Trump’s proposals to transfer approximately two million Palestinians from Gaza to other countries, along with the United States assuming responsibility for Gaza, were presented as fresh, “outside-the-box” ideas. This framing gave them an air of innovation and creativity, presenting them as concepts previously unconsidered.

While it is certainly a new idea, not all new ideas are necessarily good ones – and some are best left well outside the box. Unlike the “Deal of the Century,” which was presented in January 2020 as a comprehensive 181-page plan, the current proposals emerged as a spontaneous whim announced by Trump just before his meeting with Netanyahu.

They are a mishmash of ideas, lacking any thorough planning that considers the interests and constraints of the various parties involved.

Trump’s proposals are often seen as an attempt to apply business principles to diplomacy – offering an extreme proposal in order to ultimately reach the desired outcome. As the late prime minister Levi Eshkol put it, “I compromise and compromise until I get what I want.”

Trump’s polarizing Gaza plan

However, Trump’s approach to Gaza deviates from the core principles of his election campaign, and it risks leading him into confrontations on both the domestic and international stages. This could be especially problematic in his relationships with key leaders like Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince bin Salman, Turkey’s President Erdogan, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II.

Apart from Israel, there appears to be little enthusiasm for this deal from other potential stakeholders. Trump can expect significant criticism from multiple fronts.

First, the American public, along with many across the political spectrum, is likely to oppose such a move. America’s appetite for involvement in overseas conflicts has diminished following the failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria – wars that claimed numerous lives and cost astronomical sums of money.

Second, the proposal is vehemently opposed by all Arab states, as it would force them to act against their own interests. More critically, if they were to accept it, they would risk undermining the legitimacy and stability of their regimes.

The Saudi Foreign Ministry was the first to respond on behalf of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, stating that Saudi Arabia would not back down from its position, which has been reiterated since October 7: the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.

As a leading power in the Arab world today, Saudi Arabia has set the benchmark for the position of other Arab states. The United Arab Emirates quickly followed suit, reaffirming Saudi Arabia’s stance.

AS FOR EGYPT and Jordan, both have repeatedly expressed strong opposition during the war to any attempt to relocate Palestinians from Gaza. They are concerned about the potential consequences of a population transfer into their territories and its impact on the internal stability of their regimes.

The fact that Trump’s proposal is intended to be implemented consensually, rather than by force, does not lessen their opposition in the slightest. Trump’s threat to use the US financial clout over Egypt and Jordan may backfire and might even damage Israel’s relations with these two important states.

Similarly, Morocco, which has been mentioned as another potential destination for refugees – an action framed as a gesture of gratitude for America’s recognition of Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara – will also resist being involved. Morocco has long supported the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and has even hosted both public and covert meetings between Israeli and Palestinian representatives.

Moreover, cooperating with an American initiative would likely paint the Arab regimes as traitors to the Palestinian cause, undermining their legitimacy by appearing to contribute to the destruction of the Palestinian project.

While Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause has historically been expressed in rhetorical terms, it is deeply rooted in widespread support among the Arab public.

Over the years, surveys have consistently shown the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab public opinion and Arab leaders cannot afford to ignore it. It appears that Trump fails to grasp the symbolic importance of the Palestinian issue in the Arab world, mistakenly assuming that everything can be bought with money.

And what about the Palestinians themselves? Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, and a strong attachment to the land (known as sumud) are core values within the Palestinian ethos. Trump’s ideas risk turning the October 7 war into a second Nakba, deeply wounding this ethos. They represent an attempt to erase Palestinian identity and deny Palestinians their right to an independent state – a right that is recognized by the majority of countries around the world.

The focus on Gaza overshadowed another equally significant point made by Trump in his speech – his intention to revisit the issue of annexing territories in Judea and Samaria. This could reignite calls for the annexation of Area C, which had subsided following the release of the “Deal of the Century” in January 2020. Reviving these calls now would likely provoke widespread protests across the Arab world and in the Palestinian territories.

It is possible that Trump’s “outside-the-box” ideas were intentionally designed to shock, with the aim of achieving a more modest goal later on. However, there were never going to be any real buyers for these proposals. Moreover, even if these ideas are rejected, there remains an inherent danger in the legitimization, by the world’s most powerful nation, of actions that undermine international norms of behavior.

If Trump is truly interested in rebuilding Gaza, he might consider replicating the Marshall Plan (it could even be named after him!). The Marshall Plan helped restore Europe after the devastation of World War II, without relocating its residents, and involved an investment of an unimaginable $173 billion in today’s terms.

The storm that followed Trump’s announcement is just beginning, and its outcome remains uncertain. It could end up being little more than a “tempest in a teacup,” but if it turns out to be genuine, storms typically bring damage and destruction. The only question is how much damage and destruction will result.

הפוסט Trump’s Proposals for Gaza: A Political Gamble With Global Risks הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Delivering his opening remarks during their joint press conference, Trump announced that the United States “will take over the Gaza Strip” and refashion it as the “Riviera of the Middle East”. Key to Trump’s “long-term ownership” plan, which reportedly blindsided Netanyahu, would be the relocation of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to make way for American bulldozers and urban planners.

Trump’s declaration triggered strong international condemnation. British Foreign Minister Anneliese Dodds said that “there must be no forced displacement of Palestinians, nor any reduction in the territory of the Gaza Strip.” French President Emmanuel Macron and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al Sissi issued a joint statement calling any “forced displacement” of Gazans “a serious violation of international law”. Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its commitment to a Palestinian state. Germany, Russia, and China also took issue with the plan.

The criticism is justified. Trump appeared to unilaterally reject decades of diplomatic norms pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tabling the idea of a future Palestinian state. And while he may be right in insisting that the easiest way to end the intolerable cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas is by removing Gaza’s civilian population from the battlefield, international law on human rights and migration is clear when it comes to the forced relocation of civilians (except for military necessity). Without a cohesive plan for relocating Gaza’s approximately 2 million residents, identification of countries willing to serve as hosts, and a commitment that Gazans will eventually be able to return to their homes, Trump’s declaration—made in the midst of a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas—may do more harm than good in the short run.

No wonder White House staff have been busy downplaying Trump’s commitment to employing US troops, permanently relocating Palestinians, or using US resources to finance the decades-long reconstruction effort.

Rather than disparage Trump’s vision, America’s partners in Europe and the Middle East should develop a feasible alternative that still captures its essence. This plan should prioritize replacing Hamas as a governing force in Gaza, designing an economically sound humanitarian model for international actors to host those Palestinians who wish to relocate, and establishing an international body that reimagines Gaza’s future and oversees the reconstruction process. These steps could eventually create the conditions for normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a coveted foreign policy goal for Netanyahu and Trump alike, and for future discussions of Palestinian sovereignty.

