הפוסט Jordanian-Israeli Food Security: A Road Map of Potential Collaboration הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The exception to this was the Arab and Islamic summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in November 2023. However, aside from declarations against Israel and calls for a diplomatic solution based on the two-state approach, with borders along the lines of 1967, this summit did not result in any practical action.

There are two explanations for the weak Arab response. First, there is the continuing decline of the Arab League as an institution for addressing Arab issues.

Since its formation – and that of the Arab Summit, its supreme body – it has experienced many failures, although it has also been credited with some significant achievements, such as thwarting Iraq’s threat to invade Kuwait in 1961, halting the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, and adopting the Arab Peace Initiative, among others.

The second reason is the general reluctance to intervene in Gaza until the war has ended. This is especially relevant to the Gulf states, which can contribute substantial funds toward the rebuilding of Gaza, but will not do so until the fighting is over.

The convening of the emergency summit on March 4 – symbolically called the “Palestine Summit”G – was an Arab response to US President Donald Trump’s idea for Palestinian emigration from Gaza. Though the idea is flawed and impracticable, it has forced the Arab states to formulate their own counterproposal.

What Trump did not take into account was that striking at the Arab holy cow – the Palestinian problem – would unite the Arab states, thus forcing the moderate Arab states to fall into line with more extreme positions.

Most of the leaders of the Arab states attended the summit, including the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was making his first appearance at the supreme Arab institution.

However, the Saudi crown prince and the president of the United Arab Emirates chose to send their foreign ministers, seemingly after they realized which way the wind was blowing. For Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the conference was an opportunity to give a show of Arab leadership.

Hamas is not mentioned

The concluding statement issued by the summit was worded in a rhetoric characteristic of Arab conferences and reflects the lowest common denominator on which Arab consensus could be achieved. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the statement includes condemnations of Israel. On the other hand, Hamas is not mentioned at all.

Ignoring the negative rhetoric toward Israel, the Arab proposals can be summarized as follows:

A call for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank; a reaffirmation of the Arab strategic decision to pursue peace, as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative, which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people through the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with east Jerusalem as its capital; a total rejection of all acts of violence, terrorism, and extremism; full opposition to any attempt to uproot Palestinians from their land; a warning against annexations in the West Bank that could lead the region into a renewed cycle of violence; adoption of the Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza (see below); a call to convene, at the earliest possible time, an international conference to discuss reconstruction and raise funds; and a call for the full implementation of the ceasefire, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.

Interestingly, the statement refers to a Palestinian agreement to establish a temporary, local, technocratic administration in Gaza, “under the umbrella of a Palestinian government,” alongside efforts to help restore the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, following necessary reforms within both the PA and the PLO. In the meantime, Egypt’s foreign minister has announced that the individuals who will serve in this administration have already been selected.

הפוסט Arab Leaders Unite on Paper, but Who Will Rebuild Gaza? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The UAE’s Foreign Policy Anchors and Their Influence on Israel and the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This strategic meeting is poised to be transformative. A recent call between US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has set the groundwork for what could be a defining moment in US-India relations.

The meeting comes at a critical juncture in global security.

Beyond traditional defense considerations, both nations face evolving challenges from China’s expanding influence across multiple domains—cybersecurity, space technology, maritime trade, and artificial intelligence.

The $400 billion China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has heightened these concerns, particularly for US allies in the Middle East.

India and the United States are eager to deepen their strategic partnership across several key areas.

Defense technology sharing, joint military exercises, and cybersecurity cooperation are expected to feature prominently in their discussions.

Their partnership also extends to critical infrastructure initiatives, most notably the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

The IMEC represents far more than just a trade route—it serves as a strategic counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

While the BRI has enabled China to gain control over critical infrastructure through debt-trap diplomacy and state-directed investments, IMEC offers a transparent, market-driven alternative.

Spanning 4,500 kilometers and connecting India to Europe via the Middle East, IMEC significantly reduces shipping times and provides partner nations with infrastructure development opportunities while safeguarding their sovereignty.

What is the significance of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor?

The corridor’s strength lies in its diverse partnership structure: India’s technological and logistical capabilities, Israel’s innovation and strategic position in the Mediterranean via the Port of Haifa, the UAE’s financial resources and infrastructure expertise, and Europe’s market access and technological advancements.

Unlike the BRI, which promotes Chinese control over vital assets, IMEC ensures that infrastructure development benefits all participating nations while maintaining their strategic independence.

The corridor also enhances global supply chain resilience, mitigating the risks associated with economic coercion and over-reliance on Chinese-controlled trade routes.

Currently, crucial global trade arteries—such as the Malacca Strait, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandab—are increasingly vulnerable to Chinese influence.

Given China’s indirect support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels during the war in Gaza, Israel should be particularly concerned. By purchasing large quantities of Iranian oil, China indirectly funds the Houthis through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which channels resources to its proxies.

American intelligence sources have reportedly revealed that the Houthis are using Chinese weapons for their assaults on shipping in the Red Sea while refraining from attacking Chinese vessels.

The Houthis’ disruptions in the Bab el-Mandab Strait threaten global trade security.

Recent developments further highlight the urgency of countering China’s growing influence.

Senator Marco Rubio’s recent trip to Panama to counter China’s increasing presence in the Panama Canal, as well as the Panamanian government’s subsequent reassessment of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) commitments, indicate that the US is beginning to grasp the stakes and is prepared to confront the challenge.

Israel’s role in this evolving strategic landscape is significant. The Israel-India defense relationship, worth over $10 billion annually in military and cybersecurity technology, has become a crucial component of regional security architecture.

Private-sector engagement has further strengthened these ties, with multinational companies from India making strategic investments in Israeli infrastructure and technology sectors.

One such company, the Adani Group, is of strategic importance in the geopolitical triangle of US-India-Israel.

This Indian conglomerate holds a 70% stake in the Haifa port in northern Israel and is involved in ventures such as military drone production and plans to manufacture commercial semiconductors.

This group is also actively acquiring strategic ports across the Indo-Pacific, challenging China’s monopoly with independent infrastructure development and building alternative supply chains essential for preventing Chinese dominance.

Adani is one of the only private companies globally capable of simultaneously developing and operating key infrastructure—ports, power plants, airports, roads, data centers, transmission grids, and logistics chains.

Unlike China’s state-driven model, this entity operates independently of government control, making it a more reliable partner for nations wary of economic coercion.

The significance of this competition was underscored last year when the company faced an aggressive short-seller attack and legal challenges from the US Department of Justice—moves that directly benefited China.

What is the success of this alliance built upon?

The success of this alliance of US strategic partners depends on continued coordination between government policy and the private sector.

Companies capable of developing and operating strategic infrastructure while maintaining independence from state-directed economic imperialism are crucial partners in this effort and must be supported.

To effectively counter China’s dominance, the US and its allies will have to cultivate multiple Adani-like players across partner nations—companies capable of providing world-class infrastructure without falling under state-directed economic control.

These companies need strategic backing, policy support, and financial resources to scale against China’s subsidized expansion model.

Undermining firms like these through financial warfare, regulatory hurdles, or political miscalculations ultimately serves Beijing’s interests.

These initiatives should not be solely driven by the US but by Israel as well.

A wake-up call for Israel 

The Houthi attacks and their alliances with China and Iran should serve as a wake-up call for Israeli leadership. The realization of China’s BRI mega-project would place Israel in a significantly more difficult position during conflicts, disrupting trade not only for Israel but also for its allies while granting Iran substantial leverage.

The stakes are clear: The emerging partnership between democratic nations provides a crucial counterbalance to China’s expanding influence across multiple domains.

The US-India alliance, which includes key partners like Israel and the UAE, serves as a model for how democratic nations can collaborate to safeguard their strategic interests while promoting transparency and sovereignty.

The upcoming Trump-Modi meeting must enhance this strategic partnership, as it has the potential to significantly contribute to both regional and global security and prosperity.

The article was published on February 9th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Here’s Why Israel Should Care About the Modi-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the same day, in Riyadh, the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with the secretary general of the Arab League and representatives from the European Union and 11 Arab states, convened to discuss developments in Syria. A few days later, the Saudi foreign minister visited Syria.

This rapid response highlights the immense importance Saudi Arabia places on developments in Syria for the future of the region, particularly in light of the active involvement of Turkey and Qatar. It also reflects Saudi Arabia’s readiness to offer humanitarian and economic assistance if the new Syrian regime adopts a balanced policy – one that ensures the country’s territorial integrity, protects ethnic and religious minorities, and distances Iran’s proxies.

The two events mentioned above clearly demonstrate the prominent role Saudi Arabia has assumed under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), a role also evident during the Israel-Gaza War. For instance, on November 11–12, 2023, following a summit of African states, Saudi Arabia hosted a summit bringing together the Arab and Muslim worlds to discuss the wars in Gaza and Lebanon.

This summit convened both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – marking the first time in history that these two organizations met simultaneously in the same location. This move by the Saudis served as a clear statement of their intent and their leadership role in the Arab, Islamic, and African spheres.

However, it appears that the crown prince’s ambitions are not confined to the region but are also global, relating to both the diplomatic and economic spheres, as well as to softer areas such as sports and media.

Diplomatically, Saudi Arabia has established, in partnership with the European Union, the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, an international coalition with some 90 member states. The Saudi declaration that normalization with Israel will not be pursued without a Palestinian state – a significant change of position by the Saudis in the wake of the war – indicates their desire to lead an international process to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the economic sphere, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East. Its Vision 2030 development plan was designed to reduce the country’s dependence on oil incomes by developing new areas of economic activity. The Saudis want to develop other economic areas apart from oil, gas, and petrochemicals, and become a country that attracts tens of millions of tourists every year, with sports – and especially football – an important tool for advancing this policy.

Saudi Arabia has three key advantages in this regard. First, it holds the largest oil reserves in the world, producing approximately three million barrels a day, with the capacity to quickly increase production. In the event of a disruption to global oil supply, Saudi Arabia, alongside the United Arab Emirates, could produce an additional four million barrels daily, rapidly compensating for the shortfall.

Equally important, Saudi Arabia can do so at a relatively low cost, as its cost of producing a barrel of oil is the lowest in the world at just $10. The second advantage is its strategic location, allowing it to serve as a key transport hub between India and Europe, with Israel potentially playing an important role in facilitating this connection.

Saudi Arabia also serves as an important economic anchor for Egypt and Jordan. The tens of billions of dollars these countries have received over the last decade have played a crucial role in maintaining the stability of their regimes. One notable outcome of this economic aid was Egypt’s return of the Sanafir and Tiran islands to Saudi Arabia in 2017.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s economic leverage is expected to bolster its efforts to gain influence in Syria and Lebanon, particularly after the election of a new president in Lebanon who is not aligned with Hezbollah. It is no surprise that the Saudi foreign minister was quick to visit Lebanon after Joseph Aoun’s election on January 9.

In addition, Saudi Arabia plays an important role in terms of media in the Arab world, with its Al Arabiya network being no less popular than the Qatari Al Jazeera.

Last but not least, Saudi Arabi enjoys a unique status in Islam due to the location within its borders of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, to which more than two million Muslims make the Hajj pilgrimage each year.

Despite its relative military weakness – which it is supposed to overcome thanks to an American air defense umbrella – Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic, economic, religious, and media capabilities, alongside the charismatic leadership of MBS, position it as the natural leader of the Arab world.

These capabilities now face a new American president who seeks to economically pressure Iran while keeping oil prices low. If Trump aims to achieve his vision of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he will need full cooperation from Saudi Arabia. The first step in any process will, of course, be an agreement for the complete release of hostages and the end of the war, which would establish a post-conflict framework for governance in Gaza that is acceptable to both the United States and the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia.

For years, Egypt has been seen as the leader of the Arab world, or at least considered the “key player,” a term coined by Egyptian journalist Muhammad Husayn Haykal. While Egypt remains an important regional actor, particularly in relation to Gaza and Arab-Israeli relations, its demographic and economic challenges have weakened its position, creating a vacuum that has been filled by an increasingly assertive Saudi crown prince.

The article was published on Januart 31st 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Riyadh Is the Arab World’s New Real Leader הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

That vision, known as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, was launched on Sept. 9, 2023, when the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union, Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, and Italy to advance the transcontinental infrastructure project. The Biden administration hailed it as a major diplomatic and commercial breakthrough — a project that could compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

But Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel and the regional conflict that it triggered just weeks after the G20 summit has damned enthusiasm for the project and led to uneven investment in its future.

With the first phase of the ceasefire deal gradually being implemented, and President Donald Trump returning to the Oval Office, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor should enjoy a breath of new life. In order for that to happen, the Trump administration will need to tackle some of the region’s most complicated security challenges while simultaneously empowering partners along the economic corridor to take the lead in developing a cohesive commercial model. If performed successfully, the United States would both incentivize the establishment of a new regional architecture and take an important step towards reducing its role in the Middle East.

A 21st-Century Superhighway

When the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was first introduced, it was met with much fanfare. Sitting alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Biden told the G20 audience that the corridor was “a really big deal” and part of a collective effort to: “building sustainable, resilient infrastructure, making quality infrastructure investments; and creating a better future that represents greater opportunity, dignity, and prosperity for everyone.”

Few details about the corridor were shared at the time. From what can be understood from the memorandum of understanding, the project is meant to be composed of three elements: an eastern maritime corridor linking India and the Arabian Peninsula, a railway project designed to link all six Gulf Cooperation Council member states, and a northern corridor connecting the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Jordan and Israel. In addition to rapidly expanding transportation infrastructure, the corridor would incentivize the continued investment in undersea data cables and future energy projects such as green hydrogen pipelines and electricity interconnectors.

Each of the involved parties saw the corridor as a win-win scenario for its own reasons. For India, it offered a way to strengthen its role in global value chains and counter China’s growing influence. In Modi’s own words, “This corridor is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil.” For the Gulf states, the project offered a way to execute a clear hedging strategy between the United States and China, support East-West trade routes that maintained their role as middle powers, and diversify their energy markets. For Europe, the corridor would buoy its economic security and establish critical energy links with the Gulf states. For the Biden administration, the project was seen as a logical counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as an opportunity to facilitate greater interconnectivity and cooperation between key partners in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Trump administration might very well share the same view. For all the parties involved, establishing a land bridge across the Arabian Peninsula would reduce security risks for international shipping around the Horn of Africa as well as bottlenecking at the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal.

Just weeks after the G20 summit, enthusiasm about the corridor was replaced with realism. Hamas’ attack — and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza and Lebanon — derailed normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia and strained ties between Israel and the other Gulf states. Houthi attacks forced international shipping vessels to reroute away from the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. For Hamas, the prospect of Israeli-Saudi peace was seen as a threat to the Palestinian national cause. But for Iran, Hamas’ primary sponsor, the real concern was that Israel’s continued integration in the region and participation in projects like the corridor would further constrain the Islamic republic. As part of a televised address on Oct. 4, 2024, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told supporters that America and its allies were backing Israel so that it could become “a gateway for exporting energy from the region to the Western world while facilitating the import of goods and technology from the West to the region.” Encouraged by Tehran, Houthi attacks disrupted Red Sea shipping lanes, damaging global trade and contributing to Egypt’s economic woes. Seen as a way to bypass the region’s unstable corners, the war raised serious questions over how a transcontinental corridor can avoid the interference of a regional power like Iran.

Iran is not the only regional actor who expressed concern about being excluded from the economic corridor. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan famously responded to the corridor announcement by saying “there is no corridor without Turkey.” In the last year, Ankara has been championing the Development Road Project, a land-based trade corridor from the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Turkey. Since the fall of Assad, multiple plans — including energy pipelines — connecting the Gulf to Turkey via Syria have been floated.

Like Iran and Turkey, Egypt fears that the corridor will draw business away from the Suez Canal, which serves as a crucial revenue source for a country with limited foreign investment opportunities and an increasingly unstable economy. While Egypt’s limitations were part of the reason why it was left on the outside of the corridor looking in, many participating states appreciate the importance of Egyptian economic stability — both for the region as well as the corridor’s future.

Jockeying for participation in such a transformative mega project is not limited to Middle Eastern actors. While the war in Gaza dampened European interest in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, the EU’s Global Gateway is still operational and southern European states like France, Greece, and Italy have positioned themselves as potential landing points for the corridor.

Beyond the question of who will take part in the corridor’s main artery, other challenges remain. Member states have yet to articulate how the multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects associated with the corridor will be financed. There are also serious doubts as to whether an intermodal transportation network that combines maritime shipping, railways, and highways will be more cost-efficient and sustainable than existing transportation routes. Though energy projects and digital highways are touted as complementary but equally important components to the corridor’s future, no feasibility studies have been conducted to date that test the viability of these plans (e.g. green hydrogen pipelines).

But as Biden’s speech hinted, the corridor is far from dead. Bilateral trade between India and the United Arab Emirates increased by 93 percent since the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2022, and the diversification of trade beyond oil is keeping pace. The United Arab Emirates is now India’s third-largest trading partner after China and the United States. In February 2024, India and the United Arab Emirates signed a bilateral agreement designed to support the corridor’s establishment. The same month, U.S. transportation giant FedEx inaugurated a $350 million facility in Dubai. Regional investment in infrastructure has also continued. In September 2024, the United Arab Emirates signed a $2.3 billion railroad agreement with Jordan. Saudi investments in its railway network have increased to well over $4 billion as part of the government’s plans for Saudi Vision 2030. The same could be said for diplomatic activity between member states. Any observer of Indian diplomacy at the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil would confirm that the geopolitical disturbances of the past year have done little to dissuade Modi from advancing a front and center, corridor-friendly agenda.

In summary, the interests that helped establish the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor remain as prevalent today as they did when the mega project was first announced. What remains to be seen is whether enough trust and common interest required to achieve such a sophisticated degree of economic interconnectivity exists between the principal actors. This is at least partially dependent on how the United States chooses to engage the region under Trump.

Bridging East and West by Stabilizing the Middle East

If the United States is to continue supporting the corridor’s development, it will need to find a balance between supporting the construction of a new regional security architecture, empowering member states, and ensuring that certain regulatory and taxation policies are upheld. Trump, who ran on an America First agenda and will be occupied with a myriad of global issues, may not have the bandwidth to engage meaningfully in the corridor. Still, there are concrete steps his administration can take that would uphold the U.S. commitment to its international partners while directly and indirectly benefiting the corridor’s future.

First, the administration should articulate its continued commitment to the corridor, allaying any concerns that the United States will renege on past promises under Trump. One way of demonstrating this is by appointing a special envoy to the initiative. This would mirror the decision in February 2024 by French President Emmanuel Macron, who tapped energy industry veteran Gerard Mestrallet for the position. Committing a senior U.S. representative to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor would contribute to the project’s gradual institutionalization — a necessary step to create common policies on regulation, taxation, and customs procedures. The special envoy would engage diplomatically with member states as well as support American companies who wish to take part in the corridor’s development.

Trump should become an “empowerer-in-chief,” entrusting his cabinet appointments like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent to advance U.S. foreign policy interests without him needing to be in the room. It would be unsurprising if the corridor attracted the attention of Jared Kushner, a trusted voice during Trump’s first presidency.

That doesn’t mean there wouldn’t be a role for Trump himself. Arguably his greatest strength is the warm personal relations he enjoys with many heads of state who are involved in the corridor. From India’s Modi to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Trump would find himself in good company at a future India-Middle East-Europe Corridor summit. But rather than steal the spotlight, Trump should practice lateral leadership, empowering international partners with a readiness for the United States to step in when the project needs a bit of a nudge.

At the same time, the Trump administration should encourage the construction of additional East-West corridors if they benefit America’s international partners and are both economically and strategically viable. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East only strengthen the case for diversifying and multiplying economic corridors. The eggs of the global trade shouldn’t all be placed in one basket.

The most instrumental way in which the Trump administration can support the corridor, along with other potential East-West corridors, is by addressing Middle Eastern instability. That means stewarding the distinct ceasefire agreements brokered by the Biden administration between Israel and Hezbollah and Israel and Hamas and gradually turning them into more lasting political arrangements.

It may sound far-fetched today, nevertheless there are scenarios where elements of the corridor’s development are used to support Gaza’s rehabilitation. A revitalized Gaza port under international supervision, for example, would be a boon for Palestinians. The port could also serve as a supporting spur to Haifa Port — purchased by Indian-owned Adani Group in 2023 — where many of the corridor’s plans currently hinge. In short, by drawing inspiration from the corridor, the Trump administration could incentivize the parties to reach a durable resolution to the war that would create a window of opportunity to revisit normalization efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia and attract additional foreign investment to the region.

A similar logic could be applied when dealing with new governments in Lebanon and Syria. If leveraged in the right way, participation in East-West corridors could be a major incentive for new political actors to respect U.S. interests, maintain their commitment to keeping the peace, and further reduce Iranian, Russia, and Chinese influence.

In addition to these steps, the United States should devise a more effective mechanism for constraining Houthi aggression. The corridor is not a replacement for the Suez Canal, and therefore the secure passage of maritime traffic around the Horn of Africa and Red Sea should remain a top priority for America and its allies.

Last but not least, the Trump administration will need to identify the correct formula for containing Iran and severing supply chains between Tehran and its proxies. Without some kind of arrangement between the United States and Iran, it is safe to suspect that the Islamic regime will try to undermine efforts to develop an East-West corridor that leaves it out in the cold.

This would be a stiff task for the most competent of U.S. administrations, regardless of whether it had an interest in supporting the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’s fortunes. Considering some of the other pressing global issues that will draw Trump’s attention, such as a potential trade war with China and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, it is difficult to see how the Trump administration could achieve this feat alone. Perhaps that is the point. The corridor cannot succeed just by sheer American will. The project has so many diplomatic and commercial components that no single administration — or global actor — can take on such responsibility alone. Completing the corridor will require a coordinated effort over the course of decades. What the Trump administration can try to provide, however, is a commitment to empowering regional partners in a way that serves long-term U.S. national security and economic interests.

The article was published on January 28th 2025 in War On The Rocks.

הפוסט Making Deals, Building Corridors: Trump’s Middle East Moment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The normalization of the relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was close before October 7, 2023 but was shelved after the attack by Hamas. Indeed, one of the goals of the attack was to torpedo it.

The end of the Israel-Hamas War and the agreement for the release of the hostages present a new opportunity to bring this initiative to fruition. We are witnessing an ideal moment, combining two essential elements required for success: first, a significant change; second, the presence of an appealing idea or plan ready to be implemented.

The major change is marked by two significant events. First, the end of the war. History shows that wars often create opportunities for large-scale change due to their tectonic impact. This war has caused significant damage to Iran and its proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas – and has led to Syria’s removal from the Axis of Resistance.

However, such post-war opportunities are not always seized, often due to a lack of leadership or due to short-sightedness, stubbornness, or folly on the part of a country’s leaders.

The second major change is the new US administration, with Trump driven by personal ambition to leave a lasting legacy, possibly by securing a Nobel Peace Prize.

At the same time, there is an attractive proposal on the table: normalization with Saudi Arabia. For Israel, the appeal of this prospect lies in the fact that Saudi Arabia is a key player in the Gulf, the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as the international stage.

An agreement with Saudi Arabia would strengthen the regional coalition against Iran. Moreover, given that all previous peace and normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states have withstood the test of war, such an agreement would further solidify Israel’s integration into the region.

Riyadh’s influence

Saudi Arabia’s influence is evident in three main arenas. Diplomatically, it plays a leading role in both regional and international processes. For instance, in 2002, Saudi Arabia introduced the peace initiative that evolved into the Arab Peace Initiative. It is still ratified annually by the Arab League summit, though it has never received an official response from Israel.

Similarly, during the recent Israel-Hamas War, Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, hosted the 2023 Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit, bringing together in a joint meeting both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation for the first time.

In addition, Saudi Arabia, in partnership with the European Union, founded the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, an international coalition of approximately 90 member states.

Most recently, on January 12, 2025, Riyadh hosted the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with representatives from 11 Arab states, to discuss the situation in Syria. This indicates that Saudi Arabia is not willing to cede the Syrian arena to Turkey, Qatar, or extremist Islamic groups.

Economically, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, even surpassing Turkey. It holds the world’s largest oil reserves and has the capacity to increase production. This gives Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, the ability to swiftly compensate for any disruptions in the international oil supply – whether due to boycotts of countries like Iran or Russia, or natural disasters, such as those that have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico.

By doing so, Saudi Arabia can prevent a dramatic rise in oil prices, which otherwise would trigger shock waves throughout the global economy.

Saudi Arabia also serves as a crucial economic anchor for Egypt and Jordan. The tens of billions of dollars these countries have received over the past decade have been instrumental in maintaining the stability of their regimes.

This economic leverage is expected to play a significant role in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to exert influence in Syria following the formation of a new governing regime, as well as in Lebanon after the election of a new president not aligned with Hezbollah.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia holds considerable media influence in the Arab world, with its Al Arabiya network surpassing the popularity of the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera.

Finally, Saudi Arabia enjoys a unique status in Islam, as it is home to the two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, which host the annual Hajj pilgrimage attended by over two million Muslims annually.

For these reasons, normalization with Saudi Arabia opens the door for Israel to the large Saudi market and perhaps also to other Muslim countries, such as Indonesia.

The main challenge, however, lies in resolving the Palestinian issue. Prior to the war, it seemed that Saudi Arabia might settle for a symbolic concession on Palestine as a condition for normalization. However, statements made by senior Saudi officials during the war indicate that the price of normalization has risen significantly and now includes the establishment of a Palestinian state.

On the other hand, former US secretary of state Antony Blinken stated that normalization “is ready to go,” but two conditions must be met: the end of the war in Gaza and a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood.

Assuming that the war will indeed end, the main bone of contention is the Palestinian issue, especially given that the war has brought about a decline in the willingness of the Jewish public in Israel to agree to a Palestinian state.

However, a survey conducted in early January 2025 found that more than 70% of the Jewish public supports the return of the hostages and the end of the war, normalization with Saudi Arabia, a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians, and the formation of a regional security coalition against Iran.

The concept of a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians may be constructively ambiguous, but it raises several important questions: Will it satisfy the Saudis? Will there be a Palestinian partner? Can a diplomatic and security arrangement be reached in Gaza, potentially in partnership with moderate Arab states, that satisfies both sides?

While the answers to these questions are complex and uncertain, one thing seems clear: An opportunity exists for realizing the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Will it be seized? As Winston Churchill once said, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity; the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.”

The article published in January 23rd 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Normalizing Relations with Saudi Arabia Provides New Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli public has been waiting for this for months, with consecutive public opinion polls indicating that a large majority supported ending the war in Gaza in return for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

As months went by, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing governing coalition worked to avoid such a deal — Hamas was doing the same. And the U.S. administration, although heavily invested in mediation efforts, simply didn’t apply effective pressure to make either party change course.

At the same time, the number of living Israeli hostages gradually decreased; casualties among Israeli soldiers increased; and the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population continued.

Today, Israelis are supportive of the cease-fire deal, but they also can’t help but ask why it wasn’t reached six, seven or eight months ago. The terms that were discussed and rejected at the time were nearly identical to the ones agreed upon now. Why was it necessary for additional hostages, soldiers and civilians to die before leaders finally took action?

Still, the deal brings with it a sigh of relief. We, Israelis, have all come to know and care so much about the hostages. Hope for their release and concern for their fate have become part of our daily lives. Their families have been leading a brave and furious struggle to bring them back home, sometimes in the face of unbearable, ugly attacks by the far right.

Many Israelis showed solidarity and support, feeling a basic Israeli principle had been jeopardized — the state’s responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring its people back home. And it was often claimed in recent months that until the hostages returned, Israeli society couldn’t heal from the trauma of Oct. 7.

Now, things are finally moving forward. The excitement upon the return of the first three hostages was felt in every corner. But we also receive the cease-fire announcement with a heavy heart. Not all of the 33 hostages who are to be gradually released in the deal’s first phase are said to be alive, and no one definitively knows which hostages will return on their feet.

More questions arise too: What will be the health condition of those returning? What will be the fate of the remaining 65 hostages who are to be released in later phases of the deal, which Netanyahu doesn’t seem eager to implement? What will be the future of Gaza after Israel’s withdrawal? And will residents of southern Israel finally be able to return home safely?

There are still many unknowns. But since the cease-fire was announced, they also carry a spark of optimism.

This deal shows that, eventually, diplomacy can work. International mediators can deliver. Sides to a bitter conflict can reach an agreement, and public pressure can make an impact. It shows that suffering can come to an end, that families can reunite and a better future can emerge.

Taking place in the context of many other regional changes, this cease-fire also creates new opportunities. From the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire in Lebanon to the transition in Syria and the weakening of Iran, all these developments improve Israel’s geopolitical situation. If only the country had a government that would seek to leverage this to advance a two-state solution, we could have witnessed a much more dramatic transformation — including normalization in Israeli-Saudi relations.

The window of opportunity for such change will still exist for a while to come, but its realization would require different, more moderate Israeli leadership, as well as curbing and sidelining far-right extremism, reversing anti-democratic trends within Israeli society and politics, and reviving pro-peace attitudes and practices.

The immediate priority, however, is fully implementing all phases of the cease-fire agreement, and setting in motion a constructive “day after” plan in the Gaza Strip — one involving the Palestinian Authority and regional countries, at the expense of Hamas. Israelis and Palestinians will need a continuous international helping hand to do this, especially from the U.S.

It’s time to turn the page on the dark chapter that Oct. 7 brought, and start charting the better, more peaceful future that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. The cease-fire inches us closer to that reality, and the mediators who, however belatedly, made it happen deserve appreciation and thanks, and they should follow the process through till it is fully implemented.

The article published on January 22nd 2025 in Politico.

הפוסט Gaza Cease-Fire: The View From Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lebanon now has a leader after over two years of failed attempts to elect a president. Aoun is backed by the international bloc opposing Iran (primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France) and comes from the military establishment responsible for upholding the ceasefire with Israel. This is promising news – but realizing its potential depends also on Israel’s actions.

In the past year, Israel heavily struck Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel’s use of force during the summer and fall of 2024 – assisted by US mediation efforts – led the terror organization to agree in November to a 60-day ceasefire, relinquishing its commitment to continue fighting as long as Israel fought Hamas in Gaza. The weakening of Hezbollah also paved the way for the Syrian opposition’s successful campaign to overthrow the Assad regime in Damascus, an ally of Hezbollah and Iran.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is one of the few diplomatic achievements that Israel has managed to secure since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror attack, and it bears significant importance.

Since the ceasefire began, rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has almost entirely ceased. Although many northern residents still do not feel secure enough to return home, public opinion surveys indicate that most Israelis support the ceasefire, support which is echoed by regional states and Israel’s Western allies.

Israel’s interest should be in making permanent this temporary lull in fighting and seizing the opportunities it presents – the weakening of Hezbollah within Lebanon’s internal politics and the gradual reshaping of Israel-Lebanon relations.

Doubts about the future

However, as the 60-day ceasefire period draws to a close, doubts are growing about Israel’s commitment to the agreements reached and to ending the fighting on the northern front. To achieve this, Israel must act wisely on both military and diplomatic fronts to best serve its long-term strategic goals.

Although Hezbollah has been defeated (in this round) by Israel, while weakened domestically, it has not been defeated in that arena and is working hard to maintain its assets and status. Hezbollah is an authentic representative of significant portions of the Lebanese population – as reflected in its representation and influence in Lebanon’s parliament. A survey published by an American think tank in early 2024 revealed that 93% of Lebanon’s Shiite population – about a quarter of the country’s inhabitants – held a positive view of Hezbollah at the time.

On the other hand, ahead of the recent presidential election, Hezbollah’s preferred candidate withdrew from the race to avoid a possible defeat, which would have signaled the group’s weakening.

Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon see an opportunity to shift the balance of power and have successfully worked to elect a new president since the ceasefire began, viewing it as a chance to establish new leadership in Lebanon that opposes Hezbollah and aligns with the West and moderate Arab states.

Despite its military strength, Israel has limited influence over Lebanon’s internal politics and should avoid actions that portray it as attempting to dictate processes or appoint leaders there – much as in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, Israel’s actions do create a context that impacts Lebanon’s internal developments. In the past, Hezbollah gained support beyond Lebanon’s Shiite community by presenting itself as a defender of Lebanese sovereignty against a powerful Israel. Now, Israel should use its military power cautiously to avoid reigniting dwindling public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel should reduce its military footprint in Lebanon, including reported drone flights over Beirut. Israel should also make a special effort not to hit Lebanese army soldiers.

Formal apologies for any such hits, as Israel made in early December, are important signals to the Lebanese public.

According to the ceasefire agreement, the Lebanese army is supposed to play a key role in replacing Hezbollah, and Israel has an interest in empowering it. On a tactical level, continued IDF strikes on the Lebanese army would likely diminish its willingness to confront Hezbollah. Strategically, such actions could undermine Joseph Aoun’s position as he transitions from army chief to president.

In Lebanon, there are complaints about repeated Israeli violations of the ceasefire, with reports of over 1,000 such incidents since late November. This creates anger in Lebanon, portrays Israel as a heavy-handed aggressor harming civilians unnecessarily, and hinders the creation of mechanisms to promote shared interests between the two countries. Israel should stop these violations, in accordance with the self-determination clause mentioned in the ceasefire agreement, and cease the destruction of villages it has occupied in southern Lebanon. Israel’s current actions risk fueling support for Hezbollah and generating hostility among moderate factions in Lebanon, who could be crucial interlocutors in future efforts to demarcate the land border and redefine relations between the two countries.

Israel must learn from the experience of the First Lebanon War in 1982. Its swift military achievements then were gradually eroded when they were met with Lebanon’s complicated internal situation.

The Palestinian armed forces were exiled to Tunisia but were then replaced by an even stronger force, Hezbollah, which has become a strategic problem for Israel, partly due to its ties with Iran. We must not be blinded by Israel’s recent short-term military success. Lebanon is a complex and difficult country to influence, but the outcomes of the war have already sparked internal processes there that could align with Israel’s interests.

Israel must now avoid causing harm or disrupting Lebanon’s internal processes, express commitment to implementing the ceasefire – including withdrawing the IDF from southern Lebanon – declare its desire for a future peace with the Lebanese state, and invest diplomatically in expanding coordination and channels of communication with Lebanon, with the assistance of international actors such as the UN, the US, France, and Gulf states. This is even more important in light of the dramatic changes occurring in Syria, which are likely to shape the region’s future in the coming years.

Excessive and prolonged use of Israel’s military power against Lebanon could lead to the imminent collapse of the ceasefire, delay the return of northern residents to their homes, cause further harm to IDF soldiers, strengthen Hezbollah, increase hostility toward Israel among moderate elements in Lebanon, and erase Israel’s impressive military achievements.

Israel is now required to act wisely, both diplomatically and militarily, and not let the Lebanese opportunity slip away. The ceasefire must be implemented, preserved, and turned into a permanent arrangement.

The article was written by Dr. Ehud Eiran, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, and was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel Should Make the Ceasefire with Lebanon Permanent הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Notably, he described the October 7 attack as “a barbaric act with no justification”—a clear condemnation that, for the vast majority of Israelis, is considered a minimum starting point for any dialogue with the Arab and Muslim worlds. This, in fact, is the most critical aspect of Alghashian’s remarks and serves as his call to action. As he stated, “I propose one starting point: a mid-level dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. Instead of striving for hollow declarations of victory, we must foster a more serious conversation. Alongside peace efforts from the top-down and bottom-up, we need an in-depth analytical dialogue based on a network of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics.”

We wholeheartedly welcome Alghashian’s call and suggest broadening its scope into practice.

From my perspective as an Orthodox Jewish rabbi, religion is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as to the broader challenges of the Middle East. My goal, and that of my rabbinical colleagues both in Israel and abroad, is to position religion on the other side of the equation: not as part of the problem but as part of the solution. Indeed, we go further: not only can and should religion be part of the solution, but a long-term resolution is likely impossible without incorporating the religious dimension. The reason is clear—religion and tradition play a pivotal role in shaping behavior at every level, from individuals and communities to states and diplomatic relationships in the Middle East. Ignoring the religious aspect and trying to resolve conflicts solely based on shared interests has not proven effective so far, and there is no reason to believe it will succeed in the future.

Of course, this does not mean we should neglect shared interests. Israelis and Saudis undeniably share common concerns—like those Alghashian articulated—about “a region engulfed in turmoil and conflict” and “regional instability.” It is worth stating the obvious: most Israelis seek peace and stability, not endless war. It’s also obvious that conspiracy theories suggesting Israeli expansionist ambitions in the Middle East are baseless. Our goal is to be accepted as an equal partner in the region—with formal, open relations—not relegated to a marginalized role, as Alghashian aptly described.

The first step, as Alghashian suggested, is indeed a mid-level dialogue. However, we propose adding religious leaders from both sides to the roster of researchers, experts, journalists, and academics. Many of us, in fact, wear multiple hats as scholars, experts, and more. A dialogue that excludes religious leaders will yield intriguing insights for certain elites, but it won’t facilitate deeper processes, shift attitudes, or persuade veto players on both sides—key actors without whom no agreement can be signed, or if signed, will hold little chance of enduring. This mistake—intentionally sidelining religious leaders—was made during the Oslo Accords, as the architects viewed them as part of the problem. They were correct, but they failed to recognize that without making religious leaders part of the solution, there could be no solution. We all know the result. Let us avoid repeating past mistakes and learn from them.

Alongside addressing shared interests, we must also care for our distinct identities. Neither side has any intention—or expectation—of relinquishing, altering, or compromising their ancient traditions and identities for short-term interests. Instead, we propose an opposite approach: one that focuses on deeply understanding our shared roots, enabling us to transform these different identities from sources of conflict into foundations for a better shared future. After years of deep dialogue with leaders across the Muslim world and a growing group of rabbis well-versed in Islam, the Quran, and fluent in Arabic, we are confident in the transformative potential of such conversations and believe the time has come to expand them.

The renowned Hebrew poet Rachel Bluwstein—so central to Israeli culture that she is simply called “Rachel the Poet”—asked in one of her famous works, “Why does an outstretched hand not meet a sister’s hand?” We see Alghashian’s article as an immensely important outstretched hand, and we respond simply: here is the sister’s hand. Let us meet.

הפוסט Will an Outstretched Hand Meet a Sister’s Hand? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In retrospect, we should have realized that we had ignored the fact that the Palestinians could alone not provide answers to significant parts of the core issues of the conflict—the refugee issue, the Jerusalem issue, and, of course, the security envelope—because each one of them requires a regional approach.

In Oslo, Camp David, and even in the very advanced talks of then-Prime Minister Olmert with Abu Mazen, there was a lack of understanding of the necessity for a broad regional framework, which would provide the Palestinians with the backing to make the necessary compromises—and provide the Israelis with the incentive of the fruits of regional peace.

The Israeli right tried to exploit the failure to achieve an agreement in order to promote opposing approaches—Sharon attempted unilateralism following Barak’s assertion that there was no partner for an agreement, and Netanyahu marketed the illusion that regional peace could be achieved without a Palestinian component. Both of these approaches tragically exploded in our faces on October 7.

The events of October 7 and the ongoing war since then have ended the fantasies of most Palestinians to become a majority in a single democratic state between the river and the sea. Long beforehand, they had given up their hope that negotiations would lead to the establishment of their own state.

The terrible massacre that Hamas committed hardened the hearts of many Israelis, who had previously believed in the moral imperative to end control over a foreign people. The walls of fear and hostility have risen among both Israelis and Palestinians, two peoples who have paid an unbearable price over the past fifteen months.

We must internalize that for the Israeli public, the most important issue is security. After October 7, the Israeli public is more frightened, more suspicious, and less willing to consider moral arguments. Therefore, even those of us who believe that the occupation must end to avoid moral and strategic harm to Israeli democracy must offer the citizens of Israel an arrangement that allows them to achieve what they desire most of all: security.

Security is brought by diplomatic arrangements, such as those we have with Jordan and Egypt. Security that is derived from a united regional front against the axis of Shiite jihadism led by Iran and the Sunni jihadism that may emerge with Turkey’s backing after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Surveys by the Accord Center for Social Psychology at the Hebrew University, conducted even during the most difficult periods of the fighting, reveal that the Israeli public is willing to accept a Palestinian state if it comes in the form of a comprehensive normalization agreement between Israel and Arab countries. The majority of the Israeli public (about 61%) prefers separation from the Palestinians over annexation. The data indicates that ultimately, even when the winds of war are blowing, the Israeli public is much more realistic than its current leadership. Israelis understand that the path to security passes through normalization, which will include the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Arab normalization of relations with the State of Israel.

The current reality necessitates the promotion of a regional solution—a 23-state plan—which includes all Arab states, a demilitarized Palestinian state, and Israel as an integral part of the region. Unfortunately, a large proportion of Israeli citizens are not interested enough in ending the occupation. However, agreements that will bring about security and prosperity for Israelis and that will end the occupation will receive public support.

The challenge for the Peace Camp is to implement the “Arab initiative,” which was first presented in 2002 as a Saudi initiative but has effectively become an initiative of the Arab League. The “Arab Initiative” offers full normalization between Arab countries and Israel in exchange for a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian conflict based on the 1967 borders. During Obama’s presidency, Arab countries added the principle of land swaps at the request of US Secretary of State John Kerry.

The Abraham Accords did open the door to regional normalization and economic cooperation, but their disregard for the Palestinian issue limited them to a small number of countries and did not resolve the fundamental issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, after October 7, no Arab country can afford to ignore the Palestinian issue, and it is very clear from Saudi Arabian declarations that normalization must include a Palestinian state.

The important lesson from the Abraham Accords is that the Israeli public preferred normalization over annexation, which was avoided thanks to the UAE, which made clear to Trump that this was a red line that could not be crossed. Moreover, since the accords, many Israelis now recognize the advantages of normalization. Many of those who saw Arabs only as enemies have found the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco to be their preferred tourist destinations and enjoy the ability to fly cheaply and in less time to the Far East.

Together with Arab countries, the Biden Administration prepared a regional framework—that includes a Palestinian state—as a way to end the war in Gaza and achieve a governance alternative to Hamas. This framework is also in the interest of the Trump Administration and the entire Sunni world led by Saudi Arabia, and they have a better chance of addressing the objections of the Israeli right than the outgoing Biden Administration.

The Israeli peace camp should adopt a discourse that emphasizes strengthening Israel’s security, economy, and international legitimacy, all of which resonate with the Israeli people.

This will not convince the current government, which has been taken over by the most extreme elements of the Israeli right, but if it is the public’s will, in the end, a sane government will be established here that will work to implement it.

We need to create responses that are suitable for Israel in 2025—practical solutions to everyday problems. To turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a minefield for Israel’s integration into the region into the key to its advancement.

The article was published on January 8th in The Times of Israel.

הפוסט The 23 State Solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the nature of Saudi Arabia is inherently challenging to comprehend, no one bears greater responsibility for your misunderstanding of it than your own prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. If you really want to understand Saudi Arabia’s position both with regard to normalization with Israel and on the Palestinian issue, then the best place to start is by examining Saudi discourse.

As a Saudi researcher of Saudi policy toward Israel, I have confronted the complexities of Israel. The complexities of a people – and its discourses – must always be respected.

This courtesy is something Netanyahu has not extended to the Saudi kingdom. Your political leadership has misled you by oversimplifying Saudi Arabia and its people – their logic, their beliefs, and their discourses.

Therefore, I want to make use of the opportunity to communicate with you, the Israeli people, directly as a Saudi who genuinely seeks peace.

I would like to dispel two key exaggerations that your country’s current political leadership has promoted.

The Iranian issue

The first has to do with the Iranian issue. Netanyahu has been promoting the idea that Saudi-Israeli normalization is the logical outcome of the shared Iranian threat. This idea is inaccurate to say the least. Netanyahu proposes that a major regional confrontation with Iran would lead the Saudi kingdom to move away from its traditional position, to set aside its grievances with Israel regarding the Palestinian issue, and to base normalization on a logic of mutual enmity. This is too simplistic, and the Saudi ruling elite thinks in a far more nuanced way than that.

It is true that the Saudis still view Iran as its primary security concern. Equally true, however, is that both Saudi Arabia and Israel fundamentally differ in how they strategically address that concern. While the Saudis have concluded that working with Iran is the best way to address its security grievances, Netanyahu’s robust approach is something the Saudis wish to avoid.

What we Saudis truly fear is a region embroiled in conflict. Saudi anxiety over regional turbulence stems from our concern about the restructuring of our economy, which we consider an existential issue, and we know we cannot achieve our ambitious economic goals in a turbulent region.

What the Saudi ruling elite fears most is the radicalization that is almost certain to arise from this ongoing war.

The images of death, destruction, and the loss of innocent Palestinian and Israeli lives are painful for all. Some members of the Israeli government talk of resettling Gaza and annexing more territory in the West Bank. This is not only repugnant to us but has two additional effects: It increases the sense of grievance toward Israel and the potential for further extremism in the region.

This leads to the second issue that Netanyahu has misled you on – the notion that the Saudis do not care about the Palestinian issue. Your government has misled you, the Israeli people, into believing that Saudis will willingly abandon their historical stance and normalize relations with Israel regardless of the Palestinian issue, which is now an inescapable reality.

Within Saudi Arabia, there is a sense of solidarity that perhaps has not been seen since the Second Intifada. What you will not see are pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli demonstrations taking to the streets of the kingdom, as that is not part of Saudi culture.

But I urge you not to measure the gravity of Saudi support by the absence of such demonstrations, which is about the fear of extremists trying to instrumentalize this pain. In that sense, I also want to communicate to you that October 7 was a barbaric atrocity that took the lives of innocent people. Too much innocent blood has been spilled in this conflict.

The Saudi-Palestinian relationship is not devoid of tensions. However, the reality is that sporadic tensions are part and parcel of deep, longstanding relations. I would suggest you avoid the perception that instances of tension with the Palestinians are signs of imminent Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Moving forward

How do we proceed? Our people have many interests in common, but there is nothing we share more, unfortunately, than the blood of our respective brethren spilled and mutual pain. We must empathize with each other and keep our eyes on the horizon of the necessary peace that will benefit us all.

There might be many possible points of departure, but I will present one: an Arab-Israeli “mid-level dialogue,” between analysts, think tanks, journalists, and academics with the aim of fostering healthier and more constructive Arab-Israeli discourse.

A discourse that speaks to the other, and not over or about the other. Mid-level Arab-Israeli discourse should be forward-thinking, presenting new, creative proposals that address the need for peace, while incentivizing political actors to remain invested in the process.

I know that there are people in Israel who desire real peace. We are ready to engage, but you need to help us by ensuring we jointly aim at solving this issue from its roots. Otherwise, and allow me to use a notion from the book From Mistress to Known Partner: Israel’s Secret Relations with States and Minorities in the Middle East, 1948-2020 by Elie Podeh: Israel and Israelis will once again become nothing more than the mistress of the region.

The Abraham Accords are indeed a milestone in Arab-Israeli relations. However, history has shown that even mistresses out in the open are still viewed as illegitimate and unacceptable. This can be seen in a range of polls from Abraham Accords countries, which indicate the lack of support by many for relations with Israel.

It is time we enter a process in which Israel moves from being considered a “mistress” into an open and legitimate partner for peace – and that can only happen through a two-state solution.

The article was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט Saudi perspective: The Palestinian issue cannot be pushed aside הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In contrast to its image as a stable regime, a quick look at the history of Syria shows that before the rise to power of the Alawite Assad dynasty in 1970, it was the least stable country in the Middle East. From 1949 to 1970, it experienced no fewer than 17 military coups, most of which failed. Hafez al-Assad learned from these earlier failures, gaining a clear understanding of the necessary conditions for establishing a lasting dictatorship.

Syria has long been a focus for regional and international tensions, leading the journalist and Assad’s biographer Patrick Seale to refer to the phenomenon as “the struggle for Syria.” Seale argued that whoever wants to control the Middle East from an international perspective, and whoever wants to lead the Arab world, must rule Syria, due to its geostrategic location and importance. While this thesis has not always stood the test of time, the idea of the struggle over Syria as a reflection of a broader struggle in the regional and international arenas remains entirely valid.

After it sided with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Syria became an important component of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. With the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League following its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, it was Syria – not Iran – that led this axis, and strove for “strategic equilibrium” with the Jewish state. However, the 1990 Gulf War and the collapse of his Soviet patron led Hafez to break off relations with Iran, forge new relations with the United States, and enter into negotiations for a peace treaty with Israel.

During the first decade of his rule, Bashar was courted by both sides, which he exploited to further his own interests and those of his regime. Yet the assistance he received from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah during the Arab Spring, which made a decisive contribution to his survival, carried a considerable military, economic, foreign policy, and civilian price tag: reliance on the Axis of Resistance to the point of dependence; the transformation of Syria into a Russian and Iranian base of influence in the Middle East; and the use of its territory as a staging post for supplying Hezbollah, Iran’s most important ally in Lebanon.

Not actively fighting Israel

SYRIA HAS not played an active role in the October 7 war, due to the severe consequences of its civil war, though its passive role placed it as part of the Axis of Resistance. However, there were many who hoped that the setbacks suffered by the Axis during the war would lead Bashar to follow his father and switch his military and foreign policy orientation, especially in light of the differences of opinion and concerns recently voiced about a possible Iranian takeover of the country.

The rebels’ assault, then, surprised everyone. They perfectly exploited the moment when Iran and Hezbollah were reeling from major blows inflicted by Israel, while Russia was bogged down in its war in Ukraine and distracted by the political conflict in Georgia. The external actors who saved Assad during the Arab Spring could not save him again this time around.

The problem is that the rebel forces are not a unified bloc. They came together in order to end the Assad regime, but the road to establishing a functioning Syrian national entity will be a long one, because each of the country’s ethnic and religious groups – Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, and Alawites – imagines a Syria in its own image, even if they are all currently united around the new-old Syrian flag (which was the flag of independence from the French Mandate).

There are several scenarios that present themselves in the Syrian arena, with the most optimistic being that the country maintains its recognized borders and establishes a representative government following elections. The pessimistic scenario is that it breaks up into separate entities along ethnic and religious lines.

Between these two extremes are several more realistic possibilities, ranging from the rise of an Islamist regime of some type or other, to armed conflicts between the different groups. Initial signs of this latter outcome are already visible in the north, with fighting between the Kurds and Turkish-backed rebels.

FROM A regional perspective, Syria has returned to its natural position in the Arab world. The alliance with Iran since 1980 has been rather unnatural, given that Syria, from its independence, was allied with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Though it was Nasser’s Egypt that promoted Pan-Arabism, the roots of this ideology lie in Syria. Thus, even if Islamist ideology becomes a central feature, Syria will remain an important actor in the Arab world. The removal from power of the Alawites, who are viewed as either infidels or Shi’ites (depending on who is being asked), and the return of Sunni rule means that the alliance with Iran and Hezbollah is no longer relevant.

Israel, of course, has benefited from the changes in Syria, which has ceased to represent a strategic threat for the foreseeable future, due both to the military setbacks it has suffered and to the severe economic consequences of the civil war. Moreover, Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance has major regional implications, because the “Shia Crescent” has now been severed, which will make it much more difficult for Iran to transfer arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, the fact that the Axis of Resistance has become a purely Shi’ite axis creates a countering Sunni axis that shares many common interests with Israel.

The change in Syria is not just another regime change in the Middle East. It is significant because it means the renewal of the struggle in and for Syria, between regional and international forces. The country may have exited the Axis of Resistance, but this does not mean that it has automatically crossed to the opposing camp, especially given that Iran and Russia will try to act to maintain their control or influence there.

On the other hand, the United States is already in contact with the various rebel groups in Syria, and Israel is also not standing idly by. In other words, the struggle for Syria has begun again, with the potential to create new opportunities for Israel and the West.

The article was published on December 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט The Fall of Assad Is Just the Beginning: The Struggle for Syria Has Resumed הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has so far acted true to form, limiting its actions to the military sphere by creating a new buffer zone in Syria and destroying the offensive capabilities of Bashar al-Assad’s army, especially its missile and chemical weapons systems.

But if Israel is to have an impact on shaping this strategically positioned space, it must adopt a broad diplomatic initiative.

How can Israel reshape Syria?

At the current decision-making juncture, we must realize that the process of reshaping Syria is already underway. We must also recognize that in the emerging Syrian narrative, Israel is deemed to have played an integral part in liberating the country from the atrocities of the Assad regime and its Iranian patrons.

My conversations with Syrian colleagues clearly point to the perception that Israel’s victory over Hezbollah had a major impact on the Syrian army’s collapse and provides it with unique influence on future events.

However, resting on our laurels and reveling in the scenes of looting at the Iranian embassy in Damascus is a path fraught with risks. Anyone who thinks the Iranians have washed their hands of Syria probably does not understand the economic situation in Syria or does not know the Iranian regime.

As it has done in Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria itself at the end of the previous decade, Iran excels at exploiting political transitions. While currently perceived as a central pillar of Assad’s oppressive regime – having gambled on his survival and faced setbacks – Iran has shown a remarkable ability to adapt to shifting circumstances.

It has consistently demonstrated a talent for forging alliances, particularly in the face of domestic political vacuums and economic needs. The rebel takeover of Syria only deepens these needs. The Iranians have demonstrated impressive skills in building strategic ties with Syria’s non-Shi’ite population groups, such as the Sunnis and Druze in the south of Syria, and large Sunni tribes in the border area with Iraq.

Let us not forget, either, that the Iranians play a significant role in keeping Syria’s energy and electricity sector running. Iran therefore has significant cards to play against the forces trying to shape a new order in a devastated country despite the innate hostility between them and the rebels in Damascus. Iran’s leaders have, in fact, already expressed a desire to develop ties with the new Syrian regime.

ISRAEL MUST recognize that the current vacuum is temporary and therefore requires it to adopt a far more proactive approach than it did during the Syrian civil war. That includes two policy measures that point in opposite directions but seek to deal with the current uncertainty.

First, Israel must strengthen its relations with major political actors in Syria – the emphasis is, of course, on the Druze in the south, and on Rojava, the autonomous Kurdish state that has emerged over the past decade in the strategic space of northeastern Syria.

The ties should be enhanced through a quiet and cautious dialogue given both the sensitivity of building such ties while the issue of political unity is paramount in Syria, and Israel’s standing in the region is at an all-time low.

In the words of a Syrian-Kurdish friend: This is the worst time to have a public relationship with Israel, and the most important time to have a quiet dialogue with it. Tweets on this matter by reckless Israeli ministers are not helpful to this sensitive effort.

Israel has maintained an informal relationship with the Druze for years, based on a series of unwritten agreements. This was most recently demonstrated last week when the IDF defended the Syrian Druze village of Khader against attacks by local rebels.

The relationship with the Kurds is more complex, in part because of its implications for Israeli-Turkish relations. However, a model for an unofficial strategic relationship already exists in Israel’s long-standing relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. It is rooted, among other factors, in the Kurds’ perception of Israel as a role model for nation-building, survival, and prosperity in a hostile environment.

At the same time, Israel should actively encourage and support the international and regional economic rehabilitation of Syria. This reliance on foreign aid could serve as leverage to shape the future regime, conditioning assistance on the new government’s adoption of moderate policies both domestically and internationally.

Europe and the GCC countries previously refrained from engaging in Syria’s reconstruction because they did not want to strengthen the Assad regime, but that argument is now void.

A large-scale reconstruction process could encourage a return of refugees from Europe and the countries of the region to their homes, easing the burden on their host countries. Western nations and moderate Arab states also share a common interest in removing Russian and Iranian influence from Syria.

ISRAEL’S ROLE in Syria’s reconstruction would be modest but meaningful. Initially, it would focus on guaranteeing respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a commitment to cease attacks as long as the new regime ensures Iran’s exclusion. In the second phase, Israel could help facilitate reconstruction by allowing the use of its air and land routes for logistical support.

