As the dust begins to settle from the wars of the past decade, a growing realization emerges: From the ruins of Gaza, Bint Jbeil, and Aleppo will rise the new political order that will define the Middle East for the coming decades. Those leading the rebuilding efforts will be the ones shaping the region’s political future.

The struggle over the narrative of reconstruction places Israel at a critical crossroads – whether to remain in the role of a destroyer or take part in shaping the region as a builder.

The choice is between a future of instability, extremism, and chaos – allowing Iran to reenter the arena – or a future of Israeli-Palestinian partnership in a comprehensive reconstruction plan. In this vision, physical rebuilding could serve as a foundation for reshaping Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, its adversarial neighbors to the north, and the wider Arab world.

The western Middle East lies in ruins, on a scale reminiscent of post-World War II Europe. The devastation is concentrated in three key areas: Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.

The cost of restoring basic life-sustaining infrastructure in Gaza alone is estimated at $20 billion, barely a third of what will be needed to fully rebuild Gaza over the next decade.

Yet, Gaza’s reconstruction pales in comparison to the enormous task of rebuilding Syria, where the destruction caused by the civil war is estimated at $500 billion.

In Lebanon, devastation is the direct result of governance failure – corruption and systemic inefficiency that led to economic and social collapse, with the war merely adding a layer of physical destruction.

What unites these three arenas is the dramatic political shifts brought about by war. All three are in transition between old regimes and new governments, whose capacity to rule will be determined largely by the reconstruction efforts.

This makes rebuilding a direct factor in Israel’s security, not just in terms of immediate threats but also in shaping Israel’s long-term security environment and its relationships with Palestinians and regional states.

For example, who rebuilds southern Lebanon will directly impact the security situation on Israel’s northern border for years to come. If Hezbollah leads the reconstruction using Iranian funds, it will retain, at least partially, its status among the Shi’ite population and their willingness to support it militarily.

However, if Lebanon’s new government takes charge, relying on international economic aid, it could restore its sovereignty and reduce the willingness of southern Lebanese communities to turn their homes into Hezbollah rocket depots.

Similarly, the way Syria is rebuilt will influence its future relations with Israel. If the reconstruction is led by a regional and international coalition, it could serve as leverage to push the new Syrian leadership away from conflict. More importantly, such an effort would prevent Iran from reestablishing its foothold, as Tehran is a global expert in exploiting chaos for strategic gains.

The urgency of reconstruction

Regional actors are beginning to grasp both the enormous potential and the pressing necessity of large-scale reconstruction. The sheer scale of destruction has transformed rebuilding into a challenge of historic proportions – akin to a regional Marshall Plan but led by the region itself, primarily the Gulf states.

The regional interest in reconstruction stems from a clear realization: Leaving the wounds of Gaza, Aleppo, and Lebanon open will create the conditions for the next regional war. For Arab states, rebuilding is first and foremost a matter of regional stability.

The recent war demonstrated how quickly shock waves from Gaza and Beirut can destabilize governments and disrupt trade routes across the Middle East. This vulnerability has created a sense of urgency among Arab states to intervene.

The release of Trump’s plan only intensified the urgency for these countries to present an alternative. This set the stage for the regional emergency summit held earlier this week in Cairo, initiated by Egypt to coordinate a joint reconstruction effort.

While momentum builds and plans take shape, Israel remains entirely absent from regional reconstruction efforts. Securing a place at the table – ensuring Israel has a say in shaping the post-war Middle East – requires it to forge a new kind of strategic partnership with those leading the rebuilding efforts, namely the Gulf states and other key Arab partners.

Yet at present, Israel is seen as an irrelevant spoiler – a military power capable of destroying any long-term reconstruction effort, but one that lacks a strategic vision or the willingness to plan for the future.

Above all, Israel’s messianic political vision for Gaza and the West Bank positions it as an obstacle. These policies run counter to the regional understanding that the long-term success of Gaza’s physical reconstruction is inseparable from establishing a stable political future for Gaza.

This is not just about Saudi or Emirati diplomatic sensitivities – it is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. There is no logic in investing billions in developing Gaza’s port and energy infrastructure or Lebanon’s economy if they are destined to be bombed in the next escalation.

Yet, instead of engaging with the serious regional discourse on reconstruction, Israel’s leadership remains preoccupied with fantasies about a Gaza Riviera without Palestinians and delusional visions that even Trump’s advisers have abandoned in recent weeks.

As of today, Israeli decision-makers are the only actors in the world clinging to Trump’s so-called reconstruction plan. It took Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states three hours to dismiss Trump’s statement and clarify that their involvement in Gaza’s rebuilding depends on transferring control to a Palestinian authority.

Ultimately, participating in the critical process of regional reconstruction and the reshaping of Israel’s relationships with its neighbors demands a price that Israel’s current government finds unbearable – giving up its messianic dreams of annexation and population transfer. It requires a fundamental shift from being a force of destruction to becoming a partner in designing the Middle East’s future.

The article was published on March 9th, 2025, in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Gaza Reconstruction is Israel’s Chance to Shape the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A Blue Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Climate, Society and Regional Prosperity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Hydropolitics in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The EU’s Cross Border Cooperation Program in the Mediterranean (CBC Med/NEXT MED) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A month has passed and, for the first time since 2008, a Turkish leader and an Israeli prime minister are expected to meet today, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. This is a diplomatic success story uncommon in the conflict-ridden Mediterranean. Examining the key factors that enabled the gradual transformation of Israeli-Turkish relations in 2021 and 2022 could help other countries in the region that are seeking to improve ties achieve this goal.

The opening conditions were difficult, with tensions being the norm in relations over the last decade. Starting with Israel’s Cast Lead operation in Gaza in 2008 and continuing with the Davos and Mavi Marmara flotilla incidents in 2009 and 2010 respectively, relations were mostly in crisis mode. The failure of a reconciliation agreement reached in 2016 within only two years of its signing intensified this. It also led to increased skepticism in both countries as to whether long-lasting reconciliation was attainable and whether the other side was trustworthy and serious in its intentions.

Tensions between Israel and Türkiye, initially based on deep differences regarding the Palestinian issue (mostly related to Hamas, Gaza, and Jerusalem), became further fueled by more recent geopolitical divergences. Israel developed meaningful relationships with countries that Türkiye was at odds with—Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and the United Arab Emirates—while Türkiye built economic cooperation with Iran and engaged in talks with it and Russia regarding Syria. Each country regarded the other as part of a rival regional camp, sometimes in an exaggerated manner due to an insufficient understanding of each other’s interests. The ongoing tensions and harsh rhetoric generated negative mutual perceptions, lack of trust, and a disconnect between the Israeli and Turkish leaderships.

Nevertheless, relations were sustained, albeit on a limited scale and via relatively low-level engagement. For several years, there was no sense of urgency to change this; the status quo seemed to work and to address sufficiently the needs of both countries. Bilateral trade even reached new heights during this period. There was little public pressure in Israel or Türkiye to normalize ties and almost no champions for doing so within their respective political systems. Finally, there was not much interest among the international community in investing political capital to bring the countries closer together.

Several factors stand out in how Israel and Türkiye managed to overcome this situation and succeeded in opening a new and promising chapter in their relationship. They include the historical resilience of ties, the consistency of Türkiye’s interest in improvement once it decided to advance it, the change of leadership in Israel, the practicing of effective diplomacy, the successful design and implementation of a gradual diplomatic process, the setting of a positive agenda, the restoration of dialogue and trust, some geopolitical convergence, and electoral considerations.

A Multifaceted Enabling Context

Israel and Türkiye have enjoyed diplomatic relations since 1949. Although occasionally downgraded in response to disputes, these were never cut off. Ups and downs were characteristic of the relationship throughout the decades. In 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu set a precedent when they reached an interest-based agreement to repair relations and resolve the flotilla crisis. Türkiye then walked back on reconciliation in 2018, following the relocation of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and multiple Palestinian casualties caused by Israel in protests near the Gaza Strip border.

The historical resilience of relations provided a supportive framing for yet another reconciliation process to be launched, however. And, in parallel, unofficial connections—through nongovernmental organizations, academia, business, and cultural actors—helped maintain ties even in difficult years and repeatedly helped to bounce back from crises.

The consistency of Turkish interest in improving ties—which started in December 2020 when Erdoğan publicly spoke in favor of better relations with Israel, while still criticizing Israeli policies toward the Palestinians—was an important factor. Although its initial signals about wanting warmer ties were taken with a grain of salt and largely disregarded in Israel, Türkiye continued to convey this message. It also accepted the slow pace of progress, which was what Israel’s government wanted, and it found ways to respond to Israeli-Palestinian tensions in Jerusalem and to the escalation in Gaza without damaging the prospects for reconciliation. This helped convince skeptics in Israel that it was worth exploring whether normalization was feasible.

The change of leadership and the formation of a new government in Israel in June 2021 provided a game-changing opportunity. The new government did not start off as a friend of Türkiye. Most of its senior members were critical of the country and of Netanyahu’s 2016 agreement with Erdoğan, and they did not place reconciliation on their agenda. Nevertheless, Netanyahu’s ousting shook things up and provided an opportunity to seek a fresh start.

The election of Isaac Herzog as president of Israel in 2021, in parallel to the formation of the new government, was a major turning point. His positive approach toward Türkiye (including a family-related angle), diplomatic skills, support for regional cooperation, and constructive rhetoric were key factors. He received backing from the government to test the waters with Türkiye, and his successful efforts created conditions for reconciliation and persuaded previously skeptical Israeli politicians. Supporters of reconciliation gradually emerged in the public sphere, filling the previous void.

Beyond political leadership, professional and effective diplomacy were major factors in bringing success. Diplomacy is about building relations and finding common ground, even in times of tensions and crises. Career diplomats from both countries exemplified optimism and determination as they quietly improved the situation and dismantled obstacles. The empowerment of Israel’s foreign service under the new government enabled skilled diplomats to take a lead and make a more significant impact than they could have under Netanyahu, who deliberately weakened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his terms as prime minister.

A slow, gradual, and careful process of reconciliation was designed and successfully implemented, including a correct sequencing of events and phases. Through the accumulation of small wins, proofs of success, and tangible benefits, the process created momentum. Cooperation was re-energized, security challenges were overcome, differences contained, and positive developments routinized. With a success story apparently in the making, people became motivated to join in, and there was an increase in exchanges and joint endeavors.

Israel and Türkiye decided not to let their differences dictate their relations and to seek cooperation based on a positive bilateral and regional vision. As a positive agenda was set, a more constructive rhetoric became the custom, new narratives were put forth, and sensitivity to each side’s needs was practiced. The process highlighted tangible economic steps and benefits prior to reconciliation, as well as the existence of multiple areas of potential political, security, economic, and civilian cooperation. This helped increase support for the process as it unfolded, making it seem only natural when a decision to de facto upgrade ties was reached in the summer of 2022.

It also led to the restoration of dialogue and trust. Channels of communication between officials and leaders were expanded and diversified, and high-level visits took place with much visibility and positive symbolism. The Israeli public expressed support for improved ties and the overall view in Türkiye regarding the process was positive as well.

Geopolitical trends also played a part. In parallel to their reconciliation process, the two countries were working to improve their other relationships in the region, thus creating a broader context of ending isolation, more regional dialogue, and less conflict. The United States under the Biden administration, while not actively mediating between Israel and Türkiye, encouraged them to reassess and realign their foreign policy in light of regional changes (including the Abraham Accords of 2020), reflecting US interests.

Finally, domestic politics were also a factor, especially regarding the timing of reconciliation. Preparing for a seemingly difficult election cycle in 2023, Erdoğan wanted to present concrete achievements to counter domestic criticism of his policies in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The nearing of elections in Israel, which might put Netanyahu back in power, was another factor. Sealing the deal before domestic politics came in the way, and in a manner enabling Prime Minister Yair Lapid to present another diplomatic success prior to the elections, were also important catalysts for progress.

How to Keep Moving Forward

This unique culmination of factors enabled Israel and Türkiye to do what many doubted they could—start a new chapter in their relationship and reconcile, despite difficult opening conditions and without external mediation. Both countries are doing so while being well aware of their differences on key policy issues. They are also seeking to create a mechanism that will help overcome future obstacles.

Israel and Türkiye should now formalize their reconciliation by quickly finalizing the appointments of ambassadors and consul generals. The ambassadors should prioritize interaction with the two countries’ public via media interviews and in-person engagement with as many sectors of society as possible. In parallel, the two countries should relaunch their strategic dialogue (which did not officially take place during the years of crises), start convening an annual government-to-government consultation, establish friendship groups in both parliaments, devise a joint vision for the future of ties, and orchestrate parallel public events in both countries—with a strong cultural component—to celebrate the new chapter.

Ministers and senior officials from both governments should be encouraged to hold mutual visits, identify potential spheres of cooperation, and sign memoranda of understanding and agreements in order to diversify and expand the fields of cooperation and add new components to relations. Sustainable channels of communication should be established between professional echelons in a variety of ministries, in a way that can be resilient to future changes in political leadership.

The recent agreement on civic aviation, including the resumption of flights by Israeli carriers to and from Türkiye, can further increase the human connection. In that regard, the two sides should cherish the important role that civilian cooperation played in sustaining relations during the years of crisis and should work to elevate such cooperation. For example, they can establish a joint fund to support civil society organizations seeking to advance joint projects. These could include nongovernmental organizations, schools and universities, think tanks, cultural and sports institutions, and more. In addition, an academic exchange program can be established, and both countries can ask the EU to incentivize academic cooperation between themselves as part of the Horizon Europe and Erasmus+ programs.

Finally, the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation should be leveraged to advance regional cooperation and to support conflict resolution. For example, the two countries could seek trilateral cooperation with the United Arab Emirates or convene joint meetings of the existing Israeli-Turkish and Israeli-Palestinian economic committees. Together with additional countries in the Mediterranean, they could also advance a new inclusive regional mechanism to deal with climate change. Israel could support reconciliation between Egypt and Türkiye while Türkiye could seek ways to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. All of this should be done with the goal of transforming the Mediterranean into a region characterized by more cooperation and less conflict.

Sustaining their reconciliation process, injecting more diverse content into it, and finding constructive solutions to policy differences will be the next diplomatic tasks for Israel and Türkiye. But already, the process both countries have undertaken is a meaningful diplomatic success story, which will hopefully inspire others in the Mediterranean to follow their example.

This article is from “GMFUS” from September 20, 2022

הפוסט Israeli-Turkish Reconciliation Is a Rare Success Story of Diplomacy in the Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The summer plot against Israelis in Istanbul was foiled and Turkish authorities detained some suspects in June and July. At the beginning of August, Turkish authorities released rare footage showing the capture of Iranian agents following Israeli tourists in Istanbul, providing more information on Iran’s plans to harm Israeli citizens. Israeli and Turkish media emphasized the mutual struggle of respective security agencies in both countries to stop Iranians from committing terrorist acts against Israeli holidaymakers on Turkish soil.

Such was the background to the visit of Yair Lapid—the soon-to-be prime minister—to Ankara in June. A few months earlier, Israeli President Yitzhak Herzog, who invested considerable effort into reigniting bilateral relations between the two countries, had also paid a visit to the Turkish capital, where he met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This rapprochement soon culminated in the return of ambassadors and the full restoration of diplomatic ties, ending a long period of tense relations between Ankara and Jerusalem.

Despite the rift that started with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010—some would say it has brewed since President Erdogan’s rise to power in 2002—Israel and Turkey have maintained economic relations. These ties seem to have a life of their own and have continued to grow despite the hostile political climate and the lack of respective ambassadors. In 2020 alone, Israel exported $1.5 billion worth of goods to Turkey, while Turkish exports reached $4.67 billion. In comparison, Russian exports to Israel amounted to $1 billion in 2020.

Both economies have benefitted from these ties, and there is no doubt that the volume of bilateral trade will continue to grow after the full restoration of diplomatic ties. In the energy sphere, President Erdogan has expressed hopes for Israeli-Turkish cooperation in establishing a pipeline from Europe to stream Israeli gas to Europe. This development can serve both countries—a NATO ally and America’s closest ally in the Middle East—in enhancing their regional and global influence.

In addition to diplomacy, tourism, trade, and energy, there is also a security dimension to restoring Israeli-Turkish relations. For years, Turkey had acted as a patron of Hamas, an Islamist Palestinian movement that took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 and became one of the major political and military forces in the Palestinian territories. Israel had always insisted that Hamas leadership must leave Turkey as a prerequisite for re-establishing relations between the two countries, and that Turkish religious organizations stop meddling in the situation at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

Due to a significant geopolitical shift in the region, with Arab states normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords and promoting relations with its archenemy Greece, Turkey is now realigned with the Gulf countries and has eased tensions with Egypt, causing a decrease in support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, it remains to be seen whether Hamas leadership will soon be looking to relocate elsewhere and stop its malign activity against Israel on Turkish soil.

Another question of grave strategic importance to Israel is how the two countries can cooperate against Iran, which might soon be relieved of some sanctions due to a possible revival of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), thereby enjoying an unprecedented economic and diplomatic renaissance. It is a given that Israel sees Iran as its worst enemy and existential threat, however, Turkey also often finds itself on the opposite side of the Islamic Republic, especially in Syria and Azerbaijan.

Additionally, just like Israel, Turkey is wary of growing Russian-Iranian cooperation and fears the possible weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program if the JCPOA isn’t revived, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

In recent years, Turkey and Iran have increased their economic cooperation. However, even if their economic interests overlap at times, the geopolitical divisions between the countries have grown as well. The recent Iranian terror plot against Israeli citizens is a good example of that; Ankara fumed over the Iranian attempt to compromise its security and harm its diplomatic goals of improving ties with Jerusalem and Washington. Indeed, cooperation with Israel against Iran’s malign regional activities might serve Turkey’s interests in the United States well, increasing synergy between its allies and providing a strong front against Tehran’s regional ambitions.

The change in Turkish policy towards Israel, Hamas, and Iran was seen well during the recent Israeli military operation Breaking Dawn at the beginning of August. Although Ankara had rushed to condemn Israel’s military operation in the Gaza Strip and called for “restraint,” the condemnation itself was significantly more moderate than on previous occasions. And, only a few days after the operation, Ankara and Jerusalem festively restored their ties. This change in attitude might have something to do with the fact that the group targeted in Gaza was not Hamas, but rather the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—a pro-Iranian movement, heavily sponsored by Tehran. The PIJ had verbally attacked Ankara’s restoration of relations with Israel.

It remains to be seen how Israel and Turkey will play the Iranian card in the future, as some regional powers—such as the United Arab Emirates—are looking at diffusing tensions in the Gulf. However, it seems that Ankara and Jerusalem will continue to work jointly to prevent terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens in Turkey, as this threat is still not entirely removed, and explore the possibility of pursuing common goals vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic and its many regional proxies.

This article is from “Atlantic Council“, from September 9, 2022

הפוסט Iran helped Turkey and Israel mend ties. Here’s how. הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But something is missing. While the Mediterranean Games bring together athletes from countries which are at odds with each other, and while the list of participating countries expands to include some non-Mediterranean countries – Israelis and Palestinians are left out. They are not competing in the 2022 games, nor were they invited to compete in any of the previous Mediterranean Games.

הפוסט Sports for Peace: Let Israelis and Palestinians Compete in Mediterranean Games הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming relations between Israel and Turkey

Turkish foreign policy change – Turkey adopted an assertive and confrontational policy towards its neighbors in the Mediterranean and other countries in the Middle East over the past decade. Its relations with Greece and Cyprus deteriorated over conflicting claims to economic waters and control of potential gas reservoirs, as well as the continued conflict in Northern Cyprus; its relations with Egypt worsened over Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and involvement in the war in Libya; relations with Israel ran aground, mainly over the Palestinian issue. Turkey found itself isolated in the eastern Mediterranean Basin facing an expanding system of alliances and regional cooperation from which it was excluded. These developments prompted a turning point in Turkish foreign policy over the past 18 months aimed at thawing relations with countries in the region, including Israel. Although the Turkish moves began while Netanyahu was still in office, they gained momentum after the June 2021 swearing-in of the Bennett-Lapid government and subsequent inauguration of President Isaac Herzog.

Warming relations – Turkey began to express its desire for warmer relations with Israel, emphasizing a re-examination of potential cooperation in the field of energy and natural gas. Positive public messages were exchanged between the sides, replacing the negative ones conveyed by the parties in recent years mostly for domestic political purposes. The Turkish policy shift, together with the change of government in Israel and Herzog’s incumbency, formed the basis for slow progress in relations, which included expanded channels of communications between senior officials, the start of concrete cooperation, and a process of rebuilding trust. In March 2022, Herzog met with Erdogan in Ankara, and in May 2022, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu visited Israel, marking the first visit by a Turkish foreign minister in 15 years. In June 2022, the security cooperation between the countries came to light in the face of Iranian terrorist threats to Israelis on Turkish soil, prompting a quick visit to Ankara by Foreign Minister Lapid and meeting with his counterpart Çavuşoğlu despite the political chaos in Israel and the announced dissolution of the Knesset.

Cooperation potential – The warming relations hold out inherent potential for promoting cooperation, along three main channels. First, existing channels of cooperation can be expanded. These include upgrading diplomatic relations back to ambassadorial level, strengthening tourism, and expanding commercial channels. Second, thawing long frozen cultural, academic and economic cooperation channels. Finally, new avenues of cooperation must be examined – the world has changed since the freezing of relations over a decade ago. New opportunities have emerged in such fields as the need to develop renewable energy and address the climate crisis, as well as in technological advances, alongside a shared interest in regional political processes and opportunities for multinational axes. For example, Turkish moves to improve its relations with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, along with Israel’s strengthening relations with those countries, open up opportunities for trilateral and regional cooperation in a variety of fields.

Challenges and lessons – The current course of gradually warming relations begs the question of how these developments differ from previous attempts to warm relations, whether there was a significant learning process on the Turkish side that led to a real policy shift on Israel, and what Israel has learned from the past. Previous attempts to warm relations have encountered challenges and pitfalls stemming mostly from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli military operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem have generated repeated crises between the countries. The current process of warming relations is characterized by greater mutual sensitivity. This sensitivity was reflected in Turkey’s moderate reactions to the rising tensions in Jerusalem around the month of Ramadan, terrorist attacks, and Israeli responses. In contrast to the previous reconciliation attempt of 2016, this time the parties chose to conduct their dialogue at higher levels than in the past, to give the moves considerable public exposure, to use positive rhetoric, and propose ideas for consultation mechanisms to contain future crises between the sides.

Implications of the thaw with Turkey for Israel’s activity in the Mediterranean

Israel is Turkey’s doorway to regional integration – Turkish steps to warm relations with Israel reflect a broader move to thaw relations with countries in the region. Following a decade of assertive and confrontational policies, Turkey found itself isolated, precisely as the US was changing the nature of its involvement in the region, and a new cooperation-based regional architecture was taking shape. Given the emerging regional landscape, its isolation, and its desire to become a regional energy hub, Turkey now aspires for a role in forming regional initiatives and cooperating and strengthening its relations with countries in the region. However, relations between Turkey and other countries in the region – Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus – are even worse than those with Israel. Ankara is making efforts to reach out to Egypt, and Greece as well. But whereas its outreach to Egypt has fostered a similar process of warming relations as with Israel, the same cannot be said for the situation vis-à-vis Greece, prompting a renewed confrontational policy toward Athens. Turkey views Israel as a potential conduit to regional cooperation, not necessarily with Greece and Cyprus, but certainly with actors such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. While this assessment presents it with great opportunities, these must not come at the expense of Israel’s other partnerships in the region.

Learning from Egyptian-Turkish experience and the potential of Israeli-Egyptian cooperation vis-à-vis Turkey – Since Sisi’s rise to power, Egyptian-Turkish relations have been characterized by hostility and mutual distrust stemming from Erdogan’s repeated questioning of the legitimacy of Sisi’s rule. Tensions with Egypt have also arisen over Turkey’s stand with the Muslim Brotherhood, its intervention in Libya, the agreement marking the maritime border between Libya and Turkey, and its attempts in previous years to intervene in Gaza (moves perceived as intervention in Egypt’s backyard, while undermining its status and security); disagreement over the need to delineate Mediterranean maritime borders; and Egyptian condemnations of Turkish moves in the region. Nevertheless, like Israel, Egypt has maintained extensive bilateral trade with Turkey, which amounts to over $5 billion a year, a number that has grown at a dizzying pace of tens of percent in recent years. Meanwhile, Egypt is Turkey’s main source of liquefied gas imports. Starting in 2021, the two countries have embarked on a trend of cautious warming relations. This development is presented sympathetically in the media, but the Egyptian side is waiting to see how it translates into action. Given their similar situation and interests vis-a-vis Turkey, Israel and Egypt also face similar questions over their relations with Ankara, offering Israel an opportunity to learn and perhaps even cooperate with Egypt as part of the joint warming of relations with Turkey. At the very least, Israel must conduct itself with maximum transparency toward Egypt in the process of warming relations with Turkey in order to avoid crises in relations.

Relations with Turkey must not sacrifice relations with Greece and Cyprus – Israel and the Hellenic countries have built up a relationship of trust over the past decade, which allows room for maneuver vis-à-vis the Turkish issue. However, relations between Israel, Turkey, and the Hellenic countries are not a “zero-sum game” – warming relations with Turkey should not come at the cost of Israel’s relations with Greece and Cyprus. Israel succeeded in implementing this policy in 2016, and it can do so again. However, caution must be exercised, with maximum transparency and attentiveness to the concerns of Greece and Cyprus in order to prevent damage to relations. Israel is careful to accompany the warming of relations with Turkey with a series of reassuring messages to Greece and Cyprus expressing its commitment to the partnership that has been forged – public statements, visits by senior officials and tripartite meetings, and even joint military training. From the perspective of the regional framework, Israel cannot resolve the conflicts between Turkey Greece, and Cyprus, but Turkey’s integration into regional initiatives is an important process that can contribute to reducing tensions and promoting regional dialogue and stability.

Coordination with the US and Europe – Despite the widespread regional perception of an American pullout from the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin, the US clearly remains very involved, despite a change in its modus operandi. The war in Ukraine has also shuffled the deck, leading the US and Europe to invest considerable resources in the face of the Russian threat. These include strengthening ties with oil-producing countries in the Middle East and bolstering the NATO alliance, in which Turkey plays an important role. These circumstances explain the US and European desire to see Turkey integrate into the Mediterranean Basin and cooperate with their other allies in the region. To the extent that initiatives are advanced to integrate Turkey into the region and strengthen its relations with countries in the region, an open and coordinated dialogue with the Americans and Europeans must be maintained in order to leverage it optimally for Israel and the region. In contrast to the process of warming Israeli-Turkish relations in 2016, this time care must be taken to ensure that the warming of relations with Turkey progresses in a coordinated manner with the US and Europe, rests on a stronger and more robust foundation, progresses at an appropriate pace, and serves Israel’s desire to promote stability and regional cooperation over time.

Integration of Turkey into regional forums – Turkey aims to reduce its dependence on Russian gas and become a regional energy center, making cooperation in the field of gas and energy a major goal of the Turkish move to warm relations with Israel. Plans to export Israeli gas to Turkey via a pipeline seems to be unfeasible and unviable, and Israel must make this clear to Turkey at the outset and not create expectations that cannot be realized. Nevertheless, there is potential for Turkey’s integration into regional frameworks, which to some extent will meet the Turkish need and promote regional interests, and Israel can help in this regard. Potential new areas of cooperation could include the fields of renewable energy and climate change, serving as the basis for a new regional network that includes Turkey.

הפוסט Implications of Israel and Turkey’s diplomatic thaw on Israel’s Mediterranean Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming of relations is expected to boost existing fields of cooperation (e.g. trade and tourism) and de-freeze fields that were put on hold during years of tensions (e.g. the strategic dialogue on regional affairs). At the same time, it also creates an opportunity to launch new fields of cooperation on issues that are relevant to current realities.

Climate change is the leading field. It is an issue of growing centrality in both Turkey and Israel, in which there is untapped potential for joint endeavors. For example, Israel’s charge d’affaires in Ankara, Irit Lillian, recently told Turkish media that cooperation in the field of sustainability could improve economic and trade ties.

Climate change is already taking a toll in Turkey, with fires, droughts, flooding and pollution in the Marmara Sea. More extreme climate events are expected in the coming decades alongside the intensification of current trends. Until recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not convey a sense of urgency regarding climate change. However, in his 2021 speech to the UN General Assembly, Erdogan spoke much about climate change, calling for international action and emphasizing Turkey’s commitment.

In October 2021, Turkey ratified the Paris Convention, becoming the last G-20 country to do so. Turkey plans to reduce emissions by 21 percent by 2030 and reach zero emissions by 2053. With the support of the EU, a network of municipalities is operating in Turkey to deal with climate change. In late 2021, Turkey adopted a program called the “Green Development Revolution,” and in February 2022, a climate council was established in Turkey, with government support and participation of representatives from all over the country.

Climate change is likely to assume a more central role in Turkey’s political discourse, as the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections draw near. In January 2022, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu addressed a letter to young Turkish citizens, pledging that the political bloc he heads would lead to real climate change and “work to save the ecological future of Turkey and the world.”

At the same time, Erdogan is trying to rebrand himself from a leader criticized for ignoring the climate issue, into a leader of innovative national environmental programs who urges the international community to take better action. The approaching elections are likely to heighten his interest in developing climate-oriented cooperation with other countries, including Israel.

President Herzog’s vision of inclusive regional cooperation to tackle climate change raised interest in Turkey. This is partly because Turkey is not a member of the current Mediterranean frameworks in which Israel participates, e.g. the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the Cypriot governmental initiative to coordinate climate change activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Turkey feels that these initiatives isolate it in the region and that they do not have a real interest in its inclusion. A new Cypriot proposal to establish a regional framework to deal with summer wildfires has also been recently presented to Greece and Israel, but not to Turkey.

Israel’s climate developments

IN ISRAEL, there has been a recent discussion of turning the EMGF into a forum dealing with renewable energies, or energy in general, and not only natural gas. This is a result of difficulties in profitable cooperation in the natural gas field and the increased importance of renewable energies. Each EMGF member has veto power over adding new members or observers. For example, the Palestinian Authority has torpedoed the UAE’s request to be accepted as an observer in the forum.

Turkey does not believe Greece and Cyprus would accept its membership. To a lesser extent, there is a similar Turkish perception about Egypt. Even if the Hellenic states were willing to include Turkey, Turkey would likely demand representation for Turkish Cypriots as well, a condition that Cyprus and Greece are not expected to accept.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of upgrading the EMGF into an inclusive regional framework also dedicated to environmental issues does not seem feasible at this stage. The establishment of a new forum, built from its onset as a partnership among all countries of the region, stands a better chance of success since it would not be perceived as directed against any regional actor.

This could enable Turkey, Cyprus and Greece a measure of political flexibility, as has been the case with other regional frameworks that they joined upon establishment, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

Such a move could be jump-started with an Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian meeting on environmental and climate issues. This would have been considered impossible until recently, but it now appears more feasible given the cautious attempts by Egypt and Turkey to improve their relations. Israel can play a role in promoting such a meeting, albeit initially on an informal level, with a focus on promoting regional dialogue ahead of COP27 scheduled for late 2022 in Egypt.

Another new opportunity for regional cooperation on climate change issues is the parallel warming of relations between Israel and Turkey, and Turkey and the UAE. From an economic point of view, trilateral projects are already reportedly being discussed, and an Israeli-Turkish-Emirati summit on environmental and climate issues can also be advanced. In this case, there is less sensitivity than there is with Egypt – especially in light of Erdogan’s successful visit to the Emirates – and a gathering of officials from the three countries should be possible early on in the process.

Including the Palestinians

IT IS IMPORTANT to include the Palestinian issue in any discussion of regional cooperation on climate and the environment. The Palestinian issue is important to Turkey, and as part of warming relations with Israel, Turkey has an interest in finding new ways to help the Palestinians and advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Cavusoglu clearly stated that during his press conference with Foreign Minister Lapid, and that environmental issues could be part of a positive agenda that serves the interests of all parties.

In addition to the regional aspect, Israel and Turkey should launch bilateral cooperation on climate change, which could include a regular ministerial-level annual meeting – alternating between Israel and Turkey; ongoing contact between relevant professionals in government ministries, exchange of knowledge, coordination and joint work; mutual assistance in the event of exceptional climate events (fires, flooding, etc.) and the launch of a climate hotline; support for civil society organizations from both countries that are interested in environmental projects and joint action; and encouraging academic cooperation in the fields of environment and sustainability, which will include conferences, research as well as faculty and student exchanges.

Climate change is already reshaping the international system, creating common interests and fostering cooperation between countries that used to be at odds. Israel-Turkey relations stand to benefit from this trend. Tackling climate change can become a central pillar in the new chapter in relations, bringing benefits not only to the citizens of both countries, but potentially also to the region as a whole.

The op-ed was published in JPost in June 2022.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey must cooperate on climate change הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming of relations is expected to boost existing fields of cooperation (e.g. trade and tourism) and de-freeze fields that were put on hold during years of tensions (e.g. the strategic dialogue on regional affairs). At the same time, it also creates an opportunity to launch new fields of cooperation on issues that are relevant to current realities.

Climate change is the leading field. It is an issue of growing centrality in both Turkey and Israel, in which there is untapped potential for joint endeavors. For example, Israel’s charge d’affaires in Ankara, Irit Lillian, recently told Turkish media that cooperation in the field of sustainability could improve economic and trade ties.

Climate change is already taking a toll in Turkey, with fires, droughts, flooding and pollution in the Marmara Sea. More extreme climate events are expected in the coming decades alongside the intensification of current trends. Until recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not convey a sense of urgency regarding climate change. However, in his 2021 speech to the UN General Assembly, Erdogan spoke much about climate change, calling for international action and emphasizing Turkey’s commitment.

In October 2021, Turkey ratified the Paris Convention, becoming the last G-20 country to do so. Turkey plans to reduce emissions by 21 percent by 2030 and reach zero emissions by 2053. With the support of the EU, a network of municipalities is operating in Turkey to deal with climate change. In late 2021, Turkey adopted a program called the “Green Development Revolution,” and in February 2022, a climate council was established in Turkey, with government support and participation of representatives from all over the country.

Climate change is likely to assume a more central role in Turkey’s political discourse, as the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections draw near. In January 2022, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu addressed a letter to young Turkish citizens, pledging that the political bloc he heads would lead to real climate change and “work to save the ecological future of Turkey and the world.”

At the same time, Erdogan is trying to rebrand himself from a leader criticized for ignoring the climate issue, into a leader of innovative national environmental programs who urges the international community to take better action. The approaching elections are likely to heighten his interest in developing climate-oriented cooperation with other countries, including Israel.

President Herzog’s vision of inclusive regional cooperation to tackle climate change raised interest in Turkey. This is partly because Turkey is not a member of the current Mediterranean frameworks in which Israel participates, e.g. the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the Cypriot governmental initiative to coordinate climate change activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Turkey feels that these initiatives isolate it in the region and that they do not have a real interest in its inclusion. A new Cypriot proposal to establish a regional framework to deal with summer wildfires has also been recently presented to Greece and Israel, but not to Turkey.

Israel’s climate developments

IN ISRAEL, there has been a recent discussion of turning the EMGF into a forum dealing with renewable energies, or energy in general, and not only natural gas. This is a result of difficulties in profitable cooperation in the natural gas field and the increased importance of renewable energies. Each EMGF member has veto power over adding new members or observers. For example, the Palestinian Authority has torpedoed the UAE’s request to be accepted as an observer in the forum.

Turkey does not believe Greece and Cyprus would accept its membership. To a lesser extent, there is a similar Turkish perception about Egypt. Even if the Hellenic states were willing to include Turkey, Turkey would likely demand representation for Turkish Cypriots as well, a condition that Cyprus and Greece are not expected to accept.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of upgrading the EMGF into an inclusive regional framework also dedicated to environmental issues does not seem feasible at this stage. The establishment of a new forum, built from its onset as a partnership among all countries of the region, stands a better chance of success since it would not be perceived as directed against any regional actor.

This could enable Turkey, Cyprus and Greece a measure of political flexibility, as has been the case with other regional frameworks that they joined upon establishment, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

Such a move could be jump-started with an Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian meeting on environmental and climate issues. This would have been considered impossible until recently, but it now appears more feasible given the cautious attempts by Egypt and Turkey to improve their relations. Israel can play a role in promoting such a meeting, albeit initially on an informal level, with a focus on promoting regional dialogue ahead of COP27 scheduled for late 2022 in Egypt.

Another new opportunity for regional cooperation on climate change issues is the parallel warming of relations between Israel and Turkey, and Turkey and the UAE. From an economic point of view, trilateral projects are already reportedly being discussed, and an Israeli-Turkish-Emirati summit on environmental and climate issues can also be advanced. In this case, there is less sensitivity than there is with Egypt – especially in light of Erdogan’s successful visit to the Emirates – and a gathering of officials from the three countries should be possible early on in the process.

Including the Palestinians

IT IS IMPORTANT to include the Palestinian issue in any discussion of regional cooperation on climate and the environment. The Palestinian issue is important to Turkey, and as part of warming relations with Israel, Turkey has an interest in finding new ways to help the Palestinians and advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Cavusoglu clearly stated that during his press conference with Foreign Minister Lapid, and that environmental issues could be part of a positive agenda that serves the interests of all parties.

In addition to the regional aspect, Israel and Turkey should launch bilateral cooperation on climate change, which could include a regular ministerial-level annual meeting – alternating between Israel and Turkey; ongoing contact between relevant professionals in government ministries, exchange of knowledge, coordination and joint work; mutual assistance in the event of exceptional climate events (fires, flooding, etc.) and the launch of a climate hotline; support for civil society organizations from both countries that are interested in environmental projects and joint action; and encouraging academic cooperation in the fields of environment and sustainability, which will include conferences, research as well as faculty and student exchanges.

Climate change is already reshaping the international system, creating common interests and fostering cooperation between countries that used to be at odds. Israel-Turkey relations stand to benefit from this trend. Tackling climate change can become a central pillar in the new chapter in relations, bringing benefits not only to the citizens of both countries, but potentially also to the region as a whole.

This article is from “JPost“, from June 27, 2022

הפוסט Israel and Turkey must cooperate on climate change- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming of relations is expected to boost existing fields of cooperation (such as trade and tourism) and de-freeze those that were put on hold during years of tensions (such as the strategic dialogue on regional affairs). At the same time, it also creates an opportunity to launch new initiatives on issues that are relevant to current realities and needs. Climate change stands the on the top of this list. It is an issue of growing centrality both in Turkey and Israel, in which there is untapped potential for joint endeavors to take shape. For example, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Israeli embassy in Ankara, Irit Lillian, recently told Turkish media that cooperation in the field of sustainability could improve economic and trade ties between the two countries.

Climate change in Turkey: from neglect to hot topic

Climate change has already been taking a toll in Turkey, with fires, droughts, flooding and pollution in the Marmara Sea. More extreme climate events are expected in the coming decades alongside the intensification of current trends: warming, dehydration, damage to water sources, and rising sea levels.

However, until recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not convey a sense of urgency regarding climate change. Among other things, he promoted the Istanbul Canal project, which is claimed to have negative environmental consequences, and was absent from the COP26 conference in Glasgow. However, Erdoğan devoted much of his 2021 speech to the UN General Assembly to climate change, calling for vigorous international action and emphasizing Turkey’s commitment to the issue.

In October 2021, Turkey ratified the Paris Convention, becoming the last G-20 country to do so. Since ratification, Turkey has reached an agreement with the World Bank, France and Germany to receive considerable financial assistance that will help it meet its treaty obligations. The country plans to reduce emissions by 21 percent by 2030 and reach zero emissions by 2053. With the support of the EU, a network of municipalities is operating in Turkey to deal with climate change. In late 2021, Turkey adopted a program called the “Green Development Revolution”. And in February 2022, a climate council was established, holding its first meeting in Konya, with government support and participation of representatives from all over the country.

Climate change is likely to assume a more central role in Turkey’s political discourse, as the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections draw near. This because of the increased global spotlight on the issue, effects of climate change that are already felt in Turkey, the opposition’s criticism of Erdoğan’s handling of the issue, and his renewed focus and calls for action. In January 2022, opposition leader KemalKılıçdaroğlu addressed a letter to young Turkish citizens, pledging that the political bloc he heads would lead to real climate change and “work to save the ecological future of Turkey and the world.”

At the same time, Erdoğan is trying to rebrand himself from a leader criticized for ignoring the climate issue into a leader of innovative national environmental programs who urges the international community to act in a more just and effective manner. The approaching elections are likely to heighten his interest in developing climate-oriented cooperation with other countries, including Israel.

A dedicated bill and a special envoy: Israel wakes up to the call

In Israel, climate change is gradually becoming a high-priority issue. In recent years, civil society organizations were the ones taking a lead in educating the public, advancing policies and advocating for change. Governments were lagging, as was clearly spelled out in an October 2021 report by the State Comptroller on “National Climate Action by the Government of Israel”, which concluded that “Israel has yet to make the necessary perceptual shift to effectively deal with climate change”.

However, since taking office in June 2021, the current government has made several resolutions related to climate change and has set targets and actions for implementation. In May 2022, an important milestone was reached, with the approval in the government of a climate bill, championed by Environmental Protection Minister Tamar Zandberg.