Like it or not, Trump has set the tone for negotiations on the future of Gaza and Palestine. If the United States’ partners truly desire an alternative ending, they must meet Trump in the middle with a vision of their own.

The article was published on February 11th on GMF.

הפוסט Don’t Like Trump’s Gaza Plan? Offer an Alternative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This strategic meeting is poised to be transformative. A recent call between US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has set the groundwork for what could be a defining moment in US-India relations.

The meeting comes at a critical juncture in global security.

Beyond traditional defense considerations, both nations face evolving challenges from China’s expanding influence across multiple domains—cybersecurity, space technology, maritime trade, and artificial intelligence.

The $400 billion China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has heightened these concerns, particularly for US allies in the Middle East.

India and the United States are eager to deepen their strategic partnership across several key areas.

Defense technology sharing, joint military exercises, and cybersecurity cooperation are expected to feature prominently in their discussions.

Their partnership also extends to critical infrastructure initiatives, most notably the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

The IMEC represents far more than just a trade route—it serves as a strategic counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

While the BRI has enabled China to gain control over critical infrastructure through debt-trap diplomacy and state-directed investments, IMEC offers a transparent, market-driven alternative.

Spanning 4,500 kilometers and connecting India to Europe via the Middle East, IMEC significantly reduces shipping times and provides partner nations with infrastructure development opportunities while safeguarding their sovereignty.

What is the significance of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor?

The corridor’s strength lies in its diverse partnership structure: India’s technological and logistical capabilities, Israel’s innovation and strategic position in the Mediterranean via the Port of Haifa, the UAE’s financial resources and infrastructure expertise, and Europe’s market access and technological advancements.

Unlike the BRI, which promotes Chinese control over vital assets, IMEC ensures that infrastructure development benefits all participating nations while maintaining their strategic independence.

The corridor also enhances global supply chain resilience, mitigating the risks associated with economic coercion and over-reliance on Chinese-controlled trade routes.

Currently, crucial global trade arteries—such as the Malacca Strait, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandab—are increasingly vulnerable to Chinese influence.

Given China’s indirect support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels during the war in Gaza, Israel should be particularly concerned. By purchasing large quantities of Iranian oil, China indirectly funds the Houthis through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which channels resources to its proxies.

American intelligence sources have reportedly revealed that the Houthis are using Chinese weapons for their assaults on shipping in the Red Sea while refraining from attacking Chinese vessels.

The Houthis’ disruptions in the Bab el-Mandab Strait threaten global trade security.

Recent developments further highlight the urgency of countering China’s growing influence.

Senator Marco Rubio’s recent trip to Panama to counter China’s increasing presence in the Panama Canal, as well as the Panamanian government’s subsequent reassessment of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) commitments, indicate that the US is beginning to grasp the stakes and is prepared to confront the challenge.

Israel’s role in this evolving strategic landscape is significant. The Israel-India defense relationship, worth over $10 billion annually in military and cybersecurity technology, has become a crucial component of regional security architecture.

Private-sector engagement has further strengthened these ties, with multinational companies from India making strategic investments in Israeli infrastructure and technology sectors.

One such company, the Adani Group, is of strategic importance in the geopolitical triangle of US-India-Israel.

This Indian conglomerate holds a 70% stake in the Haifa port in northern Israel and is involved in ventures such as military drone production and plans to manufacture commercial semiconductors.

This group is also actively acquiring strategic ports across the Indo-Pacific, challenging China’s monopoly with independent infrastructure development and building alternative supply chains essential for preventing Chinese dominance.

Adani is one of the only private companies globally capable of simultaneously developing and operating key infrastructure—ports, power plants, airports, roads, data centers, transmission grids, and logistics chains.

Unlike China’s state-driven model, this entity operates independently of government control, making it a more reliable partner for nations wary of economic coercion.

The significance of this competition was underscored last year when the company faced an aggressive short-seller attack and legal challenges from the US Department of Justice—moves that directly benefited China.

What is the success of this alliance built upon?

The success of this alliance of US strategic partners depends on continued coordination between government policy and the private sector.

Companies capable of developing and operating strategic infrastructure while maintaining independence from state-directed economic imperialism are crucial partners in this effort and must be supported.

To effectively counter China’s dominance, the US and its allies will have to cultivate multiple Adani-like players across partner nations—companies capable of providing world-class infrastructure without falling under state-directed economic control.

These companies need strategic backing, policy support, and financial resources to scale against China’s subsidized expansion model.

Undermining firms like these through financial warfare, regulatory hurdles, or political miscalculations ultimately serves Beijing’s interests.

These initiatives should not be solely driven by the US but by Israel as well.

A wake-up call for Israel 

The Houthi attacks and their alliances with China and Iran should serve as a wake-up call for Israeli leadership. The realization of China’s BRI mega-project would place Israel in a significantly more difficult position during conflicts, disrupting trade not only for Israel but also for its allies while granting Iran substantial leverage.

The stakes are clear: The emerging partnership between democratic nations provides a crucial counterbalance to China’s expanding influence across multiple domains.

The US-India alliance, which includes key partners like Israel and the UAE, serves as a model for how democratic nations can collaborate to safeguard their strategic interests while promoting transparency and sovereignty.

The upcoming Trump-Modi meeting must enhance this strategic partnership, as it has the potential to significantly contribute to both regional and global security and prosperity.

The article was published on February 9th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Here’s Why Israel Should Care About the Modi-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

We owe it to ourselves to ask the question: Where did we go wrong? Why did we not allow the Biden administration to implement the detailed plan it had prepared for the day after the war in May, which included an alternative to Hamas in Gaza and the normalization of Israel’s relations in the region in a way that would provide security against Iran and its proxies? Why did the Biden administration fail to use the many levers the US has over the Israeli government to save us from the continuation of the catastrophe that has caused so much unnecessary suffering?

What allowed Trump, whose values could not be more contrary to those of the liberal camp in Israel and the United States, to succeed where the principled and Zionist Joe Biden failed?

One of the main reasons for this is the view, which still prevails among too many in our camp and the leadership of most Jewish organizations abroad, that there must be “no daylight” between the positions of the American administration and the Israeli government.

This approach is not only anachronistic but also truly harmful when Israel is led by a government whose main purpose is its own self-preservation. A purpose that often comes at the expense of Israel’s national interests. A purpose that goes against the position of the majority of the Israeli public and that of the liberal majority of American Jews, who have long supported the cessation of hostilities, the release of the hostages, and the defense of our democracy against attempts to destroy it.

Translating pressure

The Prevailing view is not only that it is forbidden to show a gap in positions, but even more so that it is forbidden to translate the gap into pressure on the Israeli government – even one as antagonistic and in need of reigning in as our current one.

A prominent example of this playing out was the criticism from some of the leaders of Israel’s liberal camp regarding the delay in supplying two-ton bombs ahead of the entry into Rafah. It was clear there was no operational need for these bombs, but it was a signal and a message to Israel that it must take the position of the American administration into consideration with regards to the risk of collateral damage.