The past two years have highlighted the symbiotic relationship between developments in Gaza or the West Bank and events in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran.

Israel’s continued military presence in Gaza complicates its coordination with the Arab world on rebuilding Syria and undermines the legitimacy of local actors to collaborate with it, either publicly or covertly. Ending the destructive war in Gaza is therefore crucial for Israel’s ability to engage with regional partners in reshaping the future order in Syria.

The past two years have also taught us an important lesson about the failure of Israel’s “villa in the jungle” approach – the danger of burying one’s head in the sand and ignoring regional developments, leaving the initiative in the hands of meaningful and hostile others. This misguided approach resulted in Iranian entrenchment in Syria and the upgrading of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities.

Israel must seize the current opportunity to foster a stable and non-hostile relationship with its strategic neighbor to the north.

The article was published on December 18th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel has the chance to help reshape Syria and form stable ties הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For the region’s autocratic regimes – again, with the exception of Iran and its proxies – a Trump administration is preferable because, unlike the Democrats, he does not view human rights as an obstacle to maintaining relations. Leaders such as Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden, at various points, balanced their policies not only with national interests but also with liberal values.

While they did not expect these regimes to transform into democracies overnight, especially after the results of the Arab Spring, they promoted a spectrum of more liberal approaches toward minorities and opposition groups, as seen, for example, in Jordan.

Currently, no fewer than 10 Middle Eastern states rank in the bottom 20 of the 2024 Global Index of Freedom and Democracy, with another seven in the next two deciles. The trend is unmistakable.

Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was among the first leaders to congratulate Trump. Despite his distaste for Trump’s 2019 nickname “my favorite dictator,” he benefited from Trump’s practical support, including sustained annual aid with no conditions or restrictions related to domestic policy, and a 2017 visit to Washington.

Sisi also hopes Trump will assist in securing additional loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, especially as Egypt faces economic strain due to war-related declines in Suez Canal traffic and Sinai tourism revenues.

Morocco has similarly extended its congratulations to Trump, who became the first US president to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara – an acknowledgment exchanged for Morocco’s normalization of relations with Israel.

In the Gulf, Arab states are also pleased by Trump’s return. His first foreign trip in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia, where he signed over $100 billion in deals, though it remains unclear how fully these were realized.

More significantly, Trump’s past firm stance on Iran aligns well with Saudi interests. Although Riyadh struggled with the administration’s lack of response to the 2019 Houthi drone attack on the Aramco oil fields, Trump’s position is still viewed as more assertive than that of the Democrats.

Saudis continue to hope for normalization with Israel

The Saudis continue to hope for normalization with Israel. Trump, along with his son-in-law Jared Kushner, laid much of the groundwork for the 2020 Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, leading many to believe his administration could further this process.

However, the cost of normalization for Saudi Arabia has risen since the Israel-Hamas War began: they now seek the establishment of a viable Palestinian entity, if not an outright state – something Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to offer. The UAE and Bahrain would also welcome such steps, and both, along with Egypt, remain supportive of Trump.

Netanyahu has also expressed enthusiastic support for Trump’s return, calling it “the greatest comeback in history.” Israel, often regarded as the region’s only democracy, echoes the reaction of its autocratic neighbors, perhaps for similar reasons.

Conversely, Iran and its allies are apprehensive about Trump’s return. Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, his authorization of the strike that killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, and his generally firm stance against Tehran are still fresh in their minds. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s greatest fear is that Trump might grant Israel the green light to target Iran’s nuclear facilities – a stance the Biden administration has avoided.

All these expectations, hopes, and fears are based on Trump’s record from his first term. Now, without the pressure of reelection and with a strong influence over both houses of Congress, a second term could diverge significantly from the first.

Two main factors may drive this shift: a commitment to addressing America’s domestic issues and reducing US involvement abroad, as Trump pledged during his campaign, and a desire to leave behind a positive legacy to counter his divisive public image.

Ultimately, Trump’s actions are often unpredictable, making it challenging to foresee his course with certainty. The most sensible conclusion, then, is to “expect the unexpected.”

הפוסט Most Mideast autocrats welcome President-elect Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While high tides are often seen as a positive sign, low tides can strain these connections.

As we mark the 30th anniversary of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, relations between the two appear to be nearing an unprecedented low – mirroring the current state of Israel’s ties with other countries in the region.

The bonds and shared interests linking Israel and Jordan are deeper than those Israel has with any other country with which it holds diplomatic relations.

Since its early days as Transjordan, the Hashemite Kingdom has been considered Israel’s “best of enemies.”

While Jordan participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel, its leaders maintained secret ties with Israeli counterparts throughout this period.

The existence of common enemies and Jordan’s reliance on Western allies (first Britain, later the United States) made Israel a valuable partner in preserving Hashemite rule.

King Hussein expressed gratitude to Israel for its support during Black September in 1970, when he was engaged in a struggle against the PLO.

In return, he warned Golda Meir of the impending war during their meeting at Glilot in September 1973.

Israel, in turn, could generally rely on the Jordanian army to secure the long-shared border, preventing terrorist incursions.

Over time, Jordan also developed additional strategic needs, such as water and gas, which Israel provides.

Before 1994, peace with Jordan had always been a possibility. However, unlike Egypt, Jordan lacked the strength to withstand opposition from the broader Arab world and the Palestinian population within its borders.

But Israel’s signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords with the PLO provided Jordan with the legitimacy it needed to formalize its own peace treaty a year later.

After years of attempting to represent Palestinian interests, Jordan relinquished this role to the PLO, while retaining its special role in the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, according to the peace treaty.

How to proceed? 

Since then, the failure to solve the Palestinian problem has presented the regime with a dilemma, of how to square its own interests, and those of the state, with the demands of its citizens.

The response has been to keep diplomatic relations with Israel on a low-profile while sustaining close, clandestine military, defense, and intelligence cooperation.

Thus, while public relations remain cool, covert ties have remained strong. A similar dynamic has unfolded with Egypt but with a significant difference: in Jordan, more than half the population is Palestinian.

Tensions on the Temple Mount and conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians have consistently strained relations between Israel and Jordan.

The Jordanian government has typically responded by recalling its ambassador and issuing strong condemnations of Israeli actions – measured responses that have not jeopardized the peace agreement itself.

However, as the current conflict endures, as Palestinians in Gaza face ongoing humanitarian hardships, and as Israel refrains from offering a political horizon, the voices in Jordan calling for more decisive actions against Israel are likely to grow louder and could increasingly impact Jordanian policymakers.

Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, exemplifies the duality of Jordan’s stance.

Throughout the conflict, he has issued strong condemnations of Israel’s actions, yet he has also emphasized that Jordan, along with the broader Arab world, seeks peace rather than war, advocating for a solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative.

Developments with Jordan may be more pronounced, but a similar pattern is evident in Israel’s relations with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

Despite a shared interest in countering Tehran, all these states condemned Israel’s recent attack on Iran.

Although these countries maintain varying levels of relationship with Israel, even the UAE – despite continuing flights to Israel and maintaining moderate statements – has made it clear that it will not participate in “the day after” in Gaza unless progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state.

This stance is also shared by Saudi Arabia, which has yet to normalize relations with Israel.

Taking peace with Arab states for granted 

Under the Netanyahu government, Israel appears to take its relations with peace and normalization with Arab states for granted.

The longevity of peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt – 30 and 45 years, respectively – may create the impression that these relationships are immune to crises. However, this assumption should not be put to the test.

Rational government policies should consider the circumstances, limitations, and risks associated with their implementation.

Israel’s limited strike on Iran was influenced, if not compelled, by American pressure to avoid complicating matters for the US administration ahead of the elections.

Similarly, an Israeli government acting with strategic foresight must weigh not only its own interests and those of its closest ally, the United States, but also the interests of other regional countries with shared concerns.

In this context, two key issues arise.

In the short term, priorities include ending the conflict, securing the release of hostages, securing Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the northern border, and establishing an alternative governing structure in Gaza.

In the longer term, a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue is essential, ideally through the formation of a state-like entity.

Resolving the first set of challenges could improve relations with the Arab states; however, only addressing the second will elevate these relationships to new heights.

This may currently seem like a fantasy, but so did peace with Egypt and Jordan just a few decades ago.

The article was published on November 11th in The Jerusalem Post. 

הפוסט How Israel’s War Risks Destroying Ties with Jordan and Regional Allies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This axis includes Hezbollah, Shi’a militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and, to a certain extent, Syria.

The anniversary serves as a reminder, first and foremost, of the political, military, and intelligence failures that demand investigation by a state commission of inquiry.

It also offers an opportunity for reflection on the consequences and significance of what we have been through in the past year.

October 7 has caused a national trauma, marking yet another disaster in the long chain of tragedies experienced by the Jewish people.

Addressing this trauma is one of the most pressing tasks confronting Israeli society and its leadership.

 It has led to a loss of trust among many Israelis in the government; and while the war has diverted attention from the government’s judicial revolution, those plans do not appear to have been shelved.

The brutality of Hamas’s terrorist acts has also led to a process of dehumanization and delegitimization of Palestinians within Israeli society. While this may be a natural reaction to the events of October 7, it is likely to raise serious obstacles to renewing dialogue after the guns fall silent. Surveys indicate that a similar process has occurred among Palestinians toward Jews.

From a regional perspective, Israel has succeeded in rebuilding its deterrence, although only time will reveal the extent of this recovery.

The importance of Israel’s military and intelligence achievements lies not only in the outcomes but also in the way they are achieved – through ingenious military, technological, and intelligence-based subterfuges.

A heavy cost for deterrence 

The restoration of Israel’s deterrence has come at a heavy cost to Gaza’s civilian population. While it is hard to determine the exact number of casualties, estimates suggest a staggering toll, with figures around 40,000 deaths [of which Hamas recently admitted internally that 80% were combatants or their family members].

The primary challenge regarding deterrence lies in the nature of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, which are ideologically driven and therefore conventional deterrence is less effective against them.

Regionally, the Axis of Resistance has faced significant setbacks. Iran’s proxy doctrine has faltered, partly due to the lack of coordinated action, especially on October 7.

While Hamas’s attack marked a notable success for the organization, it ultimately led to the destruction of its forces and capabilities, signaling the end of its rule in Gaza.

Hezbollah, for its part, was able to initially claim a significant achievement, having launched thousands of missiles and rockets at northern Israel for an entire year, resulting in substantial economic damage and the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis.

However, this came at a high cost, including the elimination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and a chain of top commanders, alongside a severe blow to its operational capabilities.

Israel’s current operation in southern Lebanon is likely to inflict further damage on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, potentially forcing it to withdraw beyond the Litani River [as stated in the United Nations Resolution 1701].

While it is still too early to predict the war’s impact on Hezbollah’s domestic position in Lebanon, it is evident that the devastating consequences will lead to significant repercussions.

Tehran’s April 14 direct attack on Israel was a failure, with most of the missiles and drones launched intercepted by Israeli forces (or their allies) or landing in unpopulated areas.

The second Islamic Republic attack, on October 1, executed in retaliation for Nasrallah’s assassination, was larger and relatively more successful, but also resulted in no Israeli casualties, causing minor damage to property. This highlighted Israel’s significant technological advantage.

THE COALITION of moderate Middle Eastern states has remained stable. While Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and Arab public opinion generally supports the Palestinian cause, the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have maintained their relations with Israel – some covertly, others openly.

Certain countries even played an active role in countering the Iranian missile attack on Israel, as part of the cooperation in air defense systems that developed following the Abraham Accords and Israel’s integration into the US Central Command.

In its conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, Israel finds more allies in the Arab world due to the fierce rivalry rooted in the Sunni-Shi’a religious divide.

All the Sunni states perceive Shi’ite Iran and Hezbollah as a significant threat to their interests and therefore support Israel.

Conversely, Israel’s war with Hamas – a Sunni Palestinian organization – brings the issue of Palestinian independence to the forefront, which is widely supported by the Arab public. To maintain their fragile legitimacy, the Arab leaders publicly express pro-Palestinian rhetoric.

The United States remains the sole global power actively engaged in the region, though its involvement has so far been limited to defensive assistance, supplying weapons to Israel, and mediating between conflicting parties.

Additionally, the US has conducted limited operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea, constrained by a desire to avoid a regional war, especially given domestic pressures related to the upcoming presidential elections. Furthermore, recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have diminished US enthusiasm for ground interventions.

Meanwhile, Russia’s focus has shifted to its war with Ukraine, though it continues to maintain its stronghold in Syria. China’s involvement in diplomatic efforts has been minimal.

As a result, Middle Eastern states have largely been left to their own devices, a situation that has inadvertently bolstered Israel’s standing and role in the area.

One year later 

A year after October 7, the Palestinian issue has once again taken center stage. The Abraham Accords and the normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia may have pushed it to the sidelines, as Netanyahu intended, but Hamas’s attack redirected attention toward the urgent need for a solution.

The moderate states in the region advocate for a two-state solution and have even formed a coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, to promote it. Just as October 7 provided an opportunity to confront Hamas and Hezbollah – two significant threats to Israel’s borders that previous governments had neglected – it also created a renewed opportunity to settle the Palestinian issue.

Seemingly, the prospects for a solution have improved, as there is growing international acceptance of the idea that, given the presence of approximately seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, separation is the only viable option.

On the other hand, neither side of the conflict currently has capable leadership willing to pursue this direction. In addition, various polls indicate that the war has fueled increased extremism among both the Jewish and Palestinian populations.

However, a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed within a broader regional settlement, may serve as the most promising path toward resolving the Palestinian issue.

The political, military, and intelligence failures of October 7 are now compounded, a year later, by a moral failure – the failure to secure the release of the hostages.

While it remains uncertain whether Yahya Sinwar would have ultimately agreed to a deal, the real failure lies in the Netanyahu government’s apparent lack of effort to exhaust every possible means for reaching a deal.

There is currently no end in sight to the war across its various fronts. Its continuation will have significant costs for Israel, both diplomatically – with increasing international and regional isolation – and economically, resulting in a substantial budget deficit, further downgrades of Israel’s credit rating, a decline in foreign investment, and more.

Given that Israel does not desire war with Iran and cannot eradicate Hezbollah, it should focus on militarily achievable goals leading to a political settlement in Lebanon and Gaza.

The notion of “victory” is elusive, as all parties involved will likely frame the conflict as a success for themselves. Significant objectives could include inflicting substantial damage on Iran, pushing Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border, dismantling its military capabilities, restoring a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) in demilitarized Gaza, and securing the return of hostages. Achieving these goals would provide justifiable grounds for concluding the war.

The article was published on October 14th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s Restored Deterrence Comes at the Cost of Diplomatic and Moral Challenges הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On May 26, 2000, during Hezbollah’s victory celebrations following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Nasrallah delivered a speech in which he famously declared that while Israel possesses nuclear weapons, it is “weaker than a spider’s web,” a phrase derived from the Quran.

Although the Second Lebanon War in 2006 led him to conclude that it would have been better for Hezbollah not to have initiated the military operation that sparked the war, it also resulted in the organization enhancing its military capabilities, thanks to substantial aid from Iran.  Additionally, the judicial upheavals in Israel further reinforced his perception – and that of many in the Arab world – that Israeli society is “weaker than a spider’s web.”

Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon has stemmed from its leadership in the struggle for the return of Lebanese territory still occupied by Israel and its central role in the “axis of resistance” aimed at undermining Israel, or at least reducing its power. This rhetoric may have compelled Hezbollah – possibly against its will – to enter the current war, albeit in a measured and calculated manner.

In other words, the rhetoric itself functioned as a powerful historical force that the organization no longer fully controlled. This situation is reminiscent of how Nasser was drawn into the 1967 conflict, despite his reluctance to engage in an all-out war with Israel.

Reinforcing self-image

Rhetoric is not only a powerful tool in the struggle against an enemy; it is also a tool for reinforcing self-image. During the current war, there have been instances in which Hezbollah’s media outlets have given false representations of its actions.

Thus, for example, after the assassination in July 2024 of the organization’s military commander in Beirut, Fuad Shukr, Nasrallah claimed that 340 rockets had been fired at Israel and that drones had hit two of Israel’s military bases, including Glilot. In actual fact, the bases were not attacked, and the large majority of the rockets were shot down. These boasts were intended to present a false impression of accomplishment for the Shi’ite audience in Lebanon and beyond, with the aim of restoring Hezbollah’s honor and averting humiliation.

This was surprising because, for years, Nasrallah has portrayed himself as a leader who operates in a measured manner and is capable of speaking the truth, even when it is not in his favor. This image was crucial for him in relation to both his external audience (Israel) and his internal audience (the Lebanese, particularly the Shi’ite population).

His willingness to lie in such a blatant manner was a clear indication of the pressure he was under. Furthermore, after the recent attacks, he promised that “Israel’s crime will lead to a severe response and appropriate punishment, from expected and unexpected quarters.” However, no such response materialized while he was still alive.

It is possible that Nasrallah interpreted the Israeli cabinet’s decision to include the return of residents in northern Israel to their homes as rhetoric aimed at internal purposes, akin to his own use of such rhetoric, rather than as a genuine expression of Israel’s determination to act against Hezbollah. It is particularly surprising that he failed to recognize this shift following the recent operation, which appeared to signal a significant change in Israel’s behavior.

In other words, Nasrallah did not take Israel’s declarations and actions seriously.

Similar expressions of bravado have emerged from Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. The Houthi spokesperson regularly boasts about fictitious achievements following missile launches at Israel. Another aspect of this behavior includes issuing exaggerated and empty threats, such as asserting that the Houthis are collaborating with Hezbollah and militias in Iraq to “close the Mediterranean,” or that maritime conflicts could escalate into unforeseen events that would cause Israel to “beg for peace.”

These declarations prompt many in Israel, as well as in the Arab world, to question whether the Houthis genuinely believe their own rhetoric. What is significant, however, is that this is the image they wish to project to their own public, most of whom may not have the means or inclination to verify the truth of such claims.

Iranian rhetoric shows similar patterns

Similar rhetoric can also be heard from Tehran, despite the significant setbacks faced by the axis of resistance. For instance, in response to Nasrallah’s assassination, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared, “The fate of the region will be decided by the forces of resistance,” and asserted that “the Zionists are too weak to inflict a meaningful blow on the strong structure of Hezbollah. Lebanon will make the enemy regret its actions.” Bragging statements came after Iran’s second missile attack against Israel, which caused some damage but only one fatality and a couple of light injuries.

Older readers may recognize a striking similarity to the broadcasts of Radio “Voice of Thunder” from Cairo before and during the 1967 war. The station’s propaganda transmissions in Hebrew aimed to instill fear in Israeli society, while its broadcasts in Arabic sought to bolster morale among Egyptians and Arabs through exaggerated claims of victories over Israel.

Since 1967, the media landscape has undergone a radical transformation, with the internet and social media enabling the public to verify statements made by leaders and regimes. It is not surprising that media outlets in Lebanon and across the Arab world frequently critique and ridicule the distorted narratives presented by Hezbollah – often portraying Nasrallah as an attacker of chicken coops rather than military bases, as he had claimed.

The bluster emanating from Beirut, Tehran, and Sanaa reflects a broader issue: the inability of regimes and organizations to face failure, dishonor, and humiliation. Ultimately, this rhetoric can take on a life of its own, as the speakers begin to believe their own fabrications. In Nasrallah’s case, this delusion cost his life.

The article was published on October 8th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט At His End, Nasrallah Was a Victim of His Own Rhetoric הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For various reasons, including political considerations, there are limits at this moment to how the international community can push Israelis and Palestinians to adopt and fully implement Biden’s grand design. But it must not give up. This group of states – composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, other Western and European states, and Arab and Muslim states such as Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – can still play a crucial role in promoting this solution. They should assist local forces who are invested in advancing peace in two key ways: by countering Israel’s advancing annexation efforts in the West Bank, and by promoting transformative actions on the ground to support the future implementation of the two-state solution.

Israel’s government is taking steps towards annexation the West Bank, extending Israel’s sovereignty and erasing the Green Line that has separated it from the occupied territories. It supports violent settler actions to expel Palestinian communities from their lands, promotes settlement construction, allocates funds for settlement development and has transferred administration of the occupied territories from military to civilian control within the Defence Ministry Which is controlled by the ultra-right. The government aims to eliminate any distinction between Israel and the settlements, preventing future territorial compromise and the two-state solution. In the defensive battle against these efforts, the abovementioned states have potentially effective tools at their disposal that could prevent further deterioration of conditions in the West Bank.

For years, Western and Arab states have tried to influence Israel’s government by applying political and diplomatic pressure on it. At times, they have conditioned cooperation or other forms of support on halting actions that deepen the occupation and annexation. This was the case with the United States’ demands to stop settlement construction and to evacuate illegal outposts, and with the linkage between the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and halting the government’s annexation plans. Unfortunately, the actions of the international community have been little more than political and moral lip service. Examples include the European Union’s decision in 2016 to label products from settlements after years of discussions, which has remained largely symbolic, and the initiatives promoted at the United Nations to create a blacklist of companies supporting the occupation, which never led to coordinated action. In reality, the international community adopted Israel’s approach of conflict management (as opposed to trying and solve the conflict), and did not place real pressure on Israel to end the occupation or be held accountable for it as long as the region remained relatively quiet. Thus, despite these efforts, successive Israeli governments have continued to expand the settlement enterprise.

In early 2024, a new tool was introduced by the United States and other Western states: sanctions on violent settlers and settler organizations promoting annexation. So far, these have affected a small number of violent settlers whom Israel’s political and legal system chose not to confront. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of this tool, but against a government indifferent to its international standing and to democratic-liberal values, when political and diplomatic pressure seems ineffective, sanctions could be a key tool. They have an immediate and significant impact on the functioning of these individuals and organizations, and they exert additional pressure on the Israeli government, which is committed to the settlers and is required to find solutions for them. The government’s support for the settlers therefore comes at the expense of all Israeli citizens – by taking capacity away from government planning in other sectors and by spending funds from public coffers. Thus, in the face of attempts by the government and the settlers to erase the Green Line, these sanctions accentuate it and present Israeli citizens with a clear choice — either the settlements or Israel. Sanctions can become more significant and effective by expanding them to include more central figures and organizations in the settlement movement, and by increasing coordination on them between Europe, the United States and Arab states.

The role of the international community is not only to keep the two-state solution alive but also to establish facts on the ground to promote it. Just as settlers have, for years, taken steps to obstruct peace, the international community must now actively promote an ‘evolving peace’. This should involve practical measures to advance the two-state solution across different areas. Such efforts are essential to avoid reverting to the pre-7 October conflict-management approach and to support instead the establishment of a stable, effective and moderate Palestinian state that can coexist peacefully and securely with a moderate Israel.

For example, as part of strengthening the Palestinian national movement, the international community should, at an appropriate time determined with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, recognize a Palestinian state with borders to be determined in future negotiations with Israel. This would help change the legal status of the occupied territories, bolster moderate Palestinians and Israelis who support compromise, and foster a more equitable negotiation process when the time comes. The international community should also be ready to support the Palestinian Authority and prevent its collapse in the face of Israeli retaliatory measures following such recognition.

Recognition alone will not be enough, however; changes on the ground will be essential. Arab states, Europe and the United States have the relevant tools and experience to support these changes. There is a need to build the institutions and infrastructure of the future Palestinian state, to foster peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians, to establish moderate approaches, to create mutual restraining interdependence and to strengthen in both societies the moderate forces that will support a political leadership in line with these goals. All these efforts must be pursued through cooperation, even in an environment where Israel’s government and terrorist organizations will attempt to undermine them.

One such effort must be to ensure that the Palestinian Authority is integrated in key regional projects that Israel’s government would not want to reject. For example, the United Arab Emirates could insist on including the Palestinian Authority in the water-for-energy exchange project between Israel and Jordan that it backs, or the European Union could similarly condition Israel’s connection to the European electricity grid through the EuroAsia Interconnector. In the longer term, it will be important to ensure that the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor includes the Palestinian Authority or state.

Reforms within the Palestinian Authority must be advanced, with closer monitoring of how resources are being translated into building effective institutions and improving the services provided to Palestinians. Investment in local governance is necessary, accompanied by the development of local physical and institutional infrastructure that will form the foundation for the Palestinian state. Israel was built in a similar manner – by connecting sub-centres that were founded and developed under the British mandate. To this end, for example, the EU’s Twinning and TAIEX programmes could be expanded and adapted for local Palestinian governance.

There must be support for civil society organizations in Israel and Palestine that encourages joint projects and strengthens the discourse and organizations that promote peace and equality. The expansion and implementation of the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act adopted by the US Congress in 2020 can serve as a platform for this. In the fight against fundamentalist Islam, tapping Indonesian civil society organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, that promote moderate Islam worldwide and the United Arab Emirates’ experience in promoting religious tolerance can lead to profound changes within Palestinian society. The Jewish diaspora in the United States should do the same for Israeli society.

Efforts should be made to promote Palestinian economic independence by connecting the Palestinian economy to the Arab world and developing local sources of income, alongside local solutions for energy and food security based on sustainable practices. A long-term planning effort is needed to lay the groundwork for building the Palestinian state. Rebuilding the Palestinian security and police forces, and much more, is necessary. In short, there is a lot of work to be done, and it must start.

Middle Eastern countries, Europe and the United States have a vested interest in promoting peace and stability in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. It is not viable for them to wait idly for Israeli and Palestinian political leaders to choose peace. The international community must actively establish facts on the ground to advance peace, protect the possibility of a two-state solution and create favourable conditions for nurturing peace-supportive leadership and implementing a political process when the time is right. This is the essence of ‘evolving peace’ and Israelis and Palestinians need the international community’s support to overcome their extremist leaderships.

The article was published on September 27th in Chatham House.

הפוסט The International Community’s Role in Moving From the Gaza War to Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians and Regional Stability הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the Allenby Bridge Crossing attack diverted attention from another significant event in the kingdom – the House of Representatives elections held every four years. The timing of these elections was particularly inconvenient for King Abdullah, given the ongoing war in Gaza, the worsening economic crisis, and the terror attack just two days earlier. They were held in the context of a process of liberalization that the king has been leading in recent years, with three main goals.

First, the process primarily aimed at strengthening the political parties and integrating more of them into the political system. Of the 130 outgoing members of the House of Representatives, 118 were independents, while only 12 represented just four parties.

What lay behind this step were fears of an increase in the strength of the Islamic Action Front (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan). Thus, in the new electoral system, every citizen votes for two candidates: a representative from a national list and a representative from a regional list.

Two-thirds of the 138 seats in the House of Representatives are allocated to representatives from regional lists (97), with the remaining seats (41) awarded to those from national lists. This system was designed to dilute the power of the Islamist party. However, the intended outcome did not materialize.

While the new House includes 12 parties – three times more than before – the Islamic Action Front has tripled its number of representatives to 31 and now comprises around 23% of the House.

The second goal was to increase the representation of women and younger people, reflecting the ambitions of sectors traditionally underrepresented in Jordanian politics. King Abdullah has, in fact, been working to advance the status of women and youth for several years. On this front, significant progress was made compared to the past: 27 of the 138 members (nearly a fifth) in the new House of Representatives are women, up from 15 out of 130 (11.5%) in the previous House.

The third goal of the reforms was to increase public trust in politics. A survey conducted in May 2023 by the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman found that the majority of Jordanians do not trust political parties and believe they have failed. Only 2% follow party activities, and just 1% know the names of party leaders or would consider joining a party. Therefore, this third goal has not yet been achieved, as only a third of the electorate turned out to vote – just slightly more than in previous elections.

Overall, to the king’s credit, the elections were fair and transparent, as confirmed by EU supervisory commissions at the polling stations – no small feat in a region dominated by autocratic regimes that avoid unnecessary political risks.

The gains made by the Islamic Action Front were hardly surprising, however, as the past two years have seen a significant rise in support for political Islam across the Middle East. Many Jordanians favor greater inclusion of Islamic parties in national politics.

According to a May 2023 survey by the Arab Barometer, around 50% of Jordanians reported reading religious texts and praying daily as well as expressing a desire for Islamist parties to play a more prominent role in the country’s politics.

Muslim Brotherhood aligned with the Palestinian cause

Additionally, there has been substantial support for the Hamas movement despite it being legally banned. Around 57% of the Jordanian public demonstrate their sympathy for Hamas, even before the outbreak of the current war. When the Gaza war began, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan aligned itself with the Palestinians and expressed solidarity with Hamas. The Brotherhood organized pro-Hamas demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Amman and other locations, raised funds, and coordinated donations of food, clothing, and equipment for Palestinians in Gaza.

It maintained contact with Hamas leaders and supported both the continuation of the fighting and the recruitment of Jordanian volunteers for terror attacks against Israel. In this context, the timing of the war worked to the advantage of the Islamic Action Front, which was able to incorporate the Palestinian resistance into its election campaign messaging.

Support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, demonstrated by the elections, extends beyond the cities. It is deeper and more widespread, reaching towns in the periphery and even Bedouin tribes. Residents of weaker peripheral regions, often lacking proper infrastructure, have traditionally supported Islamic movements and, at times, expressed sympathy for Islamic terrorist organizations. One such region is Ma’an in southern Jordan, the hometown of Maher Diab Hussein Al-Jazi, the terrorist responsible for the murder of three Israelis at the Allenby Bridge Crossing.

In recent years, Bedouin Jordanian citizens have become more prominent within the Islamic Action Front, including as members of the House of Representatives.

In contrast, Palestinians in Jordan have shown greater loyalty to the Hashemite regime and refrained from engaging in subversive activities or mass protests against the government during and after the “Arab Spring.” Their strong participation in Jordan’s economy is one of the key factors behind this loyalty.

To what extent, then, should Israel be concerned about the election results?

Historically, it is important to note that this is not the first time the Muslim Brotherhood has garnered significant support in Jordan. The party reached the peak of its influence in the 1989 elections when it secured 22 seats in the House of Representatives, which at the time had only 80 members – meaning that the Brotherhood controlled about a quarter of the available seats.

Just as King Hussein skillfully managed Jordan’s foreign policy with a balanced approach, signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, despite the Brotherhood’s opposition, King Abdullah will also have to navigate between national strategic interests and local political pressures. The House of Representatives is likely to become more vocal and critical of Israel and the West.

Combative declarations, antisemitic slogans, and calls to revoke the peace treaty or expel the Israeli ambassador are expected to resurface.

The king is well aware that the threats he faces come not only from Iran but also from the growing strength of political Islam within his kingdom. In response to these challenges, King Abdullah will continue to rely on the West, Egypt, the Gulf states and Israel – an alliance crucial to the survival of the Hashemite regime.

The article was published on September 23rd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Islam’s Influence in Jordan Presenting Significant Challenges for the King הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Deradicalization and Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation: Lessons and Recommendations Based on Past Conflicts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document is one of a series of studies and policy documents that examine the relations between the local climate and foreign policy, as part of a project by the Mitvim Institute and with the support of the Glazer Foundation. The document was written in collaboration with SID-Israel, the umbrella organization of the Israeli professional community in the fields of humanitarian aid and international development. SID-Israel incorporates civil society organizations, government institutions, academic and research programs, private companies, consultants, and independent experts, and works to create a supportive professional environment, based on the exchange of knowledge and experience. Sid-Israel was established and operates thanks to the generous and ongoing support of Pears Foundation.

הפוסט Humanitarian Strategy in the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hezbollah’s opponents have been criticizing it for decades for  serving foreign interests and undermining the stability and security of the Lebanese state. The events of the last ten months underscore their criticism, as the Shiite organization threatens to drag Lebanon into a destructive war against the basic interests of the crisis-stricken country.

Indeed, it seems that the ongoing war with Israel sharpens the constant tension within which Hezbollah exists – the tension between its Iranian-Shiite identity and the national image it tries to project as the “defender of Lebanon.” This tension is Hezbollah’s most prominent weakness.

Since the beginning of the war, Nasrallah has tried to walk between the raindrops and reconcile the conflicting interests in the hope that the war in Gaza will end soon and allow him to continue holding the stick at both ends. Despite the clear consensus within Lebanon against a full-scale war with Israel, including among the Shiite community, and the harsh criticisms leveled at him, Nasrallah has so far managed to avoid serious challenges to the legitimacy of Hezbollah. However, the event in Majdal Shams may now threaten his ability to continue doing so.

Hezbollah’s swift denial of involvement in the attack, despite widespread evidence of its responsibility, reflects a familiar tactic. The group and its allies are using a classic strategy: diverting attention away from their actions by accusing others of trying to incite inter-communal strife within Lebanon. By doing this, Hezbollah is attempting to frame any criticism or blame directed at it as an attempt to destabilize the Lebanese state.

However, despite this denial of responsibility, genuine anxiety has spread among Lebanese in the last day about an Israeli response that could very well drag the Land of Cedars into a full-scale war and bring destruction on a catastrophic scale. Accordingly, the criticism leveled at Hezbollah is intensifying.

The internal pressure on Hezbollah is a unique opportunity to end the undeclared war between Israel and Hezbollah on relatively favorable terms for Israel. Thus, the attack on Majdal Shams can have a similar impact to the attack on Qana Village during Operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996 – a game-changing event that leads to a cessation of hostilities. If Israel, with the help of the international community, leverages this pressure, it can push Hezbollah to end the fighting on terms that advance Israeli interests, particularly focusing on the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s forces from the south. Obviously, such an action would provide only a temporary solution, but it would allow for a significant achievement for Israel by enabling the return of northern residents and more effectively isolating the campaign in Gaza. In doing so, it can bring substantial issues back to the table, such as Hezbollah’s legitimacy to hold weapons outside the framework of the Lebanese state, and the question of its presence south of the Litani River. 

Cooperation with the international community has a significant role in promoting Israeli goals. The attack on Hezbollah came in response to the elimination of its field commanders in Kila village, a few kilometers from the Israeli border. Hezbollah’s presence and operations in the south are an affront to the international community and its decisions, standing in complete violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The Majdal Shams massacre can be a turning point for the level of international involvement. This should include clear conditions for any economic or other assistance to the Lebanese state, requiring the enforcement of the Resolution.

It is clear and obvious that even ending the current round of fighting with a diplomatic solution will not resolve all the standing issues between Israel and Hezbollah, including territorial contentions along the land border. The likelihood of a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the coming years remains high. However, it is better for Israel to act according to Sun Tzu’s ancient advice—to choose the arena and time for the war—rather than being dragged into a conflict without clear goals or an exit strategy, and less than optimal conditions.

Instead of trying to reshape “response equations,” Israel should act proactively to change the conditions in the north. The immediate goal should be providing security—albeit temporary—to the residents of the north and allowing them to return to their homes. Simultaneously, it should address the long-term necessity of preparing the state and the IDF for a military-political campaign against Hezbollah and Iran in the coming years. By doing so, Israel can ensure both the short-term safety of its citizens and strategically position itself for future conflicts under more favorable conditions. 

הפוסט The Majdal Shams Massacre – A Chance for a Diplomatic End to the War in the North on Favorable Terms for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM,) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met secretly in Bahrain in mid-June with senior figures in the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE,) Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

CENTCOM is a unified combatant command of the US military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a crucial role in coordinating military and security efforts among US allies. Such a meeting, particularly with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on?

Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is usually linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict.

In Israel, “normalization” has become a codeword for “warm” peace with other countries – as opposed to the situation between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, in which there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but not “normalization.”

By contrast, in the Arab world, the connotations of “normalization” (tatbi in Arabic) are negative, and thus the term usually preferred is “normal relations.”

Thus, “normalization” should reflect several levels of relations. The first is that of functional formal normalization. This model features cooperation on defense and intelligence, and occasionally also on economic issues. This kind of normalization is mainly based on the existence of common interests and enemies, and it takes place mainly behind the scenes, though it can also have public expressions stemming from the existence of diplomatic relations.

Cooperation is conducted between formal representatives in the royal court, the president’s office, the military, intelligence agencies, and relevant government ministries. This is the model of Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan.

The second model is unofficial normalization, characterized by bilateral relations – mainly secret – without the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is the situation in which Israel found itself for many years after independence, up until the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Oslo Accords, and the Abraham Accords.

The third model is that of legitimate normalization, characterized by cooperation not only at the government level but also between civil societies. The cooperation is held openly and publicly, albeit with some covert cooperation as well. This is the model of Israel’s relations with the Abraham Accord states – Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain.

Why do we need a formal agreement?

THE SECRET meeting in Bahrain raises an important question: If Israel is benefiting from military and intelligence cooperation during the war, even as it is being vilified in the Arab world, then what need is there for a formal agreement with Saudi Arabia, especially if Israel is required to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in return, or to take some concrete steps toward this outcome?

There are several answers to this question: First, in the absence of any real progress on the Palestinian issue, Israel is liable to return to its former status in the Middle East – that of a mistress with whom dealings are held behind the scenes, but without such transactions being publicly acknowledged.

Israel’s decision-makers had no choice but to accept this status because the rulers of Arab states feared for their lives and their legitimacy. Without any formal commitment, such relations are vulnerable and unstable, at the mercy of circumstances, interests, and the consequences of their own exposure.

Second, Israel’s ability to cooperate economically with Arab states is dependent on the existence of a warm legitimate peace. The relations that developed with the Abraham Accord countries are an example. Building significant diplomatic and economic ties is only possible when there is openness.

Thus, for example, the Negev Forum, created to combat Iran’s efforts to attain military nuclear capability, held its first meeting (and to date, its last meeting) in March 2022, with representatives in attendance from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE, while Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also invited.

Trade with the UAE had reached around three billion dollars before October 7. Moreover, according to the Abraham Accords Report, for the first five months of 2024, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE was $1.39 billion, constituting an 8% increase from the first five months of 2023.

A smaller increase also occurred in the volume of trade between Israel and Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain. A decrease in trade (17%) occurred with Jordan, while Turkey announced a complete ban, though figures are not yet available.

Economic cooperation of this kind with Saudi Arabia can only happen when diplomatic relations exist; the economic possibilities with Saudi Arabia are much greater. There is also the possibility of realizing President Joe Biden’s proposed economic corridor from India to the Mediterranean and Europe, via Saudi Arabia – an ambitious infrastructure project aimed at connecting India to Europe through the Middle East.

Third, Israel is already becoming a pariah state in the international arena. Moreover, there is a risk that further escalation would even damage the secret cooperation held with states in the region. Ending the war, with a linkage to a regional process vis-à-vis the Saudis, will halt and even reverse this process, and might expand the circle of countries that normalize relations with Israel.

And finally, it is in Israel’s interest to offer a vision for a solution to the Palestinian issue, as all attempts to bypass this problem have failed.

The fact that quiet normalization continues with the moderate Arab countries during the war is an important sign of the strong existing interests behind this alliance.

The article was publish on July 15th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Secret Meetings Prove Israel, Saudi Arabia Still Want Normalization Amid War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

I have been a lecturer in international relations and a peace scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for the last 31 years. I am always amazed at the naïve and misguided attitude we Israelis have toward the concept of “peace,” which has become a pejorative in the national lexicon. This is the consequence of a complex and tragic situation, disappointment regarding truncated peace processes and above all decades of Orwellian social engineering to the effect that “managing” the conflict is preferable to any political solution and that “total victory” supplants the vision of the prophet Isaiah.

Part of the confusion and the natural recoil to talking about the possibility of peace on the “day after” the war in Gaza stems from a binary and also naïve understanding of the concept. Many of us, who are still in the grip of trauma, for understandable reasons, tend to think that the Arabs as a whole and the Palestinians in particular want “to throw us into the sea” (we received clear proof of that intention in the horrific massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7). Others think that any talk of peace must refer to “true peace,” a la John Lennon, imagining a world suffused with harmony and love, in which the Palestinians have been transformed into ardent Zionists.

But there is another possibility. Peace in its “negative” sense – namely the absence of war, rather than of conflict – is achieved out of vested interests and a sober-eyed reading of reality. There need not be a necessary link between peace and love. Negative peace is made between enemies who reach the conclusion, after a war, out of selfish considerations, that it is in their own interests to reach a political solution. After all, war has no inherent value and it does not allow for a normal life.

Peace is also the normal state of affairs that characterizes relations between most of the countries in the world, including those that are hostile to each other, such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or even the United States and China nowadays. Costa Rica is a demilitarized, thriving country in Central America that does not constitute a threat to its neighbors. And as U.S. President Joe Biden constantly stresses, a completely demilitarized Palestinian state in the format of a two-state solution would bring Israel its coveted security (and peace), with the requisite guarantees.

From the time I was a doctoral candidate at Princeton University, in the late 1980s, I have been studying processes of “peaceful change” as a widespread alternative to war in international relations. The process implies a change in the existing situation, not by way of violence, but as a result of cooperation and negotiations between two or more parties. Territorially, it refers to cases of decolonization, transfer of territories between states (including as a solution for border disputes), the establishment of new states, and a change in the legal status of certain areas without the transfer of territory or sovereignty.

There are hundreds of examples of such peaceful change in the history of Europe, America, Africa and Asia, particularly in the context of decolonization. In the Israeli-Arab conflict, we can point to the successful cases of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt (1977-1979) and between Israel and Jordan (1993-1994). Imagine for a moment what our situation would be today in the absence of peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.

Conversely, the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, in 1991-2011, ultimately failed. Moreover, the negotiation process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization was severed terminally, with the failure of the mediation effort by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2014 and the Palestinians’ application to participate in several international institutions, including the International Court of Justice. Nonetheless, as called for in the vilified Oslo Accords, there is still security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, a situation that assists the Israeli security forces in fighting terrorism.

Within the framework of my academic research, I developed a model that presents six background conditions that help to bring about successful peaceful change, together with variables in the process itself. Even if the model is primarily theoretical, it has already been used as part of the mediation efforts of the Organization of American States and the United States after the war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, which three years later led to a peace agreement between the two countries. If since then we have not heard anything about a territorial dispute between those two South American countries, that augurs well for the future.

The background conditions are: (1) An asymmetrical distribution of power that gives one side a reason to want to preserve the status quo; (2) similar political regimes; (3) normative agreement regarding the application of international law in relation to the territory in dispute; (4) diplomatic involvement of a third party; (5) a previous war; and (6) a third-party threat to one or both of the parties involved in the negotiations.

The variables in the process refer to the degree of cooperation and reciprocity between the parties, the negotiations themselves and the differences between the sides’ interests vis-à-vis the territory (for example, one side wants “national honor” and “economic benefits,” the other wants “security”).

The October 7 massacre and Israel’s justified counterattack in the Gaza Strip shattered the illusion that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could be “managed,” and brought about the most brutal war between the two peoples since 1947-1949. After the war – and assuming that Hamas does not continue to be sovereign in the Gaza Strip but is supplanted by an international entity for a transitional period – is a gradual process of peaceful change possible between Israel and the Palestinians?

As in the case of Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War, a few years would be required before a process of peaceful change becomes feasible – but not a generation. Ironically, a tragic situation of “mutually hurting stalemate” between the two sides has made them both “ripe” for a political process that could bring about a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israel. On the surface, it appears as if the current impasse might be a good candidate for the proposed model, with certain adjustments, per the following favorable condition for peaceful change:

1. The distribution of power between Israel and the Palestinians is clearly tilted in Israel’s favor. Israel possesses the military, economic and even moral shoulders that enable it to be “generous” in the pursuit of its national interest, according to which only a situation of peace can guarantee recognition of its borders, once such borders have been demarcated by agreement. As such, Israel will be able to become a “normal” state that integrates into the region and makes peace with Saudi Arabia and with all the moderate Arab states.

2. Israel is (still?) a liberal democracy, at least within the boundaries of the Green Line, whereas the Palestinian Authority is not a state in the full sense of the word, and its regime is (still) authoritarian (elections were last held there in 2006). Neither of the current leaders (Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively) possesses the domestic legitimacy or the willingness to move ahead in the direction of a political solution. Accordingly, we must surmise that only democratic elections in both Israel and the PA, and new leaderships, will allow for them to advance peaceful change in the coming years.

3. Both Israel and the PLO have recognized and accepted UN Resolution 181, which set out the partition plan of
November 29, 1947, and Security Council Resolution 242, from 1967, regarding “withdrawal… from territories” in exchange for peace, as expressed, among other places, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at Bar Ilan University in June 2009. It can be said that a normative agreement exists regarding the recognition of the mutual legitimate rights of the two peoples to part of the territory of the Land of Israel/Palestine.

4. The current war has led to a considerable internationalization of the conflict. The United States, the countries of the Arab League, Turkey, the European states and the vast majority of the international community support a solution based on Resolution 181 (a “two-state solution”) and are ready to mobilize for the diplomatic effort that would be required to advance it, following Gaza’s postwar rehabilitation. Renewed ratification by the Arab states, and Israeli recognition, of the Arab League’s 2002 peace initiative could assist in the process.

5. The current war between Israel and Hamas has demonstrated tragically that it will not be possible to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians by military means alone. Hence, the diplomatic path must be tried after not having been attempted substantively for the past 30 years, due to its being torpedoed by extremist elements on both sides, including Hamas and the Jewish messianic – all of whom view the political process and the division of the land as a substantive threat to their fundamentalist, maximalist visions.

6. The external threat posed by Iran and its proxies in the “resistance axis” constitutes an incentive for the moderates in the Middle East, and also for the Israelis and the Palestinians, to embark on a path to peace and compromise. In addition to the external threat, each of the two societies also faces a considerable domestic threat emanating from the extremist elements that demand exclusive ownership of the same land.

A year ago, inside a Salvation Army store in Washington, D.C., I saw an inscription on the wall, attributed to the writer Robert Ludlum: “Hope is stronger than fear.” There are moments in international relations in which a crisis can constitute an opening for a historic opportunity. The bulk of the background conditions for a process of peaceful change between Israelis and Palestinians exist already today, even if at the moment it is mainly fear and despair that prevails between them, rather than trust. May courageous and legitimate leaders arise, among both the Israelis and the Palestinians, who can transcend themselves and the agony of their peoples, and launch a political process after the war with massive third-party assistance. That is the life imperative for both peoples who inhabit this land, neither of which is going away.

Even if this academic model at the moment sounds a bit fanciful, we must talk about peace and about change by peaceful means as a road map for a better future, and demarcate an alternative to Israel’s becoming mired in the Gaza Strip in the wake of its military occupation and the continuation of a guerrilla war of attrition without any
achievable goals.

The article was published on June 21st, 2024 in Haaretz.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian Peace May Look Entirely Different From How We Imagine It הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now.

How is it that Hamas, not a particularly large or strong organization, is refusing to bend to the pressure from the United States, the main global power, and two major states in the Middle East, Egypt and Qatar?

Despite being under heavy military pressure from Israel, suffering large-scale casualties, and having lost most of its territorial strongholds, as well as its Philadelphi Corridor tunnel lifeline, Hamas remains unwilling to accept proposals that would seem to be relatively generous, considering its current situation.

To answer this question, one needs to go into Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s mind – a difficult, if not impossible, task, as the events of October 7 proved. Even if some psychologists might categorize his personality as psychotic or narcissistic, there is an element of rationality to his decision-making, even if this rationality is different from ours.

Despite this challenge, it is possible to suggest several explanations for the inability of the mediators to persuade Sinwar or to force his hand until now. The first explanation is that none of the mediators has sufficiently strong leverage against Hamas.

Of the three, Qatar would seem to have the three most significant assets: halting the financial aid it provides to Hamas (which in any case would seem not to be arriving at present); freezing the organization’s assets in Qatar; and closing Hamas’s offices in Qatar, which would mean exiling the organization’s leaders from its territory.

Qatar has threatened to expel the Hamas leadership from its territory, but this threat has not yet been carried out because Qatar understands that such a step would jeopardize its ability to mediate between Israel and Hamas.

Losing this role would damage Qatar’s regional and international status. In any case, hurting Hamas’s leadership’s standard of living is not of concern to Sinwar.

Egypt has even weaker leverage than Qatar. Though Egypt is considered in the Arab world as the “big sister,” it has few resources to deploy in mediation. It has even lost its last leverage – control of the Philadelphi Corridor.

Though its General Intelligence Service, responsible for relations with Hamas, provides a form of “bear hug” of the organization, there are more opposing than shared interests between the two.

US plays important role as mediator

The importance of the United States as a mediator lies in its ability to offer guarantees against any violation of the agreement by Israel after signing. Beyond this, President Joe Biden has no direct leverage against Hamas. The main, and perhaps only, indirect leverage at his disposal is to apply pressure to Qatar, a US ally that houses the largest American military base in the Middle East and enjoys special status as a non-NATO-member ally.

But the United States has no interest in harming itself by harming Qatar. In this context, it is possible that the United Nations has stronger leverage in the form of applying sanctions, under the terms of Article 7 of the UN Charter.

A second explanation relates to the fact that sanctions against uncooperative actors in the international arena are ineffective when those actors’ survival is at stake.

In other words, those in danger of being wiped out are not deterred by threats made by their allies or by mediators. Thus, any proposal that does not entail an unequivocal promise to end the war will be rejected, even at the cost of further casualties – which in any case, are not a factor for Hamas in considering whether to continue or end the fighting.

And finally, the pressure being applied to Israel by the international community, the military pressure being applied by Hezbollah on the northern border, and the pressure from Israeli society to reach a deal for the hostages have led Sinwar to conclude that his goals will be achieved eventually, even if it takes a long time. This policy involves risk-taking and brinkmanship, characteristic of leaders who are impetuous or extremely courageous.

What are the options?

If this assessment is accurate, then what can be done? There are three options:

The first is simply to accept Hamas’s demands. The advantage of this course of action is that it will bring the end of the war and the release of the hostages, and perhaps allow Israel to focus on the northern theater, which in any case requires a more robust policy, whether by diplomatic or military means.

The disadvantage is that Israel will be seen as not having achieved its military goals of toppling and removing Hamas, and Hamas will receive a boost to its self-image as having defeated Israel by surviving. In this sense, the war will be similar to the Suez War and the Yom Kippur War, which ended with military victories for Israel but with diplomatic victories for Nasser and Sadat, respectively.

The second option is to start working seriously on plans for the reconstruction of Gaza under alternative leadership – not an Israeli civilian or military administration, but on a body enjoying international legitimacy, such as the Palestinian Authority, albeit with a different leadership, enjoying local legitimacy. The return of the PA to Gaza, with backing from moderate Arab states, would be a real threat to the remnants of Hamas rule in Gaza.

This possibility also involves promoting normalization with Saudi Arabia, which in turn would be a catalyst for further security and economic integration of Israel in the region.

The third option is to continue the war until Hamas surrenders unconditionally, though presumably this goal is unattainable as long as Hamas continues to hold hostages.

The war in Gaza is asymmetrical: it is a war between a state and a non-state actor, between a large military deploying massive forces and advanced weaponry against an organization using limited (and sometimes primitive) means and guerrilla tactics.

In many ways, it is reminiscent of the Vietcong’s war against the United States in Vietnam, and we all know how that ended. Israel needs to choose a realistic option – that is, a combination of the first and second options described above.

The article was published on June 29th, 2024 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט How has Hamas kept its strength for so long without giving in to mediation pressure? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An important factor in every negotiation between states is the incentives put forward by one of the parties to the conflict or by the mediating party.

For example, Israel’s willingness to recognize the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was an incentive for Morocco to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. Similarly, the supply of F-35 warplanes by the United States was an incentive for the United Arab Emirates to sign a similar agreement with Israel.

Sometimes, there is a mega-incentive, one that cannot or should not be refused. Who, for instance, could have refused when Anwar Sadat proposed his historic visit to Jerusalem?

The idea of normalization with Saudi Arabia has featured prominently in recent headlines, following the Saudis’ willingness to pursue this idea in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state – or at the very least, significant progress in that direction. Israel’s opposition to such a deal stems from a combination of ideological, political, and security-related factors.

The idea is anathema to those who ideologically believe in the need to liberate all of the biblical Land of Israel and who refuse to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian national identity. Security-wise, there are fears over the shrinking of Israel’s borders. And politically, normalization could lead to the disintegration of the current government and possibly the end of the Netanyahu era. These are all very strong reasons for opposing such a deal.

But for those willing to act in a rational and considered manner, the Saudi proposal is an incentive to something much bigger than just a bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. First, it opens up the path to recognition of Israel by other states in the Middle East and in the Muslim world.

Second, it would be a blow to the “axis of resistance” led by Iran, as one of its main goals has been to derail this normalization process.

Third, it would strengthen the integration of Israel into the region’s security architecture, as was manifested during the April missile attack by Iran.

The fact that the Israeli, Saudi, Bahraini, Emirati, Egyptian, and Jordanian chiefs of staff met in Bahrain under the umbrella of the US Central Command earlier this month may attest to the possibilities inherent in this new security structure.

Fourth, normalization with Saudi Arabia would reduce antagonism toward Israel, regionally and globally, and would halt the process of Israel’s becoming a pariah state.

Fifth, it would reinforce Israel’s economic ties with other states in the Middle East, especially with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

And finally, it would lead to Israel’s integration into a new economic architecture that will link the Far East and India with Europe, via sea and land corridors passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

Should Israel agree to Saudi normalization?

In and of itself, normalization with Saudi Arabia would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. But the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state may elicit fierce opposition from the Israeli public. These fears are natural and logical, particularly after the October 7 attack. Yet, this disaster has in fact led to three important developments that make the creation of a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later.

First, it restored the Palestinian question to its “natural” place at the core of the conflict. Israel’s attempts to relegate it to the margins or make it disappear entirely by signing normalization agreements with Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East have failed. Like the idea that Hamas would not attempt a large-scale attack from Gaza, this has proved to be another misjudgment.

Second, the disaster has revived the two-state solution, which before October 7 had become irrelevant in the eyes of many due to the growth of Israeli settlements in Area C in the West Bank. The one-state idea had gained traction in many circles, but the disaster demonstrated that, despite everything, separation is a necessity, while a single state for Israelis and Palestinians is a recipe for violence and destruction. The re-emergence of the idea of a Palestinian state has occurred in the international arena at both the state level and among international organizations and institutions, as well as in general public opinion.

Third, actors in the international and Arab arenas have come to understand that they need to be part of the solution, by giving recognition and guarantees to both sides, possibly even including the deployment of troops. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel hands responsibility for its security to others, but that the solution requires regional and international partners who have an interest in the success and maintenance of any agreement.

A fateful decision is now required, of the kind that David Ben-Gurion made with the Declaration of Independence and that Menachem Begin made when agreeing the peace deal with Egypt. The problem is that Israel currently has a prime minister with a majority in the Knesset but without public legitimacy. No less serious is the fact that Palestinian leadership also suffers from legitimacy deficiency.

Moreover, Palestinian public opinion polls reveal widespread support for Hamas, and little support for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinian side will also have to undergo a process of sobering up to the realities of what is possible.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is a mega-incentive that presents Israel with a dilemma: Should it continue with its ghetto mentality and self-victimization, clinging to the belief that “in every generation, someone rises up to destroy us,” or should it forge a new regional partnership and alliance? What happens next is not a historical inevitability; it will be decided by Israeli society and its leaders.

The article was publish on June 22nd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Bilateral normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia can offer something bigger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has missed quite a few opportunities over the years for normalization with the Arabs, in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Those who hark back to the saying coined by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” should revisit the history books.

The first missed opportunity with the Saudis dates back to December 1977, when Crown Prince Fahd sent an emissary to Israel with a verbal message for Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan refused to meet him without knowing the content of the message in advance, and the messenger went home. In August 1981, Fahd proposed an initiative, which Israel scornfully rejected. In February 2002, Israel simply disregarded another Saudi outreach, this one by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, whereas the Arab League adopted it. The Arab Peace Initiative, as it came to be known, was particularly significant because it reflected broad consensus on recognition of Israel within the 1967 borders, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, in return for Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel resisted the plan’s terms not only on political and ideological grounds, but also out of ignorance regarding Saudi Arabia’s importance in the Arab and Islamic world and a perception of its leadership as corrupt and religiously extreme. Had the Arab Peace Initiative been presented to Israel at earlier stages of the conflict, the leadership would likely have seen it as an acceptable basis for negotiations and an agreement. But the process of radicalization underway within Israel’s Jewish society with regard to the occupied territories prompted repeated efforts to circumvent the Palestinian problem. The 2020 normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco ostensibly signalled the ultimate justification of these efforts, but the event of Oct. 7 and its aftermath refute the claim that the Palestinian problem could be ignored.