Climate change is currently acknowledged in Israel as both a national security threat and an opportunity to develop regional cooperation with Muslim and Arab countries. For example. the security establishment is convening experts to finding paths to best address the climate-related security challenges. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appointed Ambassador Gideon Beharas a Special Envoy for Climate Change and Sustainability, a trilateral Israel-UAE-Jordan deal has been reached on the exchange of water and electricity, and President Isaac Herzog has established – shortly after being elected – the Israeli Climate Forum, which brings together all leading experts from multiple sectors to develop and advance joint initiatives and recommendations.

A foot into regional partnerships (ousted by old enmities)

President Herzog’s vision of a “renewed Middle East”, the activities of his Climate Forum, and his remarks – prior to visiting Ankara – about the need for a regional partnership to deal with climate change, are of interest to Turkey. This is partly since Turkey is not a member of the current regional frameworks in which Israel participates in the Mediterranean, e.g. the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the Cypriot governmental initiative to coordinate climate change activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey feels that these initiatives isolate it in the region and that they do not have real interest in its inclusion. A new Cypriot proposal to establish a regional framework to deal with summer wildfires has also been recently presented to Greece and Israel, but not to Turkey.

In Israel, there has been recent discussion of turning the EMGF into a forum dealing with renewable energies, or energy in general, and not only natural gas. This is a result of difficulties in profitable cooperation in the natural gas field and the increased importance of renewable energies. So far, the EMGF has yielded policy benefits for its member states and facilitated cooperation among them, but it has not yielded significant fruits regarding its original purpose – maximizing the profits of natural gas discoveries.

Each EMGF member has veto power over adding new members or observers. For example, the Palestinian Authority has torpedoed the United Arab Emirates’s request to be accepted as an observer in the forum. Turkey does not believe Greece and Cyprus would accept its membership. To a lesser extent, there is a similar Turkish perception about Egypt. Even if the Hellenic states were willing to include Turkey, Turkey would likely demand representation for Turkish-Cypriots as well, a condition that Cyprus and Greece are not expected to accept.

Out with the old, in with the new

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of upgrading the EMGF into an inclusive regional framework also dedicated to environmental issues does not seem feasible at this stage. Establishment of a new forum, built from its onset as a partnership among all countries of the region, stands a better chance of success since it would not be perceived as directed against any regional actor. This could enable Turkey, Cyprus and Greece a measure of political flexibility, as has been the case with other regional frameworks that they joined upon establishment, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

Such a move could be jump started with an Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian meeting on environmental and climate issues. This would have been considered impossible until recently, but it now appears more feasible given the cautious attempts by Egypt and Turkey to improve their relations. Israel can play a role in promoting such a meeting, albeit initially on an informal level, with a focus on promoting regional dialogue ahead of COP27 scheduled for late 2022 in Egypt.

Another new opportunity for regional cooperation on climate change issues is the parallel warming of relations between Israel and Turkey and Turkey and the UAE. From an economic point of view, trilateral projects are already reportedly being discussed, and an Israeli-Turkish-Emirati summit on environmental and climate issues can also be advanced. In this case, there is less sensitivity than there is with Egypt – especially in light of Erdoğan’s successful visit to the Emirates – and a gathering of officials from the three countries should be possible early on in the process.

It is important to include the Palestinian issue in any discussion of regional cooperation on climate and the environment. The Palestinian issue is important to Turkey, and, as part of warming relations with Israel, the country has an interest in finding new ways to help the Palestinians and advance Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Çavuşoğlu clearly stated that during his press conference with Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid, and environmental issues could be part of a positive agenda that serves the interests of all parties. Pro-peace Israeli ministers and MKs consider climate change as an important topic for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, as was evident by Minister Zandberg’s meeting with her Palestinian counterpart in Ramallah, and by a special conference convened in the Knesset by MK Emilie Moatti.

Trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Turkish cooperation on climate change can be encouraged, with the first step being a meeting of the three relevant ministers.

Bilateral to-do list

In addition to the regional aspects, Israel and Turkey should launch bilateral cooperation on climate change, which could include:

1) Convening a regular government-to-government annual meeting for strategic dialogue on climate and energy issues – alternating between Israel and Turkey.

2) Establishing a direct channel between Turkey’s Chief Climate Negotiator and Israel’s Special Envoy for Climate Change and Sustainability and developing ongoing contact between relevant professionals in government ministries, exchange of knowledge, coordination and joint work.

3) Providing mutual assistance in the event of exceptional climate events (fires, flooding, etc.) and the launch of a climate hotline, preferably with participation of other Mediterranean countries. In the past, private entrepreneurs were the ones enabling cooperation on such issues, but with the warming of relations – the state apparatus should be the one taking the lead.

4) Linking Turkey’s Climate Council and the Israeli Climate Forum, in a way that enables joint events, initiatives, deliberations and sharing best practices. Leaders of the two entities can meet on a regular semi-annual basis, and a webinar for all participants could be organized, for mutual acquaintance, to learn about official and unofficial efforts conducted within each country to tackle climate change, and to discuss together pressing climate issues in the lead-up to COP27.

5) Creating a joint platform for civil society organizations from both countries that are interested in environmental projects and tackling climate change, possibly under the umbrella of the Turkish-Israeli Civil Society Forum.

6) Encouraging Israeli and Turkish companies to cooperate on climate-related CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) and ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) criteria, under the possible umbrella of the Israel-Turkey Business Council.

(7) Encouraging academic cooperation in the fields of environment and sustainability, which will include conferences, research as well as faculty and student exchanges. This could be done through the signing of Memorandum of Understandings between universities, exchange of students and staff via the EU’s Erasmus+ higher education mobility program, joint research projects through the Horizon Europe research and innovation program.

Climate change is already reshaping the international system, creating common interests, and fostering cooperation between countries that used to be at odds. Israel-Turkey relations stand to benefit from this trend. Tackling climate change can become a central pillar in a new chapter of relations, bringing benefits not only to the citizens of both countries, but potentially also to the region as a whole.

This article is from “ISPI“, from June 23, 2022

הפוסט Climate change can help bring Israel and Turkey closer הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Cavusoglu, who is expected to be accompanied by energy minister Fatih Donmez, is scheduled to meet his counterpart Yair Lapid on Wednesday, a day after holding talks with Palestinian officials.

Energy sector cooperation is expected to top the agenda, with Ankara expressing its willingness for a partnership between Israel and Turkey in a project that could carry Israeli natural gas to Turkey, and then potentially on to Europe.

But a wider issue is also expected to be discussed –  the re-establishment of diplomatic ties at the ambassador level, after Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador in 2018, following the Israeli killing of almost 60 Palestinians in protests against the opening of a United States embassy to Israel in Jerusalem.

That was the culmination of a continuing period of poor relations, which had been difficult since the late 2000s. The two countries traded frequent accusations over Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and treatment of Palestinians, as well as Ankara’s support for Hamas, which governs the blockaded Gaza Strip.

They have also disagreed over various other regional issues, such as the 2013 coup in Egypt, the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, the 2019 withdrawal of US troops from Syria and Turkey’s military operations in the same country.

Yet it appears as if the two sides are willing to overlook this. In March, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, who predominantly holds a ceremonial position, made a landmark visit to the Turkish capital, Ankara – the first such visit since Shimon Peres’ trip in 2007.

Herzog and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan both said they wanted to normalise ties, with Erdogan also stressing the importance of energy cooperation between the governments going forward.

Phone conversations and letters between the two leaders have followed since, despite Erdogan’s often forthright public condemnation of Israeli actions against the Palestinians.

Taha Ozhan, the former chairman of the Turkish parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said that Turkey and Israel’s current goal is to establish efficient diplomatic ties again and see if it is possible to work together in certain areas thereafter.

“Turkey and Israel are aware that there is a need for them to talk to each other over regional issues, from Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean to issues related to the Arabian Gulf,” Ozhan, who is also an academic at the Ankara Institute, told Al Jazeera.

“However, much more time is needed for them to establish trust and work together in foreign policy areas, amid so many disagreements and considering the situation of Palestinians is only getting worse,” Ozhan said.

He added: “Restoring diplomatic relations might be an initial step for more dialogue and eventually lead to establishment of a positive policy agenda and deeper ties. No one should expect a shortcut to normalisation … especially during the election year in Turkey.”

Potential energy cooperation

Turkey’s desire to acquire Israeli natural gas was apparent in statements coming from Ankara even before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, a country both Turkey and Europe heavily rely on in terms of energy.

“We can use Israeli natural gas in our country, and beyond using it, we can also engage in a joint effort on its passage to Europe,” Erdogan said in February.

In another statement in March, he said “one of the most important steps we can take together for bilateral ties, I believe, would be natural gas,” adding that Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, whose government holds executive power in Israel, could visit Turkey as part of the process.

Erdogan and Bennett talked on the phone last November in the first such call in years.

According to Galip Dalay, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House in Britain, cooperation among other Eastern Mediterranean countries, namely Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, has motivated Ankara to fix its ties with the latter two.

“Turkey does not want countries around it to align themselves with Greece and Cyprus because of their own disputes or frustrations with Turkey. This seems to be why Ankara is reaching out to Egypt, Israel and even to the United Arab Emirates to fix strained relations,” he said.

“The reason for the cooperation among these governments, which puts Turkey in a lonely position, is not the conversion of their interests, but their anti-Turkey positions,” he told Al Jazeera.

But even if Turkey and Israel’s positions do become closer, it does not mean that a deal is around the corner, nor that Tel Aviv will abandon Greece and Cyprus.

Nimrod Goren, the chairman of the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, told Al Jazeera that cooperation over a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Israel is still not likely any time soon.

“Energy cooperation with Turkey is important for Israel and has much potential, but it does not need to be on the natural gas front,” Goren said.

“Israel has other regional partners in natural gas, such as Greece, Cyprus and Egypt,” he said, adding that Israel would be more comfortable cooperating in other areas with Ankara, such as renewable energy.

East Mediterranean rivalry

Turkey and the breakaway self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognised only by Ankara since 1983, have been at odds with European Union members Greece and Cyprus over energy resources and jurisdiction in the waters in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The internationally recognised government of Cyprus has signed exclusive economic zone agreements with Egypt and Israel and handed hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licences to international companies since the 2000s.

In response, Turkey signed similar agreements with the TRNC and Libya in 2011 and 2019 respectively.

Turkish and Greek vessels have explored for hydrocarbons in the disputed waters between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus over the last few years, leading to increased tensions between Athens and Ankara.

Stormy relations

Taha Ozhan said that economic and trade relations between Israel and Turkey have historically carried on, despite the political problems that have existed.

“Both countries have been rational on the matter of the economy in the past. Energy ties should be evaluated in this context,” he said, adding that a wider deal in the Eastern Mediterranean would create benefits for the whole region.

Goren agrees that the Israeli and Turkish governments have been able to protect their diplomatic ties, and that, despite the tensions over the years, trade and tourism between the two countries were still at high levels.

“These [trade and tourism] are all far from the potential they can reach and fulfilling that potential can be achieved through moving to the ambassador level,” he said.

“The Palestinian-Israeli issue has always been the stumbling block impacting the level of Israeli-Turkish relations, but the sides should discuss how to contain their differences when dealing with each other,” Goren added.

Ties between Turkey and Israel have been shaky since the 2008-2009 Gaza War and the death of 10 civilians in an Israeli raid on the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship, part of a flotilla trying to breach the blockade on Gaza by carrying aid into the territory in 2010.

After years of frozen ties, a 2016 reconciliation agreement saw the return of ambassadors, but it collapsed in the wake of the Israeli response to the 2018-2019 border protests in Gaza, in which more than 200 Palestinians were killed.

Turkey recalled its diplomats and ordered Israel’s envoy out of the country in 2018, as bilateral relations hit another low.

This article is from “Al Jazeera“, from May 24, 2022

הפוסט Turkey FM visit to Israel a sign relations are warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Erdogan has clearly expressed his country’s interest in natural gas imports from Israel, most recently at a March 9 news conference, alongside visiting Israeli President Herzog. Both sides understand full-well the two intertwined aspects of the energy issue: economic-energetic and diplomatic-strategic.

In terms of energy, Turkey’s desire for imported Israeli gas is completely understandable. Turkey imports most of its energy needs – from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and elsewhere. Generally, about half or more of its energy imports originate in Russia and its desire to diversify its supply sources is understandable. This is particularly germane given the war in Ukraine and the West’s efforts to wean itself from dependence on the Russian energy market.

Turkey seeks to preserve and improve its global positioning by bolstering its standing as a key passageway for energy transport in a shifting geopolitical reality. The natural gas discovered in Israeli EEZ offers a clear energy resource, especially given its location almost next door. The limited economic profitability that undermined previous negotiations on gas purchases from Israel could change, given the newly emerging circumstances.

Both sides realize the diplomatic aspect, as mentioned, is an inseparable part of the economic-energetic one. Israel and other actors in the region took advantage of the prolonged chill in relations with Turkey to consolidate a rather impressive regional architecture, which in essence excluded Turkey from the regional game. Ankara only realized this belatedly and embarked on largely successful intensive diplomatic efforts to improve ties with a series of regional players – Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Its goal is to reclaim its previous central position in the region and enhance (once again) it standing on the two core issues of Turkish national interest: their relationship with Greece with its myriad disputes, and the Cypriot problem.

The regional structures built in recent years – trilateral cooperation between Israel and the Hellenic states, and between Israel and Egypt, within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – have weakened Turkey’s negotiating hand and undermined its regional standing, thwarting its ambition to expand its influence. Nonetheless, Turkey remains a significant regional player, and ignoring it does not bode well for the area’s stability.

Its importance has been highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the West, particularly the US, have recognized this. At the same time, Israel has made it clear that efforts to improve ties with Turkey would not be made at the expense of the close relationships it has built in recent years with Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Israeli gas exports thus clash with this stance, at least right now.

HOW, THEN, can this circle be squared in order to move ahead on both aspects of the Israel-Turkey relationship? Following is a package of proposed measures designed to provide momentum and a diplomatic-energetic horizon toward which both sides can proceed.

Clarification of national interests

Each side must lay out its clear interests in a frank, in-depth manner. Israel aspires to move ahead with its relations with Turkey, albeit not at the expense of its strategic relationship with its regional allies – Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Gas exports to Turkey in the immediate term are not possible (without a shift or progress on the two key disputed issues mentioned above). The reason is fairly clear: The possible routes for shipping gas from Israel to Turkey traverse Cypriot economic waters and Israel would be unwilling at this point to damage the close relationship forged with its neighbor (and within the trilateral Hellenic alliance).

The second possible route goes through the economic water of Lebanon and Syria, and is a non-starter in any case. The renewal of a diplomatic-strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey is in its infancy, and the disagreements and mistrust cannot be overcome overnight. Turkey strives to integrate into the regional architecture shaped in recent years in a position worthy of its stature. Gas exports from Israel are therefore vital for Turkey, both in energetic and diplomatic terms.

Finding a formula for Turkey’s integration into the regional architecture: Substantial progress in Turkey’s relations with its neighbors obviously cannot be expected at this stage, especially not prior to next year’s elections in Turkey (and Cyprus). At the same time, Turkey’s exclusion from the regional gas forum, a framework that clearly illustrates the new regional architecture, cannot continue. Some sort of formula is required signaling the start of a course correction. To that end, a bilateral mechanism pointing to the direction of relations down the line would be advisable.

This would consist of a series of high-level diplomatic dialogues between Turkey and the states with which it is engaged in smile diplomacy, meaning, Israel, Egypt and Greece (and Cyprus in a more indirect way). Its goal (and branding) would be to examine the most effective way to integrate Turkey into regional activity in a manner serving both Turkey and the region. The desired goal: a serious diplomatic-political dialogue designed to identify practical ways to reverse Turkey’s exclusion from regional activity. Israel could play a key role in advancing such dialogue.

The establishment of an Israeli-Turkish working team in the energy field: The work of such a team should focus on two issues. The first is the question of future Israeli natural gas exports to Turkey. Practical questions must be discussed pending policy circumstances that will enable such exports – what quantities can be expected, how they will be conveyed (pipeline, shipping, liquefaction facilities), their price level, etc.

The second issue with which the team should deal is possible renewable energy cooperation in the immediate-to-near term. The demand for natural gas is high and understandable, but this does not eliminate the green agenda, certainly that of consumers in Europe. As a rule, regional cooperation in the field of renewable energy is perceived as softer, attractive and even practical, in a way that does not require far-reaching understandings (and conditions) at this early stage of the relationship improvement process.

The establishment of a trilateral Israeli, Turkish and European energy working group: Such trilateral dialogue would connect the European Union to the Israeli-Turkish discourse, illustrating Turkey’s central role in the European, energy and diplomatic-political agenda. After all, the EU is the most important player, alongside Washington (and perhaps even more so) vis-a-vis Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean in general.

Ultimately, this is the beginning of a process, albeit challenging and complex, and both sides should be warned that these are not developments and agreements that can be reached immediately. At the same time, it is essential to adopt a work plan adapted to the political reality and political schedule of the relevant players – a plan serving as an engine for combined political and energy momentum.

This article is from “JPost“, from May 23, 2022

הפוסט Turkish FM’s visit to Israel is a chance to unify politics- energy momentum – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Erdogan has clearly expressed his country’s interest in natural gas imports from Israel, most recently at a March 9 news conference, alongside visiting Israeli President Herzog. Both sides understand full-well the two intertwined aspects of the energy issue: economic-energetic and diplomatic-strategic.

In terms of energy, Turkey’s desire for imported Israeli gas is completely understandable. Turkey imports most of its energy needs – from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and elsewhere. Generally, about half or more of its energy imports originate in Russia and its desire to diversify its supply sources is understandable. This is particularly germane given the war in Ukraine and the West’s efforts to wean itself from dependence on the Russian energy market.

Turkey seeks to preserve and improve its global positioning by bolstering its standing as a key passageway for energy transport in a shifting geopolitical reality. The natural gas discovered in Israeli EEZ offers a clear energy resource, especially given its location almost next door. The limited economic profitability that undermined previous negotiations on gas purchases from Israel could change, given the newly emerging circumstances.

Both sides realize the diplomatic aspect, as mentioned, is an inseparable part of the economic-energetic one. Israel and other actors in the region took advantage of the prolonged chill in relations with Turkey to consolidate a rather impressive regional architecture, which in essence excluded Turkey from the regional game. Ankara only realized this belatedly and embarked on largely successful intensive diplomatic efforts to improve ties with a series of regional players – Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Its goal is to reclaim its previous central position in the region and enhance (once again) it standing on the two core issues of Turkish national interest: their relationship with Greece with its myriad disputes, and the Cypriot problem.

The regional structures built in recent years – trilateral cooperation between Israel and the Hellenic states, and between Israel and Egypt, within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – have weakened Turkey’s negotiating hand and undermined its regional standing, thwarting its ambition to expand its influence. Nonetheless, Turkey remains a significant regional player, and ignoring it does not bode well for the area’s stability.

Its importance has been highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the West, particularly the US, have recognized this. At the same time, Israel has made it clear that efforts to improve ties with Turkey would not be made at the expense of the close relationships it has built in recent years with Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Israeli gas exports thus clash with this stance, at least right now.

HOW, THEN, can this circle be squared in order to move ahead on both aspects of the Israel-Turkey relationship? Following is a package of proposed measures designed to provide momentum and a diplomatic-energetic horizon toward which both sides can proceed.

Clarification of national interests

Each side must lay out its clear interests in a frank, in-depth manner. Israel aspires to move ahead with its relations with Turkey, albeit not at the expense of its strategic relationship with its regional allies – Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Gas exports to Turkey in the immediate term are not possible (without a shift or progress on the two key disputed issues mentioned above). The reason is fairly clear: The possible routes for shipping gas from Israel to Turkey traverse Cypriot economic waters and Israel would be unwilling at this point to damage the close relationship forged with its neighbor (and within the trilateral Hellenic alliance).

The second possible route goes through the economic water of Lebanon and Syria, and is a non-starter in any case. The renewal of a diplomatic-strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey is in its infancy, and the disagreements and mistrust cannot be overcome overnight. Turkey strives to integrate into the regional architecture shaped in recent years in a position worthy of its stature. Gas exports from Israel are therefore vital for Turkey, both in energetic and diplomatic terms.

Finding a formula for Turkey’s integration into the regional architecture: Substantial progress in Turkey’s relations with its neighbors obviously cannot be expected at this stage, especially not prior to next year’s elections in Turkey (and Cyprus). At the same time, Turkey’s exclusion from the regional gas forum, a framework that clearly illustrates the new regional architecture, cannot continue. Some sort of formula is required signaling the start of a course correction. To that end, a bilateral mechanism pointing to the direction of relations down the line would be advisable.

This would consist of a series of high-level diplomatic dialogues between Turkey and the states with which it is engaged in smile diplomacy, meaning, Israel, Egypt and Greece (and Cyprus in a more indirect way). Its goal (and branding) would be to examine the most effective way to integrate Turkey into regional activity in a manner serving both Turkey and the region. The desired goal: a serious diplomatic-political dialogue designed to identify practical ways to reverse Turkey’s exclusion from regional activity. Israel could play a key role in advancing such dialogue.

The establishment of an Israeli-Turkish working team in the energy field: The work of such a team should focus on two issues. The first is the question of future Israeli natural gas exports to Turkey. Practical questions must be discussed pending policy circumstances that will enable such exports – what quantities can be expected, how they will be conveyed (pipeline, shipping, liquefaction facilities), their price level, etc.

The second issue with which the team should deal is possible renewable energy cooperation in the immediate-to-near term. The demand for natural gas is high and understandable, but this does not eliminate the green agenda, certainly that of consumers in Europe. As a rule, regional cooperation in the field of renewable energy is perceived as softer, attractive and even practical, in a way that does not require far-reaching understandings (and conditions) at this early stage of the relationship improvement process.

The establishment of a trilateral Israeli, Turkish and European energy working group: Such trilateral dialogue would connect the European Union to the Israeli-Turkish discourse, illustrating Turkey’s central role in the European, energy and diplomatic-political agenda. After all, the EU is the most important player, alongside Washington (and perhaps even more so) vis-a-vis Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean in general.

Ultimately, this is the beginning of a process, albeit challenging and complex, and both sides should be warned that these are not developments and agreements that can be reached immediately. At the same time, it is essential to adopt a work plan adapted to the political reality and political schedule of the relevant players – a plan serving as an engine for combined political and energy momentum.

The op-ed was published in The Jerusalem Post on May 2022.

הפוסט Turkish FM’s visit to Israel is a chance to unify politics-energy momentum – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

If So, How Do We Proceed From Here?

First, it is crucial to remember that the two countries came to the intersection from different directions and with different expectations. The past few months, Turkey has initiated a series of moves aimed at improving relations with countries in the region, including Israel, Egypt, and Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. There are a number of reasons for these attempts, including a number of issues with the economy, its current regional status, considering increased cooperation within the region over the past few years, and upcoming presidential elections. Turkey has succeeded in warming up diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, to a certain extent, with Saudi Arabia, and now with Israel as well. President Erdogan’s comments at the joint press conference with President Herzog emphasized his desire to open up a new chapter in relations, but they also well reflected his expectations: cooperation with Israel and rapid progress in the energy sector, and, most concretely, Israeli gas exports to Turkey. Israel has reached this political crossroads from a different direction. As a result of the new regional architecture in the eastern Mediterranean and the Abraham Accords with the Gulf states, Israel has a convenient position from a strategic and political perspective. In this regard, the agreements to export gas from Israel to Egypt and Jordan, as well as the establishment of the Regional Gas Forum (EMGF), are compelling examples. Israel has always seen Turkey as a very important regional player with whom improving relations is in Israel’s interest as well as in the interests of the region. During the last decade, there have been significant changes in the relations between Israel and Turkey: the mutual interests that used to exist have diminished and weakened, and trust between the two countries has declined substantially. As a result, President Herzog’s visit and the return of political dialogue at the highest levels mark a positive and refreshing step forward. This state requires careful and measured conduct, as well as the necessary coordination of expectations, to avoid disappointment, or crisis, from the beginning.

From an Israeli point of view, two non-trivial challenges are required at the political level: building trust between the two governments and re-formulating the meetings of interests between the two countries. This is a complex, but certainly possible, process that requires strenuous work in the near term. It is obvious to both parties that cooperation in the energy field requires agreements on the economic level (price of the gas, rout and other expenses), but more importantly: on the political-strategic level as well. In other words, this is not just an ordinary economic product, but one that is extremely important in its political foundation, some would actually call it a precondition. In light of the circumstances in the eastern Mediterranean, and in view of the deep disagreements, it seems that this is an issue related to sovereignty for key players in the region, including Turkey. It cannot be ignored. As part of Israel-Turkey’s political dialogue, it is important to discuss the recent institutional developments in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean in a serious, comprehensive, and honest manner.

Israel has already emphasized that its relations with Turkey won’t be developed on the expense of those with Greece and Cyprus. The same is considering its relations with Egypt. The inclusion of Turkey within the regional exercise is of a vital importance and necessity, but let us be honest, this is a real challenge, which requires a creative dialogue, and as stated, on the base of renewed trust. It is an achievable task.

The war in Ukraine poses a serious challenge to the international system in general. In our case, Israel and Turkey are each faced with complex dilemmas in this regard, and for the most part, there are considerable similarities in the way they deal with and debate it. It is of vital importance for both of them to analyze what kind of common understanding could arise for them facing this enormous crisis.

Thus, the two countries are at a crossroads of fascinating and promising opportunities. The renewed dialogue should be conducted calmly and sensibly, despite the troubling times and the urge to move forward quickly in order to avoid premature crises. By the way, returning ambassadors to the two capitals is a necessary first step, and one that doesn’t cost too much.

The op-ed was published in Turkish Policy in April 2022.

הפוסט President Herzog’s Visit to Turkey: How to Proceed? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Energetic dreams

The red carpet at Erdoğan’s palatial Presidential Complex in Ankara had not yet been rolled back when Turkish newspapers reported that Fatih Dönmez, the county’s energy minister, would soon visit Israel to discuss future cooperation in the energy sphere.

Since the beginning of 2022, Erdoğan has hinted that relations with Israel might significantly improve very soon. His rhetoric has connected the restoration of ties to a revival of the idea of bringing Mediterranean gas from Israel to Europe via Turkey. In 2016, Turkey and Israel discussed ways to import Israeli gas to Europe. But the negotiations quickly collapsed due to Turkey’s sharp criticism of Israeli policies in the Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem.

In December 2018, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece struck the EastMed pipeline agreement to transport gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe, helping EU countries meet their aim of reducing their energy dependence on Russia. Turkey was an ardent critic of the EastMed deal, and when Washington earlier this year withdrew its support from the project, Ankara said it was never viable or realistic.

Gabi Mitchell, an expert on Eastern Mediterranean energy and geopolitics and director of undergraduate studies at the University of Notre Dame at Tantur, told The Media Line that although the Turks are eager to promote projects in the sphere of gas with Israel, the prospects of such cooperation are and always were doubtful.

“Even before the visit, there were statements coming from Turkey about common projects in the sphere of energy. In 2016, the two sides agreed to discuss this issue. The talks finally failed in 2018. The Turks and the Israelis said they couldn’t agree on costs, but for Israel, there was also a concern about bypassing Cyprus,” said Mitchell. “The situation is not much different today, even if the EU is experiencing an exceptional situation and we might potentially witness a change of direction due to the current crisis in the energy sphere. Nevertheless, the Europeans will still be concerned about hurting the Cypriots and, at the end of the day, Europe is interested in switching from gas to renewable energy. Of course, there are also other available options on the market.”

Presidential elections in Turkey are scheduled to take place on or before June 18, 2023. Over the past few years, Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis. Criticism against Erdoğan grew significantly as the prices of food staples and oil soared and the government seemed unable to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mitchell believes that while Erdoğan is eager to show results and achievements during an election year, Israel should weigh all the pros and cons carefully and not rush into potentially risky commitments.

“First of all, a lot of Israeli liquid natural gas is supplied to Turkey through Egypt. We already provide for some of their needs. Also, Israel will need some time to realize the volume of normalization of relations. The elections are next year. For now, Israel can afford to wait and see who will run Turkey and how relations will develop,” he concludes.

Will Erdoğan drop Hamas for Israel?

Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad – two Palestinian terrorist organizations –condemned Herzog’s visit to Ankara, but Hamas leaders refrained from explicitly criticizing Turkey over the visit. Hamas political bureau deputy head Saleh al-Arouri and other top figures in the organization operate from Turkey. Many moved there from Damascus when the civil war broke out. A joke making the rounds in Gaza this week had it that if Erdoğan were to expel Hamas leaders from Turkey, they would have to search for a home on another planet. The experts warn, however, that despite the rapprochement with Israel, the Turkish president’s policies vis-à-vis Palestinian Islamists remain unchanged for now.

“According to some in the Turkish media, Erdoğan has secured better relations with the Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel without changing his core policies on Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood at large,” Dr. Assa Ofir, a historian of the modern Middle East and an expert on Turkish affairs, told The Media Line. “Some of the media continue to spread antisemitism and incitement against Israel. Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting, will start on April 1 in close proximity to two Jewish holidays – Purim and Passover – and the tensions in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza might grow. How will Turkey behave in case of another flare-up between Israel and the Palestinians? Will it slide back into its familiar anti-Israeli rhetoric or stay away? This Ramadan will present an opportunity to test the revived relations between the two countries,” Ofir said.

So, while the politicians were hailing a “turning point” in Turkish-Israeli relations, many questions remain unanswered for now, and many potential bumps in the road could be just around the corner. But it seems that after more than a decade of hostility, there is now political will on both sides to allow some space to work out problematic issues and regain some of the trust that was lost years ago.

The op-ed was published in themedialine on March 2022.

הפוסט Ramadan Will Test Budding Israel-Turkey Relations: Expert הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to offer his mediation services, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was preparing for his own conversation with the Russian president urging him to end the war immediately, allow for a ceasefire and negotiations, and enable civilian evacuations. The Turkish president also offered to host a meeting between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu orchestrated a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Erdogan had offered to act as a mediator already in early February during his visit to Ukraine amid threats of a Russian invasion.

The Turkish mediation efforts are in line with policies Erdogan adopted at the end of his first decade in power, with Ahmet Davutoglu serving as his foreign minister. Turkey was branded as a state that aspires to play regional and global mediator roles, as this being a cornerstone of its new foreign policy. Although Turkish mediation did not yield many tangible results at the time, it remained in the toolbox of Turkish diplomacy, and currently serves to preserve Turkey’s important relations with Russia and Ukraine alike. Although Turkey is increasingly leaning towards Ukraine’s side and shows signs of distancing itself from Russia since the invasion, as expressed in public statements and in restricting warship passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Ankara seeks to maintain its relations with Moscow.

These ties are far from being exemplary for Turkey. Russia’s decision to intervene in the Syrian war in 2015 prompted concerns in Ankara and led to a crisis in relations following Turkey’s downing of a Russian military jet. The two countries differ on key regional issues, chief among them Syria and Libya. Turkey fears these differences could result in Russian moves, for example, military activity in Syria’s Idlib region that would send waves of refugees to its borders.

Despite their disagreements, Turkey and Russia maintain important cooperation. Turkey imports a significant portion of its natural gas and wheat from Russia. Turkey has also been talking to Russia about defense procurement (S-400 systems), despite its membership in NATO and US opposition. Turkey also relies heavily on Russian tourism, which constitutes a significant portion of its incoming tourism flows. Reflecting this reliance, tourism was one of the issues which Russia’s ambassador to Cyprus raised with his hosts in response to their opposition to the Russian invasion. “Summer is coming up, you’ve closed your airspace – you shot yourselves in the foot,” he said. “Where will Cyprus get its Russian tourists from? They won’t come, they will go to Turkey, is that what you want? For them to go spend their money over there [Turkey]?” Over 4.5 million Russian tourists visited Turkey in 2021, an asset which Ankara would not wish to relinquish.

Nonetheless, Turkey also values its relations with Ukraine and was quick to recognize its independence in the 1990s. Ukraine is also a significant source of tourism for Turkey (some 2 million in 2021), and their varied business dealings include Turkey’s sale of the Bayraktar drones that feature in Ukraine’s attacks on the Russian invaders these days. Turkey has been expressing its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the incursion began, supplying it with humanitarian aid and urging NATO and the West to upgrade their support for Kyiv. Turkey’s foreign and defense ministers held talks with their Ukrainian counterparts, and Turkey eventually acceded to Ukraine’s request regarding Russian naval passage through the straits. However, Turkey opposes sanctions on Russia, arguing that these would not help and simply delay resolution of the core problems between the sides.

Erdogan is gearing up for elections in 2023, facing complex political challenges and an economy in crisis. A crisis with Russia could further challenge Turkey’s economy and Erdogan’s prospects. A Russian tourism boycott of Turkey following the 2015 downing of the Russian jet demonstrated the repercussions of such a move and Erdogan is keen to avoid a repeat of that scenario. However, he also wants to demonstrate equity in NATO and the West, as well as foreign policy achievements following some tough years in that arena.

In the Russia-Ukraine context, Turkey’s mediation efforts are consistent with Erdogan’s other regional diplomatic moves, mainly promoting dialogue and seeking positive agendas. This is a different approach than the one we have become accustomed to seeing from the Turkish president, who in recent years tended to highlight divisive issues and raise tensions with neighboring countries. The new approach was recently reflected in Erdogan’s successful visit to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey’s dialogue with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the warming of relations with Israel. This is a positive construct, which will enable Israel to derive more diverse benefits from restoring relations with Turkey than it could in the past, both at the bilateral and regional levels. And who knows, these developments might even encourage Israel and Turkey to promote their own respective peace processes, while trying to mediate the conflicts of others.

The op-ed was published in JPost in March 2022

הפוסט As Israel-Turkey relations shift, attention turns to Russia and Ukraine – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The most ambitious structure is, of course, the Regional Gas Forum, which was founded in January 2019 with 8 members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, Italy, Palestine, and France, and two observers – the European Union and the United States. Lebanon was invited to take part in the creative project, but Israeli membership and the complex internal-external arena in Lebanon prevented the move, that was quite clear that the Lebanese had a genuine interest in. Truth be told, the player who was absent from this political-strategic process – Turkey – was, to a considerable extent, the “glue” that helped formulate this impressive architecture. Moreover, its uniqueness stems perhaps from two main aspects: one, pertains to substantial encounters of interests, identified between most of these actors; and the second, it is a regional framework that the initiative to establish was from the region and without linkage to any conflict, with an emphasis of course on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Now, at the beginning of 2022, the East Mediterranean is facing an improved base, with proven potential for cooperation, but at the same time is facing a double challenge: how to deepen cooperation between its members; and how to produce an open and positive dialogue with the missing player – Turkey. Initially, it seems an impossible task, especially given the fact that the Turkish policy in recent years is seen as provocative by most (if not all) other players in the region. On the other hand, it is now clearer for Turkey and its adversaries, that an intensive and creative effort needs to be made to create a mechanism or some framework, that will allow for a political-strategic dialogue contributing to stability in the region. Turkey has felt uneasy and resentful, in the face of its exclusion from regional frameworks, and in recent months has tried to improve its relations with few countries in the region – Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The difficulties at home, in the economic and political arena, play a significant role.

So, is it possible to find meeting points that will enable for a comprehensive process in the East Mediterranean, despite the deep disagreements between many actors? Clearly, this is a challenging task, one that may have been doomed to failure from the beginning. However, in view of the danger of escalation and miscalculation, in a region prone for that, it is necessary to try producing a political discourse that will help the dynamics that have already been cast in the region.

First, we should have in mind four main insights:

Many countries in the region have rightly recognized the promising potential that developments in the region have created and managed to produce close relationships. These now seem obvious, but this was not the case a decade ago. The Israeli – Greek – Cypriot Triangle is a clear example of identifying correctly the common interests arise, adopting the necessary policy to build a solid and close trust, and deepen their bilateral and as well trilateral relations. Similar process was taken between Israel and Egypt, bilaterally and regionally.

The regional process, described above, was largely led by the countries of the region themselves, in a way that showcased the potential and significance of the region for the International Arena.

The Abraham Accords have created a potential common denominator between (some) of the Gulf states and those of the eastern part of the Middle East. Although it is too early to judge whether it will be possible to find practical meetings of interests that will strengthen the cooperation between the two sub-regions, it seems that the potential exists. The arithmetic political framework in the East Med may be adopted to some extent: how about an Israeli – Emirati – Turkish triangle, not overriding bilateral channels, trying to build trust and identify common spheres for cooperation.

The discoveries of natural gas were a catalyst for the collaborations created but could equally drag the area into an escalating tension. However, what turns out, at least for the time being, is that the potential for energy cooperation is mostly regional. This can, albeit with immense difficulties, produce interesting interface points. Not to mention the great potential for cooperation on renewable, much needed field for creative and practical solutions, and less contentious.

Beyond that, it is worth adopting two main principles, which will help create an improved understanding:

The rules of international law as a main principle that should dictate the moves of all players in the region. A major point of contention between Turkey and all other players concerns the principles adopted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This will not be easily resolved of course. However, Israel, for example, is not a party to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but it agrees with its provisions and follows them, and was able to reach to agreements with its neighbors (though not yet with Lebanon) regarding their economic zones. In other words: even if it is (very) difficult to bridge the disputes in the region in this context, interim agreements, or informal understandings, should be found considering the overriding principle of respecting international law.

There is no a zero-sum game when it comes to relations between the countries of the region. Naturally, disagreements will remain in place at present stage, and meetings of strategic interests will also remain between some, or most, of the players in the region. This does not mean that one relationship should be conditioned, practically or rhetorically, on another. Israel has already made it clear that improving the political dialogue with Ankara will not come at the expense of the extremely close relationship and trust achieved with Greece and Cyprus. This will require considerable political maneuverability, but it is possible and achievable.  The key insight that emerges from the experience of the last decade in the Eastern Mediterranean is fascinating and challenging; it has been shown that countries in such a complex and multi-conflict region have been able to identify a strategic window of opportunity, overcome disputes and mistrust, and establish a promising regional framework, which is indeed at the beginning of its path. This challenge continues to be at their doorstep, creating a constructive discourse that develops paths for understandings and collaborations, even if not necessarily accompanied by the guise of a ” love affair.”

The op-ed was published in Turkish Policy in February 2022.

הפוסט Regional Architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean: Challenges and Opportunities at the Current Crossroads הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Surprisingly, Washington clarified its position in the past few days. The United States (US) Embassy in Athens issued a statement on January 10th that confirmed previous reports in the Greek media regarding a US withdrawal from support for the project. The statement said the US was diverting its support towards the planned connection of power cables between Egypt and Greece (and Africa), as well as the cable between Israel, Cyprus and Greece: “These projects will not only connect vital energy sectors, but will also help prepare the region for a transformation to clean energy.” At the same time, “the United States has remained strong in its support for efforts to promote regional cooperation, including in a three-plus-one framework, which includes Israel, Greece, Cyprus and the United States.”

It is probable that the main reason is due to the obvious impracticality of the project. As well, it should contribute to reducing tensions in the region, given the Turkish position. At the same time, US economic interest should not be ruled out, since its preference might be to sell more liquefied natural gas to Europe than it does now.

As mentioned, there was not much enthusiasm for the pipeline in Europe either, even though the EU funded a feasibility study. Already at the end of October 2021, a source in the European Commission defined the project as complicated and inconsistent with the long-term goals towards green energy.

What are the implications of the current American position?

It is quite clear that at this stage, it means freezing the project. It should be remembered that the main importance of the pipeline was political-strategic all along. It was an illustration, albeit a very pretentious one, of the triangle formed between Israel, Greece and Cyprus, and the energy potential of the region for Europe. This potential has been a significant catalyst for multiple common interests in a variety of fields. The Israeli-Greek-Cypriot triangle has also made a significant contribution to the regional architecture built in recent years, especially with the establishment of the Regional Gas Forum in January 2019. Actually, the Cypriot Minister of Energy is the current president of the forum, whose headquarters are in Cairo, Egypt.

Moreover, the regional export alternatives of natural gas have been established in recent years in the region (export agreements between Israel, Egypt and Jordan) and through the liquefaction facilities in Egypt. In other words, the practical feasibility of the EastMed pipeline has diminished, even without the EU’s green agenda.

Will this undermine the political-strategic cooperation in the Israeli-Greek-Cypriot triangle? Will the American-Hellenic relationship, which has become very close in recent years, be damaged? The answer to both questions is no. In many ways, the pretentious project of the gas pipeline accomplished its strategic mission.

Presumably, of the three countries participating in the project, Israel, Cyprus and Greece, the latter is the most disappointed. Israel is at the most advanced stage in terms of utilizing its gas reserves and Cyprus has managed to sign agreements with Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon (although the latter was not yet ratified by the Lebanese parliament) regarding its economic waters and has discovered gas reserves in its territory. Cyprus is in a frontal and extremely complicated confrontation with Turkey; however, it is a complex issue that shall not be discussed here. Greece has not been able to settle its deep and complex disagreements with Turkey over economic waters and is not close to it.

Nevertheless, the alliance formed between Israel and the Hellenic states is immeasurably more important than the feasibility or discontinuation of a project of this magnitude. The common interests, values and trust built between the three countries are one of the cornerstones of the regional relationships of the last decade.

Admittedly, Egypt is not upset with the US clarification, since it emphasized its prime attraction as an energy hub.

Ankara is clearly satisfied with the US position. It will strengthen its position even though it faces challenging obstacles, mainly a lack of confidence with most of the relevant actors in the region.