Another example was the malicious attack in Israel and from many Jewish organizations in the US against the vote of 19 senators – all supporters of Israel and the special US relationship with Israel – who voted to disapprove of unrestricted weapons transfers and send a message to Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that American aid is not a “blank check.”

The position of the senators was unambiguous: The US should not unconditionally support a futile war without a strategic plan to get hostages home or for the day after – and should not do so in violation of US and international law and in a manner that harms both American and Israeli interests.

Biden and his secretary of state Antony Blinken invested monumental efforts in building plans that could have dramatically and positively changed Israel’s situation in the region and brought back the hostages, but they failed to implement them because they feared the political repercussions of pressuring the Israeli government. The Biden administration continued to declare at every opportunity that the prevention of the deal was Hamas’s fault, even though it was as clear as a bell that Netanyahu was the main obstacle to the deal. They removed political pressure that could have gotten hostages home and ended the war sooner, contrary to their own stated goals.

Netanyahu immediately understood the dynamic and Biden’s weakness, openly disregarding American requests.

Hamas is indeed responsible for the atrocities of October 7 and is an openly jihadist, barbaric terrorist organization, but its position over the halting of the fighting to free the hostages has not changed since the first day of the negotiations. After the IDF completed the majority of its military tasks many months ago, there was no reason to prevent the conclusion of the deal other than Netanyahu’s narrow political considerations, primarily the preservation of the coalition.

Jewish organizations in the US supported the release of the hostages, but due to those anachronistic and harmful constraints, they failed to use their influence to actually do something about it. The automatic backing of the Israeli government’s position proved both absurd and dangerous.

This is not the first time that the tendency of many Jewish organizations and leaders in the Israeli liberal camp to align with right-wing governments here has caused strategic damage to Israel. The opposition to the nuclear deal between the P5+1 superpowers and Iran is another example.

They aligned with Netanyahu’s position, leading to the eventual Trump withdrawal from the agreement that had stopped Iran from developing weapons. In hindsight, it is now abundantly clear that the agreement was the best option available, and Trump’s withdrawal from it has resulted in Iran becoming a threshold nuclear state. It also allowed China and Russia to extricate themselves from the international coalition designed to prevent Iran’s nuclearization, and they are now both in a strategic alliance with the ayatollahs’ regime.

Another example was the support of many Jewish organizations and centrist leaders in Israel for Trump’s and Netanyahu’s policies to abandon the Palestinian issue in the framework of the Abraham Accords. This weakened the Palestinian factions that support a settlement and strengthened Hamas. Together with other moves to strengthen Hamas and weaken the Palestinian Authority, this was among the factors that led to October 7.

There is no doubt that there is an Israeli interest in normalization with Arab countries, but the attempt to achieve this goal while bypassing the Palestinian issue dramatically harms Israel’s security interests. Here too, the voice of many Jewish organizations was not to be heard.

The time has come for the majority in the Jewish community in the US and the centrist politicians in Israel who claim to lead the liberal camp to realize that the “no daylight” approach in Israel-US interaction only serves the agenda of the messianic Right and the survival of governments that harm Israel’s vital national security interests. It is high time for collaboration between the opponents of the far Right, on both sides of the ocean, to enable an American foreign policy that supports the values we believe in instead of the survival of Netanyahu and his supporters.

The article was published on February 2nd 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Biden’s Failure and Trump’s Success הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

That vision, known as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, was launched on Sept. 9, 2023, when the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Union, Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, and Italy to advance the transcontinental infrastructure project. The Biden administration hailed it as a major diplomatic and commercial breakthrough — a project that could compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

But Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel and the regional conflict that it triggered just weeks after the G20 summit has damned enthusiasm for the project and led to uneven investment in its future.

With the first phase of the ceasefire deal gradually being implemented, and President Donald Trump returning to the Oval Office, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor should enjoy a breath of new life. In order for that to happen, the Trump administration will need to tackle some of the region’s most complicated security challenges while simultaneously empowering partners along the economic corridor to take the lead in developing a cohesive commercial model. If performed successfully, the United States would both incentivize the establishment of a new regional architecture and take an important step towards reducing its role in the Middle East.

A 21st-Century Superhighway

When the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was first introduced, it was met with much fanfare. Sitting alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Biden told the G20 audience that the corridor was “a really big deal” and part of a collective effort to: “building sustainable, resilient infrastructure, making quality infrastructure investments; and creating a better future that represents greater opportunity, dignity, and prosperity for everyone.”

Few details about the corridor were shared at the time. From what can be understood from the memorandum of understanding, the project is meant to be composed of three elements: an eastern maritime corridor linking India and the Arabian Peninsula, a railway project designed to link all six Gulf Cooperation Council member states, and a northern corridor connecting the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Jordan and Israel. In addition to rapidly expanding transportation infrastructure, the corridor would incentivize the continued investment in undersea data cables and future energy projects such as green hydrogen pipelines and electricity interconnectors.

Each of the involved parties saw the corridor as a win-win scenario for its own reasons. For India, it offered a way to strengthen its role in global value chains and counter China’s growing influence. In Modi’s own words, “This corridor is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil.” For the Gulf states, the project offered a way to execute a clear hedging strategy between the United States and China, support East-West trade routes that maintained their role as middle powers, and diversify their energy markets. For Europe, the corridor would buoy its economic security and establish critical energy links with the Gulf states. For the Biden administration, the project was seen as a logical counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as an opportunity to facilitate greater interconnectivity and cooperation between key partners in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Trump administration might very well share the same view. For all the parties involved, establishing a land bridge across the Arabian Peninsula would reduce security risks for international shipping around the Horn of Africa as well as bottlenecking at the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal.

Just weeks after the G20 summit, enthusiasm about the corridor was replaced with realism. Hamas’ attack — and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza and Lebanon — derailed normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia and strained ties between Israel and the other Gulf states. Houthi attacks forced international shipping vessels to reroute away from the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. For Hamas, the prospect of Israeli-Saudi peace was seen as a threat to the Palestinian national cause. But for Iran, Hamas’ primary sponsor, the real concern was that Israel’s continued integration in the region and participation in projects like the corridor would further constrain the Islamic republic. As part of a televised address on Oct. 4, 2024, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told supporters that America and its allies were backing Israel so that it could become “a gateway for exporting energy from the region to the Western world while facilitating the import of goods and technology from the West to the region.” Encouraged by Tehran, Houthi attacks disrupted Red Sea shipping lanes, damaging global trade and contributing to Egypt’s economic woes. Seen as a way to bypass the region’s unstable corners, the war raised serious questions over how a transcontinental corridor can avoid the interference of a regional power like Iran.

