secured a military post by the fence. A third Israeli soldier and the attacker were killed in an exchange of fire a few hours later, also on Israeli territory.

Soon after the incident, Israel’s government called on Cairo to thoroughly investigate the attack. In the ensuing hours, the Egyptian authorities did not openly admit the incident was deliberate, saying the policeman was chasing a drug smuggler into Israeli territory. Still, according to Haaretz citing security sources, in preliminary talks between Israeli and Egyptian military officers at the site, the Egyptians acknowledged an act of aggression, saying that the policeman, usually stationed some 5 kilometers (3 miles) away from the border, had operated alone.

Israel is now calling on Egypt to carry a joint investigation into the attack.

“Israel has conveyed a clear message to the Egyptian government: We expect that the joint investigation will be exhaustive and thorough. This is part of the important security cooperation between us, which has benefited both countries over the years,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday.

On Monday morning, Egyptian authorities released more details about the attacker, identifying him as 22-year-old Mohamed Salah. Israel’s public broadcaster KAN reported that Salah had suffered some mental issues after the death of a friend who works in the same military unit as him, and had complained on more than one occasion about his military service. In May 2021, during an IDF operation in the Gaza Strip, Salah expressed on Facebook solidarity with the Palestinians.

Relationship stressed but treaty holds

Experts say Israel and Egypt have a shared interest in keeping their end of the deal, and maintaining a safe border.

“Israel-Egypt bilateral relations as well as the changing regional reality are guiding the interests of both states. In the last few years, Egypt has been heavily involved in mediation efforts with Gaza, in efforts much appreciated by Israel,’’ former Israeli Ambassador to Egypt and lecturer at Reichman University Haim Koren told Al-Monitor.

Koren added that a joint investigation into the circumstances of the incident is in the interest of both countries.

Security cooperation with Egypt is considered a top priority for Israel. The two countries signed a peace treaty in 1979, but for many years, bilateral relations were cold. Few Egyptian tourists have ever visited Israel in the years since the signing of the peace treaty. That being said, in the last decade, since the rise of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, strategic ties between the two countries have deepened and expanded, both in the domain of security and in the domain of energy.

The Egyptians are interested in cooperating with Israel on battling jihadist groups (Islamic State and al-Qaeda-affiliated) in the Sinai Peninsula and in guaranteeing calm in the Gaza Strip.

Reports in recent years, such as a 2016 Bloomberg report, suggested that Israel was helping Egypt in Sinai both through accurate intelligence and with drone strikes. The Times of Israel reported in 2017 about an ISIS jihadist killed in Sinai by an Israeli drone.

Egypt is concerned that unrest in Gaza could spillover to Egyptian territory. It is also in a constant battle against smuggling networks into and from the Strip.

For Israel, Egypt’s extensive involvement in mediation vis-à-vis Hamas and the Islamic Jihad is of the outmost importance. As such, it was Egyptian mediation that enabled reaching a cease-fire between Gaza and Israel last month.

Israel values cooperation with Egypt also on the regional level. Qatar has been supporting Gaza financially in recent years, with Israel’s agreement. On the other hand, Israel is concerned over the proximity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad with Iran, which places Tehran practically on Israel’s southern border. Security ties with Egypt are key for stability in the region, as far as Israel is concerned.

“The recent Saudi-Iranian agreement also impacts the region with new consequences. To that we must add the return of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad into the fold of the Arab League. As such, Israel and Egypt will both need to see — also together — how to address the changing role of Qatar and of Turkey in this new Middle Eastern game. Both Israel and Egypt must address the emerging ‘Iranian axis’ and what regional jihadi terrorism would look like, including in the Sinai Peninsula,” Koren told Al-Monitor.

Energy cooperation between Israel and Egypt has also become a major topic in bilateral relations. Israeli media had reported extensively on a gesture made by Sisi last February, during a regional energy conference, when he went straight to Israel’s Energy Minister Karin Elharrar, who uses a wheelchair, and thanked her for coming.

Deadly incidents on the Israel-Egypt border are rare. The last one occurred when an Islamic militant cell infiltrated the border in 2011. The assailants fired first at an Israeli bus and then at an Israeli car, killing eight Israeli civilians and wounding 38. In the chase after the assailants and the ensuing exchange of fire, five Egyptian soldiers and two Israeli security agents were killed, alongside seven of the attackers.

This article is from “Al-Monitor“, June 5th, 2023.

הפוסט Israel-Egypt security cooperation rattled but steady after border attack הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.