Hamas’s murderous offensive and the ensuing war also created a unique opportunity, as do many wars that result in systemic overhauls. Such was the case with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war that ultimately led to peace with Egypt. Exactly 50 years on, Israel is steadfastly refusing to take advantage of this cataclysm to initiate or accept plans for the day after the Gaza war, in keeping with its historic pattern. It has never initiated a peace plan – the one with Egypt was proposed by President Anwar Sadat.

Normalization with Saudi Arabia is in itself politically and economically important, but its many regional and international ramifications are even more so. First, it will open the door to recognition by other countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Second, it will deliver a blow to the Iranian “resistance” axis, which aspires to undermine Muslim normalization with Israel. Third, it will anchor the process of Israel’s integration into the regional and global security architecture, with its benefits as evidenced by the coalition mounted to foil Iran’s April 2024 missile attack on Israel.

Fourth, it will take the sting out of at least some resistance to Israel in the world and in the region by those who oppose its policies but not its existence, thereby stopping its descent into pariahhood. Fifth, it will strengthen Israel’s economic ties with countries in the region, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Trade between Israel and the UAE in 2023 soared to almost $3 billion and would have surpassed that figure had it not been for the war. And finally, normalization with the Saudis would result in Israel’s integration into the new economic architecture linking the Far East and India to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel through a sea and land corridor.

The Saudis have been successful in their efforts to moderate the Arab response to Israel’s war in Gaza, as reflected in the May 16 Arab League summit in Bahrain, with the participation of almost all the kings and presidents of Arab countries, including Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. While denouncing Israel’s actions in Gaza and calling for an end to the war and the deployment of international forces there, the joint concluding statement also called for an international conference and expressed support for the two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative. In other words, the war has not changed the strategic Arab adherence to the two-state solution.

Many in Israel view the establishment of a Palestinian state as a security threat, a logical concern especially after October 7. However, it is precisely this catastrophe that makes a Palestinian state inevitable, sooner or later, for the following three reasons. First, it restored the Palestinian problem to its “natural” place at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, thwarting attempts to marginalize or eliminate it through normalization with Arab countries on the periphery of the Middle East. Second, the disaster has prompted renewed discourse on the two-state solution, which had seemed irrelevant before October 7 due to the massive increase in settlements throughout Area C of the West Bank. The idea of “one state” gained traction in many circles, but the Hamas massacre demonstrated that separation is nevertheless the only viable option, whereas one state is a recipe for calamity.

Third, international and Arab actors understand that they must be part of the solution by providing guarantees to both sides, including perhaps by sending peacekeeping forces to Gaza. Foreign involvement does not mean that Israel entrusts its security to others, but rather that regional and international partners have an interest in offering and preserving solutions to the conflict.

The negative consequences of Israel’s refusal are already manifest. The announced recognition of a Palestinian state by Ireland, Norway and Spain signals the beginning of a political tsunami that will lead to recognition by other countries, in addition to the 140 that have already sone so over the years. This worldwide recognition of a Palestinian state would also further exacerbate international rejection of Israel’s rule over a foreign people. Instead of Israel eventually having to bend under international pressure, it could benefit right now through Saudi recognition and normalization, which would include a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The realization of this grandiose plan requires a fateful decision of the kind adopted 77 years ago by David Ben-Gurion. But Netanyahu is no Ben-Gurion, and despite the backing of a Knesset majority, lacks public legitimacy following the October 7 disaster, for which he and his government are responsible. Just as troubling, the Palestinian leadership also lacks public legitimacy, being perceived as corrupt and unfit to make fateful decisions. Reflecting its low standing, Palestinian polls demonstrate wide support for Hamas, especially following Oct. 7, and little backing for the two-state solution. In other words, the Palestinians, just like the Israelis, need to undergo a process of disillusionment – in Israel’s case with the limits of power, in the Palestinian case with the limits of ambition.

The current circumstances would seem to quash prospects of a two-state solution in the foreseeable future. However, should an Israeli government take the leap and accept the “Saudi move”, and the Palestinians would then reject it, for whatever reason, the Saudis would likely regard this as a sufficiently big fig leaf to move forward with their plan. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is clearly fed up with the Palestinians. In March 2018, he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinian leadership had missed opportunities and rejected all the offers it was given over the past 40 years. “It is about time the Palestinians take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining,” he reportedly told the closed-door meeting.

Prospects of normalization with Saudi Arabia following the events of October 7 place Israel at a crossroads. It can either continue to adhere to its historic role as a victim persecuted throughout history and to this very day, or seize the opportunity as a powerful independent nation to break out of its ghetto into the region as a partner and ally. Either decision is down to Israel’s leaders and society, not a deus ex machina.

The article was published on June 1st in Haaretz. 

הפוסט The Road not Taken with Saudi Arabia Is Bigger Than Normalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Addressing a December 2023 forum in Doha, he emphasized what is obvious to anyone concerned about Iran’s growing influence in the region – Israel’s refusal to discuss a political solution with the Palestinians is a boon for the leadership in Tehran. It serves as a catalyst for expanding Iran’s influence and expelling Israel from the region.

This unwillingness poses a major obstacle to seizing the opportunity of the October 7 and April 13 attacks on Israel to forge a regional alliance against Iran.

Iran’s combined missile and drone attack on Israel should have dealt a significant blow to Iran and its regional standing. It could even serve as a turning point in regional and global determination to confront the threat it poses, as it stands on the cusp of nuclear capacity. The offensive provides a clear illustration for the United States and the countries of the region of the need for a joint stand against a more aggressive, violent, and destabilizing Iran. This is an opportunity to turn the Iranian proxy network from an asset into a liability for Iran in the regional arena – to further overstretch Iran on multiple fronts.

The Gaza war has exacerbated the clash within the commitment of Iran’s Arab allies to Tehran’s directives and the interests of these host/captive countries. The growing criticism in Lebanon of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Israel-Hamas war, and the Assad administration’s refusal to allow an Iranian attack on Israel from its territory clearly illustrate these countries’ growing recognition of the price they pay for Iran’s intervention in their affairs.

Thus, the April 13 attack should serve as an impetus for an Israeli-regional alliance against Iran with American and international, and especially regional, support. The Gulf states, whose airspace was grossly violated by the Iranian missiles and drones, were provided with strong evidence of the tangible nature of the Iranian threat.

At the same time, the risk of the attack to regional stability is being compounded by Iran’s threats to block the Strait of Hormuz and shipping routes to the Red Sea. The Iranian threat thus directly affects the substantive interests of the international community. Iran has become, from an international perspective, a tangible regional threat with ripples that risk the stability in the Middle East and beyond. Ultimately, the attack increases the sense of urgency among the United States and Western countries of the need for a regional coalition.

However, the Gaza campaign has made clear that progress toward such a regional axis directly depends on Israeli agreement to discuss a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians. Recent Saudi statements make clear that the price of forging public strategic ties with Israel has gone up and now includes political progress on the Palestinian front as a condition for normalization.

Israeli willingness to discuss a two-state political horizon could have dealt Iran a decisive blow, but Israel is at grave risk of squandering this opportunity. Instead of leveraging October 7 for open and enhanced security cooperation with Arab states, thereby turning Hamas’s cognitive victory into a strategic defeat for Iran and its proxies, the Israeli government is serving Iran’s goals. In a January article of rare sincerity, former Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora noted that regional hands are now reaching out to Israel, but Israel refuses to hold them.

Israel’s regional partners came to its aid

Israel has celebrated the courageous regional participation of Jordan and other countries in the effort to defend it from Iran’s offensive. This rare moment of cooperation in the face of a common threat could create a false sense of renewed momentum in Arab-Israeli relations.

In fact, prospects of a renewed momentum are undermined by the deep frustration among current and potential partners in the region at Israel’s refusal to discuss the goals of the war. The April 13 cooperation obscured Israel’s deeply troubled relations with Jordan and the Gulf states and the implications for the future of cooperation vis-à-vis Iran.

It is important to distinguish between military-operational coordination under American auspices in the face of a specific attack, and the establishment of a regional, political, and public alliance against Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions.

A joint regional coalition cannot exist solely on the basis of a shared threat; it must be based on a convergence of interests to promote a common political vision, or at least agreement on the strategic direction of the partnership.

A wide chasm separates Israeli government positions and the vision of regional partners from Saudi Arabia to Egypt. The danger of sliding into this chasm has become more real for Arab leaders since October

Moreover, Iran’s attempts to erode the regional standing of Israel and the United States have deepened concern for the future relations between Israel and the region, let alone for a united front against Iran.

Thus, Iran’s April 13 attack coincides with its broad political-diplomatic offensive since the start of the war aimed at redefining the strategic balance of power in the Middle East by eroding Israeli and American influence in order to strengthen its own.

The Iranians are exploiting the war in order to roll back the assets Israel acquired through the Abraham Accords and reverse it to the status of a regional pariah. Iran’s move focuses on pressuring key countries to cancel or at least reduce diplomatic ties with the Zionist regime.

The intensive shuttle diplomacy by Iran’s foreign minister illustrates the map of Iranian interests. His schedule included a visit to India, a key component of the American-Gulf-Israeli alliance promoted by President Biden, ongoing contacts with the Saudis, frequent coordination meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and a call to sever Ankara’s economic relations with Israel.

The Iranian effort has had very limited success so far. Specifically, there is no evidence that it has had a direct impact on Saudi motivation to halt normalization or on Turkey’s decision to limit the scope of trade with Israel.

However, combined with Israel’s inability to present clear goals for the devastating war in Gaza, Iran’s effort could bear fruit, as Israel’s status erodes and its short-sighted failures become apparent to all.

The solid foundation of the Abraham Accords for the UAE and Bahrain was Israel’s integration into a long-term regional process that would provide security and economic stability. The war exposed Israel as a regional power firing from the hip, driven by political compromises with the far Right, rather than by a long-term perspective. It exposed to the Emiratis, Saudis, and Bahrainis the gaps between their own long-term thinking and Israel’s inability to think beyond the tactical military level and short-term political maneuvering.

This is exactly the vacuum Iran is targeting. The first sign of Iranian success has emerged in the weakest link of the normalization countries – Sudan. On October 9, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s government renewed diplomatic relations with Iran in order to obtain weapons for its war against a rival faction. This is a classic Iranian method familiar from Yemen and Syria – Iran identified an opportunity, a political vacuum created by a civil war in a country of strategic value, and filled it.

Iran’s effort to exploit the Gaza war in order to expel Israel from the region is not only interstate-oriented. It also exploits public anger in the Arab world against Israel over the protracted war in Gaza and the worsening humanitarian crisis there. The return of the resistance narrative allows Iran to ride the wave of sympathy for its allies – especially the Houthis in Yemen.

In the face of the ineffectual response by Arab states, Iran and its allies are portrayed as the only supporters of the Palestinian struggle in the current destructive war. Its efforts are also fueled by a desire to portray Iran on the regional and global stage as a representative of the struggle against American colonization in the Middle East rather than a foreign Shi’ite interloper in the Sunni Arab world.

The April 13 attack – despite its failure – is likely to be accepted in parts of the Arab world as evidence of Iran’s commitment to this struggle.

Israel’s research institutes and policy planners have dealt for an entire decade with the question of which threat is more dangerous – the Iranian or Palestinian. As expected, we were all wrong. The threats are intertwined and inseparable.

By weakening relatively moderate Palestinian elements and bolstering Hamas; eroding the fragile relations with Jordan and Egypt; creating a humanitarian crisis in Gaza and fomenting public anger in the Arab world, and stubbornly refusing to present a political vision for the “day after,” we are opening the door to greater Iranian influence in the region.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and the Middle East is no exception. The Iranians are experts at seizing opportunities created by extremism and conflict.

As long as we keep moving without a strategic vision, we are providing the Iranians with optimal conditions for influence.

Thus, while we prepare for direct war against Iran and its allies, the far-right architects of Israel’s colossal October 7 failure serve Iran’s strategic interests. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi could not have hoped for such predictable and effective allies as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Throughout this damned campaign, Israel has demonstrated once again that it never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

The article was published on April 21st in Jpost

הפוסט Israel’s lack of vision is a blessing for Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In addition to the civilians on both sides of the border, the most significant victim of Hezbollah’s decision to engage in conflict, which could potentially escalate into a full-scale and destructive war, is the state of Lebanon. The recent events highlight Lebanon’s inherent weakness and raise fundamental questions about its functioning as a state entity. However, Lebanon’s weakness is actually the most effective restraint against Hezbollah and could potentially serve as a catalyst for resolving the conflict without resorting to war.

Those following Hezbollah know that the Shia movement struggles with a series of dilemmas and continuously fights to justify its existence within the Lebanese arena. These dilemmas occupy the organization during normal times and seem to become even more crucial during these days.

Hezbollah was established by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as part of a vision to export the Islamic revolution. This means the organization was born within Lebanon but not as part of it, serving a broader revolutionary-theological vision where, in the end, Islam (Shia) would rule the world. The Lebanese state, with its political mechanisms and sectarian arrangements, had no place in this vision. However, over the years, Hezbollah gradually changed its nature. Along with blurring its revolutionary Islamist dogmas, the organization began to adopt a Lebanese national identity and even integrated into the country’s political system.

This process is often described as the “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah, wherein its leaders emphasized their struggle as a national movement serving as “Lebanon’s protector” against dangers, especially from Israel. However, this “Lebanonization” is viewed with suspicion both inside and outside Lebanon. While some see it as a genuine process, many in Lebanon and abroad see it as a cynical facade meant to mask the organization’s true intentions.

This is the main dilemma occupying Hezbollah and troubling it, especially in these times—the dilemma between being an Iranian proxy and a patriotic Lebanese organization; and the dilemma between being a resistance movement committed to exporting the revolution and destroying Israel and being “Lebanon’s protector.”

Lebanon’s Internal Crisis

It seems that Hezbollah was caught off guard by Hamas’s attack on October 7 and was not prepared for its consequences. Indeed, the current time seems highly inconvenient for it to wage war against Israel. Over the past four years, Lebanon has been experiencing an unprecedented severe economic crisis. The local currency has undergone a historic collapse, GDP has plummeted, and inflation and unemployment rates are soaring. The economic crisis quickly translated into a real humanitarian crisis, with over 80% of Lebanese citizens living below the poverty line.

Moreover, Lebanon is in the midst of a complex and ongoing political crisis that exacerbates the economic collapse and fuels massive protests by desperate citizens. Since October 2022, Lebanon has had no sitting president, and since October 2021, a transitional government with no executive power has been in place. A destructive war with Israel is truly the last thing the Lebanese can afford.

Lebanon’s dire internal situation is closely linked to Nasrallah’s considerations and his choice to limit the conflict and avoid a full-scale war, at least for now. It is commonly believed that Hezbollah holds sway in Lebanon—that it dictates events, for better or worse. However, this statement is not entirely accurate. While Hezbollah is indeed the most powerful force in Lebanon, it is not omnipotent and is also subject to power limitations and restraining factors.

Internal Opposition

Even before October 7, Hezbollah suffered from a highly negative image within Lebanon. Alongside the perpetual suspicion towards it, the organization is seen by many as primarily responsible for the severe economic crisis and political stagnation, and as an obstacle preventing Lebanon from overcoming them. Since engaging in conflict with Israel on October 8, without any provocation from Israel, criticism of Hezbollah has been mounting. Public opinion in the country strongly opposes entering a war with Israel and fears its devastating consequences.

The opposition to war crosses sectarian lines and is also clear among Shias, Hezbollah’s base of support and power. As the campaign continues, criticism against Hezbollah grows for the severe damage caused by its policies and the high price Lebanon could pay if it doesn’t stop. The waves of refugees coming from the south and the growing destruction as Israel expands its attacks to more distant areas make the sense of fear increasingly palpable.

Various officials, including some considered Hezbollah’s allies, have clearly expressed their concern over the situation on the border and have not spared criticism of Hezbollah, opposing attempts to link Gaza’s events to Lebanon. More and more reports indicate that Lebanon’s official stance is to immediately return to implementing UN Resolution 1701, which includes, among other things, keeping Hezbollah fighters away from the border.

In civil society, the criticism is even harsher and more outspoken. This is evidenced by a popular campaign with the hashtag “Lebanon_does_not_want_war,” gaining significant momentum on social media. Every day, more and more statements are published criticizing Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into catastrophe for foreign interests without any logic or justification.

The situation is simple: the average Lebanese citizen may not hold much affection for Israel, but these days even Palestine is not a concern. The arguments about the necessity of the resistance’s mobilization alongside Gaza simply do not convince him, not when he is concerned about his family’s survival.

A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah would essentially be a mutual destruction— a bloody and destructive stalemate. No one is under the illusion that such a war would lead to the disappearance of the other side, but the devastation and destruction that would occur in both Israel and Lebanon serve as a deterrent for both sides. Hezbollah does not hide this, and since the conflict began, Nasrallah has repeatedly stated that he does not want war, and once the “aggression” in Gaza stops, calm will return to the Lebanon border.

However, the sides are caught in a dangerous trap, and a complex dynamic has developed over recent months, where despite no one wanting war, it may become inevitable. Nasrallah hears the voices within Lebanon and knows that dragging the country into war could undermine his claim to be “Lebanon’s protector.” However, it is difficult to see how he can back away from his promise to stand by Gaza until the war ends completely.

On the other hand, while tens of thousands of its citizens have become refugees in their own country, Israel needs to present a convincing narrative to them that the threat from the border has been eliminated. It seems that among Israel’s political and military leadership, the view is growing that a change in the situation can only be achieved through military action.

Weakness as an Opportunity

Meanwhile, external actors, both regional and international, are trying to prevent the escalation. According to reports, the United States submitted a proposal to resolve the issue of the land border, which will be agreed upon after a ceasefire; France presented a similar initiative, and Qatar has also been mentioned as a potential player in the settlement. Hezbollah has expressed a willingness behind the scenes to discuss a formula that would end the conflict, and recently it was reported that one of Hezbollah’s senior officials even traveled to the United Arab Emirates, with one of his objectives being to explore the possibility of Emirati mediation to end the fighting, despite the strained relationship between the parties.

However, it seems that the path to a solution is still long, and at this moment, the possibility of a war breaking out seems more likely than reaching a political settlement. At this point, the state of Lebanon, with its weaknesses and frequent crises, becomes a critical factor in the ability to resolve the issue without resorting to war. The ongoing crisis in Lebanon and the growing internal opposition to Hezbollah are the Shia organization’s point of weakness and an important factor in restraining its activities. Nasrallah, as mentioned, is constantly trying to reconcile the existential dilemmas that occupy him, and it is likely that he would be willing to make concessions. For now, it seems there is no conflict between the interests of the Lebanese state and Hezbollah’s patrons in Iran, as Tehran is also not interested in expanding the war.

Israel would do well to take advantage of this point of weakness. In cooperation with the international community, Israel can work to create an “improved Resolution 1701,” which would include measures to rescue Lebanon from its economic and political crisis, and even lay the groundwork for resolving more complex issues in the future. Israel has much to offer the Lebanese, and many are willing to listen.

It must be acknowledged that the threat posed by Hezbollah will not disappear peacefully, and we must be cautious about falling back into the “deterrence” equation, the flaws of which were horrifyingly exposed in the case of Hamas. However, given the growing internal opposition to it in Lebanon, Israel and its regional and international partners have an opportunity to sharpen Hezbollah’s dilemma between its Lebanese and pro-Iranian identity. A challenging political move of this kind could give Israel more room to maneuver in dealing with the organization and, not least, a better position against its patron, Iran.

הפוסט Lebanon’s Vulnerability: A Chance for Israel Amid Anti-War Sentiment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As I’ve come to learn from other Israelis, my experience of flourishing friendship with Majid is not unique. After the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israelis and Emiratis took to meeting one another on Zoom in high numbers. These remote introductions that defined global communication during the pandemic offered a kind of soft initial encounter between the two peoples. Since that time, professional interactions between Israelis and Emiratis have taken on an uncommon level of warmth. One Israeli CEO opened up to me about how his Emirati colleague affectionately calls him a “long-lost brother found,” a striking reflection of the familial resonance of the 2020 Abraham Accords and its namesake’s two sons.

It all might seem rather counterintuitive. Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan are far older. Yet they don’t exhibit anything close to the 120 business-to-business agreements and memoranda of understanding signed with the UAE. As a point of comparison, it was reported in 2022 that Egypt and Israel were aiming to achieve $700 million in annual trade by 2025. The United Arab Emirates saw $2.56 billion of trade with Israel in 2022, accompanied by investments exceeding $3.5 billion.

At 46 and 30 years, respectively, the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan have also begun to show signs of aging. The official reactions of both countries to Israel’s war with Hamas have been quite critical of Israel, with Jordan recalling its ambassador and Egypt publicly threatening to nullify the Camp David Accords. The UAE, by contrast, has exhibited a more balanced reaction. Lana Nusseibeh, a Palestinian Emirati and the UAE’s ambassador to the United Nations, has indeed issued condemnations of Israel’s actions and successfully led the adoption of Resolution 2712, which called for increased humanitarian aid to Gaza. However, her public statements have also included a dimension of sympathy and understanding for Israel, referring to the October 7 attacks as “horrific.” And the only Israeli ambassador to a Middle Eastern country who has remained in office throughout the war without recall or expulsion is Amir Hayek, Israel’s ambassador to the UAE.

Why? Because Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates stands on a stronger foundation of emerging shared values and may well develop into a true national friendship.

In 2016, the UAE government established a ministry of tolerance. The UAE’s commitment to religious toleration is a function of a broader cultural evolution that has been taking place in the country for several decades. On February 5, 2019, over a year before the signing of the Abraham Accords, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation Abdullah bin Zayed announced a plan to create the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi, an opulent complex containing the Imam Al-Tayeb Mosque, the St. Francis Church, and the Moses ben Maimon Synagogue — named in the spirit of interreligious dialogue. The announcement came during Pope Francis’s visit to the Arabian Peninsula, the first ever by a pontiff, when he referred to the UAE as “a land that is trying to be a model of coexistence, of human brotherhood, and a meeting place among diverse civilizations and cultures.” In keeping with the nature of the visit, the pope and Sheikh Ahamed al-Tayeb signed the Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, also known as the Abu Dhabi Declaration. Worth noting is that despite the Egyptian heritage of both Maimonides and al-Tayeb (admittedly not exactly a philosemite), such an initiative was taken in the UAE rather than Egypt. Egypt has not had a chief rabbi since the 1972 departure of Rabbi Haim Moussa Douek for France and then New York. The UAE, by contrast, announced Rabbi Yehuda Sarna as the country’s first chief rabbi in 2019.

Founded 23 years after Israel, the UAE is swiftly establishing itself as a technological focal point in the Arab world, marked by substantial investments in knowledge-based entrepreneurship. Such entrepreneurship cultivates a sense of curiosity about other points of view and an interest in learning from those who have similar drives. As is well known, Israel has long been recognized as a global hub for cutting-edge technology, contributing groundbreaking inventions and knowledge to the international community. It is therefore no surprise that both nations demonstrate pioneering advancements in space industries, renewable energy, and other advanced technological fields within the region. Even Israel’s entry into natural-gas production has not diminished its primary economic reliance on its intellectual human capital, a prioritization it shares with the UAE.

Another aspect of this cultural revolution has been educational. The Emirati government decided in 2021 to include Holocaust studies in its schools’ textbooks. In parallel, the organization Sharaka (Arabic for “partnership”), founded on the basis of the Abraham Accords, “is working to shape a new Middle East, built on dialogue, understanding, cooperation and friendship.” The organization has forged this path with its Holocaust Education Program, which brings joint Arab-Israeli delegations on an educational journey to Israel and Poland with the goal of learning the lessons of the Holocaust as an extreme expression of intolerance. The program aims to empower young leaders within these communities, nurturing them to become ambassadors of tolerance and coexistence.

As the first head of Middle East relations at the University of Haifa — a new position that would have been inconceivable a mere decade ago but emerged from the possibilities of the Abraham Accords — I can attest to the interest of scholars from both countries to work together. Nearly all Israeli universities have now engaged in some way with Emirati counterparts. The enthusiasm to join up with Israelis is even greater in Emirati think-tank institutes such as the Emirates Policy Center, the Anwar Gargesh Diplomatic Academy, Trends, and b’huth.

An Abu Dhabi workshop entitled “New Regionalism in the Middle East” in June of last year was a collaboration between four Emirati think tanks and Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center, and was attended by researchers from the UAE, Israel, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey. The discussions, in which I participated, were deep, honest, and intriguing, tackling sensitive issues — such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Israel’s current right-wing government, and social differences — head-on. My conversations with female colleagues from the region were among the most eye-opening and empathic I have experienced in an academic or professional context; they left me inspired to work together with them in regional sisterhood.

However, the educational and cultural evolution within the UAE is also reflected in political terms in ways that present opportunities as well as challenges to Israel. Careful observation of the UAE’s foreign policy reveals that the Abraham Accords are part of a larger campaign to promote regional reconciliation. Beginning with Syria under Basha al-Assad’s leadership before extending to Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Qatar, the UAE has pursued normalization with Israel’s enemies as well. There are, of course, pros and cons to this. On the pro side, any initiative toward genuine regional peace might help create conditions of mutual understanding and advance Israel’s vision of being a country like all others with safe and secure borders. The UAE’s formal ties with Syria have already proven beneficial to Israel, particularly since they allowed the Emirates to play a role as mediator during the war.

On the con side, this collaboration might ultimately impose limitations on Israel in the future. Israel has constructed a narrative for its relations with the Arab Gulf states based on the concept of a shared adversary: Iran. Without this common enemy, history suggests, regional actors will return to traditional factional lines, and the current phase of reconciliation in the Middle East may prove unsustainable in the long term. Owing to the evolving regional dynamics, Israel must explore new narratives to reinforce the legitimacy of its normalization with the Gulf countries, especially in light of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year. Needless to say, these attempts at reconciliation and understanding are unprecedented.

More work remains to be done. The question is, who will do it? It is an open secret that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not widely regarded as the most trustworthy partner in the Gulf. The strained personal relations Bibi shares with Gulf leaders are evident in almost all discussions I’ve had with regional counterparts, and in the well-known fact that he has not publicly met with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed. In contrast, bin Zayed has met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog twice, including once during the war, as well as with former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. During Bennett’s term as prime minister and Yair Lapid’s as foreign minister, they initiated the Negev Forum — a significant achievement for Israel’s integration in the Middle East. Under the renewed term of Netanyahu, the differences are widely felt within the Israeli government offices. UAE media portray the current government as “ultranationalist and ultra-Orthodox,” and a series of actions and statements by the Israeli government had already strained relations before October 7. The saving grace is that these primary tensions are quite possibly temporary.

The wellsprings of connection between the two countries run deep, deeper than some of those with whom Israel has enjoyed nonhostile relations for decades. The Israel-UAE partnership is still in its infancy, on a complicated journey toward maturity that holds known and unknown challenges. These challenges require ongoing commitment and collaboration. The partnership has proven durable thus far, weathering a perfect storm: the largest military conflagration for Israel in a generation. What has become clear is that both countries genuinely value prosperity for themselves and the other. Is there a stronger definition of regional friendship than that?

Moran Zaga is a policy fellow at Mitvim— the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy.

הפוסט Israel’s peace with the United Arab Emirates is a model for a new Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Over four months have elapsed since the start of the war against Hamas, yet Israel’s objectives and vision for the “day after” in Gaza remain a mystery. At the same time, the United States, the European Union, Arab states, and a host of civil society organizations in Israel and abroad are energetically formulating various blueprints for ending the war and moving toward an agreement.

Israel’s reluctance to offer a plan for the aftermath of the war stems from political considerations, but the current Israeli government or its successor will soon have to take a clear stand.

In examining the “day after” options, it is necessary to review the points of agreement among the relevant parties.

All (or most) agree that Hamas cannot control Gaza or be involved in the post-war settlement, that the Palestinian Authority (PA) must undertake reforms, that Israel must elect a new government, and that some Arab states will provide economic assistance to rebuild Gaza and strengthen the PA. However, there is no agreement on who will rule Gaza, whether a Palestinian state will be established, and whether such an arrangement will constitute part of a broader regional deal.

Judging by historical precedent, military and political cataclysms breed change. The deadly results of the Hamas offensive and the resultant Gaza war are thus creating an opportunity for change in the regional architecture and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, based on past experience with peace and normalization agreements, three components are missing at present on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides: legitimate leadership, political determination, and trust. That leaves two options. One is to despair and give up, and the other is to examine how progress can be achieved despite these complexities.

A trustworthy mediator is key to any prospect of success. President Joe Biden has taken on this task and is determined to produce a landmark achievement ahead of the November 2024 presidential election. To that end, the United States, in cooperation with 10 European and Arab states, is reportedly drawing up a three-track arrangement.

One is intended to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza and a return of the Israeli abductees; the second is aimed at “reshaping” the PA; the third is the establishment of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. A word of warning is warranted: the American Road Map for Peace plan of 2003 also consisted of stages but was halted at an early stage after the PA and Israel failed to fulfill their parts.

Incentives play an important role in optimizing the prospects of a settlement.

What are the incentives of each side?

The Palestinians’ main gain would be the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with agreed territorial swaps – something they were denied after the Oslo Accords. This would include the reunification of the West Bank and Gaza, its acceptance as a member of the UN, and recognition by most countries.

Israel also stands to gain, obtaining guarantees for an agreement designed to prevent a security threat from the Palestinian side, an agreement with the most important country in the Arab and Muslim world (Saudi Arabia); continued integration in the Middle East, opening of new markets; building bridges with distant Muslim countries (Pakistan, Indonesia, etc.); easing resistance to Israel in the region and around the world given the solution to the Palestinian problem, and, finally, greater Saudi involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction, at Qatar’s expense or at its side.

הפוסט Normalization with Saudi Arabia looks unlikely, but we should try anyway הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s success in stabilizing the humanitarian situation in Gaza correlates with minimizing harm to non-combatants. This provides greater flexibility for Israeli troops to defeat Hamas.

Preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza is an overriding Israeli security interest, directly affecting the achievement of its war objectives, including returning the hostages and toppling the Hamas regime.

However, even if the severity of the war has dulled Israeli compassion for the non-combatant Palestinians in Gaza, it is important to recognize that providing humanitarian aid correctly will enhance Israel’s security. It will protect the life and health of the abductees and soldiers in Gaza, prevent the spillover of infections and disease into Israel, grant international political and legal legitimacy to the war, and help topple the Hamas regime.

The humanitarian crisis endangers hostages, soldiers, and Israeli citizens

A severe humanitarian crisis is already developing in Gaza. The dire shortage of potable water and edible food, unprecedented sewage and waste overflows, shortages of vaccines and medicines, and terrible overcrowding have resulted in the spread of serious diseases and widespread hunger, especially among children.

Infections and epidemics not only directly impact abductees and soldiers in the field, but also pose a growing threat to residents of the Gaza border communities in Israel and in other parts of the country. Aid agencies are already reporting outbreaks of respiratory diseases, hepatitis, scabies and typhus, and increasing concern about the outbreak of polio and measles epidemics. Stray animals and pests that have emerged from the piles of rubble pose a real threat of transmitting diseases such as rabies or Q-fever, potentially reaching Israeli territory.

Meanwhile, untreated sewage in Gaza, flowing directly into the sea during rainfall, creates pollution that affects operations of the Ashkelon desalination plant. The health of both humans and the environment on one side of the border is interconnected with that on the other side.

The humanitarian crisis undermines Israel’s standing in the international legal arena

South Africa’s prosecution at the International Court of Justice in The Hague relies heavily on the extensive killing and destruction in Gaza, the lack of distinction between Hamas terrorists and non-combatants, and the severe humanitarian crisis in the beleaguered coastal enclave.

The accusations, bolstered by key Israeli figures calling for a comprehensive erasure of Gaza, make cynical use of the term “genocide,” but emphasize the harsh living conditions endured by Gazans. Clearly demonstrating the lack of intention to harm non-combatant Gazans and commitment to preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip will help Israel refute accusations of genocide and relegate South Africa’s claims to the dustbin of history.

The humanitarian crisis  constrains Israel’s use of military force

We are in the midst of a complex war against a barbaric enemy. The State of Israel, with the objective of toppling the Hamas regime, has initiated a protracted military campaign conducted in densely populated urban areas, both above and below ground. Since the start of the war, military necessity has clashed with human suffering in the Gaza Strip.

The deeper the humanitarian crisis created by Israel’s fighting, the more legitimacy it loses, and the stronger the international demands become to shorten or halt the war.

Israel’s success in managing and stabilizing the humanitarian situation in Gaza directly correlates with minimizing harm to non-combatants and improving living conditions for residents. This, in turn, provides greater flexibility for Israeli troops to fight Hamas.

Proper humanitarian aid  will contribute to the collapse of Hamas

Israel has the potential to enhance health conditions in Gaza by implementing several key measures. Firstly, it should resume power supply to medical facilities, and water and sewage infrastructure. Additionally, allocating some incoming fuel for the removal of waste and raw sewage from population centers is essential. Approving the introduction of chlorine to disinfect all water sources, most of which may be contaminated, is another crucial step. Furthermore, repairing water pipelines from Israel to the southern Gaza Strip is necessary to ensure a daily minimum water supply. Managing vaccination campaigns is also vital.

This leaves the question: Who will carry out these measures, and how? This challenge is an obstacle to any significant progress in humanitarian aid efforts. Gaza’s residents rely entirely on Hamas for aid distribution, which the October 7 massacre perpetrator exploits by diverting goods and equipment from aid trucks entering the enclave, and thereby perpetuating its power.

To weaken Hamas, it must be excluded from civilian life in the Gaza Strip. To that end, humanitarian aid, operation of critical infrastructure, and administration of health and education must be transferred to alternative actors. Israel must promptly support the design of an alternative system of government to the Hamas regime as a complementary measure to its military operations. Failure to act now creates a governmental vacuum (for example, in areas where Israel has defeated Hamas), allowing Hamas forces to swiftly return and reclaim territory.

Israel must capitalize on regional and international mobilization for this purpose. An unprecedented range of international forces, states, and aid organizations are willing to operate on the ground in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA funders are pressing for reforms in the organization’s mechanisms, and the PA is willing to undergo reforms with American backing. This presents a crucial opportunity to establish an alternative to the civilian administration of the Gaza Strip, which would also serve as governmental infrastructure for the day after.

A political strategy, which has been sorely lacking since the beginning of this war, is critical to advance the collapse of Hamas and the establishment of an alternative regime in Gaza. Israel should collaborate with the international community to seize the opportunity to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and strengthen local and regional forces that will assume responsibility for Gaza in the future. A pilot project to provide humanitarian and civilian services to refugees could be launched immediately in the northern Gaza Strip in a designated shelter managed by the WHO in collaboration with Palestinian Authority professionals under the auspices of the UAE.

Humanitarian aid, like a military campaign, cannot achieve its goals independently of political action. The humanitarian perspective mirrors the military one: Just as the absence of a political framework for the day after the war significantly undermines the IDF’s achievements and allows Hamas to resume control, so piecemeal solutions to the humanitarian crisis and the lack of a political decision also harm Israel’s goals and interests, enabling Hamas to retain power through humanitarian aid.

Both military and humanitarian actions serve Israel’s security objectives, but without an alternative to Hamas control, the organization continues to benefit, once again.

IN CONCLUSION, a significant easing of the humanitarian situation in Gaza will safeguard Israel’s interests and help oust the Hamas regime through the introduction of an alternative civil-governmental mechanism. Furthermore, the humanitarian, health, and infrastructural conditions will improve significantly only if Gaza is administered by governmental mechanisms with which Israel can engage. These two conditions are interdependent.

Calls are being heard in Israel to withhold humanitarian aid for Gaza as a means of pressuring Hamas to release the hostages. The safe return of the hostages is the most urgent and important goal of the war, and only after their return will we be able to begin rehabilitating our society.

However, the situation in Gaza has not been a priority for Hamas, which tends to strengthen as blame is placed on Israel for the worsening conditions. Therefore, blocking humanitarian aid does not increase pressure on Hamas to release the hostages.

On the contrary, it harms Israel’s war objectives and strengthens the terrorist group. Israel must do the opposite of what Hamas wants – instead of contributing to the humanitarian crisis and drawing international accusations of crimes against humanity and genocide, it must advocate for the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, leveraging it to topple Hamas.

Bar Rapaport is the project manager for climate diplomacy at the Mitvim Institute. She is currently working to earn her PhD on regional cooperation in the midst of the climate crisis, with an emphasis on conflict and the Middle East, at the Hebrew University’s Harry S. Truman Research Institute.

הפוסט Why it’s essential to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Israel and Egypt share several strategic objectives. They aim to defeat Hamas or significantly diminish its political and military power. Egypt views Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood – an organization that had been outlawed and suppressed by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Both countries seek to restore stability to the Gaza Strip and the wider region. Egypt has suffered significant economic setbacks, including a sharp decline in tourism and in income from fees for transiting the Suez Canal, due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Israel and Egypt both aim to demonstrate to the Arab world the destabilizing effects of supporting the Shia axis. They envision a new Sunni-led regional order, supported by the United States, to counterbalance the influence of Iran and its allies.

At the same time, there are conflicts of interest between Israel and Egypt.

From the Egyptian perspective, Israel taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor while “encouraging the migration of Gazans to Egypt,” as several Israeli politicians have stated, constitutes a red line.

Similarly, the two states are in disagreement over what should happen after the war. While Egypt supports the return of an “upgraded” PA to rule Gaza, Israel has expressed opposition to the return of the PA in any form. Israel has also said that the IDF will not rule over the Gaza Strip – but has not specified who will.

Regarding the future of the West Bank. While Egypt, the Arab states, the United States, and the international community support the unification of the West Bank with the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a Palestinian state led by an upgraded PA, Israel remains opposed to such an outcome. These conflicts of interest, however, are not currently a threat to the stability of Egyptian-Israeli relations.

At present, the primary concern revolves around Rafah. From a military standpoint, Israel aims to eliminate the Hamas battalions in Rafah and gain control over the Philadelphi Corridor to block Hamas’s smuggling tunnels. Egypt seeks to broker a deal to secure the release of hostages and halt the war, at least temporarily, to ward off the nightmarish scenario of Palestinian refugees flooding Sinai. To this end, and with Israel’s participation, Cairo hosted an important meeting – which so far has not yielded any results.

With Israel unwilling to sign a deal at just any price, an Israeli military operation in Rafah following a collapse of negotiations is a very real and frightening possibility from an Egyptian perspective. Were it to occur, such a scenario would be viewed by the public and by certain governmental circles in Egypt as the outcome of an Israeli policy targeted at expelling the Palestinians from Gaza.

Egypt threatening Hamas and Israel

In the meantime, Egypt is attempting to solve the problem by threatening both Hamas and Israel. Egypt has told Hamas that Israel will attack Rafah if it does not agree to a deal within two weeks. This threat would seem to imply agreement with an Israeli attack on Rafah if a deal is not reached – a failure that would fall on the leadership of Hamas, as it is unlikely that this time frame has been decided without coordination with Israel.

In tandem, Egypt has warned Israel against the “disastrous consequences” of a military operation in Rafah. Yet, at the same time, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry stated that there was no threat to the peace treaty between the two countries as they are “actively dealing” with the pressing issues.

For Israel, launching a military operation in Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor may create two problems. First, there are ethical concerns regarding the displacement of approximately 1.3 million Gazan refugees who would be forced, once again, to seek shelter elsewhere. Second, there are political and military implications for Egypt, particularly if masses of Palestinian refugees attempt to breach the fence and seek refuge in Sinai.

Although Egypt has been buttressing the fence recently, it would be difficult to control large numbers of desperate refugees looking to escape the fighting. In such a scenario, Egypt would face the dilemma of either resorting to the use of force against the crowds and risking accusations of betrayal and abandonment of the Palestinians or allowing them entry and placing the blame on Israel, leading to a crisis in diplomatic relations that could result in Egypt recalling its ambassador or even taking a more serious step.

Looking at it from another angle, Israel could potentially enhance its relationship with Egypt by facilitating aid from the international community and Arab states to bolster the Egyptian economy.

A historical precedent worth considering is the 1991 Gulf War, wherein Egypt’s participation led to the forgiveness of approximately $20 billion in debt and favorable repayment terms for other outstanding loans. Presently, Egypt faces significant economic challenges, further aggravated by the ongoing conflict. Significant international assistance to Egypt has the potential to impact its position on key security matters concerning Israel, such as the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah Crossing.

In essence, while an Israeli military operation in Rafah may be deemed necessary to eradicate Hamas, it also carries the risk of deteriorating Israeli-Egyptian relations. Avoiding this scenario will demand meticulous planning for the safe relocation of Gazan refugees and close coordination between Egypt and Israel.

Yet a sober analysis would lead to the conclusion that even with such measures in place, there’s no guarantee that the worst-case scenario can be entirely averted.

Prof. Elie Podeh teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

The article was published in the “Jerusalem Post” on February 20th.

הפוסט An Israeli offensive in Rafah could worsen relations with Egypt הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While Israel has generally provided effective military response to threats in its immediate maritime domain, such as curbing armed Palestinian terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the 1970s, it has failed to provide a significant naval response in the distant areas of the Red Sea.

It did not resolve Egypt’s obstruction since 1947 of Israeli passage through the Suez Canal by maritime force, nor did it remove the Egyptian blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Straits during the Yom Kippur War, although such options were examined, at least in 1973.

At the same time, Arab threats to these shipping lanes have created a rare opportunity for Israel to mobilize international support over the years. The blockade imposed on the passage of vessels or goods through the Suez Canal (1947-1967), and the current attacks on vessels in Bab-el-Mandeb threaten not only Israel but the fundamental international principle of freedom of navigation and, in the case of the Suez Canal, the specific international treaty anchoring its operations. Moreover, damage to vessels imposes an economic burden on all commercial maritime activity in the area, not only on shipping to and from Israel, due to increased insurance costs and circuitous shipping routes.

These circumstances generated international support for Israel whenever threats emerged in the Red Sea maritime space. In 1951, for example, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling on Egypt to allow the passage of goods and vessels to and from Israel through the Suez Canal. In 1957, president Dwight D. Eisenhower provided Israel with what it interpreted as a commitment to employ US naval assets to protect the freedom of navigation if the Egyptians once again blocked the Straits of Tiran from shipping to and from Israel.

However, these diplomatic achievements proved insufficient in the absence of international enforcement. The UN Security Council’s firm 1951 support for Israel did not prevent Egypt from hampering the passage of Israel-related shipping in subsequent years, with the issue ultimately resolved only by the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty. The 1957 American commitment regarding the Straits of Tiran did not translate into the use of international military force to open the waterway in the May 1967 crisis.

THE RENEWED threats and attacks on Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea, this time by the Houthis from Yemen, have prompted international concern at this violation of the international freedom of navigation, with a United Nations Security Council resolution calling on the rebels to stop the attacks, and condemnation by at least 40 countries. The two superpowers – the United States and China – appealed directly to Iran to exert its influence over the Houthis to end the attacks. Even Russia avoided imposing a veto on the Security Council resolution.

Hesitating to attack the Houthis

This time, the declarations were translated into action. In December 2023, the United States announced the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian by an international coalition of forces to protect traffic in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The United States and Britain also attacked targets in Yemen in a bid to force an end to the Houthi attacks at sea.

But even the US-led coalition’s effort to defend freedom of navigation is being overshadowed by the same kind of international hesitation demonstrated in the past. Many Operation Prosperity Shield partners provide only symbolic assistance, which usually includes the deployment of a limited number of staff officers.

Most US allies in Western Europe did not join the coalition, translating their concern over the infringement of freedom of navigation into the dispatch of limited forces that would not operate under the US umbrella. Even Spain, an important NATO partner with a proud maritime heritage, refused to send troops, citing the need to avoid undermining “international peace.”

So far, the coalition has not achieved its objectives and the Houthi attacks continue. The escalation of the US response, which included a large-scale attack on Houthi targets together with UK forces, also failed to achieve its objective.

Nonetheless, over a month since the launch of the coalition’s activity, several insights can be gleaned with relevance for Israel.

FIRST, DEFENDING its interests requires increasing Israeli dependence on its allies, especially on the US, in addition to the dependence it has developed since the 1970s for the supply of weapons and political backing in the international arena. The current coalition includes, for the first time since 1991, the use of international, and particularly American, military force to defend Israeli interests (inter alia). The US naval force in the region, while trying to protect commercial shipping, is also intercepting missiles fired by the Houthis towards Israel. In fact, the Gaza war appears to have deepened the Israel-US military cooperation not only at sea, with Pentagon officials reportedly involved in top-level military discussions in Israel immediately after October 7.

Second, as was the case in 1991, such direct military dependence could be used by Washington as a lever to advance its preferences, for example on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Even if Israel’s incumbent prime minister seeks to repel such pressure and a different US president is elected in November, the potential for US leverage remains significant, given Israel’s reliance on US munitions.

Third, while Israel finds itself attacked in terms of its “international legitimacy” in arenas such as The Hague, it enjoys military protection from the international system in the Red Sea, and its interests are consistent with the Security Council’s resolution.

Moreover, China, which prides itself on good relations with all sides, implicitly holds Iran responsible for the infringement on freedom of navigation. The Chinese stance and Russia’s decision to refrain from vetoing the anti-Houthi Security Council resolution highlight the limitations of Iran’s strategy of confronting Israel on multiple fronts (its so-called “unity of arenas” strategy), for example by creating a potential wedge between Tehran and Beijing.

Planners in Jerusalem should examine the current Red Sea challenge in the broader context of chess with Tehran, and not only through the lens of a boxing match with Hamas in Gaza. Such a review could identify additional opportunities for Israel given the breadth, not to mention overload, of Iranian activity.

Fourth, coalition action is also significant in terms of Israeli force structure and its deployment. Israel is not a formal member of the maritime coalition, but it presumably coordinates with the US on certain aspects of the use of force in the Red Sea. The more this coalition (and perhaps similar ones in the future) contributes to protecting Israel, the better the conditions for Israeli participation in future coalition frameworks, including regional ones. This would require some adjustment to improve the suitability of Israeli forces to coalition action. Questions are also expected to re-emerge regarding Israeli military engagement in missions other than those for its own defense, such as the Western expectation in the 1950s that Israel would assist the coalition fighting in Korea at the time.

Finally, Israel’s adversaries clearly understand the harmful potential for Israel of a naval threat. The sea has traditionally been a secondary arena in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but recent developments in Bab-el-Mandeb have led Iran and the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to declare that, under certain circumstances, they may threaten Israeli maritime interests in other areas as well, especially the Mediterranean Sea and Israeli ports.

The sea, therefore, may develop into an arena requiring greater Israeli effort, but could also create additional opportunities for international cooperation, and not only in the Red Sea.

The article was published in “The Jerusalem Post” on February 14.

הפוסט What Israel can learn from the US-led coalition’s attacks on the Houthis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the fiscal year ending in June 2023, Egypt generated $8.776 billion from the Suez Canal. However, since the beginning of 2024, revenues from transit fees, paid by ships navigating the canal, have experienced a sharp decline of 40% to 50%. Ongoing Houthi attacks are discouraging many shipping companies from using the Suez Canal. For those that do choose the Red Sea route, substantial increases in insurance premiums are adding to the economic challenges.

The decline in Egyptian tourism income is striking amid the current conflict. It’s hard to imagine vacationing in Sinai with Houthi missiles and drones flying overhead toward Israel. In the 2022-2023 fiscal year, tourism contributed a record $13.63 billion to Egypt’s revenue. At present, it’s challenging to fully assess the extent of the damage inflicted on Egyptian tourism by the ongoing conflict, but reports indicate a significant and alarming decline. This unfavorable situation is likely to persist as long as the war continues.

The tourism industry in Sinai supports hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, and this new crisis, coming on the heels of the COVID pandemic, poses a risk of causing irreparable damage.

The effects on the Suez Canal and the tourism sector have reduced foreign currency revenues, resulting in a significant impact on the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound. Currently valued at 31 pounds to the US dollar, it is expected to reach approximately 40 pounds to the dollar by the end of the year.

Inflation on the rise in Egypt

The rising inflation rate is further exacerbating the cost of living. Regrettably, the Egyptian government is unable to offset this rise by subsidizing essential goods, leading to a further deterioration in the standard of living for Egyptian citizens, which has already been declining in recent years.

Another substantial source of foreign currency income for Egypt is the remittances from its millions of expatriate workers. In the first half of 2023, these transfers experienced a significant 23% decrease, declining from $15.6 billion to $12 billion. The main reason for this decline is the expectation of an Egyptian pound devaluation, as the official dollar exchange rate significantly lags behind the black-market rate.

The ongoing crisis resulting from the war in Gaza compounds the challenges Egypt has been grappling with following two major global crises: the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Adding to these concerns is Egypt’s status as the world’s largest grain importer, with 80% of its imports originating from Ukraine and Russia.

This heavy dependence has led to a substantial surge in prices and inflation. In June 2023, annual inflation peaked at 36.8%, accompanied by a 65% increase in food and drink prices. Given that approximately one-third of the 110 million population lives below the United Nations-defined poverty line of $2.15 per day, these significant price hikes are likely to have far-reaching political and social consequences. It’s important to remember that the January 2011 revolution was largely triggered by the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent rise in prices.

THE POOR economic conditions are anticipated to contribute to increased unemployment. A pronounced downturn in tourism activities in Sinai and across Egypt, coupled with the persistent devaluation of the Egyptian pound leading to rising inflation, is likely to elevate unemployment rates. It is worth noting that high youth unemployment was one of the primary factors behind the onset of the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

The challenging economic conditions are expected to lead to a rise in unemployment. The significant decline in tourism both in Sinai and throughout Egypt, combined with the continuous devaluation of the Egyptian pound resulting in rising inflation, is likely to elevate unemployment rates. It is worth noting that high youth unemployment played also a major role in sparking the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

Israeli-Egyptian relations have gained attention amid reports of a strain between the two leaderships, coupled with tensions and disagreements concerning the governance of Gaza, post-war. Issues such as Israel’s desire to regain control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah Crossing, along with Egyptian concerns over potential Palestinian expulsion from Gaza by Israel, have added complexity to the situation.

However, the Houthi attacks from Yemen present an equally severe challenge directly threatening Egypt’s economy.

In economic terms, Egypt is enduring more significant repercussions than any other Arab state, including Jordan. Therefore, it is crucial for Israel to recognize that Egypt’s decision-making regarding the Gaza conflict is influenced not only by military and political considerations but also by the prevailing economic circumstances.

The article was published in “The Jerusalem Post” on February 6.

הפוסט Egypt needs to consider its economy in Gaza war outlook הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The lack of focus and the inability to materialize the dozens of signed agreements is evident these days, emphasizing what has not yet been implemented. For instance, an agreement for employing Moroccan migrant workers in Israel has not yet been signed, despite the statement made by the former interior minister Ayelet Shaked in July 2022. Nor has the economic infrastructure to enable business between the countries been completed, namely agreements on customs, double taxation avoidance, promotion and protection of investments, and other systems to enhance the attractiveness and competitiveness of the trade channel between Morocco and Israel.

Moroccan decision makers, for their part, appear to regard the ongoing war with Hamas, and no less so the current Israeli government, as detrimental to the resumption of relations between the countries to its positive course. Statements by senior Israeli officials calling for the destruction of Gaza, while vehemently opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state, echo in the Moroccan media, damage Israel’s image, and mainly serve opposition parties who wish to harm the special relations between the two countries.

Nevertheless, Morocco’s official position regarding relations with Israel as a strategic interest remains intact. This was evidenced by the results of the extraordinary Arab Islamic Conference held in Riyadh in November, in which Morocco – alongside other key Arab and Muslim countries – was reluctant to embrace actual decisions or actions against their relations with Israel. Morocco’s decision to keep its ambassador in Tel Aviv – despite the Israeli mission staff being evacuated from Rabat – is a significant statement in itself.

In the economic field, businesses more or less continue as usual. Israeli companies come to Morocco or meet their partners in third-country destinations such as France and Spain. This discreet arrangement seems convenient for everyone.

Tourism has almost completely stopped between the countries

Tourism is the most affected sector, with direct flights between Tel Aviv and Rabat still on hold, and a travel warning in effect with a rating of three out of four, advising Israelis to avoid non-essential travel to Morocco. As a result, Israeli and international Jewish tourism to Morocco has almost entirely stopped. This situation is exacting a price from Israeli tourism agencies and Moroccan hotels and service providers. While tourism is a key to people-to-people connections, most civil and cultural partnerships are currently on hold and in a “waiting” situation until the end of the war.

Despite the challenges, some joint initiatives can be preserved, finding creative ways to sustain them, such as transferring them from a bilateral framework to a multi-sided one under an American, European, Emirati, or other umbrella, or conducting activities online whenever possible.

One of the main challenges in the civil context is the sentiment among Israelis of Moroccan descent regarding Morocco. It ranges from disappointment to astonishment and a lack of understanding in light of images of mass protests from Rabat and other cities in Morocco and even antisemitic incidents that do not receive official condemnation.

Here, it should be noted that Israeli frustration is partly due to cultural and behavioral differences between Israel and Morocco, despite their close cultural connection. According to the Moroccan perspective, including that of decision-makers, it is preferable to avoid conflicts, make explicit statements, and deal with matters quietly behind the scenes. In their view, the secrecy of action is a key to success, preserving internal stability and advancing a wishful agenda. That’s because, according to their understanding, one cannot resist what one does not see or know, so ultimately, maintaining quiet preserves the status quo as if nothing has been done. In Morocco, non-action is considered, in practice, equivalent to any action, and perhaps even the most proper and challenging action to execute.

Three years after the resumption of official ties, and in the shadow of the Gaza war challenges, the crisis also provides a new opportunity for regional and bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Morocco’s relatively neutral position may in fact enable it to play an important role in the aftermath of the war as part of a broader coalition dedicated to rehabilitation and reconstruction processes. It could help in the reconstruction and in implementing local and regional programs to deal with and prevent extremism and violence.

Morocco could assist in the training of Palestinian public employees deployed in Gaza. Morocco could also host forums, meetings, and conferences to support and promote a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The good relations that Morocco maintains with both sides – Israeli and Palestinian – and the religious authority of King Mohammed VI, including his role as the chairman of the Al-Quds Committee in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, are just some of the assets Morocco can bring to this complex task.

The connection with Morocco is a significant asset for Israel in times of peace and war alike. It is important that we learn and derive insights from the past three years towards the new chapter in relations that will unfold once the war is over.

The article was published on Janurary 1, 2024 in the Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Morocco and resolving the Gaza crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, Qatar also hosts Hamas leaders on its territory, the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera network and its leaders frequently criticize and demonize Israel, while Qatari money funds Hamas and other terrorist organizations as well as leading academic institutions around the world to promote Islamic messages. What, then, is Qatar – an enemy or a friend of Israel?

In order to answer this question, let us travel back in time three decades.

The history of formal and secret relations between Israel and Qatar

Clandestine ties were first established between Israel and Qatar immediately after the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993. That same month, the Qataris initiated the first secret meeting between then-foreign minister Shimon Peres and his Qatari counterpart at the home of Qatar’s ambassador to the United Nations. This relationship continued intermittently until April 1996, when formal relations were established. These were designated a “trade office,” but functioned as embassies in all but name.