Iran is not the only regional actor who expressed concern about being excluded from the economic corridor. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan famously responded to the corridor announcement by saying “there is no corridor without Turkey.” In the last year, Ankara has been championing the Development Road Project, a land-based trade corridor from the Arabian Peninsula to Europe via Turkey. Since the fall of Assad, multiple plans — including energy pipelines — connecting the Gulf to Turkey via Syria have been floated.

Like Iran and Turkey, Egypt fears that the corridor will draw business away from the Suez Canal, which serves as a crucial revenue source for a country with limited foreign investment opportunities and an increasingly unstable economy. While Egypt’s limitations were part of the reason why it was left on the outside of the corridor looking in, many participating states appreciate the importance of Egyptian economic stability — both for the region as well as the corridor’s future.

Jockeying for participation in such a transformative mega project is not limited to Middle Eastern actors. While the war in Gaza dampened European interest in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, the EU’s Global Gateway is still operational and southern European states like France, Greece, and Italy have positioned themselves as potential landing points for the corridor.

Beyond the question of who will take part in the corridor’s main artery, other challenges remain. Member states have yet to articulate how the multi-billion-dollar infrastructure projects associated with the corridor will be financed. There are also serious doubts as to whether an intermodal transportation network that combines maritime shipping, railways, and highways will be more cost-efficient and sustainable than existing transportation routes. Though energy projects and digital highways are touted as complementary but equally important components to the corridor’s future, no feasibility studies have been conducted to date that test the viability of these plans (e.g. green hydrogen pipelines).

But as Biden’s speech hinted, the corridor is far from dead. Bilateral trade between India and the United Arab Emirates increased by 93 percent since the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2022, and the diversification of trade beyond oil is keeping pace. The United Arab Emirates is now India’s third-largest trading partner after China and the United States. In February 2024, India and the United Arab Emirates signed a bilateral agreement designed to support the corridor’s establishment. The same month, U.S. transportation giant FedEx inaugurated a $350 million facility in Dubai. Regional investment in infrastructure has also continued. In September 2024, the United Arab Emirates signed a $2.3 billion railroad agreement with Jordan. Saudi investments in its railway network have increased to well over $4 billion as part of the government’s plans for Saudi Vision 2030. The same could be said for diplomatic activity between member states. Any observer of Indian diplomacy at the 2024 G20 summit in Brazil would confirm that the geopolitical disturbances of the past year have done little to dissuade Modi from advancing a front and center, corridor-friendly agenda.

In summary, the interests that helped establish the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor remain as prevalent today as they did when the mega project was first announced. What remains to be seen is whether enough trust and common interest required to achieve such a sophisticated degree of economic interconnectivity exists between the principal actors. This is at least partially dependent on how the United States chooses to engage the region under Trump.

Bridging East and West by Stabilizing the Middle East

If the United States is to continue supporting the corridor’s development, it will need to find a balance between supporting the construction of a new regional security architecture, empowering member states, and ensuring that certain regulatory and taxation policies are upheld. Trump, who ran on an America First agenda and will be occupied with a myriad of global issues, may not have the bandwidth to engage meaningfully in the corridor. Still, there are concrete steps his administration can take that would uphold the U.S. commitment to its international partners while directly and indirectly benefiting the corridor’s future.

First, the administration should articulate its continued commitment to the corridor, allaying any concerns that the United States will renege on past promises under Trump. One way of demonstrating this is by appointing a special envoy to the initiative. This would mirror the decision in February 2024 by French President Emmanuel Macron, who tapped energy industry veteran Gerard Mestrallet for the position. Committing a senior U.S. representative to the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor would contribute to the project’s gradual institutionalization — a necessary step to create common policies on regulation, taxation, and customs procedures. The special envoy would engage diplomatically with member states as well as support American companies who wish to take part in the corridor’s development.

Trump should become an “empowerer-in-chief,” entrusting his cabinet appointments like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent to advance U.S. foreign policy interests without him needing to be in the room. It would be unsurprising if the corridor attracted the attention of Jared Kushner, a trusted voice during Trump’s first presidency.

That doesn’t mean there wouldn’t be a role for Trump himself. Arguably his greatest strength is the warm personal relations he enjoys with many heads of state who are involved in the corridor. From India’s Modi to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Trump would find himself in good company at a future India-Middle East-Europe Corridor summit. But rather than steal the spotlight, Trump should practice lateral leadership, empowering international partners with a readiness for the United States to step in when the project needs a bit of a nudge.

At the same time, the Trump administration should encourage the construction of additional East-West corridors if they benefit America’s international partners and are both economically and strategically viable. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East only strengthen the case for diversifying and multiplying economic corridors. The eggs of the global trade shouldn’t all be placed in one basket.

The most instrumental way in which the Trump administration can support the corridor, along with other potential East-West corridors, is by addressing Middle Eastern instability. That means stewarding the distinct ceasefire agreements brokered by the Biden administration between Israel and Hezbollah and Israel and Hamas and gradually turning them into more lasting political arrangements.

It may sound far-fetched today, nevertheless there are scenarios where elements of the corridor’s development are used to support Gaza’s rehabilitation. A revitalized Gaza port under international supervision, for example, would be a boon for Palestinians. The port could also serve as a supporting spur to Haifa Port — purchased by Indian-owned Adani Group in 2023 — where many of the corridor’s plans currently hinge. In short, by drawing inspiration from the corridor, the Trump administration could incentivize the parties to reach a durable resolution to the war that would create a window of opportunity to revisit normalization efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia and attract additional foreign investment to the region.

A similar logic could be applied when dealing with new governments in Lebanon and Syria. If leveraged in the right way, participation in East-West corridors could be a major incentive for new political actors to respect U.S. interests, maintain their commitment to keeping the peace, and further reduce Iranian, Russia, and Chinese influence.

In addition to these steps, the United States should devise a more effective mechanism for constraining Houthi aggression. The corridor is not a replacement for the Suez Canal, and therefore the secure passage of maritime traffic around the Horn of Africa and Red Sea should remain a top priority for America and its allies.

Last but not least, the Trump administration will need to identify the correct formula for containing Iran and severing supply chains between Tehran and its proxies. Without some kind of arrangement between the United States and Iran, it is safe to suspect that the Islamic regime will try to undermine efforts to develop an East-West corridor that leaves it out in the cold.

This would be a stiff task for the most competent of U.S. administrations, regardless of whether it had an interest in supporting the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’s fortunes. Considering some of the other pressing global issues that will draw Trump’s attention, such as a potential trade war with China and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, it is difficult to see how the Trump administration could achieve this feat alone. Perhaps that is the point. The corridor cannot succeed just by sheer American will. The project has so many diplomatic and commercial components that no single administration — or global actor — can take on such responsibility alone. Completing the corridor will require a coordinated effort over the course of decades. What the Trump administration can try to provide, however, is a commitment to empowering regional partners in a way that serves long-term U.S. national security and economic interests.