Nevertheless, the challenge of stabilizing tense relations in the eastern Mediterranean basin remains. It requires a more assertive US policy, which does not appear to be so now. An interesting test concerning US policy concerns the Lebanese angle: Will the gas supply from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon actually materialize? It seems that it will, especially after the US guarantee in recent days that this deal will not be harmed due to the sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. Will the US mediation in relation to the Israeli – Lebanese maritime borderline materialized? The question marks are much bigger. It remains to be seen in the coming few weeks.

**The article was published Jpost, 30 January 2022

הפוסט The EastMed pipeline accomplishes its strategic significance הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Thirty years on, his son, President Isaac Herzog, has an opportunity to play a central role in writing a new chapter in Israel-Turkey relations. In fact, Herzog has already started on this quest, establishing a positive and effective communications channel with President Erdogan since taking office last year, and apparently earning his trust.

Mutual trust has been sorely missing from Israel-Turkey relations in recent years, explaining Israeli reluctance to respond positively to Turkish overtures expressing willingness to improve relations, overtures that have turned in recent months into clear messages from Erdogan himself.

The successful outcome of the November 2021 crisis involving the detention of an Israeli couple in Istanbul, enabled through cooperation by officials on both sides, aided by senior government echelons, has contributed to rebuilding trust and opening a new and important channel between Erdogan and Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. Bennett is “conveying messages” and displaying “positive attitudes”, Erdogan recently said.

This increased openness toward Israel reflects a Turkish move to mend regional relations, as reflected in attempts to improve ties with the UAE, Egypt, Armenia, Greece and Saudi Arabia, too. Turkey has already signed extensive economic agreements with the UAE, and suggestions have emerged of future joint projects among Turkey, Israel and the UAE.

Ankara believes that tensions with the states of the region are hampering the conduct of Turkish foreign policy and, therefore, the various normalization efforts are expected to accelerate in 2022, according to a recent article by the Turkish think tank SETA. For Israel, these parallel diplomatic processes provide an opportunity to warm relations with Turkey with less concern about undermining its friendly relations with others in the region.

After all, as long as the UAE and Turkey were bitter enemies, and when tensions between Turkey and Egypt reached new heights, these countries would have misconstrued any Israeli move toward Turkey. As for Greece and Cyprus, Israel reached an agreement with Turkey in 2016 without damaging its important relations with the Hellenic states, and could presumably do so again.

However, as Israel and Turkey seek paths to draw closer, one must pay attention to the framing given to this development. In 2016, when Israel and Turkey resolved the crisis over their 2010 flotilla clash, the move was publicly presented as a step that will enable export of Israeli natural gas to Europe via Turkey. Now, with the withdrawal of US support for the EastMed gas pipeline from Israel to Europe via Cyprus and Greece, Turkey is once again stressing the potential for Israeli gas exports to Europe through its territory. For Israel, this is not a comfortable framing of ties with Ankara in terms of its relations with the Hellenic states.

Instead, Israel would do well to highlight other benefits of restoring relations with Turkey to ambassadorial level – advancing strategic dialogue on Syria and Iran, upgrading trade and tourism, expanding political and civilian cooperation, and leveraging ties with Turkey to advancing Israel’s relations with Muslim states and peace with the Palestinians.

President Herzog should thus accept President Erdogan’s invitation to Ankara. Ahead of his visit, he would do well to inform the Turkish President that he is saving a seat on his flight back for a new Turkish ambassador whom he would be honored to host. The time has come to turn the page in Israel-Turkey relations. And as was the case 30 years ago, a president from the Herzog family could help make it happen.

**The article was published on YNETNEWS, 28 January 2022

הפוסט Why Herzog is right to visit Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After a decade of excitement at the prospect of moving Israeli gas to Europe through the EastMed pipeline, the United States has pulled its support for the ambitious project. Some experts believe this news announcement caught Israel, Greece and Cyprus by surprise, and that it could affect the political map as well as the future of energy in the Mediterranean.

‘Expected, but still surprising’

“I believe that this announcement was surprising,” said Gabriel Mitchell, an expert on Eastern Mediterranean energy and geopolitics and director of undergraduate studies for the University of Notre Dame at Tantur in Jerusalem.

“The reason we know it’s surprising? Because the message came through some document that was actually a non-paper. It was not something official that came from the State Department, while it was expected that this kind of message would come from the US ambassador in Greece,” Mitchell told The Media Line.

“During the last week the ambassador had plenty of meetings with officials in Greece and in the US to reassure them that there is in fact no change in US policy,” he added.

Still, everyone knew that there are quite a few economic issues with this project, Mitchell said.

“During the past decade the Greeks, the Cypriots and even the Israelis talked very little about these challenges and used the idea of this project in order to advance their geopolitical interests. Also, the Europeans knew that the EastMed [pipeline] was difficult to implement, but still supported the idea, rather than pull out and upset the Greeks and the Cypriots,” he said.

The EastMed pipeline was designated under a European Commission regulation as a “Project of Common Interest” in 2013, and the commission contributed more than €34.5 million ($38.9 million) to complete technical, economic and environmental studies in 2015-2018.

In January 2020, the accord to construct the pipeline was signed in Athens by leaders of Greece, Cyprus and Israel. The pipeline was to be approximately 1,180 miles long and have a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters per year. Its cost was estimated at approximately €6 billion ($6.86 billion).

Michael Harari, a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a former ambassador to Cyprus, believes the Americans in their announcement said out loud something that everybody knew for a while, the project is not practical.

“Its importance was mainly political and it achieved its purpose – the alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus is very strong. The Americans believe that this announcement can contribute to alleviating tensions with Turkey, and there is also another consideration – the US also sells gas to Europe,” Harari told The Media Line.

“However, most importantly, the decision emerged from the understanding that this project is unrealistic and that the decision to pull out from it will not come at the expense of Greece and Cyprus,” he said.

Turkish delight

Ankara, which has long opposed the EastMed project, didn’t try to hide its pleasure at the news. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was quoted as saying that the American decision was based on the high cost of the pipeline.

“This project is not something that can happen. They [the United States] carried out all the analyses, and they saw it had no positive sides. In other words, the cost calculations don’t add up,” Erdoğan said, according to the Turkish NTV news channel.

He added that his country is still up to discussing the possibility of flowing Israeli gas to Europe through Turkey, and that Israeli President Isaac Herzog might soon visit Ankara.

Israeli-Turkish relations have been strained for the last few years due to Erdoğan’s support of Hamas and harsh criticism of the Jewish state. Recently, however, the Turkish president hinted that relations with Israel will get warmer “soon.”

Harari believes that while Jerusalem will welcome dialogue with Ankara, there will be no quick advancement of the project proposed by the Turks.

“The first reason is the low level of trust between the countries. Even if the ambassadors return [to Tel Aviv and Ankara], it will still take years to stabilize the relationship. And the second reason is that Israel, as well as Cyprus, directs its gas [from their offshore reservoirs] to Egypt. Of course, theoretically there is enough gas for everyone, but if Israel has to choose between Egypt and Turkey, it’s clear which one it will choose,” Harari said.

The future is in the cable

For now, it seems that by pulling the plug out of the EastMed project, the US is giving Turkey some diplomatic breathing space in order to mend the strategic relationships that went sour in recent years.

Meanwhile, Mitchell says that the Israeli-Hellenic alliance is strong and has a life of its own now.

“The ties are solid and many things are happening in this sphere. Israel’s Elbit [Systems defense electronics firm] signed a huge deal with the Greek army, there is trade, broad diplomatic and defense relations. And there is also the power cable project, which is no less significant, and the truth is that it will be even more significant than the gas streaming. The plan is to lay a 1,200-km.- [750-mile]-long power cable from Greece to Cyprus and Israel so that the partners can sell electricity to neighbors. If Israel needs more electricity, it could buy it from Europe,” Mitchell said.

The memorandum of understanding on the 1,200-km. EuroAsia Interconnector (EAI) was signed last year by the energy ministers of Israel, Cyprus and Greece. The project was also designated by the European Commission as a key “Project of Common Interest,” making it eligible for EU financing. The first phase is expected to be operational by 2025, when all three states will be linked to energy grids in Europe and in Asia.

“The success of the infrastructure projects is largely dependent on funding and timing. During this transition period between fossil fuels and green energy, the EU’s prioritization of renewables enabled the EAI to get off the ground,” Mitchell said.

“In contrast, Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons may be victims of the moment; technological advances enabled their discovery but market oversaturation and the rise of renewables have limited international interest in costly pipelines,” he said.

This article is from “The Media Line“, from January 23, 2022

הפוסט The EastMed Pipeline Is Dead, Long Live the EuroAsia Electricity Project הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The close relationship forged among Israel, Greece and Cyprus lies at the heart of this new regional architecture. The three countries correctly identified, with impressive speed, the emerging strategic opportunity and the bilateral and trilateral relationship has since developed at dizzying speed. The convergence of interests was translated into quick progress in forging relations at the highest levels. All three capitals were seized with a sense of urgency in striking while the iron was hot, both in light of tangible congruent interests, as well as concern that the window of opportunity opened by the chill between Israel and Turkey could soon close.

The flourishing Israeli-Greek-Cypriot relationship spans a variety of aspects. In terms of diplomacy, it facilitated the promotion of ties with the European Union (EU) and the US; in terms of security, it manifested itself in joint military maneuvers and defense contracts; economically, it resulted in the development of tourism, technology and innovation. It also manifested itself in energy-related issues with the development of offshore gas fields, a proposed gas pipeline to Europe and a link between their power grids. Cooperation on substantive civilian matters is just as important, among them education, research, and remembrance of the Holocaust and of the camps for displaced Jewish survivors on Cyprus prior to the establishment of the state, and more.

The successful Israeli-Hellenic model paved the way for other trilateral partnerships on the Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian axis and even on the Greek-Cypriot-Jordanian one. In January 2019 it served as a catalyst for forming the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which was an authentic attempt by its member states to form a regional cooperation framework. The forum consists of eight members – Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Italy, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and France, as well as two observers – the EU and US. The potential for energy cooperation was obviously the driving force for the creation of this forum, but over time most of its members seem to have developed relationships of trust,

A look at developments in the Eastern Mediterranean also highlights the tightening relationship between Israel and Egypt. The convergence of Israeli strategic interests with those of Egypt has generated impressive cooperation at the highest levels, which has expanded from the traditional security relationship between the two sides to the economic one, as well. Israel supported Egypt’s efforts to establish itself as a leader in the regional gas forum and it continues to cultivate cooperation and constant contacts in managing the Gaza arena. Nonetheless, the successful diplomatic-economic cooperation has so far failed to trickle down to the public level of Egyptian society.

The continuing chill in Israel-Turkey relations has had a key impact on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. While economic ties between the two countries are unaffected, high-level diplomatic contacts have been severed and the embassies are headed by second-tier diplomats rather than ambassadors. Turkey perceives the Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance and regional gas forum architecture as confrontational frameworks aimed at its isolation. Ankara made a certain effort to improve relations with Israel before the Biden Administration took office, but the move failed mainly because neither Turkey nor Israel displayed true willingness to bridge their differences. There has been a marked deterioration over recent years in the shared interests that bound these two countries together in the past, and Israel does not feel the need to invest too great an effort in strengthening ties with Ankara given current circumstances.

To round out the snapshot of relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, we must look to two additional members of the new regional framework – Jordan and the PA. Israel’s relationship with Jordan has experienced serious tensions and crises in recent years. In a welcome development, the new Israeli government is clearly making an effort to turn the page in relations with Amman. The Mediterranean framework could provide an additional arena for Jordan’s inclusion in a comfortable regional architecture, especially given Israel’s natural gas export agreement with Jordan that has gone into effect.

The EMGF is a multilateral cooperation framework that also brings together Israel and the PA. It can be used to advance shared projects of mutual value, including but not limited to energy issues, which could contribute to long-term trust and ties between the sides.

The past decade in the Eastern Mediterranean is an Israeli foreign policy success story in many respects, providing many opportunities. Nonetheless, Israel must be cognizant of the challenges it faces in this arena.

• Tensions between Turkey and states in the region. Ankara is clearly displeased with the new regional architecture. Feeling isolated, it has adopted an assertive and even aggressive policy manifested mostly in its attitude toward Greece and Cyprus and intervention in Libya. Although the sides do not appear interested in an escalation, its potential exists. It is therefore incumbent on these states to explore how they can integrate Turkey in some manner in the regional network. After all, Turkey is a highly significant actor in the Mediterranean and even beyond. Bringing Turkey into the fold is a challenge for the US and EU no less than for Israel. A dialogue with Turkey that directs disagreements to the negotiating table remains a vital need.
• The climate crisis. The Eastern Mediterranean is defined as a global hot spot for climate crisis implications. The wildfires that swept throughout the region recently offer just one illustration of the challenges ahead for the region, along with water shortages, declining fish stocks, political instability, waves of migration, intrusive species and more. Along with the challenges, the climate crisis also offers a unique opportunity for vital cooperation between the states of the region. The EU and the Biden Administration have placed the struggle against the climate crisis high on the international agenda. This issue should also be placed high on the regional agenda, including the obvious focus on renewable energies.
• Lebanon’s instability. The severe unprecedented crisis in Lebanon appears intractable, with the country facing imminent collapse. The involvement of external actors, chief among them Iran, greatly hampers efforts to unravel the domestic entanglement. Israeli-Lebanese negotiations on marking their economic waters could, perhaps, project favorably on the collapsing Lebanese economy and ease tensions, but current conditions clearly preclude any compromise. Israel would do well to consider use of the new regional system to help boost Lebanon’s stability, while keeping a low profile on the matter.
• Strengthening dialogue with the EU: The discovery of natural gas reserves and consolidation of the Eastern Mediterranean as a distinct region have enriched the dialogue vis-à-vis Europe. The future of proposed gas exports to Europe is uncertain, but there is clear potential for boosting Israeli-European discourse and cooperation on a myriad of economic and civilian issues. It is important to take advantage of the new regional potential to improve the EU’s image in Israel, as well as Israel’s image in European public opinion.

Time will tell whether Israel is successful in taking optimal advantage of the emerging Mediterranean architecture on its doorstep. Israel, which struggles with multiple identities and affinities (Western-European, Middle Eastern) could perhaps feel more at home in its Mediterranean identity and use it to advance integration and cooperation for its own benefit and that of all the actors in the region.

הפוסט Regional architecture that should be promoted in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Cyprus Relations

The State of Israel and Cyprus are similar in many respects – both feature island characteristics (in terms of geography and/or state of mind), both control natural gas reservoirs, and both endure a complex, prolonged national conflict. In addition to bilateral ties and partnerships, Israel and Cyprus are members of multilateral frameworks and alliances in the Mediterranean Basin, the most prominent being the trilateral alliance comprising Israel, Cyprus and Greece and the Cairo-based Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Israel and Cyprus cooperate on a wide variety of matters, among them security and military issues, tourism, energy and civil marriage. Their relations have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to ensure its interests in the Mediterranean Basin and realize its goals, such as maintaining regional stability, advancing energy cooperation, encouraging and rehabilitating tourism, and coping with the COVID-19 fallout, along with the ongoing issues of the climate crisis and the growing maritime traffic along regional sea routes. 

Three major developments led to the strengthening of Israeli-Cypriot ties over the past decade. The first was the discovery of gas reservoirs in the eastern Mediterranean Basin. The understanding that cooperation would benefit both sides led Israel and Cyprus to sign an agreement in 2011 demarcating their Exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and their commitment to advance energy cooperation. Second, the growing acrimony in Israel’s relations with Turkey, especially since the 2010 flotilla to Gaza incident, and the concurrent rise in Cypriot-Turkish tensions following the failure of negotiations to resolve the conflict over Northern Cyprus, enabled and encouraged closer Israel-Cypriot ties. Third, the regional instability stemming from the Arab Spring led Israel and Cyprus to seek cooperation that would contribute to regional stability. 

The strengthening relations between the two states was manifested in the rapid signing of agreements, arrangements and shared regulations. Given both sides’ growing recognition of the need and importance of these ties, they took advantage of regional developments to advance that goal. Although Cypriot President Christofias (2008-2013) was not particularly enthusiastic about promoting relations with Israel and tended to advocate for the Palestinian side in accordance with the traditional Cypriot position, he realized that his country’s interest lies in closer relations with Israel and set about promoting them. On the Israeli side, in February 2012 Netanyahu became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit the neighboring island. The trilateral relations with Greece grew out of the mutual relations forged between Israel and Cyprus, and in 2016 the leaders of all three states made it official with a formal strategic alliance. 

Interests and Challenges in Israel-Cyprus Relations

Cyprus holds several key interests for Israel, stemming especially from its strategic location and its membership in the European Union (EU). Each state, to some degree, regards the other as a security-strategic hinterland underpinning their military cooperation, even as Israel conveys a clear message that this security cooperation is not directed at a third party. Israel understands that cooperation with Cyprus is necessary for the exploitation of its gas reservoirs, gas production and export. Cooperation with Cyprus is an important component of Israel’s desire for regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Israel also views the Cypriot membership in the EU as an advantage in terms of exerting influence on the organization’s decisions regarding Israel, or at least preventing resolutions that Israel finds unpalatable. Along with the shared political, energy, security and economic interests, the two states cooperate in tourism, communications, the environment, culture, and more, and share a belief in democratic values. 

Israel’s interests prompted its decision to strengthen cooperation with Cyprus, but these relations do not come without challenges. A rapprochement between Israel and Turkey could intensify tensions with Cyprus. An eruption of violence in the conflict over Northern Cyprus or between Cyprus and Turkey over their maritime border, as well as an Israeli-Palestinian clash, could also have a detrimental effect on relations. For now, both states are trying to circumvent issues related to their own national conflicts. 

The core element of Israeli-Cypriot cooperation, energy, could also create challenges. The high potential and shared expectation of yields from these gas fields could challenge relations if the cooperation fails to meet the high expectations they each harbor. There has already been voiced doubts over the feasibility of some of the shared plans for the production and export of natural gas to Europe, chief among them the gas pipeline plan, thus the sides must consider alternatives. Geopolitical shifts, even positive ones such as the forging of closer ties between Israel and the Gulf States, could also challenge ties with Cyprus should they develop at the expense of the alliance, whether by diverting available resources from strengthening ties with Cyprus to benefit stronger ties with other states, or whether as a result of Israeli commitment to additional actors with clashing or different interests. 

Opportunities in Israel-Cyprus Relations 

The diverse, significant and abundant opportunities in the Israel-Cyprus relationship can be seen as a mirror image to the challenges. Israel and Cyprus must take advantage of their warm ties to deepen their roots and expand bilateral cooperation as much as possible in order to bolster the relations resilience in the face of frequent changes. 

Opportunities on energy issues are varied and include a deeper cooperation beyond natural gas resources to energy connectivity projects, such as the Euro-Asia electric cable, and the development of renewable energies. The Regional Gas Forum could also provide a platform for institutionalized cooperation on renewable energy and expand to additional fields such as commerce and maritime regulation. To this end, Israel and Cyprus could cooperate with other members of the forum to expand its mandate to include these issues. 

The fabric of cooperation in the region could presumably pose a challenge given the different interests of various actors, but it also opens up significant opportunities. Adding new partners to the varied Israeli-Cypriot regional cooperation ventures could actually strengthen and lend greater weight to relations between the two states and increase their prospects of success. Adding the UAE to energy projects, for example, or Morocco to climate change or maritime agriculture projects would also provide a beneficial opportunity for stronger regional cooperation. The warming of Israeli-Moroccan relations could open up opportunities for Israel to deepen its involvement in regional Mediterranean organizations of which Cyprus is also a member. This, in combination with the EU and its commitment to advancing green energy and a circular economy, and in partnership with the US, further increases the potential for regional cooperation. The political connection to Europe via Cyprus is significant and can be used not only to help Cyprus avert resolutions unfavorable to Israel but also to boost cooperation. The launch of the new EU Southern Neighborhood policy, which seeks to promote cross-border cooperation in the Mediterranean region, constitutes such an opportunity. 

Although Israel and Cyprus have generally avoided directly interfering in each other’s conflicts, the conflicts could in reality constitute areas of mutual cooperation. Israel and Cyprus can help each other move ahead with conflict resolution and peace by supporting implementation of concrete measures on the ground, providing the required political support for these peace processes and learning from each other’s experience in conflict resolution. 

הפוסט Major Potential in the Israel-Cyprus Friendship From the “Israel and the Mediterranean” Working Group הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Instead, talks petered out. Not only were the Israeli and Lebanese teams at odds over where negotiations should start, they couldn’t even look each other in the eye. Though the United States managed to bring the parties back to Naqoura in April 2021, the hiatus did little to soften the two sides.

In order to understand what went wrong, it is important to analyze the context of the meetings that took place and the developments that occurred between October 2020 and the present. The Israeli-Lebanese maritime boundary dispute isn’t simply about territorial claims but also economic and geopolitical interests. Identifying which of these three variables is driving the parties involved is the key to understanding whether negotiations will eventually resume or whether this corner of the Eastern Mediterranean will become more contentious.

Israel and Lebanon’s maritime dispute is a manifestation of deeply rooted territorial disagreements. The 1923 Paulet-Newcombe Agreement that demarcated the boundary between the British and French Mandates in the post-Ottoman era contained multiple inconsistencies that subsequently carried over into relations between Israel and Lebanon. Following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council produced documents intended to provide further clarification on the contentious border. But these efforts made little impact. Hezbollah, the radical Shiite political party and militia that has operated in southern Lebanon for decades and is today the most powerful actor in the country, has never recognized these agreements. As a result, the land border is still actively monitored by the Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the U.N., and Hezbollah militia.

None of these aforementioned documents addressed the territorial waters and maritime boundary between the two states. It was only in the mid-2000s, when international energy companies started to explore along the Levantine coast, that policymakers comprehended how an undefined border between two rival states could be problematic. But unfortunately, as is the case in many maritime disputes, Israel and Lebanon utilized different demarcation methods to map out their respective Exclusive Economic Zones. Israel marked the border as being at a 90-degree angle from the coastline. Lebanon marked it as a continuation of the land border. To further complicate the situation, the two parties disagreed from which point on land the maritime boundary should be drawn. These differences produced a disputed area of roughly 860 square kilometers (533 square miles).

Recognizing both the risks and rewards of mediating between these bellicose neighbors, the U.S. offered its services with both eyes open. From 2010 to 2012, Ambassador Frederic C. Hof shuttled between the parties and presented a proposal that would divide the disputed territory in a ratio of 55 to 45 in Lebanon’s favor (commonly referred to as the “Hof Line”). According to Hof’s account of the negotiations in Newlines, Israeli and Lebanese negotiators were disappointed with the U.S. proposal but begrudgingly accepted that it may be the best available compromise. Hof asserts that if not for the collapse of the Lebanese government in 2013, the parties would have reached an accord.

It took nearly a decade for Israel and Lebanon to restart negotiations. During that period, multiple offshore hydrocarbon discoveries were made in the waters of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum — an international organization committed to advancing energy development and cooperation opportunities — was established by Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. In 2021, France joined the forum as a full member.

Because of its ongoing dispute with Israel, Lebanon would not participate in these processes and struggled to attract international companies to explore its waters.

Several factors, including chronic government mismanagement of resources, a growing Syrian refugee population, the U.S. sanctions regime on Iran and its associates in Lebanon, the coronavirus pandemic, and the tragic blast at the Beirut port, created a perfect storm that incentivized talking with Israel. Though optimistic about the prospects of discovering meaningful offshore reserves in Blocks 8, 9, and 10 (designated areas leased to companies for exploration) and then successfully commercializing them in the post-COVID-19 energy market, the logic of the caretaker Lebanese government was that resolving the maritime boundary dispute with Israel was the first step toward bringing foreign investment back to Lebanon.

Israel welcomed the opportunity to settle the matter. The maritime dispute with Lebanon had not adversely affected the development of Israeli offshore hydrocarbons — although Block 72 runs up against these contested waters — neutralizing the threat of a possible Hezbollah attack and delinking the maritime boundary dispute with the enduring land border disputes would create more room for Jerusalem to maneuver in the crowded Eastern Mediterranean.

Israel and Hezbollah are enemies, yet Lebanese stability is crucial to maintaining Israeli security interests. From the Israeli perspective, if the discovery of natural gas buoyed Lebanon’s floundering economy, all the better.

Despite these incentives, the parties were at odds over how to restart talks: Who should facilitate future negotiations, the U.S. or the U.N.? Should negotiations include maritime and land border disputes? Eventually, Washington managed to convince the parties to accept a formula where the two sides would meet face-to-face under the mediation of U.S. Ambassador John Desrocher and with U.N. sponsorship. In an effort to demonstrate their opposition to normalizing relations with Israel, the Lebanese team reportedly spoke indirectly to their Israeli counterparts sitting across the room.

The Israeli negotiation team (and possibly the U.S. mediators) assumed that the starting point for negotiations would be the 2012 Hof Line. But the Lebanese team quickly poured cold water on that notion, presenting instead a maximalist position that claimed an additional 1,430 square kilometers (887 square miles) including the territory where Karish, a natural gas field operated by Energean and containing an estimated 32 billion cubic meters, is located.

From the Lebanese perspective, the negotiations led by Hof should have relied on the legal precedent set by other internationally arbitrated maritime disputes and emphasized the relationship between the land boundary and the maritime boundary. Instead, “to avoid provoking a controversy over who owned what rock,” the U.S. team started drawing the Hof Line three miles offshore. In addition, Lebanese negotiators argued that Hof’s proposed compromise granted undue weight to a rock called “Tekhelet” located less than a mile from the Israeli coastline that shouldn’t have been taken into consideration when assessing the equidistant line between the two sides.

While this position might carry weight among international maritime legal experts, it was a dead end in the negotiations. Israel isn’t a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and therefore didn’t feel committed to a rigid interpretation of international maritime law. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, who oversaw the negotiation process, called the Lebanese volte-face a “provocation” and tweeted to President Michel Aoun in Arabic that the two should meet in Europe in order to get things back on track. Steinitz has challenged Lebanon’s argument against the Tekhelet rock, citing that Lebanon has used similar land masses in identifying its maritime boundary with Syria.

Coincidentally, Lebanon’s northern neighbor is also driving a hard bargain. In March 2021, the Assad regime announced that it had signed a four-year contract with Russian energy company Kapital in two blocks that overlap with Lebanon’s maritime claims. The news triggered a flurry of Lebanese reactions. On April 1, 2021, Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces party, called on the government to resolve the maritime dispute with Syria and warn Russia against operating in the disputed area. Furthermore, it was reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had a telephone call with Aoun, during which he expressed resentment at the criticism voiced in Lebanon against Syria.

The maritime dispute between Lebanon and Syria is no less complex than that with Israel. However, Lebanon is weighed down by the web of commercial and strategic interests that tie its competing political factions to Syria, Iran, and Russia. These considerations will likely force Beirut to make significant compromises on its northern maritime boundary. In light of the U.S. withdrawal from the region, Russia sees the Eastern Mediterranean — and the Levantine coast in particular — as a base from which it can project greater regional influence.

If decision makers in Beirut were mentally preparing to acquiesce to Syrian demands, then it helps explain why they adopted a hard line toward Israel, where there is no love lost and no strings attached. Just weeks before the resumption of talks, the Lebanese government discussed the possibility of changing resolution no. 6433 (which delineates Lebanon’s maritime borders) in order to include the maximalist positions recently brought forward by the negotiation team. U.S. Undersecretary of State David Hale met with Aoun reiterating the need for dialogue and reaffirming U.S. commitment to mediate “on the basis on which we initiated these discussions,” confirming the suspicion that Lebanon’s new position ran counter to the framework agreement arranged by Desrocher that enabled the recent round of talks. However, these efforts proved fruitless. When the negotiation teams met in April, the divide was still unbridgeable. It is difficult to predict if and when negotiations will continue.

There are several lessons to be gleaned from this episode. It was faulty to assume that the incentives that brought Israel and Lebanon together in 2020 were sufficient to deliver a comprehensive resolution to their maritime dispute. Compared to the past decade, conditions for direct negotiations were optimal, but too much time had passed since the Hof-led negotiations of 2012, and the positions of the actors reflected some of the changes that had occurred in the interim. Negotiating with Lebanon is particularly thorny due to the fragmented nature of Lebanese politics and the number of internal and external actors who can veto any progress. Lebanese stability may be an Israeli interest, but no maritime boundary agreement was going to guarantee something so indeterminate. After a long hiatus, it may have been wiser to ease into discussions gradually and set expectations for conduct within the negotiating room.

Relations between Israel and Lebanon will always be influenced by regional developments. While there is no evidence to suggest a causal link between the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on Nov. 27, 2020, and the postponement of direct talks, there has been a steady uptick in hostilities between Israel and Iran over the last few months in the maritime space and surrounding the Iranian nuclear program. Hezbollah may give the Lebanese government a green light to resume negotiations, but it is unlikely that an Iranian proxy will permit the sides to come to an agreement so long as regional tensions run high. Following the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas in May, it is fair to assume that Hezbollah will veto efforts to restart negotiations in the near future.

The recent news of a maritime dispute between Lebanon and Syria is also a reminder that the Eastern Mediterranean is an evolving geopolitical space, and once-dormant actors may soon return to the regional picture. The last decade of offshore exploration focused on Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus’ waters. But as the Syrian civil war reaches a relative degree of stability, international energy companies are likely to turn their attention to the northernmost corner of the Eastern Mediterranean. This means that Russia — the Assad regime’s protector — will begin to flex its muscles more assertively in regional affairs. Future negotiations between Israel and Lebanon should give serious consideration to Russian interests when trying to assess how to best reach an agreement.

The construction of a regional framework for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean could further incentivize Lebanon to seek a compromise. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is a nascent organization, yet membership within the gas forum could yield commercial dividends for Lebanon so long as a creative solution can be found around its opposition to Israel. That may seem far-fetched, but in an increasingly digitized world it would behoove the forum’s member states — France in particular — to find a creative solution. The maritime dispute between Israel and Lebanon has implications upon the maritime claims of other states — such as Cyprus — and the energy industry’s perception of the region as a viable space for exploration and development. If Israel and Lebanon manage to work out their differences, others may follow suit.

The U.S. has done an admirable job trying to get the parties to the table. No one else in the international community has the combination of gravitas and leverage on both Israel and Lebanon. But U.S. interest in resolving this dispute shouldn’t be taken for granted. The U.S. is withdrawing from the region, and it is easy to imagine a scenario where Israel and Lebanon return to their respective corners empty-handed. Lebanon would struggle to attract foreign investment, and Israel would continue to look over its shoulder with concerns about the safety of its offshore investments. The path forward requires a political compromise that accepts a technical solution in exchange for economic benefits. The onus is now on both Israel and Lebanon, in their own ways, to demonstrate to Washington what compromises they are prepared to make in order to put this issue to rest and why the U.S. should remain invested both in this process and the region at large.

**The article was published on NEWLINES magazine, 2 June 2021

הפוסט Lines in the Sea: How resolution of Israel and Lebanon’s <br> maritime dispute could set a regional precedent הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) established in 2019 could be one such alternative. Its founding members were Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Jordan, Greece, Cyprus and Italy. France joined subsequently as a full-fledged member while the US and European Union remain observers. Lebanon was invited to join at the outset, but it rejected the invitation in light of Israel’s membership in the forum – despite the natural gas potential in its economic waters that has attracted the interest of some of the world’s biggest energy companies.

At the same time, negotiations between Israel and Lebanon have had their ups and downs, with Lebanon seeming to undermine prospects for progress. Is there a creative, practical measure that could appeal to Beirut and at the same time serve Israel’s interest? Its purpose would be to integrate Lebanon into the regional architecture taking shape in recent years in a manner conducive to stability. Could observer status for Lebanon in the EMGF be a feasible and desirable option?

The easiest and most immediate answer would seem to be “no”. How could Lebanon make such a decision given the complex political situation it faces? The multiplicity of actors, domestic and external, most of them driven by contradictory interests, cannot enable the (many) decision makers to take that path. On the other hand, observer status would allow Lebanon to keep a safe distance from membership in a forum of which Israel is a member but at the same time provide it with influence and benefits given the growing importance and relevance of this grouping.

Would this benefit Israel?

On the plus side, it would serve to connect Lebanon to a relevant and worthy regional framework, thereby drawing it into constructive activity vital for the region, in general, and for Israel. After all, Lebanese gas (and oil) reserves, if discovered, would contribute to the regional potential and aid in Lebanon’s rehabilitation. It would also constitute an addition, albeit indirect and partial, to the “wave of normalization” between Israel and Arab states created by the Abraham Accords, although this would have to be downplayed given the opposition of many elements in Lebanon to such an idea.

On the negative side, granting Lebanon observer status could introduce potential obstacles into a forum that has operated successfully over the past two years with almost no political landmines, except for the Palestinian veto of observer status for the UAE (and presumably this obstacle will soon be overcome through Egyptian pressure).

The key question pertains to the feasibility of such a move, and just as important to its potential effect on US mediation efforts between Israel and Lebanon. Given that Lebanon has not closed the door completely to renewed negotiations with Israel, and its interest in exploiting its economic waters, an invitation to join the forum as an observer could be perceived as serving the Lebanese interest. Some of the actors will try to thwart the move, presumably, but others could view it as beneficial, especially given the current circumstances.

Either way, sensitive and complex diplomacy is required, mostly behind the scenes. Washington could raise this alternative discretely. It could be tied to a desirable compromise over the maritime border, not necessarily as a stick or carrot, but as a complementary move serving the Lebanese interest. At the same time, Egypt and France, which holds significant sway in Lebanon, and perhaps even Cyprus, could contribute, each from its own perspective to this complex diplomatic undertaking.

As far as Israel goes, the potential advantages of such a move far outweigh the drawbacks. Israel should support the move – albeit quietly and discretely, as mentioned. The Lebanese will presumably have a hard time picking up the gauntlet, but who knows, they may surprise us all.

הפוסט Involving Lebanon in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Greece and Cyprus fill important roles in the gas forum, and over the last decade have strengthened their strategic relationship with Israel. If the Biden administration is intent on advancing a multilateral approach towards in international affairs, then it is worth examining how these two countries can support efforts to improve Israeli-Palestinian communication in advance of future direct negotiations.

The current policies of Greece and Cyprus on Israeli-Palestinian affairs are understandably nuanced. Both countries regularly engage with the Palestine Authority and are committed to the official positions of the EU (e.g., support for a two-state solution along the 1967 borders and opposition to unilateral Israeli measures such as settlement construction and annexation). Neither country, however, is a leading voice within the EU on this issue and Israel has relied on each of them – along with members of the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) – to soften (and sometimes block) European reactions to its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2015, for example, Greece defied European labeling policies on goods manufactured by Israeli companies in the West Bank. Despite PA efforts to convince Greece to take an official stance against Israel’s annexation ambitions in the summer of 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis did not publicly reference the matter during his visit to Israel in mid-June, focusing instead on other aspects of the bilateral relationship.

Greece and Cyprus do not require instruction from Israel to keep their distance from the conflict. Embroiled in their own ongoing disputes with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the divided island of Cyprus, both countries prefer to not meddle in the affairs of Israel. This approach should not be confused with a lack of interest. At an official level, Greece and Cyprus want to see a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Greek Orthodox Church remains a principal religious institution and landowner in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Both countries enjoy robust commercial and strategic relations with Arab countries in the region.

Still, the importance of the strategic relationship with Israel has compelled Greece and Cyprus to take a back seat on Israeli-Palestinian affairs. Bilateral trade with the Palestinians – which was never robust – has decreased over the past two decades. PA officials now reference their strong ties with Athens and Nicosia in the past tense. Other regional players, such as Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Turkey, and Qatar play a more central role in intra-Palestinian politics and delivering messages between various Palestinian factions and Israel.

Greece and Cyprus are limited both in their capacity and interest to perform a central role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. Under the right conditions, however, they could support a number of focused elements in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The recent news about potential Gaza Strip projects  suggests that Greece and Cyprus could play a constructive role in regional energy cooperation and Palestinian participation in the EMGF. The forum includes both Israeli and PA representation, a rare phenomenon considering the current nadir in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Energy security is a serious matter for Palestinians – especially in the Gaza Strip, where electricity shortages are commonplace – and initiatives that improve reliability and affordability of supply would help stabilize the Palestinian economy and raise the quality of life. As mentioned above, there is already momentum in this space, so Greece and Cyprus would not be taking bold positions by offering to play a facilitating role on energy-related matters that come up in the forum, encouraging foreign companies to look into supporting the development of Gaza Marine field, and making sure that their Palestinian counterparts feel heard. The current mission of the EMGF focuses solely on energy issues, but its mission is likely to expand with time. It is increasingly obvious that Eastern Mediterranean states need to be in dialogue on a litany of topics, both economic and environmental, and this is an area where Greece and Cyprus could ensure a Palestinian presence.

Second, Cyprus could play a role in supporting the reopening of the Gaza Strip. Gaza remains under a strict blockade – facilitated both by Israel and Egypt – and the humanitarian conditions remain dire. Israel’s restrictive list of banned import/export goods hampers economic growth and is easy fodder for anti-Israel criticism in the international community. There is some evidence that Israel wants to change that. In February 2021, Qatar announced that it – along with the Office of the Quartet – had successfully negotiated an agreement with the Israeli government and Delek Group to construct a pipeline between one of Israel’s natural gas fields and the Gaza Strip. Just a few days later, Egypt agreed to help develop the Gaza Marine field, a natural gas reserve located just off the coast.

As recently as 2018, Israel and Cyprus were in discussions about establishing a floating dock in Limassol to receive and monitor goods bound for the Gaza Strip. The concept of the floating dock was a creative one, but the conditions – that Hamas return Israeli civilians Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed and the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war – were a nonstarter.

Despite promising proposals, the economic and humanitarian circumstances in the Gaza Strip remain the same (if not worse). The  floating dock may, however, be worth reviewing once more in light of recent announcements by Qatar and Egypt. A port solution would benefit all parties and should be delinked from the broader political process with the Palestinians. This would require significant coordination between Israel, Cyprus, and the PA, as well as other international actors like Egypt, the EU, and the U.S. If the project was revived under new U.S. and EU leadership, this would be a feasible, low-cost way to reduce Gaza’s isolation.

As member states of the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus have a major voice in the formulation and execution of the European Neighborhood Policy in the Mediterranean as well as the Southern Neighborhood which includes Israel and Palestine. Given their position, Athens and Nicosia could proactively identify regional projects in which Palestine and Israel can jointly participate as well as collaborate with initiatives that support the growth of trade opportunities, European investment in the Palestinian economy, and academic exchange. While it is commendable that Greece and Cyprus support Israeli positions within the EU, a neutral approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue could better ensure a sustainable, long-term relationship.

In the past, Cyprus functioned as a location for Israeli and Palestinian civil society engagement. Student programs brought together Israelis, Palestinians – as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots – to learn about one another’s narratives, and map the successes and shortcomings of conflict resolution methods in other countries. Resuming these activities would allow Cyprus to serve as a neutral venue and draw from the Cypriot community’s professional know-how. With US Congress approving 250 million USD in funding to Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding efforts in December 2020, there is an opportunity for third-party actors to take part in new initiatives.

Greece and Cyprus’ association to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed in recent years, however they can play a constructive role in improving on-the-ground conditions in the Palestinian territories as well as supporting regional and international initiatives that encourage Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Resolving the conflict is not only about final status issues. There are countless, smaller matters concerning the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations that have yet to be resolved and could benefit from external engagement. Future mediators should include Greece and Cyprus amongst the select number of international actors that can play a modest role in advancing the cause of peace.

**The article was published on MEI, 21 May 2021.

הפוסט Greece and Cyprus can play a modest role in advancing<br> Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean has attracted significant attention over recent years. New economic opportunities and geopolitical developments are contributing to this trend and are turning the region into a central tenet of Israel’s foreign policy. Together with regional alliances and bilateral relations that Israel is advancing in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Israeli public has also begun to perceive the area as a new space for regional belonging. In the 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 25 percent of the Israeli public considers Israel primarily as part of the Mediterranean (as opposed to 29 percent who answered that Israel belongs more to the Middle East and 24 percent to Europe).

Throughout history, the Eastern Mediterranean played a central role in global political, economic, and social transformations. The recent far-reaching changes and developments in the region have repositioned it as a distinct and central region in the international arena. Environmental concerns, the movement of refugees, the struggle between powers over trade routes, political conflicts among and within the countries, economic cooperation, the emergence of security communities and the discovery of natural gas reserves, are all processes that tie regional members to the geography of the Mediterranean. These new issues can and should be taken into consideration alongside old issues that characterize the region – a common history, similar climate, the diasporas, shared values, and Mediterranean culture.

Israel is not only active but dominant in the Eastern Mediterranean, with its policy characterized by a myriad of relations and unique approach of non-exclusive policy. Israel strives, with considerable success, to maintain and promote relations with different countries that hold different or conflicting interests, without the relations with one necessarily coming at the expense of relations with the other. Israel is a partner in regional alliances (such as the Alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – EMGF), maintains bilateral relations with many countries openly and formally, and maintains informal relations with other countries. The discovery of natural gas reserves in Israel’s economic waters gives it economic and political power in the region and allows it a wider range of political manoeuvrability. Notably, however, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip on the shores of the Mediterranean, restricts Israel’s ability to reap the potential benefits that the area holds for it.