Even before the establishment of formal relations. Israel examined the possibility of purchasing gas from Qatar in 1994-1995. The contacts were secret, but Qatar did not deny them when leaked to the media. The two sides even signed a memorandum of understanding, although Israel ultimately opted for Egyptian gas, which was also cheaper. Nonetheless, Israel played the Qatari card in order to exert pressure on Egypt, which was dragging its feet on signing the gas deal. Netanyahu’s election as prime minister in May 1996 lowered the profile of relations, but high-level behind-the-scenes meetings continued, mainly on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Qatar, like Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia, closed its diplomatic mission in Israel in 2000 in response to the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada. However, unlike the other three countries, it quickly restored relations, which even improved in terms of coordination, and then-foreign minister Tzipi Livni maintained excellent relations with the Qatari leadership.

Qatar suspended official ties once again during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009. It put out feelers on resuming them after the war, but Netanyahu and then-foreign minister Liberman rejected the idea in light of what they called “duplicitous” Qatari policy – hinting at Qatar’s continued financial assistance to terrorist organizations. In tandem, however, Israeli officials and business people continued to visit Qatar in secret, and messages were exchanged. Arab media reported that Netanyahu met secretly with the Qatari prime minister in May 2011 in Paris.

Qatar’s ties with Hamas, especially after its takeover of Gaza in 2007, enabled it to play a mediating role during Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012. The fact that Egypt was then ruled by Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood helped achieve a quick ceasefire. Soon after, Qatar appointed Mohammed al-Amedi as ambassador to Gaza. In this capacity he established good rapport with politicians and military figures in Israel. Following Operation Protective Edge in 2014, an official and orderly mechanism was established (called the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism) to transfer Qatari money to finance civilian projects in Gaza. It is assumed that some of these funds found their way into the Hamas coffers to finance terrorism.

Occasional clandestine contacts continued. For example, Mossad chief Yossi Cohen and the then-head of the IDF’s Southern Command Herzi Halevi visited Qatar in February 2020 and met with the heads of security and intelligence agencies. And in March 2022, then-IDF chief Aviv Kohavi reportedly met in Bahrain with his Qatari counterpart to examine cooperation against the threat of Iranian drones.

Qatar’s connection with Israel is part of a broader range of ties with the West in general, and with the United States in particular. The main headquarters of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which has responsibility for the Middle East, is located in Qatar. Thousands of US troops are also deployed in the Al Udeid Air Base southwest of Doha and the US military also has access to the Hamad seaport. In January 2022, US President Joe Biden granted Qatar non-NATO status as a major ally – a status that even Saudi Arabia still does not enjoy. Qatar has also signed several defense deals with the United States totaling billions of dollars.

Thus, Qatar’s foreign and security policy seeks to maintain good ties with diverse countries in the region and around the globe in order to achieve two main goals. The first is to ensure maximum security for the small wealthy country in an arena fraught with risks and potential enemies. The second goal is to gain global and regional influence and prestige through the enormous wealth generated by the gas fields located in its territory. To achieve its goals, Qatar uses “soft” diplomacy by funding sports, culture, education, academia and providing mediation services. Indeed, Qatar’s relations with many players have made it a valuable mediator in multiple arenas: Afghanistan (between the United States and the Taliban), Lebanon (in local politics), Sudan and Somalia (among civil war rivals), in the Palestinian arena (Fatah and Hamas), and, of course, between Israel and Hamas.

The most appropriate term for describing Israel-Qatar relations is the academic term “frenemies” – a combination which encompasses friendly but also antagonistic policies. Some interpret this relationship as a camouflage and dangerous deception. However, a closer look reveals that it has served both countries well in the past, and continues to serve them during this war in obtaining hostage releases.

Qatar would exert a lot of influence to maintain its role in Gaza in the “day after,” yet Israel should seek to diminish this role as far as possible. Saudi Arabia may look as a possible alternative, but it is unclear whether Crown Prince bin Salman is interested at all in embroiling himself in the Gaza quagmire.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on December 15th.

הפוסט Are Israel and Qatar allies or enemies? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel remains at the heart of the region’s energy discussions. Since 2020 it has been successfully exporting natural gas to Jordan and Egypt, the latter providing an important export route to the global energy market by way of its two LNG terminals in Idku and Damietta.

Through a combination of intentional diplomacy and structural changes to the international order, Israel has leveraged its position to strengthen bilateral ties with Greece and Cyprus, reach a historic maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon, play a central role in the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, and attract foreign investment from supermajors and the Gulf States.

Still, more heavy lifting is required for Israel to advance beyond its current achievements. Despite signing a joint MOU with Egypt and the EU in June 2022 to deliver more gas to Europe, Israel’s export options for delivering gas into the global energy market still remain constrained.

Israel enjoys cooperative ties with Cairo, but even with additional pipelines in the works there is a commercial and technical bottleneck when it arrives in Egypt. Past shortages in Egyptian gas supply often resulted in the consumption of gas delivered from Israel. But even if Israel’s gas was earmarked for export – as is intended – Idku and Damietta have limited capacity and it doesn’t appear as if Egypt’s LNG capacity will be expanded in the near term. In order to increase its energy security, Israel must therefore continue to seek ways of diversifying its export options and regional partners.

This explains why there has been so much diplomatic activity around Cyprus in recent weeks, where the newly minted Christodoulides government is trying to attract foreign investment and international interest. Christodoulides’s strategy is clear: create a pathway for Cyprus to finally become a meaningful player in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy architecture.

There are two distinct initiatives that Cyprus is pursuing to achieve this goal, both of which depend on Israeli cooperation. The first is resolving the outstanding Aphrodite-Ishai dispute. According to a recent MEES report, Chevron and the other invested partners in Cyprus’s Aphrodite field (estimated 129 BCM) are close to buying out the four firms with stakes in the Ishai license, thus removing a key obstacle that has prevented the field’s development.

The same report indicates that following recent meetings between Energy Minister Israel Katz and his counterpart George Papanastasiou, Israel and Cyprus’s ministries of energy are working on a parallel intergovernmental agreement that will help expedite Aphrodite’s development.

The second initiative underway is Nicosia’s push to develop a pipeline that would deliver Israel’s natural gas to a Cyprus-based LNG facility, either land-based or a floating LNG facility near Vasilikos port, which could then be sold on the global market. This “Plan B” version of the infamous East Med pipeline is attractive, especially as it falls within the EU’s broader ambition to diversify its energy sources (reducing its dependency on Russian gas) and earns Project of Common Interest status. Paired with the steady progress on the EuroAsia electricity interconnector project, Israel and Cyprus have multiple reasons to work together.

The creation of a new LNG terminal is a costly and time-consuming affair. And there is no clarity on who would fund such an enterprise, though as the operator of both Aphrodite and Leviathan Chevron would likely need to foot the bill to spearhead such efforts along with NewMed, Shell, and potentially newcomers like BP and Adnoc.

Will Israel, Cyprus cooperate to resolve gas crisis?

There are two questions here: Is Israel prepared to cooperate with Cyprus in such an intimate way, and is Cyprus really committed to becoming a hub? After all, the headlines out of Nicosia may be designed as a way of baiting Turkey into direct talks over the divided island. When push comes to shove, would Christodoulides pursue regional energy projects at the expense of restarting negotiations with Turkey, a much bigger geopolitical prize?

Turkey understands this, which is why it is almost guaranteed that the prospect of Israel-Turkey gas cooperation will be raised during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s anticipated meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan later this month. Turkey is the largest gas consuming market in the region, and like Egypt and Cyprus, wishes to become an energy hub. Despite all of the geopolitical disputes between Ankara and the EU, it has generally been a reliable partner for delivering energy from the Caucasus and the Middle East.

For strategic reasons, Netanyahu will neither rule out nor endorse this option, which is also paved with complications. How would cooperation with Turkey impact relations with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and other regional actors? If Erdogan utilized cooperation with Israel in order to sideline Cyprus, how would that serve Israel’s interests?

And who is to say whether Turkey’s foreign policy will be more predictable during Erdogan’s final term as president than it was in the past 15 years? International energy projects are dependent on trust. While Israel and Turkey are starting to turn a new leaf, pipelines aren’t going to feature in the relationship anytime soon.

Israel’s export problem isn’t going away. But between now and the end of the year, offshore drilling will continue, and bid rounds in Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon may provide companies even greater incentive to invest. The region’s interplay of geopolitics, economics, and energy demand suggests that with the right balance of political and commercial interests a win-win outcome is still attainable.

If Katz manages to develop and execute a cohesive policy in that time, he could potentially see the fruits of his labor as foreign minister when he and Eli Cohen switch positions. The Eastern Mediterranean’s great gas game isn’t over. Quite the opposite is true.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on July 12th.

הפוסט The East Mediterranean great gas game isn’t over הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In previous instances, similar developments have led to harsh rhetoric and criticism of Israel by Erdogan, and to a de facto downgrade of ties but this time – things kept on moving forward, albeit at a slower pace than under Israel’s previous government.

Maintaining this will be a key objective of both countries in the coming months. But, their goal should be to look beyond a more-of-the-same approach, and seek new advances by involving new societal sectors, setting up cooperative endeavors in new fields, and leveraging positive geopolitical developments. This, while acknowledging that relations between the states are not limited to those between heads-of-state and governments. There is also much space for others in Israel and Turkey, who share different sets of values than their leaders, to find common ground and work together.

First and foremost, Israel and Turkey should increase the scope of their bilateral ministerial meetings, which have not taken place often during the last six months. Beyond meetings and photo-ops, it will be crucial to ensure that sustained working relations are set between the professional levels at relevant ministries – especially those dealing with foreign affairs, energy, economy, environment and defense.

Climate change is important to Israel, but less for Turkey

Of special importance is the issue of climate change, which is central in Israel’s regional ties, but around which only limited cooperation with Turkey exists. It is an issue that is of utmost importance to President Isaac Herzog, who set up the Israeli Climate Forum and who is advocating an inclusive regional approach toward a “Renewable Middle East.” The trust established between Herzog and Erdogan in recent years should be utilized to ensure the sustainability of Israel-Turkey ties, even should political conditions create renewed tensions, and climate change is an agenda item through which this could be done.

Relations could also be improved in terms of parliamentary cooperation – whether through direct engagement between the speakers of parliament (as has recently happened between Israel and Morocco), through the exchange of parliamentary delegations, or via cooperation between sister parties (including via multilateral groupings such as the Socialist International). The fact that Turkey’s former ambassador to Israel Namik Tan has recently been voted into parliament, can give a boost to parliamentary cooperation.

WHILE THE Israeli and Turkish political leaderships, diplomatic echelons and private sectors are already cooperating rather well, an emphasis should be put on enhancing civil society cooperation, which is still lagging. The Turkish-Israeli Civil Society Forum, which managed to create and maintain NGO ties during the years of bilateral political crisis, can be a central pillar of this. It should now be empowered as a focal point for non-governmental cooperation. A specific emphasis should be placed on academic cooperation, enhancing exchange of students and faculty – whether through relevant EU programs (such as Erasmus+), bilateral agreements between universities, and governmental investment (such as was done in the past with the Süleyman Demirel Program for Contemporary Turkish Studies at Tel Aviv University).

On the domestic fronts, as pro-democrats in both Turkey and Israel are stepping up their efforts to safeguard their democracy, there is much room for bilateral exchanges between them, on best practices and lessons learned. This type of cooperation has increased in recent months, with Turkish and Israel experts sharing insights and recommendations with audiences in each other’s countries.

It may grow in importance in the coming months, as municipal elections in both countries approach (October 2023 in Israel, and March 2024 in Turkey). They are seen as significant political tests for those committed to liberal democracy and can create a new space for exchange of expertise and new collaborations between pro-democracy candidates and mayors.

Developments in the region and their importance

Regional developments are also creating new opportunities for innovative Israel-Turkey cooperation. Turkey is stepping up its rapprochement with Arab countries with which Israel already has good relations. Just after the Turkish election, further progress was evident in Egypt-Turkey rapprochement as well as in UAE-Turkey ties.

As these relations continue to improve, new tripartite and minilateral modalities of cooperation – also involving Israel – could be envisioned, on issues such as energy, water, security, climate change, conflict resolution, and improving the situation in Gaza. This can also enable more inclusivity in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the convening of a regional conference (an idea promoted by the EU, but which has not yet happened also due to Egypt-Turkey tensions) and Turkish involvement (even if short of membership) in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Turkey and Israel relations should also focus on improving Israeli-Palestinian ties and advancing peacebuilding. The issues of Gaza and Jerusalem caused tensions between the countries in the past, and this can happen again – especially if the extremist nature of Israel’s current government leads to another flare-up.

In the absence of dramatic escalation, Turkey and Israel should aim – as part of their strategic dialogue – to identify concrete contributions that Turkey can make to improve the situation. This can include the establishment by Turkey and other international actors a dialogue house on the seamline in Jerusalem, which will enable pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians a safe and convenient space to convene and advance joint civil society endeavors. Turkey is relevant to this as it has already set up a cultural center in Jerusalem, and can also share lessons learned from the Home of Cooperation established in the buffer zone in Cyprus to improve ties between the Turkish and Greek communities there.

Turkey-Israel relations might face renewed challenges in the near future given the deep ideological differences between their leaderships on the Palestinian issue. In the meantime, both countries can benefit from advancing shared bilateral and regional interests, that will broaden Israel-Turkey ties and assist in preventing another crisis if and when political tensions increase. In parallel, Israelis and Turks who hold beliefs and ideologies that differ from their leaders, should utilize the improved official ties to step up their value-based cooperation, and enhance bilateral and international liberal partnerships

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on June 18th.

הפוסט Advancing Israel-Turkey relations, new regional cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The attack, unprecedented in its nature in over two decades, rattled the Israeli security but it is not expected to boil over and shake the core of the security relationship cemented in the 1979 peace treaty. According to Haaretz, citing security sources, Saturday’s incident caused considerable embarrassment on the Egyptian side.

The incident took place early Saturday morning. An Egyptian policeman infiltrated the security fence on the Israel-Egypt border in the Sinai Peninsula. After passing the border, the policeman shot dead two soldiers while they secured a military post by the fence. A third Israeli soldier and the attacker were killed in an exchange of fire a few hours later, also on Israeli territory.

Soon after the incident, Israel’s government called on Cairo to thoroughly investigate the attack. In the ensuing hours, the Egyptian authorities did not openly admit the incident was deliberate, saying the policeman was chasing a drug smuggler into Israeli territory. Still, according to Haaretz citing security sources, in preliminary talks between Israeli and Egyptian military officers at the site, the Egyptians acknowledged an act of aggression, saying that the policeman, usually stationed some 5 kilometers (3 miles) away from the border, had operated alone.

Israel is now calling on Egypt to carry a joint investigation into the attack.

“Israel has conveyed a clear message to the Egyptian government: We expect that the joint investigation will be exhaustive and thorough. This is part of the important security cooperation between us, which has benefited both countries over the years,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday.

On Monday morning, Egyptian authorities released more details about the attacker, identifying him as 22-year-old Mohamed Salah. Israel’s public broadcaster KAN reported that Salah had suffered some mental issues after the death of a friend who works in the same military unit as him, and had complained on more than one occasion about his military service. In May 2021, during an IDF operation in the Gaza Strip, Salah expressed on Facebook solidarity with the Palestinians.

Relationship stressed but treaty holds

Experts say Israel and Egypt have a shared interest in keeping their end of the deal, and maintaining a safe border.

“Israel-Egypt bilateral relations as well as the changing regional reality are guiding the interests of both states. In the last few years, Egypt has been heavily involved in mediation efforts with Gaza, in efforts much appreciated by Israel,’’ former Israeli Ambassador to Egypt and lecturer at Reichman University Haim Koren told Al-Monitor.

Koren added that a joint investigation into the circumstances of the incident is in the interest of both countries.

Security cooperation with Egypt is considered a top priority for Israel. The two countries signed a peace treaty in 1979, but for many years, bilateral relations were cold. Few Egyptian tourists have ever visited Israel in the years since the signing of the peace treaty. That being said, in the last decade, since the rise of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, strategic ties between the two countries have deepened and expanded, both in the domain of security and in the domain of energy.

The Egyptians are interested in cooperating with Israel on battling jihadist groups (Islamic State and al-Qaeda-affiliated) in the Sinai Peninsula and in guaranteeing calm in the Gaza Strip.

Reports in recent years, such as a 2016 Bloomberg report, suggested that Israel was helping Egypt in Sinai both through accurate intelligence and with drone strikes. The Times of Israel reported in 2017 about an ISIS jihadist killed in Sinai by an Israeli drone.

Egypt is concerned that unrest in Gaza could spillover to Egyptian territory. It is also in a constant battle against smuggling networks into and from the Strip.

For Israel, Egypt’s extensive involvement in mediation vis-à-vis Hamas and the Islamic Jihad is of the outmost importance. As such, it was Egyptian mediation that enabled reaching a cease-fire between Gaza and Israel last month.

Israel values cooperation with Egypt also on the regional level. Qatar has been supporting Gaza financially in recent years, with Israel’s agreement. On the other hand, Israel is concerned over the proximity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad with Iran, which places Tehran practically on Israel’s southern border. Security ties with Egypt are key for stability in the region, as far as Israel is concerned.

“The recent Saudi-Iranian agreement also impacts the region with new consequences. To that we must add the return of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad into the fold of the Arab League. As such, Israel and Egypt will both need to see — also together — how to address the changing role of Qatar and of Turkey in this new Middle Eastern game. Both Israel and Egypt must address the emerging ‘Iranian axis’ and what regional jihadi terrorism would look like, including in the Sinai Peninsula,” Koren told Al-Monitor.

Energy cooperation between Israel and Egypt has also become a major topic in bilateral relations. Israeli media had reported extensively on a gesture made by Sisi last February, during a regional energy conference, when he went straight to Israel’s Energy Minister Karin Elharrar, who uses a wheelchair, and thanked her for coming.

Deadly incidents on the Israel-Egypt border are rare. The last one occurred when an Islamic militant cell infiltrated the border in 2011. The assailants fired first at an Israeli bus and then at an Israeli car, killing eight Israeli civilians and wounding 38. In the chase after the assailants and the ensuing exchange of fire, five Egyptian soldiers and two Israeli security agents were killed, alongside seven of the attackers.

This article is from “Al-Monitor“, June 5th, 2023.

הפוסט Israel-Egypt security cooperation rattled but steady after border attack הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The policy brief was published on “MEI“, on May 25th.

הפוסט The slowing down of Israel-Arab relations under the Netanyahu government הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been running in Turkish national elections for over 20 years, first as founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that challenged the existing political order, subsequently as a prime minister who reshaped the system of government and more recently, as an all-powerful president seeking another term.

Turkish elections have aroused interest in Israel over the years, whether due to Erdogan’s Islamist affiliation that initially prompted speculation about Turkey going the way of Iran or more recently, the impact of his continued hold on power for Israeli-Turkish relations and regional geopolitics.

A new aspect has informed Israeli discourse on Turkey in recent years: concern in Israel’s pro-democracy camp that democratic erosion processes in Turkey are similarly emerging in Israel under Netanyahu’s enduring rule. Seven years ago, the Israeli opposition sounded warnings against “Israel turning into Turkey,” and in 2020, Benny Gantz’s opposition Blue and White party adopted the campaign slogan “It’s Blue and White or Erdogan” (it rhymes in Hebrew).

Since the establishment of the current Netanyahu government and in the face of the legislative processes it is promoting, pro-democracy forces in Israel are increasingly turning to colleagues in Turkey (as well as in Hungary and Poland) to learn about the situation there and to seek tips for safeguarding democracy.

The political renewal that characterized Turkey’s opposition towards the recent election is resonating among Israeli opposition forces, who have an increasing interest in creating fresh, united and renewed political frameworks (see, for example, Labor MK Gilad Kariv’s recent call for unity on the political Left). Relevant insights that can be distilled from the Turkish opposition’s attempt to replace Erdogan touch mainly on issues of alliances and unification, momentum and hope.

Alliances and unifications

In the run-up to the 2023 elections, most Turkish opposition groups joined forces behind a single presidential candidate: the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP, founded by Ataturk), Kemal Kılıcdaroglu. This push to consolidate a united front began ahead of the 2018 presidential elections and bore fruit in the 2019 municipal elections with impressive victories by opposition candidates in major cities.

Ahead of the 2023 presidential elections, six parties from across the political and social spectrum ran a joint campaign, calling for the restoration of democratic order and a return to a parliamentary system of government. Along with Kılıcdaroglu, the heads of the other five parties ran as vice presidential candidates, as did the mayors of Istanbul (Ekrem Imamoglu) and Ankara (Mansur Yavas), who played a key role in the campaign.

The ideologically diverse front performed well during the campaign, although it ultimately failed to live up to expectations. In a sign that may be relevant to Israel’s fragmented politics, the Kurdish ethnic minority in southeastern Turkey provided Kılıcdaroglu with overwhelming support on Election Day, having reached agreements with the opposition front without joining it.

THIS IS an encouraging lesson for the prospects of forging constructive political alliances with Israel’s Arab citizens, even if formal cooperation under one political roof is unlikely.

The joint Turkish presidential campaign conveyed unity and determination and willingness to put differences aside in favor of achieving an overarching national goal. Preliminary agreements among the parties enabled opposition parties to formulate joint political moves vis-a-vis different constituencies in order to maximize their relative advantage on Election Day.

On the other hand, the bloc’s great ideological diversity undermined certainty regarding the policies the opposition would adopt if elected and the identities of political appointments that would follow. This was clearly evident, for example, in the foreign policy field. The opposition bloc included Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s former foreign minister, credited with boosting Turkey’s standing in the Arab and Muslim sphere, as well as Namik Tan, a former Turkish ambassador to Israel and the United States, aligned with pro-Western views.

Which of the two would have set the diplomatic tone had the opposition won? Voters could not know this in advance and the opposition’s attempt to make up for this uncertainty by issuing a comprehensive election platform (unusual in Turkey) only provided a partial response to these concerns.

A seemingly more appropriate model in the Israeli context would be for parties of significantly different ideological stripes to run separately and parties more ideologically aligned to form unions, with a public commitment in advance to form a coalition after the elections.

On the parliamentary front, the bloc’s largest party, CHP, gave up some of its future representation in advance to allow for mergers with several smaller parties. The move was criticized in retrospect when election results indicated that the mergers had failed to increase the CHP’s power and the party was nonetheless forced to transfer seats to ideologically distant parties that had garnered negligible voter support.

When forming political consolidations, one must therefore consider not only how to maximize profits on Election Day, but also how to enable effective parliamentary action throughout a future term. In addition, the opposition’s reliance on key figures (mayors) who were designated for senior positions in the event of victory but not for parliament membership in case of defeat, risked a future weakening of their various factions.

The lesson for Israel is that entry into national politics must be wholeheartedly sincere, including the willingness to give up current positions to make way for opposition parliamentary activity.

Momentum and hope

Election Day in Turkey generated much optimism among the camp of change, especially as elections drew nearer. This was no small matter, given the repeated disappointments this camp has suffered in recent years and a sense of helplessness generated by Erdogan’s prolonged rule. This is an important lesson about the relative ease of inspiring hope and leveraging a thirst for change when the public feels that its leaders are acting responsibly and jointly to advance the bloc’s common interest.

THE FORMATION of a collective opposition alliance, the positive campaign it led, the unifying national discourse, the willingness to break social taboos and legitimize ethnic and religious minorities all harnessed the opposition’s supporters and conveyed a sense that change was possible. This, in turn, increased voter turnout and motivated voters to volunteer for polling station supervision – a central pillar of the opposition’s Election Day strategy.

The global dimension introduced by the opposition into the election campaign was also important, stressing that victory would position Turkey as a model for like-minded voters in other countries. The opposition also felt responsible in light of the global attention to its efforts.

The positive momentum and favorable polls ultimately dazzled and generated over-optimism, which may have led to missed electoral trends in the periphery and away from social networks, and to a lack of sufficiently appropriate responses for them in the campaign. This phenomenon has occurred in the past both in Israel and in other Western countries, requiring attention in the future.

The role played by mayors in the campaign indicated the power of the municipal arena. Given repeated losses by the opposition’s national leadership (such as those Kılıcdaroglu himself experienced since being elected head of his party, in 2010), the municipal leadership kept producing stories of success. Imamoglu and Yavas were regarded as winners, having cracked the code for defeating Erdogan’s candidates, in 2019.

Serving as mayors, they were also portrayed as leaders mindful of their residents’ daily needs and their presence in the campaign added a fresh spirit to a somewhat outdated party leadership. Both mayors also played a major role on election night. They appeared in public together every few hours to update on the state of affairs and try to uplift voter morale. This is relevant in the Israeli context ahead of the upcoming municipal elections in October 2023.

The extent to which the pro-democracy camp is successful in creating a compelling narrative of success and victory in these elections and producing young and promising leaders will also be particularly significant ahead of the next Knesset elections, towards which new political frameworks may take shape.

Since the advent of democratic protests in Israel, in January 2023, a growing Israeli openness has developed to international partnerships, to learn from the experiences of like-minded allies in other countries and to share insights from Israel with others. This is a welcome trend generating hope that the voices emerging from Turkey’s recent elections will indeed resonate in Israel and help bring about change.

This article is from “the Jerusalem Post“, May 23th, 2023.

הפוסט What lessons can Israel learn from Turkey’s elections? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Under Chinese auspices, Iran is recovering from Western sanctions and restoring its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This process is also bringing an end to the conflict with the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who had previously enjoyed Tehran’s backing.

The Chinese have managed to exploit the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, which fractured the international coalition built under the Obama administration, in order to provide Iran with an escape from sanctions in exchange for strategic cooperation.

Russia, too, is not sitting idle and deepening its collaboration with the Ayatollah regime amid the conflict in Ukraine.

Given these regional developments, one could have expected Jerusalem would also act strategically. However, it has almost entirely abandoned the consideration of dealing with the profound regional changes in recent years and instead focused on tactics.

Fewer pacts, more operations like Shield and Arrow in Gaza. The Abraham Accords were signed nearly three years ago as an alternative plan to prevent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans to annex West Bank territories as part of Donald Trump’s so-called “Deal of the Century” and marked the last time Israel participated in regional strategic maneuvering.

Since then, the Middle East has made leaps and bounds while we’re lagging behind. Henry Kissinger’s quip from half a century ago that “Israel has no foreign policy, only a domestic policy,” rings ever truer and leads us down a diplomatic cul de sac.

Netanyahu is trapped, whether willingly or not, in a far-right government and is discovering that the cost of maintaining a messianic coalition is distancing from allied nations.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s visit to the Temple Mount led to the prime minister’s visit to the United Arab Emirates being canceled. The invitation from the White House never came, and Netanyahu realizes that as the Americans distance themselves and lose interest in him, the regional countries also lose interest in Israel.

Our greatest strength has always been serving as a bridge to the United States, and when the bridge becomes shaky, we become much less desirable or relevant.

An ancient Arabic proverb says, “movement is a blessing,” yet Israel insists on getting stuck in one place without negotiations with the Palestinians or regional dialogue. The result is more and more tactical crises, more military operations, and more assassinations that lead us nowhere. Israel has no exit strategy, not from military operations and not from the stagnant, bloody daily reality.

Unlike us, other countries in the region do move constantly. They mend frayed ties, form new alliances, and create a new reality of which Israel is not a part. This is not a predetermined fate. Israel can only be part of the region if it addresses the central issue of the Palestinian conflict (despite the Abraham Accords, which came into existence in exchange for relinquishing the dangerous fantasy of annexation).

Those who dream of peace with Saudi Arabia need to initiate a meaningful dialogue with the Palestinians. The path to Riyadh goes through Ramallah and requires restoring trust with Washington, which has been undermined not only due to the political upheaval but also because of the lack of diplomatic action and succumbing to more and more right-wing provocations such as ascent to the Temple Mount, de facto annexation steps, and coalition agreements that will lead to de jure annexation.

We need the Americans in order to re-engage in regional affairs, and we need to engage in dialogue with the Palestinians to generate hope for a solution instead of living in a perpetual cycle of violence.

This article is from “Ynet“, May 18th, 2023.

הפוסט As Middle East alliances are reshaping, Israel is lagging behind הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

How, then, does the Middle East regard the constitutional revolution in Israel? Contrary to the great interest that Israel displayed at the time in the events of the Arab Spring, the Middle East media is not showing the same interest in the “Israeli Spring.”

In general, three approaches can be identified in the Middle East media with regard to the events in Israel.

Israel’s enemies think Israel is withering and falling apart

The first, adopted mainly by Israel’s enemies, reinforces the age-old Arab conception according to which Israel would eventually wither and fall apart due to the religious and sectarian rifts dividing it. In the early days of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as Yehoshafat Harkabi wrote in his monumental study of Arab attitudes toward Israel, this theory was a leading school of thought among Muslim and Arab intellectuals.

The most prominent purveyor of this approach is Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. As early as May 2000, following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Nasrallah declared in his victory speech that despite Israel’s great military power and nuclear capability, its divided society is reminiscent of weak cobwebs. Now he has referred to the mass protests as a civil war and forecasting that Israel, at 75, will not survive to mark its 80th birthday.

Hezbollah’s media channels have all been mobilized to portray the protests as reflecting the imminent end of the Zionist entity. Having been forced to swallow the bitter pill of the 2022 Israel-Lebanon maritime agreement that supposedly weakened its status in Lebanon, Hezbollah finds in the protests an opportunity to highlight Israel’s weakness and hence to emphasize its own strength.

In Iran, too, not surprisingly, the media hopes for division and rupture among the Zionists, analyzing the most likely scenarios for the destruction of Israel. However, the Iranian media has not been overly focused on the protests, perhaps due to fears of inspiring renewed hijab protests at home.

Some are wondering what benefit the Palestinians can derive

The second approach analyzes the protests mainly through the Palestinian lens, asking what benefit, if any, the Palestinian citizens of Israel or residents of the Palestinian Authority could derive from them. For example, an op-ed in a Qatari newspaper, headlined “There is no Israeli spring in sight,” stated that most of the Israeli demonstrators had not changed their racist attitude towards the Palestinians and therefore the protests do not augur any change for them.

The Arab-Palestinian public in Israel is not a homogenous bloc in terms of its attitude toward the protests. Most recognize the dangers of the regime coup and are concerned about its consequences for themselves but nevertheless, the majority avoids participating in the protests because it does not see them as a response to its own demands, which include, among other things, repealing the Nation-State Law.

FRUSTRATED BY the political impasse and the rise to power of an extreme right-wing government, some Palestinians see the protests as a way to weaken Israel. As exiled Palestinian leader Mohammed Dahlan commented, “I hope Netanyahu succeeds in his plan to destroy the Israeli judicial system. Anyway, it’s an internal Israeli issue, so I just hope it succeeds.”

Some Palestinians view the protests as an example to be emulated in criticism of the Palestinian leadership. “I feel sad when I compare the hundreds of thousands who participate in the popular protest movement in Israel… and the complete silence in the Palestinian arena,” wrote Ziad Abu Zayyad, former Palestinian Authority minister for Jerusalem affairs and a veteran journalist.

“For over 15 years, we have lived without a parliament and without democracy, witnessing legislation carried out by unelected people, which is not subject to the principles and procedures established by law… (yet) we do not see any popular protest against the schism or demands to stop interference in the judicial system or to hold elections. We need to stop and ask ourselves what has brought us to this degree of indifference.”

Some Middle East media is ignoring the protests

The third approach adopted by Middle East media ignores the protests or reports on them laconically without resorting to assessments of their implications for the regime and Israeli society. This approach is typical of all countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel: Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Bahrain and Sudan. Saudi Arabia and Oman can also be included in this group.

The deliberate silence in these countries appears to stem from three main reasons: First, given that the process taking place in Israel is ongoing, it is too early to judge its implications. Second, regardless of the outcome of the protests, the Israeli government headed by Netanyahu will not undermine relations with Muslim countries with which it has diplomatic relations and therefore the shared interests of both sides will not change.

Third, increased reporting on the protests in Israel is liable to awaken the Arab public from the slumber imposed by all the Arab rulers who suppressed the Arab Spring protests, whether through violence or monetary incentives. Therefore, reports of pro-democracy protests do not serve these authoritarian regimes.

In conclusion, the attitude in the Middle East media to the protests in Israel largely reflects the complexity of views regarding Israel’s place and status in the region: its enemies wish for its demise, while its friends or allies prefer to remain on the fence. Paradoxically, it is mainly the Palestinians who are likely to be affected by the protests because Israel and the international community continue to ignore their plight.

Israel’s weakness at this time, as reflected in some Middle Eastern media, may be construed as a possible opportunity to escalate the Palestinian struggle, particularly on the eve of Ramadan.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from March 26, 2023.

הפוסט What are Middle East reactions to the judicial reform? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the coalition members’ plans to harden legal sanctions on Arab Israelis to the point of stripping them of their citizenship and expel them from Israel, and given the projects to extend the settlers’ presence in the occupied territories, the proposed plans are bound to raise tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel. This could set off actions of solidarity among Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Arab countries.

Meanwhile, the new coalition’s plans to expand the settlements and give them a better legal cover by exerting control over the High Court – through legislative override or change in the judges nomination process – is also bound to raise Israeli-Palestinian tensions in the West Bank.

One could rightly argue that the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and the harsh treatment of its population has gotten for a half-century did not wait for new rules to be enacted by a rightist government.

Tensions are bound to rise

But if the proposed legislation succeeds, particularly the override rule and the change in the judicial nomination process, any move would become possible as Prime Minister Netanyahu and his allies crave for total control of the West Bank. With Finance Minister and Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich in charge of civil affairs in the West Bank and with part of the powers of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, tensions are bound to raise.

These tensions may be contained for a while but for how long given Smotrich’s political aims in the West Bank, his political alliance with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, and the fact that these two men and their allies in the Knesset exert true control on the fate of Netanyahu’s government?

Then, yes, the message from the Israeli government would become clear: there is no Palestinian Authority and there will be no Palestinian state, even a demilitarized state as Palestinian leaders have agreed to as a condition for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace since the 1990s.

Given their possible consequences on the ground, on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and in the West Bank, the proposed rules are bound to provoke a deterioration of the relations between Israel and the Arab countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations – no fewer than six.

STOPPING THE projects of the annexation of the West Bank by the previous Netanyahu government was already a condition that made the Abraham Accords possible. The plans of the present Israeli coalition to expand settlements won’t benefit Israeli-Arab relations when progress is expected in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

This point is not only a diplomatic issue, it touches the very fabric of Arab public opinion. Normalization won’t be fully accepted if there is no progress and there is indeed a deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The moment is for building on the assets that the Abraham Accords represent for regional cooperation and peace. The present Israeli government needs to show political and diplomatic maturity. The Middle East has changed positively since the Camp David, Oslo and Abraham Accords, except for a majority of the Palestinian people.

It is time an Israeli and Arab leadership emerges that understands these issues and breaks with the politics of conflict and arrogance. The business communities are here and the civil societies, too, and the potential for shared initiatives and prosperity is real.

It may be that today the unlocking of this situation sits on the shoulders of one man: Netanyahu. The possibility that he does not go to court and avoids prison is completely linked to the fate that his governing coalition is preparing for the Israeli High Court. But by changing the legal rules and particularly by putting the override rule into law, Netanyahu might sacrifice the stability of this country and its relations with its neighbors for his singular benefit.

No one knows better than Netanyahu and the members of Knesset what is better for peace and their country, and their regional and international standing. If the United States and the United Kingdom have already expressed strong reservations about dealing with the present Israeli government and certainly with some of its members, what could be the position of Cairo, Amman, Abu Dhabi, Manama or Rabat?

The present legal issues before the Knesset and Israeli public opinion may be a matter of domestic politics but the way they are handled through votes in the Knesset, civil disobedience, the resignation of opposition MKs or an amnesty law will deeply affect the fate of Israeli-Palestinian relations, which are already at a very low point, and the status of Israeli Arabs, which, in fact, has been improving amid firm and continuous efforts after decades of stagnation.

Jamal Amiar is a Moroccan journalist and writer and a guest contributor to Mitvim Institute for Regional Policies.

The article was published in The Jerusalem Post on March 16.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian relations are deeply affected הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Prime Minister Netanyahu devoted a significant part of the interview he gave on December 15 to Al-Arabiya, a Saudi television network, to explain that his main course of action will be to promote a move along the lines of the Abraham Accords, with Saudi Arabia.

He emphasized that an agreement of this kind will strengthen the firm regional stance against Iran, contribute to stability in the region, and even help advance a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It should be noted that this interview was done as part of an attempt on Netanyahu’s part – including in interviews he gave to American media – to calm regional and international public opinion about the composition of his new government. It is doubtful whether those efforts were successful, but the main and most interesting question is; can it be expected that such an ambitious move will actually take off?

Truth be told, the Abraham Accords, (it is likely that the UAE and Bahrain received a “green light” from Riyadh to sign) as well as additional steps on the part of Saudi Arabia (for example, giving permission to Israeli planes to fly over its airspace), will illustrate the changes that have taken place in the region in the last decade.

The main changes were: the consolidation of the perception of the Iranian threat toward the Gulf countries; a decrease of the Palestinian issue in the order of priorities among the countries of the region; and the feeling (whether accurate or more a perception) of erosion of the degree of American commitment to stand by its allies in the region.

It should be noted that a public opinion poll conducted in Saudi Arabia in November, published by the Washington Institute last month, brought up some very interesting findings. The survey included 1,000 respondents, who were all interviewed personally.

In relation to the US, for the first time in a decade, it was relegated to the third most important country for Saudi Arabia. Of the respondents, 57% rated relations with China as “important,” 53% thought the same about relations with Russia, and only 41% preferred to have a relationship with the US. At the same time, 73% of respondents defined the war in Ukraine as “having a negative effect on the region.”

The findings regarding Israel are no less interesting. 43% of respondents support ongoing contact with Israel (no details were given regarding this, but in recent times Saudi Arabia has hosted a senior banking conference with the participation of an Israeli representative, as well as hosting an Israeli team in an international sports event).

On the other hand, only 21% of the respondents believed that the Abraham Accords had a positive impact on the region. Furthermore, 90% of the respondents believed that the results of the elections in Israel would cause “negative results in the region.”

NATURALLY, PUBLIC opinion polls of this kind should be viewed very carefully, especially in a country like Saudi Arabia. Still, they do have the potential to give a sense of the general way of thinking on these matters. It should also be taken into account that the research institute in question is considered close to Israel.

It should be emphasized that Netanyahu highlighted in his interview with the Saudi television channel that he will work to strengthen US relations with its allies in the region. He also implied that he will take it upon himself, in one way or another, to work with the White House on relations with Saudi Arabia. It is no secret that the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia has not been at its best in recent years, despite efforts by President Biden to restore it.

Either way, the questions which remain regarding the prospects for improving the relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia are clear and understandable. From Netanyahu’s point of view, there is a great deal of logic in trying to promote this historic move, and to prove that it is possible to reverse the commonly held belief, that Israeli-Arab normalization can only be achieved in relation to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The Abraham Accords proved that this is possible, and an Israeli-Saudi agreement will provide the ultimate guarantee for this.

However, questions are focused, of course, on Saudi Arabia:

Will such a move indeed be perceived in Riyadh as serving Saudi interests?

Is there anything in it, in their view, to strengthen their position and deter the growing Iranian challenge?

Does Netanyahu have the ability to deliver to the Democratic American administration, as their relationship is not great to say the least?

And does Saudi Arabia feel that it has the ability to bypass the Palestinian issue once again, without harming its regional position, and especially stability in the internal arena?

Indeed, there are many questions, to which it is clear that there are no reliable answers, certainly not at this stage. By the way, Netanyahu was asked several times during the interview with Al-Arabiya, whether Israel would act against Iran, even without American backing or consent. He failed to provide an explicit answer, as expected, but mentioned the operation that brought the Iranian nuclear archive to Israel. The same was asked in relation to the Arab (Saudi) peace initiative, and not surprisingly, a clear answer was avoided.

It is worth mentioning in this context that in the past, during Netanyahu’s previous government, speculation abounded concerning Israel’s willingness to give a bigger role to Riyadh in Jerusalem and the Holy Sites. However, these questions during the interview illustrate the issues that both interest and trouble the Saudis.

FROM NETANYAHU’S point of view, there is solid logic in marking this as the main course of action in the “political plan” he is outlining for his new government. It can also be assumed that he sees Ron Dermer, who was a central figure around the Abraham Accords, albeit with the Trump administration, as an essential factor in this context.

Still, it is not clear how it will work, if at all, with a Democratic administration in the White House and especially after the damage Netanyahu’s previous government caused to Israeli-US relations.

As for Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, he would prefer to wait and see which policies the new government in Israel will implement, especially when taking in consideration its unprecedented character. It remains to be seen how the Palestinian arena will react, especially when Mahmoud Abbas’s PA is in crisis.

Moreover, King Abdullah of Jordan’s interview just a few days ago in which he emphasized his kingdom’s role in the Holy places in Jerusalem, indicates how sensitive and acute the issue of Jerusalem is, not only for Israel, but also for the Arab world as a whole, not least because of the Saudi ambitions for a central role there.

Ben-Gvir’s visit to the Temple Mount on Tuesday only serves to increase tensions.

This article is from “JPost“, from Janurary 8, 2023

הפוסט Is a formal Israeli-Saudi agreement achievable? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These assumptions were momentarily suspended when Israel and Lebanon finalized a maritime boundary agreement after 12 years of sporadic and interrupted efforts. With Washington’s mediation, the parties reached terms that would allow them both to exploit the sea’s riches and encourage foreign investment. For two states who share a long history of violence, grievance, and distrust, it was a significant achievement.

Could Israel and Lebanon’s willingness to compromise set in motion a domino effect that unlocks the region’s stranded hydrocarbons? And could this happen quickly enough to help Europe deal with its current energy problems? Israel and Lebanon are hardly the region’s only quarreling parties. Greece and Turkey have a decades-long, multifaceted maritime dispute, and the Cyprus conflict has a maritime dimension as well. 

The combination of incentives, timing, and effective mediation that worked for Israel and Lebanon will be hard to replicate. Yet their path to compromise, particularly the decision to shift away from international legal arguments in favor of addressing core national interests, successfully demonstrated how other Eastern Mediterranean actors could find creative solutions to their own disputes. 

Path to Compromise

A confluence of events created uniquely conducive circumstances for Lebanon and Israel to reach an agreement. Economic conditions in Lebanon, exacerbated by the tragic 2020 blast in Beirut, compelled the Lebanese government and Hizballah to temporarily set aside their ideological opposition to Israel for the sake of brokering a deal that could potentially unlock valuable gas deposits and avoid open conflict. But this was not the only geopolitical development that made the agreement possible. The signing of the Abraham Accords also encouraged indirect talks, weakening Arab opposition to engagement with Israel. And the West’s commitment to finding alternative oil and gas supplies for Europe further convinced the Biden administration to continue mediating between the two sides. The timing of domestic political developments was also fortuitous. Due to pending elections in Israel, Lebanon, and the United States, each of the negotiating parties, as well as the mediating party, hoped that a deal would help their standing at the ballot box.

Crucially, this confluence of events over the last 18 months led negotiators to shift from international legal arguments toward addressing Israel’s and Lebanon’s core interests. For Israel, this meant emphasizing national security concerns such as stabilizing the Lebanese economy, establishing a deconfliction mechanism along its northern maritime boundary, enabling the safe development of the Karish gas field, and achieving de facto Lebanese recognition of the buoy line Israel installed after its 2006 war with Hizballah. For Lebanon, this meant overlooking its boycott of Israel in order to convince international oil and gas companies to explore and develop its waters. Indeed, even the potential of future development could be enough for Lebanon to improve its position with the International Monetary Fund and enable it to court investments from other countries. This shift managed to break the deadlock that had muddied past mediation efforts.

The decision by Israel and Lebanon to shift away from focusing on international maritime law is very much in the spirit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was established as a guideline rather than a strict rulebook for delimitation agreements. The past decade saw a variety of potential maps with multiple, competing boundary lines representing each country’s rival legal arguments. Tellingly, the current agreement doesn’t include a map that domestic political opponents could challenge. This reflects the underlying reality that the benefits of an agreement outweigh the technical merits of any specific set of claims. 

Finally, the agreement reinforces the argument that an informed and invested mediator may be more effective at producing a breakthrough in certain negotiations than a neutral one. Historically, Israel has always relied on the United States to mediate between itself and its regional neighbors, in large part because Washington was the only party who could offer security guarantees in exchange for Israeli concessions. Lebanese negotiators — due to a combination of their own concerns about American neutrality as well as Hizballah’s combative stance — were often reluctant to rely on U.S. mediation. But in this case, they begrudgingly acknowledged that Washington was the party most likely to deliver an agreement. 

Still, the United States didn’t accomplish this alone. Supporting actors like France and Qatar encouraged the parties to reach the finish line. The United Nations, an observer during the mediation process, also played an important technical role that enabled the parties to meet on several occasions along the Israel-Lebanon border. Finally, energy companies Energean and Total demonstrated creativity and flexibility while advocating for pragmatism. 

And this collective effort may have still come up short if it wasn’t for the singular persona of U.S. special envoy Amos Hochstein. Not only did Hochstein possess an intimate familiarity with the energy industry, the Israeli and Lebanese actors, and President Biden himself, but he also benefited from having previously tried and failed to bridge the gaps between the parties during his time in the Obama administration. The combination of experience, access, and personal investment enabled Hochstein to cut through the noise where others fell short and push the parties towards an accord. Simply put: Hochstein was much more than a messenger from the White House.

Replicating Results

Can these conditions be replicated elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean? Early signs suggest that the international buzz surrounding the Israel-Lebanon agreement has encouraged more regional actors to thaw their own frozen negotiations. Lebanon and Syria reportedly attempted (but failed) to restart negotiations on their own maritime boundary dispute. According to various outlets, Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority are also trying to advance talks on developing the long-ignored Gaza Marine field. More realistically, Israel and Cyprus have promised to put their outstanding issues over the Aphrodite-Yishai field to bed.

Each of these disputes has its own unique complexities, yet they pale in comparison to the Eastern Mediterranean’s true Gordian knot: the ongoing and often interconnected maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey and the divided island of Cyprus. Agreements on these issues would not only reduce the probability of regional conflict, but could potentially open the door to previously dismissed partnerships in the field of energy and beyond. The circumstances may be considerably less conducive here, but there are still useful lessons to be drawn. 

First, it was the prospect of exploiting offshore gas reserves that helped Lebanon and Israel see a settlement as being win-win. In the case of Greece and Turkey, their maritime dispute doesn’t promise an immediate economic bounty, thus eliminating the most obvious potential incentive for settlement. And while offshore hydrocarbons have been discovered in Cyprus’ waters, the stakes are also considerably higher, specifically as they relate to the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. 

The timing of domestic elections helped push Israel and Lebanon over the finish line. However, the elections being held in Cyprus in February 2023, Greece in July 2023, and Turkey in June 2023 are likely to have the opposite effect. With the economic benefits less imminent and the issues of sovereignty more prominent, elections will make it harder for decision-makers in Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara to compromise

Turkey’s approach will prove particularly pivotal. Like Lebanon, regional energy initiatives have left it on the outside looking in. Over the last decade it has frequently forced itself into Eastern Mediterranean energy politics, often by trying to change the legal or security realities at sea. The question is whether the lessons from the Israel-Lebanon agreement will embolden a more muscular or more compromising line from Ankara. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an October 27 press release welcoming the Israel-Lebanon agreement and stated that “this model, which reflects similar practices around the world, sets a good example for the region and in particular for Turkish and Greek Cypriots.” This might suggest a more moderate tack. But Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiadis countered by noting that Turkey has rejected past mediation efforts and declined to submit claims for international arbitration. 

It is naive to expect overnight results. Israel and Lebanon negotiated for a decade, suffering multiple setbacks before making a breakthrough. By comparison, many of the region’s other maritime disputes are further behind in the process. To make matters more complicated, Europe plans to have shifted considerably to renewables by decade’s end. On the positive side though, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus don’t have to deal with interference from a non-state actor like Hizballah.  

The Israel-Lebanon agreement suggests that the right balance of timing, compatible interests, and an invested mediator can yield a breakthrough. Resolving maritime disputes is not only about extracting resources, but also about removing sources of conflict and gradually developing trust between aggrieved parties. Even if the hydrocarbon age is slowly coming to an end, there are multiple reasons why the United States, Europe, and Eastern Mediterranean states should pursue similar types of maritime agreements in the months and years to come. The blueprint provided by Israel and Lebanon is as good a starting point as it gets.

This article is from “War on the Rocks“, from November 11, 2022

הפוסט Is the Israeli-Lebanese maritime boundary agreement replicable? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the expected steps for the day after, mainly to avoid a crisis of expectations on both sides of the border.

For Lebanon

In the immediate time frame, it should be expected that the agreement will make it possible to complete the gas supply, which has been discussed in recent months, from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon. As remembered, this step was not completed since Washington did not give adequate guarantees to the parties concerned (Egypt and Jordan) that the agreement does not violate the existing sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria. Presumably, the U.S. delay in providing the appropriate guarantees served also as a means of pressuring Lebanon to complete the agreement with Israel. Although the deal will not solve Lebanon’s energy problems, it will alleviate the severe current crisis in the country concerning electricity supply.

The agreement with Israel sends a positive message for Lebanon but does not provide an immediate answer to its economic woes. It remains to be seen how the Lebanese government will handle with the IMF and the World Bank’s demands for reforms before approving vital loans to Lebanon. Significant reforms will oblige the ruling elite to take political-economic measures, which it can be assumed is not enthusiastic about doing so. The public should play a central role in Lebanon and the international community concerning the required reforms in the face of a corrupt and unpopular ruling elite.

In the near-medium term, Lebanon will seek to take advantage of the agreement to join the energy market. The French energy company TOTAL committed to start drilling in the Qana field immediately. It is essential to mention the other partnerships in this field: the Italian company ENI and the Lebanese government. The latter regained the share held by the Russian company NOVOTEK (estimated at 20 percent). According to various reports, the Qatari gas company is interested in entering the Lebanese market and acquiring this share (as well as some more percentages from the French and Italian companies).

It is extremely important to align expectations in these initial stages, on the part of the Lebanese government (and the French company). After all, it is a potential for gas and oil, but it must be found.

It can be assumed that following the agreement with Israel, Lebanon will seek to speed up energy activities in all its economic waters. Lebanon has completed the first round of tenders, but this has so far yielded only one drilling, which has not produced any proven resources. It is to be expected that Lebanon will seek to promote the second round of tenders, which has been postponed several times, and build on the positive atmosphere that the agreement with Israel projects. Either way, it is a long process, albeit one with more promising potential, given a more stable political climate.

For Israel

Israel is in a completely different situation. It has already harnessed the gas discoveries in its economic waters for significant political-strategic gains and at the economic-energy level. The agreement will remove the question marks hanging over the Karish field’s development – not concerning its being in Israel’s economic waters – but in removing a volatile potential of instability or escalation.

The question of the reserves that will be found in the Lebanese Qana gas field (which is shared by both countries) depends, as mentioned, on the drilling that will be carried out by the French company. Although future revenues for Israel should not be underestimated, this is not a significant economic element that will change the national situation from Israel’s point of view. Its political importance, which concerns the manner of implementation of the agreement with Lebanon, increases immeasurably.

An interesting and vital angle concerns the Israeli-Cypriot dispute over the joint Aphrodite-Yishai gas field. The failure of the two countries to reach an agreed mechanism still stands and more emphasized considering the Israeli – Lebanese agreement. This is a highly relevant point, precisely in view of the growing attractiveness of the East Med for Europe (following the war in Ukraine), and the regional dynamic following the Israeli – Lebanese agreement.

For the Regional Geopolitics

The agreement between Israel and Lebanon projects a regional calming, due to the potential for escalation that lay in the failure of the American mediation. The potential for Lebanon to join the regional energy system is complex and will take time. Lebanon will have to make difficult decisions in the face of the impressive regional array that was built in recent years thanks to the energy discoveries. There still stands an open invitation for it to join the regional gas forum (EMGF), but Israel’s membership is obviously a serious challenge. The first step could be to join as an observer. In any case, it is likely, or hopefully, that positive results of the expected drilling in its economic waters will force Lebanon to follow a constructive and beneficial path. It’s anticipated that Lebanon will move on to conclude agreements on its maritime borders with Syria. It should be expected that Syria will not adopt a speedy policy, partly (or mainly) to the Russian angle. The Lebanese – Cypriot agreement that Lebanon hasn’t ratified will need further discussion. It remains to be seen how the “new commers” will take a (positive) advantage from the proven regional potential of the last decade.

For the International Arena

The importance of the Israeli – Lebanese agreement for the international arena, and the U.S., in particular, relates to two key aspects: neutralizing a potential for escalation in the region; and a positive message regarding the formation of a Western energy front against Russia, even if the prospects for energy implementation look quite a few years ahead. The trilateral MOU between Israel, Egypt, and the European Union, signed last June in Cairo, illustrated the attractiveness of the Eastern Mediterranean for Europe. The Lebanese – Israeli agreement fits well into this.

Conclusion

It would be fair, even realistic, to exercise great caution concerning the positive potential arising from the agreement. Its main test lies in its implementation and the way the two parties, as well the U.S., which bears a responsibility that should not be overstated, will deal with difficulties that will obviously arise.

At the same time, both sides’ hard decisions are not self-evident. This is especially evident in the Lebanese arena, with so many players who have generally proven that they cannot overcome their different interests and needed an unprecedented political-economic crisis to bridge the gaps between them.

Similarly, Israel recognized this window of opportunity and made complex decisions, in difficult political circumstances (pre-elections), which produced restlessness in the domestic arena. The preference for the diplomatic path, and the recognition of the extraordinary meeting of interests with Lebanon, provide Israel with many meritorious points.

The United States has again demonstrated its great vitality in the region, precisely at a time when it is perceived as reducing attention to the region.

By the time it will be clearer if this agreement was a game changer in a complicated and challenging region, and what lessons could be taken for other players in the region.

The op-ed was published in November 2022 in the Transatlantic Policy Quarterly.

הפוסט The Israeli – Lebanese Agreement: The Day After הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the current agreement does not herald an immediate rescue and salvation for Lebanon in the short term—given that developing the Qana field, erecting the infrastructure, and drilling and producing the gas is a long-term process—it remains a clear win for the country, having diminished the threat of war hanging in the air for several months. In the event of an actual outbreak of war, it is unlikely that Lebanon would have survived, given the ongoing economic crisis, shaky security situation, and political impasse. This fact, most probably, was also acknowledged by Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, which neither wants nor is capable of replacing the little that remained of the Lebanese state and being blamed for another devastating war.

The maritime border agreement instils some stability in the Lebanese system, removes the prospect of war (at least for the short term), and introduces the ability to profit from gas sales, thus, providing a light at the end of a very dark tunnel for the country. Similarly, Israel, which experiences chronic political instability and watches with concern the wave of violence developing in the West Bank and the weakening of the Palestinian Authority (PA), will be spared from worrying about an immediate escalation at the northern frontier.

Although the agreement with Lebanon does not guarantee long-term stability and does not necessarily reduce the chance of a war between Israel and Hezbollah in the future, Israel can now develop the Karish gas field without the threat of an attack by Lebanese drones and, instead, can focus on stabilizing the situation in the West Bank. The deal is unlikely to be canceled, despite the promises of the head of the opposition Benjamin Netanyahu, due to both the substantial security dangers and the fear of fatally damaging relations with the US.

America’s pivotal role

If things go as planned, Lebanese gas flowing to Europe will decrease the continent’s dependence on Russian gas. Furthermore, America’s successfully-brokered deal will translate into more regional confidence in the US’s role and influence in the region.