The article was published on January 28th 2025 in War On The Rocks.

הפוסט Making Deals, Building Corridors: Trump’s Middle East Moment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Carter, who passed away at the age of 100, was committed to the future of Israel and the region, and to promoting a two-state solution. It is very regrettable that too many people in Israel distort his legacy and blame him for being hostile, even though he understood earlier than others the danger of our descent into a bloody binational reality.

The Camp David Summit, which he initiated, was a personal project of his. Carter acted with persistence and determination, moving between the delegations’ rooms, proposing compromises, and pressing to reach the historic agreement between Israel and Egypt—the country that was then the leader of the Arab world.

Even then, Carter understood that a true solution to the conflict must include the Palestinian issue, and he pushed for Israeli recognition of Palestinian autonomy as part of the agreement, a recognition that ultimately came only with the Oslo Accords 15 years later.

Carter’s commitment to promoting a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to accompany him for decades after he left the White House in 1980. Many in Israel did not welcome his criticism of settlement policies and the preservation of the occupation. He indeed delivered pointed criticism, yet it was rooted in genuine care and a sincere aim to foster peace.

In his book “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid,” published in 2006, Carter expressed an approach that was not easy to digest but reflected a deep understanding of the reality here. Carter posed an equation that many here have since internalized: without peace, the occupation turns Israel into an apartheid state, where two different legal systems exist for people living in the same territory.

In October 2010, he attended the weekly demonstrations in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah against the takeover of homes in the neighborhood by settler organizations. He rightly told the protesters, “I don’t think it can be argued that demolishing homes or confiscating a house where a family has lived for several generations is a just, fair, or peace-loving act.”

Carter was probably the most progressive president the United States has ever known. A worldview that explains his deep commitment to Israel. His commitment drove him to make tremendous efforts to promote peace solutions and prevent Israel from descending into an apartheid reality.

He was an evangelist, however, a very different one from those who have taken over the Republican Party. The Republican evangelists believe that war will bring the second coming, while he believed that peace is the true redemption.

Sometimes he also displayed naivety, leading him to believe that diplomacy alone could change the fundamental perceptions of organizations like Hamas—a premise that proved to be incorrect. He failed to foresee the consequences of the Khomeinist revolution and later to rescue the Americans who were held hostage.

However, Carter’s belief in diplomacy as a tool for resolving conflicts was not misguided. Diplomacy does indeed sometimes require support from military and coercive tools, but in the end, there is no alternative to it.

His greatest achievement—the peace agreement with Egypt—is not only proof of the power of diplomacy but also the greatest gift Carter gave us all: an agreement that opened the door for Israel’s integration into the region and the subsequent agreements that followed.

Our leaders would have done well to listen to his warnings about the implications of the occupation on Israel’s moral and international standing. To accept his advice that the two-state solution is the only way to ensure both the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and the rights of the Palestinians.

Jimmy Carter passed away peacefully nearly 45 years after leaving the White House. But now, the Democratic Party, like many in the United States, who struggled to digest him and his views during his presidency, is embracing his ideological values more than ever, as well as his views on the conflict.

Even after his death, we should wisely listen to Jimmy Carter’s legacy regarding our region. A legacy that, at its core, serves as a reminder that the State of Israel must choose its future—to be an apartheid state or to remain a democracy and the safe, thriving national home of the Jewish people.

The article was published on January 2nd in The Times of Israel.

הפוסט President Carter Was a True Friend of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For the region’s autocratic regimes – again, with the exception of Iran and its proxies – a Trump administration is preferable because, unlike the Democrats, he does not view human rights as an obstacle to maintaining relations. Leaders such as Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden, at various points, balanced their policies not only with national interests but also with liberal values.

While they did not expect these regimes to transform into democracies overnight, especially after the results of the Arab Spring, they promoted a spectrum of more liberal approaches toward minorities and opposition groups, as seen, for example, in Jordan.

Currently, no fewer than 10 Middle Eastern states rank in the bottom 20 of the 2024 Global Index of Freedom and Democracy, with another seven in the next two deciles. The trend is unmistakable.

Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was among the first leaders to congratulate Trump. Despite his distaste for Trump’s 2019 nickname “my favorite dictator,” he benefited from Trump’s practical support, including sustained annual aid with no conditions or restrictions related to domestic policy, and a 2017 visit to Washington.

Sisi also hopes Trump will assist in securing additional loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, especially as Egypt faces economic strain due to war-related declines in Suez Canal traffic and Sinai tourism revenues.

Morocco has similarly extended its congratulations to Trump, who became the first US president to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara – an acknowledgment exchanged for Morocco’s normalization of relations with Israel.

In the Gulf, Arab states are also pleased by Trump’s return. His first foreign trip in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia, where he signed over $100 billion in deals, though it remains unclear how fully these were realized.

More significantly, Trump’s past firm stance on Iran aligns well with Saudi interests. Although Riyadh struggled with the administration’s lack of response to the 2019 Houthi drone attack on the Aramco oil fields, Trump’s position is still viewed as more assertive than that of the Democrats.

Saudis continue to hope for normalization with Israel

The Saudis continue to hope for normalization with Israel. Trump, along with his son-in-law Jared Kushner, laid much of the groundwork for the 2020 Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, leading many to believe his administration could further this process.

However, the cost of normalization for Saudi Arabia has risen since the Israel-Hamas War began: they now seek the establishment of a viable Palestinian entity, if not an outright state – something Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unlikely to offer. The UAE and Bahrain would also welcome such steps, and both, along with Egypt, remain supportive of Trump.

Netanyahu has also expressed enthusiastic support for Trump’s return, calling it “the greatest comeback in history.” Israel, often regarded as the region’s only democracy, echoes the reaction of its autocratic neighbors, perhaps for similar reasons.

Conversely, Iran and its allies are apprehensive about Trump’s return. Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, his authorization of the strike that killed Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, and his generally firm stance against Tehran are still fresh in their minds. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s greatest fear is that Trump might grant Israel the green light to target Iran’s nuclear facilities – a stance the Biden administration has avoided.

All these expectations, hopes, and fears are based on Trump’s record from his first term. Now, without the pressure of reelection and with a strong influence over both houses of Congress, a second term could diverge significantly from the first.

Two main factors may drive this shift: a commitment to addressing America’s domestic issues and reducing US involvement abroad, as Trump pledged during his campaign, and a desire to leave behind a positive legacy to counter his divisive public image.

Ultimately, Trump’s actions are often unpredictable, making it challenging to foresee his course with certainty. The most sensible conclusion, then, is to “expect the unexpected.”