The political, economic and social developments in the Mediterranean are ongoing and constantly evolving. The region’s consolidation offers many opportunities and challenges for Israel, and is accompanied by both cooperation and struggles over the region’s desired characteristics, the regional institutions that should be established, common values, geographic boundaries, and each member state’s role and political power.

To assess possible developments, identify opportunities and challenges, and thus discover the necessary political actions, it is first necessary to understand the arena and identify trends, processes, different issues at stake, and active players and their various interests. To this end, in 2019 Mitvim – the Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policy, the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Center for National Security Studies at the University of Haifa, formed a research and policy group. The group’s goals were to better understand the Mediterranean arena and Israel’s place therein, to formulate guidelines and policy recommendations, and to promote political dialogue with various regional actors.

This paper summarizes the first series of meetings of the research and policy group in 2019-2020 and presents the key insights that emerged throughout it. The meetings focused on global and regional powers’ activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, energy and environmental issues, the impact of the coronavirus epidemic, conflicts and collaborations, and questions of identity and norms. These summaries portray a perspective of what is currently happening in the Mediterranean, the opportunities and challenges facing Israel, as well as a reference to the guiding principles and recommended courses of action for Israeli foreign policy.

הפוסט Israel and the Mediterranean<br> A New Space for Regional Belonging <br> Meeting Summaries from a Research and Policy Group הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lebanon, as we know, is mired in an unprecedented economic and political crisis. The political actors are unable to form a new government, given a complex web of interests and arm-twisting involving external actors, as is always the case in Lebanon. What, then, prompted the Lebanese decision to further complicate matters?

Several factors are involved. Complex interests, including (or especially) those of Hezbollah, compel Lebanon to present a tough, hawkish position vis-à-vis Israel, even one that contradicts its previous stand. Hezbollah pressure is reflected, for example, in the move by former minister of energy and foreign affairs, Gebran Bassil (President Michel Aoun’s son-in-law) blocking a compromise on formation of a government.

In the energy context, Bassil is unlikely to allow other actors to reap the fruit of an agreement with Israel, which could open up Lebanon’s energy market and send a positive message to the ailing economy (even if it takes years for economic dividends to materialize). Presumably, Iran is also reluctant to back progress in Lebanon’s negotiations with Israel in light of its attempts to renew the nuclear agreement with world powers and impending June presidential elections.

What is more, a somewhat noisy dispute has erupted in recent weeks between Lebanon and Syria over their maritime border. While the dispute is not new and has included appeals to the UN by both sides laying out conflicting interpretations of their rights, the issue has escalated recently over Syria’s contract with a Russian firm on oil and gas survey activities in an area Lebanon claims as part of its economic waters. The dispute has generated criticism of Syria in Lebanon and the foreign minister has insisted on negotiations with Damascus on the matter.

Some two weeks ago, Syrian President Bashar Assad reportedly called President Aoun to complain about the Lebanese criticism of his country. Given current circumstances, Lebanon prefers a “tough patriotic” stand vis-à-vis Israel than against Syria, especially since Russia has taken de facto control in recent years of energy rights in Syrian economic waters (and on land, too).

What does this all mean for Lebanese-Israeli negotiations? Is agreement between the sides still possible? Perhaps. An agreement remains of vital interest, especially for Lebanon. After all, Israel is already enjoying the economic and diplomatic fruit of the natural gas discovered in its waters, while Lebanon is facing a disastrous economic crisis. The latest confrontational move complicates things, but Lebanon might also see it as enhancing its room for maneuver in the no-holds-barred poker game with Israel.

Now, more than ever, US mediation must be restored in order to bring both sides into a more constructive framework. The Biden administration has already adopted an entirely different approach to foreign policy, prompted by its inward domestic focus. Renewing the shuttle diplomacy between Jerusalem and Beirut is vitally important in order to avoid severing all contact and exacerbating tensions and, of course, in order to renew discussions albeit under less convenient and more challenging circumstances. But is this not the secret magic of negotiations?

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, April 28th 2021.

הפוסט Lebanon ups ante on maritime border with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Historical Background
3. For the better part of Israel’s modern history, relations with Greece and Cyprus could be described as something between dormant and strained. Israel enjoyed full diplomatic ties with both countries, however Greek and Cypriot support for the Palestinian cause and Israel’s cooperation with Turkey were obstacles that prevented the parties from fostering meaningful relations. In the 1980s, the governments in Athens and Nicosia were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and frequently hosted PLO head Yasser Arafat. In 1988, Cyprus officially recognized the State of Palestine. Supporting the PLO was a red line for Israel, who was actively pursuing Arafat and trying to thwart his operations. At the same time, both Greece and Cyprus viewed Jerusalem’s strategic cooperation with Ankara from the lens of their shared conflict with Turkey. These positions only began to soften during the 1990s, following the interim agreements with the Palestinians (1993-1995) and the peace agreement with Jordan (1994).^[1] But even then, the continued partnership between Israel and Turkey in the 1990s and early 2000s seemed a bridge too far to cross.

It was only after 2009, following the collapse of the Greek economy, the Arab Spring, and the disintegration of Israel-Turkey relations, that a window of opportunity opened for the three countries to improve their ties. During this period of time, offshore natural gas reserves were discovered in the waters of Israel and Cyprus, further incentivizing cooperation between Jerusalem, Athens, and Nicosia. Today, the tripartite alliance is one of Israel’s most significant strategic partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was not a welcome sight for the Palestinian Authority (PA), whose leadership had enjoyed positive relations with Greece and Cyprus for decades. Inter-Palestinian divisions between Fatah and Hamas had weakened the PA’s legitimacy and it had little leverage on the now pro-Israel governments in Athens and Nicosia. Despite the continuation of high-level meetings between Palestinian officials and their Greek and Cypriot counterparts, in 2015 the Greek parliament stopped short of fully recognizing Palestinian statehood.^[2]

Contemporary Greek and Cypriot Policies on Israeli-Palestinian Affairs

The current policies of Greece and Cyprus on Israeli-Palestinian affairs are understandably nuanced. Both countries regularly engage with the Palestine Authority and are committed to the official positions of the EU (e.g., support for a two-state solution along the 1967 borders and opposition towards unilateral Israeli measures such as settlement construction and annexation). This reflects public support for a resolution of the conflict and sympathy towards Palestinian national aspirations. However, neither country is a leading voice within the EU on this issue and Israel has relied on each of them – along with members of the Visegrad Group – to soften (and sometimes block) European reactions to its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2015, for example, Greece defied European labeling policies on goods manufactured over the pre-1967 lines.^[3] Despite PA efforts to convince Greece to take an official stance against Israel’s annexation ambitions in the summer of 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis did not publicly reference the matter during his visit to Israel in mid-June, focusing instead on other aspects of the bilateral relationship.^[4] Similar efforts were reportedly made by Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi vis-a-vis his counterparts in Nicosia.^[5]

Greece and Cyprus do not require instruction from Israel to keep their distance from the conflict. Embroiled in their own ongoing disputes with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the divided island of Cyprus, both countries prefer having a relationship with Israel that does not necessitate one party meddling in the affairs of the other. This approach should not be confused with a lack of interest. At an official level, Greece and Cyprus want to see a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Greek Orthodox Church remains a principal religious institution and landowner in Israel and the Palestinian territories.^[6] Both countries enjoy robust commercial and strategic relations with Arab countries in the region. Despite being separated by the sea, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is never too far away.

Still, the importance of the strategic relationship with Israel, and the desire to marginalize Turkey’s regional partnerships, has compelled Greece and Cyprus to take a back seat on Israeli-Palestinian affairs. Bilateral trade with the Palestinians – which was never robust – has decreased over the past two decades.^[7] PA officials now reference their strong ties with Athens and Nicosia in the past tense.^[8] Other regional players, such as Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Turkey, and Qatar play a more central role in intra-Palestinian politics and delivering messages between various Palestinian factions and Israel. In sum, Greece and Cyprus have little incentive to involve themselves in Israeli-Palestinian affairs and are more likely to wait until international actors – or the Israelis and Palestinians themselves – renew their interest in negotiations and invite them to contribute to the peace process.

Potential Greek and Cypriot Contributions to Advancing Peace

Greece and Cyprus are limited both in their capacity and interest to perform a central role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. However, under the right conditions, they could support a number of focused elements in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

First, Cyprus could play a role in supporting the reopening of the Gaza Strip. Gaza remains under a strict blockade – facilitated both by Israel and Egypt – and the humanitarian conditions remain fragile. Israel’s restrictive list of banned import/export goods hampers economic growth and is easy fodder for anti-Israel criticism in the international community. There is some evidence that Israel wants to change that. In February 2021, Qatar announced that it – along with the Office of the Quartet – had successfully negotiated an agreement with the Israeli government and Delek Group to construct a pipeline between one of Israel’s natural gas fields and the Gaza Strip. Just a few days later, Egypt agreed to help develop the Gaza Marine field, a natural gas reserve located just off the coast. Both of these developments demonstrate that there are areas where regional actors can make an impact on the ground.

As recently as 2018, Israel and Cyprus were in discussions about establishing a floating dock in Limassol to receive and monitor goods bound for the Gaza Strip. The concept of the floating dock was a creative one, but the conditions – that Hamas return Israeli civilians Abera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed and the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war – were a nonstarter. It was also unclear whether the initiative was serious or just part of a public relations campaign to undermine Hamas’ credibility in the Gaza Strip.^[9] Cyprus had its own set of concerns at the time and was reluctant to interfere in Israeli-Palestinian affairs.

However, the economic and humanitarian circumstances in the Gaza Strip remain the same (if not worse), and the recent announcements by Qatar and Egypt suggest that this project is worth reviewing once more. As highlighted by Ambassador (ret.) Michael Harari, a port solution would benefit all parties and should be “dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians.”^[10] This would require significant coordination between Israel, Cyprus and the PA, as well as other international actors like Egypt, the EU, and the US. If the project was revived under new US and EU leadership, this would be a feasible, low-cost way to reduce Gaza’s isolation.

The recent news about potential Gaza Strip projects also relate to the second arena where Greece and Cyprus could play a constructive role: regional energy cooperation and Palestinian participation in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The forum is a regional body established in 2020 that includes both Israeli and PA representation, a rare phenomenon considering the current nadir in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Energy security is a serious matter for Palestinians – especially in the Gaza Strip, where electricity shortages are commonplace – and initiatives that improve reliability and affordability of supply would help stabilize the Palestinian economy and raise the quality of life. As mentioned above, there is already momentum in this space, so Greece and Cyprus would not be taking bold positions by offering to play a facilitating role on energy-related matters that come up in the forum, encouraging foreign companies to look into supporting the development of Gaza Marine field, and making sure that their Palestinian counterparts feel heard. The current mission of the EMGF focuses solely on energy issues, but its mission is likely to expand with time. It is increasingly obvious that Eastern Mediterranean states need to be in dialogue on a litany of topics, both economic and environmental, and this is an area where Greece and Cyprus could ensure a Palestinian presence.

As member states of the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus have a major voice in the formulation and execution of the European Neighborhood Policy in the Mediterranean as well as the Southern Neighborhood that includes Israel and Palestine. Within this framework, the Athens and Nicosia could proactively identify regional projects that include Palestinian and Israeli participation, increasing the engagement and interconnectivity between the two sides, as well as participate in initiatives that support the growth of trade opportunities, European investment in the Palestinian economy, and academic exchange. While commendable that Greece and Cyprus support Israeli positions within the EU, a neutral approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue could better ensure a sustainable, long-term relationship.

In the past, Cyprus functioned as a location for Israeli and Palestinian civil society engagement. Student programs brought together Israelis, Palestinians – as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots – to learn about one another’s narratives, and map the successes and shortcomings of conflict resolution methods in other countries. Resuming these activities would allow Cyprus to serve as a neutral venue and draw from the Cypriot community’s professional know-how. With US Congress approving 250 million USD in funding to Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding efforts in December 2020, there is an opportunity for third-party actors to take part in new initiatives.[11]

Finally, in the event that there is a genuine international effort to bring Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table, Greece and Cyprus can support those processes as comparatively neutral parties, knowing that Israel will trust its Eastern Mediterranean allies to have its best interests at heart. This is no small thing. Often in negotiations, there is a concern that international actors are trying to force a solution that is not in the interests of one or both of the conflicting parties. Having the support of friends goes a long way to easing those concerns.

Greece and Cyprus’ association to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed in recent years, however they can play a constructive role in improving on-the-ground conditions in the Palestinian territories as well as supporting regional and international initiatives that encourage Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Resolving the conflict is not only about final status issues. There are countless, smaller matters concerning the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations that have yet to be resolved and could benefit from external engagement. Greece and Cyprus are likely to wait until Israelis and Palestinians demonstrate a readiness to resume negotiations, but future mediators should include them amongst the select number of international actors who can play a modest role in advancing the cause of peace.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government. A special thank you to Jenna Kaplan for her research on this report.

^[1] Gallia Lindenstrauss and Polykarpos Gavrielides, “A Decade of Close Greece-Israel Relations: An Assessment,” INSS, April 2019.

^[2] Raphael Ahren, “Greece officially starts using term ‘Palestine’,” Times of Israel, June 8, 2015 and Representative Office of the Republic of Cyprus to the State of Palestine, Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 15, 2021 and Greek-Palestinian Relations, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 15, 2021.

^[3] Raphael Ahren, “Greece to defy EU order on labeling settlement goods,” Times of Israel, November 30, 2015.

^[4] “Palestine urges Greece to oppose Israel’s West Bank annexation plan,” Middle East Monitor, June 19, 2020 and “PM Netanyahu’s remarks at the joint statements with Greek PM Mitsotakis 16 June 2020,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 14, 2021.

^[5] “Israel seeks Cypriot help in softening EU opposition to annexation,” Times of Israel, June 23, 2020.

[6] The Greek Orthodox Church is an important institution in Jerusalem’s religious landscape. In light of the Abraham Accords, one could imagine a scenario where Athen’s interests in Jerusalem’s interfaith balance results in a more proactive Greek role alongside the Gulf states.

^[7] “Greece (GRC) and Palestine (PSE) Trade | OEC,” and “Cyprus (CYP) and Palestine (PSE) Trade | OEC,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed on March 13, 2021.

^[8] Nabil Sha’ath, “Will Greece betray the Palestinians?” Ha’aretz, January 27, 2016; “Greece has historical ties of friendship and solidarity with the Palestinian people, Ambassador Toubassi says,” ANA-MPN News, April 7, 2019.

^[9] Stuart Winer, “Israel reportedly agrees to set up seaport for Gaza in Cyprus,” Times of Israel, June 25, 2018 and “Cyprus mulling Israeli request for port to send goods to Gaza,” Times of Israel, June 26, 2018.

^[10] Michael Harari, “A port in Cyprus for Gaza’s humanitarian crises,” Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2018.

[11] Jake Epstein, “Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilders prepare for $250m US government injection,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2021.

הפוסט Greece, Cyprus, and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Strong Israel-Turkey relations make sense. Historically, both countries have been important partners in the Western alliance. Turkey is an original NATO member and Israel’s special relationship with the US and European Union goes back decades. In the heyday of Israel-Turkey ties, joint military exercises and intelligence cooperation were commonplace. Israel and Turkey also have complementary economies and continue to enjoy upwards of $6 billion in bilateral trade. Turkey operates as a conduit for oil from Azerbaijan and the Kurdistan Regional Government to reach the Israeli market. Throughout the Syrian civil war, Israel has functioned as a land bridge for Turkish “roll on roll off” trucks delivering goods to Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula. Israeli and Turkish democracy may have witnessed better days, but the roots have not been completely uprooted.

Despite their obvious compatibility, Israel and Turkey have drifted further apart in the past decade than at any other point in their history. This is due to several factors, including the cycle of violence in the Gaza Strip and Turkey’s adoption of a hostile position towards Israel and its policies toward the Palestinians.

On the surface, this was not a radical departure from the past; while holding the distinction of being the first Muslim country to recognize the State of Israel, bilateral relations often reflected the peaks and valleys of the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Turkish governments often expressed their disapproval of Israel’s policies by downgrading diplomatic ties.

However, Erdogan’s embrace of the militant group Hamas—along with other Muslim Brotherhood affiliates—proved to be a step too far. It is a decision that has haunted Turkey’s regional foreign policy, undermining its ability to be a constructive actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other disputes.

Still, the transition between US administrations is often a period of strategic realignment. Look no further than Qatar—arguably Turkey’s sole remaining partner in the Middle East, who managed to harness the positive energy of Israel’s normalization with the Gulf States in order to restore ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council. If that dispute—which included an embargo and painful economic sacrifices—could be resolved, then why can’t Israel and Turkey find common ground? Their shared opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and presence in Syria remain compelling strategic reasons to let bygones be bygones.

Erdogan understands that Turkey must evolve in response to the changing international conditions. His statement on December 25, 2020—“our heart desires that we move our relations with [Israel] to a better point”—was a deliberate effort to shake things up. Turkey has reportedly made similar overtures to Athens, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Brussels.

The bigger question is whether Israel is interested. Unlike the seemingly boundless potential of normalization with the Arab world, Turkey is a familiar space with clear limitations. Most investment opportunities have already been explored and global market conditions have dampened enthusiasm about potential natural gas cooperation (although renewables could be a worthwhile pursuit).

Over the past decade, Israel recreated its lost regional ally in the aggregate by strengthening ties with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt and pursuing the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. Normalization with the UAE and Bahrain was not about replacing Turkey, but, like so many of Israel’s new partners, they distrust Erdogan and his regional ambitions.

Further complicating the situation is Israel’s domestic landscape. Polls indicate that the majority of Israelis approve of future normalization with Turkey, but Erdogan is persona non grata. Embroiled in the fourth election in two years, beleaguered Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to approve such a consequential decision during the campaign for fear of giving his opponents on the left and right an opportunity to score easy points. Besides, Israel probably enjoys the rare opportunity to make Turkey wait for an answer.

Israel has indicated several measures that would demonstrate Turkey’s earnestness, but its demand that Ankara cease its support for Hamas is what stands above the rest. While Israel has no qualms with Qatar funding Hamas, the group’s rumored cyberwarfare and counter-intelligence operations in Istanbul are a thorn in bilateral relations (Turkish officials refute these allegations). If Turkey acquiesces to Israel’s request—it has demonstrated a willingness to do so in the past—it would indicate how far Erdogan is willing to go in order to reset ties with Israel, and the West.

If Israel and Turkey are committed to resolving their differences, it would be a welcome development for the Biden administration. President Biden is well acquainted with the two parties and the strategic consequences of their fallout. Erdogan’s infamous Davos outburst occurred just days after President Barack Obama’s inauguration in 2009 and it required efforts over the course of almost two terms to mend those fences. Thus far, the only Turkish request is that Israel freeze West Bank settlement construction. This is something the Biden administration will likely request anyway, so it is in a good position to give the two sides a nudge.

The Israel-Turkey relationship no longer carries the same luster it once did and reconciliation is unlikely to solve Turkey’s troubles in Washington. Even if diplomatic ties were restored, it would only mark the first step in a longer process. The two sides need to reintroduce themselves, expand their communication channels, and create openings for dialogue between new elites. As simple as it is to exchange ambassadors, the journey forward is an arduous one and it is unclear whether either party is committed to making that investment. But, with the Biden administration’s encouragement, it could serve as a model for the route Ankara must take to rehabilitate its tarnished image in Europe and the United States. It would also provide the US the relative comfort of knowing that disputes between its regional partners won’t distract Washington as it pursues bigger, more pressing agendas.

**This article was published on the Atlantic Council, 10 February 2021

הפוסט The Biden administration can help<br> mend ties between Turkey and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One example to support this claim is the EuroAsia Interconnector, an ambitious infrastructure project that intends to connect the European electrical grid via undersea cable from Greece to Cyprus, and Israel. Few in Israel are familiar with the interconnector. Unlike the much-publicized EastMed pipeline, the interconnector garners little attention. Ironically, there is a greater chance that the interconnector – whose cable would run along a similar route as the EastMed pipeline – will successfully link Israel and Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean, and not the more recognizable natural gas project.

This paper attempts to outline the principal reasons why Israel is interested in the EuroAsia Interconnector (EAI) and why an undersea electricity cable may be a more feasible project than the EastMed pipeline (EMP). In the process, it hopes to contribute to current research on Israel’s engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as its transition from energy dependency to a new era of energy independence and interdependence.

הפוסט Supercharged: The EuroAsia Interconnector and <br> Israel’s Pursuit of Energy Interdependence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This will be a positive development, but Israelis and Turks should not let the fate of their countries’ relations be dependent only on their leaders’ will. After all, Erdoğan and Netanyahu already agreed in 2016 to exchange ambassadors (after 5 years of lower diplomatic representation due to the flotilla incident), but that agreement held water for only two years.

Turkey and Israel enjoy continuous diplomatic relations since 1949. These relations had, and still have, many ups and downs. But, overall, they have proven to be resilient. The two countries managed to overcome periods of crises and knew how to adapt their ties to changing realities. This long duration of continuous ties enabled, along the years, interaction and cooperation between multiple segments of the Israeli and Turkish societies.

While the political leaders are the ones setting the tone in the bilateral relations, Israel-Turkey ties go beyond them, and are not dependent only on how the heads of states relate to each other. Tourism, business cooperation, sport and cultural events, academic exchange are all examples for channels through which a multi-faceted and resilient Israel-Turkey relationship has evolved. Within this scope, civil society is an important actor.

The modern diplomacy of the 21st century enables easier cross-border communication and cooperation between non-governmental organizations, and opens a broader space for civil society to make policy impact and advance social change. Israel and Turkey, despite their disagreements, share similar challenges that civil society organizations can work together to confront. These could be global issues, like climate change; regional issues, like resolving conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; and domestic issues, like the need to strengthen democracy and liberalism, and to smooth tensions between religion and state.

Cooperation between Israeli and Turkish civil society organizations can increase their capacity to tackle these issues, serve as a platform to exchange best practices, lead to innovative joint endeavors, broaden ties between like-minded professionals in both countries, and improve mutual public perceptions. This may also have a positive spill-over effect on official relations. As cooperation among societies increases, Israel-Turkey relations will become less dependent on the politicians.

The leaders, in turn, may feel more at ease to seek paths to improve ties, despite the existing political differences, if they sense that this is in line with public sentiments. For example, in October 2020, a Mitvim Institute poll showed that 56 percent of Israelis want their country to try and improve ties with Turkey, while only 32 percent do not. This finding contradicts the negative political discourse against Turkey in Israel, and may encourage those politicians who see value in improving ties to speak up.

In light of current realities, there are several channels in which civil society cooperation between Israel and Turkey can be intensified:

(1) The Covid-19 crisis creates new needs and opens new opportunities for cooperation in fields related to public health (in which Israel and Turkey did not cooperate much in the past), economy and welfare. For example, in April 2020, Turkey sent medical equipment to Israel as a humanitarian step to confront the pandemic;

(2) The transition to online conferencing during the pandemic, enables think tanks and universities from both countries to increase academic and policy exchanges between scholars and experts. It also allows for more easier participation of Israelis and Turks living abroad in bilateral dialogue processes;

(3) The growing global discourse about multilateralism and international cooperation can enable Israelis and Turks to work together in multinational platforms, on issues of mutual interest, such as global warming and women rights;

(4) The rising significance of municipalities and the fact that major cities in both countries are led by liberal mayors, creates opportunities for cooperation between local leaderships and for formulating twin cities partnerships;

(5) Mounting challenges to democracy can incentivize pro-democracy organizations from both countries to exchange best practices and develop joint endeavors, e.g. in the fields of media, civil society, and human rights;

(6) The changing regional landscape in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean increases the need for Israeli and Turkish experts to exchange views on developments, identify opportunities, and work together to promote better bilateral Israel-Turkey relations and regional conflict resolution.

This set of opportunities includes new topics for cooperation and new tools for engagement. It creates an opportunity to bring new organizations from Israel and Turkey to cooperate with each other, and to broaden and deepen the cooperation that already exists. This is not a role for the governments to play. Governments should signal that they see value in civil society cooperation and should refrain from adding hurdles that will make cooperation more difficult.

It is up to civil society to highlight the need for increased cooperation between citizens and non-state actors, to emphasize the benefits that it can bring to both sides, and to lead the way. For that to happen, a coordinating body, such as the Turkey-Israel Civil Society Forum, has a central role to play, much like the Israel-Turkey Business Council assists business cooperation between the two countries to flourish.

Israelis and Turks who care about the relationship between the two countries and who yearn for better ties, do not have to wait for their leaders to change paths and reconcile. They can identify an issue they care about, reach out to partners in the other country, and take joint action. There are already many partnerships taking place between citizens from both countries, and there is plenty of room for more. Lets seize the new opportunities together.

*This article is based on joint deliberations with Dr. Salih Bıçakcı from Turkey, as part of the Turkey-Israel Civil Society Forum initiated by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.

**The article was published on Jpost, 9 January 2021

הפוסט Israel-Turkey Relations Are Not Only About <br> Erdoğan and Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper presents insights and recommendations from a policy workshop of the “Israel in the Mediterranean” group led by the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center. The workshop, convened on 19 November 2020, focused on key diplomatic, economic, energetic, environmental and identity issues that Israel faces in the Mediterranean. The document does not necessarily reflect agreement by all participants.

The Mediterranean has become a central arena of Israel’s regional foreign policies in recent years. Developments in this region present Israel policymakers with questions regarding diplomatic, economic, energetic, environmental and identity issues. The separation and differentiation between these fields is largely artificial given that they are intertwined, with policy in each sphere derived from, and projecting on, activity in the others. This document sums up the insights and recommendations emerging from a discussion of specific issues that concern or should concern Israeli decisionmakers.

On issues of diplomacy, the discussion focused on the questions of how Israel can maintain open channels of communication with Turkey, expand its alliance with Greece and Cyprus beyond the energy field, and contribute to the successful conclusion of maritime border negotiations with Lebanon. The economic discussion centered on how normalization with the Gulf States can be leveraged to bolster relations with Egypt and Jordan, and how the Mediterranean can be mobilized to strengthen Israel’s circular economy. Discussion of energy issues dealt with the advantages and disadvantages of connecting Israel to regional power grids and with alternatives to the exploitation and export of Israel’s natural gas. On environmental issues, participants discussed how Israel could mobilize the help of the international community and states in the region to deal with the climate crisis, and the potential contribution of the Mediterranean to a zero-emissions Israeli economy. Participants also discussed the potential contribution of forging a Mediterranean identity to relationships in the region.

Diplomatic Questions and Answers  

How to maintain open channels of communication between Israel and Turkey? 

The working group’s previous discussions underscored the importance of maintaining open channels to Turkey despite the tensions between the two states, an issue that is increasingly germane given perceptions by some in Israel of Turkey as a hostile nation. The current level of ties between Israel and Turkey seems to be serving both sides. Israel’s partnership with the counter-Turkey Mediterranean axis does not disrupt its relationship with Turkey to any significant extent and does not force it to choose between its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and its relations with Turkey. Nor does Turkey pay heavily for tensions with Israel. Its criticism of Israeli policy boosts Turkey’s image in the Middle East. Although Turkey has de-facto downgraded diplomatic ties with Israel, trade has increased, tourism was on the rise in 2019, and Israeli artists and performers appear in Turkey.

Nonetheless, several factors could lead Turkey to try and ease tensions with Israel. Turkey’s isolation in the Mediterranean is taking a heavy toll and of all the states in the region, Israel would be the easiest with which to rehabilitate ties. Another factor is concern about the UAE turning into an alternative tourism destination for Israelis and a transit point for connecting flights, hurting Turkish Airlines. Also at play is Turkey’s desire to play an active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under a Biden Administration that is expected to adopt a multilateral approach to the issue. Biden, who played a significant role in Israeli-Turkish reconciliation in 2016, could once again contribute to a warming of relations.

Israel and Turkey have shared interests in a number of arenas, which Israel could mobilize to advance relations with Ankara. For example, shared opposition to the decision by Belgium, Holland and Denmark to ban circumcision of minors could serve as the basis for cooperation at relevant international institutions. Members of the Turkish diaspora in Europe are seeking business opportunities with Israel. The Coronavirus pandemic has seen growing online interaction between Israeli and Turkish research and policy institutes. Israel must continue to convey the message that its alliance with Greece and Cyprus does not come at the expense of reconciliation with Turkey. The political power of both leaders, Netanyahu and Erdoğan, allows them to restore relations between their countries without paying a heavy public price or prompting domestic opposition.

How to expand Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus to non-energy issues? 

Israel has a history of relationships that started out with a “honeymoon” but did not have a happy end. Israel must ensure that its alliance with Greece and Cyprus rests on firm foundations that can withstand shocks and challenges and continue to serve stability and Israel’s long-term interests.

The main obstacles facing the alliance are the conflict between the Hellenic states and Turkey, and the gas pipeline to Europe. By its very nature, the conflict between Turkey and Greece and Cyprus endangers Israel’s non-exclusive policy in the Mediterranean and challenges its ability to maintain good relations with both sides. There is concern that escalation of the conflict could force Israel to take sides and affect its relations with the other. The feasibility of the gas pipeline to Europe, which was expected to serve as a political and diplomatic tool to strengthen ties among the countries involved, is in doubt. Israel must act to prevent a gap in expectations with other countries involved that could eventually result in deteriorating ties and unnecessary tensions.

To confront these challenges and to take advantage of the opportunities that lie in strengthening ties with Greece and Cyprus, Israel must continue to imbue relations with concrete and varied content that goes beyond the fields of security and economy. Israel acted correctly in pooling government resources to build cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. It wisely took on the leadership and costs of advancing ties in the field of innovation with these two states. Cooperation has already been forged between chambers of commerce, as well as on environmental issues, tourism, and communications. There are also many civilian initiatives, meetings, Diaspora-related activities led by the Jewish Agency, and more. The Coronavirus pandemic suspended many of these projects and cooperation ventures, but in itself provided a channel for cooperation with these states. Israel can and should take advantage of the European affiliation of Greece and Cyprus to promote cooperation with them through programs and frameworks of the EU, for example in research and development. Israel should continue underscoring the democratic character of all three states, as was done at the start of the warming relationship, in order to boost the democratic component of Israeli foreign policy.

Cyprus is interested in establishing a secretariat for the trilateral relationships that it and Greece maintain with states in the region. This plan is moving slowly despite its importance to the Cypriots, who view it as upgrading their role the region.  Israel’s ambassador to Cyprus has been named as the Israeli representative to the secretariat, and the Foreign Ministry has appointed a political coordinator to support and strengthen the move. An additional supplementary move that Israel must promote in light of its new agreements with Gulf states is the integration of the Gulf and Hellenic arenas to create synergy that would boost cooperation, without attention to the Gulf arena undermining attention to the Hellenic one.

How to achieve positive outcome of maritime negotiations with Lebanon?  

The ongoing negotiations between Israel and Lebanon on marking their maritime border are important in themselves, even if no breakthrough has been achieved, yet. The talks have a “regularizing” effect that habituates the sides to talk with each other for the first time in many years, and create a model that could serve other conflicts in the region. The talks may end up serving an entirely different purpose, not necessarily agreement on the maritime border.

As a lesson of previous talks with Lebanon, Israel must lower its expectations and keep a low profile, focusing only on the technical aspects of the negotiations and avoiding boastful statements about peace and normalization that would likely undermine this move. While Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be involved in the negotiations in order to provide a diplomatic framework, the Ministry of Energy can continue playing a leading role, in order to assuage Lebanese concerns that Israel views the talks as diplomatic negotiations.

The Obama Administration and subsequently the Trump one were invested in efforts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, eventually bringing about the launch of negotiations. Israel must convey to the Biden Administration the value of continued US mediation. It is important that the Biden Administration not regard the talks as a political issue on which it must overturn Trump’s policy, but rather an important professional and diplomatic issue that must be resolved.

Economic Questions and Answers

How to leverage normalization with Gulf States for stronger economic ties with Egypt and Jordan?

The UAE, especially Dubai, is a world-leading expert in air-sea connectivity and logistics capacity that has far reaching potential for Israel’s supply and trade chain, as well as for regional tourism. The Emirates’ logistics capacity and abilities could also help develop shared regional transportation routes, such as a shared Israeli-Egyptian maritime route and a land route in which Jordan plays a significant role. Exploiting the potential of overland and air transport through Jordan largely depends on Saudi cooperation. Development of this route could provide Jordan with a significant and critically needed source of revenue and employment, especially with the declining importance of the Aqaba Port given its difficult access for large vessels. Completion of the overland route and a link of the Israeli and Jordanian rail networks would contribute greatly to the development of such a route. Regarding development of the route between the Gulf and the Mediterranean through Israel, Israel must ensure that Egypt is not harmed and that traffic through alternative routes does not reduce its Suez Canal income.

Israel’s agreements with the UAE and Bahrain present an opportunity to advance significant economic projects. Israel would do well to promote projects with the UAE and third countries whose stability it seeks to strengthen and from which it stands to derive economic benefits. The assets Israel could bring to such regional partnerships include its technological abilities and expertise in confronting the challenges of desertification, healthcare, water, food security, agriculture, finances, and more. Israel should also consider promoting joint projects with the Emirates in Egypt, Jordan and even Sudan. In addition, energy is a standalone issue that encourages cooperation among Israel, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan (and perhaps even the Palestinian Authority, for example within the framework of the Cairo-based Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum) and multinational cooperation between the Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

How can Israel leverage the Mediterranean to advance its circular economy? 

Developed countries with a high-level of environmental awareness are turning increasingly to adoption of a circular economy that strives to end dependence on fossil fuels and treat waste as a reusable resource. Israel’s potential for circular economy cooperation lies in Europe and the UAE, sharing with them its relevant technological and innovative edge. Various agencies in Israel are promoting circular economy projects, among them the Ministry of Economy, the Manufacturers Association of Israel and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Israel must also strive to join the EU’s Green Deal program. Intensification of a circular economy and regional cooperation on the issue could result in significant cost reductions. Nonetheless, the circular economy concept is still new to the region. Egypt and Jordan are very far from adopting the idea, nor does Israel do enough in this regard.

Energetic Questions and Answers

Should Israel hook up its power grid to those of Jordan, the Gulf and Europe?

Maintaining energy stability and security is one of the challenges posed by the shift from fossil fuel to renewable energies. A regional power grid hookup contributes to energy stability and enables daily electricity trade. The more such connections Israel has – to Jordan, Egypt, Europe and the Gulf – on separate and unconnected grids, the greater its energy security. The connections could be of significant value, but in themselves cannot guarantee energy stability. The EU, which is advancing renewable energy development and encouraging such connectivity, has set a target of hooking up Cyprus and eventually the Middle East to European grids. It therefore has an interest in promoting a connection between Cyprus and Israel, too, and might be willing to bear some of the cost with local governments making up the rest. Connection to a regional grid would also allow Israel to sell its energy surplus, even if at a low price, as long as there is no effective energy storage system. Strategically speaking, Israel must maintain its energy independence, especially during times of crisis, and avoid dependence on an external energy source. Along with energy and economic considerations, connections to regional grids also involve diplomatic considerations. For example, Jordan has a surplus of renewable energy, but when Jordan does, Israel does too. Importing renewable energy from Jordan, along with the idea of combining it with water desalination for Jordan, could contribute to strengthening ties with Jordan and protecting Israel’s gas export agreement with Jordan, which has generated opposition there. The decision to expand the electricity link between Jordan and Jericho is a positive political move.

What is the preferred gas export alternative for Israel, if any?

The world will shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy within the coming years. The transition period will likely last 15 to 30 years, depending on technological progress as well as the economic and political will to speed up this shift. During the transition period, Israel must enhance its production of natural gas rather than using more polluting fossil fuels in order to maximize the economic benefits for its citizens and utilize the gas to create regional interconnections. Potential connections for gas exports include cooperation with Egypt at its coastal gas liquefaction facilities, establishment of maritime liquefaction facilities, and the proposed gas pipeline from Israel to Cyprus and Greece, the option of which serves as an important diplomatic tool. Another potential connection for Israel is with Saudi Arabia, which has demand for natural gas. Under improved political circumstances, gas could be exported to Saudi Arabia easily through a pipeline from Israel transiting Jordan.

Environmental Questions and Answers

How can the international community mitigate regional climate change effects? 

Israel should cooperate in this field first and foremost with the EU, which constitutes part of the region, is close by, knowledgeable and oriented toward the issue, and advances a well-defined environmental policy aided by generous budgets. Under a Biden Administration, the US is expected to be far more engaged in confronting the climate change crisis, and may be willing to intervene in such matters also in the Mediterranean. UN agencies are also relevant to the issue, whereas China and Russia are less so. Two important platforms that should be examined in terms of potential future cooperation are the Barcelona Treaty and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Israel would do well to build regional and international cooperation centered on concrete action – for example, joint emergency drills by Mediterranean states together with world powers to prevent maritime pollution and contamination or collect and aggregate information in order to obtain a comprehensive overview of sea-rise levels (Israel does not have systematic, official and sufficient data collection on this issue).

How the Mediterranean can help achieve a zero-emissions goal?

A zero-emissions economy is energy efficient, relying largely on renewable energies and absorbing existing emissions by mechanical and other means. Israel has difficulty reaching a zero-emissions target on its own. Israel is an energy island, it lacks sufficiently varied sources of renewable energy (such as wind and water), other than the sun. Its land mass is small, limiting space for solar energy production. Regional cooperation in acquiring green energy from states in the area and through an electricity cable from Europe, and eventually through cooperation with Gulf states once they become solar energy producers, could offer opportunities for Israel to achieve zero-emissions.

Identity Questions and Answers

How to harness the Mediterranean identity for the benefit of Israeli foreign policy? 

The Mediterranean identity rests on a geographic and topographic space and includes shared elements and characteristics in terms of popular culture, music, food, agriculture, and more. However, the variety of religions, languages and nations, as well as political conflicts, challenge its formation. Some find in this variety the basis for an identity appropriate to the region. The existence of a shared identity, or at least of shared identity elements and a sense of affinity, has far-reaching impact on the ability to promote cooperation in the Mediterranean. Many projects have been carried out over the years in an attempt to form a Mediterranean identity, in a bottom-up manner that starts from the grassroots and would impact decisionmakers.

Activity in the opposite direction is also feasible and advisable – investing resources in building a Mediterranean identity from the top-down, under the leadership of decisionmakers, as a supplementary and necessary move for regional integration and cooperation. There is a fairly positive attitude in Israel toward the idea of the Mediterranean identity, which is easier for Israeli to accept than adopting either a European or Middle Eastern identity. In attempting to forge a Mediterranean identity, one must keep in mind all existing identities in the region and recognize that the EU could view such a process as competing with its efforts to consolidate a European identity. In the process of identity formation, there may be a more limited option, which does not encompass the entire Mediterranean, but rather focuses on the sub-region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

הפוסט Israel in the Mediterranean: Policy Questions and Answers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s and the Israeli press’s focus on this normalization ignores the fact that many in the Arab world still boycott Israel and refuse to normalize relations with it.

It is enough to look at the story of the Egyptian actor and singer Mohamed Ramadan as a reflection of another model of peace, which exists between Israel and Egypt and Jordan.

It was during a November 2020 rooftop party in Dubai that Egyptian celebrity Ramadan had his picture taken with Omer Adam, a very popular Israeli singer. The picture of the two went viral on social media, and the Israeli Foreign Ministry also took the liberty of sharing the picture on its official accounts in Arabic, adding: “Art always unites us.”

The post ignited an unprecedented outcry on Egyptian social media against Ramadan, who was accused of being a Zionist, a traitor and an actor in the “normalization carnival” serving the “Zionist project” in the region.

It took only a few days for the attack against Ramadan to expand way beyond the social media sphere, when the Egyptian actors union suspended his membership, and the journalists union forbid its members from publishing any news about Ramadan.

In the eyes of Egyptians, Ramadan’s crime was that he violated the prohibition of any form of normalization with the “occupying state.”

Things did not end there for Ramadan, as a lawsuit was filed against him for “insulting the Egyptian people.”

In an effort to minimize the damage he suffered, Ramadan argued on Instagram that he was not aware of Omer Adam’s Israeli nationality, and that he “salutes the Palestinian people.” He even later changed his profile picture to that of the Palestinian flag.

Admittedly, the response in the Egyptian social media is not a new phenomenon but, rather, a reflection of ingrained negative images and perceptions of Israel and the Jews, both in Egypt and Jordan.

These perceptions surface from time to time against anyone suspected of promoting normalization with Israel. Such was the case in 2016 with Egyptian member of parliament Tawfik Okasha, when he was expelled from parliament after meeting the Israeli ambassador. On other occasions, the anti-Israel sentiment causes violent outbreaks, such as when the Israel Embassy in Cairo was attacked on September 9, 2011.

Throughout the decades since the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the regimes allowed the anti-Israeli hate discourse to thrive, and, in fact, it managed to play on both sides. On the one hand, both president Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah preserved the peaceful relationship with Israel and solidified their position as mediators between Israel and the Palestinians; on the other hand, they never promoted the importance of peace with Israel at home, allowing the public to express hostility against Israel and did little to prohibit anti-Zionist and antisemitic voices. Attempts to censor antisemitism were mainly due to pressure from the United States.

Such a dual position served them on their home front to cope with Islamic elements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which regularly preached against Israel and Judaism, and with the leftists and liberals, whose opposition to Israel concentrated on the objection to what they perceived as the Israeli occupation.

This approach also characterizes Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who despite having strengthened the diplomatic and military cooperation with Israel behind the scenes and publicly supported the UAE move, still abstains from supporting civil normalization with Israel.