After President Joe Biden’s visit to the region in July, the Palestinians and their supporters in the US claimed the administration was slow in promoting a peace agreement between the sides.  Understandably, the Palestinian side is waiting for more determined steps from the American administration. Yet, at present, while Israel is heading once again into elections and the PA is critically weak, political negotiations and a political agreement are no more possible than a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon. But perhaps while a grand deal is not possible, smaller-scale stabilizing agreements in security and the economy can still be achieved.

Agreements of this type require no less effort and dedication than peace agreements. The US succeeded despite the many obstacles and dead ends due to its negotiation skills, patience, and ability to connect this deal to other agreements, such as the gas agreement with Egypt, which will allow the flow of gas from Egypt to Lebanon via Syria (despite the sanctions on the Bashar al-Assad regime).

A regional conflict-solving model?

The maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel may also give impetus to other positive developments, such as the thawing of the development of the Gaza Marine gas field off the coast of the Gaza Strip. Egypt has already announced its willingness to act towards the achievement of this goal, and it is very appropriate that the US be involved in the entire process to give it additional heft.

The Israel-Lebanon maritime agreement sends an important message to the region: even in impossible situations, complete stagnation on the political level, and a rising military threat, dedicated and focused mediation can bring about desired results. On October 27, the day the agreement was signed, Prime Minister Yair Lapid described it as “historic.” Without sounding too dramatic, there is some truth in this.

It is possible that, in the chaotic reality of a volatile Middle East, where multiple actors with contradicting agendas shape politics, this problem-solving model might prove to be the most approachable and realistic—at least for the time being. Therefore, it is even more important that the Israeli-Lebanese deal be crowned a success and not become another broken promise that will be exploited by each side to harden positions next time.

The hard work must go on

Despite the obvious sense of relief among all those who supported the agreement in Israel, the US, and Lebanon—Elias Bou Saab, a deputy parliament speaker, was rewarded with a medal by  President Aoun for his efforts in achieving the deal—there is no doubt that the success of the agreement will be measured solely by its performance in the future. If the wave of violence in the West Bank continues and expands, it may cause the Palestinian organizations working closely with Hezbollah to join the infighting with Israel. Although the maritime border agreement does not prevent new conflict between the parties or the manifestations of violence, its credibility and the success of other agreements will be severely damaged, as well as the ability to implement its terms and start gas drilling in the Kana field.

In the future, if gas is indeed discovered and the profits begin to flow to Israel, the US will have to establish a careful and meticulous mechanism to ensure that the money does not reach Hezbollah or Iran. American mediation and monitoring should continue even after the signing of the agreement. This is important for the two signatory parties and the US, since failure of the maritime agreement might also harm its credibility and influence in the region.

The foot must definitely not be taken off the gas pedal: it’s time to prepare for spoilers and to consider implementing this experience in other parts of the Middle East.

The op-ed was published in October 2022 in the Atlantic Council.

הפוסט The Israel-Lebanon maritime deal is an example of successful US-led mediation. Can it be copy-pasted to other Middle Eastern arenas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the deep crisis in Lebanon, which has been unable to establish a new government following the Beirut Port explosion, the relevant players, including Hezbollah, have now realized that talks must be renewed and an intensive effort must be made to reach agreements. This would convey a vital and positive message given Lebanon’s collapsing economy, although clearly it would take quite a few years before Lebanon could reap the benefits of maritime gas reserves in the currently contested area. For now, the coronavirus and its impact on the global energy market have put a dent in gas-exploration investment in the region.

The main obstacle to an Israeli-Lebanese agreement has almost always stemmed from Lebanon’s complex political arena with its multiplicity of domestic and foreign players. However, the Lebanese now understand that resolving the dispute with Israel is vital to tapping the energy potential of their economic waters, allowing international energy companies to proceed with gas-exploration plans, specifically in the area known as Block 9 adjacent to the contested waters.

Given Lebanon’s current severe crises, conditions are ripe to achieve agreement. The September 2020 signing of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) charter likely also made it clear to Lebanon – which is not a forum member – how far behind it is compared to the other states of the region, intensifying its desire to move ahead. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a figure acceptable to all sides, especially Hezbollah, is leading the negotiating process for Lebanon.

The Americans have in the past presented the sides with an informal proposal for resolution of the maritime dispute, which Israel agreed to accept, but to which Lebanon did not respond. According to various reports at the time, the proposal favored the Lebanese side in suggesting that more than 50% of the disputed area be recognized as belonging to Lebanon. The importance of an agreement for Israel, even if it means even greater concessions in the upcoming negotiations, would be to defuse an explosive issue in relations with its northern neighbor. It would convey a positive message to its partners in the Mediterranean Basin, although Lebanon is not expected to join the EMGF immediately even if agreement with Israel is reached.

Despit reports of imminent negotiations, it is too early to pop open the champagne. Negotiations by their very nature are rarely straightforward, even if the current circumstances appear promising. What is more, Lebanon is crippled by its fragmentation and abundant and harmful foreign influences. Nonetheless, the proactive US mediation and involvement of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are encouraging. The timing of the negotiations, on the eve of US presidential elections, would also be advantageous to the Trump administration, especially if significant progress is achieved in the coming month. Lebanon had consistently demanded UN involvement in the mediation, while Israel only wanted American involvement. The eventual decision to hold the talks at UN headquarters in Naquora, Lebanon, appears satisfactory to both sides.

It is essential to keep in mind at this point that the negotiations relate only to the maritime border, nothing else. Neither side intends to discuss land border disputes or additional issues. Nor are these talks linked to Israel’s recently signed agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and obviously not to an Israel-Lebanon peace accord. Israel would do well to avoid referring to such prospects that would only complicate matters for the Lebanese players and intensify domestic and external pressures to avoid agreement with the “Zionist entity.”

These developments are not directly related to the growing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Lebanon and Israel have always wanted to resolve the maritime border issue. Nonetheless, progress on the Israel-Lebanon front would likely have a positive effect on the climate in the region and could help efforts to ease Greek-Turkish tensions. Turkey is presumably closely monitoring these “winds of reconciliation,” given its growing involvement in Lebanon in recent years, and examining the possible implications for its interests.

Thus, while discussion of peace is not on the agenda, a successful conclusion of the Israel-Lebanon negotiations is important. To that end, Israel would be wise to focus on professional energy discussions with Lebanon, in which agreement seems feasible, and avoid imbuing the talks with broader diplomatic dimensions as some political elements might be interested in doing.

The op-ed was published in October 2022 in JPost.

הפוסט Israel-Lebanon negotiations: cautious optimism but no bells of peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The main challenge concerning a provisional government taking steps of this magnitude regards Israel’s fundamental definition as a parliamentary democracy. Israel’s government serves by virtue of the trust granted to it by a majority in the Knesset. Clearly, transitional governments which do not have a Knesset majority do not enjoy this legitimation of their power.

That is a point that opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has been trying to hammer home, in the context of his wider campaign against interim Prime Minister Yair Lapid before the November 1st elections. There is no doubt that both politicians are trying to maximize profits from their bases on the Lebanon border issue and to present the other party’s position as illegitimate.

As it stands, the maritime border deal helps Lapid to establish a public image as the confident prime minister who doesn’t shy away from confronting hard decisions for the sake of unprecedented gains – for example, Lebanon’s de facto recognition of Israel’s existence. Netanyahu, in response, frames Lapid’s negotiating tactics as a treacherous selling out to Hezbollah.

Even if it is crystal clear that Lapid is trying to leverage the emerging agreement with Lebanon to shore up his stature among the electorate, that does not undermine the contention that this negotiation is vital to Israel’s national interest. But Lapid must provide prove its necessity during this sensitive period, a month prior to the elections, both by public diplomacy, by cabinet ratification and by government legal advice.

Can a caretaker PM conduct international negotiations?

This article is from “Haaretz“, from October 9, 2022

הפוסט Does Israel’s Prime Minister Have the Right to Strike a Deal With Lebanon? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the one hand, it adheres to its policy of rejecting any agreement with Iran, on the other, it faces the growing realization that no real alternatives exist to an agreement that would halt Iran’s nuclear race. In the meantime, the futility of military measures to stop Iran’s rush to nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly clear. Lacking new ideas, and consistently harping on the same policy messages formulated a decade ago, Israel’s bargaining position and its ability to influence the state of play have been deeply eroded.

Why name it after Menachem Begin?

The current crisis challenges the fundamental principles of Israel’s nuclear proliferation policy, named after prime minister Menachem Begin’s decision to attack Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981. The so-called “Begin Doctrine” has since served as the guiding Israeli principle dictating the use of “all means necessary” to prevent its enemies from acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine mostly focused on two principles: independent Israeli action in the face of such threats, and kinetic military action as the main method to upend development efforts, even at the cost of possible military escalation.

Since the attack in Iraq, the concept has undergone some adjustments in accordance with changing reality. For example, political and operational US-Israel coordination has increased, but the doctrine’s principles are unchanged. Its credibility was further enhanced by the success of the 2007 operation “Out of the Box,” an Israeli airstrike that nipped in the bud a Syrian-North Korean effort to develop nuclear weapons.

The Begin Doctrine also underpins Israel’s policy on the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed, the political component – support for maximum international pressure and opposition to contractual solutions with Iran – is an essential component of Israeli policy. However, the policy also entails kinetic activity – intensive use of a variety of military means to physically halt the Iranian project. This is a large-scale and creative effort, one of the most extensive in the history of Israel’s national security, to identify vulnerabilities and develop operational capabilities to damage the infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear project.

The effort has yielded a decade of operational successes using an array of tools, according to foreign reports, from the introduction of the Stuxnet malware into Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities in 2011, through a series of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, to the sabotage of the enrichment facility in Natanz last year. These successful operations have created the illusion that the campaign to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions would be a rehash of Israel’s success in quashing the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear bids. Here, too, the Jewish (and American) brain, along with several hundred kilograms of high explosives, would put an end to Iran’s military nuclear fantasies.

However, although Israel has won many battles, it has lost this war. While its varied and imaginative operations delayed Iran’s progress, they did not change its direction. Iran is currently approaching the status of a “nuclear threshold state”; its ability to break through to nuclear weapons depends to a large extent on its leaders’ decisions alone, not on developing additional capabilities.

Should Iran choose to leap forward and enrich enough uranium for a bomb, it can do so at its leisure. Should it choose to hang back, it can seek to take advantage of its proximity to nuclear capability in order to enhance its geopolitical standing. In either case, the tangible Iranian experience of recent years – enriching uranium to high levels of 60% – has moved them through a conceptual point of no return, a point that the emerging agreement will no longer be able to turn around.

Advanced centrifuges can be shattered, and enriched uranium can be shipped for storage to a third country, but how do you obliterate the knowledge the Iranians have accumulated in high-level enrichment? How do you reverse the expertise gained in the construction of upgraded centrifuges?

The failure to halt Iran’s nuclear program has exposed the fundamental weakness of the Begin Doctrine – it is effective primarily in degrading enemy capabilities, not in changing conditions or motivations. When the doctrine meets a national-strategic effort of a powerful state, the most it can do is postpone the inevitable conclusion. A hint of this was clearly discernible in the Iraqi reactor attack: the facility’s destruction did not prevent Saddam Hussein from nearing nuclear capability less than a decade later, on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The current crisis point ostensibly presents Israel with a prime opportunity to reexamine its strategy against nuclear proliferation. However, criticism of existing policy on the Iranian nuclear project and discussion of shifting realities and their future implications are strictly limited at the political level.

Across the political spectrum, few are willing to admit the fundamental flaw of the Israeli perception and its failure, let alone, to offer alternatives. The people of Zion are not overly fond of prophets of doom, and the electoral price of such outspokenness is too high. Far more convenient to continue talking about military options (knowing they do not exist) and the tightening of sanctions (which do not achieve their ultimate goal).

And so, almost 50 years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli system is once again in cognitive dissonance, crippled by a political, professional and mental inability to challenge a concept that has taken root over four decades. How can we explain to the public and to ourselves why we have invested so much money and political capital and endangered human lives, in promoting a failed policy? It is easier to stick to the existing concept, introducing tactical improvements to current policy, rather than change the line of thinking outright.

What Israel needs now is nothing short of a conceptual overhaul of the fundamental assumptions underpinning its policy on the Iranian threat. It needs a new and different strategic forum that will pose new questions we must ask even if we do not wish to do so.

Topping the list is the most difficult question of all – what happens on the day after Iran achieves the nuclear threshold level? Along with last-minute attempts to scuttle this stage, we are required to ask what changes Israel should make to its strategic policy in case of Iranian nuclearization. A political-strategic discussion on Israel’s political moves in this grim but not impossible reality is imperative at this point. This does not, of course, mean that Israel should cease its attempts to block Iran from completing its advance toward an operational nuclear facility.

However, confronting the question of the day after is also essential for Israel in order to plan its actions on this day; the matter must be addressed despite the mental difficulty it provokes. Challenging assumptions requires discussing questions to which we think we already know the answers. Central among them is the question of whether Iran is one rigid and monolithic whole, or whether there are shades and differing interests among its influential actors.

An essential part of the discussion should be reserved to practical steps. It should examine the potential to incorporate international and regional systems as partners in a coordinated political campaign against shared Iranian threats. First, Israel’s strategic relationships with its strategic partners should be reexamined, with an emphasis on rethinking the concept of a strategic alliance between Israel and the US, as well as significantly upgrading the relationship with NATO. Second, the discussion must address the most significant development since the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement – the normalization agreements and the new potential for building a system of strategic security partnerships with countries in the region, whether above or below the surface.

Israel has already begun this discussion, mainly in the field of air defense, but there is still great untapped potential for expansion. In this context, a joint strategy is vital for outlining possible scenarios, such as an increase in Iran’s regional military activity or the threat of a regional arms race.

Establishing a new strategic discussion forum necessitates diversifying the circle of participants and injecting new and different knowledge into the mix. Shaping new concepts and thinking about Iran requires a different circle of experts that combines existing expertise with new voices and disciplines. Regional and international diplomatic expertise, as well as deep and multilayered knowledge of Iran’s society, economy and culture are essential components. Civil society should have a central place in the debate as a repository of thinking not limited by political or bureaucratic constraints.

The challenge facing Israel in rethinking and adapting its Iran policy to the new reality is one of the most complexes it has ever faced. The nation that demonstrated creativity in penetrating dozens of meters below ground into the centrifuge facilities at Natanz will now be required to demonstrate similar creativity in the political and conceptual spheres. The starting point is to admit to ourselves that the existing conception, the Begin Doctrine, is no longer relevant.

This article is from “JPost“, from October 2, 2022

הפוסט Is it time for a new approach to deal with the Iranian threat? – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Today, the gloves are finally off. For lack of other options, Russia is opening to Iran and is preparing to establish a new alliance of pariah states with the Islamic Republic—to the detriment of Jerusalem. This turn in Russian strategy poses a grave new challenge not only to Israel, but the United States.

The sum of all fears

It is still unclear whether, during a July 19 trip to Tehran, President Putin succeeded in securing a deal with the Iranian leadership to purchase Iranian weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In Tehran, Putin met with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as well as with President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan—the guarantors of the Astana process, launched in Kazakhstan’s capital in 2018 in order to promote a peaceful solution for Syria, which will take into consideration the interests of Russia, Iran, and Turkey.

Before his visit, Western sources leaked details about Russian interest in Iranian-made drones, such as the Ababil and Mohajer models, and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan briefed reporters about US intelligence that such a deal was under consideration. The Iranian government denied that the deal was discussed during the summit in Tehran and Russian leadership has so far remained silent. If consummated, the acquisition of Iranian-made UAVs by Moscow would spell bad news for Ukraine, as it would pose a new threat to the Ukrainian defense. But military experts in Israel also fear potential consequences in the Middle East.

In recent years, Israel has reportedly conducted hundreds of air strikes in Syria, targeting Iranian military equipment and installations. Sources in Israel’s defense establishment told me that Iranian UAVs present a genuine and increasing threat to Israel. In March, two Iranian drones intended to explode in Israel were shot down over Iraq by American fighter jets. Meanwhile, on July 7, Lebanese militant group Hezbollah attempted to target Israel’s Karish gas facility in the Mediterranean Sea with drones, which were downed by the Israel Air Force. Now, Moscow’s acquisition of Iranian drones might also enhance Russia’s ability to project power in the Middle East, sources in Israel’s defense sector believe.

Yet, while the Iranian-Russian drone deal has been widely covered, another important, less-discussed aspect to military cooperation between the two counties is Russian weapon sales to Iran. For the last two decades, Israel’s leadership has invested considerable political capital into building relations with Moscow.

Among the chief goals of this effort was to thwart the strategic sale of Russian weapons to Iran. The United Nations arms embargo on Iran expired in 2020 and, since then, it is rumored that Iran intends to resume its arms trade with Russia—both as an exporter and importer. This issue has been a consistent concern to Israel since the 1990s. It was raised with Putin by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in November 2003 and again in October 2008, when then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a mechanism would be created to discuss Russian weapon sales to Tehran and Damascus. Most recently in October 2019, then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that Russia had canceled a big weapons sale to Iran due to his negotiations with the Russian leader.

Yet, despite Israeli pleas, Hezbollah was able to acquire Russian rockets, which it fired on Israeli territory during the second Lebanon War in 2006. Later, Russia supplied both Iran and Syria with S-300 advanced air defense systems (Syria also received S-400 in 2015). In late July, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz confirmed that, in May this year, Russian forces in Syria had opened fire on Israeli jets using advanced S-300 anti-aircraft defense systems during an Israeli air force attack on targets in Syria’s northwest.

Today, with Russia’s economy strained and its access to markets is limited due to Western sanctions, deepening cooperation between Moscow and Tehran appears inevitable. For Iran, it might be the perfect chance to acquire Russian-made weapons, like the SU-30 fighter jets, that were previously unavailable due to the Kremlin’s concerns about Western sanctions against Iran. The Iranian shopping list is long, and Israel fears that there are no levers or sources of pressure to stop this deal in the current environment.

Redefining the camps

Along with Russia’s growing isolation, which dictates closer military and economic integration with countries like Iran and North Korea, tensions between Moscow and Jerusalem have been growing since before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

Since the beginning of 2022, Russia’s tone towards Israel has become more aggressive, often harshly rebuking Israel for its alleged military activities in Syria. When the Russian offensive in Ukraine began, Israel desperately tried to formulate a balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow and Kyiv to satisfy both parties. Five months into the war, neither party seems to be satisfied. While Ukraine demands that Israel provide it with military assistance, Russia is fuming over then-Foreign Minister and current Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s remarks over Russian war crimes in Bucha. The latest Russian retaliatory slap is a threat to halt the activities of the Jewish Agency, an Israeli non-governmental organization providing services and immigration assistance to Russia’s Jewish population.

Today, due to the war in Ukraine, camps in the Middle East are being quickly redefined: the comfortable position of neutrality that allowed regional states to cooperate with both superpowers is no longer an option. While many Middle Eastern leaders still welcome Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and send their envoys to Moscow, how many will acquire Russian weapons, risk sanctions, and take a hit to their frail economies?

For Israel, the region’s biggest recipient of US military aid and the United States’ closest ally in the Middle East, there was never a doubt as to which camp it belongs. And, yet, during the last two decades, Israel found ways of growing closer to Russia, even as Moscow grew closer to Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. In 2009, the two parties signed a contract to deliver twelve Israeli UAVs to the Russian army. In 2014, Israel refused to denounce Russia’s annexation of Crimea despite US pressure. Furthermore, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Israel has again refused to supply Ukraine with military aid, citing its concerns over a possible curtailment of its activities in Syria by the Russian military.

Russia’s recent rapprochement with Iran, its growing criticism of Israel, and its moves aimed against Israeli and Jewish organizations in Russia leave no room for doubt that Moscow and Jerusalem might be bound for some kind of confrontation, and relations between the countries are likely to deteriorate further. While Israel still hopes that the Jewish Agency will remain in Russia, there is no doubt that it is difficult for both countries to return to a pre-Ukraine-war reality.

Even if Israel were to completely refrain from making any statements on the war in Ukraine, Russian cooperation with Iran—and its regional proxies—would still be inevitable due to profound global geopolitical shifts. The current tension around the Jewish Agency might be diffused if Benjamin Netanyahu is reelected on November 1, given his close relationship with the Russian leader. Netanyahu hasn’t made any Ukraine-related statements but blamed Lapid for the current crisis. His supporters believe that it will be easier for him to mend ties with Moscow rather than with Lapid. Nevertheless, Netanyahu will find it difficult to brag about his friendship with Putin while Russia is isolated by the West and Israel’s strongest ally—the United States—is throwing all its weight behind supporting Ukraine and ostracizing Moscow.

Today, Israel urgently needs a new and more confident policy on Russia. To do so, it can build on its previous experience of dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. At that time, while Israel was weaker than the Soviet Union, Jerusalem was determined to defy any limitations on its freedom of operation in Egyptian skies. Israel refused to be a Soviet hostage and showed that, in an extreme situation, it was ready to confront Soviet planes and air defenses.

It is often assumed that Russia has no appetite to open another front against Israel in Syria due to its focus on the battlefield in Ukraine, and this red line has not been crossed by Moscow yet. However, the situation might change if Russian alignment with Iran and Syria keeps expanding. If and when that happens, Jerusalem must be ready with an adequate and strong response, and with the confidence that it has the United States to rely upon.

This article is from “Atlantic Council“, from August 4, 2022

הפוסט Russia is forming an alliance of pariah states in the Middle East. It might put Israel in an awkward situation in Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A visit to Auschwitz “is usually a definitive moment in the Jewish journey,” Feferman, an American-Israeli who is director of communications and global affairs at the Sharaka (“partnership,” in Arabic) NGO, wrote after the visit. But this year, he experienced it “in a dramatically different way, surrounded by Arab Muslims” who had come to learn, to open their hearts and minds and to put their own safety at risk at home in order to teach their societies about the calamity experienced by the Jews in Europe. A few days later, Feferman was in the United States, where he spoke about the peace accords between Israel and the Gulf states with a group of Muslim-American leaders of Pakistani origin.

Sharaka, an Israeli-Emirati organization, was founded immediately after the signing of the Abraham Accords, in September 2020. In the short time since then, the group has brought together hundreds of Israelis and hundreds of Arabs and Muslims from around the world, and not all of them from countries that are signatories to the accords. Its board of directors consists of Arabs and Jews, many of the latter of whom are identified with the Israeli right wing. Among them, for example, are Amit Deri, who heads the organization Reservists on Duty, which clashed with Breaking the Silence in the past; and David Brog, an American Jew who was formerly the executive director of the Evangelical organization Christians United for Israel. Feferman does not term Sharaka a right-wing organization, because, he says, it integrates Israelis from many different backgrounds.

Sharaka’s declared goal is to take advantage of the positive atmosphere generated by the Abraham Accords to forge close ties between Israelis and Arabs and create a common language between future leaders in the Middle East. “People from all sections of Israeli society are showing an interest – young and older, Jews and Arabs, secular and religious,” Feferman, who was an intelligence officer in the Israel Defense Forces, says in a phone call from Ben-Gurion Airport, when he’s on the way to another meeting abroad designed to bring people closer together. “Some of them are skeptical at first, but when they get there they understand what true peace, a warm peace, should look like.”

Like Sharaka, there are many other groups and individuals working industriously in this field, organizing young people who lead delegations, as well as mayors and other senior figures in local governments who pay frequent visits to the United Arab Emirates. The large majority identify with the right. Fleur Hassan-Nahoum, for example, a deputy mayor of Jerusalem who describes herself as a right-center Likud supporter, leads the UAE-Israel Business Council and the Gulf-Israel Women’s Business Forum. Youssef Hadad, a Christian Arab who served in the Golani infantry brigade and became a well-oiled, one-man hasbara (Israeli PR) machine, took part last year in the Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony in the UAE.

Other examples abound. One of them is the organization Habayit (The Home), whose members include Yishai Fleisher, the spokesman for the Jewish settlement in Hebron. The group, which advocates the application of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank, seeks to promote what it calls “new political solutions that will make possible acceptance of Palestinians in Israel, not from concessions but from strength.” Its members constantly speak about human rights, though not about civil rights.

In the wake of the Abraham Accords, members of Habayit also arrived in the Gulf and made contact with Emiratis who are sympathetic to Israel. Rudy Rochman, one of the nonprofit’s leaders, is also promoting a project called Sudra, referring to an Ancient Israelite headdress that recalls the Arab keffiyeh, but in blue-and-white.

Twitter and Facebook have also seen the formation of large groups of social media influencers – Israelis, Emiratis and Bahrainis – some of whom proudly style themselves “Arab Zionists.” They are mutually empathetic, talk about coexistence, send one another greetings on the Jewish holidays and express solidarity at times of mourning or terrorist attacks. For example, on the day of the terrorist attack in Be’er Sheva on March 22, an Emirati blogger named Hassan Sajwani tweeted: “Heartfelt condolences, thoughts and prayers with the victims of today’s horrendous terrorist attack that murdered 4 innocent Israelis in #Beersheba, Israel. Prayers for the injured.”

In contrast to the Israeli right, which connected in a natural way with the Abraham Accords and has been working full-steam since to promote partnership with the Gulf states, the left in Israel cold-shouldered the agreements. The initial responses by Israeli left-wing politicians, journalists, commentators and societal organizations offered various reasons for this approach. It’s not a true peace, they said, because we were never at war with the UAE; it’s a dubious deal in which undemocratic regimes are receiving Israeli weapons, aircraft and spyware. Numerous articles have been written about the systematic violation of human rights in the Emirates, which are concealed beneath smiles and a glittering façade. Quite a few spokespersons from the left refused to view the accords as peace agreements because of their mistrust of the leaders who devised them. It’s essentially a business deal, whose main beneficiaries are people close to Benjamin Netanyahu and former U.S. President Donald Trump, they said.

The prism of suspicion and criticism through which left-wingers viewed the agreements at the time of their signing is understandable. However, in the nearly two years that have passed since then, the relationships have developed and grown with content: Trade has increased, and genuine academic and research cooperation has developed. In the past year, for example, trade between Israel and the UAE was valued at $1.2 billion (by comparison, trade with Egypt that year totaled $330 million). Cooperation agreements were signed between universities in the Emirates and Tel Aviv University, the University of Haifa and Reichman University, as well as other Israeli research institutions. At the beginning of 2022, the Israeli government approved creation of a fund dedicated to development of Israeli-Emirati research projects.

הפוסט Why Is the Israeli Left Still Turning a Cold Shoulder to Gulf States? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Relations between Israel and Jordan have experienced a rebirth over the past year. After the exit from office of former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, under whose leadership relations with the Hashemite monarchy were strained and sometimes hostile, the two sides have rediscovered each other, like a couple that falls in love again after years of mutual acrimony. The Jordanians no longer hide their willingness to cooperate with Israel on a variety of topics, such as a joint food program, renewable energy, the struggle against radical Islam, preventing arms smuggling, and stabilizing the Palestinian territories.

The reciprocal effects of Jerusalem’s renewed relationship with Amman and its new ties with the normalization states remain to be seen. This is an important aspect of the normalization process because a significant connection to Jordan gives the Abraham Accords geopolitical depth. However, the situation in Jordan is complex. King Abdullah avoided sending his foreign minister to the Negev Summit in March to avoid antagonizing domestic opponents. Instead, he headed to Ramallah to calm simmering unrest there. Israel understood his decision.

Israel values Abdullah’s mediation because Jordan is the custodian of Jerusalem’s Muslim holy sites. Both sides hoped that quiet diplomacy in Amman would prevent violence around Al Aqsa Mosque and in the West Bank during Ramadan, Passover, and Easter.

Last year, when violence erupted around Al Aqsa, thousands of Jordanians took to the streets (some reaching the Israeli border) and demanded that their government sever diplomatic relations with Israel. The king did not surrender but he is clearly concerned about the deterioration of the security situation in the Palestinian territories. Senior Jordanian and Israeli officials held many meetings in a bid to forge understanding and cooperation and prevent further upheaval.

This year, the violence again quickly escalated at Al-Aqsa; despite improved relations, Jordanians harshly criticized Israel for allowing the upheaval. The parliament demanded the expulsion of Israel’s ambassador and demonstrators in Amman called for breaking ties with Israel. Jordanian officials made highly critical statements to appease the protestors. But all sides understood that when the situation in Jerusalem will be back to normal, bilateral cooperation will be back on track.

Just three years ago, when then-US President Donald Trump unveiled his “deal of the century,” Jordanians felt cheated and excluded. In their view, Israel had hatched a plot against them with US cooperation. News spread that under the plan, control of the holy sites would pass from Jordan to Saudi Arabia. Then came the Abraham Accords. The Jordanians were not thrilled. They feared that the kingdom’s special position as a bridge between Israel and the Arab world was being eroded and that the agreements could harm both the Palestinians and them.

Unlike Israel’s new partners – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco – Jordan is unable to disconnect from events in the West Bank. The shared history, family ties, involvement in internal politics, and the issue of the Muslim holy places bind together the Jordanians and Palestinians. Upheaval in Al-Aqsa, a regime change in Ramallah, or any other shock would damage the Hashemite monarchy but would hardly be felt in the Gulf region. This is where the main difference lies between the Jordanian and Gulf states’ attitudes toward Israel.

The changing of the guard at the White House and in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office offered an opportunity for enhanced, coordinated conduct of Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, and the Gulf states. Israel improved its relationship with Amman, sought to ease the distrust between the two sides, and displayed an unusual willingness to cooperate. Simultaneously, for the first time since the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israel is allowing Jordan to enjoy the fruits of normalization by promoting economic projects that pay off for all parties. Thus, in November 2021, Israel, Jordan, and the UAE signed a trilateral agreement in which Israel would purchase 600 megawatts of “green” electricity from the Jordanians (produced with Emirati assistance) and in return would consider the export of 200 million cubic meters of desalinated water to Jordan.

Once the hackneyed, damaging slogan “Jordan is Palestine” was no longer being heard in Jerusalem or Washington, Jordan renewed its status as an important partner of the US in the fight against radical Islam. US President Joe Biden even transferred a US military base from Qatar to Jordan. And a positive change occurred in Amman toward the Abraham Accords and the possibility of upgrading cooperation with Israel. Had Israel focused solely on promoting relations with its three new partners, it would have excluded Jordan and Egypt, advancing the accords within a vacuum, disconnected from a complex regional reality in which developments are intertwined.

Embracing the Jordanians has great significance for easing Palestinian unrest. The dire economic situation in Jordan corresponds with the deterioration of security in the Palestinian territories. The smuggling of weapons from Jordan is also related to the activities of radical Islamic organizations on both sides of the border. Israel must continue to bring Jordan closer and work with it to calm the region and improve the situation in the PA. In this context, signatories of the Abraham Accords can play an important role in driving economic processes with Israel in Jordan and the PA. Jordan is a critical connection between the regional normalization process and the Palestinian sphere. Prosperity and flourishing of Israeli-Arab relations in the Gulf and North Africa must also benefit the Palestinians.

The romance between Israel and Jordan must not be allowed to die out. Israeli politicians are enthusiastic about immediate gains deriving from the improved ties and are less aware of the Sisyphean work of diplomats and intermediaries, carried out without fanfare. Amman is also looking at the political upheaval rocking the Bennett-Lapid government and hoping the storm will not damage the delicate fabric of relations created over the past year. At the same time, the political and economic embrace of Jordan cannot lead to long-term, stable results without a change in the hostile Jordanian public attitude toward Israel. Despite the great political warming, at the level of civil society – in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority – relations with Israel remain frozen. Hostility remains intact and has perhaps even grown.

Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority must consider this. The stability and resilience of relations also depend on the ability to change the public narrative in Jordan itself. As political relations flourish while the backyard burns with rage, prospects of an internal explosion increase. Intergenerational change also makes the issue urgent. While the older generation of Palestinians and Jordanians is working to preserve the status quo, the younger generation has given up and moved into a more hostile, combative position. Only significant progress in the political field vis-à-vis the Palestinians and confidence-building measures could improve the atmosphere on both sides of the Jordan River.

This article is from “The Media Line“, from May 13, 2022

הפוסט Jordan key to deepening Abraham Accords, calming West Bank הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Largely rejected by its neighbors for decades, Israel accepted its separateness; a “villa in the jungle” according to former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, or an “island state” to use Foreign Minister Yair Lapid’s framing. Even the peace accords with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), as well as a short period of formal and open relations with a few other Arabs states in the 1990s, did not alter this reality. The flow of goods, people, and ideas between Israel and its neighbors remained nonexistent for decades. Israel was always an endpoint—a spoke—but never a hub or a place of transit; indicatively, as late as 2003, Israel’s main international airport did not have any infrastructure for transit passengers.

There were, of course, some breaches in the great wall between Israel and the region. In some cases, Israeli and moderate Arab leaders (in countries which did not have formal relations with Israel) communicated “under the table” (often a crowded place in Middle Eastern affairs) and, at times, openly. There was certainly intelligence sharing, even military assistance in some cases, and significant, albeit clandestine, levels of trade with the Gulf states, despite the prohibitions of the Arab boycott. Even Iranian goods ended up in the Israeli market, and vice versa, despite the Israeli law that disallowed “trade with the enemy.” A trickle of Israeli tourists did visit Jordan and Egypt after both countries signed peace accords with Israel, but even congressional incentives to encourage Israeli–Egyptian and Israeli–Jordanian joint business ventures (QIZs) could not produce intensive economic contacts.

Against this dismal background, the last few years, especially since the 2020 Abraham Accords, saw Israel connecting to the region as never before. The formal relations with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco led to an unprecedented flow between Israel and the three nations: national, military-to-military, and civil society agreements for cooperation, massive tourism (which in Morocco was significant even before the agreements), and multiple business and cultural interactions all took shape and left their mark despite the constraints of the pandemic. Even countries that did not “go formal” with Israel are helping to connect it to the region: Since 2020, Saudi Arabia has been allowing Israeli air traffic over its territory, after decades of blocking it.

Connectivity also evolved on Israel’s Western flank. The Mediterranean Sea, once an afterthought in Israeli strategic thinking, turned out to be an important space for new connections. Israeli gas from the sea is exported to Egypt and Jordan, and the three nations together with Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and the Palestinian Authority launched in 2019 a new regional organization, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which in 2021 was joined by France (with the US as an observer) and recognized as a regional compact by the UN. Gas is also one of the cornerstones for an Israel–Greece alignment that involves a wide spectrum of exchanges from education to security. This alignment also has an aspect of foreign direct investments: A Greek company owns some of the Israeli gas fields, and an Israeli company is part owner of a Cypriot field. The three nations have ambitious energy connectivity visions: laying a pipe that would connect Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe, or—as the US now suggests—an electricity project that would connect their grids to Europe, aptly named the EuroAsia Interconnector (a similar cable now connects Algeria with Southwestern Europe).

Israel now serves as a transit hub  as well. For the past decade, Turkish trucks have been shipped to the port of Haifa and then driven through Israel to Jordan and to Iraq, since the more direct land route between Turkey and the two Arab nations became blocked by the fighting in Syria and related disruptions in northern Iraq. Israel and the UAE agreed that Emirati oil is to be piped from Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat to its port on the Mediterranean near Ashkelon (using a pipeline originally designed to carry Iranian crude). Finally, the Chinese were looking into developing a train line on a similar Red–Med route to serve as an alternative route to the portion of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) that goes through the Suez Canal.

Encouraged by this opening, planners are already offering even more ambitious connectivity visions. In 2017, Israel’s Minister of Transportation Israel Katz proposed “tracks for peace,” the development of an advanced train network that would connect Israel to Saudi Arabia. Katz also proposed the development of an artificial island that would serve the Gaza Strip, as others floated an idea for an offshore international airport for Israel and a new pipeline that would deliver Israeli gas to the Gaza Strip.

This new reality is, in fact, a “back to the future” moment. After all, the land is dotted with postmarks attesting to the centrality of connectivity in its history. Prehistoric sites in Israel, offer glimpses into 1.5 million years of early human migrations out of Africa via the Levantine corridor into Eurasia. Later, ancient traders (dating back at least to the Bronze age, some 3,500 years ago) passed through the land on two ancient routes: Via Maris and the King’s Road. In the 13th century, the Mamluk Sultanate created the postal road, a vital artery of communication that stretched between Cairo and Damascus. The 20th century introduced modern forms of connectivity. Indeed, the “tracks for peace” initiative echoes older times. In the early 20th century, the Ottomans—who ruled over an open and connected Middle East—laid the tracks for the Hijaz train, which ran from Damascus to Medina, with a small offshoot to the now Israeli port cities of Akko and Haifa. By 1934 oil was piped from British-controlled Iraq to British-controlled Israel/Palestine, processed in the port city of Haifa, and exported to markets away from the region.

Connectivity was not confined to the transport of goods. In its day, it not only economic interactions but also ideational and human ones. Christianity was born out of a small Jewish sect in Israel/Palestine, and traveled far, becoming the dominant religion and culture by the middle of the first millennium in Europe.

Even local products carried the vernacular. Jaffa became nearly synonymous with oranges. As for gauze, the thin fabric now mostly used for medical dressing, it took its name from the Israel/Palestine region where it emanates: Gaza.

As late as the 1940s, the region was more integrated.  The Israeli construction company Solel Boneh operated in Iraq, Egypt, the Emirate of Transjordan, and even Bahrain. Jews from Palestine sought educational opportunities in the region. Russian-born Eliahu Eilat, Israel’s first ambassador to the US and later the president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, was a graduate of the American University of Beirut. European Jews who sought to immigrate to Palestine in the late 19th century, ended up in the larger centers in Egypt, such as Cairo and Alexandria, integrating into business and social life. Leia Nadler, the daughter of an Egyptian (Jewish-Romanian born) candy magnate family, married Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the famous Egyptian diplomat and former secretary-general of the UN. From today’s perspective, the old epithet “Levantine” has become a badge of honor, not an insult

These lessons of the past are encouraging. Connectivity offers multiple economic opportunities, as trade, energy, and people pass through the land. Past “connectors,” such as the Mamluks developed significant infrastructure in the 13th century to support their “postal road.” Two of the bridges that were built for this purpose, in Lod and in Yavne, still served local transport needs well into the 21st century, over 700 years after they were built. Being a connector also strengthens one’s status, as it creates leverage vis-à-vis the parties that are interested in the flow of goods. Connections can also create economic interdependence, thus decreasing the chances for violence between these former foes.

But the new connectivity comes with costs. Energy connectors can damage the environment. Indeed, despite the obvious geostrategic gains, Israeli activists warned against the delivery of oil from Israel’s Red Sea shore to its Mediterranean shore on account of the increased environmental risk. Their plea was heard, and for now, the Israeli Ministry for Environmental Protection is trying to stop the Israel–UAE oil connectivity deal.

Connectivity had also become a competitive arena in the great power’s strategic rivalry. The US perceives Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative as threatening to American global interests. Even if the construction of a Chinese rail in Israel would serve the latter’s economic interests, the securitization of connectivity may limit Jerusalem’s ability to move ahead as Washington is expected to oppose the move.

Looking into the future, the new connectivity raises at least three questions. First, how durable is it? As history shows, the area went through periods in which it was connected to the region, and moments in which it retreated inward. At times, leaders displayed both tendencies, by shaping the connectivity they desired. As noted, the Mamluks built an impressive ground route through the territory, but also took special care to destroy all ports on the Mediterranean, lest Western invaders would come again, like the Crusaders did on ships from Europe.

Second, how will this new connectivity affect Israel’s relations with its immediate Arab neighbors? Much of what was described above takes place between Israel and the Mediterranean states, and Israel and the Gulf and North African states. Can these new relations make Israel closer, more accepted, by the Egyptians and Jordanians, and maybe later by the Lebanese and Syrians? One glimpse of how this could unfold was the 2021 deal between Israel and Jordan with the UAE’s financing, for a solar powered desalinated water swap between the first two nations.

Finally, will the new connectivity affect Israel’s identity? Over the years, Israel developed a unique identity that mostly does not correspond with the characteristics of the region. Among its core aspects are a close cultural, political, and economic connection to Europe and North America, and a set of political institutions and norms that draw both on Judaism and democracy. Israel also defines itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people. With some half of the Jewish world residing in North America and Europe, Israel was bound to look West, not East.

The new connectivity bears with it the promise of change. It offers a more inclusive framework for engaging with a region that once rejected Israel. Trade, tourism, and investment will lead to greater interaction, educational exchanges, and the flow of ideas and people. Growing numbers of Israelis are now retiring to cheaper (and close-by) locations in Cyprus and Greece, while some Israeli businessmen are seeking residency in the UAE to avoid the heavy taxation at home. One appealing framework that has yet to take hold in Israel is its redefinition as a Mediterranean country: a liminal identity that offers a commonality between Christian-European nations such as Cyprus, Arab Muslim nations such as Egypt and Morocco, and the Jewish state. At a deeper symbolic level, such an identity could focus less on Israel’s specific locality and the weight of association with its holy sites, and more on mobility, movement, and exchange. Some Israelis think it is the only way ahead. Author AB Yehoshua wrote in 2014 that if Israel “wants to ensure itself a lasting existence . . . it must find a path of renewal by deepening its Mediterranean identity.”

Over the generations, Jews were highly effective in rising to the challenge of reshaping their identity. Will regional connectivity usher, not only riches and maybe security, but also a new ideational reincarnation?

This article is from “JSTribune“, from May 2022

הפוסט To the Middle East and beyond! Israel’s new connectivity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Rather, it looked like a meeting of forward-looking statesmen, who are setting a positive agenda, highlighting partnership and cooperation, and seeking to ensure a better future for their people and for the region.

The closing remarks of the foreign ministers who participated in the Negev Summit included messages of warm peace, which were absent for decades from Israel-Arab relations. The guests from the UAE, Egypt, Morocco and Bahrain spoke about upgrading diplomatic ties, fostering people-to-people relations, learning curiously about each other, deepening connections between people, broadening cooperation, fulfilling potential, and advancing prosperity.

They spoke about multiple and diverse fields of diplomatic, security, economic and civilian cooperation, and highlighted the importance of concrete steps that will bring actual benefit to ordinary citizens.

The decision, announced by Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, that the summit will be turned into a recurring event is a positive outcome. Israel, as well as Egypt, gained experience in recent years in setting up regional cooperative mechanisms in the Mediterranean – via the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), triangular relations with Greece and Cyprus and participation in regional organizations such as the Union for the Mediterranean.

Now, it seems like the time has come and conditions are ripe to transfer modalities and insights from these processes to the Middle East.

In the longer term, efforts should be made to leverage the Negev Summit into more than a periodical meeting of foreign ministers, and to consolidate a permanent forum, with concrete goals, specific working groups, and joint projects.

To maximize the benefits from such a forum, it is important that it also include Jordan and the Palestinians, just as they are members of the EMGF. There, Israel agreed to equal representation of the Palestinians on a state level and this could be replicated also in a Middle Eastern forum, should one take shape.

IT IS already clear that the Negev Summit was a substantial diplomatic achievement for the Israeli government, foreign minister and foreign service. In his first year in office, Foreign Minister Lapid hoped to achieve new normalization agreements with additional countries.

This has not materialized yet, but the deepening and upgrading of the existing normalization process, as well as the willingness of Egypt to draw closer to the “warm peace club,” are significant achievements that are full of potential.

Egypt, which has for years limited its cooperation with Israel mostly to security affairs, is increasingly showing openness to cooperation in other fields as well. The Egyptian foreign minister spoke clearly about that in the summit.

The Negev Summit, as well as other recent developments in Israel-Arab ties, reflect the empowered status of Israel’s Foreign Ministry. After consecutive years in which Israel’s foreign service was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, Israeli diplomats are now playing a central role in shaping regional relations and are finally fulfilling their professional potential.

Also, after years in which the Foreign Affairs Ministry kept a low public profile in Israel, its diplomats are now regularly and freely granting interviews to local media, in which they provide context and information about events and developments, and more importantly, they reflect the importance of diplomacy and of a well-functioning foreign service to the Israeli public.

Countries in the region, which have yet to normalize ties with Israel, are following recent developments in Israel-Arab relations. As regional cooperation brings more tangible benefits – and the Negev Summit is expected to help make that happen – and as warm and open interaction between Arab and Israeli officials becomes the new norm, additional countries are likely to opt for increased relations with Israel – whether in public or behind closed doors.

And, in case the normalization process will also be leveraged to progress in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, with the support of Arab countries with which Israel now enjoys mutual trust, the benefits will be much bigger: for Israelis and Palestinians who will enjoy more peaceful relations, for countries in the region that will find it easier to normalize with Israel and for the prosperity of the people of the region.

The warmth that characterized the Negev Summit is expected to make the Middle East an even warmer region, and this time, it is for the best.

The op-ed was published in JPost in April 2022.

הפוסט Negev Summit: Middle East becoming warmer, friendlier הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Iran is obviously the main cause of this tumult. The impending nuclear agreement worries all countries in the region. The gradual US withdrawal from the Middle East and its determination to sign the deal with Iran brings its allies together to face a common enemy. Although US forces are located in Bahrain and Qatar, and perhaps elsewhere, countries in the region that fear Iran understand they must play a more central role, making Israel a dominant actor in these anti-Iran efforts, which include a proposed joint air defense system. Such cooperation may also include defense of the Gulf states (including Saudi Arabia) against Houthi attacks from Yemen, against which Israel can provide anti-missile interception systems, as well as drones. Morocco and Bahrain have also established cooperation with Israel in bilateral security agreements.

The top-level meetings allow Israel to update its Arab partners on its mediation between Russia and Ukraine. They also provide opportunities for each country to advance its interests. Egypt, for example, the world’s largest wheat importer, is concerned about the rising cost of wheat, gas and oil prompted by the war in Ukraine and seeks financial and economic assistance. Jordan shares similar concerns and is seeking to advance the January 2022 agreement with Iraq on an oil pipeline from Basra to Aqaba.

The summit meetings indicate the rising importance of the Emirates in the regional arena, which was the only player present at all these meetings. The UAE is also the main sponsor of Syria’s return to the Arab fold in hopes that Assad will restore stability and reduce Iran’s involvement in Syria. However, it should be remembered that the UAE, especially Dubai, also helped Iran circumvent Western sanctions. Moreover, in November 2021, the UAE declared its intention of “turning over a new leaf” in relations with Iran.

In December, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the UAE’s national security adviser, visited Tehran. The UAE’s communication channels with all the players in the region facilitate its role as intermediary. The position, when also backed by economic and military capabilities, positions the Emirates as a regional leader. Egypt and Saudi Arabia likely eyes this development with suspicion, but cannot prevent it given their economic weakness (Egypt) or non-existent dialogue channels with some regional actors (Saudi Arabia).

The relative rapprochement between Israel and Turkey, as reflected in President Chaim Herzog’s meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and between Israel and Qatar, as expressed in a visit there by Israel’s top general Aviv Kochavi, both in the first week of March, also reflect the change in Israel’s regional standing. Bennett and Erdogan are said to meet soon.

The political competition between Israel’s government leaders – Bennett, Lapid and Defense Minister Benny Gantz – is an important aspect of these developments, with each trying to outbid his rival. Lapid cultivated a special relationship with King Abdullah and met with him twice, as well as inaugurating the Israeli embassies in the UAE and Bahrain. Gantz flew to Bahrain and Morocco to sign military agreements. Bennett decided to play key roles in both the international arena (Ukraine) and in the regional one, visiting Bahrain and the Emirates. The competition between Bennett and Gantz was reflected in the pair’s planned separate visits to India. This competition for prestige energizes relations between the countries, on the one hand, but also risks tensions with other countries.

The trilateral meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, and now the Negev summit of foreign ministers is a milestone in regional politics, not only in terms of the participants’ ranks, but mainly due to their exposure to the limelight. Just six years ago, when then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Isaac Herzog met with Sisi, Abdullah, and US Secretary of State John Kerry in Aqaba, they did so in secret. The fact that these leaders are no longer afraid to be seen with Israeli leaders is the significant innovation. It indicates that Israel is once again in the position of an acknowledged partner, rather than a hidden mistress.

The op-ed was published in JPost in March 2022.

הפוסט Egypt, Jordan’s close ties with Israeli officials are now out in the open הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The API, conceived by Saudi Arabia, offered Israel regional belonging, normal ties with all Arab countries, and a sense of security in exchange for resolving conflicts with the Palestinians and Syria. It presented the Israeli leadership and public with an incentive to make peace, addressing Israel’s long-standing yearning to shake off its regional isolation and to be accepted in its neighborhood.

The API, however, did not bring the desired peace. A large majority of Israelis never heard of it. Most of those who did, were not aware of its actual content. And many of those who are aware, tended to focus on reasons to reject it or question its credibility. Consecutive Israeli governments never formally responded to the initiative. Despite occasional behind-the-scenes overtures, Israeli leaders generally chose to ignore the API. Some of them even spoke out against it, because of their opposition to the two state solution it entailed.

The Arab League ratified the API repeatedly over the years and emphasized its commitment to it, even during periods of Israeli-Palestinian escalation, instability in the Arab world, and the rise of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa. However, Arab states did invest much in marketing it to Israelis and displayed only limited willingness to adapt its wording to changing circumstances.

The international community, for its part, welcomed the API and recognized its potential, but failed to incorporate it into a broader international package of peace incentives, which could have also included US security guarantees and an upgrade of ties with the EU.

And so, the API turned along the years into a missed opportunity, with mounting questions about its relevance. First, it was the Syrian civil war, which made the initiative’s clause calling for Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights unrealistic under the circumstances. Second, the 2020 normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries reflected an Israeli right-wing success of significantly de-linking the normalization of ties with Arab states from progress towards the two state solution.

The Negev Summit, held exactly on the 20th anniversary of the API, expresses the type of normal relations envisioned by the initiative. However, the Palestinians were not invited to the event and the Palestinian issue is not high on its agenda. This led Jordan to skip the festive meeting. The summit coincides with a particularly low period for the Palestinians, with delays in European aid to the Palestinian Authority, US calls for internal Palestinian reforms, widespread Palestinian distrust of its leadership, and the continuation of the ongoing split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip although the government in Jerusalem no longer wishes to preserve it.

This is not a cause for Israeli celebration and should not be seen in Israel as a victory over the spirit of the API. Alongside international incentives and peacemaking efforts, Israeli-Palestinian peace is first and foremost in the interest of the two peoples engaged in the conflict. Thus, Israel should try to attract global interest in the peace process, even if the world appears uninterested. Israeli-Palestinian peace will serve Israel’s objectives, enhance its security, increase its ability to breach additional diplomatic glass ceilings, and assist to fulfill national and regional potential for economic prosperity.

Efforts to advance peace will benefit from an update to the API, as well as to other key proposals related to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, written some 20 years ago and often referred to until today, such as the Clinton parameters and the Quartet roadmap. Changed circumstances require new policy plans. Even if the goal of achieving a two state solution remains unchanged, the way to achieve it should be relevant to today’s changing and renewed Middle East.

A new peace plan formulated by the Arab League could be based on preliminary consultations with Israel, which were not possible 20 years ago but are certainly feasible in today’s new regional realities. A preliminary Israeli-Arab discourse on a new Arab Peace Initiative could result in an initiative that provides a better response to needs, sensitivities and political capabilities.

A new Arab Peace Initiative could more accurately spell out the glass ceiling in Israeli-Arab relations set by the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It could present Israel with a roadmap for expanding the normalization cycle to other Arab and Muslim countries. And it could serve as an incentive for the Palestinians, increasing the likelihood that the future leadership there, in the post-Abbas period, will be pro-peace and moderate, and will not be shaped by extremists.

The Negev Summit, participated by Israeli and Arab foreign ministers, is historic and symbolizes a new, positive and very different regional reality from the one to which Israel had grown accustomed for decades. These changes should now also be leveraged to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, with the active help of Israel’s new Arab partners. Even if many of them do not prioritize this issue at the moment, which is likely to change in the future – hopefully in constructive circumstances, rather than as a result of another Israeli-Palestinian escalation.

Distrust of the Arab world and a conviction that the API might be a trap, shaped Israeli attitudes towards the API along the years and was an obstacle to its realization. Today, with growing trust and a sense of partnership between Israel and key Arab countries, this obstacle can be removed. If framed correctly, a new Arab Peace Initiative, could be seen in a more positive light. It could be presented as a joint regional aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which will complete the transformation of Israel’s standing in the Middle East and which will open new horizons for regional cooperation, prosperity and security.

The op-ed was published in The Jerusalem Post on March 2022.

הפוסט After 20 years, time for a new Arab peace initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Introduction

Since mid-70-s Saudi Arabia had exercised a role of a regional coordinator between various Middle Eastern states and between them and the USA, competing with other middle eastern powers and looking for ways to establish its own position. Twice in the past it had put on the table a peace initiative that was aimed at finding an acceptable solution for Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and both times these initiatives didn’t take off for various reasons. Saudi Arabia traditionally stood by the Palestinians and supported financially the PA and its institutions. The reality of the Arab spring and Iran domination, as well as the rise of the crown-prince Muhammad Bin-Salman and Abraham accords had radically altered the regional dynamics. During the last few years Saudi Arabia moved closer to Israel and further away from the Palestinians, it became more preoccupied with Iranian threat and domestic reforms and it seemed unable to present and pursue an independent policy on Israel and Palestine, while still aspiring to play a significant place in regional decision-making. How can Saudi Arabia facilitate peace or contribute for peace-making between Israel and Palestinians and what needs to happen first to allow this scenario?

1. Historical background

Two Peace Initiatives

The Arab Peace initiative (API) that was first presented by then Saudi crown prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz in 2002 is a well-known story that was widely covered and discussed, however Saudi Arabia’s engagement in Arab Israeli peacemaking starts much earlier than API. On August 7,1981, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz announced a plan for peace in the Middle East. It affirmed the right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 as well as the right of all states in the region to live in peace.

In 1982 Israel firmly rejected Fahd’s initiative, claiming that it doesn’t differ substantially from the traditional Arab position and the reference of PLO makes it impossible for Israel to embrace it. The Saudi leadership as well as its American allies continued to stick to Fahd’s plan for a few years, until it was mostly forgotten.

After Fahd’s plan it took the Saudis two more decades to initiate another plan based on solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in return for full Arab recognition and normalization with Israel.

In 2002, during the Arab Peace Summit in Beirut then crown prince Abdullah abd al-Aziz launched his peace initiative that was soon embraced by all Arab countries, and later by all Islamic countries during OIC conference in 2007. The Palestinians who depended on the Saudis for contributions, supported the API, while Israel never provided an official response to the initiative (vast majority of Israelis never heard of the Arab Peace Initiative).^[1]

Regional Changes – Irrelevant of the API?

Jerusalem and Riyadh share common concerns regarding Iranian expansion and the withdrawal of US from the region, but it seems for now that the unresolved Palestinian issue will continue standing in the way of any attempt to bring the parties closer together.

20 years later all Arab states still officially support the API, but few of them decided to go ahead with normalization process regardless of progress made between Israel and Palestinians. In 2020 UAE, and then Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan signed peace treaties with Israel. Their actions drew harsh criticism on behalf of the Palestinians, as well as Iran, Turkey and some Arab countries. Saudi Arabia didn’t join “the normalizers club”, however, it was clear that without KSA’s consent, the other Arab states would probably not opt for full recognition and normalization of relations with Israel.

Saudi Arabia still stands by 2002 plan and recently its representatives reaffirmed during a session in UN that the API is the basis for any further normalization between the countries.

Waiting with Normalization

Saudi Arabia traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, yet at the same time it feared the revolutionary dynamic of the PLO and its criticism of Arab monarchies. In the nineties, Riyad mostly stayed away from Oslo accords dynamics, it didn’t open a diplomatic office in Tel-Aviv as Qatar, Oman and other countries did. In 1993 newly established Palestinian Autonomy launched its embassy in Riyad, however Saudi Arabia never opened its embassy in Ramallah. One of the reasons to this reluctance to promote bilateral Saudi-Palestinian ties was Yasser Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during his invasion to Kuwait in 1990. Throughout the years it allocated millions of dollars to PA as financial aid, while some of its royals openly supported Islamic armed movements in Palestine, including HAMAS through charity funds and aid organizations.