הפוסט Most Mideast autocrats welcome President-elect Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On that same day, a Democratic senator named Joseph R. Biden, along with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff director Antony Blinken, staff member Puneet Talwar, and US ambassador to Israel Richard Jones met with veteran Israeli politician Shimon Peres. The ensuing discussion, buried in piles of Wikileaks documents, testifies to the misconceptions and mistaken assessments of the time.

When Biden asked about the role Hamas might assume in the post-election period, Peres was dismissive.

What does Hamas have to do with victory?” he asked rhetorically and answered, “If they win, they face a dilemma. If they enter the government, they must change or (risk) endangering other Palestinians. They won’t get the financial support they need to deliver results if they don’t stop terror. That will put pressure on them to moderate.” Peres pointed to a possible paradox, whereby “the more Hamas wins, the stronger the position of Fatah [will be] in Palestinian politics.”

Witnessing the rise of Hamas in Gaza

Peres was not concerned about the rise of Hamas. He thought Israeli policymakers would refuse to work with the group if it remained a terrorist organization. On the other hand, he suggested that Israeli pundits should criticize Israeli politicians rather than the absence of strong Palestinian leadership. “They don’t have a Ben-Gurion or a Lincoln, but the Palestinians are still a people,” he said.

Biden also asked about the prospects of Gaza’s economy following Israel’s pullout in September 2005. Peres emphasized that Gaza needed regional cooperation between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in order to survive. Yet, he lamented the fact that Israel took it upon itself to export Gazan produce, referring to the undertaking as “a blessing that has become a curse: We must x-ray every tomato. Why should we torture them?”

Peres expressed his preference for Gaza to export its produce through Egypt.

Biden then asked whether the Gazan economy was large enough to attract foreign investment, to which Peres responded that Saudi and Palestinian billionaires were interested in joint ventures. In a prophetic judgment, Peres added, “The Saudis are becoming more pragmatic as they realize how important Jordan is as a buffer state with an Iraq dominated by the Shi’a.”

ASKED WHY Israel had not done more after the disengagement to unfetter the Gazan economy, Peres cited Palestinian rocket fire but did not offer any suggestions on how to deal with this problem. Pressing on the economic issue, Biden asked what could be done to prevent the disintegration of the Gazan economy. Peres lauded the possible nomination of former Palestinian finance minister Salam as prime minister (which indeed occurred in June 2007), but then offered another solution: Jordan would administer the West Bank economy, while Egypt administered the Gaza economy. He ended on an arrogant note, telling Biden that the Palestinians should understand that they could make money from business, not only from corruption.

The Peres-Biden conversation is illuminating. First, it demonstrates the absence of Israeli strategy for “the day after” its disengagement from Gaza.

The ideas put forth for an airport, seaport, and safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank were not implemented for security reasons, leaving the Gaza economy isolated, even before Hamas seized power in June 2007, and bearing out the PA’s concern that the enclave would become a de facto prison.

Second, the talk reveals flawed judgment regarding the meaning of the elections, which reflected structural, ideological, and political changes in Palestinian society. Hamas won not only because of PA corruption but also because the unilateral disengagement was perceived as a victory of its armed struggle – much like Hezbollah’s victory resulted in Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.

Third, Peres clearly reflected an optimistic Israeli school of thought that Hamas could change its stripes and become more moderate as a result of outside pressure. What is more, some in Israel believed that certain Arab states would seriously consider administrating Gaza or the entire Palestinian territories.

Some of these flawed judgments are still prevalent in the conduct of the 2023 Gaza war.

During his recent visit to Israel at the start of the war, Biden reminisced about his meeting with prime minister Golda Meir when he was a young freshman senator in 1973. Biden did not mention his conversation with Peres that took place more than three decades later, and it is doubtful he has any clear memories of it. Yet the protocol exposes the problem of Israel’s decades-long Gaza conception, which has come back to bite it and has now been dumped at Biden’s door as president.

The article was published in the Jerusalem Post on December 12th.

הפוסט Biden saw the rise of Hamas – now he has to annihilate it הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the weakening US grip on the Middle East stems from global trends and its impact extends beyond our neighborhood, it is undoubtedly an ominous process for America’s main ally in the region – Israel. Could the Israeli government turn around this direction in the interests of its national security?

What went wrong with American-Saudi relations

The process of US withdrawal from the Middle East can be dated back to 2011 and the Bush Administration’s failed attempts to impose the neoconservatives’ vision of forcing democratic governments on the countries of the region. These failures in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya created a vacuum which drew in ISIS and Iran. This process was impacted further when the United States became the world’s leading oil producer due to the development of shale oil extraction technologies. American energy independence severed the Gordian knot between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, and brought to the surface the cultural and moral contradictions between the countries.

The Iranian-backed Houthi attack on Aramco’s oil facilities in 2019 marked a further milestone in this process, with the Trump Administration’s lack of response signaling to its allies that they should not rely on the US to deal with the Iranian threat and prompting Saudi disillusionment with its expectations of Uncle Sam’s protection.

Tensions had already intensified following the 2018 murder of exiled Saudi dissident and Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, and even more so after the 2021 US intelligence report, which blamed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the killing. The report made it very difficult for the Democratic Party to prioritize realpolitik with the values it seeks to promote, especially given the erosion of US energy considerations.

However, the Americans did not give up. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2022, President Biden tried to repair somewhat relations with the Wahhabi kingdom and even agreed to meet with bin Salman. But his overture was met with a chilly reception, leaving him neither here, nor there: on the one hand, he had legitimized the leader he accused of murder, and on the other, he was met with a cold shoulder, in stark contrast to the warm welcome accorded in Riyadh five months later to Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The cooling of relations between the Biden Administration and the Saudis is not merely symbolic. It has practical implications, such as the Kingdom’s decision to blatantly ignore US expectations to lower oil prices at an August 2022 OPEC meeting. This, in turn, not only encumbered American efforts to help Europe withstand the energy pressures induced by the war in Ukraine, but also to combat domestic inflation, with its major impact on political support for the administration.

These developments, along with China’s growing influence and the threat it has begun to pose to Taiwan and other US allies in the Pacific, have made East Asia more important to US interests than the Middle East, both economically and in terms of competition with China for dominance of the global economy and technological leadership. The United States has therefore shifted its involvement to the eastern Asian continent. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which restored a measure of American attention to Europe and NATO, also contributed to the declining priority to US interest in the Middle East.

Democracy or money

President Xi’s deepening foothold in the Middle Eastern arena, even as American policy is trying to maneuver carefully between its values and the nature of the strategically important monarchical regimes in the region, makes clear that he has much more in common with Mohammed bin Salman than President Biden does. These two authoritarian leaders, Xi and bin Salman, make no secret of their ambitions and willingness to take risks in order to expand their international influence. The fact that China has also become Saudi oil’s biggest customer has further strengthened the alliance between the two countries.