For Sisi, his legitimacy to rule is rooted in projecting himself as the only leader who can stabilize the country and protect it from its internal and external enemies. The depiction of Israel as a potential enemy, in addition to the Islamic threat, serves his argument for the necessity of military autocracy.

The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, together with the absence of any solution on the horizon, continues to fuel the anti-Israel discourse in the Egyptian and Jordanian publics.

The leading elements propagating anti-Israeli and sometimes antisemitic discourse include the Islamic associations and labor unions. For them, opposition to normalization constitutes an implicit form of attacking the regime without being branded a traitor or hurting Egypt’s interests and honor. To put it simply, attacking Israel is the only “legitimate” form of protesting against the autocratic regime.

In this context, the attack against Ramadan serves both as an opportunity to condemn Sisi’s “traitorous” relationship with Israel, while also an opportunity for the Egyptian public to declare its disapproval of the Gulf states’ “appeasement” of Israel, “serving the Zionist dream of leading the Arab world.”

HOWEVER, UNLIKE previous attacks against Israel, the regime’s response to this latest anti-Israeli outcry was not absolute silence. In the government-owned Al-Ahram newspaper, a senior intellectual attacked the unions and defended the relationship with Israelis, especially among the younger generation which never witnessed wars against Israel.

This new approach is important because it indicates that the regime is aware that protests propagated in the media are also aimed against it and thus endanger it. It is also possible that the UAE’s and Bahrain’s normalization with Israel, with Saudi consent in the background, empowered the regime’s confidence in its relationship with Israel.

Either way, it is too soon to say whether the regime’s reaction signifies a shift in its position against anti-Israel or anti-normalization expressions, but its reaction does demonstrate that the regime has an important role in changing the hostile discourse against Israel and reshaping it.

It’s difficult to compare the Gulf states, which have no vociferous labor unions or Islamist opposition, with Egypt, Jordan and other Arab states which have a vibrant, though subdued, civil society. It is clear, though, that in the absence of channels of attacking the regime, anything involving Israel serves as a valve for a “legitimate” protest. Hence the attack against Ramadan enabled Egyptians to voice their discontent with the Gulf states’ policy toward Israel and an opportunity to mock and condemn Sisi’s relationship with Israel.

Israel is facing two types of normalization: the one with the Gulf states (and perhaps with Morocco and Sudan) and the one with Egypt and Jordan. It will be interesting to follow which type will affect the other, if at all, and whether a progress or a solution to the Palestinian conflict may warm the cold type of normalization.

** The article was published on Jpost, 28 December 2021

הפוסט After UAE, Bahrain normalization, <br> will ties with Egypt, Jordan improve? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Opening Remarks

Merav Kahana-Dagan, Deputy Head, Mitvim Institute

The year 2020 will be remembered as a particularly strange one. On the one hand, Covid-19 seemed to bring the world to a stop and freeze everything in place; on the other, it was a year of change and development, both globally and regionally. Despite and along with all the challenges, we at the Mitvim Institute continued to advance a fix in Israel’s regional foreign policies. We saw progress and positive developments on some issues, while on others, progress is yet to be seen. We were successful in promoting joint action with government representatives and MKs to improve Israel’s foreign policy and strengthen the Foreign Service. We conducted regional dialogues with think tanks and experts from Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey. We sought to underscore the importance of relations with the EU and aided Israeli efforts to improve these ties. Just recently, we released the 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, an annual survey conducted for the eighth straight year in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, providing information and insights into the Israeli public’s views on a variety of foreign policy issues.

Dr. Paul Pasch, Israel Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 

The Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung have been strategic partners since Mitvim was established in 2011. We are especially proud of the fact that the Mitvim Institute is one of the few Israeli organizations that still conducts policy dialogues with a variety of regional partners – Turks, Palestinians, Jordanians, as well as research institutes and organizations engaged in discourse about the Mediterranean. The Mitvim Institute, with its modest means, is ranked in a high and respected place on the University of Pennsylvania’s global think tank index, and this is certainly a source of pride. The Mitvim Institute plays an important role in preserving and improving the dialogue between Israel and the governing institutions of the EU. It currently appears there is an opportunity to renew and strengthen the significant Israel-EU relations, which have suffered over the last few years. In recent months, against the backdrop of the agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan, the Mitvim Institute helped us see beyond the sense of public euphoria and understand the process in a more nuanced perspective.

Israel’s Relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean

Dr. Roee Kibrik, Director of Research, Mitvim Institute

It is hard to pin down Israel as belonging to just one regional system. The State of Israel is somewhere in the middle, between and betwixt, inside and beside, and often outside several regions. That explains why respondents in the Mitvim Institute’s annual surveys, when asked “to which region does Israel primarily belong,” are usually rather evenly divided among the Middle East, Mediterranean and Europe. Israel seeks to advance its interests in all three, as part of the regional fabric and balance of power. We must remember that these regions are not separate from each other and are closely interlinked.

Many significant developments have occurred over the past year, some surprising, some initiated by Israel, some led by other players, and some the result of external circumstances. These developments present Israel with many challenges as well as opportunities. Israel is no longer the isolated, enemy-encircled island that it perceived itself as for many years. Israel is discovering that it has much to gain from cooperation and that it can conduct ties with various countries, even those in conflict with each other or with Israel.

Israel has adopted a complex and more nuanced regional foreign policy. While it appears that external circumstances led Israel to adopt this approach, rather than a reasoned, thought-out internal decision, Israel could benefit greatly if it develops a more sophisticated foreign policy in accordance with these changes and adapts its tools accordingly. To that end it must also transform its Foreign Service into a well-funded, effective and coordinated body that plays a significant role in Israel’s decision-making processes.

Prof. Elie Podeh, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

This was a difficult year, but it had some positive parts, and was clearly an unexpected one. Despite the heavy shadow of Covid-19, Israel signed three normalization agreements, with the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan. These contradict to a certain extent the accepted thesis that progress in Israel’s relations with the Arab world cannot occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Perhaps we failed to correctly assess the shift in parts of the Arab world, the extent of the Arab world’s impatience with the Palestinians, the level of US determination and the pandemic’s repercussions.

The biggest change stemming from the signed agreements is a tremendous improvement of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis its enemies. The second significant change is the benefit for Israel’s economy. What is more, Israel’s image in the media and civil society in some of the region’s states has been enhanced. This was no dramatic, immediate shift; we are talking about a gradual change. The Arab media’s attitude toward Israel is fundamentally negative, but the manner in which Gulf media views Israel has improved. There has also been a shift in the Arab attitude toward the concept of normalization. The peace with the UAE and Bahrain is a different kind of peace. It is substantially different from the peace with Egypt and Jordan, signed primarily with the regimes in those states. With the UAE and Bahrain, the change is also occurring from the bottom up, not just from the top down. This is another kind of peace.

However, we must not be lulled into euphoria, as we have been in the past. These are significant achievements, but they are taking place on the periphery of the Middle East and do not necessarily have a dramatic effect on some of the conflicts and problems plaguing the region. Ultimately, the Palestinian issue is the heart of the conflict and we cannot divert attention to the periphery and assume that this will resolve the conflict. We may have even distanced a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A political shift in the US could result in the hoped-for change that would place the Palestinian issue higher on the US agenda.

Dr. Moran Zaga, Research Fellow, Mitvim Institute

The agreement between Israel and the UAE is a groundbreaking event within a broader process. In recent years, the UAE has positioned itself as a regional power active on the regional and international level. The normalization with Israel signals another milestone in its quest for influence and its efforts to adopt courageous and reality-changing measures. The UAE has strategic and ideological motivations in this regard. Israel, for its part, has an interest in facilitating a significant role for the UAE in the Middle East because it holds regional views similar to our own and wields influence in places that Israel does not, such as in Syria and Iraq.

Israel has invested significant resources in developing ties with the UAE through government and civil society channels. The change in relations that will take place will find its expression not only in the openness of ties, but also in their extent, capacities, and wider array of cooperation – in research, culture, tourism and diplomacy. The two states have shared interests and potential for cooperation in additional fields, such as climate change, food security, energy, technology, regional security and the Iranian threat. The building of the joint platforms we are currently witnessing that encompass government ministries, dedicated task teams, civilian forums and Memorandums of Understanding is an encouraging signal of a firm foundation with continuity potential.

Maintaining the special fabric of relations woven between Israel and the UAE is important, as is expanding the ties created between a narrow stratum of decision makers into broader connections. Since the UAE is a federative state, it is worth trying to link up various local leaders to the process. Some of the emirates in the federation have yet to express their views on normalization, and it is important to monitor their attitude. The UAE needs additional legitimacy for the step it took, and it therefore hopes that other Arab states will follow. That is why the ties that it seeks to forge with Israel are regional and not just bilateral in nature. The two sides have a mutual interest: strengthening the Emirati move towards Israel and expanding Israel’s network of ties in the Middle East.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Director, Europe-Israel Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

Israel-EU relations started off in 2020 under the shadow of the Trump plan, deteriorated into threats of European punitive measures if Israel went ahead with its unilateral annexation intentions, and significantly improved under Gabi Ashkenazi as Israel’s foreign minister.

The EU is Israel’s biggest trade partner, providing it with a stick it can use against Israel with varying degrees of force that could all be harmful (for example, the possibility that was raised not to renew the EU’s research and innovation agreement with Israel for the 2021-2027 period). The suspension of the annexation plan paved the way for better relations, and Ashkenazi enjoys respect and a warm European embrace, not the least of which stems from European dislike of Netanyahu and Ashkenazi’s clear differentiation from him. Officials in Jerusalem, Berlin and Brussels are trying to leverage the archiving of the annexation plan in order to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012 and to which certain European states have objected in recent years.

Israel’s normalization agreements with Arab states is forcing the EU to recalibrate its course on a two-state solution, given that non-resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no longer poses an obstacle to normalization with some Arab states. In addition, in order for Israel to be more attentive to the EU, the organization would do well to undo the ineffective linkage it makes between progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the upgrading of Israel-EU ties. The government of Israel, for its part, must stop its incitement that depicts the EU as a foe rather than friend, and that encourages a negative attitude toward the EU in Israeli public opinion, which is without justification or foundation and is damaging to the relationship. The government of Israel must promote ties with the EU, which is a strategic partner of the State of Israel. We must base our relations on dialogue, even if a critical one, and manage to once again distinguish between politics and interests.

Gabriel Mitchell, Director of External Relations, Mitvim Institute

The combination of Israel’s economic and strategic capabilities has created many opportunities in the Mediterranean. The discovery of natural gas has allowed Israel to dialogue with its neighbors and expand contacts with them. This past year, Israel signed the convention that anchors the status of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) as an internationally recognized organization, signed agreements with the governments of Cyprus and Greece on gas exports via the planned East Med pipeline, and worked together with Greece and Cyprus to stem the spread of Covid-19 and maintain open skies for tourism. Israel also offered Lebanon humanitarian aid following the Beirut port explosion, named Amira Oron as Ambassador to Egypt, maintained open dialogue and cooperation channels with Turkey, and coordinated with Egypt, Qatar, the UN and other international players to allow goods into Gaza and avoid eroding the status quo.

Israel currently faces three significant challenges in the region. It can no longer rely solely on the US, which is in the process of withdrawing from the region, and it must therefore look out for its own strategic interests and find additional pathways to advancing its goals in the region. The two other challenges stem from the collapse of global energy prices and the freeze placed on gas exploration in the Mediterranean as a result of the Covid-19 crisis, and Turkey’s challenge to the regional order with an aggressive foreign policy in a bid to expand its sphere of influence. In order to advance its interests in the Mediterranean, Israel could bolster ties with its EMGF partners, expand cooperation with them on issues such as the environment, renewable energy, tourism, cyber and maritime security. Israel could also strengthen ties with European states invested in the region’s future, encourage US participation in the EMGF and expand joint Israeli-American research projects to additional states, display willingness to resolve the maritime border issue with Lebanon, find a solution to the Gaza energy crisis, and maintain open communication channels with Turkey.

Israeli Diplomacy in Muslim and Arab States

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Mitvim Institute

New opportunities have opened for Israel in the Middle East in recent years. Relationships with Arab states are changing, facilitating new and expanded cooperation. The ties are no longer mostly clandestine and security-focused as they were previously; they are increasingly open and also include civilian, economic and diplomatic aspects. The Israeli public and decision makers have identified this shift and are increasingly viewing the Middle East as a region with potential for cooperation and not just as an arena in which Israel must defend itself from its neighbors. The realization of the full potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. That is true even as some Arab states are willing to normalize ties with Israel in return for suspension of Israel’s annexation intentions, even without concrete progress toward peace with the Palestinians. However, other factors are also delaying the realization of the potential in Israel-Arab relations, among them the Israeli government’s domestic conduct.

The State Comptroller’s report issued this year pointed to serious shortcomings in Israel’s Foreign Service. Other than the Foreign Ministry, which has been significantly and deliberately weakened in recent years, over 30 other government ministries and agencies are active in the foreign policy arena, without a central body to coordinate their activities. This is apparent in the management of Israel’s ties with Arab states, and examples of the issues that arise due to this lack of centralization have emerged over the past two months since the announcement of normalization with the UAE. Key examples include tensions between the security and diplomatic echelons and the continued dominance of security officials on foreign policy issues; the rivalry and lack of cooperation among various government ministries operating vis-à-vis Arab states; the absence of effective Knesset oversight, particularly by the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, over the government’s implementation of foreign policy; and the need for a more effective interface between government agencies and the business and civil society sectors.

With Israel facing new opportunities and forging new ties in the region, a greater synergy must be created among the various elements involved in Israel-Arab relations, and their friction and rivalry must be set aside. Management of the evolving ties with our neighbors must be entrusted to the professionals most equal to the task, with a leading role for the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats. The emerging new period in the Middle East opens a window of opportunity to re-examine Israeli diplomacy in Arab and Muslim states.

Dr. Ehud Eiran, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

The Abraham Accords stemmed primarily from security-strategic interests, such as the need to confront Iran and prepare for the apparent decline in the US commitment to the Middle East. That explains the significant role of Israeli security officials in progress toward the normalization agreements, in dialogue and contacts with Gulf regimes and security counterparts there.

Years ago, diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the Arab world were managed by the agency that preceded Israel’s Foreign Ministry – the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, which also conducted intelligence gathering activities in the Middle East. In later years, Israel’s contacts with Arab states became a military issue (for example, meetings of the armistice committees), largely clandestine in nature (for example, smuggling Jews out of northern Africa), leading to the “securitization” of Israeli relations with the Middle East. There is also a lateral-generational aspect involved. The first Foreign Ministry officials to deal with the Arab issue (such as Eliyahu Eilat and Eliyahu Sasson) were products of an open Middle Eastern environment that closed after Israel’s establishment.

The peace with Egypt and Jordan and the diplomatic processes of the 1990s brought the Foreign Ministry back, to a certain extent and at least at the time, to the Middle Eastern arena with the opening of several representative missions in regional capitals. In other words, the type of interaction between Israel and Arab states has generally determined the identity of the Israeli agency leading the relationship. The undermining of Foreign Ministries in the conduct of foreign relations both in Israel and elsewhere in the world has also affected this aspect.

An opportunity has now opened up to expand the Foreign Ministry’s role in relations with Arab states. Hopes of civilian ties, nurtured at the time of the peace agreement signing with Egypt and Jordan, were dashed; security issues have since dominated those relations. However, Israel’s emerging ties with Gulf states hold a promise of success. There is already a history of civilian cooperation with those states that can be leveraged, Gulf states are far from the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and their general agendas underscore greater openness to the world. An example of the Foreign Ministry’s importance in the renewed ties with the Arab world comes into play in multilateral aspects, such as the formal Israeli mission to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi and Israel’s membership in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum headquartered in Cairo.

Haim Regev, Deputy Director General for Middle East, Foreign Ministry

Israel’s Foreign Ministry under a full-time minister is in a different and better place these days than it was six months ago, and that includes participation in decision making, a significant budget, broader areas of responsibility, and more. In examining the Foreign Ministry’s activity in the Middle East, we have to keep in mind who Israel’s interlocutors are in those states. Often, they are security and intelligence officials associated with the rulers of those states, and therefore their natural partners on the Israeli side are also security officials. Links with the Foreign Ministry are often perceived in Arab states as the final stage before normalization of relations. Nonetheless, since the 1990s, the Ministry has had varied ties in the Middle East with relevant elements, especially in the Gulf. The Ministry’s greatest achievement has been the “routinization” effect – accustoming Arab states to Israeli presence in their territory. Since 2016, an Israeli mission has been operating in Abu Dhabi within the framework of IRENA, with Israeli representatives allowed to enter the UAE on an Israeli diplomatic passport, thus creating a basis for expanded relations.

Links with Gulf states up until now have existed on four levels: diplomatic – dialogue with a small circle of senior figures; economic – widespread Israeli business activity in the Gulf, which would not have been possible without Foreign Ministry involvement; people-to-people – connecting civil society organizations and preparing public opinion for links with Israel; social media – the Ministry is heavily invested in Arabic-language social media, creating a public platform for relations to develop once official ties are declared. The Ministry has learned the lessons of the peace processes with Egypt and Jordan, ones that lacked sufficient preparation of public opinion and routinization. The recent breakthrough with Gulf states provides the Ministry with broad opportunities in terms of business, tourism, culture and more.

The Jordanians and Palestinians are closely aligned on the regional scene and they are beginning to internalize the change in Israeli-Arab relations and the fact that the more they lag behind, the more they stand to lose. Now, with the annexation issue delayed and in light of the fact that the UAE is an important ally of Jordan’s, new Palestinian and Jordanian thinking may emerge. It is important to remember that the peace with Jordan is of great strategic importance to Israel.

Ksenia Svetlova, Director, Israel-Middle East Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

The recent agreements and developments with Gulf states have spotlighted the weakness of the Knesset, especially of its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The Knesset is tasked with government oversight, but it does not carry out its mandate. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee has hardly held any discussions on the regional processes that have matured in recent years. Even when lawmakers wanted to deal with these issues, information was not available to them. Some MKs tabled questions but did not receive answers and were dismissed out of hand on vague security grounds. Security issues have dominated the committee’s work for years and the subcommittee for foreign affairs is very rarely convened.

We at the Mitvim Institute recently published a study on how the government conducts issues related to regional cooperation. The study’s main finding was the absence of an overall coordinating body for the many agencies and ministries active in the region. Such a body, responsible for ties with Arab states and tasked with shaping a national diplomatic strategy, must be established. Specific plans must be drawn up for dealing with each country in the region, and uncoordinated overlaps between different governmental agencies must be avoided. One single body must be tasked with planning and promoting regional cooperation, and all the information available to various governmental agencies must be shared. The Foreign Ministry’s tasks have been generously farmed out to various ministries in recent years while the security establishment enjoys prominence and superiority in decision making processes. In the past six months, the Foreign Ministry’s standing has improved and it is clearly participating and leading more. The Foreign Ministry must be the lead agency in diplomatic relations in general, and in those with Arab states specifically.

We are at the start of an important process turning Israel into a member of the Middle Eastern family after many long years. Along with the clear advantages and opportunities this integration brings, it raises complex challenges, and dealing with them requires cooperation among government agencies. The signing of historic agreements without any Knesset oversight or input is a deeply unsound practice that must change.

Yael Ravia-Zadok, Head of Economic Diplomacy Division, Foreign Ministry

Economic diplomacy is the Foreign Ministry’s growth engine. The Covid-19 crisis has illustrated the Ministry’s essential role in acquiring medical equipment, arranging travel for stranded Israelis, ensuring continued flights to Israel, and more. The Ministry is working to leverage Israeli innovation and capabilities for the needs of other states as well, strengthening Israel’s diplomatic equity and identifying new business opportunities for Israeli firms. Over the past two years, Israeli representative offices have helped advance deals worth 7.6 billion USD, which created over 65,000 new jobs for Israelis. The Ministry thus contributes not only to Israel’s strategic security, but also to its economic security.

The Foreign Ministry is flourishing. It is leading a rich diplomatic agenda and has secured additional budgets. The presence of Israeli diplomats on the ground is an asset, as they forge the connection between local needs and Israeli capabilities (and vice versa), and strengthen ties with countries where they are posted. These needs pave the way for action. In 2011, we identified Jordan’s need for alternative trade routes after its main route through Syria was blocked. The Foreign Ministry initiated the creation of an overland bridge for goods from and to Jordan, thereby strengthening Israel’s regional standing and its equity vis-à-vis Jordan.

The economic dimension is a central axis to promoting ties in the region. The QIZ agreement with Egypt has increased Egyptian exports and created 300,000 jobs. Think of the fact that hundreds of thousands of households make a living off the fruits of the peace with Israel. This is no small achievement. The natural gas discoveries have changed Israel’s standing in the region and turned it into an energy exporter to its neighbors. Energy diplomacy facilitated the founding of the EMGF, established this year in Cairo at the initiative of the Israeli and Egyptian energy ministers.

The Abraham Accords are a historic event affecting the entire region. The trilateral fund announced by the Americans will constitute an important tool for promoting joint economic projects. The agreements already signed (on aviation, visas and investment protection) are laying the foundations for future ties and building trust. We will strive to promote trade, innovation, renewable energy and infrastructure projects in the region. Israel seeks to solidify the new partnerships for the benefit of the region, and beyond. The sky is the limit.

Political Perspectives

Minister Orit Farkash-Hacohen, Minister of Strategic Affairs and Tourism

In dealing with strategic issues, it is important to focus on the campaign being waged on social media against Israel. This is a daily struggle and it is not simply about our image, but about the truth. This is a battle for consciousness and for Israel’s good name. Manipulations of consciousness and awareness generate negative discourse on social media against Israel, born of a desire to influence the public agenda in a way that negates Israel’s existence, its legitimacy and its interests. The Ministry of Strategic Affairs is also active in combating hate speech on the web. I recently inaugurated a new smart communication center with the head of the Julis local council and the Council for National and Civic Service, and this year six young Druze women will operate a digital communications room in Arabic.

In 1967, following the Six Day War, Sudan hosted the Khartoum Summit at which Arab states adopted the notorious “Three No’s” negating Israel’s existence – “no to recognition, no to negotiations, no to peace.” Today, this trend has been reversed to one of recognition. Yes to dialogue, yes to connections, no to boycotts.

Tourism is the best expression of peace between nations.  That was why Begin underscored the importance of tourism for building bridges in his speech during Sadat’s visit to Israel. Governments are the ones that sign agreements and treaties, but true peace is built when people meet each other. The State of Israel and I, too, expect tourists from Arab and Muslim states. This is the way to infuse content into sustainable peace between states. We will continue to strengthen Israel’s standing and legitimacy in the region and the world.

MK Ofer Shelah, Yesh Atid-Telem

The chasm in the heart of the Middle East between states striving for stability and radical Islam offers Israel opportunities to improve its standing in the region. Israel was for decades excluded from regional processes, and decisions on substantive issues (such as the war in Syria and the Iranian nuclear program) were adopted without input regarding its interests and those it shares with its neighbors. Putin may invite Netanyahu for a photo-op, but on matters such as the war in Syria, he talks to Rouhani and Erdoğan. They are players in the arena; we are not. The same goes for the US pullout from the Middle East. The true “deal of the century” would be to offer the US a Middle East led by its allies – Israel and the other states striving for stability.

Following the recent normalization agreements, Netanyahu may be celebrating his argument that we can improve our standing in the region without placing the Palestinian card on the table, but separation from the Palestinians is a paramount Israeli interest if it seeks to remain Jewish and democratic. The Palestinians are paying a heavy price for their rejectionism. If we do not take advantage of the momentum with Gulf states to effectuate a separation from the Palestinians, then the normalization too will boil down to a deal intended to improve the standing of various regimes in the Middle East concerned about losing touch with the US once Trump is replaced.

Just like those surveyed by the Mitvim Institute for its annual Israeli Foreign Policy Index, I do not see a recent change in the standing of the Foreign Ministry. The weakening of the Ministry and the parceling out of its tasks to other ministries for political expediency began a long time ago and has been damaging to Israel. This is not just a technical issue related to the Ministry’s presence or absence at crucial decision-making junctions. It is also about the absence of coordinated Foreign Service activity and lack of backing for it to promote vital Israeli interests.

Netanyahu thinks US Jewry will disappear from the map given the high rate of assimilation and loss of contact with Israel. This must be confronted, and the US Jewish community must be reconnected to Israel. That is a job for the Foreign Ministry to do.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair, Meretz

The new agreements with Gulf states are important and must be backed. Nonetheless, the argument made by the government and the Israeli right that these agreements cancel out the Palestinian issue is fraudulent and damaging to Israel’s interests. Progress in negotiations with the Palestinians is in Israel’s interest in order for us to live here peacefully and securely. The new agreements could help advance negotiations with the Palestinians and achieve a two-state solution.

In recent years, we have witnessed a rise in reactionary, anti-democratic and anti-liberal regimes and leaders. Israel has forged and strengthened ties with some of them at the expense of relations with democratic, liberal governments. Regarding Europe, Israel must invest resources and preserve its ties with the democratic states that have been and remain our allies. The government-backed claims that the EU is hostile to Israel must also be silenced. This is a fundamentally unacceptable and unworthy idea.

Israel’s democratic essence does not allow us to distance ourselves from liberal democracies such as Germany and France, and from an organization such as the EU. Israel’s place in the world is among the enlightened and democratic people who defend human rights and seek peaceful conflict resolution. The current government of Israel will not change its policy in that regard, but even it has sufficient members who are supposed to understand our affinity for and closeness to the democratic and liberal world.

Political change in the US could result in renewed thinking in Jerusalem regarding the direction of our foreign policy. Israel has always enjoyed bipartisan consensus in the US. That consensus has been cracked in recent years and Netanyahu and the government of Israel played a key role in this deterioration. The Jewish community in the US traditionally votes overwhelmingly for Democrats. In its ties with the Jewish communities there, Israel’s government must underscore the shared values and interests we have with them and realize its mistake in undermining relations with the Democratic Party and over-relying on Trump and the Republicans.

MK Aida Touma-Suleiman, Joint List

This would seem to be the most successful period ever for Israel in terms of regional politics, with a new announcement of a supposed peace agreement emerging every few days. However, the states with which Israel is reaching agreements fit the profile of regimes that oppress their people. That happens in Europe, Africa and in the Gulf and the broader Arab world. Despite the general impression of success of the Netanyahu government’s regional policy, we are in fact deteriorating toward a more complex situation. Economic trade agreements are a diversion from the true attempt to resolve the situation that led us to the conflict in the first place. Israel is an occupier of another people and Netanyahu’s policy provides an alibi for continued occupation. The Trump plan is not a peace plan; it fails to advance the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, this is a mega-annexation plan thwarting the founding a Palestinian state. The agreement with the UAE is part of this plan.

The agreements with Gulf states distance us from peace. If these agreements serve the goal of isolating the Palestinians and are intended to bring them to their knees, they cannot be considered peace agreements. Do these agreements serve the interests of the people? In my view, they do not, despite their economic potential. Only the wealthy will profit. Netanyahu and his government have launched a dangerous arms race in the region. Since the signing of the agreements, all we hear about are preparations for war and acquisition of fighter jets. This is not a climate that bodes well for peaceful relations.

Anyone who thinks Israel can conduct a regional policy as an occupying power leaves us with a heavy and explosive legacy. Even after Trump and Netanyahu step down, we will have to deal with the obstacles that they sowed into the road to peace. The question that we, and especially Israel’s Jewish majority, must ask is what kind of future and state we want. Netanyahu is building an apartheid state, and his moves do not help us build a true democracy and end the occupation. The alleged success recorded today in relations with the region actually signals a troubling deterioration.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment, November 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But whoever wins, Jerusalem can’t depend on a United States, in the process of withdrawing from the Middle East, to safeguard its strategic interests. Israel must find other ways to advance its goals, most critically in relation to an expansionist Turkey.

When, in mid-October, Israeli and Lebanese officials met for the first time in three decades to start resolving their ongoing Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundary dispute, some overeager media outlets hinted that the two acrimonious neighbors were the next candidates on track for normalization.

But this was no Trump-initiated miracle or frantic pre-election political theater. Rather, the American-mediated talks were the fulfilment of persistent U.S. diplomatic efforts and engagement over the course of a decade.

No matter who sits in the White House, the U.S. remains committed to supporting eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation and the diffusion of maritime tensions. Facilitating such cooperation is a rare point of bipartisan consensus in Washington and is likely to continue regardless of who wins on November 3rd.

But America’s wider engagement and commitment to the region is fraying.

For Israel, compensating for a fading American presence requires a reboot of its regional policies and level of engagement, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, which now has unprecedented economic significance.

Over the last ten years, Israel has sought to maximize the economic and diplomatic potential of its offshore natural gas. In September 2020, Israel signed a charter alongside Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus to formally establish the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a multinational organization dedicated to boosting regional energy cooperation.

But a decade’s progress was scuttled in 2020 by the collapse of global energy prices following the coronavirus outbreak, and by rising tensions between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.

While the next U.S. administration can’t solve these commercial challenges, it can play a constructive role in conflict management, as the breakthrough in Israel-Lebanon negotiations demonstrates.

The primary dilemma for the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean is Turkey’s challenge to the regional order. In an effort to expand its influence, Turkey has aggressively pursued its own, independent policies in the region.

Ankara’s confrontative agenda is partially driven by its need to push back against the success of the Gas Forum. From a commercial perspective, Turkey would have beeen a natural partner in this organization. But Ankara’s relationship with Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus is too strained for it to be a member.

Recent elections in Northern Cyprus saw an Ankara-backed candidate edge out a moderate incumbent president, which is almost certain to add to tensions with Cyprus and Greece.

And rather than pursue dialogue, Turkey has directed its navy to test the limits of EMGF member states and ensnare its neighbors in a cycle of maritime brinkmanship that will ultimately scares off foreign investors.

Over the summer, European countries, such as France and Germany, stepped up to address Turkey’s activities, but without success.

The Trump administration adopted an ambivalent position. On the one hand, it called Turkey out for violating Greek maritime space. Yet U.S. officials made no offer to mediate between the two parties, nor has there been an attempt by the White House to broker a grand bargain between Turkey and the region’s other actors.

This muted approach can be explained in part by the complex nature of U.S.-Turkey ties, and Trump’s desire to maintain a good rapport with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey is a NATO member whose actions are increasingly inconsistent with American and transatlantic interests.

הפוסט Will Biden Help Israel Take on Turkey? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Palestinian Issue as Ground and Ceiling for Arab-Israeli Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The main obstacle to an Israeli-Lebanese agreement has almost always stemmed from Lebanon’s complex political arena with its multiplicity of domestic and foreign players. However, the Lebanese now understand that resolving the dispute with Israel is vital to tapping the energy potential of their economic waters, allowing international energy companies to proceed with gas exploration plans, specifically in the area known as Block 9 adjacent to the contested waters. Given Lebanon’s current severe crisis, conditions are ripe to achieve agreement. The September 2020 signing of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) charter likely also made it clear to Lebanon – which is not a forum member – how far behind it is compared to the other states of the region, intensifying its desire to move ahead. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a figure acceptable to all sides especially Hezbollah, is leading the negotiating process for Lebanon.

The Americans have in the past presented the sides with an informal proposal for resolution of the maritime dispute, which Israel agreed to accept, but to which Lebanon did not respond. According to various reports at the time, the proposal favored the Lebanese side in suggesting that more than 50 percent of the disputed area be recognized as belonging to Lebanon. The importance of an agreement for Israel, even if it means even greater concessions in the upcoming negotiations, would be to defuse an explosive issue in relations with its northern neighbor. It would convey a positive message to its partners in the Mediterranean Basin, although Lebanon is not expected to join the EMGF immediately even if agreement with Israel is reached.

Despite reports of imminent negotiations, it is too early to pop open the champagne. Negotiations by their very nature are rarely straightforward even if the current circumstances appear promising. What is more, Lebanon is crippled by its fragmentation and abundant and harmful foreign influences. Nonetheless, the proactive US mediation and involvement of Secretary of State Pompeo are encouraging. The timing of the negotiations, on the eve of US presidential elections, would also be advantageous to the Trump Administration, especially if significant progress is achieved in the coming month. Lebanon had consistently demanded UN involvement in the mediation, while Israel only wanted American involvement. The eventual decision to hold the talks at UN headquarters in Naqura appears satisfactory to both sides.

It is essential to keep in mind at this point that the negotiations relate only to the maritime border, nothing else. Neither side intends to discuss land border disputes or additional issues. Nor are these talks linked to Israel’s recently signed agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, and obviously not to an Israel-Lebanon peace accord. Israel would do well to avoid referring to such prospects that would only complicate matters for the Lebanese players and intensify domestic and external pressures to avoid agreement with the “Zionist entity”.

These developments are not directly related to the growing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Lebanon (and Israel) has always wanted to resolve the maritime border issue. Nonetheless progress on the Israel-Lebanon front would likely have a positive effect on the climate in the region and could help efforts to ease Greek-Turkish tensions. Turkey is presumably closely monitoring these “winds of reconciliation”, given its growing involvement in Lebanon in recent years, and examining the possible implications for its interests.

Thus, while discussion of peace is not on the agenda, a successful conclusion of the Israel-Lebanon negotiations is important. To that end, Israel would be wise to focus on professional energy discussions with Lebanon, in which agreement seems feasible, and avoid imbuing the talks with broader diplomatic dimensions as some political elements may be interested in doing.

הפוסט Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Negotiations: Cautious Optimism but No Bells of Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum: Cooperation in the Shadow of Competition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper focuses on the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin and the optimal policies Israel should adopt in response. It is based on the main points raised at the seventh meeting of the research and policy group: “Israel in the Mediterranean” held on July 28, 2020 at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center. The paper briefly describes the nature of the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin and examines Israel’s interests and relevant policy, the essence of which is to strive for stability, realize gas deposit profits, and expand regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. The paper does not reflect agreement among all session participants.

1. The nature of the Eastern Mediterranean Basin conflicts

Multiple conflicts and players – Along with many cooperative ventures emerging in the Mediterranean Basin, many conflicts are also being waged – some prolonged and others relatively new, some violent and others diplomatic or economic in nature. The most prominent are the conflicts between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus; between Israel and the Palestinians; between Turkey and Egypt; between Israel and Lebanon; the Syrian civil war; and the multi-party war in Libya. Some of the conflicts have spread into other arenas (in terms of combatants, weapons, interests and alliances). In addition to the states directly involved, local groups are also involved, as are other states in the region, world powers, and global energy groups.

Turkey vis-à-vis the region – Turkey has found itself largely isolated in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. It is engaged in conflicts with Greece over maritime border delineation, with Cyprus over demarcation of economic waters, as well as in the ongoing conflict in Northern Cyprus. It is at odds with Egypt against an ideological backdrop and competition over predominance as a regional energy hub. Tensions between Turkey and Israel have increased with the declining prospects of the proposed gas pipeline from Israel to Turkey and the strengthening of Israel’s ties with Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. Turkey is also involved in the Syrian civil war, where it is fighting primarily against Kurdish forces, and it has intervened in the Libyan civil war on the side of the Sarraj regime in Tripoli, with which it has even signed an agreement on maritime borders. The agreement infringes on Greece’s economic waters claims, generating broad opposition on the part of other states in the region. Turkey’s isolation is also reflected in its absence from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). In order to ease its isolation and bolster its regional standing, Turkey has adopted an assertive strategy it dubs “the Blue Homeland”, using its maritime power and willingness to project military force to command attention to its maritime claims and regional interests. Given this state of affairs, the renewal of the peace process in Northern Cyprus does not appear to be at hand.

Syria and Lebanon – These states are focal points of regional instability and Iranian influence. Syria has deteriorated into a prolonged civil war with involvement of Iranian, Russian, Turkish and other forces in the region. The internal and regional migration flow prompted by the war is destabilizing the region beyond its borders. Hezbollah appears to be serving Iran’s interests rather than those of Lebanon. As a whole, Iran is deeply vested in turning Syria and Lebanon into a land bridge between itself and the Mediterranean. In addition, Lebanon, for its part, has also land and maritime border discords with Israel.

Energy as a source of cooperation and conflict – The natural gas deposits discovered in the Mediterranean are an important element in the cooperation among Israel, Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. In the not-so-distant past, cooperation between Israel and Turkey also rested on energy cooperation potential. The establishment of the EMGF in Cairo in early 2019 is a clear example of how energy can advance cooperation. The gas export agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan are another example. Nonetheless, energy is also at the heart of many conflicts. It is a key element in the conflict between Turkey and Cyprus over their maritime border demarcation, it is an additional irritant in the competition between Turkey and Egypt over their role as regional energy hubs, and it is key in Libya, where local and regional players and world powers are fighting for access to oil resources.

The expression of the global power balance and conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean – The American decision to limit its presence in the Mediterranean Basin region, as expressed in the drawdown of the Sixth Fleet, creates a vacuum being filled by other players. Russia is enjoying the US withdrawal and expanding its activity and influence in the region, as is the Turkish fleet, which enjoys greater freedom to maneuver. The US pullback from the region is accompanied by its distancing from Turkey, resulting in growing tensions between Turkey and NATO and Turkish-Russian rapprochement. This is particularly obvious in weapons deals that Turkey is promoting and in the issue of its involvement in NATO defense projects. In Libya, on the other hand, Turkey and Russia are on opposite sides of the divide. The conflicts in the Mediterranean challenge European consensus, as various European states have different interests concerning the conflicts in the Mediterranean Basin. French interests, for example, are opposed to those of Italy in the Libyan arena and vis-à-vis Turkey. Germany, given its centrality in the European Union and its ties with Turkey, is promoting arbitration measures among Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.

1. Israel’s policy and interests regarding the regional conflicts

Israel as a stabilizing element in the Mediterranean Basin – Israel has an interest in stability and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, wherever it can help settle conflicts and mediate between rivals, it should do so based on its experience from the conflicts in which it was involved itself. Israel should diversify its regional relationships, establish ties with as many players as possible, and expand its fields of cooperation. Israel should also cooperate with regional institutions and organizations – on the governmental and civil society levels – to help promote their activities and encourage them to be as inclusive as possible.

Israel cannot remain impartial. It must stand by its closest allies – In dealing with the Syrian civil war, Iranian entrenchment, and instability in Lebanon, one of Israel’s greatest assets is its ability to conduct discourse and dialogues with Russia and China. Both these powers are deepening their involvement in these countries and Israel should mobilize their help to protect its interests. Israel should also strive to improve its relations with Turkey, without endangering the interests of its main allies in the region – Cyprus, Greece and Egypt. But, along with the desire to maintain a non-exclusive policy and distance itself from the conflicts to the extent possible, Israel must stand by its close allies and look out for its own interests in the tangle of conflicts. It must support Egypt as an important strategic ally as well as Greece and Cyprus, with which it maintains and develops a close relationship. Israel must not accept the Turkish demarcation of a maritime border with Libya.

Continued mobilizing energy to promote regional cooperation – The potential that lies in the natural gas deposits in Israel’s exclusive economic zone is declining given the current energy crisis, market conditions, and existing alternatives. Israel has a surplus production capacity for the local market, and the entry of the Tanin and Karish gas fields into the market, now delayed to the last quarter of 2021, raises additional doubts about the economic viability of the drilling. At the same time, this provides additional gas export opportunities. There are also increasing question marks over the profitability of the EastMed pipeline from Israel to Europe. For now, Israel should keep alive the gas pipeline idea to bolster ties with Cyprus, Greece, and possibly Italy. The coronavirus and its attendant energy crisis have also affected the EMGF, but the forum continues to hold great potential for strengthening regional cooperation. Israel must promote the expansion of the forum to include the foreign ministers of the participating states and not just their energy ministers, and to focus on energy issues in general, not just natural gas, with an emphasis on renewable energy. In any case, Israel must prepare to shift to renewables and take advantage of its gas reserves for the exports of advanced products (hydrogen, for example).

Harnessing stabilizing elements from outside the region – Israel’s special relationship with the US is one of its key assets. These relations boost Israel’s regional power, and it can use them to help its allies in the region. Israel should encourage the US to maintain its presence in the region. To that end, it should nurture bipartisan ties with the US, considering the possible entry of a Democrat into the White House in January 2021. Additional states with which Israel should cooperate in the region are France, which supports Greece and Cyprus in their conflict with Turkey, and Germany so that Israel able to promote regional dialogue and achieve agreements. Israel can and should cooperate with additional international elements that seek to stabilize the region or that have the potential to do so.

הפוסט Israel and the conflicts in the Mediterranean Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The relationship between Israel and Turkey in the last decade (since the Marmara incident in 2010) is in an ongoing slump. The signing of the normalization agreement in June 2016, which settled the Marmara affair, did not restore confidence between the countries or trigger a resumption of high-level dialogue. It’s been two years that diplomatic representation in the countries has been at the level of a Chargé d’Affaires rather than ambassador, a partial indicator of Ankara’s response to the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem and what Turkey defines as sharp Israeli measures during clashes with the Gaza Strip.

In the past few weeks, there have been reports of attempts to thaw the relationship, for example with regard to the issue of economic water demarcation in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. It is highly doubtful that these reports have a solid foundation, and in any case, the chances of advancing such a dialogue are quite low.

The main challenge lies in the fact that it is difficult for the two countries to find mutual interests. Their deep disagreements center around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel’s possible application of sovereignty to parts of the West Bank (which exacerbates tensions on the Palestinian issue), and Ankara’s support for political Islam, whether in the Palestinian arena (Hamas) or in the Middle East in general.