Is Saudi Arabia able or willing to facilitate any dialogue or cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians to the benefit of all parties? For now, the country refrained from any concrete attempt to promote and implement the API so that it will transform from a theoretical concept to reality. What are the possible spheres where cooperation is possible and desirable? And what are the pitfalls that should be considered? How can Saudi Arabia, a traditional religious leader and a country with significant financial possibilities promote the moderate approach to future political compromise and peace making through its religious, political and economic institutions?

1. All roads lead to peace?

Saudi-Palestinian sulha is needed first

In May 2020 when Palestinians around the world mark Nakba (Catastrophe) day that symbolize the beginning of exile for many thousands of Palestinians from their homes, an internet campaign was waged in the Saudi segment of the internet. Saudi pro-governmental researches, pundits and influencers were posting posts that were critical of Palestinians and their leadership. Many used hashtags, such as “this is not my fight” (referring to Nakba) or “ungrateful Palestinians”. Later in fall, prince Bandar bin-Sultan, one of the most senior Saudi royals said in an interview to Al-Arabiya channel that Palestinian leaders were “cheats, liars and ungrateful”. It seemed as if Saudi leadership was trying to prepare the public opinion to the possibility of normalization with Israel, paving the way to public support through bashing the Palestinians. The Palestinians, and specifically the PA leadership accused the Gulf states, namely UAE and Saudi for “selling off the Palestinians and their struggle”.

A year later a Saudi ambassador to Jordan, Naef bin-Bandar as-Sudairi paid a public visit to Palestinian refugee camp Wahdat in Amman as what was described by some Palestinian political analysts as the first step to defrost the relations between the two parties.

If Saudi Arabia will promote any projects designed to improve the state of relations between Israel and the PA, the thick ice that accumulated in the relations between Riyad and Ramallah, should be melted first. The visit of the Saudi ambassador to Wahdat refugee camp is a positive move, but it’s just the first step in the long road to reconciliation. As of today, the Palestinians are still very wary of Emiratis, Bahrainis and Saudis, even if the latter didn’t proceed with establishing formal relations with Israel. If the Palestinian side will feel that the Saudis approach them only to whitewash their cooperation with Israel, the likelihood of their participation will remain extremely low.

Saudi-led multi-lateral peace conference – phantom or reality?

Back in 2016, when Benjamin Netanyahu was desperately seeking another partner to join his 61-fingers coalition, he and MK Yitzhak Herzog, the head of the Zionist Union faction in the Knesset, discussed a regional peace plan that included embrace of the Arab Peace Initiative and renewal of negotiations with Palestinians. This initiative was proposed to Netanyahu during a February 2016 secretive meeting in Aqaba by foreign secretary John Kerry.  Later John Kerry met Netanyahu in Rome and proposed to arrange a regional conference that will be attended by the heads of the Arab Sunni states, such as Egypt and Jordan, as well as Saudi Arabia and UAE.

This initiative never materialized as Netanyahu decided to include a right-wing party Israel Beytenu in his coalition instead of center-left Zionist Union. The PM eventually took a right turn and buried the idea of negotiations with Palestinians. In 2020 he promoted the idea of West Bank annexation, and then dropped it for the sake of signing a peace agreement with UAE and Bahrain (and later with Morocco and Sudan). Also, Yair Lapid, today a minister of foreign affairs, had mentioned favorably the idea of regional peace conference that will include the Saudis or even be led by them.

As the fight for primacy in the Middle East between Arab and non-Arab powers is ongoing, Saudi Arabia might be interested in hosting and arranging such an event that will relaunch the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, but only in case if its success will be guaranteed. A failure of such an initiative will further distance the Saudis from Israel and support the bias of the radical camp in KSA and other countries. Currently, when the coalition of right, center, left and the Arabs in Israel is shaky and the influence of PA keeps diminishing, the possibility of arranging such an event in the near future is doubtful. The leadership might change soon in Ramallah, also a political change in Jerusalem is always possible. Until both parties will have enough support at home for this move (or become desperate enough to risk it), it’s hard to imagine this initiative coming to live.

Nevertheless, in the future this kind of scenario might enable all parties to benefit: the Saudis will get a place at the negotiation table, the Israelis will win the recognition of Riyad and the Palestinians will enjoy the economic benefits, aid and renewal of negotiations.

Economy, ecology and academy

The crown prince Muhammad Bin-Salman has ambitious plans for his country. He wants to turn Riyad and Jeddah into regional and international technological and business hubs, and the futuristic city of Neom grows fast despite the complications caused by the outbreak of coronavirus. He is dreaming of Saudization of the work force, but as of today Saudi Arabia still needs a lot of working hands and bright heads to make this transformation happen.

Well-educated Palestinian professionals always worked in the kingdom, but due to recent tensions as well as a few cases in which Palestinians were involved with HAMAS or Muslim Brotherhood and ended in Saudi jails had significantly diminished their numbers in KSA. Joint Israeli-Palestinian-Saudi projects aimed at “green” urban development, cleantech and protection of environment in the region might produce the necessary cohesion and synergy without causing the inevitable uproar on the Palestinian side. Saudi investment in Palestinian-Israeli startups will provide another connection between the younger generation who today mainly exist in parallel worlds, never meeting or interacting with each other. The creation of QIZ (Qualified Industrial Zones) mechanism, similar to one that was created by the USA for the sake of promotion of cooperation between Israel, Jordan and Egypt, might be useful. The QIZ initiative allows Egypt and Jordan to export products to the United States duty-free, as long as these products contain inputs from Israel. Saudi Arabia may offer similar privileges for Palestinian and Israeli companies to boost cooperation to follow-up some political developments on the ground (currently, it’s hard to imagine a direct Saudi involvement with Israeli businesses, even if the purpose of it is to help the Palestinians or to boost cooperation)

In regards to opportunities in academic sphere, they are quite limited as of today, since there are no diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, while the Palestinian universities are off limits for both Saudis, Emiratis or Bahrain due to increased animosity caused by Abrahamic accords that were largely rejected by the Palestinian society. However, academic collaborations that do not need actual meetings or student exchanges are actually possible, especially if they will be initiated by a fourth party – a Western university, especially in scientific and technological fields.

One aspect of regional relations is particularly important today: ecology. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has launched a comprehensive national development strategy to support the diversification of energy sources to achieve the goal of increasing the use of renewable energy. Cooperation with Israel, Palestine and probably Jordan in this sphere might be better accepted by Saudi society, as it fits well the “Green initiative” that is meant to protect the environment and the ecological balance for the sake of future generations.

It’s important to keep in mind that the idea of “economic peace” is rejected by the Palestinians, and if these initiatives will happen without any prospect of political progress, they will die before being born or draw sharp criticism in the PA.

Culture, religion and society

A few years ago, when some Israeli and American officials implied that Riyad might take over Jordan’s role as the guardian of the holy Muslim places in Jerusalem, the reaction in PA was extremely negative and suspicious. Not that Jordan that normalized relations with Israel in 1994 is very popular among the Palestinians today, but Saudi Arabia was considered to be a hostile and anti-Palestinian and the statements of the crown prince Muhammad Bin-Salman regarding possible compromise in Jerusalem just further strengthened their bias. After 2020 elections in US the rumors about Riyad pushing out Amman from Jerusalem had stopped, but the suspicions remained. Therefore, any move in religious sphere made by Saudis will probably draw a wave of criticism, especially since in the past Saudi donations and contributions to mosques across the Middle East had ignited a wave of radicalization. It can of course, promote its moderate image through inter-religious dialogue (something that is happening already for the last few years), although it seems that the current Saudi leadership is also uninterested in promoting its soft power via preachers, minbars and mosques.

As of today, Saudi Arabia is going through massive transformation and liberalization of its religious, cultural and social sphere, due to series of reforms introduced by the crown prince Muhammad Bin-Salman. Once an ultraconservative and suffocating place, Saudi Arabia is opening up to the tourists, displays its historical, pre-Islamic antiquities (such as Al-Ula) and fights with Dubai for primacy in business, sport shows, book fairs and film festivals. It remains to be seen how the Saudis can involve both Israelis and Palestinians in various project in sphere of culture, but there is no doubt that the Saudi facelift attracts both Israelis and Palestinians. Without making the grand move, such as recognizing Israel or signing a peace treaty with it, Saudi Arabia can engage Israelis and Palestinians in its large book fairs, initiate tele-bridges (as was done in Soviet Union during the Perestroika when people from Soviet Union and USA were first brought together) and promote other similar activities. The Saudi World Muslim League had undertaken a trip to Aushwitz in 2019 and it is already active in promoting the “wasatiya” (moderation) in Muslim societies abroad.

1. Conclusion

Saudi Arabia is currently looking for its place in the regional system where new, bold actors, such as neighboring Dubai operate fast and change facts on the ground. It has to decide, whether it’s interested to play a role in bringing the Israelis and the Palestinians closer together in order to stabilize the system and avoid another dangerous spiral of violence. If it will choose to do so, it will have to improvise and take risks, which seems to fit the current mood of its young leadership. It can start with taking the “baby steps” in various fields – from allowing joint academic researches with other companies, to economic initiatives that will boost Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, such as the QIZ mechanism. Saudi Arabia can use its religious influence to promote “wasatiya” (moderation), and it already does so today through its World Muslim League.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia as a regional heavy weight, cannot risk failure. It will get involved if it can benefit from the process and if the necessary guaranties are provided, something that will be difficult to achieve in today’s unstable regional climate. Currently it might concentrate on smaller steps behind the scenes in order to improve the chances for peace building in the future.

[1] “The Arab Peace Initiative at 15 Years,” Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, July 2017.

הפוסט Saudi Arabia’s Engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

‘Ideal Middle Eastern venue for Chinese investment’

In Tehran last March, the Chinese and Iranian foreign ministers signed a 25-year cooperation agreement (a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”). Under the accord, Beijing promised to invest $400 billion in Iran’s economy in exchange for a steady and heavily discounted supply of oil.

This agreement and its implications for global security and economy were widely discussed back then. But as 2021 neared its end it became clear that Iran’s neighbor and ex-nemesis Iraq was the real star of the Chinese Belt and Road strategy in the Middle East.

According to a report from Fudan University’s Center for Green Finance and Development in Shanghai, last year Iraq received $10.5 billion in investment under the Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. Iraq has become the third-biggest Belt and Road partner in energy engagement, after Russia and Pakistan. Overall Chinese investment in Arab and Middle Eastern countries rose by about 360% in 2021, while construction engagement increased by 116%, compared to 2020, the study said.

Nowadays China is involved in the building of Al-Khairat heavy oil power plant near Karbala. It took the promise to finance construction of 1,000 schools (and some 7,000 schools in the future) in return for oil products to secure the Al-Khairat deal. China’s state company also won the contract to develop the Mansuriya gas field and there is no shortage of other industrial and civil projects.

“I’m a bit surprised by the fact that Iraq is now the third-largest BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] country since China has a great deal of attention and money invested in Kazakhstan, it is very focused on Central Asia, it conducts business in Egypt and builds cities there,” Carice Witte, the founder and executive director at SIGNAL – Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership, told The Media Line.

“In my opinion, Iraq being the third-largest BRI country says a number of things: first of all, that Iraq is a less controversial investment than Iran, that it has a great deal of untapped potential and easier access than Iran. And also, that the Iraqi government and people are easier to negotiate with and to do business with than Iranians,” she continued.

“The Chinese have always found it extremely difficult to do business with Iran and there is a lot of unpublicized tension in Iran-China relations. Due to China’s dependence on Saudi and Gulf energy, they feel it’s important to cultivate another significant source of oil. Iraq is a very young market that needs to grow, needs everything and has a way to pay for it (unlike Syria which has limited oil reserves and Lebanon which has none). When you think about it, Iraq is the ideal venue for China in the Middle East,” Witte said.

After 20 years of US presence, it’s China that delivers the goods

The Iraq-China relationship dates to when Beijing was selling Baghdad weapons in the 1960s and 1970s while Iraq supported its claim to a seat on the UN Security Council. Relations developed further during the 2000s, after Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled. China, along with Russia, was fiercely opposed to the Iraq War, yet it became one of its main beneficiaries.

In 2008, the China National Petroleum Corporation signed a huge production deal with the Iraqi government and became the first foreign firm to do so since the war. In 2013, China bought almost half of Iraqi oil production. During these years Iraq acquired Chinese drones to fight ISIS, supported the Hong Kong national security law at the UN and defended China’s treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang.

Witte explained that since Iraq’s hopes to see America more involved and supportive of its development didn’t materialize, it is looking for deeds, not words.

“There was a time of excitement about the potential of American support for Iraq, and during that time the plans for cooperation with China were stalled. China is patient and it is able to wait until a new opportunity presents itself,” the expert said.

“And after watching the US behavior in the Middle East over the last few years, the reality sank in that the US cannot necessarily be counted on. America wants to give, but not to do. It gives money, but it doesn’t go and improve the situation of the locals. That’s why we have Chinese everywhere – because the Americans don’t do the work anymore,” Witte said.

Eric Davis, professor of political science at Rutgers University and former director of its Center for Middle Eastern Studies, recently tweeted, “When the United States asks why China has become a stronger global power, you should realize that China plays a strong role in investing in developing countries like Iraq. China is investing in the natural gas and solar energy industries in Iraq and is building an airport. Where are the American investments?”

‘The Silk Road Axis’

Not all Iraqis are happy with these developments, just as not all Iranians welcomed the 25-year cooperation agreement signed with China.

Former MP Ghaleb Muhammad Ali wrote in his social media accounts that while China imports crude oil at the price of $70 per barrel, Iraq imports the same volume of Chinese gasoline for $200, indicating that Beijing is getting the better of this cooperation.

Dr. Ronen Zeidel, an Iraq specialist at the Tel Aviv-based Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, said, “On one hand, the Iraqis are highly engaged with the Chinese. They let them access the Iraqi oil market and the Chinese promised to build schools and other infrastructure. Schools are very important since there are plenty of schools in horrible condition and it’s something that is highly discussed in Iraq.

“However, many are also afraid of the barter principle – exchanging their oil for infrastructure, like in Africa. Opponents of Iran fear that pro-Iranian militias’ violence also has something to do with Chinese involvement. They even call it “the Silk Road Axis,” Zeidel said.

Since the 25-year cooperation agreement was signed last year, Iran has seen a few anti-Chinese protests. Demonstrations were staged near parliament where the protesters chanted slogans such as “Iran is Not for Sale” and “Death to Those Who Sell the Homeland.”

Nothing of the kind has taken place in Iraq, where, according to Zeidel, the physical presence of China is not as widespread as in Africa or some parts of Europe. “Iraqis are both drawn to China, since they want their country to develop, and afraid of it,” he said.

The experts are certain that cooperation between China and Iraq will keep growing in 2022, even if the volume of investment does not expand.

Will Chinese involvement contribute to stabilization of the situation in and around Iraq? Some believe this will be the case, due to Chinese concern over disruption of oil supplies. For now, it’s clear China is slowly but surely building its position in the Middle East and that this new reality will affect the global power competition worldwide.

The op-ed was published on JPost in February 2022.

הפוסט How Iraq became the top link in China’s belt and road strategy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Between Islamic Revolution and the Cedar Tree

Many of Nasrallah’s enemies call him “an Iranian agent,” and indeed, one of his formal titles is that of the Supreme leader’s Representative in Lebanon. For his supporters, he is the sole defender of Lebanon. In fact, as a leader of Hezbollah, he embodies both identities—a true son of the Iranian Islamic revolution and a Lebanese political leader who represents his authentic constituency.

By birth, upbringing, and socialization, Hassan Nasrallah is just as Lebanese as any member of the privileged Maronite or Sunni families who reside in posh neighborhoods like Achrafiya or Gemmayzeh, in another Lebanese universe. He was born and raised in Burj Hammoud, the eastern suburb of Beirut. During the civil war his family moved to the Tyre area in southern Lebanon. Later he moved to Baalbek, the heart of Beqaa valley, to study. Soon, like many of his peers, he joined the Amal movement (also called Harakat al-Mahrumin, “The Movement of the Deprived”), which was deeply influenced by Imam Musa Sadr who fought against corruption and poverty in largely-Shia populated South Lebanon. Later, discouraged by what he described as the Amal leaders’ “lack of religious devotion” and their readiness to accept Israeli-supported Bashir Gemayil as Lebanon’s president, he left Amal and joined the ranks of the newly established Hezbollah—more radical, far more religious, and closely associated with Iran.

“All of my sisters are active members of Hezbollah. But, as for the brothers, they were all in the Amal movement first. Now, all of them, except for Hoseyn, have left it. We have been discussing and exchanging views with each other for some time now. Today, Hezbollah is making good progress and changing for the better. Its goal is to move in the right direction with the necessities of the time and to uphold its Shiite principles,” said Nasrallah in his autobiography, published in Persian in 2006.

According to personal accounts of people who were close to him, Nasrallah is indeed a deeply religious person, a scholar who dreamt of becoming a religious leader. According to his autobiography, his “ideal person” remains Khomeini, founder of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, while the ideal form of authority is velayat e-faqih—a revolutionary variation of the Shia faith, in which the Islamist system of governance requires obedience to the “Interpreter of the Law,” the Supreme Leader. However, in practice, Nasrallah often acts as a realist. Not unlike the leaders of the Soviet Union—who let go of the dream of the global communist revolution—he no longer dreams about establishing an Islamic Republic in Lebanon today or in the future.

“It is not possible with force and resistance. It requires a national referendum. A referendum that wins 51% of the vote is still not the solution. What it needs is a referendum for which 90% of the people vote. Hence, with this assumption, and in view of the status quo, establishing an Islamic Republic system in Lebanon is not possible at the present time” said Nasrallah back in 2006. At the time, Southern Lebanon lay in ruins, devastated after a war with Israel that Nasrallah had triggered. He then concentrated on establishing charitable organizations to win back the loyalty of the people and find his place in mainstream Lebanese politics.

Yet according to Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, the first secretary-general of Hezbollah, it was Nasrallah’s total loyalty to Iran that eventually caused a split inside the organization, transforming it into an operative arm of Iran in Lebanon (unlike Nasrallah, Tufayli rejected the principle of velayat e-faqih as un-Islamic, and viewed Iran’s government as tyrannical). After the explosion in Beirut in August 2020, Tufayli openly accused Nasrallah of being complicit in the disaster. Nasrallah regularly affirms his loyalty to Iran and Ayatollah Khamenei, implying that if Iran will be drawn into war, his organization will not sit idle. This constant tension between his Lebanese identity and his loyalty as well as religious and organizational connections to Iran is perhaps the defining aspect of Nasrallah’s era.

No Longer a Robin Hood

Nasrallah understood well how badly his Shia constituency needed the welfare they were denied by the Lebanese state. Establishing this social service program was also vital to Hezbollah’s rise and success. For poor Lebanese families in the southern villages and city slums, what mattered was not the jihadi agenda but rather the food packages during Ramadan, medical services, and small zero-percent loans. This use of social services gave Nasrallah an image of a Lebanese “Robin Hood,” ready to “take from the rich” in order to “give to the poor.” He skillfully filled the vacuum created by the weak government, while his constituency was ready to overlook the many shady activities in which Hezbollah was involved: money laundering, drug trade, and massive accumulation of weapons for local dominance and a future devastating war with Israel.

However, in 2021, after almost three decades in power, these structures—created by Hezbollah during the years of plenty—are no longer enough. The crisis in Lebanon, multiplied by the spread of coronavirus, is now much wider and deeper than anything Hezbollah could solve. Sanctions on Iran and measures taken by Western powers against illicit funds and drugs smuggling slowed down the money flow from Iran to Lebanon, as well as from Hezbollah’s supporters in Africa and Latin America. More and more Western countries decided to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, halting all activities of related groups and associations.

Thus, neither Hezbollah nor the Iranian oil shipments (another Robin Hood-like act) can resolve the energy crisis or offer an alternative to Western or Arab aid. Hezbollah’s role in support of the Syrian regime in the long and bloody civil war raised doubts about the true necessity of the “resistance weapon.” The man who praised martyrdom and sacrificed his son Hadi and sent hundreds of other people’s sons to their death during armed conflicts with Israel—and the war in Syria—now found out that his men actually wanted to live and thrive, rather than pay the price of his politics. Two out of three pillars of Hezbollah’s appeal—the charity and the ethos of resistance—have now been seriously diminished.

Will Nasrallah Take Lebanon to the Graveyard of the Failed States?

Hezbollah, which once vied with Amal for attention and influence among Lebanese Shia, now holds significant military and political power, a separate financial system, a powerful militia, a network of charities, and political representation in Lebanon’s Parliament. It relies on three important principles: religion, the fight against Israel, and the battle against corruption and poverty. Despite previous setbacks—such as the war with Israel in 2006 or the demonstrations in 2019 when anti-Hezbollah slogans sounded loud and clear—Nasrallah has been able to maintain his power over Hezbollah and Lebanon, essentially ruling a state within a state. In 2008 he effectively occupied Beirut and proved to the then Prime Minister Saad ad-Din al-Hariri who really held the keys to power in Lebanon. He then delayed the formation of the government and the election of a president until he got the desired result. He came to be known as a mighty and skillful political player, perhaps the only player in town.

This proved to be a pyrrhic victory. Today Nasrallah bears overt responsibility for the prospect that his country—once considered the “Switzerland of the Middle East,”—is a step away from the graveyard of failed states. By posing impossible conditions and promoting the interests of Iran over those of Lebanon, he jeopardizes Lebanon’s future. His organization, as it turns out, does not have the capacity to replace the Lebanese state, nor is it willing to evolve into a normative political organization and let go of terror, illicit funding, the drug trade, and its ultimate commitment to fight Israel on Iran’s behalf. The Shia-Lebanese identity of Nasrallah leaves him little room beyond tactical compromises, while his loyalty to Iran’s leadership will prevent serious reforms and true change. Lebanon can hardly be called a sovereign country anymore as the shallow nature of the Lebanese state led Hezbollah to fill the void and expand into every sphere of life in the country. But it now falls to him to reap the bitter results of the chaotic situation that for 30 years served his interests. The real danger is that he might need a new war to change the equation and regain Hezbollah’s status as the “defender of Lebanon.”

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune

הפוסט Hassan Nasrallah, Master of Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During the last few weeks, this campaign waged by Igatha 48 – a charity arm of the southern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel – has collected well over 8 million shekels or about $2.5 million to help the refugees in northern Syria. The funds and the goods are collected in mosques as well as through a designated bank account which is publicized in Arab-language media and on the Facebook pages of other charitable organizations in Israel’s Arab sector. The campaign gained immense popularity during a recent live broadcast donation effort via Facebook, when the mayor of Kafr Qasim made a personal donation of a few thousand shekels, sparking a “donations competition” among Arab cities and villages. Israeli media barely reported this countrywide campaign that included neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, big cities, small villages and Palestinian refugee camps.

Late last week, the United Nations warned that many of Syria’s nearly 3 million displaced persons and refugees face dire winter conditions after the region experienced record-low temperatures and a snowstorm. The humanitarian crisis in the country had entered its 11^th year and, according to international relief organizations, the situation is far from getting better.

“The current campaign is just one of many,” said Ghazi Issa, chairman of the Igatha 48 charitable organization affiliated with the southern branch of the Islamic movement in Israel. Igatha is the Arabic word for relief. “We held a similar campaign last year, two years ago and so on. They usually take place in winter, since the Syrian winter is very cold and hard and the hardship of the refugees is growing,” Issa told The Media Line.

According to Issa, Igatha 48 also held similar relief campaigns for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and is recognized by the United Nations. All collected funds and goods are transferred to northern Syria through the charitable association and facilitated by the Turkish charitable organizations Khair al Umma and Tariq al-Haya that operate inside Syria, he says. The activists of Igatha do not cross the border, since under Israeli law Syria is regarded as an “enemy state”; they instead watch the trucks carrying the humanitarian aid as they cross the Turkish-Syrian border on their way to the refugees.

One of the charity’s most recent projects is a brand-new Syrian village called “Orange Jaffa.”

The Orange Jaffa village is located in the township of Basiqah in Idlib Province in northern Syria. In the first stage, Orange Jaffa will comprise 100 residential units, and the plan is to eventually create 500 residential units that will be connected to running water and electricity, replacing the tents that the refugees suffer in through the winter.

“This is a human matter. We are all brothers, we are one nation. If a person sees children that are freezing to death, he must move and do something. The issue is not just aiding Syria. It’s human compassion and mercy,” Freij told The Media Line.

The op-ed was published in The Media Line in February 2022.

הפוסט Israeli Arab Citizens Donate Millions for Refugees in Northern Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This attack has turned into the fiercest battle between ISIS and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in years, and it involved sleeper cells, suicide terrorists and riots inside the prison. According to Omar Abu-Layla, an executive director of the DeirEzzor24 research and analysis organization and a former Free Syrian Army spokesman, the attack by ISIS cells and the riot within the prison were carefully planned and organized, and the time was chosen based on the weather conditions. In addition, some of the fighters disguised themselves by wearing SDF uniforms.

Gweiran Prison, the largest of about a dozen facilities run by the US-supported Syrian-Kurdish forces, holds a few thousand inmates, among them top ISIS commanders and other extremist figures. The fighting there continued for more than three days, with the Kurdish SDF forces fighting supported by US-led coalition airstrikes on ISIS-held positions in Hasakeh. According to a tweet by SDF spokesman Farhad Shami, 17 Kurdish fighters were killed and 23 were wounded, along with dozens of ISIS fighters. It is unclear how many prison inmates were able to escape. Footage of a few dozen recaptured prisoners showed men dressed in prison uniforms under civilian clothes. ISIS flags and uniforms were discovered in the area where the battles between the ISIS gunmen and SDF fighters took place.

ISIS operatives claimed responsibility for the Gweiran Prison break through its media outlet, Amaq, and announced that it was able to free 800 inmates. An SDF spokesman rejected this claim, saying that it was impossible for 800 people to leave the area without being seen and followed by SDF fighters. ISIS also took responsibility for an ambush on an Iraqi military post near Baghdad on Friday. Eleven Iraqi soldiers were killed in this incident. Since the attacks, Iraq has tightened security measures on its border with neighboring Syria and President Barham Salih tweeted, “The attempts to revive terrorism in the region cannot be underestimated.”

Experts are now wondering whether the battle at the Gweiran Prison is an indication that the dangerous terrorist group, that was able to capture large swaths of land in Syria and Iraq in 2014, is in the process of rehabilitating and will soon pose a serious threat to both countries again.

Abu-Layla believes that, despite the many countries that claimed victory over and the eradication of ISIS, the organization is still strong In Syria and has many sleeper cells placed in the country. “We also must remember that Iran is working to push ISIS to the American-controlled region,” Abu-Layla told The Media Line.

According to the SDF spokesman, in addition to Syrian citizens there also were some foreign nationals among the killed ISIS attackers. Thousands of foreign nationals, including women and children, are held in SDF-controlled prison facilities, and Abu-Layla believes that this situation is a recipe for disaster.

“The issue of ISIS prisoners remains tough and difficult to contain. Also, the Kurdish administration relies on it as a political card to attain global support and establish an international court, which is a tactic that has not always been useful for the administration,” he said.

Although the global coalition has provided the SDF with logistics and helicopters to guard the prisons, the shaky structure of the prisons still does not allow for the secure control of such a huge number of dangerous prisoners, he says. According to the expert, five attempted riots and prison breaks occurred during 2021. The current attack on Gweiran Prison was the worst, however.

“Six attempts in less than a year raise the question of the extent of the seriousness of the coalition and SDF to secure the prison well,” Abu-Layla said.

“ISIS is a complicated body, serving many masters. It also serves as an excuse for many, such as the Syrian regime that used this card to justify its other actions,” according to Assad Hanna, a former White Helmet activist, and currently an international affairs fellow at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

In addition, Hanna told The Media Line, “the local authorities in northeast Syria like PYD (the Kurdish left-wing Democratic Union Party) and SDF accuse all of their Arabic opposition of being ISIS. The reality is that the SDF is not capable of holding them (ISIS prisoners) there for a long time, and the countries where they were citizens should deal with them at a professional level. Holding them in that prison under an annual budget which may get cut at any time (meaning that the guards will no longer be there) is not going to work.”

Prof. Uzi Rabi, director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies based in Tel Aviv, says that behind the headlines of the more recent ISIS-Kurdish clashes there are also long-term ethnic tensions between the Kurds and the Arabs in northeastern Syria.

“Many of the inmates are ISIS fighters. However, there are also many family members of Arab tribes who were arrested on suspicion of being ISIS sympathizers or anti-Kurdish elements. Also, ISIS cells maintain friendly cross-border ties with many Arab tribes in Syria and Iraq who share an anti-Kurdish agenda. The tension is enormous, and ISIS is gaining power. The situation is far from being similar to the pre-2016-2017 period, and still there any many places where it gets ammunition, intelligence and support. It seems to be enough to turn ISIS into an undeniable fact on the ground,” Rabi told The Media Line.

Rabi believes that the situation in Iraq is actually worse than in Syria due to the existence of “Saddam soldiers” – Arab Sunni elements who enjoyed being in power during the Saddam Hussein-era and who are ready to fight against Shia rule in Iraq at any cost, along with ISIS or with anyone else.

Dr. Kamal Sido, a Middle East consultant at the international Society for Threatened Peoples headquartered in Germany, believes that in the absence of firm American support of the Kurds, there might be an increase in the number of Arab tribes in northeastern Syria that will support ISIS.

“They are looking at the stronger actor and trying to make the right choice. If the Americans will continue supporting the Kurds firmly, the Arabs will try to mend ties with the Kurds. However, if they will see a weak and undefined position, they might choose ISIS. I still hope that the Americans will support the Kurds in their fight against ISIS,” Sido told The Media Line.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 25, 2022

הפוסט ISIS cells are reappearing in Syria and Iraq הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Between a rumor and a policy

Tangsiri is certainly not the first one in the Middle East to “expose” the Jewish roots of the rival party and to accuse a leader or a dominant figure of being a descendant of the Jews. The internet is full of conspiracy theories about the Jewish mother of the late Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, the Jewish roots of ex-Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Jewish origins of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former leader of the terrorist ISIS organization.

Yet, there is a big difference between an obnoxious internet-born rumor and official state policy that proudly trumpets its antisemitism. While some countries in the Middle East are making an effort to promote tolerance and coexistence and to fight against antisemitism in the education system and in the media, it seems that Iran – along with radical Islamist movements – is pulling the Muslim world in the opposite direction, says Iranian-born Ellie Cohanim, who served as Deputy Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism in the Trump administration.

“The Iranian regime engages in what I have termed an ‘obsessive antisemitism,’ meaning that antisemitism motivates much of their activity and is part and parcel of their ideology,” Cohanim told The Media Line. “Whether it is the fact that they have named their militia group the ‘Al Quds Force,’ so named for their desire to ‘liberate’ Jerusalem from the Jews; or their Holocaust denial as state policy; or their terror proxy activity through Hamas, Hizbullah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and even the Houthis, all aimed at the destruction of Israel, the regime’s desire to end a Jewish sovereign presence in the Middle East animates much of their activity,” she said.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is home to a Jewish community of about 10,000. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, a few Iranian Jews were accused of spying for Israel and executed; 35,000 Iranian Jews left Iran soon after. Officially, Iran separates between the Jews and the “Zionists,” however, in practice, these terms are often used interchangeably.

Cohanim highlights the use of both the terms Zionist and Jew in the Iranian general’s speech in which he claimed that the Saudis are descendants of Jews. “Noteworthy in this speech is how the navy general would flip back and forth between the terms Zionist and Jew, contradicting the regime’s own narrative in which they claim that they don’t hate Jews they merely hate Israel. But in moments like in this speech, or when Ayatollah [Ali] Khamenei had the gall to refer to US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner as ‘Jewish’ and ‘filthy Zionist,’ in those moments they undermine their own narrative,” she said.

‘I’m a Semite, too. How can I be against myself?’

It’s not a secret that for many years antisemitism was well accepted in most parts of the Middle East, and often propelled by various regimes, both conservative and progressive. Antisemitic sermons were read at the mosques and antisemitic tropes were taught in classrooms at schools and universities. However, today, when more Middle East countries are developing warmer relations with the Jewish state, and the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as a peace deal with Morocco are flourishing, it seems that the tide is finally turning, even though it might take many years to undo the indoctrination of the past. Yet, Iranian leadership – as well as Muslim Brotherhood offshoots around the world – keep promoting the same old hate-filled agenda against the Jews and the Jewish state, relying on several sources rooted in religion.

While Islam recognizes Judaism as a monotheistic religion and sees Jews as the “people of the book,” relations between the Prophet Muhammad and the Jews weren’t always easy. While the hadiths – a traditional collection of the sayings of Muhammad and of his tacit approval or criticism – contain information about the care and concern the prophet had for his Jewish neighbors, the Quran and the Hadith also mention that Muhammad had fought against the Jewish tribes that refused to embrace Islam. These verses are often recited and quoted by antisemitic religious and political leaders in the Muslim world; however, the verses are often misquoted and their meaning is distorted, according to Haras Rafiq, interim managing director of ISGAP – The Institute for Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy and a trustee of the British charity Muslims Against Antisemitism.

“When we look at traditional, classical Islam we see that Jew is not a derogatory term. This phenomenon is approximately 100 years old. Today, when you want to attack somebody in the Muslim world, you call him Jewish. It’s the worst kind of a slur among the Muslim majority around the world. When Imran Khan became a prime minister of Pakistan, there was a fundamentalist extremist organization that called him a Jew,” he told The Media Line.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the vacuum was filled with various ideologies such as fascism, communism, Islamism, Baathist and more, Rafiq says. “Leaders, such as the Grand Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini merged the European form of antisemitism with misinterpreted verses from the Quran and turned it into a religious issue,” Rafiq said.

Rafiq, who has advised numerous British prime ministers and worked with UK ministers and US secretaries of state, notes the misuse of the Quranic quotes and stories, and blames the propagandists from Iran and radical Islamist organizations for using the Quran and the Hadith for incitement and recruitment purposes. “The Shia in Iran believe that we are now at the ‘End of Times’ and the Jews are doing the work of the Dajjal, the Antichrist, by controlling the money,” he explained.

Saudi citizens do not appear to have reacted to the Iranian’s general verbal attack against the royal family.According to Ahmed N. Al-Ibrahim, a Saudi-American political analyst, the Saudis are not bothering themselves with Iranian slurs and insults too much. “Sometimes Iran says that the Saudi royal family is Jewish. And sometimes they say that the Sauds are from Mars,” he said.

“They can say whatever they want. We know that the Iranian regime is backward – it is against the Arabs, against the Jews, against all. Their number one enemy is Al-Saud. We are not worried. Also, the bloodline of the Sauds is well-known. These are stereotypes for local consumption. As for antisemitism, well, Jews are not the only Semites in the Middle East. We are Semites too. I’m a Semite. How can I be antisemitic? It means that I will be against myself,” Al-Ibrahim added.

Decades to achieve real change

Experts are looking at what can be done today to curb the hateful antisemitic propaganda coming from Iran.Cohanim believes that, in order to stop the inciteful rhetoric, the US has to choke off the Iranian regime’s funding sources.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 21, 2022

הפוסט Iran drives antisemitism in the Muslim world- analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Then Aoun made a similar statement, saying that “unjustified, deliberate and systematic blockage which dismantles the state and drives it to its demise must be ended.” The Cabinet has not met since October.

Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement is an ally of Hezbollah in the Lebanese parliament and in 2016 he was elected the president due to its support after 29 months of stalemate.

Hezbollah quickly reacted to the Aoun statement by slamming Bassil – who has presidential aspirations when Aoun’s term ends next year – and indicating that Bassil might be losing its support.

Meanwhile, Aoun on Thursday signed a presidential decree approving legislative elections for May 15, 2022, two months later than the current parliament had wanted it to take place.

Experts are questioning whether the leaders of FPM are truly reconsidering their ties with Hezbollah so close to the upcoming 2022 parliamentary elections, and what such recent statements say about the growing resentment against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

“The criticism against Hezbollah is growing fast. Many people are talking about it out loud. The press is very militant these days, and there is also a criticism that is expressed through social networks, namely Twitter. In 2019 (Hezbollah’s) offices were targeted in Nabatiyeh, in the heart of their own base,” Dr. Moran Levanoni, an expert on Syria and Lebanon affairs for the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, told The Media Line.

“Lately it seems that the resentment is growing, especially after the explosion at Beirut Port. Also, (Hezbollah leader Hassan) Nasrallah promised to provide a solution to the energy crisis, but his attempt to bring oil ships from Iran has failed. He didn’t succeed to do anything meaningful. So, when Aoun says what he says, he aims not only to foreign ears, but also to the domestic audience that is unhappy with what Hezbollah does,” he added.

Pierre Akel, a Lebanese journalist and researcher who hosts the popular trilingual website Middle East Transparent, says that the economic and political crisis has badly hurt Hezbollah’s reputation and popularity.

“I believe that Hezbollah is finished popularity-wise. I appreciate that today more than 80% (of voters) are against them. After all, the Shia Lebanese are hungry like everybody else. Even if they have money in the bank, they can’t withdraw it, as a person can only withdraw up to $400 each month now,” Akel told The Media Line. “The people are poor and when they are going to the pharmacy to buy some milk powder for their children they do not have the dollars to pay, as they are not Iranians and not Hezbollah activists. Hezbollah also had to cut the salaries for its own fighters, but still they are the only ones who have the money. So, there is a class struggle between the rich who are close to Hezbollah’s plate, and those who are lacking everything.”

At the same time, Israeli researcher Dr. Yusri Hazran, a lecturer at the Shalem Center and a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, says that despite the recent statements made by Aoun and Bassil, their political alliance with Hezbollah is not over yet.

“The elections are coming up, therefore it’s hard to believe that the words will annul political loyalties and alliances. Also, Hezbollah is not really a part of the traditional Lebanese elites that are to blame for the current economic crisis. That’s the image that the group wants to promote,” Hazran told The Media Line. He added that Hezbollah is determined to prevent a rift with the Christians, which would explain the “limited and measured reaction after the shoot-up in Beirut” on October 14 in which seven people were killed during a protest organized by Shiite groups Amal and Hezbollah to demand the removal of Tarek Bitar, the judge who is investigating the 2020 blast in Beirut. Hezbollah blamed the troops of Lebanese Forces Commander Samir Geagea for the deaths.

“Hezbollah is not interested in igniting a civil war in Lebanon, neither do they want responsibility for a failed state,” Hazran said.

For years Hezbollah relied on the socioeconomic structures that it created in Shia-populated areas in order to increase its popularity and support among its poor and deprived base. Charities, free clinics and educational facilities for children were created in places that had been neglected by state authorities for many years. It gave small loans through its financial arm, Al-Qard al-Hassan, and as the economic crisis became worse it made help available to other communities and not only to Shiites. However, lately, the harsh economic realities in both Iran and Syria and the push by the United States against the group in South America have created a cash problem for Hezbollah. Some question whether the movement will be able to continue operating its many socioeconomic services to maintain its popular support.

“Lebanon needs seven oil tankers every 10 days. We are talking 30 tankers per month. Nasrallah brought one,” said Akel, who is based in Paris and closely follows developments in Lebanon. Akel says that the group no longer has at its disposal the sums of money that it used to enjoy before.

Levanoni says that for now, the socioeconomic structures are still holding.

“Hezbollah heavily relies on the illicit economy, namely the drug operation that they are running together with the Syrians. So those who are close to Hezbollah do enjoy some aid, including fuel for generators and subsidized drugs, loans, etc. Of course, these measures won’t solve the problem entirely and the situation is very grave,” he said.

The experts are pessimistic about a possible change in the political equation in Lebanon.

“Who can perform a revolution? Only a person who had breakfast that day. I will be very surprised if the current developments will change the situation significantly. Hezbollah is losing support, but for now, it’s not enough to squeeze it out,” said Levanoni.

Meanwhile, Akel, as well as many people in Lebanon, feel that the recent statements by Aoun and his son-in-law were merely an act of hypocrisy.

Jonathan Spyer, an author and Mideast analyst who is a fellow at the American think tank Middle East Forum, believes that Aoun’s statements were indeed significant, even if no immediate confrontation follows.

“The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ strategy of implanting ‘Hezbollah’s’ in Arab countries has the flaw that it tends to produce social and economic failure. This is most apparent in Lebanon right now and Aoun is clearly trying to offer a counter-trend to this, advocating repair of relations with Gulf Cooperation Council states. At the same time, neither Aoun nor others not allied with Hezbollah forces cannot and will not offer a frontal challenge to its core strategic path regarding its function as an element of Iranian regional strategy,” Spyer told the Media Line.

For now, the parliamentary elections in Lebanon that are scheduled for next year will be the first vote since the popular protests were launched in 2019. Currently, there is little certainty that they will take place as planned and that the Lebanese who are tired of a failing economy and endless fights between corrupt politicians will be able to cast their votes and choose a better future.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 2, 2022

הפוסט Lebanon may be getting tired of Hezbollah- analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Ksenia Svetlova

The lengthy conversation and the heartfelt warmth described by Housing Minister Zeev Elkin following the first meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett diverted attention from the real question: Did Bennett achieve any progress with Russia on Iran?

Russia is one of the few countries that maintains good relations with both Jerusalem and Tehran. The Russians greatly value this balance to the extent that on the same week that Putin met Bennett, his Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu met in Moscow with Iranian military Chief Mohammad-Hossein Bagheri to sign several important arms deals. The two also declared a “move to a new stage of bilateral relations” and the convening of a military-technological committee soon in Tehran.

Can President Putin be a “great friend of the Jewish people”, as Naftali Bennett called him, and at the same sell sophisticated Russian-made weapons to Iran, a sworn enemy of Israel – even as Israeli-Iranian tensions break previous records and a clash appears more than a theoretical scenario? As far as Putin is concerned, there is no contradiction between the two. He conducts strategic ties with the Turks and the Kurds, with Iran and the Arab Gulf States, with Fatah and Hamas, with Hezbollah and Israel. As long as these ties benefit Russia’s policies of expanding its influence and planting deep roots in the Middle East – Russia is determined to play on this chess board with all its pieces, big and small, black and white.

This is a complex game, as are relations between Moscow and the many actors in the region, including Iran. Russia is interested in continuing to sell its advanced weaponry to the Iranians, but is concerned about Iran’s nuclearization and does not want to be surprised by a daring Iranian move in this regard. At the same time, it also seeks continued cooperation with the Iranians in Syria in order to preserve Bashar Assad’s regime, which enables it to act freely in his country. There are also quite a few other conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tehran, especially over the Caspian Sea and specifically Azerbaijan. Contrary to prevailing views, Moscow’s relations with Iran were never smooth, both due to the ayatollahs’ hostility to the Soviet regime and concern that the Iranians would eventually become a bargaining chip in attempts to improve US-Russia relations.

Israel is also part of these tangled contradictory interests. Different figures in Israel’s political-defense establishment had for several years entertained vain hopes of a Russian, American and Israeli anti-Iran alliance in Syria. However, Moscow-Washington relations kept deteriorating, and despite Russian promises to prevent the Iranians from nearing the Syrian border with Israel, the Iranians continue to operate in the Daraa region and even in the vicinity of the Israeli border. For now, Russia is willing to allow Israel free movement in the skies over Syria, as long as Russian soldiers are not harmed. In case of an accident, whether real or staged by Iran, or accelerated development of Moscow-Tehran ties – the Russian willingness to cooperate could change substantially.

Nonetheless, Putin and Bennett may have found points of mutual interest regarding the continued development of Iran’s nuclear program. Should it choose to do so, Russia could become a key actor in the drama unfolding in recent months between Iran and the US. It would achieve two goals – international prestige (an isolated Russia burdened by sanctions will undoubtedly not object) and preventing a potential clash between Israel and Iran should the Islamic Republic decide to surge ahead to nuclear breakout status or suddenly display a completed bomb.

While the situation in Syria appears static and difficult to change, this arena could provide Israel with an opportunity to become an important link between the US and Russia based on their shared concern over a nuclear Iran. If five hours of talks between Putin and Bennett were devoted to this option, the weekend in Sochi was worthwhile.

הפוסט Between Israel and Iran- Putin’s Chess Game הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Will the Sudan coup affect future ties with Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

News of the conference was warmly received in Israel, perhaps too warmly. Prime Minister Bennett and Foreign Minister Lapid rushed to welcome the news, with the latter noting that it had caught Jerusalem by surprise. The wide media coverage created the misleading impression that Iraq was offering its hand in peace, when in fact the conference communique drew widespread condemnation – from the office of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, other politicians and the public.

The laws of Iraq, one of the few Arab states that never recognized Israel, include vestiges from the Baath Party rule that sentence to death “anyone praising Zionism”. In condemning the conference message, Al-Khadimi reiterated Baghdad’s official position advocating the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem and a just resolution of the Palestinian problem. The Shiite parties went even further and issued threats against conference participants, while the Shiite militias even threatened to fire rockets at Erbil.

Most conference attendees were members of the Sunni minority, especially of tribal groups. In his address to the conference (and his op-ed), al-Hardan linked normalization with Israel to the demand to grant federal status to Iraq’s Sunni regions, a highly sensitive issue accepted until 2014 after which it seemed to have been abandoned. That explains why criticism of the conference quickly deteriorated into expressions of ethnic Shiite-Sunni hostility, although none of the conference organizers are linked in any way to senior Sunni politicians. The Iraqi politician most identified with pro-Israel sentiment, former Parliament member Mithal al-Alusi, lives in Erbil but was not invited.

The timing of the conference in the lead up to the Oct. 10 elections forced Sunni politicians to issue harsh attacks against its participants, in a bid “to cleanse” the Sunni sect from any involvement in initiatives normalizing relations with Israel. Even the Sunni tribes denied any support for the event and its participants. The Kurdish hosts were also forced to deny having given permission for the event, the exposure of which placed them in an uncomfortable position on the eve of the elections and increased the security threat against them by Shiite militias. Nonetheless, the Kurds are unlikely to give in to demands that they hand over the conference organizers.

The backdrop of the conference is familiar to anyone following developments in Iraq and especially to social media activists. The attitude to Israel among the Iraqi public is mostly a consequence of concerns over Iran. For them, Israel is the antidote to the Iranian threat, reflecting the old adage of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Therefore, support for Israel is particularly evident when Iran and its backers attack Iraqi street protesters. With the streets of Iraq calm recently, the level of hostility toward Iran has declined. Conference participants were largely motivated by hostility toward Iran, but their position was perceived as irrelevant at this time.

Relations with Iran are not the only factor influencing attitudes toward Israel; relations with the Palestinians are also at play. At the height of the suicide attack period many Iraqis, especially Shiites, blamed the Palestinians for active participation in the killing of Iraqi citizens (many Iraqis claim that 400 Palestinian suicide bombers blew up in their towns. The real number was probably about 40). The number of such attacks has declined sharply since 2017. Given this relative calm, and in the wake of the May 2021 Operation Keeper of the Walls, the Iraqi finger of blame was replaced by public empathy for the Palestinians. While official Iraq cooperates with the Palestinian Authority, the Shiite militias cooperate on various matters with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad organizations as part of the pro-Iranian resistance (muqawama) axis.

Embarrassing exposure

Nonetheless, the Erbil conference generated discourse on the normalization issue, some of it even positive. It appears to be making waves far stronger than the true impact of the event. The web sites of Israel’s Foreign Ministry have reported an increase in the number of followers and in the number of Iraqis expressing an interest in the event. The argument in Iraq is about the identities of those favoring normalization. Iran opponents claim the conference serves the goals of the pro-Iran parties with some even claiming Iran was actually behind the event. The Shiites are accusing the Sunnis (and Kurds), while others counter with a claim that even the greatest normalization opponents had contacts with Israel in the past.

Some lessons from the event could serve Israel in the future.

1. A huge gap exists between the climate on social media and declarative public activity. The networks reflect (perhaps) the personal views of users in their private space. They can always be denied and they do not constitute a plan of action. The conference at which the speakers were publicly identified and a large number of participants were photographed placed people in a difficult position and embarrassing position, perhaps even a dangerous one. One of the participants even claimed he was brought there by a ruse. Should a similar conference be held in the future, it must be conducted in secret. Public conferences could follow at more advanced stages of a rapprochement process.

1. Such an initial conference should be held outside Iraq, advisedly in Bahrain or the UAE. There was understandably special value to holding the event on Iraqi soil, but its exposure embarrassed the Kurdish regime greatly. Future cooperation with the Kurds could be impacted if Kurdish claims are true about the misleading information given by organizers in seeking permission for the conference.

1. The timing of a future conference is also important. This time it was held against the backdrop of the most important annual Shiite pilgrimage to the holy city of Karbala. Pilgrimages intensify ethnic and religious emotions, all the more so on the eve of elections. He pro-Iran parties are taking advantage of the conference for their purposes and might emerge strengthened.

1. A future conference must be a comprehensive, pan-Iraqi event. The organizers must not be pulled into the quagmire of Iraq’s ethnic conflicts or contribute to their exacerbation in any way. The emerging picture of the event suggests that organizers hooked up with elements motivated by local, ethnic and tribal agendas, which should not be linked to normalization. The link made by speakers between a renewed relationship with Iraqi Jews, Sunni federalism and normalization with Israel was forced. There are many Iraqis of all sects, even in Erbil, who support the goals of the conference and with whom cooperation is possible – politicians, intellectuals, media personalities, civil society activists, and others. They are Iraq’s future.

1. The remarks by one of the speakers, Dr. Sahar Altai of the Ministry of Culture, included practical steps for the next stage: Meetings with Israelis and cooperation in fields such as healthcare, water and tourism. This is the direction that should be pursued. Israel should organize visits of small delegations from among the conference activists, as it did in the past with various Iraqi groups.

1. Iraq, the biggest Arab country east of Israel, operates differently than all the other Arab states, and especially those that have normalized relations with Israel. It does not have a king or president who can do as they please. In every contact with the Iraqis one must remember that some of the country’s senior politicians are not at all hostile to Israel. These are the people with whom contact should be made or from whom a signal should be awaited. What is more, lacking an authoritarian regime, contact with the Iraqi public is of great importance. Such contact should be ongoing, constant, and based on dialogue and on a shared vision and culture, not only on the existence of a shared rival.

הפוסט Irbil Conference: Road to normalization with Iraq long and complex הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nothing in the Middle East is happenstance, not even the date of that summit meeting on the first anniversary of the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. Much has happened since the previous visit by an Israeli prime minister to Egypt 11 years ago. Egypt underwent two revolutions and a short-lived rule by the Muslim Brotherhood, several Arab states entered into an unending vortex of terrorism and civil war, Israel signed peace agreements with four Arab and Muslim states, the US continued to pull out of the region, while Russia and China stepped in – to stay.

Israeli-Egyptian relations withstood several crises resulting from regional storms (and perhaps because of them), with a certain warming felt in some aspects. What lies ahead for Jerusalem-Cairo ties in the coming decade, who in Egypt is responsible for shaping Israel’s image, and why is Egypt continuing its dizzying military buildup?

Together against Islamic terrorism

Cooperation between Jerusalem and Cairo achieved unprecedented closeness in recent years, as Egypt faced widespread terrorist attacks and attempts by organizations loyal to the Islamic State to entrench themselves in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt, struggling to wipe out terrorist activity in the Sinai, welcomed the cooperation with Israel and did not try to deny or hide it, while Israel was pleased with the opportunity to enhance its ties with Cairo and was quick to accede to its many requests, including an increased Egyptian military presence in the Sinai. Despite the regime changes between 2011 and 2013, one factor remained as constant as the massive Giza pyramids – the Egyptian army. All Egyptian presidents, except the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi, were former military generals. All, without exception, saw to the military’s strengthening and enhancement of its image as “Egypt’s defender”.

The Egyptian armed forces play significant roles in the economy, culture and other aspects of life, and is estimated to control some 40% of the Egyptian economy. The portion controlled by the military has kept growing since the events of the Arab Spring that resulted in the unseating of President Hosni Mubarak. Its purview now ranges from road and national infrastructure construction to production of television series for Ramadan. It is thus no surprise that the military is also tasked with the delicate issue of relations with Israel, as reflected in the fact that it was Intelligence Chief Kamel who handed the invitation to Bennett to visit Egypt, not Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry. In the past, too, when mutual visits and meetings were more frequent, the Israel and Palestinian portfolios were managed by Mubarak confidante, Intelligence Chief Gen. Omar Suleiman.

Such special envoys, who prefer the shadows to the limelight, are tasked with the sensitive mediation between Israel and Hamas and managing Hamas-Fatah relations in a manner that serves Egyptian interests and protects it from additional upheavals. Cairo would like to see a long-term truce between Hamas and Israel, and perpetuation of the status quo in the West Bank-Israel-Gaza triangle to prevent renewed cooperation between Hamas and Daesh in the Sinai. In this respect, Israeli and Egyptian goals do not necessarily converge because a long-term truce and lifting of the siege on Gaza could significantly bolster Hamas and result in a more significant escalation with the organization in the future.

Shaky civilian cooperation

Who is to blame for the paucity of economic, cultural and diplomatic ties with Egypt despite four decades of peace? Israeli ambassadors to Egypt have reported for years feeling unwelcome in the Egyptian capital, having a hard time setting up meetings with Egyptian officials, and saying that the Egyptians who did agree to meet with them risked being boycotted or denounced. Bilateral trade also remains limited, reaching some $122 million in the first six months of 2021, whereas trade with Jordan stands at $244 million and with the UAE at $613 million.

Experts say Israel has much to offer Egypt in technological development, agriculture and especially water regime issues, but such cooperation has barely advanced. I, too, experienced negotiations over water regime cooperation with members of the Egyptian Parliament in 2016 and 2017. The other side expressed great interest in the various Israeli proposals, but subsequently dialed down its enthusiasm. When asked why, one of the Egyptian lawmakers said, “such matters need to be dealt with directly by the leaders”, and that was the end of that. While the President himself probably does not have to okay every bilateral agreement, as long as there is no unambiguous green light for deeper cooperation with Israel, civilian cooperation will undoubtedly continue to stagnate. The decision announced in recent weeks to move ahead with direct Egypt Air flights from Cairo to Tel Aviv, is a move in the right direction, as is the upcoming renewal of flights to Sharm El-Sheikh.

One exception to the rule worth mentioning is obviously energy cooperation, which has undergone transformative change in recent years – the establishment of the Cairo-based regional gas forum with Israeli participation and the agreement on Israeli gas sales to Egypt. Both developments were approved because they serve Egypt’s economic and geo-political interests.

Israel, too, prioritizes security relations with Egypt over civilian ones, according to National Security Council sources. This is ostensibly a pragmatic approach – if members of the military can get along with each other, especially given the extensive role of the Egyptian military in the affairs of state, then so be it. However, this approach means that most of the cooperation is conducted far from the public eye, save for a few exceptions, such as the Egyptian-Israeli cooperation against the Islamic State and Israel’s assistance, which could not be concealed. Meanwhile, the term “peace with Israel” remains unacceptable to most members of Egyptian society. Few Egyptians are aware of the cooperation between the two states and according to the latest Arab Barometer polls, the attitude toward Israel remains hostile and suspicious. Anti-Israel messages in popular culture, such as a television sci-fi series aired during Ramadan predicting Israel’s destruction, certainly do not help.

While the level of hostility toward Israel in Egyptian media has declined somewhat in recent years, one occasionally comes across articles claiming Israel is in cahoots with Daesh to destroy Egypt and the Arab world. Several changes were also made to school textbooks, which now include chapters on the Jewish religion and Jewish community of Egypt, and the regime has invested significant efforts in rehabilitating ancient synagogues in Cairo and Alexandria. Nonetheless, just months ago, a major storm erupted when a photo taken in Dubai of popular Egyptian actor and singer Mohamed Ramadan alongside Israeli singer Omer Adam and Israeli-Arab football star Dia Saba resulted in a boycott of Ramadan in his home country, with his appearances cancelled and songs silenced on Egyptian radio stations for several months.