This turn of events highlights the fundamental difference between China and the US – the first examines international developments through the lens of economic empowerment without ethical considerations, while the second is a self-appointed “policeman of the world,” which, alongside the economy, seeks to promote its values. In this case, these values are diametrically opposed to the nature of the Saudi regime, as well as to those of its neighbors in the Gulf and Maghreb.

Western divisions of the world into “good and bad guys” are alien to the Middle East. The more the United States tries to inculcate them into regimes in the region, the lesser the influence it enjoys. The region’s authoritarian rulers are not interested in the struggle for democracy or in the Western values that President Biden seeks to promote. In the face of American morality, they prefer to seek avenues to other powers that, like them, are indifferent to “Western” democratic values.

Iran’s rapprochement with China and subsequently with Saudi Arabia (with Chinese encouragement) was prompted by economic considerations. The US pullout from the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and the re-imposed sanctions on Iran naturally led Tehran directly into China’s arms. China offered it an escape route from the sanctions’ regime in the form of an agreement guaranteeing Chinese investments of up to $400 billion in exchange for Iranian oil, while easing its path to the status of a nuclear threshold state.

China has not stopped in Tehran, using its influence and Iran’s dependence to advance other regional goals, such as a ceasefire in Iran’s proxy war in Yemen against Saudi Arabia. Indeed, under Chinese pressure, Iran seems less enthusiastic about supplying weapons to its Houthi proxy rebels in Yemen. China is also carving inroads into the UAE through large-scale economic cooperation, and as a by-product, also striving to rehabilitate relations between the UAE and Iran.

Israel is paying the price

International relations abhor vacuums, and when one power moves away, another takes its place. Israel is paying a heavy price as a result of these geopolitical shifts.

It is no coincidence that although in its third year in office, the Biden Administration has yet to reach agreement with Iran on a return to the nuclear deal (the JCPOA). As long as Iran believes it has a reasonable alternative in China, which is indifferent to its nuclear ambitions, it is in no rush to commit to shutting down its centrifuges.

Iran’s mistrust of US ability to meet its obligations, as was the case when the Trump Administration withdrew from the nuclear agreement signed by the Obama Administration, is further disincentive to reconstitute the 2015 deal. Iran’s motivation to return to the deal is expected to diminish further given its renewed relations with Saudi Arabia and warming ties with the United Arab Emirates, leaving Israel almost alone in its confrontational approach to Tehran.

Israel’s interest, of course, is to maintain American involvement in the Middle East. While it could benefit from eased tensions between Iran and the countries of the region, Israel prefers to do so under American rather than Chinese influence, since the Chinese, unlike the Americans, do not take Israel’s geostrategic interests into consideration when planning their policy.

Troubling aspects of Israeli policy

Two aspects of its policy at this time drive a wedge between Israel and the United States and accelerating the American withdrawal: the regime coup and its attitude toward the Palestinian issue.

The government’s moves to crush Israeli democracy run counter to American liberal-democratic values and cast a dark shadow over the moral alliance between the two countries. The defense of these values underpins the existence of the American nation and is also reflected in the growing majority of the liberal public in the United States vis-a-vis receding support for Trumpist populism. The deepening US involvement in the war in Ukraine – with resources, weapons and intelligence on the one hand, and the formation of a coalition against Russia, on the other – illustrates its commitment to these same values.

Therefore, the Biden administration cannot stand idly by while the Netanyahu government leads a revolution that seeks to dismantle Israeli democracy. During a recent visit to Israel, Secretary of State Antony Blinken made it clear that Israel must respect human rights and the rights of minority groups, and ensure an egalitarian judicial system, the rule of law, a free press and a robust civil society. This is the price of the alliance between the two countries. The more Israel refuses to pay it, the lesser the commitment of the United States to fulfill its part.

The government’s destructive policy on the Palestinian issue compounds the problem. It is not limited to a decade of political stalemate and rejectionism on the part of the Israeli leadership (which now includes staunch annexation supporters such as Smotrich and Ben-Gvir), but also moves such as the repeal of the Disengagement Law, the return of de jure annexation to the discourse, and the deepening of de facto annexation, along with trigger-happy fingers and a record number of Palestinian fatalities.

Despite Israel’s interest in US involvement in the region, the Netanyahu government is doing everything in its power to make it difficult for the Americans to operate in this arena and stand by its veteran ally. Israel’s adherence to fanatical positions – both in terms of domestic policies and vis-à-vis the Palestinians – therefore undermines its own interests and helps distance the United States from the regional arena.

Risks and rewards

The United States has an opportunity to leverage the change wrought by the Abraham Accords by increasing the influence of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco on Israel to advance the Palestinian cause. This is based on the regional consensus over the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Relying on the Arab Initiative, also known previously as the Saudi Initiative, is also the way to draw the Saudis into the arena. Such a move is in Israel’s clearest interest, otherwise it will find itself isolated in a region devoid of American influence.

The United States, as a global power with global interests, also has an interest in maintaining its dominant player status in the Middle East and not letting the Russians, Chinese, and Islamists fill the vacuum. However, the political fear of the so-called pro-Israel lobby prevents the Americans from exerting their full weight to advance the Palestinian issue, and also makes it difficult for them to return to the path of agreement with Iran.

Since Israel can never rely geo-strategically on China, we have an obligation to do whatever is necessary to facilitate enhanced US regional influence. This makes it incumbent on the Netanyahu government to abandon the regime coup not only in order to preserve Israeli democracy and economic robustness, but also to safeguard Israel’s security.

The claim by Israel’s supporters in Washington that Israel being the only democracy in the Middle East guarantees its strong alliance with Washington is highly doubtful – both because we are undermining liberal democratic values and making it difficult for the Americans to realize their interest in stability in the region, especially in the Iranian and Palestinian contexts. The agenda of the Netanyahu-Haredi-messianic coalition, as set out in the coalition agreements, contravenes Israel’s main national security interest: strengthening the alliance with the United States and helping it restore its dominant position in the region.

This articale was published on “The Times of Israel” on May 19th.

הפוסט How to reverse the trend of the US distancing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Moreover, rescinding the clauses in the law that prohibit Israelis from returning to the area of four northern Samaria settlements evacuated along with Israel’s pullout from Gaza is bad for Israel since it further diminishes prospects of a two-state solution. This is obviously the intent of its instigators and its greatest threat but not the only one.

Rolling back the law also rewards those who built on private Palestinian land in violation of precedent-setting High Court rulings, making a mockery of the law by returning periodically to the scene of their crime over the years and endangering the soldiers tasked with protecting them. The Palestinians, obviously, pay the highest price by having the fabric of their life undermined by Israeli troops protecting lawbreaking settlers.

The inclusion of northern Samaria in the Gaza Strip pullout law was part of a quid pro quo deal between the Sharon government and the Bush Administration, which sought to strengthen Palestinian territorial contiguity by removing the four isolated Israeli settlements.