Moreover, Israel has tightened relations with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt around a wide range of political, economic, and energy issues, and they are conducting regular dialogues at the highest levels. A fascinating illustration of the current array of forces is the Libyan arena: Israel has common ground with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and even Saudi Arabia in support of General Haftar, while Turkey and Qatar back the Islamic-supported national consensus government.

An important and perhaps restraining factor is the impressive trade volume that has continued between the two countries through the years. But at the same time, the potential for Israel to export gas to Turkey is slim considering the deep mistrust between the two leaderships, the pandemic-induced collapse in energy prices, and Israel’s growing relationship with Cyprus, Greece, and Egypt.

The prospects for improving relations between the two countries are low at present, given their deep differences of opinion and the absence of common political-strategic interests. Yet it remains important to continue to look for ways to restore political dialogue.

הפוסט DEBATE: How Serious Is the Israeli-Turkish Rapprochement? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper focuses on the impact of the coronavirus on Israel’s relations with the Mediterranean Basin. It is based on the main points raised at the sixth meeting of the research and policy group on “Israel in the Mediterranean” held on May 14, 2020 at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center. The paper highlights the key insights emerging from the Eastern Mediterranean’s handling of the coronavirus epidemic, including the importance of regional cooperation for Israel’s national resilience, the strengthening of Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus, the economic importance of the Mediterranean for Israel, the energy crisis and its impact, and Israel’s ties with Arab states. The paper does not reflect agreement among all the meeting participants.

 Regional Cooperation as a Key Component of National Resilience 

When the coronavirus epidemic began, states exerted greater rigidity and control over their borders and the passage of people and goods as a manifestation of national interests. Cooperation between states revolved mainly around knowledge exchange and border controls. The EU’s response to the crisis among its member states was unsatisfactory at first, although it improved with time. The US’ handling of the crisis in the international arena was strictly limited. Israel compiled strategies for different scenarios that included a wide variety of extreme situations, the spread of the disease being one of them. Nonetheless, its handling of the coronavirus exposed failures in terms of readiness and crisis management, highlighting the importance of regional cooperation and its contribution to Israel’s national resilience. International coordination helped Israel manage border controls, learn about the virus from the experience of others, seek help in obtaining needed materials and equipment, and preserve a relatively high level of trade and economic activity. Israel is a small state that depends on connections with the region and the world, a fact it must keep in mind when formulating regional policy in normal times, and as part of its preparedness to deal with future emergencies and crises.

The Coronavirus Bolsters Israel’s Alliance with Greece and Cyprus

The trilateral Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance is unique in its nature and pace of progress. It allowed for a significant degree of cooperation despite the epidemic, and because of it. The crisis led the three states to place an emphasis on tourism, health and entrepreneurship. Israel maintained close ties with the Hellenic states in trying to tackle the coronavirus challenges, evident in cooperation with Cyprus in knowledge sharing and efforts to obtain medicine and equipment. Israel’s Prime Minister and the President of Cyprus were in close contact throughout the period and Israel served as a point of transshipment for raw material from India to Cypriot pharmaceutical companies that manufactured medicine for Israel’s campaign against the coronavirus. Israel obtained from Cyprus vital goods that it lacked, such as coronavirus swabs to allow widespread testing and resumption of economic activity. Research cooperation also continued, with a focus on efforts to produce a vaccine. The states subsequently sought to create a safe zone for summer tourism.

The Mediterranean Basin’s Importance for the Israeli Economy

The states of the Mediterranean region are of central interest to the Israeli economy. The Israeli industry was less affected by the coronavirus than other economic sectors, but declining demand caused by the crisis undermined Israeli exports. Turkey is Israel’s most important trade partner in the Mediterranean, both in terms of exports and imports. In comparing first quarter data from 2019 with the same period in 2020, the crisis does not appear to have had much of an impact on bilateral trade volume, although objective indexes in the coming months may reflect such an impact. In addition to Turkey, Israel’s other important Mediterranean trade partners are Italy, Spain and France.

Tourism is a crucial resource for countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy and France. The suspension of tourism has also had a significant impact on Israel, but its economy is less dependent on tourism than those of Greece and Cyprus. Israel’s tourist industry helps it present equity to its regional partners, promote cooperation and even display technologies that could enable tourism to recover and develop. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has promoted tourism cooperation among states with relatively low incidence of coronavirus. Greece and Cyprus are some of the eligible states briskly working to attract summer tourism, while Israel is keen to cooperate.

The Energy Crisis Requires Re-Examination of Agreements

The coronavirus crisis has dealt a severe blow to the energy market. Declining demand has led to an oil market crash, plummeting prices and causing difficulties in storage and supply. At the same time, the price of natural gas experienced a global drop, with customers cancelling orders and the price plunging to about 2 USD a barrel (with Israel still paying 6.3 USD per heat unit under a deal between the state and private offshore gas producers). The significant energy price fluctuation is expected to continue at least over the next 18 months.

The global crisis has also affected the Mediterranean. Energy companies have postponed planned projects in Cypriot waters; Lebanon, on the verge of an economic collapse, received bad news when Total announced it had not found gas in its waters and stopped searching. There has also been a significant decline in Egypt’s gas consumption, resulting in the suspension of operations at its LNG facilities for the liquefaction of gas exported by Israel. The Egyptians are trying to sell their gas inventories, lowering the price to 5 USD per heat unit, but are unable to find buyers. Israel is still committed to its contracts with the Delek and Noble Energy companies, paying 6.3 USD per unit of heat. The energy companies themselves are also having trouble. Noble Energy laid off thousands of employees around the world and Yitzhak Tshuva’s Delek is in financial difficulties.

The global and regional energy crisis is overshadowing existing and potential regional cooperation. Israel and the states of the region must deal with the declining feasibility of the ambitious gas pipeline from Israel to Europe, and promote dialogue on resolving disputes and conflicting interests among them. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) is a potential framework for advancing such discussions. It can provide a platform for regional players to seriously discuss the issue of regional gas exploitation as an alternative or supplement to discussion of gas exports to Europe or Asia. The governments involved in the forum must understand how to adapt their domestic economies to enable regional cooperation.

The global price plunge has highlighted the high cost of gas for Israeli consumers, but is also undermining the long-term agreements Israel signed with Jordan and Egypt, locking them into significantly higher payment than current market prices. These developments threw into question whether the interest of these states is to adhere to these agreements. Israel must examine whether it wants to engage in new negotiations with the gas companies in order to bring down prices.

The energy issue is also tied to regional political developments. The developments in the Palestinian arena and Israel’s annexation intentions in the West Bank could affect the regional arena. Annexation could lead Jordan and Egypt to re-open their gas agreements with Israel as a political protest measure, which would also serve their economic interests. Abrogation of the agreements as a response to annexation, a measure that would fall short of cutting off diplomatic ties, is possible. The Israel-Jordan agreement allows Jordan a relatively easy out from its commitment to import natural gas from Israel, stipulating that the US would cover its remaining debt to Israel.

Cooperation with Arab States

Cooperation between Israel and the states of the region has not been limited to the Hellenic states. Israel is engaged in many cooperative ventures with Arab states, including ones in the Mediterranean, with information exchange and knowledge sharing constituting key elements of the cooperation. Israel has also reportedly imported goods through Arab states, including ones with which it does not have diplomatic ties. Israel has vital interests in relations with Egypt and Jordan, and ties with them could play a significant role in blocking or curtailing the spread of the next epidemic. Obviously, cooperation with the Palestinians is essential for successful containment of the coronavirus. Israel’s economic contribution to Jordan was particularly evident during the crisis. Border closures between the two states blocked the passage of goods shipped to Jordan via Israel’s Haifa port. In addition, Israelis stopped tourist visits to Aqaba (as did the many international tourists Jordan had hoped for in the spring), and the pilgrimage of Arab Israelis to Mecca through Jordan was also halted. These two Israeli tourism sources are an important source of revenue for Jordan, which faces a significant economic crisis threatening the stability of the regime. Jordan needs assistance from bilateral ties and international frameworks to improve its economic status.

הפוסט Israel and the Mediterranean Basin Amid the Coronavirus Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The unusual route of the delivery expressed a sophisticated move of high-profile humanitarian endeavors, serving Emirati interests without entangling it in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the one hand, it displayed solidarity with the Palestinians at their time of need. Unlike its neighbor Qatar, with which it is waging a bitter struggle and which delivers cash shipments only to Hamas officials in Gaza, the Emirates could boast it was helping all Palestinians. On the other hand, it set another precedent move in the UAE relations with Israel that was happy to take part in the humanitarian chain. The aid delivery can be linked to the Emirati desire to elevate its international image by advancing “soft power” diplomacy such as medical assistance in this case, even as it faces a severe economic crisis induced by the dramatic global oil price decline. Such policy entails clear political advantages, as it is being translated into economic profit in the long term.

Once the plane landed, the Palestinian Authority (PA) announced it would refuse to receive UAE’s aid delivery, arguing that it has no interest in serving as a bridge for normalization between Israel and the Emirates. The decision came as no surprise given the crisis in the PA’s relations with Washington against the backdrop of the Trump plan and Israel’s intention to annex parts of the West Bank. The Palestinian excuse for rebuffing the aid was not far-fetched, but the exceptional Emirati move fell victim to a different ailment – inter-Arab rivalry, specifically the conflict between PA Chair Mahmoud Abbas and Mohamed Dahlan, the senior Fatah official forced into UAE exile in 2011 after being accused of trying to unseat Abbas. Since Dahlan took up residence in Abu Dhabi, Mahmoud Abbas has not set foot there and has not spared any expressions of repugnance with the state and its rulers.

Undeterred, the UAE continued to express support for the Palestinian people, conveying the message that the PA leadership is irrelevant for its genuine support for the civilian sector. Indeed, UAE humanitarian aid for the Palestinians has never stopped, going through third parties such as UNRWA or the Red Cross. If the PA received direct aid, it was clandestine. Aid for Gaza, on the other hand, was fully coordinated with Hamas through the Red Cross or directly through Dahlan’s wife, Jalila. There were times when Hamas was more receptive to the UAE aid, and others when it closed the door to such aid. The reasons for the shifting attitudes lie in the no less tense relationship between Qatar and the UAE over influence and patronage in Gaza. Whenever Qatar flexed its muscles, Hamas stopped accepting UAE’s support.

The UAE’s humanitarian aid that landed in Israel was coordinated with the World Health Organization by none other than the Palestinian-Emirati Ambassador to the UN Lana Nusseibeh, an Emirati citizen and the daughter of a prominent Jerusalem Palestinian family. She is the daughter of Zaki Nusseibeh, an Emirati government minister (the only one not of Emirati origin). Nusseibeh herself was certainly not keen on routing the shipment through Israel, viewing the Israeli channel, as do many Palestinians, as advancing normalization between Israel and the Arab world, at their expense. Like her, Dahlan, too, certainly did not encourage that route, especially because of the aid’s initial destination – the West Bank. Dahlan would have preferred to play the cards he has left in Gaza (Gaza was his original power base and his home) rather than bolstering his rival in Ramallah. In this respect, the PA’s refusal to accept the aid played into his hands in portraying Mahmoud Abbas as someone more concerned with politics than with the welfare of his people.

If additional proof was needed that Israel is part of the Middle East, the affair of the UAE aid to the Palestinians provides the evidence. Israel fell prey to the tangled rivalries besetting the Arab world and the personal rivalries within the Palestinian leadership. Both directly relate to Israeli interests. After all, Israel is interested in bolstering its relations – publicly, if possible – with the Emirates, nor is it simply a casual observer of the internal Palestinian struggle given that Dahlan is perceived by some Palestinians – and certainly by himself – as a legitimate heir to Abbas.

This tale ends, for now, with an interesting twist. The Emirati equipment and medicine appear to have found their way to Gaza, with Israeli assistance, of course. Meanwhile, on June 9, another Emirati plane, this one with clear national markings, landed in Israel carrying additional medical aid for Gaza. In this four-sided game among the UAE, Israel, the PA and Gaza, Abbas came out the loser – yet again, it should be said.

This article was published by The Jerusalem Post on 1 July 2020

הפוסט Israel Entangled in Arab Rivalries: The Case of the UAE Medical Aid for the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discovery of offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean over a decade ago has sparked intense diplomatic activity. Hoping to maximize the sea’s riches, many of the region’s governments have proposed ambitious projects that would transport the natural gas to Europe via undersea pipelines. Encouraged by U.S. administrations that saw energy development as a vehicle for strengthening ties between its allies, the rough edges of a new regional framework for cooperation slowly took form in January 2019, when the governments of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a multinational body tasked with developing a regional gas market and mechanism for resource development.

COVID-19 has scuttled this momentum. The pandemic’s impact on the global energy market has damaged the conditions for Eastern Mediterranean states to profitably export their gas, and has caused a massive rethink amongst policymakers about how to make the most out of the circumstances. Although regional actors may no longer be bound to building pipelines, energy still has the potential to propel greater regional cooperation in the coming decade. American diplomatic support and engagement would go a long way to turning this opportunity into a reality.

Israel’s Stake in the Eastern Mediterranean

This is a bitter pill for all of the region’s actors to swallow, but perhaps none more so than Israel. Historically bereft of fossil fuels, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields (in 2009 and 2010, respectively) were seen as a potential game-changer for the Jewish State. The Netanyahu government committed to the concept of gas exports as a strategic boon to Israel, and aggressively pursued a regional policy that embraced partnerships with Greece and Cyprus, as well as export deals with Jordan and Egypt. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz spent most of the last five years promoting the “East Med pipeline” — a 1,900-kilometer undersea pipeline that would link Israel to Italy via Greece and Cyprus.

However, the East Med pipeline — which upon completion would be the longest undersea pipeline in the world — was always more of a political project than a serious commercial endeavor. Not only did the path of the proposed pipeline run through disputed waters between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, but also active geological fault lines and deep trenches. These geopolitical and technical challenges could theoretically be overcome, yet industry experts argue that the biggest obstacle to the East Med pipeline is its commercial feasibility. With an estimated $7 billion price tag, there are doubts that Israeli and Cypriot gas would remain competitive by the time it arrived in Europe. For several years the European Commission has been exploring the possibility of committing to the pipeline, but at this stage is unlikely to back it financially.

The collapse of global energy prices brought on by the combination of an oversupplied market, warmer-than-average winter, and the coronavirus pandemic, has buried the East Med pipeline and put Israel in a serious quandary. Committed to a contract with Tamar and Leviathan’s developers that no longer meshes with the current economic circumstances, Israel is paying three times the global average for its own gas. The price discrepancy is so sharp that the Israel Electric Corporation is buying imported liquid natural gas at half the price of domestic supply. It is no wonder, then, that Steinitz began his second term in office with declarations that Israel would accelerate its construction of solar energy infrastructure.

The Position of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

Israel is not alone in this predicament. Almost the entire Eastern Mediterranean is wrestling with similar questions.

The vanishing prospects for the East Med pipeline are as disconcerting for Greece and Cyprus as they are for Israel. Both countries are essential partners in the project. In January 2020, leaders from the three states met in a public demonstration of their commitment to the pipeline (they reportedly signed an agreement but this document has not been made public). Cyprus hoped to link its modest offshore discoveries to the East Med pipeline, and Greece was eager to function as a conduit to Europe. The important difference is that Cyprus’ natural gas fields are not yet operational. In early May, Italy’s ENI, France’s Total, and ExxonMobil announced a year-long suspension of drilling activities in Cyprus’ waters. There are no guarantees that the developers will return with the same interest as they once did, and the remaining export options are costly.

Even operational energy partnerships are facing tough choices. For example, Jordan’s energy arrangement with Israel (45 billion cubic meters over 15 years at an estimated $10 billion) is deeply unpopular because it normalizes ties with a country seen by most Jordanians as a belligerent. With a global energy market that is driving liquid natural gas prices to historic lows, the monarchy is under mounting pressure to find cheaper alternatives. If Israel continues with its plans to partially annex the West Bank, Amman may sacrifice the deal as a symbolic gesture of disapproval even if the underlying causes are economic. Jordan might hope that it could fall back on the United States, as a guarantor in the deal, to cover its debts.

Egypt hoped that offshore discoveries would transform it into a regional energy hub, converting Israeli and Cypriot gas at its liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta and then shipping them off to Europe. Today, Egypt is struggling to find buyers, has frozen activity at one of its liquid natural gas sites, and cut production at Zohr field. While the Egyptian domestic market is diverse enough to absorb some Israeli imports, this isn’t the long-term arrangement the two parties envisioned some 16 months ago.

No matter where you turn, the Eastern Mediterranean energy picture is bleak. Debt-ridden Lebanon was dismayed by news in late April that initial explorations failed to uncover a meaningful gas field. Politicians in Beirut dreamed that offshore discoveries would deliver an instant economic windfall. But with energy companies announcing a suspension of activities in Cyprus’s waters just a week later — the same companies exploring Lebanese waters — the Lebanese government will have to search elsewhere for a financial bailout.

Meanwhile, Turkey appears to be taking advantage of the regional turmoil by continuing to send exploratory and drilling vessels into Eastern Mediterranean waters. However, these vessels’ purpose is more political than commercial. Spurned by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and with no resolution to the Cyprus conflict in sight, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned his military — on land and at sea — to protect Turkish claims to the continental shelf and break what is perceived as strategic containment of Turkey by the region’s actors. Turkish intervention in the Libyan civil war is at least partially driven by Ankara’s desire to break the will of its neighbors and force them into direct negotiations. Not only has this strategy put Turkey at loggerheads with longtime rivals Greece and Cyprus — with whom Turkey shares a long history of maritime boundary disputes — but other actors as well, including the United States.

In the long run, low liquid natural gas prices could become the norm. Some forecast that the present gas glut may continue for nearly a decade as other projects come onto the market. International projects that require costly infrastructure are going to find it difficult to compete with existing liquid natural gas providers and a growing renewable energy industry. Although COVID-19 appears to have undone significant progress in the Eastern Mediterranean, it ironically may have rescued Eastern Mediterranean states from shortsighted investments. Policymakers have benefited from a rare mulligan and can now reassess their regional prospects.

Post-Pandemic Energy Strategy

The first, and most obvious, post-coronavirus strategy, is to keep the gas local. Rather than prioritizing export markets in Europe, the challenge for Eastern Mediterranean states is to diversify their domestic infrastructure and economies to be more gas friendly. This is especially relevant for Egypt, whose domestic demand is only going to increase as its population grows. Emphasizing the regional market will require intense discussions between the main developers and governments to find the appropriate contractual language that suits the involved parties.

But would organizing a regional market assume that all actors can benefit? Over the last decade, offshore hydrocarbons were as much as cause for confrontation between Eastern Mediterranean states as they were an incentive for cooperation. Now that it is clear the gas bonanza won’t arrive as quickly as anticipated, perhaps the region’s actors will consider a recommitment to regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. From the ongoing Libyan civil war to the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey, there is no shortage of opportunities for those willing to decouple their energy aspirations from their interest in creating a functional regional space.

This is where the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum comes into play. Whereas the forum’s original purpose was to deal with matters pertaining to natural gas, post-COVID it could serve as a platform for discussion on a host of issues, from tourism to environmental protection to pandemic support to alternative energy cooperation and security. If a global pandemic instructs states about anything, it is that neighbors remain neighbors regardless of the boundaries placed between them. In short, it behooves Eastern Mediterranean states to support one another.

America’s Role in the Region

The United States should play a central role in this process. Not only is Washington the preferred mediator for many of the region’s conflicts, but American support for the development of offshore hydrocarbons and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus during both the Obama and Trump administrations, who saw the region’s gas as way to strengthen the position of its Eastern Mediterranean allies while also reducing European dependency on Russian gas. Continued engagement with Eastern Mediterranean actors will allow the United States to guide its partners towards a more cooperative future, help develop deconfliction mechanisms, and discourage interference from outside actors like Russia, Iran, and China.

This should happen in a number of different ways. First, the United States should reengage Eastern Mediterranean states in the process of maritime boundary delimitation. This issue a priority for all of the region’s actors, including European heavyweights France and Italy. In particular, Turkey’s signing of a maritime boundary agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in November 2019 sparked considerable protest throughout the region and entangled the ongoing civil war in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy politics. While the Libyan civil war isn’t the source of all of the region’s tensions, American mediation between the aggrieved parties — notably NATO member states Turkey and Greece — on the issue of maritime boundaries would start rolling back tensions and create a more constructive environment for future negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus. The signing of a maritime boundary agreement between Italy and Greece on June 9 was widely seen as a maneuver to check Turkey’s advance. U.S. diplomats should also encourage Israel and Lebanon to resolve their outstanding maritime issues, which would allow foreign companies to feel more comfortable exploring in Lebanese waters whenever they decide to resume activities. A semi-enclosed maritime space like the Eastern Mediterranean requires delimitation agreements in order to avoid conflict. Ideally, the United States would bring all region’s actors to the negotiating table simultaneously. However, the present conditions necessitate a flexible, hands-on approach to certain disputes.

Additionally, the United States can empower the nascent Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum by investing more diplomatic resources in the organization, and incentivizing collaboration between members states. One way of doing this is by expanding the language of the 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (also known as the Menendez-Rubio Bill) in a manner that offers potential avenues for participation by Eastern Mediterranean actors not mentioned in this legislative package, specifically Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Turkey. The United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center described in the Menendez-Rubio Bill could be a conduit for multinational research and development in the myriad topics that are directly and indirectly impacted by offshore hydrocarbon exploration. This could open channels of communication between American and Eastern Mediterranean industries, strengthening both economic, cultural, and strategic interests.

Going Forward

For the better part of the last decade, it was expected that energy would transform the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the pandemic’s aftershocks have disrupted the prospects for regional cooperation. A collective pivot — with American support — away from the uncertain promises of energy could be a blessing in disguise. It provides regional states the opportunity to embrace a shared future that emphasizes energy diversification, multinational cooperation, and conflict resolution.

Although the United States appears committed to reducing its presence on the global stage, it should preserve and expand energy-centric multilateral diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean that enjoys bipartisan support. The region is rich with American partners — a lasting foreign policy legacy would be finding a formula that would allow them to settle their own disputes and find new ways to cooperate.

(originally published in “War on the Rocks”)

הפוסט COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s diplomatic emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean evolved throughout the 2010s based on natural gas findings in Israel’s economic waters and growing tensions with Turkey. Israel cooperated with Greece and Cyprus to establish a new trilateral alliance, which was in line with similar triangular alliances the Hellenic countries were developing (e.g. with Egypt). This alliance became increasingly visible, with the leaders of Israel, Greece and Cyprus setting the tone by conducting multiple summits. Other ministers, government agencies and non-governmental organizations followed suit, and managed to inject significant and diverse content into the emerging alliance. Over the time, the US also stepped in and began to participate in Israel-Greece-Cyprus meetings.

The alliance was presented to the public in a positive light. A special logo was designed, which included a motto emphasizing the democratic natures of the three countries. The EU seemed to welcome this new alliance, and was willing to help fund the feasibility study of the ambitious East Med pipeline project (aimed at exporting gas from Israel, through Cyprus, to Europe). The cooperation around natural gas brought additional countries into the picture, leading to the establishment in Cairo of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in early 2019. The EMGF, which in early 2020 is evolving into a recognized international organization, enables Israel to be part of a regional mechanism with a unique composition of Arab and European states. Apart from Israel, its members include the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, Italy, Cyprus and Greece. Recently, France also asked to join, while the US, EU and World Bank serve as observers. Such an organization provides Israel with both diplomatic and economic opportunities.

Israel can benefit from even more inclusive mechanisms and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. From the onset of its engagement in this sub-region, Israel emphasized that its emerging alliances are not intended against any other country. Namely, Israel’s ties with Greece and Cyprus have not been described by Israel as anti-Turkish. When Israel reconciled with Turkey in 2016 (an agreement that did not hold for long), it did so in parallel to its ties with Egypt and the Hellenic countries, which have deep conflicts of their own with Turkey. Israel began to practice a win-win regional diplomacy that is different from its traditional zero-sum mindset. Recently, however, Israel has been taking sides in the tensions in the Mediterranean, supporting Greece and Cyprus against Turkish actions and aspirations. Nevertheless, Turkey has strategic importance for Israel, and both countries should invest efforts in improving bilateral ties, starting with an exchange of ambassadors. Israel may thus benefit from having Turkey join the EMGF, although this is not likely to be accepted by other members. Israel can also benefit from Lebanon joining. The US has been trying to mediate between Israel and Lebanon, so they can resolve their maritime border dispute, but this did not yield success yet. Joint membership of the two countries in a regional organization may help in setting up new dialogue options.

But, most importantly, Israel should leverage developments in the Eastern Mediterranean to help it solve the conflict with the Palestinians. Restarting the peace process – not annexation in the West Bank – should be the top priority of Israel’s new government, and the Mediterranean lens can enable fresh thinking and ideas on how to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza, reestablish a unified political structure that connects the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and leverage the EMGF to becoming a regional mechanism that also produces positive incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace and contributes to conflict resolution in the region.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: A New Diplomatic Arena for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and the Environment in the Mediterranean Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2019 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The gas field was discovered in the year 2000 some 36kms offshore at a depth of 600 meters. Estimated to hold about 1 TCF, making it smaller than other fields discovered in the region, the Marine field is commercially viable. The reservoir was discovered by British Gas, which was subsequently bought by Shell. Once it transpired that prospects of developing it were slim, Shell sold its share to the PA, which is currently the largest owner along with the Palestinian-Lebanese Consolidated Contractors Company.

Many contacts were held over the years about possible development of the Marine reservoir, with Israel’s involvement, but nothing came of them largely for political reasons. Once Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, attempts to move forward the possible exploitation of the gas field came to a halt. These were renewed in 2013 around the efforts, ultimately unsuccessful, by then-Secretary of State John Kerry to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Reported interest on the part of Russia and Energean Oil & Gas did not mature into concrete steps. Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz was quoted as telling participants of a January 2020 EMGF meeting in Cairo that contacts were underway between Israel and the Palestinians regarding possible gas sales to the PA in the West Bank, including the possible development of the Marine field. No additional details were announced and the Palestinian response was on the chilly side.

It is worth examining the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians in this regard. Israel’s interest in reaching an arrangement on Gaza to prevent further military clashes is obvious.

The Netanyahu government has in recent years expressed trust in possible long-term understandings with Hamas. Such a view fits in with the idea of “economic peace” that Netanyahu is promoting and is also in tune with the Trump plan (even though the plan is not expected to generate a real diplomatic process). In this context, there is also a convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt, which allows tight coordination of positions. Both states are interested in preventing escalation with Gaza and in progressing toward a longterm arrangement.

On the Palestinian side there are two players. The Hamas movement, which has adapted itself to the changes in the Middle East following the Arab Spring and to its room for maneuver vis-à-vis Egypt, is interested in an arrangement that would guarantee its control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas is seeking to achieve this goal in a way that would also provide it flexibility within the Palestinian arena in the future. As far as the PA is concerned, its weakness is clear, intensified by the waning days of Mahmoud Abbas. An arrangement over Gaza that would allow leadership by the PA, including progress on developing the Marine gas field, would serve its interests.

The obstacles and difficulties facing progress in developing the gas field are clear and significant. These include: Control of Gaza by Hamas, a terrorist organization and concern over empowering it at the expense of the PA; the absence of a diplomatic process between Israel and the PA and the deep mistrust between the sides; and the internal Palestinian political split between the PA and Hamas.

However, regional circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean are creating an opening for positive change. In recent years, a roadmap for potential cooperation in this region is taking shape, based on the discovery of natural gas as well as the repercussions of the Arab Spring. The most prominent institutional expression of the emerging regional structure is the EMGF, established in Cairo in early 2019, which is undergoing international institutionalization this year. It currently includes seven members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the PA, and is supported by the EU and the US. The participation of the Palestinians in this forum is significant, and serves a clear Egyptian interest, which is also acceptable to Israel. The gas forum could serve to develop the Palestinian gas field from both a diplomatic and energy perspective.

From a diplomatic perspective – developing the gas filed under the umbrella of the EMGF could provide a convenient framework for the relevant players – Israel, the Palestinians and Egypt. It could be regarded, rightly so, as an expression of regional cooperation based on converging interests.

From an energy point of view – a possible link of the gas field to Egypt, which constitutes a key diplomatic and energy player, could help resolve various disagreements and sensitivities. Egypt is interested in boosting its status as a regional energy hub, which also serves the Israeli interest (for now). Shell, which sold its share in the Marine field is still active in the region (it holds a 30 percent share of the Cypriot Aphrodite gas field) and owns liquefaction facilities in Egypt.

What should Israel do?

Accelerate diplomatic moves to reach an arrangement over Gaza – this requires aligning positions and consulting with Egypt, and renewal of activity vis-à-vis Hamas and the PA, including on the issue of the Marine gas field development. Israel must restore trust with the PA and make it clear that it wants to restore the PA to a leading and more prominent role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip;

Mobilize US support – Israel must update the US administration regarding its thinking on the development of the gas field as part of the arrangement with Gaza and ensure its support;

Create an economic-energy discourse on Palestinian gas – restore the development of the gas field to a high place on the agenda of the relevant players, including energy companies, and stir up their renewed diplomatic and economic interest in this issue;

Re-examine key issues – should Israel advance a direct link of the Gaza field to Egypt, for example to the pipeline through which Israel already exports gas to Egypt (if this is technically feasible) and thereby circumvent Palestinian disinterest and distrust of what could be considered an Israeli takeover of the gas? Can it be useful to also add a Cyprus angle to this endeavor, for example through involvement of Shell company?

Reaching a long-term arrangement between Israel and Gaza requires a complex and complicated process. Development of Gaza’s offshore gas field could and should constitute a concrete catalyst for such a process, as it addresses key interests of the relevant players. This idea also promotes a vision of regional, Mediterranean cooperation, in which the international community plays an important role in attempts to stabilize a bloody conflict.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Potential in Developing Gaza’s Offshore Gas Field הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(Originally published in ECONFO)

הפוסט Forget the East-Med Pipeline: Advantages of Alternative Options to Transport the Easter Mediterranean Gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article examines the current Israel-Morocco cooperation and its development through 2019. It briefly describes developments in diplomatic, security, economic and civilian arenas in order to find common ground and identify trends. Naturally, the paper will not elaborate much on the security-intelligence aspect of the cooperation, despite its centrality, due to its classified nature

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Cooperation in 2019: Warming from the Bottom Up הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Eastern Mediterranean States and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel, Energy, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Shaping a New Regional Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was also decided that the forum is open to accept additional countries, insofar as they accept the its governing rules. Obviously, the message addresses the two absentees from the forum – Turkey, which sees the new forum as a confrontational act (considering that some of the member countries are in various levels of conflict with Turkey); and Lebanon, which presumably could not allow itself to participate in a forum that also includes Israel, even though potentially natural gas (and possibly oil) could be found in its economic waters as well. The presence of the US Deputy Secretary of Energy at the Cairo meeting was important, as it could be interpreted as American support of the new forum and of the cooperation that is taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The main beneficiaries of the new forum are of course the seven members. However, some countries are expected to benefit from it in particular:

Egypt: The kick-off meeting was held in Cairo. Egypt will serve as the Chair of the forum and will also host its headquarters. Thus, Egypt has established its central geo-strategic standing in the region, both as an energy producer (with known reserves) and as a leading political player. It may restore, even slightly, its regional standing, which has been significantly eroded since the events of the Arab Spring.

Cyprus: Cyprus has been long aspiring for a regional forum that emphasizes the need to respect the rights to natural resources of its members, pursuant to international law. The forum may provide significant backing for its political and energy-related positions vis-à-vis Turkey, including a kind of “defense shield” against confrontational actions on the part of Ankara. The Egyptian leadership of the forum is convenient for Cyprus (as well as for Greece), although along the way there may be conflicts of interest over the vision of the East Med pipeline, which currently does not include Egypt.

The Palestinian Authority: It may be assumed that the Palestinian Authoirty was invited to the forum by Egypt, with the intention to convey Cairo’s continued support for the Palestinian issue. By so doing, Egypt addressed the Egyptian public opinion, as well as to the rest of the Arab world. Moreover, having the Gaza Marine gas field off the coast of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority also has practical relevance to the regional natural gas market. The new forum should explore whether it can leverage the potential embedded in this gas field also for the benefit of the Palestinians.

Israel: From Israel’s point of view, this is a very important and positive development, that brings along the opportunity to take a leading role in a regional forum, bringing together both Arab countries and the Palestinians. Israel has been hoping for a regional forum such as this one, which is a political and economic dividend deriving from the gas reservoirs found in Israel’s economic waters. The underlying reason for the Egyptian leadership of the forum is the convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt in recent years, and in any event, considering the complex regional circumstances, only Egypt could sponsor such a project and make it happen. Being backed by such a forum, it would possibly be easier for the Egyptian government to deal with domestic as well as regional criticism and resistance regarding gas import from Israel. It is possible that in the future, conflicts of interest will emerge between the member countries and it would be difficult for Israel to maneuver in terms of export destinations or to maintain its status as a regional energy hub. However, it appears that the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages.

The US: This forum is a structure that well serves US interests, despite its not being a member. The member countries have close relations with Washington and would like to see an effective American involvement in the region, even in the context of natural gas. It will be particularly interesting to observe Russia’s reaction to the forum, since it is a major player in the global energy sector and a global power that is back in the region (from which the US is gradually withdrawing).

It is still too early to say whether the new forum will succeed in playing an important role in the region and beyond, both politically and with regard to the energy sector. However, it is a structure that provides the framework for potential regional cooperation, and for the time being it seems that the member countries have strong shared interests to make it a success.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Benefits from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout the dialogue, there was a sense that Turkey and Israel can find a way to overcome their current crisis and to reinstate ambassadors. Nevertheless, such progress is not expected to lead to a significant breakthrough in the relations. The Turkish counterparts expressed hope that Israel and Turkey will resume talks on natural gas export from Israel; shared their concern over what they perceive as Israel’s support of the Kurds in northern Syria; and pointed out that Turkey and Iran should not be considered by Israel as allies, but rather as countries that cooperate at times regarding shared interest but are also competing with each other and adhering to different ideologies and beliefs. The dialogue also emphasized the importance attributed in Turkey to Jewish community in the US, and to the impact it has on the American discourse towards Turkey as well as on US policy towards the Middle East.

This paper highlights key insights from the meetings and discussions that took place throughout the policy dialogue. It does not reflect consensus among all participants

הפוסט The 2018 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the atmosphere on the Gaza border has been heating up in recent weeks, the humanitarian crisis requires an urgent response. This is a clear Israeli interest, since the situation in Gaza encourages violence that affects life in Israel proper, leads to international criticism of Israel and stands in contrast to Jewish and human values.

There are several plans that outline ways to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, including the construction of a port in the El Arish area of Egypt, the construction of infrastructure facilities on an artificial island off the coast of Gaza, the development of the gas field opposite the Gaza Strip in favor of vital electricity generation and desalination projects, and the construction of a marine port in Cyprus.

The Cyprus option was discussed again recently at the initiative of Defense Minister Lieberman during the tripartite meeting between the defense ministers of Israel, Greece and Cyprus on June 22 in Nicosia. The proposed outline includes the construction of a seaport in Cyprus (or, in effect, the allocation of a number of docks in an existing port), which will serve as a conduit for the transfer of aid to the Gaza Strip under Israeli security supervision. The idea is not new, and the Cypriot response is generally cautious, although mostly positive. In the past, they tried to mobilize the EU in order to provide a sponsorship (mainly political) for the initiative and presumably this is what they will try to do now.

Nicosia, on one hand, attaches great importance to the close relationship with Israel, and hence the need for serious consideration of the Israeli request, which puts Cyprus in a power position as a significant regional player. On the other hand, the Cypriots understand that the Palestinian Authority is not enthusiastic about the idea, as generally they are fearful, and rightly so, to meddle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially in view of the split between Hamas and Palestinian Authority.

In Cyprus, as well as in the EU, there is great understanding of Israel’s security concerns and presumably of Israel’s future demand for tight and efficient control of the goods to be transferred from a Cypriot port to the Gaza Strip. The idea of the Cyprus port, which can be part of a successful Israeli policy in the eastern Mediterranean, has several requirements: 1) serious Israeli-Cypriot (and perhaps Greek) dialogue; 2) discussion and arrangement with Egypt; 3) an international political umbrella with the participation of the EU, the US, and possibly relevant Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia); 4) an internal Israeli campaign to mobilize public support for such a move, including the support of the defense administration, which frequently warns against a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The construction of a seaport for the Gaza Strip in Cyprus should be dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians; currently negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority do not seem feasible, therefore it should not be a precondition for advancing the initiative. However, there is a need to coordinate it with the Palestinian Authority, in order to neutralize any objection for such a move that could be seen as one that strengthens Hamas. There will also be a need for indirect coordination with Hamas (through the Egyptians) in order to ensure that conditions for a successful deal are in place.

The Israeli interest is to prevent a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. The return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip is not in sight, and therefore the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip is still the lesser of two evils in Israel’s view and certainly preferable to the takeover of a more radical Islamist groups.

Furthermore, Israel must initiate and even participate (including through a significant economic contribution) in such an extensive and ambitious effort to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip. A sort of “Marshall Plan” is needed for the Gaza Strip, one that will mobilize the Arab states and the international community to fundamentally change the situation in the Gaza Strip. Such a move would benefit everyone, including Israel, both politically and publicly. The latest round of violence in the Gaza Strip and the almost daily incidents illustrate the explosive potential of Israel-Hamas relations. Presumably, the current cease-fire will not last. The Cypriot initiative, however specific, can trigger a process that will help neutralize what appears to be an inevitable confrontation. Israel must seriously advance this initiative – the sooner the better.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Port in Cyprus Can Help Resolve Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper compares the discourse promoted by the Israeli government, especially by the Prime Minister, that seeks to create an alternative discourse with the one that prevailed until a decade ago. The new discourse is constructed around two main pillars: hope for better relations with the Arab world, but not for a real “peace” or “agreement”, and the belief that it is possible to promote such relations even without attending to the relations with the Palestinians. According to the new working assumptions of the Israeli leadership, this is possible because the Arab world no longer takes interest in the Palestinian struggle as it did in the past, due to two reasons: first, the conflicts within the Arab world (especially the Shia- Sunni conflict) push the moderate Arab states to view Israel as a partner rather than an enemy; and second, because of joint regional interests.

This new perception has no ground to stand on since historically, the relations between Israel and the Arab states have always depended on the Israeli-Palestinian relations. It also overturns the Arab League Initiative, which Netanyahu once claimed was “dangerous to the State of Israel in its current form” (2007) and later claimed “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative” (2016). The “new” Netanyahu is willing to welcome the initiative as a basis for regional peace because he is ignoring its major requirement that an Israeli- Palestinian agreement be signed prior to the establishment of normal regional relations. This article focuses on the discourse promoted by the Prime Minister and his surroundings since they are the most dominant and central actors shaping the debate. Moreover, even Netanyahu’s political opponents find it difficult to create an alternative discourse: In the absence of a Palestinian partner, who can oppose any strengthening of ties with the Arab states? However, this discourse, sometimes consciously and overtly, tries to avoid the main problem: without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim world cannot be normalized. Therefore, this perception leads in practice to continued attempts to manage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instead of encouraging its resolution.

**Published as part of the publication series: Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries: The unfulfilled Potential

הפוסט Netanyahu’s Attempt to Delink Israel-Arab Relations from the Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A total of 25 participants, including the EuroMeSCo researchers involved in the project, as well as additional experts and scholars attended the workshop, which aimed at presenting and discussing the initial research results of the Joint Policy Study. Participants analyzed various factors that may constitute both opportunities and threats to an increasing cooperation between some Eastern Mediterranean countries, such as newfound energy reserves and the war in Syria.

In the first session, Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panagiotis Tsakonas from ELIAMEP (Greece) kicked off the discussion on whether the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a separate sub-regional security system and on ways to promote collective security schemes in the region. During the second session, Dr. Ehud Eiran of Mitvim (Israel) analyzed the energy and regional integration in the Eastern Mediterranean while in the third session, Dr. Muriel Asseburg of SWP (Germany) examined the Eastern Mediterranean dynamics and the evolving war in Syria. In the final session, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin of Mitvim (Israel), Walid Salem of CDCD (Palestine) and Prof. Ahmet Sözen of the Eastern Mediterranean University (northern Cyprus) debated over conflict resolution methods and approaches in the Eastern Mediterranean, and over the benefits of conflicts comparisons and mutual conflict resolution support.

הפוסט New Euro-Mediterranean Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After an arduous negotiation process of more than three years, Israel and Turkey reached a compromise on this particular issue. According to the agreement, the Gaza blockade will not be lied as Turkey demanded; however, it will be “softened” for Turkey. Essentially, Turkey will be able to ship humanitarian aid to Gaza through Israel’s Ashdod port, and will be allowed to build a hospital and a power plant in the Gaza Strip. In fact, immediately after the deal was sealed with Israel, Turkey sent its Lady Leyla ship carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza.

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Deal Could Benefit the Palestnians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nevertheless, a heavy cloud still hovers over the Israel-Turkey relationship due the changes that transpired in the Turkish democracy throughout recent years. We get the distinct impression that the link that connected Israel and Turkey over the years – the pro-Western, modern democratic link – is loosening and may even tear completely one day. The escalation of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the deep stagnation of the peace process will place a heavy burden on the bilateral ties, mainly on Ankara’s part.