Even if the Palestinian issue is not a top regional or Egyptian priority at this time, as Egypt battles the coronavirus pandemic, unemployment and water shortages exacerbated by the Ethiopian Nile dam, most Egyptians still support the Palestinians and believe full normalization with Israel should await resolution of the conflict with them. Years of anti-Israel incitement and anti-Semitism have not added to Israel’s allure, and its symbols, flags and leaders still incur hostility among many Egyptians, especially young people affected by the flourishing BDS movement.

 The supreme leader

During his initial years in power, a-Sisi avoided public meetings and photo-ops with Israel’s prime minister, although he knew many top Israeli military and defense ministry officials very well. A-Sisi was part of the Obama Administration efforts to hold a regional summit with the participation of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority in 2016. He reportedly also met with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Isaac Herzog, but preferred to avoid public scrutiny of these contacts and opted for discretion.

Anti-Israel sentiment remains a powerful force in Egypt, with many among its elites – writers, poets, journalists as well as civil society activists holding pro-Nasserite views and rejecting recognition of Israel and cooperation with it. This also hampers development of civilian ties with that state. However, military officers and the business people close to them hold a more pragmatic attitude. Even if they do not rank among Israel’s greatest fans, they identify shared enemies (such as Daesh) against whom it is worth cooperating, and shared interests (such as energy) that are worth promoting. Israelis who know a-Sisi describe him as a religious man who held solid and critical anti-Israel views, but they appreciate his determined stand against the Muslim Brotherhood takeover of Egypt. “A-Sisi is nothing short of a miracle,” one of his interlocutors once told me, “He doesn’t like us much, but he dislikes the Muslim Brotherhood much more.”

Power games

Egypt had a vested interest in rapprochement with the US and Israel in the 1970s when President Anwar Sadat first visited Israel and subsequently signed the peace agreement with it. But will the chill in Cairo-Washington relations since 2013 (interrupted for four years of the Trump Administration), affect relations with Israel, too?

It is no secret that the US is trying to distance itself from the Middle East and its many troubles. Its ambiguous policy on Syria, mistakes in Libya and the prevailing perception among the Arabs that the Americans abandoned their ally President Mubarak at the time, along with the US pullout from Afghanistan and Iraq, have prompted a rapprochement between Egypt and the competing powers – China and Russia. While the US is slashing military aid to Egypt (by 10%, for now) over its human rights infractions, China, which is less interested in Egyptian human rights, is building the country’s new administrative capital. Russia, for its part, is building the country’s first nuclear reactor at the al-Daba’a site, expanding its industrial zone on the shores of the Suez Canal and selling Egypt state-of-the-art weapons, among them the SU-35 competitor of the American F-35 stealth fighters.

That deal was signed two years ago, but the US threatened to impose sanctions and at this point it is still unclear if and when these aircraft will touchdown in Egypt and become operational. The general orientation is clear – Egypt does not intend to replace the US with Russia or China, but it would like to have its cake and eat it and prompt these two powers to compete for its favors. Its prospects of achieving this goal are unclear, but Israel would undoubtedly prefer that Egypt remain under the US umbrella, too, facilitating closer cooperation and ensuring a certain American guarantee.

President Abdel Fattah a-Sisi dreams of restoring Egypt’s battered regional status. He would like to turn Egypt once again into the regional leader of olden days, and has therefore been investing a fortune in mammoth national projects such as expanding the Suez Canal as well as in a comprehensive military buildup. In the short term, Israel does not expect a clash with Egypt and is not concerned by this buildup, but in the long term it cannot ignore the erosion of its qualitative military edge and Egypt’s accelerated weapons shopping, courtesy of the Arab Gulf States.

Conclusion

Egypt is important to Israel and vice versa. The Israeli government wisely decided to invest time and energy in improving ties with Cairo. Although the peace with Egypt remains cool, strategically it is certainly no less important, and perhaps even more so, than the newer peace with countries not bordering Israel. Israel must insist on the development of civilian relations with Egypt in order to create a bridge between these two societies and their people, but it must not forget that peace with Egypt is also linked to progress in the Palestinian arena. The tight security cooperation must not obliterate a sober view of Egypt’s re-armament and its future implications for Israel’s security.

הפוסט Hostility, incitement and the decision to improve ties with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Jibril opposed the very existence of Israel. He rejected the idea of negotiating with Israel and never accepted the idea of recognizing Israel. During two decades—the ‘70s and ‘80s—he planned and orchestrated multiple plane hijackings and attacks on Israeli civilians, which he described as “heroic.” Years before Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were established, Jibril was the innovator and trendsetter among other terrorist organizations. His PFLP-GC was the first to use “living bombs” and to find a justification for suicide bombings in Muslim jurisprudence. In 1982 his organization demanded the release of 1,182 Palestinian and international prisoners in exchange for captured Israelis, setting a precedent that came to haunt Israel more than once since then. Who was this man who had dedicated his life to Israel’s extermination but ended up with the shadowy remnants of his once-proud organization fighting with Bashar Assad’s army against other Palestinians in Yarmouk camp and dying an old man—of natural reasons, not in battle—with his purpose being as unattainable as ever?

Living in the Past 

At the end of June 2006, I was sitting in a deep leather armchair in a small office based in Yarmouk refugee camp, waiting for an interview with Ahmad Jibril. The emblems of the PFLP-GC and its flag—a green patch of land that included Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza with rifles and the words “struggle, return, liberation” on its sides—were everywhere. A man with white hair and a moustache had entered the room. No bodyguards were present, even though this man had long starred on the list of most wanted terrorists of both Israel and US (Israel once intercepted a Syrian executive plane hoping to capture Jibril, but it turned out to be an embarrassing case of mistaken identity). A few years later a high-ranking Israeli military official told me that there were times when Israel sought Jibril’s photo in order to develop his full profile and couldn’t get it. By 2006 Jibril was feeling safe enough (or irrelevant enough) to receive foreign journalists in his office. Not that many of them came here; since the days of the Oslo Accords, Jibril’s organization was mostly popular in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria and Lebanon, Fatah and Hamas came to dominate the PA areas. Still, the general secretary of the PFLP-GC was happy to talk about the “good old days,” when the name of his organization evoked fear and anxiety in Israel and around the globe.

He was born in the town of Yazur (today Israel’s Azur) in 1938 (according to other sources he was born in Ramle in 1935) to a Palestinian mother and Syrian father. When the war of 1948 began, his family moved to Syria, where he was raised in Homs and served in the Syrian army, until he got expelled for sympathizing with the Communists. He later abandoned Marxist ideologies and broke with the Palestinian left doctrinaire for the sake of militant Palestinian nationalism.

After a decade of involvement with the PFLP and playing a role in Arafat’s takeover of the PLO, in 1968 Jibril splintered off and formed a radical pro-Syrian faction, the PFLP-GC. During the 1970s, when Palestinian terrorist organizations were operating freely from South Lebanon, Jibril’s organization—believing that the PLO leadership was “too soft”—had committed several massacres, notably the Avivim school bus massacre in 1970 and the Kiryat Shmona massacre in 1974. During that interview in Damascus in 2006, Jibril’s eyes practically lit when he spoke of the Kiryat Shmona “operation” (the terrorists who arrived from South Lebanon had entered a residential building and massacred 18 men, women, and children).

“Resistance is the natural right of our people against the cruel occupier. At one point we decided in the organization that during the ‘operations,’ it is forbidden to waste time on planning escape routes to save our people, but we do not call it suicide, because it is not suicide but rather a sacrifice. There were those who criticized us, because in Islam suicide is forbidden—but we found a reference to the fact that heroic actions, such as the action our heroes performed in Kiryat Shmona, are not considered suicide but istishad (self-sacrifice for the sake of Allah). Our heroes are martyrs and not suicides. Then other organizations adopted our path as well,” Jibril said proudly, and I felt a freezing chill despite the choking summer heat.

There was no need, nor any chance to pose another question, as this angry old man continued to talk vigorously about the past, attacking Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas for abandoning the path of armed resistance, and praising his own heroism and determination. He was looking at me, but it seemed as if in his imagination he had returned to the past, when he was young, powerful, and dangerous.

Jibril’s Cul-de-Sac   

Even when Ahmad Jibril’s organization was at its prime, it had always remained a more violent and militant opposition to mainstream Palestinian politics. “The rebellious youth in the Gaza Strip and in all cities of the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem, will continue all forms of popular resistance until the occupation responds to the demands of the Palestinian people,” Khaled al-Batsh, a member of the Political Bureau of the Islamic Jihad movement said, eulogizing Ahmad Jibril. The common denominator between al-Batsh, one of the leaders of Islamic Jihad, and Jibril’s PFLP-GC is that Iran has supported and financed both organizations. This close affiliation with Tehran and Damascus was never accepted and understood by the Palestinian street, even by those who believed that armed resistance is the only path to freedom. “We, the Palestinians, are alone in this world. So if Syria and Iran want to help us—we will tell them ‘ahlan wa sahlan,’ you are welcome,” he told me back then in 2006.

As Jibril was fantasizing about “Iranian soldiers marching all the way to Jerusalem” (in an interview to the Lebanese TV station Al Mayadeen in 2017), he clearly separated himself from the vast majority of the Palestinians who never expressed any interest in Iran’s help or support for their cause and resented the idea of being marionettes for someone else’s struggle.

“A sworn enemy of Israel and of the Syrian revolution,” is how the Qatari Al Jazeera described the leader of PFLP-GC in its obituary piece. Looking for sponsors and supporters, Palestinian organizations often became a tool for foreign states and intelligence organizations, at times fighting for foreign causes and against fellow Palestinians. The USSR, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Iran all exploited the Palestinian cause for their own benefit and played the Palestinian card against other states in the grand geopolitical game. However, in recent years, it was Ahmad Jibril who completely aligned himself with Assad’s regime, which was slaughtering fellow Palestinians at Yarmouk camp and praised the controversial Iranian involvement in Palestinian affairs.

Spending his whole life away from Palestine and fighting on behalf of other people (although he had a chance to go back after the Oslo agreements as Arafat and his comrades did), Jibril no longer was receptive to the actual hopes and aspirations of Palestinian people, who were dreaming of freedom but also of normal life and prosperity. During the last 25 years, despite the disappointment of Oslo and the distrust of the other side, the majority of Palestinians still express significant support for a two-state solution, although the numbers are gradually diminishing due to the political impasse and dissatisfaction with the PA.

Despite the many attempts of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to ignite a new intifada in the West Bank, the Palestinian public—time and again—chooses not to play into the hands of their Iranian sponsors, who are only interested in creating another hotspot in the Middle East and in projecting their influence.

While listening to Jibril’s bragging about his organization’s “innovations,” such as the suicide bombers or use of gliders (in 1987 PFLP-GC terrorists used gliders to cross the border from Lebanon), I was thinking that this old man, who had dedicated his life and the lives of his many supporters to death and killing, had lost the battle miserably. While he was busy producing advanced terror techniques and footing the bill to the Syrian regime, Israel was busy generating real innovations, in medicine, science, and high tech. His political and military career had reached a cul-de-sac as his violent operations—terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens and plane hijackings—never gained him massive support even among the Palestinian public and did not promote the Palestinian cause of liberation and the establishment of an independent state even by one inch. His violent activity did not weaken Israel, and today the Jewish state is much more powerful—and accepted by much of the Arab world—than it was a few decades ago, when the PFLP-GC committed massacres. Jibril died in Damascus, forgotten by the majority of the Palestinian public, who was put off by his cooperation with Iran and Assad’s regime and by his legacy, which was nothing but blood and suffering.

Ahmad Jibril’s radical variant of secular nationalist violence died or withered well before him. Other offshoots of George Habash’s original PFLP are now small and marginal as well, although they are still capable of occasional acts of terror. It is today Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which took up a different, essentially religious justification for terrorism, who promote the values of “fighting till doomsday” and maintain the bulk of violent activities. All opinion polls show, however, that support for the groups drops when there is a hope for a political settlement for the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Ahmad Jibril bet on violence. It’s up to Israel, the Palestinian leadership, the moderate Arab countries, and the US to promote the other way through diplomacy and offer the Palestinians the prospect of a better life.

*The article was published on The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, 6 October 2021

הפוסט The Lost Battle of Ahmad Jibril הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s Ministry for Regional Cooperation was neglected until the new government was formed in June 2021. The ministry did not interest the Likud ministers who led it in recent years, and therefore it needs to be rebuilt. The ministry aims to develop economic and societal links with the Palestinians and to advance shared initiatives with Arab countries. In accordance with a 2009 government decision, the ministry is responsible for key economic matters related to the Palestinians, although previous ministers neglected this aspect. The Palestinian issue is Israel’s most central issue and must be given full prioritization.

The government could have integrated smaller ministries with larger ones, but as long as the Ministry for Regional Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including their leaders maintain a good working relationship, as they do today, there is justification for the existence of both ministries. There is a broad basis for cooperation when both offices adopt a positive and cooperative approach, and potential for significant success.

The Ministry for Regional Cooperation leads the renewed meetings between Israeli and Palestinian Authority ministers, following a long hiatus. Meetings with Palestinian ministers and discussion of mutual interests constitute a significant change and achievement. The very discourse with the Palestinians creates new opportunities, and advancement of societal and economic issues could eventually lead to discussion of policy issues and renewal of the peace process.

Despite the varying positions in the coalition regarding the peace process, we must do what is possible – within the government, on the civilian level and in terms of public diplomacy – to bring about the renewal of negotiations on the two-state solution. US President Biden also supports this, and there is no other way. The slogans voiced by Netanyahu about “peace in return for peace” with Arab states and Israel’s ability to forge ties with the Arab world while bypassing the Palestinians are false clichés.

The Palestinian Authority is facing great financial difficulties threatening its stability. Israel recently loaned it 500 million NIS, but the money will not last long. The Palestinian Authority must be strengthened. There are internal problems on the Palestinian side, especially regarding human rights, and Meretz has voiced its criticism at relevant forums. But the Palestinians elected Mahmoud Abbas, who heads the Palestinian Authority, and he is the one whom we must work with.

Over the past year, Arabs have brought Israel good news. Arabs from outside Israel have brought Israel economic promise through the Abraham Accords, and Arabs from within Israel saved it from a political and democratic crisis by joining the new coalition. Israel’s economic future lies in its integration in the Middle East. In order to fulfill this potential, Israel’s Arab minority must enjoy a status that can serve as an example of the potential for relationship with Arabs in the region. Arabs in the region must also be provided with a positive experience while passing at Ben Gurion Airport, as to not jeopardize their willingness to visit Israel.

Israelis are keen to do business with the United Arab Emirates. In the past, the symbol of wealth in Israel was Uncle Sam from the US. Now the “wealthy uncle” is an Arab from the Emirates. This is a major change. Arabs have become key to economic success. This must be leveraged in order to change the public perception of Israel’s Arab citizens and to free the Israeli public of its prevailing fear of Arabs. Nonetheless, the Emirates are not our cash machine and we must not view them as such. This is a country that is interested in strategic friendship and partnership with Israel.

The Ministry for Regional Cooperation has worked for years to advance two mega-projects envisioned by Shimon Peres – the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal and the free trade zone with Jordan (Sha’ar HaYarden project). These projects have been stagnating for over 20 years and Jordan has already withdrawn from the canal initiative. The State of Israel must announce formally whether it still regards these projects as relevant, as a decision to step back from them would free up budgets that the ministry could allocate to other initiatives.

Relations with Jordan under Netanyahu were the worst they have been since the signing of the peace agreement. Jordan claimed Israel was untrustworthy and fulfilled only some 10 percent of its promises to the Kingdom. During the new government’s first 100 days, Israel’s Prime Minister, President and Foreign Minister have already visited Jordan, in order to rebuild trust.

In honor of Saudi Arabia’s national day, the Minister of Regional Cooperation wishes its people a good life, prosperity, peace and growth. We must strive for direct flights between Ben Gurion Airport and Jeddah that will enable Israel’s Arab citizens to fulfill their religious pilgrimage. Israel’s Arab population currently goes through suffering and hardship in this regard, and that requires change.

Except for the Iranian axis, Israel has ties with all the states of the region, at one level or another. The Ministry for Regional Cooperation is focusing on promoting ties with those countries that have signed agreements with Israel and that are engaging with it openly. Other countries are waiting to see whether the Abraham Accords succeed in yielding mutual benefit. If so, they are also likely to move forward and establish diplomatic ties with Israel.

הפוסט Israel’s Ministry for Regional Cooperation: <br> A Snapshot After the New Government’s First 100 Days הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Abraham Accords Institute for Peace, co-founded by Trump Administration envoys Jared Kushner and Avi Berkowitz, held a festive Washington event on Sept. 14 to mark the first anniversary of the normalization agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco. In addition to former Trump Administration officials such as Rob Greenway, a top White House official was also in attendance. But although President Joe Biden has adopted the agreements in full, relations between Israel, the Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco are clearly not high on his administration’s priorities.

A year since the signing of the Abraham Accords with Bahrain and the UAE, the sides have achieved what they set out to do. The UAE successfully thwarted Benjamin Netanyahu’s threat to annex parts of the West Bank, and Israel has peace and/or normalization agreements with four Arab and/or Muslim states. The Israeli public, it seems, preferred the peace deals to annexation, which they feared would prompt renewed violence in the West Bank and international boycotts.

While additional Arab states such as Saudi Arabia have yet to join the normalization camp (prospects were low to begin with), relations with Abu Dhabi, Manama and Rabat have been strengthened significantly over the past year. The Arab ambassadors representing these states have already taken up their posts in Tel Aviv, while Israel’s ambassadors are working energetically in the three Arab capitals.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Israelis have visited Dubai this year and the number could well have been in the hundreds of thousands had it not been for the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Dozens of agreements have also been signed between research institutes, hospitals, and commercial and government companies. Jewish life appears to be flourishing in the Gulf, school curricula are changing to reflect the peace with Israel, and Israelis feel sufficiently comfortable to buy real estate, settle in Dubai with residency status and conduct business from the heart of the Gulf.

The past year provides us with an opportunity to examine the two assumptions underpinning the Abraham Accords. The first was that the agreements would revamp the security architecture in the region in Israel’s favor (the alliance with moderate Sunni states against Iran), and the second was that the agreements were not being linked in any way to the Palestinian issue (“peace in return for peace”). Is this also the mindset in Abu Dhabi, Manama and Rabat?

Iran the enemy, Iran the neighbor

When the first agreements were signed with the UAE and Bahrain, many in Israel imagined that the age-old dream of an alliance with moderate Sunni states against Iran and its proxies was finally coming true. Iran’s aggressive policies over three decades had alarmed many Arab countries and made them examine their relationship with Israel “with fresh eyes,” Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs said at the time.

Israel and the UAE have long cooperated clandestinely on intelligence information. The cooperation, which has intensified since the agreement, explains why the Israeli government (for the most part) did not protest the US sale of state-of-the-art F-35 fighter jets to Abu Dhabi. But in hindsight, the climate in the region appears to be shifting and the blocs that seemed to be consolidating in the summer of 2020 have taken on a different shape.

Since early 2021, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been conducting more or less public contacts with Iran. In early August, delegations from both countries participated in the inauguration ceremony of President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran – notwithstanding the attacks by pro-Iranian forces on Saudi territory over the past year and Iranian-sponsored attacks on Emirati and Israeli tankers in the Gulf.

During his swearing-in ceremony, Raisi referred to relations with the Saudis, saying there was no impediment to improved relations between the two states. The divide between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran obviously remains very deep, but they will nonetheless soon begin direct talks attesting to their willingness to improve relations.

While Israel perceives Iran as evil incarnate determined to destroy the Jewish State, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also view it as a neighbor, albeit aggressive and violent, but still a neighbor with which a status quo is a wise goal.

The states of the region were well aware of the increasing US desire expressed by three US administrations to pull out of the region, and they began preparing for the inevitable. On the one hand, they regard ties with Israel, which is also perceived as a regional power, as important; on the other hand, they feel the need to contain Iran and ease tensions with it.

How will this new state of play affect the vision of a moderate Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran? That is unclear. Israel, still blinded by the bright lights of Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Manama, does not seem to be engaging in any in-depth discussion of the implications of these countries’ gradual rapprochement with Iran and Turkey.

Bahrain, perhaps the most vulnerable to Iranian influence among the Gulf States, absented itself from Raisi’s inauguration. Its large Shiite population, physical proximity to Iran and the realization that in the absence of strong, effective friends Iranian attempts to destabilize it will continue, affect its willingness to continue on the course of rapprochement with Israel.

“Israel has become a friend. Diplomatic ties and economic cooperation have signaled the start of a Middle East in which the states embrace each other and also forge alliances against the region’s enemies, especially Iraq. Over the past 42 years, Iran has threatened many states in the region, funded terrorist organizations and supported armed militias in order to destabilize the region and ensure the ayatollahs’ regime remains in power and realizes Khomeini’s dream of exporting radical Shiite ideologies,” Bahraini correspondent Ahdeya Ahmed al-Sayed told Zman Yisrael.

Bahraini Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Sheikh Abdulla bin Ahmed bin Abdulla Al Khalifa has visited Israel three times over the past year. On his most recent visit (in August) he was even photographed with senior IDF officers and issued harsh criticism of the emerging US-Iran nuclear agreement. “Iran’s fingerprints are clearly visible on all the crises in the Middle East. Sadly, the agreement (with the powers) did not deal with Iran’s aggressive behavior and its ballistic missile program,” he said.

This was indisputably a very important statement reflecting the fact that Bahrain is probably Israel’s keenest partner in the struggle against regional Iranian hegemony and the renewed nuclear talks between Washington and Tehran.  However, it is unclear how this alliance enhances the security of either country. In terms of security it is also difficult to compare between all the above agreements and the Israeli peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan – two states that clashed with Israel in several bitter wars and currently maintain peaceful borders with it.

The Palestinian issue is going nowhere

“The blessings of the peace we make today will be enormous. First, because this peace will eventually expand to include other Arab states, and ultimately it can end the Arab-Israeli conflict once and for all. Second, because the great economic benefits of our partnership will be felt throughout our region, and they will reach every one of our citizens. And third, because this is not only a peace between leaders, it’s a peace between peoples—Israelis, Emiratis and Bahrainis are already embracing one another. We are eager to invest in a future of partnership, prosperity and peace.” From Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s September 15 speech at the Abraham Accords signing ceremony.

The determination of the Emirates and Bahrain, along with agreement by Morocco and Sudan to sign normalization and peace agreements with Israel without significant progress in the Palestinian arena signaled a new era in Israel’s relations with the Middle East, or did it? Egypt, too, signed a peace agreement with Israel without substantive progress with the Palestinians, and the peace agreement has survived despite strenuous objections by the Egyptian elite and other social strata.

The Abraham Accords and the agreement with Morocco survived the most recent military operation in Gaza (May 2021), and the architects of the normalization patted themselves on the back. Nonetheless, it was a shock to Israel’s new partners that affected the attitude toward the agreements with Israel in all four states.

While the Israelis see mostly the broad smiles of the Emiratis studying Hebrew and praising Israeli innovation, Shaima Al-Balushi, an Emirati feminist and human rights activist, knows many Emiratis who oppose the continued occupation, support the Palestinians and have grave reservations about the agreements.

“It is very important to understand Emirati culture, a culture of hospitality that welcomes guests with a smile. Israelis visiting us will not encounter hostility. Most things are said behind closed doors and among friends and groups that trust each other. We grew up in a very pro-Palestinian environment. Our teachers were Palestinian, many Palestinians live here and the first restaurants to open were Indian or Palestinian. So what Israelis see on social media, the voices expressing full support for the agreements – is a minority that also comes in for significant criticism on the part of the majority. In fact, the majority accepts the agreements because they understand their strategic importance for our country, but on the other hand we still adhere to the Palestinian issue,” Al-Baloushi told Zman Yisrael.

“The critical voices in the Gulf dub the bloggers who pose with an Israeli flag or praise Benjamin Netanyahu while attacking the Palestinians on social media the ‘Arab Zionists’. These so-called Arab-Zionists not only celebrate the agreements, they also imbue them with a romantic dimension. They gaslight the occupation and Israeli aggression against the Palestinians, hurt the Palestinians and demean their struggle. As far as they’re concerned, one must come at the expense of the other. They highlight their Zionist sentiments even though they are Arabs and not Jews,” Al-Balushi added.

In fact, all those I spoke with in the Gulf and Morocco insisted on placing the Palestinian issue center stage even when asked about other matters. They hinted or said outright that the majority in their country had not change its mind about the Palestinian issue. During the operation in Gaza, increasing opposition was voiced in Bahrain and the UAE to the Abraham Accords, and several pro-Palestinian protests were held in Morocco.

When I spoke with Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Mubarak Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s former ambassador in London on the day the Bahraini ambassador arrived in Israel, he expressed hope that close cooperation between our countries would advance a solution to the Palestinian problem. “The arrival of the Bahraini ambassador points to a new chapter in Israel-Bahrain relations,” he said. “This is happening a year after the signing of the Abraham Accords when it is already clear that we are sincerely interested in cooperation to strengthen the interests of both states. Not only will we try to help each other fight terrorism and seek new ways to ensure sustainable development, we will also make efforts to find an agreed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Al Khalifa told Zman Yisrael. “Obviously, Israel must work to include the Palestinians in diplomatic and economic initiatives with its new regional partners and reduce tensions in places like Sheikh Jarrah because these could lead to unnecessary repercussions harmful to the existing bridges. It is vital that Israel defend and protect the areas holy to Muslims such as the Al-Aqsa Mosque and limit police intervention at the holy sites.”

“I heard from my sources that what happened at the mosque in May angered many in the governments of Israel’s new regional partners,” added Shama Mishtali, an expert on Jewish-Muslim relations and founder of the Moors and Saints social startup operating from Dubai.

“The normalization with the Gulf states and other Arab states has to include the Palestinians,” says Eitan Charnoff, founder of Potomac Strategy who visits Dubai often. Charnoff, who has been active in the Gulf for years, is convinced that Israel has everything to gain by integrating the Palestinians and Arab Israelis into the normalization agenda. “Bilateral normalization that fails to take into account the Palestinians and Palestinian honor, as well as social-economic problems, will be fragile and constantly challenged by the geopolitical and social dynamics of the conflict. Increasing Palestinian economic opportunities in East Jerusalem and the West Bank through cooperation projects made possible by the new peace agreements could help prevent violence. It is imperative to de-escalate to the extent possible in places that are not central to security needs, such as Sheikh Jarrah because this tension has dangerous and unnecessary repercussions.”

Shaima Al-Balushi also believes integrating the Palestinians and pro-peace leftist Israelis into the dynamics of the Abraham Accords could benefit relations. “Most of those active in the Gulf are right wing, and there are many sensitivities of which they are not even aware, such as the issues of Jerusalem and of the occupation. It is important that the Palestinians, the Palestinians who are citizens of Israel and Israelis who support peace come so that we see there are other voices in Israel, too.”

As expected, Israeli business people have stormed Dubai, and some also Bahrain and Morocco, in search of new opportunities. Even if one believes that money is money and business is business, every country and society has a unique style and habits that must be considered. “Our new allies expect tangible results and commitment on the part of the Israeli government regarding long-term partnership. Private and public stakeholders, actors interested in building bridges, must first and foremost work to forge ties and relationships with their regional partners before presenting long-term grandiose projects. We need to focus on building significant relationships and on short-term achievements, which send a clear message about our shared vision of prosperity,” says Charnoff.

Al-Balushi advises Israelis to be patient and relate to the Gulf States as if they were dealing with Europe. “Israelis like to finalize things at the last minute, whereas we prefer to plan meticulously our meetings and moves. The Israelis must also understand that the Emiratis are still sensitive on many issues, whether another military clash or the Jerusalem issue. This cannot be ignored.”

Shama Al-Mishtali, a Moroccan who divides her time between the US and Dubai, stresses the need to integrate Palestinians and Israelis of Mizrachi origin in the normalization process with Arab states. “In a country most of whose citizens are Mizrachi or Sephardi and over 21% of the population are Arab, better ways must be found to mobilize the values of the Middle East and create a new brand that advances Judaism and Arabism as joined and intertwined. Israel must also work on the educational level to advance understanding of the Muslim world and the shared regional Jewish-Muslim history, as well as deepening the cultural understanding of the countries with which agreements have been signed. The UAE and Morocco have already taken serious steps to change their national curricula in order to include Jewish history, making normalization a national project. Israel’s education ministry should consider an initiative to advance pluralism and deeper understanding of the Muslim world by Israeli society and to teach Israelis to appreciate and advance stability and tolerance.”

Nonetheless, the Middle East is still the same Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not disappeared, either. One thing is certain: The Abraham Accords and the agreement with Morocco open a window for many opportunities both in the fields of diplomacy and economy and additional fields.

In order to do better in the coming years, Israel must analyze the past year’s successes and shortcomings. With the ink on the agreements barely dry, it is the time to work resolutely. The new alliances will not necessarily change the complex Israeli security reality nor reduce the challenges it faces, but if Israel acts wisely, it could also benefit greatly from these agreements.

Policymakers must realize that every crisis with the Palestinians, especially in Jerusalem, is harmful to Israel’s public image and will throw cold water on the agreements, even if they remain stable. Only public cooperation in these states will ensure a truly warm peace with the Gulf principalities and Morocco. It is too soon to tell whether Israel has chosen the right path.

הפוסט After the honeymoon, comes the hard work: <br> A year on, the ink has yet to dry on the Abraham Accords הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the year since Israel’s signing of normalization agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, and subsequently with Morocco, Israelis have debated repeatedly whether Saudi Arabia would be next in line.

הפוסט What it might take for Saudis to join normalization process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Having overextended its independent military capabilities in confronting Iran in its sphere of influence, Israel found itself in a vulnerable position. But while Israel might have erred in choosing the field of military engagement, Iran’s retaliatory moves offer a window of opportunity for an effective diplomatic campaign. They create a new catalyst for Israeli-regional-global cooperation against Iran to safeguard international shipping and freedom of navigation. They allow Israel to redefine the curbs on Iran’s regional activities as a global interest, and at the same time help build a long-term partnership with various regional states.

Iran’s attack on the Mercer Street tanker was another in a chain of maritime blows traded between Iran and Israel over the past two years, spanning from the Arab Gulf to the Red Sea and all the way to the Mediterranean. But while most of these attacks inflicted technical damage, the most recent one killed a British and a Romanian national. Deliberately or not, the attack signaled a significant escalation, not only in Israel’s view but also in the eyes of the world.

Iran tried to redefine the rules of the game in its campaign against Israel, retaliating against Israeli attacks in Syria and Iran by attacking Israeli-owned or operated shipping in the Gulf. But in so doing, the Iranians messed with the wrong issue at the wrong time.

Freedom of navigation is a rare principle of international consensus. Threats against global shipping lanes create surprising partnerships among rivals in the international arena.

A prominent example is a coalition formed to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa, unique cooperation among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council despite their ongoing international competition.

Protecting freedom of navigation is an accelerant for action by even the most cautious of international actors. In fact, the anti-piracy coalition led to the formation of the first naval task force in the history of the European Union. Freedom of shipping in the waters relevant to Israel – the Arab Gulf, Red Sea and the Mediterranean – serves as a geopolitical confluence of regional and international interests.

Events in the Gulf do not remain in the Gulf. Even when the focal point of risk lies in the Straits of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab, its impact on global trade is felt in Shanghai, Hamburg, New Jersey and St. Petersburg.

The timing of Iran’s challenges to freedom of navigation is particularly sensitive due to the corona pandemic, given the drastic increase in demand for maritime transportation coupled with current limitations on seaport operations. These have resulted in heavy backlogs and a steep rise in international shipping costs.

The global system is increasingly dependent on maritime trade, but it also recognizes that its shipping lanes are increasingly vulnerable. This was demonstrated prominently in March, when a single vessel blocked the Suez Canal for six days prompting temporary shortages of goods and equipment around the world.

For the West, and first and foremost for the US, the importance of protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf area exceeds the Middle Eastern context. It has repercussions on the principles that the US seeks to promote in other arenas, such as standing up to China in the South China Sea or to Russia in the Black Sea. This was one of the reasons for the speedy August 6 condemnation of the Mercer Street attack by the G7, which pointed the finger of blame squarely at Iran.

THE IRANIAN attack joins a series of previous threats to block shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, and the increase in Iran’s military operations in the Gulf. It underscores that Iran’s threat to global interests is not limited to nuclear proliferation, and illustrates how Iran’s regional conduct projects on the entire international system.

This approach was reflected clearly in the joint G7 statement, which linked the attack with the broader context of Iran’s regional activity in declaring: “Iran’s behavior, alongside its support for proxy forces and non-state armed actors, threatens international peace and security.”

The main diplomatic opportunity for Israel lies in the regional sphere, in strengthening ties with the Gulf and Red Sea states.

Much has been said about the difficulty of establishing Israeli-regional cooperation against Iran due to the different priorities of each state in the region vis-à-vis the Iranian threats. Bahrain is concerned about domestic subversion, the UAE about Iran’s development of drones and cruise missiles, Saudi Arabia about Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen, and Israel about Iran’s activity in Syriaand Lebanon.

Freedom of navigation constitutes a shared interest for all involved parties. The Gulf States are wholly dependent on unfettered shipping for trade, energy exports and communications with the international system. The challenges posed by previous Iranian attacks in the Straits of Hormuz led in 2019 to the establishment of the Bahrain-based International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), bringing together regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Western naval powers such as the US and the UK.

Leveraging freedom of navigation as an issue for regional cooperation presents Israel with a double opportunity, first as a diplomatic framework for bolstering the partnership with the normalization states, and second, for improving the handling of Iranian threats. A main challenge in moving on to the next phase of the Abraham Accords involves identifying potential long-term frameworks for cooperation. Diplomatic and operational coordination to ensure freedom of navigation provides a solid foundation for exactly this type of strategic long-term collaboration.

Bahrain’s deputy foreign minister mentioned this very potential for cooperation last week on his visit to Israel. When referring to the Iranian attack, he underscored the concern of states in the region over Iranian actions in the Gulf in the same breath with the importance of multilateral action.

Looking ahead, cooperation on this issue could help advance “creeping normalization,” providing a platform for joint action with other states that Israel aspires to include in the normalization camp. These include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman, near whose shores the latest Iranian attack occurred.

What can and should Israel do in concrete terms? First, intensify the level of its engagement with the IMSC, formally or informally. This framework is a meeting point between global and Gulf actors, and is therefore of double importance for Israel. Increased engagement could serve as a basis for deepening cooperation with Bahrain, which views the grouping as an important organ for protecting shipping lanes.

Second, define freedom of navigation as a central issue in the array of issues for strategic dialogue with multilateral fora in the Red Sea: the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea, and IGAD, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The Red Sea is a leading arena for international cooperation on freedom of navigation, and Israel has an opportunity to learn, contribute and strengthen ties there on formal and informal levels.

Cooperation on freedom of navigation could also constitute a launchpad for future regional dialogue, including Israel, on forging a joint diplomatic front against Iran’s regional campaign.

The maritime escalation gives Israel a chance to reexamine its modus operandi vis-a-vis the Iranian threat. So far, most of the creativity in this campaign has been invested in clandestine military operations. It is time to invest a similar measure of creativity in building a diplomatic coalition against the Iranian threat. It is time to create a different balance between joint diplomatic action with multilateral frameworks and independent military action.

Skillful Israeli integration in the international and regional campaign to ensure freedom of navigation would not only help protect its interests, but also serve as a tool for intensifying multilateral partnership with the region and the global system. As in the case of the Abraham Accords, Iran’s offensive actions provide Israel with an opportunity to improve its regional integration. Israel should ride this wave.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 2 September 2021

הפוסט Iran’s attacks on Israeli shipping in Gulf serves as lesson הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

he Baghdad conference held on Saturday, August 28, was unusual in terms of both venue and participants. The venue was Baghdad, the host was Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and participants included the leaders of France, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, and foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and Turkey.

The event sought to accomplish two goals: one, more limited, was to bolster Iraq’s stability; the other, broader, to strengthen regional stability. Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, which have become battlefields for some of these actors, were not invited to the event. Its timing, at the height of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, was surely no coincidence. It reflected the growing understanding by the states of the region that they can no longer rely on US involvement and must now fend for themselves.

הפוסט Why were Israel and the US not invited to the <br> Baghdad conference? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

His seminal statement places Lapid alongside historic political figures such as Israel’s first President Chaim Weizmann, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and others, committed to Israel’s integration into the Middle East. The opposing school of thought, best represented by David Ben-Gurion, espoused an isolationist view of Israel as part of the West, in general, and Europe, in particular. Most leaders of the Labor and Likud parties favored this approach, whether former Labor Prime Minister Ehud Barak or former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The latter two will go down in history for their memorable statements in this regard, referring to Israel as a “villa” and its neighbors as “a jungle” (Barak) or “wild animals” (Netanyahu). The isolationist stream dominated Israeli decision making throughout its existence. It stemmed, inter alia, from the boycott by Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbors who refused to recognize its legitimacy. A third school of thought, favored by Israel’s mythological Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Mapam party leader Yaakov Hazan and others, regarded Israel as part of the Mediterranean region. Each of these perceptions was also supported by a series of intellectuals who lobbied for the acceptance of their version.

The 1948 Declaration of Independence indicates support for the Middle Eastern affiliation. “We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East,” it states.

The Jews and Arabs in Israel, it must be said, are still undecided on the question of Israel’s affinity. Mitvim Institute surveys indicate that Israeli society is divided more or less equally among these three perceptions (with about 25% support for each), while 10% think Israel does not belong to any of these regions and 12% do not know. Arab citizens tend to see Israel more as having an affinity for Europe, but the findings regarding this group are essentially similar to those of Jewish society.

The determination of Israel’s place is not merely a political matter; it is related to issues of identity and the way other see it. If the Middle East, with its majority Muslim and Arab population, is perceived as inferior politically (in failing to practice democracy), economically (lacking attractive markets) and culturally, then those espousing Israel’s Middle Eastern affinity will remain a minority, and vice versa.

Israel’s integration into the Middle Eastern region is widely believed feasible under two conditions: Recognition of Israel, and a solution or significant progress toward resolution of the Palestinian problem. The second factor is a pre-condition for recognition, as was the case following Israel’s 1993 Oslo Accords with the Palestinians when Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar, Oman and Mauritania established diplomatic relations with Israel. However, Israel’s 2020 peace agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco illustrated that recognition and regional integration may be possible without resolving the Palestinian issue. This, in fact, was the approach that Netanyahu advanced with what he labeled the “peace in return for peace” doctrine.

The normalization agreements with the Emirates and Bahrain, and perhaps with Sudan and Morocco down the line, illustrate that the peace with Egypt and Jordan, which did not normalize relations between the people, is not necessarily the only model of diplomatic ties between Israel and the Arab world. However, the integration issue is not linked only to cooperation against a shared enemy, whether Iran or Nasser’s Egypt. Israel cooperated in the past with Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, Morocco, Iraq’s Kurds, Lebanon’s Maronite Christians and others, but these states and minorities were unwilling to expose their ties with Israel due to opposition in the Islamic and Arab world.

Israel’s integration into the Middle East will always generate religious and ideological opposition on the part of those who view it as an artificial colonial entity serving the interests of the West and controlling territory not its own, in which Palestinians have dwelled since time immemorial. Others oppose any normalization with Israel as long as the Palestinian problem has not been settled by a two-state solution. However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that Israeli policy is designed to strengthen its control of the occupied territories, leaving a one Arab-Jewish state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River as the only solution. Given demographic trends, this state would have an Arab majority. Thus, events are bringing together the deniers of Israel’s right to exist with those willing to accept it but only within the 1967 borders (with some land swaps).

Israel’s integration into the Middle East carries a price tag – resolution of the Palestinian problem. Are Lapid or other members of the coalition government – except for Labor and Meretz – willing to embark on that course? And if the answer is “no”, how is their view different from the approach that Netanyahu espoused of integration into the region without resolution of the Palestinian problem?

“Israel’s Fateful Decisions” was the title of a 1986 book by the late historian Yehoshafat Harkabi, which foresaw the following option: “Acceptance of a Greater Land of Israel as an Arab state”. Thirty-five years on, this scenario appears closer. Fateful decisions, indeed.

הפוסט Integration into the Middle East? Let’s see you pull it off, Lapid הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu played a key role in reaching the agreements and signing them, but his conduct in the ensuing months made it increasingly difficult to realize their tremendous potential. Netanyahu was hardly the sole architect of the normalization though. In fact, the process began before he came to power in 2009, and developed through intensive, behind-the-scenes diplomacy over many years. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence agencies added building block after building block. Shared security, economic, scientific, and research interests moved Israel and the Gulf states closer together. So did strategic decisions by the UAE, which saw normalization with Israel as essential to its far-reaching ambitions in the region and on the international stage. Trump and Netanyahu certainly did their part, but the move was far bigger than them.

With the breakthrough achieved and the initial elation subsiding, obstacles began to emerge. Netanyahu’s visit to the Gulf was repeatedly delayed. His policies began to frustrate the Emiratis, who protested publicly against Netanyahu’s efforts to utilize the Abraham Accords for his own political benefit. Not only did Netanyahu not personally visit the Gulf, he also vetoed visits by other members of his government for fear they would steal his limelight. Official visits by Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi and Defense Minister Benny Gantz were stalled, preventing the launching of additional ventures and the forging of deeper ties. Netanyahu’s policies in East Jerusalem and at the al-Aqsa Mosque, and the latest round of fighting in Gaza, prompted a counter-reaction by the Gulf states — albeit a mild one — and they made it clear that deterioration in Israel’s relations with the Palestinians would negatively impact bilateral ties. Another factor that proved detrimental was Trump’s failed attempt to establish an investment fund to pay for projects related to the Abraham Accords and his promise of impending normalizations by other Arab states — beyond the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan — which did not pan out, either.

A new government and new opportunities

In the final days of Netanyahu’s term, Israel’s relations with the Gulf states were a far cry from the great promises and declarations of his election campaign. But now, conditions are ripe for the new government to forge ahead and realize the potential of the relationship. Already in their first days in office, both Naftali Bennett and Lapid have stressed the importance of ties with the Gulf states, expressed their commitment to advancing them, and exchanged messages with senior Emirati officials. Absent Netanyahu’s veto on visits to the Gulf, and given the gradual lifting of coronavirus restrictions, a series of high-level Israeli government delegations is likely to be making its way to the Gulf to solidify the emerging ties. The new government is also expected to enhance its management of relations with Arab states, given the likely strengthening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Lapid and the ministry’s newly restored responsibilities, as well as the renewed predominance of diplomatic and professional considerations (rather than personal political interests) in decision making. Enhanced governmental transparency is also likely to prevent additional obstacles in relations, such as the oil deal reportedly signed by Israeli companies with the UAE, to which Minister of Environmental Protection Tamar Zandberg is opposed. The intention of the newly appointed Minister of Regional Cooperation Issawi Frej to intensify the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in relations with the normalization states augurs well, too. Government measures to promote dialogue with the Palestinian Authority (PA) would be very beneficial for its relations with the Arab world, as well.

The U.S. under President Joe Biden is also committed to promoting Israel’s ties with the normalization states, within a better framework than Trump’s — not as an avenue to circumvent the Palestinian issue, but rather as beneficial source of leverage to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations. Biden’s reported intention to appoint former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Daniel Shapiro as his special envoy for the normalization process would be very beneficial for Israel and the states in the region and possibly even help to thaw the freeze between the UAE and the Palestinian leadership, a move that if successful could pave the way for shared projects among Israel, the Gulf states, and the PA. This would also enable Israel to benefit from the EU’s new Southern Neighborhood policy, which refers specifically to the normalization agreements and expresses willingness to participate in related projects and to help advance them.

These political-diplomatic opportunities are underpinned by the civilian and economic infrastructure established in recent months between Israel and the Gulf. Cooperation between research institutions, universities, cultural institutions, companies, and civil society organizations has evolved, and new ventures are emerging almost daily, albeit still on a limited scale. This conveys a message to the new government regarding the major potential waiting to be tapped, and encourages it to act accordingly.

On Oct. 1, after a year-long coronavirus-induced delay, the international Expo will be launched in Dubai, with Israeli participation, providing Israel with an impressive stage on which to display its wares. Last year’s event was planned as the de facto launch of the Israel-UAE normalization. This year, with the right approach by the new government, it could turn into a celebration of the new relationship Israel has, and should still further develop, in the Middle East.

**The Article was published on MEI, June 24 20211

הפוסט With Netanyahu gone, the Abraham Accords<br> will not only survive, they might even flourish הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel cannot afford to ignore Jordan any longer הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It’s hard to pinpoint when that shift began, but a possible turning point was the February 2019 establishment of the Cairo-based regional gas forum comprised of Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.

Israel’s May 2021 military operation in Gaza provided Egypt with yet another opportunity to bolster its standing in the region by mediating with Hamas. Egypt had always played a key role in Israel-Hamas mediation, even under president Morsi, providing Israel with leeway when it wanted to, for example, during the 2014 Operation Protective Edge, and reining it in when it sought a speedy end to the fighting. Either way, Egypt was instrumental in achieving ceasefires and humanitarian aid.

Egypt’s involvement in Gaza is understandable. First, because the enclave lies along its border and is a potential powder keg threatening the stability of the region, in general, and specifically of Egypt. Second, it allows the administration to portray itself as a regional leader on a key Middle Eastern issue. Just as important, the mediation provides Sisi with a seal of approval in Washington, where the Biden administration is intent on reining in regimes violating human rights. Two phone calls by Biden to Sisi during the fighting in Gaza made him flavor of the month. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken also conducted visits to Cairo, Jerusalem, Ramallah and Amman. Egypt continued to lead the mediation with Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry visiting Amman and Ramallah, whereas the head of military intelligence, Abbas Kamel, is actively trying to paper over differences among Israel, the PA and Hamas.

The Gaza operation also resulted in a warming of Egyptian-Israeli relations. Not only did it strengthen bilateral security ties, it also raised the diplomatic relationship to a new level with a visit by Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi, the first by an Israeli foreign minister in 13 years.

THE GAZA operation also prompted a surprising warming of Egypt’s relations with Qatar. Back in January, Egypt, along with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan lifted its three-and-a-half year boycott of Qatar and renewed diplomatic ties with the monarchy. The crisis in Gaza provided an opportunity to dispatch Qatar’s foreign minister to Egypt to discuss his country’s future role in Gaza, not before he pledged a variety of investments in Egypt.

Sisi was also honored with an invitation by Qatar’s ruler to visit his country. The operation in Gaza and the Egyptian mediation thus provided Egypt with an opportunity to renew its active role in the Gulf arena. In light of Qatar’s continued support to the Muslim Brotherhood, it still remains to be seen whether an Egyptian-Qatari full rapprochement is in the offing.

While Gaza took up most of the headlines, Egyptian foreign policy has also become more pronounced in other arenas. One arena is Libya. Egypt supported Gen. Khalifa Haftar and his government in Tobruk, but since the government of national unity was established in Tripoli with UN support, Egypt has shifted its support and even hosted the new prime minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. From now on, Libyan forces backed by Turkey and Qatar will no longer constitute a threat on Egypt’s western border. The recent opening between Turkey and Egypt also signals agreements and understandings on several contentious issues that soured their relationship: Libya and the attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood.

Egypt’s growing activity in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea arena is just as interesting. Ethiopia’s construction of the Renaissance Dam prompted Egypt to warm its ties with Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania and recently even with Djibouti. In fact, Sisi visited tiny Djibouti on May 27. Egypt has also signed defense agreements with the Nile River countries: Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Sudan. In November 2020, it joined the Red Sea Council representing Djibouti, Eritrea, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. All these moves were designed not only to challenge Ethiopia’s regional ambitions, but also to demonstrate Egypt’s standing in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Does the Egyptian activism signal a sea change? It is too soon to tell. One must not forget that regional leadership is acquired with political, economic, military and demographic capital. Egypt has in recent years built a large army, although the extent of its readiness is in doubt judging by its handling of the Islamic State challenge in the Sinai. Egypt’s economy is in tatters following the coronavirus pandemic and absence of tourism, whereas demographic growth poses a heavy economic burden. All these factors do not augur success for Egypt in resuming its historic regional standing, but its renewed energies could turn it into what the late Egyptian journalist Hassanein Heikal once termed a “key state.”

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 20 June 2021

הפוסט Is Egypt back in the Arab driver’s seat? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Gil Murciano, CEO of the Mitvim Institute

Climate change has important implications on many regional and national security issues — from the civil war in Syria to water interests throughout the Middle East. There are three particular spaces of opportunity in the region, first the renewed commitment of the Biden Administration to climate change policy, in partnership with European actors. Second, how the long-term nature of climate change allows for the creation of a significant regional framework for international cooperation. EcoPeace has done crucial work in these efforts. Lastly, with a new Israeli government, new government officials could create new opportunities for regional cooperation specific to environmental policy.

Dr. Daniel Shapiro, Former US Ambassador to Israel

The Biden Administration is clearly making climate change a priority in both domestic and foreign policy, especially working to identify how climate change can serve other foreign policy interests. President Biden is hoping to create a policy that encourages new job growth in renewable industries in the US and to cooperate with both its allies and its global competitors, chiefly China and Russia. Crucially, addressing climate change and environmental policy provides opportunities for crisis mitigation, management and resolution. The Administration’s work in these areas and Israeli environmental technology innovation and climate issues in the Middle East create a deep understanding of the potential for diplomacy and climate action to achieve shared goals.

Janet Rogan, Conference of Parties 26 UK Regional Ambassador to the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia

International politics and conflicts are immensely impacted by shared actions relating to the environment. Climate change threatens the stability and economic growth of the global population, especially in the Middle East, the most water scarce region in the world. As a result, international diplomacy has focused on coming together to address these shared challenges, particularly mitigating global warming (through renewable technologies), adapting human activity, determining means of implementation, whether financial or otherwise, and collaborating in a coordinated way. The importance of incorporating traditionally marginalized groups, such as women and indigenous folks, in these discussions cannot be overemphasized. Without international cooperation, these issues will continue to worsen and thus worsen conflicts.

Dr. Roee Kibrik, Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute

The Israeli government has taken a slow approach to prioritizing the climate crisis within its domestic and foreign policies. This is unfortunate, firstly because today one must embrace climate change as an essential, overarching framework in order to understand the world and operate within it. Secondly, because foreign policies that directly address climate change can help fulfill Israel’s most important foreign policy goals. Embracing policies that address climate change entails embracing regional cooperation, multilateralism and the pursuit of peace.  Thus, it could push Israel to cooperate with Jordan on water security, to search for energy connectivity to Europe, or to work with United Arab Emirates on food security. Furthermore, Israel is in a unique position to gain from these policies, not only from increased security and peace in the region, but because of the innovative technologies Israel has developed that will provide it with more opportunities in the international community.

Amb. Gideon Behar, Special Envoy for Climate Change and Sustainability,

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains the fundamental belief that regional cooperation on climate change is a necessity. The risks from climate change in the Middle East are catastrophic and cannot be addressed alone, but there can be tremendous opportunities from multilateral efforts. The Abraham Accords have opened new doors for investment and cooperation, providing just one example of the regional partnerships that can be created to address climate change. The ongoing cooperation between Israel and its neighbors has always been a priority of the Israeli government, and today there is increased prioritization of environmental issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA has formed a special team on climate change to work on these issues daily, and instructed all global diplomatic missions to reach the green standard in their offices, reducing their carbon footprints and raising awareness of sustainability.

Dr. Susanne Wasum-Rainer, German Ambassador to Israel

Germany is extremely committed to and highly prioritizes climate change within its foreign policy and diplomacy. The European Commission defines climate diplomacy as committing to multilateral economic policy, addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security, taking domestic action at all political levels, and enhancing international climate cooperation through outreach. Climate change requires a global response, chiefly through multilateral cooperation, such as the Paris Climate Accords. Israel is seen as a key partner in this endeavor, both due to its regional position and high level of innovation. Israel can play a huge role in the development of natural gas and energy, which can strengthen cross-border cooperation in the Middle East. The EU is seeking to invest more in environmental technologies, and Germany is committed to participating and working on these initiatives as needed.

Gidon Bromberg, Co-founder and Regional Director of EcoPeace

There are several policy opportunities for climate change and regional diplomacy in the Middle East. The Green Blue Deal for the Middle East plan addresses the positive correlation between water scarcity and the presence of conflict, as well as the heightened impact of climate change on the particularly vulnerable MENA region. If serious action is not taken at a regional level, several parts of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean will become uninhabitable; however, these proposals offer rich opportunities for peacebuilding and unprecedented cooperation. Jordan has an advantage for producing renewable energies, while Israel and Gaza hold the advantage for the production of water. The Israeli Ministry of Energy and Water Authority have already taken increased steps in acknowledging the need for renewable energy, including buying from neighbors such as Jordan. New initiatives include looking towards private interests, including investments from the Gulf States, to build up solar markets and water supply in Jordan and the broader region. The potential threat to Jordan’s water supply could destabilize the country, which would decrease Israel’s stability as well, however the availability of resources throughout Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories can allow for economic growth, regional interdependence, and peacebuilding.

Additionally, the climate crisis provides opportunities for increasing movement towards peace and the two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. To this end, the Green Blue Deal for the Middle East includes mechanisms for water technology sharing, from desalination to sewage treatment to increase Palestinian capacity building. Tackling water issues can provide both sides with a direct response to one of the historically intractable final status issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is no possibility for a zero-sum game in climate change policy, which can provide an important paradigm shift in the understanding of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Furthermore, by creating new projects to clean and resupply the Jordan River, new green jobs and economic opportunities can be created in the region. Lastly, there is extreme importance in educating and empowering Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians to work together to break the cycle of poverty and create a better environmental future for themselves and future generations.

The Green Blue Deal for the Middle East was presented at the United Nations Security Council, the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit, and will be presented at the upcoming G7 meeting, highlighting the willingness of the international community to move forward with climate action in the Middle East.

הפוסט The Climate Crisis as a Foreign Policy Issue:<br> Israeli Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The latest round of escalation between Israel and Hamas illustrates that absent a diplomatic framework, this military strategy is greatly limited in shaping an endurable reality for Israel.

The “War between the Wars” strategy is underpinned by an assumption that Israel is destined to experience significant, temporary escalation every few years in its conflict with the Axis of Resistance – whether Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Its goal is to delay escalation as long as possible and shore up Israel’s strategic position in the interim in preparation for the next round.

However, this strategy has failed to achieve its far-reaching goals in recent years. Each round of fighting has eroded Israel’s position further.

Israel’s standing deteriorates with each new round of escalation as Hamas grows stronger in the domestic Palestinian arena, and Israel grows weaker on the international stage. This has become abundantly clear with the ICC’s decision to investigate alleged Israeli war crimes during Operation Protective Edge (2014). The recent round of escalation also caused a deep tear in the fabric of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel.

In addition, despite the Israeli military’s operational successes, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have upgraded their capacity to inflict damage on Israel’s home front, in terms both of quantity and quality. Instead of the “War between the Wars” shaping reality during rounds of fighting, the rounds of fighting are shaping the overall reality.

However, the main flaw of the “War between the Wars” does not lie in the strategy’s failure to achieve its operational goals, but in the adoption of its underpinning logic by Israel’s political leadership in lieu of diplomacy.

The “War between the Wars” dictates the logic of maintaining the status quo at all cost and accepting a chronicle of certain deterioration, while eschewing a real attempt to shape reality. It constitutes a desperate attempt to freeze reality with the best case scenario that things will not get any worse.

As a plan conceived by Israel’s security echelons in response to a change in the nature of the threat, the “War between the Wars” aims to limit the enemies’ capabilities and influence their short-term considerations rather than affecting their motivations. It is hard to blame the security echelons for this failure; as a military stopgap measure this strategy was never meant to change the systemic conditions of the conflict or provide long-term political incentives.

The “War between the Wars” was conceived by a security establishment subordinate to a political leadership that lacks the vision or the desire for long-term policy. Its adoption as a national work plan fits the anti-solutionism approach adopted by Israeli governments over the past decade to a tee.

The Netanyahu governments have turned the decision to avoid decisions into a strategy, studiously avoiding discussion of long-term solutions, and instead creating a creeping reality, whether Israel’s annexation of Area C, or its conduct vis-à-vis the Hamas or in the state’s relationship with its Arab citizens. Even the significant diplomatic developments of recent years, President Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and the Abraham Accords, were not the product of an Israeli peace initiative. They simply exploited circumstantial opportunities.

The “War between the Wars” creates a false sense of proactivity. It is a policy that sanctifies military creativity and initiative in eliminating operational risks, but enables the political echelon to avoid diplomatic measures.

We have thus become a nation of terrorist hunters rather than of statespersons and foreign policy makers, excelling in the military act but repeatedly squandering its precious achievements in the absence of a strategic policy agenda or even of specific policy goals. This illusion of proactivity collapses with every escalation. While we are busy trying to preserve the status quo, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are learning, adapting and improving conditions for the next round.

The diplomatic paralysis finds Israel at a critical moment for the future of the conflict – on the one hand an unprecedented array of regional opportunities, on the other, a significant level of risk in the national-Palestinian arena.

Shared interests provide Israel with an opportunity to make use of its partnership with states in the region (especially Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) as leverage to revitalize the negotiation process with the Palestinian Authority, and as a temporary conflict prevention tool through the economic development of Gaza.

However, Israel is also facing the twilight of the Mahmoud Abbas era and its unusual Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, which foiled the establishment of a terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and renewal of terror attacks from PA territory.

The new reality of a politically weak, divided Fatah, abandoned by its Arab partners and weakened by the Israeli government, casts a dark shadow on the continued security coordination with the PA and increases the odds of Hamas growing in power in the West Bank. The next round of fighting could present Israel with an active new front on the West Bank.

Following a decade of voluntary paralysis, Israel must now prioritize diplomacy once again, and renew its bid for peace with the Palestinians. Israel must provide a political alternative to the policy of repeated escalations, while still taking advantage of regional and local changes.

Israel must formulate a new political blueprint for its relations with the PA, including halting settlement activity and creating joint mechanisms to reduce tensions in Jerusalem and its surrounding communities. Such an initiative would stabilize the relationship with Abbas’ successors, offering Palestinians hope and ensuring continued security coordination with Israel. It could eventually constitute the basis for confidence building between the sides’ leaders and the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In this regard, Israel should turn the Abraham Accords into a strategic tie-breaker, by integrating regional states into renewed diplomacy with the Palestinians. Such a move would also be beneficial for deepening regional cooperation to encompass additional strategic areas, such as forging defense alliances vis-a-vis Iran and its proxies, and roping Saudi Arabia into the normalization agreements.

Within the framework of a renewed political process, Israel must commit to a joint international effort for Gaza’s development.

Plenty of ideas and initiatives have been floated in the past decade. But Israeli and international attention to this issue usually lasts two or three weeks after each round of escalation, then receding with the shift in public attention. Linking improving the quality of life for Gaza’s residents with the political process would generate long-term Israeli, Palestinian and international commitment.

The “War between the Wars” has served over the past decade as the necessary minimum for a bearable existence for Israel, in a dynamic threat arena.

But the limitation of this military strategy in ensuring Israel’s security underscores the message resonating in recent weeks from Gaza all the way to the northern border: That along with a determined struggle against the Axis of Resistance and its proxies, the main campaign in which Israel should engage, to prevent further wars, is the campaign for peace.

**The article was published on Haaretz, 31 May 2021

הפוסט Israel’s Fatal Weakness Against Iran’s Axis of Resistance הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the few months that have passed since the signing of the historical Abraham Accords, Israel and the UAE have opened embassies and exchanged ambassadors, launched direct flights between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi, hosted dozens of businesses, cultural and academic delegations (among them a high-ranking Emirati delegation led by the UAE ministers of finance and economy), and facilitated visits of thousands of Israeli tourists to Dubai. Universities and think tanks from both countries have established connections, and news outlets have launched different forms of cooperation. Israel, the UAE, and the US set an investment fund worth 3 billion USD (the fund is not operational yet) and banks on both sides established agreements on financial services.

The scope of activity between the two countries is impressive, and it seems that in case of Israel and the UAE, the seeds of peace have fallen on fertile ground, mainly due to high level of economic development and mutual geopolitical interests and concerns, such as the Iranian threat (although both sides evaluate and treat it differently).Today, it is almost impossible to imagine that just a few years ago Israeli athletes were only allowed to compete in the UAE if they agreed to participate without their national flag or national anthem sung at the closing ceremony.

Why is it that the peace between Israel and the UAE appears to be such a stark contrast from previous peace agreements that Israel has signed with other Arab countries? Several factors have facilitated the newly established relationship: the positive image of the UAE in Israel; the lack of past hostilities, casualties, and territorial demands between the two countries; the unofficial ties forged long before the official recognition; the many mutual interests that seem to be aligned together; and the right timing that allowed for this bold and important development.

Will the parties be able to maintain a similar level of enthusiasm also when the honeymoon stage passes? How will the two countries deal with various regional and international challenges? This paper presents an Israeli perspective on the first months of the relationship between Israel and UAE, and looks at prospects for the near future of these relations.

הפוסט The First Months of Israel-UAE Peace: <br>Israel’s Perspective on the Abraham Accords הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To counter public claims asserting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had no actual intention of implementing annexation, the Emirati leadership has emphasized that the Abraham Accords were the result of a diplomatic effort for the sake of the Palestinian people. The UAE presented Israel’s decision to halt the annexation as a quid pro quo for the normalization agreements and as the result of pressure the UAE exerted on the Israeli government.

Senior Emirati officials emphasized in the Israeli media the importance of halting annexation and of the Israeli and American commitments to do so under their agreement. The UAE thus set a red line in its relationship with Israel regarding future annexation attempts. The linkage between normalization with Israel and an end to the threat of annexation of Palestinian land signals a new stage in the UAE’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Previously, the UAE was passive on the issue, supporting the Arab Peace Initiative from the sidelines. Now, it is leading a significant move positioning itself as an active player in this arena, despite its rift with the Palestinian leadership.

However, while annexation was defined as a clear red line in Israeli-Emirati relations, other issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain a gray area, for example, the issue of the settlements in the West Bank. Along with positive relations and flourishing cooperation, the UAE has been implicitly critical of Israel over its activities in the West Bank. In December 2020, the Emirati media gave wide coverage of the shooting of a young Palestinian by Israeli soldiers, and in February 2021, it reported on the decision of the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate whether Israel had committed war crimes in the Palestinian Territories.

Additionally, the two countries share new economic relations, with many Israeli delegations visiting the UAE, including one representing the Shomron Regional Council, the umbrella organization of Jewish settlements in the northern West Bank. In December 2020, the Shomron Council signed an export agreement with the UAE’s FAM Holdings. Such cooperation, however, is limited to the private sector, and UAE officials have yet to present clear positions on the purchase of settlement-made goods, ties with the settlements and, in general, the settlement enterprise. Nonetheless, the developing cooperation with Israel will presumably force the UAE to formulate such a policy, or at least to respond to initiatives relating to the territories.

The Temple Mount/Haram Al Sharif issue is also considered a gray area in the Israeli-Emirati relationship. On August 31, 2020, during the first official Israeli delegation visit to Abu Dhabi, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed declared his commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem.

IN OCTOBER 2020, senior Emirati representatives visited al-Aqsa Mosque and encountered angry Palestinians who cursed them and shouted at them to get out, an incident that inflamed tensions between the sides and could result in rethinking the sovereignty issue at the holy site. The incident prompted Israel to strengthen security at the site for visitors from the Gulf, but once tourism from the UAE and Bahrain opens up, the site could once again provoke friction in the trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Gulf states relationship.

Those following the UAE’s diplomatic declarations and activities undoubtedly noticed that in the initial three months after plans were announced to normalize ties with Israel, the Emirati leadership went out of its way to express its commitment to Palestinian national aspirations. The many statements on the issue could attest to its importance to the Emirati leadership as well as the concern over criticism of the agreement with Israel.

Given the precedent it set among Arab and Muslim states by forging full diplomatic relations with Israel, the UAE invested heavily in public diplomacy vis-à-vis its own citizens, the Palestinian people, and the Arab world. Nonetheless, the absence of dialogue with the Palestinian leaderships deprives the UAE of significant leverage in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and forces it to choose roundabout channels to exert influence, for example, through Jordan, Egypt and the UN.

Jordan and Egypt serve as a mediating channel between the Emirates and the Palestinians, given their close relationship and importance to both sides, but most of the activity within these channels remains classified. The UN, on the other hand, serves as a public platform on which the UAE demonstrates its support of the Palestinians by providing humanitarian aid, for example, by coordinating Emirati medical equipment delivered to the Palestinians during the pandemic. Israel has now also joined these Emirati channels of influence, which provide it with a certain measure of involvement in the Palestinian arena, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and possibly in a future negotiating process.

According to Dr. Ebtesam al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center, despite Palestinian opposition to the Abraham Accords, the agreements could actually serve the Palestinian position in the conflict with Israel by:

1) Introducing a new paradigm for peacemaking.

2) Introducing new actors into the peace process, such as the Emirates, serving both Israeli and Palestinian interests.

3) Changing Israeli public opinion regarding the Arab world and the benefits Israel could derive from peace agreements, thereby boosting support for negotiations with the Palestinians. This narrative serves as the UAE’s main argument in explaining its influence on regional stability and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – in both practical terms and in raising awareness.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has sought to spotlight its direct humanitarian contribution to the Palestinians (though not via UNRWA), its relationship with the Palestinian community in the Emirates, its intention to develop new economic channels for the Palestinians and, as mentioned, its commitment to the Palestinian people and to the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

The Emirati leadership’s key message is that its decision to forge ties with Israel was designed to benefit peace, but not at the expense of the Palestinian issue. At a UN Security Council debate, the UAE urged all sides to harness the momentum created by the peace agreement with Israel for renewed negotiations with the Palestinians. With this message, the UAE is outlining its role within the new paradigm of Israeli-Arab relations and the new rules of the game it has defined.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 10th 2021.

הפוסט A look at UAE policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Jordan’s 100th birthday: Centenary of the<br> ‘most unstable’ state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the face of it, nothing about this encounter was consequential—security cooperation is the bedrock of Israeli-Egyptian relations.

However, what captured Israeli headlines was the fact that Cohen was reportedly accompanied by a large delegation of Israeli businessmen. Could the recently signed normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco be warming the “cold peace” between Israel and Egypt?

Possibly, as it is hard to argue that there has ever been a better period in Israeli-Egyptian relations.

Since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in 2013, security cooperation between Jerusalem and Cairo has reached unprecedented levels. The two countries share common goals in containing Iranian regional influence, countering Islamic radicalism, and maintaining peace in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Their 170-mile border—for decades a lawless frontier and hotbed for illicit trafficking and terror activities—now stands quiet. Understanding the need for flexibility in the post-2011 Arab Spring Middle East, Israel regularly permits Egyptian forces to enter Sinai’s demilitarized zones in numbers that exceed what was originally permitted in the 1979 peace treaty. There are similar reports of Egypt allowing cross-border operations by the Israel Defense Forces.

Nevertheless, security coordination has always been the relationship’s epicenter. So, while the depth of cooperation between Israeli and Egyptian forces is laudable, where is the relationship evolving?

Few examples are more demonstrative of that point than Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation. In the early 2010s, when offshore hydrocarbons were discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, it was not assumed that Jerusalem and Cairo would buddy up. For years, Egypt supplied Israel with natural gas, but the collapse of their arrangement in 2012 resulted in an unpleasant international arbitration process. In 2015, the International Chamber of Commerce ordered Egypt to pay $1.8 billion in compensation to the Israel Electric Corporation.

This could have been the death knell for future Israeli-Egyptian energy cooperation, yet both governments agreed that the commercial and geopolitical gains outweighed what Cairo owed. Israel’s natural gas reserves were trapped without an export route and Egypt’s dormant liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta were an ideal destination. The Eastern Mediterranean had become a breeding ground for maritime disputes—particularly with Turkey—and great power intervention, demanding more teamwork between friendly states. In 2018, an accord to deliver Israel’s gas to Egypt was signed to the tune of $15 billion. Then, a few months later, the parties reached a $500 million settlement on their old dispute.

Today, Israel and Egypt’s budding energy partnership is the foundation for the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), an international organization committed to advancing  energy development and cooperation opportunities between Eastern Mediterranean states. Based in Cairo and including Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, Egypt sees the EMGF as a vehicle to establish itself as a regional gas hub, which would create jobs, improve Egyptian energy security, and strengthen its geostrategic position. For Israel, membership in a forum with three Arab actors and four European actors is no small accomplishment.

Unsurprisingly, Egyptian Petroleum Minister Tarek El Molla and Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz are among the most recognizable and well-traveled politicians in the Eastern Mediterranean. In late February 2021, El Molla was the first Egyptian minister to visit Israel in the last five years. Their personal rapport is viewed as one of the linchpins of bilateral ties.

Security and energy cooperation has also borne diplomatic fruit. After repeatedly downgrading diplomatic ties during various low points of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Egypt has maintained its ambassador to Tel Aviv since 2008. Israel’s new ambassador to Egypt, Amira Oron, is fluent in Arabic and has a personal bond with Egypt’s vibrant Jewish past. In 2018, Egypt asked Israel to mediate its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Those efforts fell short but presented an opportunity for Israel to offer technology to help mitigate Egypt’s water security challenges upon the dam’s completion.

There are other examples of improving Israeli-Egyptian relations. For years, the route between Tel Aviv and Cairo was flown by Air Sinai—a one-plane airline that did not even bear the Egyptian flag—and not EgyptAir. However, in March 2021, it was announced that EgyptAir would fly the route under its name and triple the number of daily flights. Egypt has also restored multiple Jewish sites in Cairo and Alexandria. The gesture mirrors a trend amongst several Middle Eastern regimes who have tried to alter the perception of their attitudes towards Jews in an effort to court Washington. This message is not lost on Israelis. Anecdotal as these stories are, in concert, they reflect a larger shift taking place at the official level.

In comparison to his predecessors, President Sisi’s stance towards Israel is pioneering. However, there are also clear limitations to Israeli-Egyptian growth.

The Egyptian public has been consistently opposed to normalization with Israel and that position is unlikely to change until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved. Even civilians, like Egyptian actor Mohamed Ramadan, are castigated by the press if seen socializing with Israelis. As a result, high-profile meetings with Israeli officials—like the one with Cohen’s business delegation in March—continue to be censored for fear of public reprisal. These contradictions aren’t exclusively Egyptian. According to reports, the Israeli delegation was organized without prior consultation with the Economy and Trade Minister and Ambassador Oron.

This shouldn’t prevent Israeli and Egyptian officials from thinking creatively about the future of their relationship.

Israel and Egypt should invest more in maritime cooperation. In 2021 alone, a leak aboard a vessel reportedly smuggling Iranian oil to Syria polluted the Israeli coast with tar, and the Ever Given—a massive container ship—was stranded on the Suez Canal, backing up international commercial traffic for days, if not weeks. While neither incident was a bilateral issue per se, they both highlighted areas where enhanced communication—on monitoring maritime traffic, environmental protection, and naval security—could pay dividends.

For the foreseeable future, Israel and Egypt will continue their security coordination on matters pertaining to Hamas—the Islamist movement within Palestinian politics—and the Gaza Strip. But this should also include efforts to alter the economic circumstances that enable Hamas’ grip on power. Egypt’s recent decision to help develop the Gaza Marine natural gas field is exactly the kind of project that could meaningfully improve the living conditions of Palestinians. Expanding the Qualifying Industrial Zones program first introduced by US Congress during the Oslo Peace Process is also an area worthy of review.

Across the region, there is rising demand for technology that will increase human security and food security. Egypt should find ways of bringing Israeli tech into the economy in order to enhance the quality and quantity of its annual harvest. Investment in desalination technology would increase public access to clean water. In a country that has more than once rioted over the price of bread, diversifying Egyptian cooperation with Israel could be the difference between stability and chaos.

Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace is not high on today’s agenda. Despite years mediating between rival Palestinian factions, Egypt appears fairly disinterested in the upcoming elections. Still, Jerusalem and Cairo will never be able to completely decouple their relationship from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and therefore must continue working together to prevent future rounds of violence and the deterioration of the status quo. A disturbance to this delicate balance—for example, renewed Israeli interest in annexing portions of the West Bank—could scuttle the progress of the last six years.

Normalization demonstrated the fluid nature of Israel’s relationship with Arab states, however, methods that work with one country shouldn’t be expected to work everywhere. In Egypt’s case, the strategy is clear: keep expectations low and prioritize steady progress over grabby headlines. That may come as an unsatisfactory answer to some, but it is likely to yield the greatest benefits.

**The article was published on Atlantic Council, 20 April 2021

הפוסט Lessons from Israel and Egypt’s lukewarm peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the eve of Passover this year, I am most looking forward to the Mimuna holiday — a traditional Jewish Moroccan celebration and feast which immediately follows the end of Passover. The Mimuna is a holiday full of love for others, good neighborliness, hospitality and multiculturalism – the same values ​​that can also be expressed through Israel’s relations with its neighbors.

Personally, I am a “sabra” of Ashkenazi descent, but Mimuna is nonetheless my favorite holiday and I have always wished to receive an invitation from my Moroccan friends to celebrate. Not only because of the plethora of sweets (which are sure to throw me off my diet), but because of the values that ​​the Mimuna represents.

My love for the holiday developed under the influence of two Ashkenazis like me. Firstly, my political mentor Shimon Peres, who resolutely nurtured Israel’s relations with Morocco. Secondly, my father-in-law Dr. Dan Ronen, who was an expert on ethnic folklore, wrote a booklet on the Mimuna and for a year was the MC of the main Mimuna event in Jerusalem.

Peres had close relations with King Hassan II of Morocco and with the heads of the Jewish community in Morocco. He saw Morocco’s moderate diplomatic approach as having the potential to affect Israel’s relations with the entire region. The event that most prominently demonstrated Peres’ vision of the “New Middle East” – The same vision that was once harshly criticized by those who are promoting it today, was the Casablanca Economic Conference in 1995.

At the time, Morocco was one of the countries in which an Israeli mission was established in the wake of the Oslo Accords. Unfortunately, it was terminated following the intifada and the deterioration of relations between Israel and the Palestinians.

Despite the freeze in diplomatic relations between the two countries, Morocco remained open to Israeli tourists and business. Morocco also tried to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians, as it did between Israel and Egypt before the Camp David Accords. In the Palestinian context, Morocco has a special status as chairing the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of Muslim States and therefore has a clear commitment to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict peacefully.

As part of a series of lectures this year on March 2^nd called “With the Face to the Maghreb”, the author, journalist and former MK Daniel Ben Simon, whose book “The Moroccans” was published in 2016, hosted Andre Azoulay, Special Adviser to the King of Morocco Muhammad VI and to his father King Hassan II.

Azoulay was a close friend of Peres’ and continued to serve today as a member of the International Board of Governors of the Peres Center for Peace and Innovation. In his lecture, Azoulay expressed his desire for “the normalization between Morocco and Israel to provide an opportunity for the entire region”.

“We have all long hoped for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. In the 1990’s we were close and we missed a lot of opportunities, I think if we can help bring that spirit back it will be one of the important things that will contribute to the relations between Morocco and Israel,” Azoulay went on to say.

Morocco carries a sense of loss for the significant and vibrant Jewish community that left the country in the 1960’s, taking with it an important component of Moroccan multiculturalism. In Morocco, there exists a prevailing discourse of tolerance and acceptance of “the other”, based on a long tradition of reciprocity and mutual respect between members of the country’s three main religions. The Jewish community in Morocco had a history of open and broad-minded Judaism intertwined with universal values.

Our current representatives in Morocco, Ambassador David Govrin, who is a veteran diplomat with experience as ambassador to Egypt, and Einat Levy, an expert on Moroccan issues, are a great choice to renew diplomatic relations between countries.

It is imperative that the Israeli government use this opportunity to cultivate a spirit of reconciliation between neighbors – Arabs and Jews – and to advance the process of settling the conflict with the Palestinians while strengthening bilateral relations.

The Peres Center for Peace and Innovation is ready and willing to take part in this process and fulfill Peres’ legacy by using the expertise he has gained over his 25 years in peace projects in various disciplines – health, education, business and environment – and by harnessing the power of Israeli innovation to promote peace and “Tikun Olam” (repairing the world).

“Tirbachu and Tisadu (Have fun and dine)”!

**The article was published on The Times of Israel, 28 March 2021

הפוסט What has changed this Mimuna? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Any sign of even the slightest contact between Egypt and Israel, not to mention Egyptians and Israelis, is received by Egyptians as borderline treason. Behind the scenes, however, Egypt’s security collaboration with Israel has been steady and has even strengthened considerably in recent years. These two neighboring states also collaborate to advance their energy interests, including EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF) membership and an Egyptian security apparatus-owned Dolfinos company agreement between Israel and Egypt to export gas from the former to the latter. Indeed, the EMGF’s headquarters in Cairo previously hosted Israeli officials, including Israeli Minister Yuval Steinitz, but this kind of cooperation takes place far away from the view of average Egyptians who consider Israel their greatest enemy. More than forty years after the historic Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was signed, this perception of Israel is still prevalent, not only among the hostile media but also in Egyptian popular culture, wherein films continue to glorify Egypt’s victory in the Yom Kippur War and television programs continue to screen anti-Israel and anti-Semitic content — perpetuating Israel’s image as demonic and dangerous.

According to various sources, a public meeting between Netanyahu and Egyptian President Al-Sisi is presently being arranged. The rumor is that a delegation of Israeli businessmen is intended to join Netanyahu on his rare visit. While a date has not yet been set, certain sources have reported “a good atmosphere and willingness to meet” among the Egyptian establishment, which itself is positive. However, the question remains whether the meeting can actually take place following years of Egyptian hostility towards Israel and opposition by the regime in Egypt to holding formal meetings with Israeli leaders. And, if so, why now? What changed all of a sudden?

The answer can be found in the Gulf, or more precisely in Israel’s nascent normalization with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. The trend of normalization recently spread to Egypt’s southern neighbor Sudan and east to Morocco, aggravating Egyptian concerns over being left behind. Egypt is having to contend with a new reality wherein Israel is at the center of an important military, diplomatic and economic alliance in the Middle East. Similar concerns exist in Jordan, a country that for years hoped to bridge Israel with the Gulf. Nonetheless, Egypt was the first country to make peace with Israel, but it now has to bear the consequences of prohibiting any civil cooperation with Israel. Other than Sinai tourism, Israelis rarely visit mainland Egypt, educational and cultural exchanges are non-existent, trade hardly occurs, and the qualifying industrial zone (QIZ), intended to increase regional industrial cooperation through direct access to US markets, is not being fully utilized.

In short, there is no war, but there is also no peace. To be sure, Israel is accountable for not doing enough to promote civil cooperation with Egypt and for openly prioritizing security cooperation instead. Al-Sisi’s willingness to host Netanyahu despite this Israeli intransigence could signal a shift from the passive-aggressive behavior that characterizes the relationship. But, are warm relations actually on the horizon?

Cairo gave its official blessing to the Abraham Accords signed by Jerusalem, Abu-Dhabi and Manama, but the Accords put Egypt at a difficult crossroads: On the one hand, Egypt has done nothing to promote or advocate for the importance of its peace with Israel. In fact, the regime permitted anti-Israel sentiment to flourish and consequently, Cairo now finds itself facing a public that is extremely hostile to normalization with Israel. On the other hand, Egypt receives Saudi and Emirati financial support and hence, cannot condemn or oppose Gulf relations with Israel. Egypt also knows that entering into the new alliance between Israel and the Gulf has the potential to greatly benefit the country’s staggering economy, which at present is unable to meet the needs of the one-hundred million Egyptian citizens, through new investment projects and foreign currency. It remains to be seen how, and if, Egypt can re-engineer its public perception towards Israel, seeing that its hostility towards Israel is coming back to shoot Egypt in its economic leg.

It is a shame that Israel has yet to maximize the potential of her relationship with Egypt, but normalization with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco offers a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Israel to reverse course on this front, e.g. to make peace with Egypt (and Jordan). That is, real peace. Real peace between the people that, while not based solely on security collaboration, will still improve Israel’s security and regional stability.

הפוסט It is time to make peace with Egypt הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

So far, these encounters have exposed significant differences between the Israeli and Gulf systems of higher education, requiring awareness and attention, and possibly some adaptations.

A top-down approach

The Emirati universities and research institutions are integrated into official governmental mechanisms at varying levels of ties and commitment. For example, the presidents of public (governmental) universities are generally cabinet ministers, too. Culture Minister Noura Al Kaabi is also the president of Zayed University; Minister of State Zaki Nusseibeh is the chancellor of UAE University. Even when the role is purely symbolic, it illustrates the affinity between the government and the academic sectors.

These structural and cultural characteristics directly affect the ways research ties could develop. Additionally, traditional barriers have not yet been removed. In this interim period between the signing of the Abraham Accords and the full realization of collaborations, there are still considerable hesitations. On the one hand, the individual researcher based in the UAE is relatively independent in conducting joint projects and maintaining research ties with Israeli scholars. For the most part, their collaboration might unofficially impact their social status in the department or university spheres. On the other hand, reaching out to the faculty or university administration level is far more challenging, as the higher administration levels await formal authorization. Until bilateral ministerial agreements on higher education will be achieved, most of the institutional initiatives from Israel will encounter significant obstacles. Within this state of affairs, some progress was achieved in very few cases, such as the MoU between Israel’s Weizmann Institute of Science and The Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence.

Mapping the research institutions in the UAE and Bahrain

The UAE and Bahrain have both public and private institutions of higher learning. Mostly, Emirati nationals are eligible to study at the UAE’s public universities, while most of the faculty are international. Studies are conducted separately for men and women. Women constitute a distinct majority in the UAE and Bahrain public universities, whereas most of those who go to study abroad are men.

The private facilities include universities, colleges, and research institutions, some locally owned and others branches of international universities. Absurdly, perhaps, the American and European university branches in the UAE are not as free to initiate ties with Israel as the Emirati ones. The reason is that their administrations, naturally, are not as closely affiliated with the local leadership as are government or privately owned local universities and therefore, their waiting period for a green light is longer. In other words, the management of public universities or locally owned, private ones would probably feel more comfortable taking some decisions independently, whereas NYU Abu Dhabi and Sorbonne Abu Dhabi will wait for official government approval. Within the private research sector, think tanks seem to provide fertile ground for high profile ties with Israeli research and policy institutes. This stems from their smaller size and relatively independent standing due to their affiliation with government leadership.

Fewer oriental scholars, more scientists

In the past, the image of Israeli research ties with the Arab World was associated mainly with Islamic studies. The Abraham Accords change this paradigm from research on the Middle East to research with Middle Eastern states. The launching of research opportunities with the Gulf countries to Israeli scholars opens broad mutual research interests. Humanities in the Gulf States are relatively marginalized, with most attention devoted to applied sciences, such as management, environmental studies, law, cyber, computers and digital sciences, artificial intelligence, engineering, economics, and the space industry. There was good reason that the first official collaboration between Israeli and Emirati research centers was in the context of the coronavirus, in a joint effort to develop vaccinations. Beyond the popularity of these research fields in the Arab Gulf States, the move highlighted the UAE’s ambition to position itself as a scientifically advanced state.

International affiliation

Unlike Israeli institutions of higher education, studies in the UAE’s universities and colleges are conducted in English. As mentioned, most of the teaching and research faculty consists of foreign nationals, which affords a diverse scientific environment with abundant research approaches.

The dominant international orientation in the UAE, Bahrain and other Gulf States is discernible not only in their domestic institutions but also in their outreach abroad. Most talented students with top grades will eventually study in the West, returning home with vast knowledge, diverse ideas and cultural influences. Usually, these students are granted government scholarships, and in most cases they will return to their home countries upon their graduation. Furthermore, the Gulf States invest heavily in international cooperation with various foreign research institutions. The endeavors to integrate into the global research arena are also reflected in the formation of research centers abroad, aligned to their research doctrines and interests. Therefore, scientific collaborations with Israel, even on the institutional level, will be among many others that these states conduct.

Researching research

The academic and political culture of the UAE and Bahrain is very different from the West’s, and despite the abundant presence of international scholars, the local system creates unique conditions and characteristics. As a result, in attempting to advance scientific and research ties with these states, we must do what we do best – study and research the higher education system in the Gulf to understand it better before approaching it.

הפוסט The Culture of Sciences: Bridging the Gaps<br> Between the Emirati and Israeli Research Systems הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the Israeli media reported the move, its significance appears to have been sidelined by the dramatic news of the Capitol insurgency and Joe Biden’s inauguration as president under unprecedented security.

The US and its allies have been involved in several conflicts in the CENTCOM’s AOR, chief among them the 1991 Gulf War (“Operation Desert Storm”), various military operations in Iraq in the 1990s, military action in Afghanistan since 2001, and various other campaigns in Syria, Iraq, the Gulf and Iran over the past two decades. CENTCOM’s top priority, according to its website, is deterring Iran – combating the remnants of the Islamic State organization, helping resolve the conflict in Afghanistan, countering the threat of weaponized drones and more.

Israel’s placement under CENTCOM obviously stems from its recent normalization agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, and indirectly from those with Sudan and Morocco. According to the Department of Defense announcement, “the easing of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors subsequent to the Abraham Accords has provided a strategic opportunity for the United States to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East.”

PLACING ISRAEL under the same command as its Arab neighbors is nothing short of a revolution in strategic regional thinking. Since its foundation, and especially in the 1950s and 60s, Israel made desperate attempts to join the Western defense alliances against the Soviet Union and the communist threat. In addition to NATO in Europe, and SEATO in Asia, Britain and the US established the regional Baghdad Pact in 1955, which included Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The Israeli-Arab conflict prevented Israel’s inclusion in that coalition. Just as India and Pakistan cannot be members of the same regional organization, so Israel and the Arab states could not. The refusal by regional organizations, including NATO, to accept Israel increased its sense of isolation vis-à-vis the Arab threat.

Its inclusion at the time under the Pentagon’s European Command obviously defied geographic logic, but was meant to overcome military and political impediments stemming from Israel’s inclusion in the same arena as the states with which it was at war. A similar decision was made in the UN context, when Arab states successfully barred Israel from the Asian bloc of nations, preventing its membership in international organizations arranged according to regional groupings. It was only in May 2000 that Israel gained acceptance into the “Western European and Others Group.”

The US decision to place Israel under the CENTCOM umbrella along with Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States illustrates the willingness of these states to cooperate with Israel openly against the Iranian threat. The Americans still maintain military bases in Bahrain and Qatar, but given the gradual US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel and other countries in the region appear to be assuming a growing role in defending against the Iranian threat.

Israel’s inclusion under CENTCOM also illustrates, on the one hand, US intentions to pull out of the region, and on the other the expected expansion of Israel’s military role in shared threat areas such as Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, as proven in a growing number of attacks attributed to Israel, with US intelligence help, in these countries.

BEYOND THE military importance of the American move, it is also of symbolic significance in restoring Israel to its natural place in the Middle East. Israeli decision makers have generally not perceived their state as part of the Middle East, both due to the constraints of the Israeli-Arab conflict but also as a reflection of political and cultural preferences. Mitvim’s public opinion surveys indicate that Israeli society is consistently torn on this issue. The 2020 survey found that 29% think Israel belongs more to the Middle East than to other regions, 25% think it belongs more to the Mediterranean Basin, 24% to Europe and 22% did not think Israel belonged to any region or said they did not have an opinion.

With Israelis unable to decide, along came the Trump administration and decided for them. President Joe Biden could, of course, reverse the decision, as he has with other Trump directives. Nonetheless, the decision appears highly logical, both geographically and given the changes under way in the Middle East regarding normalization with Israel. It will be interesting to see whether all these shifts also change Israeli society’s perception of its place and affiliation in the region.

הפוסט Trump officially made Israel part of the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

**The article was published on Jpost, 4 February 2021

הפוסט Israel, Iran: Now is the time to test if détente can be reached הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An Electronic Book edited by Dr. Roee Kibrik, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Merav Kahana-Dagan.

Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries: The Unfulfilled Potential examines relations between Israel and seven key Arab states – Egypt. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Morocco and Iraq – against the backdrop of the changes sweeping the Middle East over the past decade. The researchers mapped out the potential for cooperation with each state based on shared interests, challenges and opportunities, and on the abilities, strengths and needs of Israel and those states. The researchers described existing diplomatic, security, economic and civilian cooperation – relying on open source material, their expertise in the arena and interviews they conducted.

The studies found that despite progress in cooperation between Israel and Arab countries, and notwithstanding certain growing normalization with specific Middle Eastern countries, the strategic-diplomatic, economic, social, civilian and cultural opportunities are significant and far greater than their current level. There is wide-ranging, unfulfilled potential in Israel’s relations with Arab countries, and it is more evident now than it was in the past. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and absence of significant progress in resolving it constitute the main obstacle to tapping the potential for cooperation between Israel and the Arab world, capping relations with a glass ceiling.

In formulating its policy and actions in the region, Israel should learn the lessons of the past. It must take into consideration current realities and limitations, existing interests and processes. Just as important, it must also shape its actions, assessing and choosing from among various alternatives with a view to the future potential and tremendous promise they hold out. We hope this publication helps those interested in sketching the current complex picture and the potential that lies in relations between Israel and major Arab countries, and paves the way to expanded cooperation and normalization between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East. As the studies in this publication indicate, the potential for regional cooperation is great and its realization also depends on progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace.

הפוסט Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries: <br> The Unfulfilled Potential הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Establishing diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – Israel forged diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco and announced progress in normalization with Sudan. These moves were underpinned by US encouragement and support, as expressed in significant defense, diplomatic and economic benefits for the participating Arab states. The formal relations led to advancement of agreements and cooperation in a wide array of fields, with official delegations conducting mutual visits. Attempts were made to harness Saudi participation in the normalization wave, including a reported trilateral meeting between Netanyahu, Bin Salman and Pompeo.

2. Advancing normalization with new Arab states, but not with Egypt and Jordan – the agreements with the UAE and Bahrain prompted a flourishing of security, economic and civilian cooperation encouraged and promoted by the governments. Direct flights were launched between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval to overfly its air space, and maritime trade routes were advanced. Israel and the UAE reacted with enthusiasm to the new relationship, as reflected in the agreement on mutual visa exemptions and the visit of tens of thousands of Israelis to the UAE. The advancement of normalization with Gulf states was particularly pronounced compared to the ongoing freeze in Israel’s civilian relations with Egypt and Jordan.

3. Freezing formal annexation but continuing a creeping annexation – Under international and local political pressure, and the conditions set by the UAE for normalization, Netanyahu announced a freeze of his West Bank annexation intentions. Nonetheless, his government continued to move ahead with de facto annexation, without formal declarations, including construction plans in east Jerusalem and the settlements, along with demolitions of Palestinian homes in Area C, special funding transfers to the settlements and Knesset initiatives to legalize outposts.

4. Capitalizing on US elections to advance diplomatic interests – Ahead of the US presidential elections, Israel took advantage of the Trump administration’s desire to display foreign policy achievements in order to promote normalization agreements with Arab states, despite the absence of progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. Following Joe Biden’s victory, Israel sought to capitalize on Trump’s final days in office to promote US recognition of the legality of the settlements. The election results also prompted the Palestinian Authority to resume security and civilian coordination with Israel. Israel’s preparations for the Biden administration focused on the Iranian issue in light of an expected US intention to resume negotiations with Iran on the nuclear agreement.

5. Bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean along with cautious involvement in regional conflicts – Israel has strengthened its alliance with Greece and Cyprus, especially in the fields of security, energy, health and tourism, and accepted a Cypriot initiative to form a trilateral secretariat of the alliance in Nicosia. Israel backed Greece and Cyprus in their maritime border disputes with Turkey, but did so cautiously. It wanted to avoid being dragged into a conflict to which it is not a side and not to exacerbate relations with Turkey, also given recent signals of Ankara’s interest in warmer ties.

6. Leveraging natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean for diplomatic benefits – Israel took advantage of its energy resources and geopolitical location to advance regional cooperation. It promoted, in cooperation with Egypt, the formalization of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a recognized international organization, and ratified its foundation charter. Israel also entered US-mediated negotiations with Lebanon on marking the maritime border between the two states. It approved the plan for a gas pipeline to Europe via Cyprus and Greece, and advanced cooperation with the UAE on conveying energy through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline.

7. Leading diplomatic efforts to forge a regional and international front against Iran – Israel continued its military activity against Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria, in coordination with Russia, and its diplomatic activity against the nuclear agreement and in favor of broader sanctions on Iran, in cooperation with the US. The Israeli MFA’s efforts affected decisions by additional states to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to Iran played a significant role in bolstering Israel’s relationship with Gulf states and in Israel’s decision to supply arms to Azerbaijan as part of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

8. Adopting a more positive approach toward the EU despite disagreements on the Palestinian issue – The EU harshly condemned Netanyahu’s planned West Bank annexation intentions and expanded Israeli construction in the settlements and east Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi adopted a positive attitude toward the EU and underlined the importance of improved ties with it. He participated in an unofficial meeting of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, and advanced ties with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, attempts to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council have yet to bear fruit. Israel’s ties with populist, a-liberal leaders in Central and Eastern Europe were sidelined, contrary to Netanyahu’s boasting of these relationships in previous years.

9. Empowering Israel’s MFA in terms of its professionalism, policy influence and public image – The MFA instituted new working procedures and promoted dozens of professional appointments, some of which are still awaiting government confirmation. Ashkenazi sought to ensure the participation of MFA representatives in all relevant government forums, and to strengthen coordination with other government ministries. The MFA also intensified its media exposure efforts, including spotlighting its contribution to the promotion of relation with Arab states against the backdrop of the Abraham Accords. The MFA stepped up its recruitment efforts, resulting in higher enrollment than in previous years for its cadet training and making the upcoming cadet course the biggest in recent years.

**This article was published on The Jerusalem Post, January 16 2021.

הפוסט Semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies with Arab states הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nonetheless, Morocco’s addition to the list of Arab states establishing formal ties with the Jewish State bolsters Israel’s standing in the region and its leading role in the system of regional alliances. Unlike the recently announced normalization with the Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, Israel and Morocco have enjoyed a rich, multi-tiered relationship of diplomatic, military, intelligence and civilian cooperation for decades. While governmental ties were clandestine, civilian ones were quite open, even expanding and deepening in recent years.

On the diplomatic level, King Hassan, the late father of King Mohammed VI, was instrumental in advancing Israeli-Egyptian peace in the 1970s. In October 1976, he secretly hosted Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin could not enjoy the fruit of this initiative because he resigned from office, but Moroccan mediation between Israel and Egypt continued.

In September 1977, Moshe Dayan, the foreign minister in Menachem Begin’s government met with Deputy Egyptian Prime Minister Hassan Touhami and two months later, President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem. Following the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel, Hassan invested considerable energies in behind the scenes peacemaking efforts between Israel and the Palestinians. He met three times with Shimon Peres in the 1970s and 80s in a bid to promote regional peace, especially an agreement with the Palestinians, but refused to meet with Prime Ministers Begin and Shamir because he did not believe they were ideologically ready to compromise with the Palestinians.

Labor party leaders, especially Peres, were perceived as moderates inclined to advance peace, as borne out by their September 1993 signing of the Oslo agreement. In a tribute to this achievement, King Hassan hosted Rabin and Peres in Morocco.

While fearing Arab and Muslim reaction to formal Moroccan ties with Israel, he nonetheless agreed in 1994 to the establishment of “liaison offices” rather than embassies. His son has now adopted a similar decision. However, unlike King Hassan, Mohammed VI has avoided active Israeli-Palestinian mediation and has made few mentions of Israel in official speeches.

He refrained from meeting Peres when he served as President, and like his father, refused to meet with Likud party leaders Sharon or Netanyahu. The first shift in this policy occurred in September 2018, when Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita secretly met with Netanyahu on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

Israel and Morocco have a history of close intelligence and military ties. The Mossad set up an office in Morocco in 1963, some two years after the sinking of the Egoz, a ship that ferried Jewish immigrants to Israel in defiance of the Moroccan ban on their departure. This tragic incident and the need to organize the mass migration of Moroccan Jews to Israel prompted cooperation between Israel’s Mossad and its Moroccan counterpart (which Israel helped establish), which lasted many years.

Israel provided Morocco with military assistance against the Algerian-backed Polisario Front battling for independence of phosphate-rich Western Sahara, which Morocco took over after Spain evacuated the territory in 1975. Israel’s aid consisted mainly of advice on constructing a security fence (made of sand) and trenches.

As an IDF officer, Ehud Barak was a frequent visitor to the Sahara. When he attended King Hassan’s funeral as Prime Minister in 1999, his easy conversation with King Mohammed reflected their previous acquaintance. Throughout the years, Israel lobbied Congress unsuccessfully for US recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. The Trump Administration’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory facilitated Morocco’s renewed relations with Israel.

Civilian ties between Morocco and Israel existed prior to the official ones and have actually expanded and deepened since official relations were severed. The Jewish Moroccan community in Israel and the small Jewish community in Morocco play key roles in this ongoing relationship. In March 2016, Morocco’s recognition of Israel’s Jewish Moroccan community as part of its diaspora was made official, designating Israelis of Moroccan origin as the second largest Moroccan diaspora after France.

The issue even came up for public debate on whether diaspora members should be allowed to vote, and if so, whether that right would apply to Moroccan Jews in Israel. An Israeli of Moroccan origin can even obtain Moroccan citizenship given that this right applies four four generations. In July 2011, the Moroccan constitution was amended to accord official recognition to Judaism, or rather to the Hebraic influence on Morocco’s national identity.

The expansion of civilian ties was made possible, inter alia, by tourism ties, launched in the 1980s and deepened with the establishment of formal relations. Flexible Moroccan bureaucracy enabled the leveraging of the deep cultural links between the people and annually increase the number of Israeli visitors to Morocco.

Some 45,000 Israelis visited Morocco in 2019 despite the absence of direct flights. On the other hand, very few Moroccans visit Israel, with only 3,500 doing so in 2019, due to the complexity of obtaining an Israeli visitor visa and the absence of a formal Israeli mission in Rabat – which is likely to be rectified soon.

Civilian cooperation in tourism and delegation exchanges, religious and heritage activity, music, films, art, sports and more, takes place both in the physical and virtual dimensions, based on shared values, identity and culture. Musical collaborations are particularly vibrant.

Both countries are key focal points of the Andalusian genre dating back to Juish-Muslim Golden Age in Spain, from where it migrated with the expelled Jews and Muslims to northern Africa, arriving in Israel in the 20^th century with the large Jewish Moroccan immigration.

The flowering of Andalusian music in Israel over the past decade, as reflected in the formation of new ensembles and the performance of Andalusian works, has created a shared cultural language between musicians and artists in Morocco and its diaspora.

By accepting the conditions of international sports federations and allowing Israeli athletes to compete with their national emblems, Morocco has branded itself as a host state of tournaments and sports events, along with the attendant tourism profits. In March 2019, 10 Israelis judokas participated in the Judo Grand Prix in Marrakech, where an Israeli flag was unfurled when Timna Nelson Levy and Gefen Primo were presented with bronze medals.

Furthermore, some of the former Moroccan Jewish communities which spread around the world and lost its previous communal space in Morocco, were reunited and reemerged in virtual spaces and social media. Thanks to a deep sense of longing they have been working to preserve their Moroccan Jewish heritage which was left behind, through preservation of abandoned synagogues, restoration of Jewish cemeteries and organization of conferences and cultural events for communities spread throughout Morocco, Israel and the rest of the world.

The renewal of ties between Israel and Morocco is a natural development. It is based on a cultural and civilian foundation deeper than Israel’s agreements with the Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan and thus holds great potential for a warm relationship. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that the Palestinian issue still constitutes a significant obstacle to realizing the full potential of relations with Moroccan society and sustainable peace, making it incumbent upon Israel to advance its resolution.

הפוסט Israel and Morocco: Major Potential for Warm Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The progressive camp in Israel – the one that believes in promoting peace and coexistence with the neighbours, in exhorting to diplomacy rather than weapons, and in finding partners for dialogue in the region, and which cherishes liberal values and democracy – is obliged to present an alternative policy towards these newly signed agreements. This alternative needs to be one that allows to use this newly established relationship to increase stability and peace, and to advance a possible solution to the ‘elephant in the room’: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which continues simmering.

The US role in the Middle East

If you will ask an American supporter of the progressive camp, he or she will tell you that a truly progressive US foreign policy should start with curbing American ambitions to dominance – military intervention for example, arm supplies or regime change. Many American progressives share a belief that the US should step up its commitment to avoid war and put an end to overly militarised policies. Others also think that the US should act to stop atrocities and human rights violations, especially those taking place in friendly states.

In Israel, both ‘right’ and ‘left’ politicians as well as their supporters believe that US involvement in the Middle East and its alliance with Israel are crucial for Israel’s security and well-being. The American intention to disengage from the Middle East causes a great deal of anxiety in Israel. The Middle East is generally not a friendly place. Ancient struggles and arguments mix with modern conflicts and technologies, creating a deadly mix. The nation states in the Middle East are generally weak. Non-state violent actors, such as Hezbollah or ISIS, are raising to power, and fight for influence and territory. Arab states in the Gulf look at the US military bases as providers of security, and so does Israel.

‘Doves’ and ‘hawks’ in Israel differ however in their perception about the American role in the region. While the latter tend to support any kind of deals between US and the Arab autocratic regimes, the former expect Washington to promote the values of democracy and human rights, and to exercise its influence to protect women, dissidents, refugees and other vulnerable populations.

Israeli ‘hawks’, whether in politics or in the military, do not believe in the possibility of democratisation in the Middle East. They choose the lesser of two evils – the brutal autocratic regimes – over radical Islamists, as they believe there is simply no other option on the table.

The difference in attitudes towards Iran is particularly striking. All Israelis believe that a nuclear Iran will be dangerous to Israel’s security, but while the ‘doves’ believe that the diplomatic tools and the internationally supported agreements can hold Iran back, the ‘hawks’ advocate for the uncompromising position that rejects any kind of agreements, as they have little faith in diplomacy.

Military cooperation with autocratic regimes

The progressive camp in Israel is small, yet divided. Some of them believe that Israel should stay away from selling lethal weapons and spy technologies to countries that might use it against unarmed civilians, especially since many of these deals are quite shady, and generate only little revenues to Israel’s treasury. Others tend to be more conservative in their approach to military and defence cooperation with unsavoury regimes, pointing to the necessity of regional alliances against enemies, such as Iran.

The newly signed Abraham Accords pose a challenge for the progressive camp: some argued that weapon sales are at the core of this deal, rather than promoting peace, and that they will only empower the rule of autocrats here in the region. Others, however, suggested that Israel should try to make the best out of these accords and try to promote dialogue also with other Arab nations in the Middle East, including the Palestinians.

Israel is a tiny state. It definitely cannot afford to preach democratic and human values to its neighbours, and no such attempt would be well taken. Yet, Israel can develop deeper regional relations, which go beyond the circle of military and political leaders and get closer to civil society in Arab states. For that to happen, Israel’s Foreign Service should become more dominant in shaping the Israel-Arab relation, for instance in times of crisis, when diplomatic skills are badly needed and by promoting civil cooperation in various spheres. Currently, the Israeli MFA is overshadowed by the security establishment. Also, a better judgment is necessary regarding important weapon deals: Israel as a democratic country, created from the ashes of the Holocaust, needs to balance its foreign policy and national security conduct with moral considerations.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

And there is, of course, the Palestinian issue. Israel should get back to the negotiation table with the Palestinians and seek a true and just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is extremely important for Israeli society and security, since no truce is eternal and no ceasefire will last forever. But it could also help Israel to win hearts across the border, in the Arab world. While Arab leaders are increasingly detaching themselves from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Arab people did not let go of this issue. Should Israel be interested in turning the Abraham Accords into a real peace between peoples, and not only between leaders (as the accords with Jordan and Egypt), it must work to resolve its conflict with the Palestinians.

Given the fragility of the current situation, violence can erupt in the Gaza Strip and West Bank at any moment. The progressive camp in Israel believes that the two-state solution is still on the table. But it will not remain there for long if Israel’s ‘creeping annexation’ of Palestinian territories will continue and if more settlements will be established in critical areas (such as the E1 zone between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim).

The Palestinian Fatah movement, which in the past had signed the Oslo Accords, currently rules the West Bank. Progressives in Israel believe that, seen its moderate positions, it is currently the only partner Israel can deal with, and – with the help of the international brokers – achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, the Palestinian Autonomy, led by Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, becomes weaker and weaker by the day. If it is not strengthened today, it might fall apart tomorrow, producing an incredible mess and zero opportunities for future negotiations.

It is safe to assume that once US policy toward the Middle East will return to be more balanced and nuanced, Israel will also have to adjust, if it wishes to avoid a confrontation with Biden’s White House. But a truly progressive foreign policy in the region is necessary, one that sees beyond armies and autocrats, that promotes healthy and inclusive dialogue and stays away from shady deals. In order to promote this type of foreign policy, a deep structural change in Israel’s regional politics is needed. The progressive camp, that believes that the newly established relations between Israel, UAE and Bahrain should also include a reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, must promote its agenda through media and in the Knesset. This agenda needs to be made part of an all-Israeli agenda and present Israeli decision-makers with clear alternatives, and with suggestions that they have not considered before. This is not easy, seen that there is little political support for such an agenda in the current Knesset as well as in the government, and yet the progressive camp in Israel must concentrate and present the public, as well as the decision makers with the alternative. It can also benefit from strengthening an alliance with fellow progressives abroad, in Europe, US and elsewhere in order to promote the values of peace and cooperation together.

**The article was published on The Progressive Post, 13 January 2021

הפוסט Progressive politics in the Middle East: Israel and the region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

** Katie Wachsberger is an expert in GCC affairs, working for years in UAE social and cultural sectors, currently leading several trilateral initiatives that present opportunities for collaboration among Israelis, Emiratis, and Palestinians. She has an MA from Ben Gurion University on movements of reform in Oman.

הפוסט Opportunities and Challenges for Israel-UAE<br> Economic Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the days since, however, the meeting appears to have not only a flop but also a something of a disaster. For not only has the nighttime tête-à-tête between the two leaders failed to advance Saudi-Israeli normalization after Prince Mohammad had reportedly rebuffed Netanyahu’s entreaties to move forward before the Biden administration took office. Worse, the meeting also triggered considerable blowback from those within the Saudi ruling family vehemently opposed to normalizing relations with Israel outside the context of the Arab Peace Initiative.

The latest sign came this past Sunday, when a prominent member of the Saudi royal household, Prince Turki al-Faisal, lashed out at Israel in unusually harsh terms, criticizing it for a litany of crimes since its pre-state days to the present. Yet while the belligerent words by the former Saudi head of intelligence drew most of the attention, Prince Turki also made an impassioned plea to Israelis “to take the extended hand of peace” by accepting the Arab Peace Initiative. It is a plea he has made in the past directly to Israelis.

To those craving for comprehensive peace in the Middle East, these and other similar statements by senior Saudi officials should not be discouraging. On the contrary, they offer hope that Israeli quest for normalization with Saudi Arabia will drive home to Jerusalem the need to negotiate with the Palestinians. At the same time, and no less importantly, they underscore the unique opportunity that has opened up for Riyadh to reintroduce the Arab Peace Initiative and press the parties to resume talks on its basis.

Originally launched in March 2002, the Arab Peace Initiative is one of the most far-reaching Mideast peace proposals ever advanced. The brainchild of Saudi crown prince at the time, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, the Initiative offered Israel a quid pro quo: Withdraw from Arab territory captured in the 1967 war and allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the entire Arab world would normalize relations with you. Unfortunately, the plan never got the chance to get off the ground.

The reasons are multiple, but bad timing played a crucial factor. Initiated at the time of the second intifada – the Palestinian uprising that began shortly after the collapse of the Camp David summit of July 2000 – the plan fell on deaf ears. Under terrorist attacks almost daily, Israel was in no mood to contemplate renewed peace negotiations with the Palestinians.

In fact, as bad luck had it, the Arab League summit that formally launched the initiative convened the morning after Israel had suffered the deadliest attack in its history – the Passover massacre at a seaside hotel, which claimed the lives of 30 civilians and wounded 140. Within days, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield, the largest military campaign in the West Bank since the 1967 war.

The second intifada, which claimed the lives of about 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis, left Jerusalem wary of the peace process. By the time the violence had waned during 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon deflected international efforts to resume negotiations by initiating Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. There was even talk of a follow-up move in the West Bank.

The new spirit of unilateralism – under which Israel proclaimed it would act to determine its own borders – was short lived, however, as rocket fire to Israel by Gaza militants, combined with the 2006 war in Lebanon (from which Israel had pulled out six years earlier), put into question the wisdom of Israel’s territorial withdrawals.

A U.S.-led push to jumpstart peace negotiations led to convening the Annapolis Conference in November 2007. But Sharon’s successor, Ehud Olmert, initially trod a cautious path. Eventually, Olmert’s positions would evolve, but timing again was inau8spicious, as his term was cut short by criminal indictments for personal corruption.

Meanwhile, the Arab Spring uprisings and the ensuing Syrian civil war meant that the Arab Peace Initiative no longer required, effectively if not explicitly, Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Instead, Arab leaders increasingly focused on the Palestinian front, adding the pragmatic proviso that any settlement agreed upon by the Palestinians, even if one that included land swaps to compensate for less than a full withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines, would win their full support.

Yet, for the past 11 years Benjamin Netanyahu has capably rebuffed every effort to advance a two-state solution, including the headstrong push by the Obama administration during 2013-14. But even as he has proved averse to making any concessions to the Palestinians, Netanyahu has not lost sight of the promise encapsulated in the Arab Peace Initiative. On the contrary, he sought to win the prize without paying the requested price.

This is why Netanyahu has cast the diplomatic breakthroughs with the U.A.E., Bahrain, and even Sudan as such a triumph. Bracketing off the fact that the agreement required him to abandon his plans for West Bank annexation, Netanyahu has hailed the agreements as vindication for his long-held claim that Israel would eventually normalize relations with the wider Arab world irrespective of progress on the Palestinian front.

Tactically, Netanyahu has a point. But strategically, Saudi Arabia has something even better: the diplomatic leverage to steer the process in a more desirable direction. And the best way to use this leverage is to take the unprecedented step of inviting the Palestinian and Israeli leaders to Riyadh to launch bilateral negotiations, under Saudi auspices, on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative.

True, the principles of the Initiative are difficult for Israel’s current leadership to accept, but Riyadh’s leverage with Israel means that it can offer an incentive only it can: immediate steps to normalize relations in tandem with real progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track.

To judge by the euphoria with which Israelis have greeted the agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, the prospect of normalized relations with the Saudi Arabia could well untether Israel from its deeply rooted positions on what it can and cannot do in order to reach agreement with the Palestinians.

Saudi Arabia is uniquely poised to advance comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Will it pick up the mantle?

**The article was published on Modern Diplomacy, 8 December 2020

הפוסט Will Saudi Arabia Pick Up the Mantle? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Civilian cooperation between Israel and Arab states: How does it work? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.