הפוסט Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After an arduous negotiation process of more than three years, Israel and Turkey reached a compromise on this particular issue. According to the agreement, the Gaza blockade will not be lied as Turkey demanded; however, it will be “softened” for Turkey. Essentially, Turkey will be able to ship humanitarian aid to Gaza through Israel’s Ashdod port, and will be allowed to build a hospital and a power plant in the Gaza Strip. In fact, immediately after the deal was sealed with Israel, Turkey sent its Lady Leyla ship carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza.

The rapprochement with Israel also allows Turkey to play a significant political role in the region. Most opinions suggest that Turkey could be influential in mediating between Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah, and thereby contribute to a long-term unity government in Palestine. Turkey’s potential role as a mediator between Palestinians and Israel is also widely discussed. Undoubtedly, Turkey will be able to play these roles after building sufficient trust with Israel following the agreement. However, the sealed deal between the two countries also offers Turkey a chance to play other structural roles in the region, in view of Turkey’s so power and image in the eyes of Arab and Muslim societies in the Middle East, together with its long experience of statehood and diplomacy.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Deal Could Benefit the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The trend continued in 2016. Terrorist attacks were carried out in central and symbolically significant places in Ankara and Istanbul, including the central pedestrian street, the airport, a soccer stadium and now a high-end nightclub. Turkey currently has the highest number of terror victims of any OECD country, and a solution to this issue is not yet on the horizon.

Terrorist attacks in Turkey in recent years have been carried out by two main perpetrators: the Islamic State group, in protest against the campaign Turkey is waging against it in Syria and Turkey’s cooperation with the international community on that front; and the Kurdish resistance, in a call for Kurdish independence and in protest against Turkey’s military efforts to distance the Kurds from its Syrian border. While the Islamic State attacks are mainly aimed at civilians and tourists, the Kurdish resistance directs its attacks mainly against members of the Turkish security forces.

The growing motivation of both these groups to carry out attacks against Turkey, alongside their easy access to the country in light of its long borders with Syria and Iraq, form the basis for the dramatic rise in terrorism in Turkey. Additionally, Turkey’s growing involvement in events in Syria, including in military operations that Turkey had avoided in the early years of the conflict, contributes to this situation and increases the desire and the sense of urgency among its enemies to carry out attacks against it, on its territory.

The Turkish defense establishment has had difficulty responding to this phenomenon so far. The consequences of the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last July, including the arrests of military and police officers, are not making it any easier to deal with the problem.

In a speech Erdoğan gave on December 31, before the nightclub attack, he stated that his country was facing a “new war of liberation” against the challenges of terrorism. After the attack, he stressed that terrorism in his country is also related to regional events, and that Turkey is determined to eradicate it.

Nevertheless, Turkey is required to deal with these challenges at a time of ongoing tension between it and its traditional Western allies. While Turkey enjoys security cooperation with these countries by virtue of its NATO membership, it seems this is not enough.

Given this reality, some in Turkey expect that the reconciliation with Israel will help with the war on terrorism. Although the Israeli government is highlighting natural gas as the central factor in its decision to normalize relations with Turkey, Turkish interests are also focused on renewed security cooperation with Israel, as revealed in a policy dialogue conducted in Turkey at the time of reconciliation by the Mitvim Institute and the Global Poitical Trends Center, think tanks focused on regional foreign policies.

The New Year’s Eve attack in Istanbul included Israeli victims, for the second time in the past year. Israeli President Reuven Rivlin offered condolences in Turkish. New ambassadors were posted in Turkey and in Israel about a month ago. The infrastructure for a new chapter in the relationship is already in place. Hopefully, this chapter will not be primarily characterized by shared bereavement and a war on terrorism, but by regional cooperation and the pursuit of peace.

הפוסט Terror Hits Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The risks and rewards of Israeli-Turkish energy cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout that long, wasted period of ups and downs, agreements, disagreements and various crises, both sides dug themselves into their respective positions and refused to budge an inch. When the me was right, and the strategic decision to normalize relationship was taken both by Turkey and by Israel, the heretofore “critical” stumbling-blocks became negligible. Proving that when there’s a will, there’s a way.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט The Path to Normalization between Israel and Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung:

הפוסט Turkish-Israeli Relations: Crises and Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the meantime, China continues its slow maritime advance in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the routes leading to it. Beijing strengthened its civil and naval presence by buying, building, and operating port facilities in Greece, Israel, and Egypt, in the last few years. China is also building its first overseas naval station in Djibouti. These moves are part of Beijing’s ambitious new Silk Road vision, and will allow it to further secure its crucial sea line of communications to Europe. China’s maritime actions in the region signal that it accepts the responsibilities of a rising world power. In the spring of 2015, its naval forces evacuated not only hundreds of Chinese citizens, but also hundreds of other nationals from war-torn Yemen. There are also early signs of a more direct Chinese military and naval involvement in the region. In August 2016, a Chinese admiral visited Syria, and a month earlier China completed the delivery of a third corvette to the Algerian Navy. The Chinese also conducted a joint drill with the Russians in the Mediterranean in May 2015.

Global superpowers like China and Russia are not the only ones to pose a challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean. Several sub-state armed groups share the stage. Back in 2006, the Lebanese Hezbollah damaged an Israeli naval vessel, killing four sailors, when it effectively fired a land-sea c-802 missile at the Israeli flagship Saar 5 Class corvette INS Hanit. In recent years, Islamist groups have attacked a merchant ship in the Suez Canal and Egyptian navy vessels on the Mediterranean coast. A senior NATO official expressed concern earlier this year that an even graver threat will evolve in the central Mediterranean, following the expansion of ISIS in Libya.

Yet, states are still important in the maritime regional security architecture. American engagement in the region has waxed and waned since their navy operated against the Barbary pirates in the early 19^th century. In the latest chapter of American naval power projection in the region, the 6^th Fleet presence declined dramatically. At least for the US and China, and to a lesser extent even Russia, the eastern Mediterranean is a peripheral region, far from their core interests. Unlike great powers, local actors will remain engaged in the region due to the dictates of geography. For the regional actors, defending their shores and their sea lines of communications is a core interest: Not only because they are here to stay, but the discovery of offshore gas beginning in the 1990s raises the stakes for Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Turkey and possibly other regional actors. Indeed, regional actors have been building their naval capabilities, including power projection abilities in the last few years. In 2016, Israel received its fifth (out of six) German-built diesel submarines. A year earlier it signed a deal with the same German shipyard to purchase four multitask corvettes.  In June, Egypt took delivery of the French-built Mistral class landing helicopter dock, and is expected to receive a second one by the fall. This year Egypt also began the local construction of the first of four French-designed Gowind Corvettes, purchased marine helicopters from Russia, commissioned a missile corvette donated by Russia, and a FREMM class French-Italian frigate. Talks of a possible deal for two more French corvettes commenced in 2015. Egypt also took delivery of two American fast missile boats during the summer of 2015, completing an order for four. Cairo also purchased from the United States submerged Harpoon missiles for its submarine fleet.

Similarly, the Turkish Navy, a nine-century-old institution – continued the expansion of its power projection capabilities. In April 2016, Ankara opened an overseas military base in Qatar, which will include naval units. A Turkish shipyard began in May the construction of a landing helicopter dock (LHD) to be completed by 2021. President Erdoğan hinted that his country would move to construct a fully-fledged carrier in the next decade.

Robust regional navies suggest both risks and opportunities. On the risk side, growing naval prowess enhances the chances that an escalating regional conflict can turn violent. Turkish self-confidence on the seas, for example, can lead Ankara to take an even more assertive position over Cyprus’ gas prospecting. In turn, this can affect great powers by forcing them into conflicts they would rather avoid. A possible Hezbollah-Israel clash, for example, might expose the American forces operating in the region to allegations that they support the Israeli effort by virtue of the American-Israeli alliance. Strong regional actors could also humiliate, and even constrain, great power activity. Back in 1968, The Israeli Airforce shot down Soviet jets over Egypt, and more recently it was Turkey that downed a Russian jet. Both events embarrassed Moscow, and in effect, presented a constraint of sorts on its freedom of action.

Effective regional navies also create opportunities. They can serve as allies. After all, three strong regional navies – Egypt, Turkey, and Israel – have solid (though at times, strained) relations with the United States. As such, they can offer a compensation of sorts to the limited presence of the US Navy in the region. Even if not fully-fledged allies of the United States on the waters, some of the regional powers, notably Israel and Turkey, surely share America’s concern over the anti-access/area denial “bubble” the Russians created on Syria’s shores. This is fertile ground for cooperation.

Therefore, although external powers are yet again active in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and despite being challenged by non-state actors from below, regional states still matter in shaping the maritime security environment. The increased capabilities, and expanded reach of the Egyptian, Turkish, and Israeli navies coupled with the Russian and American presence in the region, as well as Chinese ambitions there, all create a more complex environment. In a final analysis, this complexity presents opportunities for the United States, as most of the strong regional actors are closer to Washington than to Moscow. This remains the case, even with the current glitches between the United States and its traditional allies Turkey, Egypt and Israel. If Washington plays this new iteration of a maritime regional “great game” well, it has much to benefit. However, in order to exploit the potential benefits of the relationship with regional states, Washington needs to re-build trust with these regional actors. A clear signal from Washington that the East Mediterranean remains a high priority for the United States, would be a good start.

(originally published by the Hoover Institution)

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Policy Recommendations for Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the army legitimizes these moves is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of how the Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and how the Turkish political culture has taken root over the years. Indeed, in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, the Turkish army succeeded – in different ways – to bring about regime change. However, in the last two decades, Turkey has developed significant immunity against recurrence, and the failed coup attempt of July 15 is an example of this.

The main change in the status of the army took place in the early years of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reign. One of Erdogan’s main objectives, after his party’s first victory in the 2002 elections, was to promote Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. One of the most prominent conditions the EU presented to the Turkish leadership was to strengthen democracy by making the military leadership accountable to the political one. This also served the goals of Erdogan, who feared that the military would attempt to end his rule, as happened in 1997 to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who also came from the ranks of political Islam.

הפוסט Why the coup in Turkey wasn’t successful הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the deal, Israel will deposit $20 million in a Turkish bank account as compensation to the families of those who died during the I.D.F. operation to seize the Mavi Marmara in 2010. In return, Turkey will drop the lawsuit against four senior Israeli officers deemed responsible for the operation. Turkey will also be allowed to play a more central role in supplying humanitarian aid to, and supervising the development of basic infrastructure projects in, the Gaza Strip. Shipments, however, will still be inspected at Israel’s Ashdod port prior to transport via the Erez Crossing—the first of which arrived this weekend. Finally, both sides agreed to exchange ambassadors in the coming weeks.

Analysis of the deal has been skeptical; rapprochement does not change the underlying fact that Turkey continues to support Hamas, an organization committed to Israel’s destruction. One does not need to be an expert in order to predict that the next round of violence in the Gaza Strip—more of a when than an if—will put the deal’s resilience to the test.

But the fact that the two sides reached an accord suggests that differences over Gaza are taking a backseat to more pressing matters. Many didn’t believe that the deal would happen, and yet it did.

For Turkey, reconciliation with Israel is the first step to reversing a failed foreign policy that led to its regional isolation. It is no coincidence that the final round of negotiations began shortly after Turkey downed a Russian jet along the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015, or that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued an apology to Moscow shortly after signing the deal with Israel. Increased security cooperation, enabled in part by Ankara’s decision to lift its veto of a permanent Israeli mission to NATO, should contribute to Turkish efforts to contain ISIS as well as joint Israeli-Turkish interest in limiting Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel is also concerned with regional instability, yet its desire to export natural gas seems to be an equally dominant incentive. Of the multiple export options available to Israel, none are more financially viable than the construction of an underwater pipeline to Turkey. The obstacles standing before a project of this kind are many: a pipeline would run through Cypriot territorial waters and therefore requires Nicosia’ approval; the global energy market could continue to plummet thereby reducing investor interest; and, of course, bilateral ties could collapse again prior to a hypothetical pipeline’s completion. However, given the degree to which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed the deal’s impact upon Israel’s future energy security, there can be little doubt as to its centrality in this story.

Deep distrust remains on both sides. Israel and Turkey share many overlapping strategic interests, but they prioritize them differently. Regional challenges such as the Syrian civil war, and the threat of ISIS are not necessarily a source of cohesion. Yet in the last few months, both sides engaged in a public relations campaign in order develop the necessary goodwill for reconciliation. This is likely to continue in the coming months.

Forging a new narrative requires the implementation of a multi-tier process that includes the diversification of official channels that enhance Israeli-Turkish strategic, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. Civil society actors will play an important role in bolstering these efforts and increasing people-to-people dialogue. Each country’s business community, indirectly responsible for keeping the possibility of reconciliation alive during this period of diplomatic tension, must also be vocal partners in defining the future of the relationship.

Most importantly, Israeli and Turkish leaderships must create a mechanism that will allow them to effectively manage future conflicts. Throughout the decades, Israel-Turkey ties have often been impacted by developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But whereas previous Turkish support for the Palestinian cause was limited to diplomatic rhetoric, patronage under Erdogan and the A.K.P. became increasingly proactive, particularly in Gaza, necessitating a reevaluation of the relationship between Turkey and Israel.

As long as Turkey’s relationship with Hamas remains political, détente could provide a window of opportunity to rebuild the Gaza Strip. As revealed a few days after the signing of the deal, Turkey will be permitted to transfer funds to banks in the Gaza for the purpose of financing projects previously approved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Plans are already underway to build a desalination plant and power station. Basic infrastructure projects not only improve the daily lives of Gazans, but also could stave off future conflict between Israel and Hamas by creating a valuable channel of communication that runs through Ankara.

Why should the United States support this process? After all, Erdogan and Netanyahu are persona non grata at the White House these days. Neither has been particularly supportive of President Barack Obama’s Middle East policies, and that may not change after he leaves office in January. However, American security interests are dependent on Washington’s ability to cooperate with and lead its allies. Now that the reconciliation process has confirmed the sources of Israeli-Turkish tension and mutual interest, the next administration will be better positioned to incentivize cooperation over discord.

Rapprochement signals the end of one chapter and the beginning of a new one. But as emphasized by Israel’s lead negotiator with Turkey, Joseph Ciechanover, the deal only planted a “seedling”. Both parties come away from the reconciliation process with a better understanding of one another’s interests, and therefore will be better adapted to repair and cultivate this partnership going forward. The future of the relationship will be determined by how the two sides choose to care for and grow their partnership, hopefully with an eye toward not only their immediate interests, but also the long-term prospects for peace in the region.

(originally published by the Middle East Institute)

הפוסט Israel-Turkey: Where to from Now? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Supporting Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Expectations are that a deal may be announced following the next round of talks, planned for the second half of June, and reconciliatory messages have been voiced in mid- June by the Turkish prime minister as well as by Israeli government officials.

The agreement is set to upgrade Israel-Turkey relations to full diplomatic ties, and enable a return to normal relations. Major differences will remain between the two countries (including on Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians), but the two countries will be able to return to constructive working relations, as was the case in the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power, starting in late 2002.

Israel and Turkey have been engaged in negotiations to try and mend relations for several years, since the flotilla incident occurred in May 2010. This process had many ups and downs, moving between progress and setbacks.

But the fact that despite the growing mistrust and harsh rhetoric the two sides have found their way time and time again to the negotiation table means that they both see value in improving the relationship.

A public opinion poll carried out by the Mitvim Institute in late 2015 showed that for the Israeli public, security cooperation is the most important reason to mend ties with Turkey. However, possible export of Israeli natural gas has become an important factor as well. While security and economics are important driving forces, the new chapter of Israel-Turkey relations should include more enhanced civil society cooperation among NGOs and think tanks, including in the fields of conflict resolution and democracy.

For example, over the past four years, the Mitvim Institute and GPoT Center have been working together to support the mending of Israel-Turkey relations, and this cooperation can be a positive model for others. There is also an initiative to launch a Turkey-Israel Civil Society Forum, which can help fill a real gap in the field of cooperation between NGOs.

A key pillar in the agreement relates to Gaza. Efforts have been made to find a formula that will address Turkey’s concern about living conditions there, and Israel’s concern regarding security threats.

According to media reports, Turkey will be granted somewhat of a special status in regard to Gaza, which will enable it to support the people of Gaza through providing humanitarian aid, as well as water and energy. Such a formula can enable Israel to improve living conditions in Gaza, without having Hamas be able to claim credit for it. Turkey will be seen as the one to praise for this achievement.

Other regional actors are also of significance. Saudi Arabia, which is gradually becoming a more important factor in the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, is also becoming more relevant to Israel- Turkey relations. Although Israel- Saudi relations do not formally exist, there is increased visibility to contacts between the two states (i.e. joint panels of Israeli and Saudi speakers in various conferences).

The Saudis have also stepped up their cooperation with Turkey, and the close relations emerging between Saudi Arabia and Egypt can be valuable for attempts to mend Turkey-Egypt relations. Efforts in this regards have reportedly already taken place. This is something that Israel should encourage, as a parallel Israel-Turkey and Egypt-Turkey reconciliations will shape a much more positive, and win-win, environment in the eastern Mediterranean.

A new chapter in Israel-Turkey relations seems to be quickly approaching, producing a set fresh of bilateral and regional opportunities that are waiting to be explored and acted upon. The Israeli-Turkish reconciliation should be seen as a first step in devising a new win-win regional architecture in the eastern Mediterranean, and not merely as a way to increase security coordination and to better confront joint threats.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Turkey on the Verge of an Agreement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It has been 14 years since a coalition government ruled Turkey, and this is having visible effects. A political culture of compromise and flexibility has given way to an increasingly centralized regime, which is taking aggressive steps against political rivals and is working to silence critical voices in the media and civil society. Erdogan seeks full control over Turkey. He does not at the moment have the ability to change the governing system from parliamentary to presidential because of the absence of a parliamentary majority. But this is in fact already happening. The process led by Erdogan to replace Davutoglu is another step in a general change to the rules of the game that is Turkish politics.

No truly fundamental, ideological, or political disagreement erupted between Erdogan and Davutoglu and led to the prime minister’s stepping down months after leading his party to a clear election victory. Their disagreements, which began to sprout visibly over a year ago, centered on attempts – while very limited – by Davutoglu to give real meaning to his role as prime minister. One example was Davutoglu’s (failed) endeavor in 2015 to make Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, a member of parliament, against Erdogan’s wishes; another was Davutoglu’s recent, overly prominent role in the successful negotiations with the European Union on handling of the Syrian refugee crisis.

All this was not to President Erdogan’s liking, which was seen in the Justice and Development Party’s decision early this month to withdraw from the prime minister the authority to make appointments within the party. This was the signal that symbolized the beginning of the end for Davutoglu’s term. And yet, Davutoglu refrained in his emotional farewell speech from challenging Erdogan. He emphasized their years-long friendship and promised to serve the party as a member of parliament.

Even if he does so in the short term, it’s likely that the tensions between the two will overflow at some point. Davutoglu is not the first of Erdogan’s partners to find himself on the other side of the fence. Other former leaders in the Justice and Development Party, including some who helped found the party, have criticized Erdogan’s centralized behavior and his retreat from the path that characterized the party when it originated. Former president and foreign minister Abdullah Gül, former foreign minister Yaşar Yakış, and former deputy prime minister Bülent Arınç, have all come out at one point or another against moves championed by Erdogan. And yet, despite rumors in the past about the possibility of the creation of a new party out of those religious-conservative circles, not one of them has chosen so far to run against Erdogan in the political arena. It is possible that in the short term, Davutoglu’s resignation will further reinforce this group.

The Turkish plan: zero problems with neighbors

Davutoglu’s resignation also symbolized the end of an era in Turkey’s foreign policy. He joined politics after an academic career as a professor of political science, during which time he wrote extensively on his ideal Turkish foreign policy. His thick volume provided guiding principles and arrangement for Turkey’s desired conduct on the international stage. As foreign minister, Davutoglu worked to implement the paradigm he had developed. He steered Turkey’s foreign policy away from the conservative character that had characterized it for decades and towards a pro-active, ambitious approach.

Davutoglu worked to situate Turkey as a major country on the global stage, one implementing a multi-regional foreign policy. He worked to transform it into a leading actor in the Middle East, based on Ottoman heritage, and to create a reality in which Turkey has “zero problems with the neighbors”.

At the beginning of his term as foreign minister, Turkey indeed succeeded in attaining achievement on the regional and international stages. But later – particularly after the ebbing of power held by political Islam in the Middle East and the ouster of Mohamed Morsi from the Egyptian presidency – Turkey found itself more isolated and uninfluential.

What’s more, the aggressive policy towards Syria championed by Davutoglu, consisting of a commitment to topple Assad, did not yield positive results. Quite the opposite. Not only did Turkey fail to attain its stated goals in Syria, the ramifications of the Syrian war have exacted mounting security, economic, and social costs.

Just at the moment that Turkey’s foreign policy is seen as having failed, Davutoglu managed to supply his final diplomatic achievement, which may have helped hasten his downfall. Davutoglu, seen as of late as a likeable and respected dialogue partner (relative to Erdogan) by Western leaders – especially German Chancellor Angela Merkel – had a central role in arriving at the agreement with the European Union on Syrian refugees.

This agreement included a historic European commitment to Turkey to cancel the visa requirements for Turks traveling to EU nations. It was a commitment that Turkey did not receive even in the days of the great democratic reforms that Erdogan supported during the first half of the prior decade.

The irony is that Davutoglu, who as foreign minister was suspected by the West to be working to distance Turkey from its traditional pro-Western policy, is with his resignation receiving accolades from the West. And yet, the main concern in the West – and among many in Turkey – is not necessarily the change of prime minister. After all, Davutoglu is still seen as obedient to Erdogan, and so his replacement will be. The concern is over the additional erosion of Turkish democracy, which is guided by the nation’s president and is becoming more difficult to bring to a halt.

(originally published by i24)

הפוסט Erdogan keeps changing the rules of the Turkish political game הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Disaster diplomacy: The attack that brought Israel and Turkey closer הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In mid-December, officials from both countries met in Switzerland in order to finalize principles for an eventual agreement to normalize ties. Reports confirm that an outline and framework for the reconciliation agreement has indeed been reached, although some important issues – such as the blockade on the Gaza Strip – are still unresolved.  Israel and Turkey came close to sealing a reconciliation deal on several occasions since the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, most recently in the spring of 2014. However, while diplomats managed to find formulas that would overcome the differences between the countries, political leadership in Ankara and Jerusalem was hesitant to put the agreement into practice. This time around, there seems to be a convergence of economic and geostrategic interests, as well as political will on both sides.

Signs of this steady and deliberate warming have appeared more frequently in recent months. Triggered by joint economic interests over Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries, as well as mutual concern over developments in Syria, Israel and Turkey committed themselves to a sequence of steps that would create a better public atmosphere, and expand upon preexisting areas of cooperation.

Days before the meeting in Switzerland, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Israel-Turkey reconciliation “would be good for us, Israel, Palestine and the entire region.” These sentiments were also expressed by Israel’s Foreign Ministry Director General, Dore Gold, who emphasized “Israel has always strived for stable relations with Turkey and is constantly examining ways to achieve that goal.” In the last five years, statements of this nature were virtually nonexistent.

Since reports of the meeting first aired, additional positive statements were voiced. Turkish Deputy PM Ömer Çelik’s stated that “without a doubt, the state of Israel and the Israeli people are friends of Turkey.” Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said, “There is a serious, meaningful chance for thawing and normalizing relations between Israel and Turkey,” and that this is a huge opportunity for cooperation regarding natural gas.

The leaders of Israel and Turkey should not let this opportunity slip away. Rather, they should capitalize on the current good will and positive momentum, move expeditiously to resolve their remaining differences, sign a reconciliation agreement and restore full diplomatic ties.

Such a deal will not only serve the immediate interests of both countries but it would also contribute to regional security and stability by countering the advance of violent extremism in the Middle East. Moreover, it may also enable Turkey to become a more significant and constructive player in efforts to reconstruct Gaza, support inter-Palestinian reconciliation and promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In his statement on the topic, President Erdoğan said, “I don’t believe the Israeli public is pleased with the current state of relations.” Indeed, an October 2015 public opinion poll conducted by Mitvim (the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies) showed that the Israeli public sees reasons for mending ties with Turkey, with prospects for security cooperation on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Syria topping the list. In Turkey too, there seems to be wide support for the move, as reflected by a statement of Turkey’s main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who welcomes rapprochement with Israel.

Signing this agreement is a crucial step forward but more efforts will be required in order to restore mutual trust and understanding between our societies and to develop a new narrative in Israel-Turkey relations. In particular, the two countries should work to restoring mutual trust, constructively market the reconciliation agreement to their respective publics, establish diverse official channels of communication, advance new economic initiatives, launch mechanisms for joint analysis and coordination regarding regional events, engage in mutual conflict resolution support and increase dialogue between civil society organizations and new elites.

In particular, civil society organizations – think tanks, universities, and NGOs – should be encouraged to engage in this process. As our experience working together over the last few years has proven, such independent efforts can make impactful contributions to the transformation of bilateral relations.

Turkey and Israel are on the verge of opening a new chapter in their relationship that will potentially contribute to peace, safety, and prosperity in both countries and within the region. Let’s seal the deal.

(originally published in Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Time to seal the Israel-Turkey deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Operating with a caretaker government since its June 7 national elections and now heading to early elections on November 1, Turkey has opened a two-front war against the so-called Islamic State and its traditional foe, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Most analysts have pointed to the July 20 terror attack in Suruc and the subsequent killings of two Turkish police officers as the spark that triggered Ankara’s strategic shift. However, the fact that these events transpired immediately following the end of negotiations with Iran was not an accident. The broader trend of increased Iranian–Turkish competition is playing out regionally as Tehran’s support for the Kurds further antagonizes Ankara.

The improvement of Iran’s international standing under President Hassan Rouhani has coincided with a decline in Turkey’s global image. As Rouhani abandoned the hostile rhetoric ubiquitous to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s brash and aggressive handling of various domestic and foreign crises tarnished his hard-earned reputation as the West’s most reliable Muslim partner. More importantly, as Iran pragmatically began to “de-conflict” with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State while still supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey’s anger with Assad and comparative ambivalence to the jihadist threat prompted many in the West to question this NATO ally’s commitment and value to regional security.

Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Iran in recent years has undergone a major shift, as has its broader Middle East neighborhood policy. Ankara’s soft-power charm offensive throughout the region ran up against the so-called “Arab Spring” and hard power realities, falling short of its ambitions for a neo-Ottoman role in the region. Meanwhile, Tehran has been eagerly anticipating a final nuclear settlement that would once again open Iran up to international markets. During the days of Ahmadinejad, Turkey was Iran’s largest trading partner and a key international advocate. Ankara repeatedly called for lifting international sanctions, as they inhibited the economic growth of its own eastern provinces, many of which engaged in black market trading with their Iranian neighbors just across the border. The pinnacle of this relationship was the infamous Tehran Declaration that Brazil and Turkey proudly announced with Iran in 2010. Despite being quietly killed by Washington because of “miscommunications,” the deal in many ways set the parameters and precedent for subsequent negotiations and the final Iran deal.

So why aren’t more Turkish officials applauding the signing of the Iran deal and the ending of the sanctions regime? First of all, experts disagree on the extent that Turkey will benefit from Iran’s return to the global economy or how investment that once was destined for Turkey may begin to find its way to Iran as the hot new regional destination. But more importantly, the JCPOA threatens Turkey’s regional position, given both Iran’s use of proxies across the region and, specifically, Tehran’s tacit support of the PKK in recent months.

Look no further than Syria, where Turkey and Iran are visibly working at cross-purposes. Much to Ankara’s chagrin, developments in Syria appear to be working in Iran’s favor just as they did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The shifting realities on the ground are precipitating the establishment of yet another Kurdish entity along Turkey’s border, stoking fears in Ankara that the Kurds could attain their long desired state.

Turkey established a healthy working relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Yet, the close association between the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the PKK kept Ankara from developing a similar relationship with Syria’s Kurds. And although Erdoğan was in the midst of peace talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, he believed that bridging this divide would damage his reputation amongst nationalist voters. Direct cooperation with the PYD was a domestic political risk Turkey’s president was unwilling to take given that he has lost his once reliable Kurdish votes and now must appeal to his more traditional Turkish nationalist base. Instead, Ankara collaborated with those in the Syrian opposition who would pursue regime change in Damascus while respecting Turkish sovereignty.

The flaws of this policy were exposed during the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish-majority town of Kobane last autumn. As the United States frantically launched airstrikes to repel the jihadist advance, Turkish tanks overlooking the battlefield stood idle. Little surprise that Turkish Kurds, feeling betrayed by the man who once depicted himself as a champion of the Kurdish peace process and Kurdish rights, cast their ballots against Erdoğan in June’s elections.

In response, Erdoğan has transformed himself into a wartime president.

Legitimized by the Suruc bombing, Turkey’s two-front military campaign against the Islamic State and the PKK reminded many in the West of its irreplaceable geostrategic value and was initially received with great fanfare. But American observers of the region largely ignored the intense media battle this operation has sparked between Ankara and Tehran. Iranian state media repeatedly accused Turkey of supporting the Islamic State, even going as far as to assert that Erdoğan’s daughter Sümeyye visited wounded jihadists in Syria, while in Turkey the pro-AKP media blamed Iran for instigating regional violence through its multifarious proxies, particularly the PKK. One pro-government Daily Sabah column went as far as claiming that the Iran deal emboldened Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations like the PKK while employing rhetoric similar to the Iran deal’s opponents in Washington. And on August 24 images circulated in the Turkish press of Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli visiting the Qandil Mountains where the PKK operates.

This isn’t mere propaganda. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif cancelled his scheduled visit to Ankara amidst speculation that Erdoğan refused him an official face-to-face meeting.

The revival of the Turkish–Persian balance of power — a narrative that dominated the Middle East for centuries — is just the first ripple caused by the Iran deal, and should deeply concern U.S. officials. By minimally satisfying American needs for the sake of their own, competing regional goals, both states are undermining U.S. strategy. Can Washington turn the dispute between Ankara and Tehran into an opportunity to develop a coherent Syria strategy? The odds are slim. But now more than ever the United States must be aware of these cross-purposes and factor them into its broader regional calculations.

(originally published in War on the Rocks)

הפוסט Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades.

However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone.

For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan went on the offensive. Sitting on a panel with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdoğan excoriated Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Regardless of its dispute with Israel, Turkey remained a key player in the eyes of the Obama administration. Washington was convinced – perhaps because of Erdoğan’s previous offers – that Ankara could assist in containing Iran’s nuclear program, the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In October 2009, the Obama administration encouraged Erdoğan and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to separately and discreetly engage in talks with Iran, as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) proceeded to deliver a new sanctions resolution.

Instead of proving Turkey’s quality as a mediator, the resulting Tehran Declaration positioned Ankara and Washington at loggerheads. On June 9, 2010, the UNSC voted in favor of a sanctions regime. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries to oppose the measure. Some American analysts argued that the Obama administration should never have given such responsibility to a country so dependent on Iranian trade and energy: sanctions on Iran would negatively impact Turkey’s economy, and therefore it could not function as an impartial actor. Many characterized the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as simply naïve, while others even claimed that this was yet another example of Turkey trying to distance itself from the West.

There are two lessons than can be derived from these unsuccessful mediation efforts. First, the “zero problems” policy should have only been applied to Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, not the relationships between Turkey’s neighbors or relations between various actors in neighboring states. Turkey possesses neither the carrots nor the sticks to be a suitable mediator in those scenarios. More importantly, the affairs of countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood have too critical an impact on Turkey’s own fortunes for it to be considered an unbiased third party. This overextension of Turkish diplomacy came at a serious price. Second, while conceptually the notion of Turkish exceptionalism has found a place in Western political hyperbole, in reality Turkey is ill suited to function as a mediator between Western and Middle Eastern interests. If Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are committed to reframing Turkey’s foreign policy, then settling their own country’s numerous international disputes must be prioritized over the dream of functioning as an arbitrator in global affairs.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The working sessions of the dialogue included opening remarks by Prof. Mensur Akgun and Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki of GPoT Center, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Gabriel Mitchell of the Mitvim Institute, and Alan Makovsky, former top Middle East Advisor at the House Foreign Affairs Committee. These remarks were followed by a discussion among all participants, which is summarized in this document.

הפוסט The US role in Israel-Turkey relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Turkey Relations after the War in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט What is the role of Israel in Turkey’s political universe? A Q&A with Dr. Emre Erdoğan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The visit was carried out in light of progress made towards Israel-Turkey reconciliation. It was aimed at preparing for the day after an agreement is signed between the two countries. Yakış’s visit included a series of events and meetings with prominent politicians and diplomats, which focused on bi-lateral issues, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and regional affairs.

On 20 May 2014, H.E. Yakış spoke at a special event at the Israeli Parliament (Knesset), organized by the Mitvim Institute and the Knesset Lobby for Regional Cooperation headed by MK Nitzan Horowitz (Meretz). The event was attended by members of Knesset, diplomats, scholars, journalists, and businessmen.

The following day (21 May 2014), H.E. Yakış also gave a public lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he was hosted by the Nehemia Levtzion Center for Islamic Studies, the Forum of Turkish Studies, the European Forum, and the Mitvim Institute. His lecture dealt with Turkey’s foreign policy and the future of Turkey-Israel relations.

During the visit, Israel’s Channel 2 News broadcasted an exclusive interview with H.E. Yakış, conducted by Arad Nir, the channel’s foreign news editor.

הפוסט Turkey’s Former Foreign Minister, H.E. Yaşar Yakış, Visited Israel to Promote Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, even though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Anadolu Agency (AA) that Israel desires positive relations with Turkey and hopes reconciliation will arrive in the near future, the circumstances under which those statements were given – while exposing an alleged Iranian arms shipment to the Gaza Strip – speaks volumes about his position toward rapprochement. For the two former partners to officially bury the hatchet, a creative solution must be found to solving Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s demand that Israel lift its blockade on the Gaza Strip.

The blockade is an essential aspect to Israel’s security as long as Hamas or any other actor deemed a threat to the lives of Israeli citizens controls the area.

Those positions did not change because of the Gaza flotilla and in fact have only been reinforced by the Klos C’s March 5, 2014 capture.

However, Israel has shown remarkable flexibility on the Gaza issue since Netanyahu’s Obama-orchestrated- apology to Erdoğan one year ago. In that time, Israel oversaw a boost in Turkish humanitarian aid delivered via the Ashdod Port, in addition to signing off on the transfer of materials required to build a Turkish hospital in Gaza. The policy shift was impactful enough to garner the praise of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and will likely continue when diplomatic ties are restored.

Confidence building measures like these have the added benefit of playing a role in the rapprochement process and according to multiple sources, Netanyahu received a copy of a draft agreement in mid-February.

As reported, the deal would include a $20-23 million compensation package that Israel would pay to the families of the nine Turkish citizens who died aboard the MV Mavi Marmara in May 2010. In exchange, Turkey would pass a legislation that would nullify all ongoing lawsuits against the IDF soldiers and officers involved in the raid. Finally, the agreement would draw up a blueprint for normalizing ties between the two countries.

Netanyahu has now been mulling over the draft agreement (which is rumored to only lightly touch upon the Gaza blockade) for nearly one month, which likely prompted Erdoğan’s crabby one-liner that, “Nothing will happen without lifting the siege on Gaza.”

This, of course, only gives Israel’s premier more reason to pause and reconsider.

Netanyahu knows that even if he did sign off on the draft agreement, no consensus between the two parties would be reached until after the completion of Turkey’s municipal elections on March 30.

Erdoğan does not wish to reach a deal with Israel while his party is still campaigning for votes. Elections can’t impact rapprochement, but rapprochement could hypothetically impact elections. (There is a counterargument that Netanyahu doesn’t want to give Erdoğan a critical diplomatic achievement prior to elections.) And while reaching a deal is important to Netanyahu, it is secondary compared to the prevention of Iran’s nuclear program and the current round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

Don’t forget, Netanyahu rejected a draft agreement in 2011 when the conditions were not deemed favorable. He is willing to let talks wither and die until the timing is better and has the support of his cabinet and the Israeli public.

Both Israel and Turkey are looking to end this period of agitation. Rapprochement serves each country’s national interests with the potential of regional influence, natural gas cooperation, and support for each other’s peace processes all on the table.

But in order for this to happen, the Gaza blockade must be negotiated separately. The alternative is for Netanyahu, whose critical worldview has only been reinforced of late by rocket fire and missile smuggling, to again walk away from a deal.

(originally published in the Daily Sabbah)

הפוסט For Netanyahu, security trumps rapprochement with Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Published in The Jerusalem Post, January 3, 2014

Yonatan Touval is a foreign policy analyst based in Tel Aviv. He has worked with several Israeli nongovernmental organizations dedicated to advancing final-status agreements between Israel and its neighbors.

As Secretary of State John Kerry hammers out the principles for an Israeli-Palestinian “framework agreement,” many are speculating that he has formally adopted Jerusalem’s demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state. The importance of this step — both historically and for the future of U.S. peacemaking efforts in the region — should not be underestimated.

There are good reasons why the U.S. position on this issue has been slow to evolve. For one thing, the Israeli demand is relatively new; it was first explicitly tied to negotiations by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2007 and later adopted by Benjamin Netanyahu. Its novelty, coupled with the fact that Olmert dropped his insistence once good-faith negotiations with the Palestinians got underway during his last months in office, has made the demand seem, at best, superfluous and, at worst, like an attempt to stonewall progress.

Nevertheless, the United States took a significant step when, in a May 2011 speech, President Obama defined his vision for peace with the words “Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people.” The language made clear that, whatever the Obama administration thought were Netanyahu’s motivations, it accepted that Israel’s demand could no longer be ignored.

Now the matter of how that demand proceeds becomes all-important. Indeed, depending on its exact framing, the U.S. position could either lead to a major breakthrough or constitute a diplomatic blunder that would reflect profound insensitivity to the symbolic dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and risk burying the prospects for an agreement for some time to come.

Having already accorded Israel formal diplomatic recognition in 1993, the Palestinians have a strong case for objecting to the demand that they now recognize Israel’s national and cultural identity as well. Recognition of another state’s self-identity has no place in standard diplomatic practice. And for the Palestinians to extend such recognition to Israel poses a challenge beyond the usual argument that doing so would constitute a political slap in the face to the 1.6 million Palestinians who are citizens of Israel. For at its core, Israel’s Jewishness is a constitutive element of the Zionist national narrative — a narrative that, for historical reasons, is and perhaps forever will be incommensurable with that of the Palestinians.

Israel didn’t become Jewish by magic. It did so through a long-fought battle, waged on the diplomatic world stage as well as on the ground. Among the consequences of that battle: Some 600,000 Palestinians either fled or were expelled from the newly created state of Israel in 1948 and became refugees. In other words, Israel’s Jewish identity is inextricable from what the Palestinians call the Nakba, or the “catastrophe.”

Yet if it is wrong that, as Netanyahu has recently said, Palestinian recognition of Israel’s Jewishness should be the “minimal requirement for peace,” such recognition would still mark a profoundly symbolic act of reconciliation. For such reconciliation to take place, however, Israel would have to be ready to reciprocate with an equally conciliatory gesture. And there is no more fitting gesture than Israeli recognition of Palestinian suffering.

Such a recognition need not be difficult to fathom. Numerous formulations — official and unofficial — have been proposed over the years. At the Taba talks of January 2001, the Israeli team drafted a document whose operative phrase — “The State of Israel solemnly expresses its sorrow for the tragedy of the Palestinian refugees, their suffering and losses” — was considered extremely far-reaching. Since then, Israeli society has grown more at ease with competing narratives to the traditional Zionist one. A poll conducted last month, for instance, found that two-thirds of Israeli Jews would like their children to learn the “Palestinian narrative” about the conflict.

The exact language of the Israeli recognition would have to be negotiated, of course. The Palestinians may well seek to obtain an explicit apology for the consequences of Israel’s establishment, something Israel would be reluctant to offer. But Israel could acknowledge Palestinian suffering without undermining its own national narrative or — as it should be rightly wary — potentially exposing itself to legal charges in international tribunals.

The United States should encourage Israel to move in this direction by tabling its own proposal for such an acknowledgment — one that might empower the Palestinians enough to reciprocate with the recognition Israel so avowedly seeks.

הפוסט A new understanding for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Of course there are only losers in this kind of game. Both prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Binyamin Netanyahu are finding it increasingly difficult to actualize their country’s foreign policy goals without regional partnership.

For President Barack Obama it may register as his biggest diplomatic failure to date; it is one thing to struggle with coaxing enemies to the negotiation table, but an inability to reconcile longtime strategic partners is thoroughly disquieting. And the stalemate continues to negatively impact the Israeli and Turkish publics.

For this reason, Track II policymakers from the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul and Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies congregated last week to brainstorm fresh methods that would reinvigorate the stagnant negotiations.

It was a unique opportunity for dialogue during a time when diplomatic ties are downgraded and negative attitudes dominate.

What came out of the (at times heated) discussions was the need, in lieu of the changes within Turkish civil society, for a new narrative, which can substitute for the military partnership that defined much of the past 60 years.

Some of these narratives already exist.

Erdogan’s outburst at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident aside, bilateral trade between the two countries has quadrupled since 1999 and now stands at over $4 billion annually. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war when Assad closed his borders, Israel – in an act of extreme flexibility – has aided Turkey in the transportation of goods to and from Jordan.

Both countries have the ability to assist the other in conflict resolution, whether it be Palestine or elsewhere.

Israel’s offshore gas equation will (in all likelihood) involve a Turkish solution with critical regional implications.

This is not to mention the mutual strategic interests that Israel and Turkey continue to share vis a vis Syria and the Iranian nuclear program.

But no matter what new narratives may be developed in the future, the current impasse must first be settled, and Mitvim and GPoT participants were able to shed enormous light on the obstacles currently facing negotiators.

Israelis expressed a feeling of betrayal after Netanyahu’s apology in March was coldly received, and reiterated the primacy of legal innocence regardless of whether the government agrees to an ex gratia payment to the Mavi Marmara victims. Most importantly, many of the Israelis present insisted that Turkey drop all charges against any IDF officers of soldiers believed to be, or who actually were involved in the 2010 affair.

The Turks present made it abundantly clear that the criminal and civil cases related to the Mavi Marmara – which have largely been hijacked by the IHH – could no longer be dropped without the signing of an international treaty voted upon by parliament; further negotiations would be necessary in order to reach a mutually satisfactory and honorable conclusion. In addition they reiterated how a show of good will in Gaza would be positively received by the Turkish media.

Some in the room (and no doubt a healthy dose of my readers) remained skeptical. They pinned everything on Erdogan or Netanyahu. Yet those doubts were countered on both sides by claims that Erdogan has come to regret the exuberance he exhibited while divorcing from Israel, and that Netanyahu’s unwillingness to apologize was due the influence of Avigdor Liberman.

Each leader was described as a pragmatist, an intriguing term considering the abundance of negative publicity their policies and statements attract.

Though it remained unclear whether the skeptics were sufficiently answered, everyone agreed that a third party was the crucial link to ensuring normalization.

Names of potential negotiators were bandied about, including retired heads of state Carl Bildt and Bill Clinton, but I believe the only person who would garner the respect and attention of Erdogan and Netanyahu is President Obama himself.

Obama has fallen short on so many occasions it is impossible to propose his name without reservations. And yet there is a certain measure of hard and soft power generated by the White House that makes even a half-hearted effort by a lame duck impossible to ignore (see current peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians).

If Obama chose to personally tackle Israeli-Turkish negotiations, to commit fully and not be satisfied until the job is done, then we could see the normalization of ties within the next six months.

Until that day arrives, institutions like Mitvim and GPoT will continue to promote alternative channels of communication with open eyes in the quest for a new Israeli-Turkish narrative. For two Middle Eastern democracies with a history of extreme peaks and valleys, it is impossible to speak in absolutes, but considering the high level of dialogue when representatives of both countries meet it is hard to believe that relations will stay down for long.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two years later Erdoğan has become a persona non grata in Egypt. Following Morsi’s downfall, Erdoğan and other Turkish ministers lashed out at the Egyptian Army. Erdoğan considered Morsi’s ouster a blow to democracy and a betrayal of the popular will, and resolved that Turkey could not sit back as the violence in Egypt escalated.

Erdoğan sparks outrage in Egypt. He is perceived to be meddling in Egypt’s internal affairs and his conduct considered a breach of diplomatic protocol, aimed at further dividing Egyptian society.

As the tension mounted, Egypt also announced that it would deny Erdoğan access from its territory to the Gaza Strip. This supposed sanction may be a blessing in disguise for Erdoğan. Since 2011, Hamas leaders and residents of Gaza have been awaiting Erdoğan’s visit. Dates have been set, announcements made and plans approved – but the visit has yet to take place. Reasons vary, but Erdoğan’s inability to carry out his Gaza visit exemplifies the gap between Turkey’s foreign policy declarations and their implementation.

These recent tensions undermine one of the interesting post-Arab Spring coalitions. During Morsi’s term, Egypt and Turkey, two Western allies who, in the past, inhibited each other’s efforts to gain regional hegemony, began building an intimate relationship.

The rise of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood was welcomed by Erdoğan. It was thus only natural for the AKP to invite Morsi to Turkey, as a guest of honor, at its September 2012 congress.

Turkey was delighted to lend a helping hand, promising Morsi’s Egypt unprecedented financial aid. The two nation’s militaries also began building closer relations. In November 2012, Erdoğan made another visit to Egypt; this time under the pretext of Israel’s operation; a crisis that also motivated Davutoğlu to visit Gaza while hostilities were still ongoing.

Davutoğlu coined the term “Axis of Democracy” to describe the emerging relationship between Turkey and Egypt. However, in a development evocative of the collapse of the strategic partnership between Erdoğan and Bashar al-Assad following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Turko-Egyptian partnership did not survive the upheaval in Egypt.

Erdoğan may have considered Morsi an ally, but he was not devoid of criticism of his policies. In his 2011 visit to Cairo, Erdoğan marked the path which he believed political Islam in Egypt should pursue, sparking resentment among Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. “I hope the new Egyptian regime will be secular”, he said, adding that while he personally was a Muslim, the nation which he headed was a secular one. “I recommend a secular constitution for Egypt,” declared Erdoğan, emphasizing that secularism was not an “enemy of religion.”

The roadmap that Erdoğan outlined was, in his opinion, the key to success, for a religious party aspiring to successfully rule over a country where the military establishment and a large portion of the public consider political Islam an enemy. Erdoğan’s attempt to do so in Turkey was successful. Morsi’s similar Egyptian endeavor was not.

In 2011, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood dismissed Erdoğan’s warning as an intervention in internal Egyptian affairs. “You cannot transfer the experience of other countries to Egypt,” responded the movement’s spokesman. Indeed, Erdoğan’s advice was not heeded and the policies Morsi implemented in its place contributed significantly to his ouster.

During his term as president, Morsi chose to follow in the footsteps of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s Islamist Prime Minister, who was overthrown in 1997 following a military ultimatum, after only one year in office. The perception of Morsi was that of a president with a decidedly Islamist agenda, who preferred to appoint members of the Muslim Brotherhood to key government positions and attempted to rapidly undermine the secular establishment.

Morsi was viewed as a president who had the Muslim Brotherhood’s interests and not those of the Egyptian people, at heart. This approach significantly contrasts that adopted by Erdoğan during his first years as prime minister. These days Erdoğan might miss Morsi, but he undoubtedly believes that had the Egyptian Prime Minister heeded his advice – his would have been a different fate.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט If only Morsi had listened to Erdoğan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Chairman of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, reacted to poll by saying that:

“The EDAM poll shows that the lifting of the Gaza blockade is a more marginal condition for reconciliation than the apology and the compensation. This is despite frequent fierce Turkish statements on the issue. Nevertheless, Israel’s recent decision to allow Turkish humanitarian aid to enter Gaza, Erdoğan’s upcoming visit to Gaza, and the Israel-Hamas understandings following operation Pillar of Defense, all indicate that progress can also be made in regards to the blockade condition. This is likely to lead to even greater Turkish public support for mending ties with Israel.”

“Both the Israeli and Turkish publics express support for the mending of ties. This indicates an opportunity to increase cooperation also between the civil societies of both countries. Such cooperation should be sought after in a manner that will not only benefit bi-lateral Israel-Turkey relations, but that will also contribute to Israel’s regional integration and to Israeli-Arab peacemaking.”

Dr. Alon Liel, former Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claims that:

“The findings of the EDAM poll reflect a widespread public perception in Turkey that Israel is an important regional factor, which Turkey is in need of, especially due to the turmoil of the Arab Spring. The fact that an Israeli public opinion poll – carried out in August 2012 by Mitvim – showed similar trends among the Israeli public towards Turkey, gives hope that the mending of IsraeliTurkish relations is indeed possible.”

Mitvim is a progressive Israeli foreign policy think-tank, which envisions a fresh start for Israel among the nations. Mitvim works to reshape Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe, and the Mediterranean through advancing a paradigm shift in Israel’s foreign policy, advancing Israel’s regional integration, and advancing Israel-Arab peace.

A summary of Mitvim’s activities towards the mending of Israel-Turkey relations, August 2011- March 2013, can be read here.

הפוסט Reactions to a Turkish poll on Israel-Turkey relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Towards Mending Israel-Turkey Relations
Summary of Mitvim’s Activities
August 2011- March 2013

In the summer of 2011, as part of Mitvim’s “Opportunities in Change” project in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Mitvim’s task-team acknowledged mending Israel-Turkey relations as one of the main opportunities for Israel revealed in the Arab Spring.

From that moment, at a timing in which negotiating teams from both countries worked to reach an agreement (which was eventually rejected), to March 2013, when an actual agreement was reached, Mitvim acted through different channels to enhance the relations between the Israel and Turkey.

This was not only because of the strategic importance in mending the relations, but also due to an understanding that ties with Turkey are crucial for Israel’s regional integration, for its ability to engage with political Islam, and for advancing peace.

We praise the agreement between the two countries and see it as an opportunity to share and review some of the major activities carried out by Mitvim on the subject.

1. In August 2011, prior to the Palmer Report’s publication and Netanyahu’s decision to reject the Israel-Turkey draft agreement formulated that summer, Mitvim submitted a policy paper (in Hebrew) to a number of relevant decision makers. It supported the agreement formulated with Turkey pointing at the advantages it held for Israel.

2. In early 2012, Dr. Nimrod Goren published an article in Insight Turkey, a leading policy journal in Turkey. The article reviewed Israel-Turkey relations in light of the Arab Spring, elaborated on the attempts to resolve the Flotilla crisis and analyzed Israeli responses to the further deterioration in relations in September 2011, following the publication of the Palmer Report.

3. In April 2012, in the midst of crisis between the countries and during an almost complete freeze in relations between the governments, Mitvim signed a cooperation agreement with the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) in Istanbul. Both think-tanks decided to conduct a joint policy dialogue in order to analyze the events of the Arab Spring, and indicate mutual interests for both countries and options for improving their bi-lateral relations.

4. In August 2012, Mitvim (together with the Rafi Smith Center) conducted a public opinion poll regarding Israel-Turkey relations. The poll showed surprising findings, according to which a majority of Israelis believed that Israel should take action in order to improve relations with Turkey, including the issuing of an apology on operational mistakes that took place during the Flotilla takeover, as part of an agreement between the two countries. These findings challenged the common apprehension in the Israeli political system that apologizing to Turkey would result in a high political cost for the performing leader.

5. In September 2012, Mitvim and the GPoT Center, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, carried out a policy dialogue in Istanbul. The meeting was attended from the Israeli side by Dr. Alon Liel, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi and Arik Segal. From the Turkish side it was attended by researchers, analysts, senior journalists, former ambassadors and retired generals. The meeting dealt with the consequences of the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis, and the chances for mending Israel-Turkey relations. The meeting was widely covered by the Turkish media, and its conclusions were transmitted to key Israeli stakeholders.

6. In February 2012, Mitvim experts (Arik Segal, Dr. Ehud Eiran and Dr. Nimrod Goren) participated in an Israeli-Turkish civil society dialogue workshop, convened by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Tel Aviv. The workshop was dedicated to advancing the cooperation between non-governmental organizations in Israel and Turkey. This kind of cooperation was limited in scope even when the relations on the governmental level were normal, and the workshop assumed that increasing it can have a major contribution to the restoring of Israel-Turkey relations.

7. In late February 2012, just before the Israel-Turkey agreement was reached, Dr. Nimrod Goren published an op-ed calling for an overture to Turkey and highlighting a series of positive developments in Israel-Turkey relations that took place in the months before and that did not receive proper media attention. The op-ed claimed that the political atmosphere in Israel created a favorable environment for reaching an agreement between the countries, and indicated that President Obama’s upcoming visit to Israel will be a good opportunity to do so.

Aside from these actions, Mitvim experts kept in constant touch with various Turkish partners, participated in international and bi-lateral conferences and workshops dealing with the issue, published articles and op-eds in Israeli and Turkish media outlets, and held meetings and briefings with politicians and diplomats. .

Now, when the agreement between Israel and Turkey has been finally reached, Mitvim will act to assist in the process of mending the relations, and to support the opportunities to advancing peace and dialogue with the Arab world that it creates for Israel’s regional policies.

הפוסט Israel-Turkey Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Weak Neighboring States:<br> Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The public opinion poll of The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (MITVIM) revealed that 54 percent of Israelis with an opinion would support Tel Aviv in ending its intransigence and apologizing for the killings of the nine aid activists.

But Nimrod Goren, the chairman of MITVIM, is cautious about whether the Israeli government will change its decision and apologize. “[Still], the findings can give backing to those who are trying to convince the government behind the scenes to apologize,” he told the Daily News in a recent interview.

One hears several reasons behind the Israeli government’s decision not to offer Turkey an apology for the killings on the Mavi Marmara. In your view, what is the overriding reason?

It was a political decision. One [part of it] was philosophical, ideological – the belief that Turkey eventually did not want to reconcile with Israel; that no matter what Israel does, relations will not come back to where they were.

Having said that, [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu sent a delegation to negotiate with Turks. They reached an agreement under which Netanyahu seemed to be ready to accept. He sent [Vice Prime Minister and Strategic Affairs] Minister Moshe Ya’alon with the hope that he might give to the deal the legitimacy he was looking for [but it did not work out], because he came back opposing it.

And Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman opposed it. Having these two right-wing politicians against it, Netanyahu made a decision not to go ahead.

Where are we a year after, especially with the developments of the Arab Spring?

It seems that the government, as well as the public are more aware of what the Arab Spring means and the consequences of it. People saw the regime change in Egypt. They see the rise of political Islam. They see the chaos in Syria. They see that Israel has to confront some weak states around it. They feel suddenly without any balancing actor. How can we modify that? One way to modify was to look for allies outside the Middle East. That was the approach toward Greek Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania.

But these are not substitutes to difficult actors in the Muslim Ar ab world with whom Israel needs to deal with. Eventually you cannot escape from the region you are in. We have to find a way to conduct foreign policy within the Middle East. Whether the government will move toward that change or whether we will never reach that change, I am not sure.

So the government tried to find allies from outside the region as a response to the developments of the Arab Spring?

The government adopted the policy of trying to hang onto the status quo. But then came the changing of the priority of threats, the whole debate about Iran, the developments in Egypt and Syria. These put Turkey in a different place. People have a better understanding that Turkey is an ally of the West, a friend of the U.S., an actor that has leverage over several Arab countries [and has] significant means to shape developments in Syria. People now have a better understanding that we cannot remain isolated in the Middle East.

But it looks like the understanding among the public does not resonate with the government. Where exactly does Israel stand as far as relations with Turkey are concerned and about extending an apology?

It’s difficult to talk about it because it is a government of a coalition of different parties, and there are different voices, even within Likud.

[Ultimately], it’s a Netanyahu decision. When Netanyahu [entered into a] unity government with Kadima, one of the assumptions was that it would help to open the door with Turkey. But this unity government did not last long. We are back with a right-wing government that will take us to elections somewhere in the near future. It does not seem that this government is going for any major regional diplomatic initiative.

So it is fair to say that the Netanyahu government holds the same position on the issue of an apology.

But I think it is willing to reconsider it. We do not know exactly what is going on behind the scenes. There are frequent media reports that Brits and Americans are doing some talks here and there. There seems to be something happening.

But definitely the findings of the poll that shows that Israeli people are more supportive [of giving an apology] than before could give some backing to those that are willing to act toward it. In the past, it was seen as a counterproductive political action to do – as far as the public reaction was concerned.
What do you think is behind the change in the public view?

I don’t think the public really knew what the issue was really about. Last year, there was no public debate about the Palmer report [on the flotilla]. Everything was done behind closed doors. The whole debate was about an apology, yes or no. No one knew what we were expected to get out of the apology. The public was not educated, and that enabled the politicians to make a decision without having to engage with the public.

This changed during the year because so many people and so many institutions began to deal with the Arab Spring and its consequences. People are following Middle Eastern affairs [with concern], and when they look at the region, they spot Turkey. It is a country they know. But I don’t think the government is aware of it. People were quite surprised by the findings, including ourselves. We did not expect a majority to be in favor of an apology because last year it was unthinkable. Now they might start to think about the implications.

Is there any likelihood that the Israeli government will change its decision on giving an apology in the short term?

The decision and implementation could be very quick because the formula is known. The question is what will be the political point at which Netanyahu decides it is the best thing to do. Maybe this could be before elections in Israel if [Barack] Obama is re-elected as U.S. president. He might be afraid that Obama might pressure him on the Palestinian issue, and he is giving Obama something on the Turkish issue, which is important for Obama.

It could happen quite quickly. But I am not sure that as long as Lieberman remains as foreign minister, the political environment will enable it [to occur] very smoothly.

Who is Nimrod Goren

הפוסט Israelis readier than ever for raid apology, poll shows הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Paradigm Shift in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the potential threats form only part of a larger and more complex picture. As acknowledged by Israel’s President Shimon Peres, the Arab Spring also holds opportunities for Israel’s regional foreign policies and for its relations with the Arab/Muslim world. Such opportunities are often neglected in Israel, as they tend to be over-shadowed by the dominant discourse that focuses on potential security concerns. But among the opportunities that the Arab Spring did bring Israel, there seemed to also be an opportunity to mend relations with Turkey — relations that were significantly strained following the May 2010 flotilla incident. While many of the Arab Spring opportunities for Israel required some progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for their fulfillment, this was not necessarily the case regarding Israel and Turkey. Although the lack of a peace process does negatively impact Israel-Turkey relations, the major crisis between them at the time was a bi-lateral one, and could have been solved through a mutual agreement.

The crisis between Israel and Turkey, however, did not begin with the flotilla incident. It has flared up in light of Israel’s operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which started in late December 2008. Operation Cast Lead was a turning point in Turkey-Israeli relations. It put a halt to Turkey’s intense mediation efforts between Israel and Syria, and led to strong Turkish condemnation of Israel’s policy in Gaza and its consequences. Erdoğan’s clash with Peres in the Davos Summit, in January 2009, and his walking off the Davos stage with anger symbolized the beginning of a new era of crisis. This was further fuelled by the public humiliation of the Turkish Ambassador to Israel by Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, in January 2010, in an attempt to protest an anti-Israeli TV series that was aired in Turkey. It was in this context – of an Israeli siege on Gaza and of a highly visible Israel-Turkey crisis – that the flotilla incident took place.

It is thus clear that the Israel-Turkey crisis is not all about the flotilla. It already began before. However, once the flotilla incident happened, it overshadowed other pending issues between Israel and Turkey. Finding a formula that will enable the two countries to move beyond this incident became a prerequisite for any effort to restore normal bi-lateral ties between them and to move towards reconciliation. Not only at the official governmental level but also at the societal level. Early attempts at resolving the flotilla incident did not bear fruit. Israel’s Industry, Trade and Labor Minister Benyamin Ben-Eliezer met in late June 2010 with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to discuss ways of resolving the crisis between Israel and Turkey. This meeting, as well as other efforts held in the second half of 2010, did not lead to a breakthrough.

Things seemed to be stuck. But, 2011 brought a new opportunity for Israel and Turkey to mend their bi-lateral relations. The re-election of Erdoğan in the June 2011 Turkish general elections, coupled with the dramatic events of the Arab Spring, provided a new political and regional context in which the relations could be re-evaluated. This context contributed to Turkey and Israel, with US mediation, making progress towards drafting an agreement between them. However, this agreement was eventually rejected by Israel in August 2011 leading to the eruption of a new cycle of escalating tension between the two countries.

The aim of this article is to analyze the Israeli decision-making process and discourse regarding the crisis with Turkey in 2011. It will first examine the changing circumstances of 2011, including the impact of the Arab Spring and the different manners in which Israel and Turkey reacted to it. Afterwards, it will focus on the Israeli decision to reject the draft agreement with Turkey and on the different phases of the Israeli reaction to the new crisis with Turkey that followed. Finally, it will reflect on possible next phases in Israel-Turkey relations, and on conditions that may assist in providing yet another opportunity for making the two former allies less alienated.

An Opportunity for Reconciliation

During the first half of 2011, it was common to hear from Turkish and Israeli pundits that once the June 2011 elections in Turkey are over, Erdoğan may very well move towards mending relations with Israel. Despite the fact that Israel was not a major issue in the election campaign, this assessment was based on the assumption that upon being free from electoral considerations, Erdoğan would have more room and political will to manoeuver towards fixing the Israel-Turkey crisis. Indeed, following the elections and AKP’s landslide victory, there was an effort by both sides to create some better atmosphere between the countries.

A few days after the elections, the Turkish organization IHH announced that it would not take part in another planned flotilla to Gaza. This was apparently decided upon due to pressure from Turkish government officials, and was regarded in Jerusalem (together with Turkey’s assistance to Israel regarding the December 2010 Mt. Carmel fire), as an indication that Turkey was pursuing a more constructive approach towards Israel. Netanyahu responded with a letter to Erdoğan, which congratulated him on his elections victory, and which stressed that the Israeli government “will be happy to work with the new Turkish government on finding a resolution to all outstanding issues between our countries, in the hope of reestablishing our cooperation and renewing the spirit of friendship which has characterized the relations between our peoples for many generations.”

Even Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon took part in the efforts to express renewed warmth between the countries. Ayalon met in Jerusalem with a group of Turkish journalists that decided to visit Israel, and claimed that he actually did not intend on humiliating the Turkish Ambassador in early 2010. Ayalon told the Turkish journalists that “the incident [in which the Ambassador was seated in a low chair] was a joke that was blown out of proportion,” that he has sent a letter of apology to the Turkish Ambassador, and that the cancellation of the second flotilla is a good opportunity for Turkey and Israel to restore their relations. He also posed for a Turkish journalist while sitting in a lower chair than her. Ayalon, though, did not change his hawkish position regarding the flotilla incident. He still hoped that the flotilla incident would be shelved by Turkey. This was unrealistic.

In parallel to these public diplomacy acts, the US had publicly encouraged the governments of Turkey and of Israel to work closely together. Reports began to appear claiming that the US was also mediating secret negotiations between Israeli and Turkish representatives. For the US, having its two major allies in the region at odds with each other was a strategic hardship it was willing to put strenuous efforts to resolve.

It was not only the Turkish elections that enabled this attempt at Turkish-Israeli reconciliation. While the elections did provide a more favorable political context for the sides to get closer together, it was the Arab Spring that provided a more favorable regional context. Turkey’s pro-active decision to side with the protesters in the different Arab countries and its aim at playing a central role in assisting peaceful transformations was of importance in this regard. It led to the collapse of the alliance between Turkey and Assad’s Syria, which was a key factor in Turkey regional foreign policies in recent years and which brought Turkey closer to the region’s radicals, such as Hamas and Iran; it led to a significant improvement in the relations and coordination between Turkey and the US in light of their mutual interests in the changing region; and it enabled Turkey to try and position itself as part of a new regional alliance of moderate (albeit critical of Israel) countries that work to prove that Islam and democracy are compatible. Turkey had to re-evaluate its ties in the region.

Turkey and Israel seemed to have more joint regional interests than before. Both countries aspire for regional stability and security (albeit holding often diverging views on the means to achieve this). The events in Syria brought the regional instability to the borders of Israel and Turkey, with some incidents of cross-border spillover already taking place – the flow of Syrian refugees towards Turkey, and the attempt by Syrian protestors to cross the border into Israel in the Golan Heights. In such a period of change and uncertainty, Israel and Turkey – the democratic and pro-Western countries in the region – could have benefitted from coordination and dialogue mechanisms enabling a joint look at the changing region, much like Turkey-US relations evolved for the better during the Arab Spring.

The improvement in Turkey-US relations, and the increased coordination between their leaders, enabled the US to have more leverage on Turkey to push it towards reconciliation with Israel. Moreover, Turkey’s continued interest to assume a mediator role between Israel and the Palestinians, as expressed by Abdullah Gül, also gave Turkey a reason to improve ties with Israel. In order to be a mediator, Turkey has to have good relations with both sides and open communication channels to them. These were assets that Turkey had in the past, and that previously helped it bring Israelis and Arabs closer together.

For Israel, the Arab Spring brought new reasons for mending relations with Turkey. In light of a region in turmoil, of fear from further isolation and from rising radicalism, of concerns from possible implications of the Palestinian approach to the UN and from the Iranian nuclear project – Israel should have been more interested in having at least normal relations with Turkey. Turkey is a significant regional power, one of the only Muslim countries willing at all to engage with Israel, a source of stability, and a country that can have a moderating effect on some regional actors and can serve as a channel between Israel and the new regimes in the Arab world.

However, the first year of the Arab Spring did not lead Israel to try and get closer to Turkey. Israel and Turkey differed in the way they viewed the changes in the Arab world. In contrast to Turkey’s pro-active and supportive approach to the Arab Spring, Israel adopted a passive approach that was preoccupied with threats and concerns. Israelis looked around them and saw the regional status quo, which they have grown to know and to feel relatively at ease with, collapse. They saw Muslim parties and movements grow stronger. They saw the fall of Hosni Mubarak, a strategic ally of Israel. They also saw demonstrations in front of Israeli embassies in Egypt and Jordan. Israelis began to doubt whether the existing peace agreements would survive the regional changes. They also feared that the Assad regime might initiate an Israeli-Syrian escalation in order to divert attention from the domestic unrest in Syria.

In light of this approach, the Israeli government decided to follow regional developments with a wait-and-see policy. It refrained from issuing statements of support to the Arab protesters and from calling on Arab leaders to step down. The Israeli government believed that until the region stabilizes – and even if this is to take several years – Israel should not initiate major diplomatic initiatives or take bold regional or pro-peace steps. By taking such an approach, Israel – unlike Turkey – gave up on the opportunity to play a role in the re-shaping of the region. It chose to try and dis-engage itself from Middle Eastern affairs and to seek new alliances in its periphery as a compensation for its lost regional alliances, including its relations with Turkey. Thus, Israel turned to develop increased cooperation with Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. Netanyahu’s visit to Cyprus in February 2012, the first-ever visit of an Israeli Prime Minister to the neighboring island, was a clear manifestation of this policy.

These official Israeli attitudes and policies were echoed in Israel’s public opinion. In February 2011, forty-six percent of the Israeli public thought that Egypt’s revolution will have a negative effect on Israel-Egypt relations (while only nine percent thought the opposite); seventy percent thought that the chance for democracy in Egypt in the foreseeable future was low; forty-six percent though that there were high chances for an Iranian-style Islamic regime forming in Egypt; and forty-eight percent thought that Egypt’s revolution will strengthen Hamas (while only thirteen percent thought the opposite). Attitudes did not change for the better as time went by. In November 2011, sixty-eight percent of Israelis believed that their country’s national security situation was worse than it was before the process of change in the Arab world started.

These negative beliefs regarding the Arab Spring were coupled with a belief that Turkey is aspiring for leadership in the changing Middle East and that it is bolstering its popularity in the Arab world through criticism of Israel. This combination had a negative impact on prospects for mending Israel-Turkey ties, and it overshadowed the above-mentioned joint interests that the two countries shared in light of the regional turmoil. Israelis were skeptic as to whether Turkey is at all willing to have better relations with Israel at this point in time.

The opportunity that emerged in 2011 for Israel-Turkey reconciliation was eventually left unfulfilled. The two countries held secret negotiations under US auspice, and senior representatives sent by both governments joined these talks. The aim was to agree on a formula, on an agreement, that would fix relations and that would lead to the shelving of the Palmer report. The Palmer Report was drafted by an UN-appointed committee that was supposed to assist in fixing the Israel-Turkey crisis. The report’s publication was postponed several times, in order to give the negotiators more leeway to try and reach an agreement.

With each delay, it became more apparent that the report – if and when published – would be used by both sides to reinforce a blame game between them. The report was gradually perceived as a verdict as to which side was guilty in the flotilla incident, rather than as a tool to promote a solution to the Israeli-Turkish crisis. Nevertheless, the fact that both sides came to realize that the report did not fully support their views became an incentive for progress in the negotiations. The report was to claim that Israel’s blockade of Gaza was legal – despite Turkey’s claims, while arguing that the IDF used unreasonable and excessive force in the takeover of the flotilla – despite Israel’s claims.

Eventually, the Israel-Turkey negotiations led to a draft agreement, which is said to have included an Israeli apology for operational mistakes that may have occurred during the takeover of the flotilla, Israeli compensation to the victims’ families, a restoration of full diplomatic ties between Israel and Turkey, and a guarantee by the Turkish government not to prosecute Israelis involved in the flotilla incident. Israel, however, decided to reject the agreement. In August 2011, following deliberations in the Israeli cabinet and despite US pressure, Netanyahu notified Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Israel would not apologize to Turkey. Shortly afterwards, the Palmer report was leaked to the press, putting a halt to any attempts for reconciliation and leading to a renewed escalation of tensions between Israel and Turkey.

The draft reconciliation agreement that was rejected by Netanyahu, did in fact address Israel’s major concerns and interests – it included only a low-key and conditional version of an apology, it protected to a significant extent Israeli soldiers from law suits, it did not demand any change of Israeli policy regarding Gaza (as was demanded by Turkey before), and it ensured normal diplomatic ties between the countries. If so, why was such an agreement eventually rejected?

The Israeli Decision

In major Israeli state circles there was support for the reconciliation agreement. Israel’s Attorney General, Yehuda Weinstein, has reportedly advised Netanyahu to reach an understanding with Turkey, even if that meant issuing a general apology for operational mistakes and misuse of force in order to prevent lawsuits against Israeli soldiers. Within the defense establishment there was increased support for resolving the crisis even at the price of an apology to Ankara, as “Israel has a major stake in improving relations with Turkey in light of Turkey’s standing in the region, its past economic relationship with Israel, and the opportunity to renew defense-related export to Turkey.” Also, among Israel’s diplomatic circles there was support for such a move.

However, the voices within the bureaucracy and the establishment that supported an agreement with Turkey were usually not voiced in the public domain, and did not spark a public discourse on the issue. The negotiation process with Turkey was conducted behind closed doors, and the eventual Israeli decision was shaped by only a few political leaders, based on political considerations as well as their personal beliefs and ideology. There was no real public pressure on the issue, although the possible reaction of the public was definitely part of the political considerations that were actually taken into account.

Israelis did not understand the significance of the flotilla event for Turks. While Davutoğlu labeled the flotilla incident as “Turkey’s 9/11,” Israel dismissed the incident as an event used by Erdoğan to humiliate Israel and to improve Turkey’s standing in the Arab and Muslim world. Israelis were offended by the fact that Turkey did not stop the flotilla from sailing. They did not grasp the intensity of public emotions in Turkey regarding the killing of the Turkish citizens (which was seen in Israel as a legitimate act of self-defense) and that the demand for an apology was a consensual issue in Turkey, also shared by Israel’s friends there. Israeli officials wanted to believe that an expression of sorrow, without an apology, would be enough to satisfy Turkey. This was not the case. Moreover, Israelis were not aware of the nuances of the proposed agreement. The public debate focused on whether or not to apologize to Turkey, while there was very little understanding of what the agreement called Israel to actually apologize about, of the broader context in which such an apology will be made, and of what Israel was about to get in return.

The prevailing attitude in Israel was that relations with Turkey are doomed and that further deterioration is inevitable due to Erdoğan’s policies and statements, especially as the crisis between the countries began before the flotilla incident. Thus, an agreement was seen as being of no use, as Turkey would later come up with other demands (such as the lifting of the blockade of Gaza, a demand made already at the onset of the crisis) and with other sorts of criticism. Turkey, in turn, did not do enough to address the Israeli concerns and to help convince the Israeli public that should Israel take the needed actions to repair the relations, then these will actually bear fruit and will lead to the restoration of normal ties between the countries.

Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman framed the debate about a possible Israeli apology around the issue of national pride. He claimed that national pride should be a guiding principle in Israel’s foreign policy making, and that an apology will undermine this pride and will thus weaken Israel’s strategic position in the region. This position was not shared by all members of the Israeli government. Minister Matan Vilani, who took part in the negotiations with Turkey, clearly stated that “whoever refers to the crisis with Turkey in terms of national pride does not understand the strategic reality in the Middle East”. Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor were also supportive of mending ties with Turkey. Netanyahu himself was reported to have already agreed on several instances to apologize to Turkey, before backing off due to domestic political reasons, namely the fear of criticism by major coalition partners or by key members of his government. It was the fierce objection by hard-liners Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon (who represented the government in the negotiations with Turkey) and Lieberman that eventually pushed Netanyahu to oppose the agreement, perhaps as an attempt not to alienate his right-wing constituency, in which Lieberman was enjoying increased popularity.

The Turkish response to the Israeli decision was extremely harsh. It was to serve as proof to those in Israel that opposed the reconciliation agreement that Turkey was in no way ready to once again actually become a friend of Israel. Erdoğan and his government, which promised in advance to sanction Israel should it refuse to take the actions Turkey has expected, embarked on a series of tough anti-Israeli statements and policies, In an interview to Al Jazeera, Erdoğan stated that the flotilla incident could have justified going to war if it was not for Turkey’s restraint. The Turkish Prime Minister announced a series of sanctions against Israel. Israeli diplomats were expelled and diplomatic relations were downgraded to second-secretary level, what has remained of the Israel-Turkey military cooperation was put on halt, official trade between the countries was frozen, Turkey tried to block Israel in multi-national institutions, Turkey announced that it plans to have a military presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea to escort future flotillas and to challenge Israel’s natural gas drillings, that it will support lawsuits against Israeli soldiers, and that it will consider further sanctions. Erdoğan also declared that he is planning to challenge the Israeli blockade on Gaza by visiting the Gaza Strip in adjacent to a scheduled visit to Egypt. In a specific incident that was not included in the sanctions declared by Erdoğan, Israeli tourists were detained in the Istanbul airport, discouraging those Israelis who were still considering Turkey as a tourist destination. In early September 2011, not a day has passed without further escalation in the crisis. Turkey was trying to put a concrete, visible and high price tag on Israel’s decision to reject the reconciliation agreement. There was concern that things might get out of control.

The Israeli Discourse

The Israeli reaction to the crisis that has flared up with Turkey had several phases and aspects to it. The initial public response was one of confusion mixed with concern, even fear. Israelis could not understand Erdoğan’s conduct. The Turkish Prime Minister was portrayed in the Israeli media as an irrational, extremist and radical leader, who does not play according to international diplomatic norms. Erdoğan was occasionally compared to Israel’s worst enemies in the present and in the past, and was depicted as someone who is inherently against Israel and with whom cooperation or reconciliation are impossible. Israelis were amazed at what they saw as a disproportionate over-reaction. Some sought to explain it with frustration by Erdoğan over the legitimacy given by the Palmer Report to the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Questions started to pop up in the Israeli media about whether Turkey plans to carry out actual acts of warfare against Israel.

In light of the Turkish reaction, public opinion polls revealed a striking consensus within the Israeli public against any apology to Turkey. There were also public calls to boycott Turkish products, and to refrain from visiting the country. In the past, Turkey was a country that so many Israelis used to visit and towards which Israelis had such warm feelings. It was the only country in Israel’s neighborhood that embraced Israelis, and accepted them. Now it was seen in Israel as a country that changed course and that sided with Israel’s enemies. Israelis felt deeply betrayed by Turkey, claiming that it is Turkey that needs to apologize for enabling the IHH flotilla to set sail in the first place. While Turkey declared that its measures are directed against the current Israeli government and not against Israel or the Israeli public, this did not lead things to be seen more favorably in Israel. Reconciliation seemed far-fetched, with relations hitting rock-bottom.

In parallel, a different kind of Israeli discourse has begun to emerge. One that was critical of the Israeli government’s handling of the diplomatic crisis with Turkey, questioning Netanyahu’s decision to reject the reconciliation agreement, and stressing the importance of having good ties with Turkey. Traditional supporters of the relations with Turkey spoke up once again, and new voices – that were not heard prior to the Netanyahu’s decision about the agreement – came forth. These included political opposition figures, as Tzipi Livni and Tzachi Hanegbi from the Kadima party, but also public figures as the Governor of the Bank of Israel Stanley Fischer, and former-Minister Prof. Amnon Rubinstein.

This trend, which by-far did not represent the mainstream Israeli discourse, was somewhat empowered by some op-eds in the media, and especially by a column published by Nahum Barnea of Yediot Aharonoth, one of Israel’s most influential journalists. In September 2011, Barnea published an account of the secret negotiations between Israel and Turkey, publishing for the first time the actual content of the draft reconciliation agreement. His column made clear what was on the table and what Israel had missed out on. “Very few in Israel asked what Israel actually has to apologize about,” wrote Barnea, adding that “if you ask the Israeli on the street he will say confidently: Israel is asked to apologize on the IDF operation. This is not true”. According to the draft agreement, Israel had to apologize only for the very same operational mistakes that it already acknowledged through its self-appointment investigation committee.

The official Israeli policy towards Turkey in light of the heightened conflict was one of containment. Israeli government members kept quiet and did not retaliate towards Erdoğan’s statements and policies. The logic was to let Erdoğan play his game on his own, without reacting to his provocations. Israel believed that time will take its toll, and eventually Turkey would move on to other issues. Moreover, there was the expectation that the Barack Obama administration would help Israel in containing Erdoğan and in limiting his anti-Israeli rhetoric and actions. The Egyptian decision not to facilitate Erdoğan’s request to visit Gaza in September 2011 was perceived in the Israeli public as a direct outcome of American pressure.

The Israeli policy of keeping a low profile regarding the Turkish sanctions did not hold for all. It was Lieberman, in an attempt to make political gain among Israel’s right-wing constituency, who was reportedly planning an Israeli diplomatic retaliation against Turkey. Lieberman wanted to prove that it is Turkey who has much to lose from its policy towards Israel, and to portray himself as taking care of Israel’s national pride. It was leaked to the press that he was assessing different ideas on how to embarrass Turkey on the Armenian, Kurdish, and human rights issues.

However, the Netanyahu government opposed this initiative. The official Israeli discourse was trying to devalue the crisis with Turkey, and it was doing so by using two contradictory arguments. One argument held that Israel-Turkey relations had already deteriorated so much in recent years that they could not get much worse. The second was citing the fact that economic relations between the countries surprisingly reached a peak after the flotilla crisis, meaning that political tensions between the governments do not have an impact on the actual conduct of relations between the two societies.

What Can Happen Next?

The last couple of months of 2011 have brought more calm to Israel-Turkey relations. The regional focus has been redirected towards Syria, where Turkey has assumed a leading role against the Assad regime. Erdoğan’s “megaphone diplomacy” against Israel has been put to a relative halt, probably also due to American pressure. Moreover, there have been some renewed positive public diplomacy moves – Israel’s acknowledgement of a supportive Turkish role in the reaching Israel’s prisoners swap deal with Hamas, Israel’s offering of aid following the October 2011 earthquake in Van and Turkey’s willingness to accept it (that made the top news in Israel), and Netanyahu’s conversation with Erdoğan (for the first time in ten months) following the passing away of Erdoğan’s mother. Nevertheless, the January 2012 visit of Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh to Turkey and the manner in which he was embraced by the Turkish leadership — reinforced the negative image that many in Israel currently hold towards Turkey’s policies.

In parallel to these political aspects, Turkey-Israel relations began to draw the attention of civil society organizations, which have been gradually trying to become involved in attempts to mend the relations. A growing number of think tanks, NGOs, and youth movements are seeking ways to bring together Israelis and Turks, something that was not sufficiently done even when the official relations between the countries were strong. In parallel, the US continues to express its support and desire for improving Israel-Turkey relations, with occasional media reports on discrete channels or on new bridging proposals.

These attempts at creating a better atmosphere, at establishing a new modus vivendi between the countries, and at preventing further deterioration are a positive step and should be encouraged. They will not be enough to normalize relations, but can help in defining what Israel-Turkey relations can look like given the current political and regional circumstances and in charting constructive paths to get there. By themselves, these efforts will not be able to dismantle the danger of further deterioration in the official relations. Events of near clashes, that used to take place in the Aegean as part of the Turkey-Greece dispute in the Aegean, might occur in the Mediterranean if things get worse. The reactivation of ties between the Israeli and Turkish air forces in December 2011 was an important step to try and prevent this from happening, especially as almost all official channels between the governments have been cut off. Israel and Turkey seem to be headed towards a period in which they will be engaged in fierce rivalry but within the context of some sort of diplomatic, economic, and social relations.

Normalization between Israel and Turkey can be likely in the event of a policy change in Israel regarding Turkey or of a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process. These do not seem feasible under the term of the current Israeli government, with Lieberman as Foreign Minister, but may become more plausible after the next Israeli elections, when a new coalition is formed. In the meantime, from the Israeli side, it is essential to educate the public and policy-makers that better ties with Turkey are both feasible and desirable, to maintain the existing level of economic and social ties, and to establish new channels for joint policy-dialogue between Israeli and Turkish scholars, policy analysts, and institutions.

Turkey-Israel relations have a long history of ups and downs. These were mostly linked to developments in Israeli-Arab relations, and not to bi-lateral crises resembling the flotilla incident. People tend to remember the Turkey-Israel “honeymoon” of the 1990s, but to forget the cold relations of the 1980s. As a new reality unfolds in the Middle East, with Turkey playing a central role in the re-shaping of Israel’s neighborhood, Israel and Turkey should strive to mend their bi-lateral relations. The 2011 opportunity for reconciliation was left unfulfilled, but the regional conditions that enabled this opportunity are still out there. It may not be long before another opportunity for reconciliation appears, due to a political change in Israel or to further regional realignments. Should this happen, Israel, Turkey, and their international allies should seize the opportunity and not let it sail past them, once again.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey During the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Read the full article at Haaretz

הפוסט Israel Is Missing an Opportunity to Mend Ties With Turkey הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.