In exchange for agreeing to evacuate northern Samaria, prime minister Ariel Sharon received a written commitment from President George Bush, which recognized that a future Israeli-Palestinian agreement would keep settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty and prevent a significant return of Palestinian refugees to Israel’s sovereign territory. The letter also affirmed the US recognition of Israel’s right to defensible borders.

Two of these principles are vital to ensuring Israel’s survival and the third guarantees the viability of West Bank settlement groupings in exchange for compensating the Palestinians with land swaps. Bush’s letter to Sharon constitutes a governmental commitment by the US to Israel, a commitment it made in exchange for an Israeli commitment that has now been violated with the repeal of the northern Samaria pullout.

A country that reneges on its commitments also frees the other side from adhering to those commitments. The current bill not only violates the commitment of an Israeli prime minister to a US president but also casts heavy doubt on all Israeli government commitments and proves they can no longer be trusted because domestic political pressure outweighs external commitments.

US criticism is growing

Even as US criticism of the regime coup is growing, the Knesset, with government backing, chose to further fuel the fire by breaching a formal commitment to the Americans. At times, this government seems to be acting independently of Israel’s existential interests, as is the case of repealing the disengagement law and of Diaspora Affairs Minister Chikli’s suggestion that US Ambassador Tom Nides mind his own business.

But Israel’s business is intertwined with that of the US, for decades it’s greatest and closest ally and friend. In addition to the withdrawal from northern Samaria, Israel more recently committed to refrain from annexing parts of the West Bank in return for the landmark Abraham Accords engineered by the Trump administration.

THE US and the Arab signatories to the agreements will no longer have reason to believe that the Israeli government can be trusted to repel domestic political pressure and adhere to this commitment, either.

Ambassador Michael Herzog’s unusual rebuke by the deputy secretary of state attests to the severity with which the Americans view the disengagement law repeal.

What is more, coming on the eve of Ramadan, the move sends a dangerous message to the countries with which we have normalization agreements. The message is clear: commitments by previous governments and the state are not binding and therefore, Israel can no longer be trusted.

The message signals that the Israeli government is an agent of instability in a region desperate for stability and calm. The decision also renders irrelevant the recent Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian security agreements reached at meetings in Aqaba and Sharm e-Sheikh.

Signs of mistrust have already emerged in the distancing of the Emirati government, the delay of security cooperation and indefinite postponement of Netanyahu’s visit to the United Arab Emirates, as well as the widening rift with Jordan following Ben-Gvir’s ascent to the al-Aqsa compound. The fear of renewed annexation measures could further undermine relations with our Arab neighbors and the Palestinian Authority, given the sense on the Palestinian street that security cooperation with Israel only yields unilateral Israeli measures and a record number of fatalities.

Europe, too, is eyeing us suspiciously, with Israel’s repeal of its commitment further undermining already unstable relations. Every president and prime minister who has hosted Netanyahu in recent weeks has made a point of publicly expressing European concerns about the anti-democratic direction in which his government is heading.

This will now be compounded by criticism of the government’s political conduct, or more correctly, misconduct, criticism that is liable to undermine security cooperation with the West, including moves to stop Iran’s nuclear program.

We must not forget. Israel needs a strategic alliance with the US. Ze’ev Snir, until recently head of the Atomic Energy Commission, recently told Yediot Ahronot columnist Nadav Eyal, “Without American backing, the State of Israel will find it very difficult to exist, to say the least.” Now, in order to satisfy the political lust of the extreme Right, the Israeli government continues to sabotage this alliance – an alliance on which the existence of Israel depends.

The damage to the alliance with the Americans comes against the backdrop of growing concern about flare-ups fueled by the extremist rhetoric and other provocative moves of the new government on the eve of Ramadan. Israel will soon have to ask the Americans for a renewed stock of Iron Dome missile interceptors and backing in the Security Council and The Hague against anti-Israel votes.

The time has come to restore the helm of the state to people committed to national responsibility and to prevent the agents of chaos from critically risking our national security.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from March 27, 2023.

הפוסט Israel needs a strategic alliance with the US הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Indeed, while enjoying the status and perquisites of a U.S. special ally, it has pursued policies not only in variance with American strategic interests but often directly adversarial to them. And it has done so on a wide array of fronts, in the Middle East and across the globe.

The adversarial shift began with the ascendance of a specific leader: Benjamin Netanyahu. From his first rise to power in 1996 through the more than years 15 years he has held the reins—after losing an election in 1999, Netanyahu returned in 2009 and, with the exception of an 18-month hiatus between June 2021 and December 2022, has been prime minister ever since—Netanyahu has consistently and increasingly advanced foreign and security policies that, whether directly or indirectly, undercut U.S. strategic interests.

Notably, these policies pertain not only to areas in which Israel could be argued to hold overriding interests, such as the Palestinian one. Although Netanyahu’s diplomatic approach on this front has been at odds with U.S. interests for all but the Trump years, Washington should, and has been, understanding of this divergence between the two allies. The same case can be made for Netanyahu’s policy on Iran, even as he has unequivocally sabotaged and derailed American efforts on this front.

But the remarkable fact is that Netanyahu’s Israel has pursued policies at odds with American strategic interests across much of the world. Let us recount the ways.

In Europe, Netanyahu’s Israel has adopted a policy aimed at undermining the European Union and the liberal democratic order for which it stands. In fact, it has aligned itself not merely with some of Brussels’s staunchest adversaries—such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban, Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński and Mateusz Morawiecki, and Italy’s Matteo Salvini, to name a few; it has openly embraced some of Europe’s most far-right parties and their populist leaders whose opposition to Brussels transcends E.U. politics and turns on an illiberal agenda with, astonishingly, neo-fascist and even neo-Nazi strains. A partial list includes the Freedom Party of Austria, founded by a former Nazi SS officer, and Germany’s extremist Alternative for Germany (AfD).

For Netanyahu, these relationships have been first and foremost transactional. In exchange for Israel turning a blind eye to their historical and ideological links with neo-Nazism and present-day anti-Semitism at home, these parties provided their support for Israel’s policy on the Palestinian front. Such support, moreover, has also served a wider strategic aim for Netanyahu: by undermining E.U. consensus on foreign policy toward Israel, these relationships contribute to sowing divisions within the E.U. itself and weaken Europe’s core liberal norms.

Of course, Netanyahu’s brazen diplomatic posture against the liberal democratic order—the cornerstone of American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War—has been reflected most strikingly in his intimate relationship with Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin. As Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu should certainly maintain cordial and constructive relations with Moscow, a major world power with a growing presence in the Middle East, including across Israel’s northern border of Syria. But the relationship Netanyahu has cultivated with Putin has gone far beyond what has been strategically necessary to safeguard Israeli interests; worse, it has often come at Washington’s expense.

The full cost to U.S. strategic interests became apparent in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although launched during Netanyahu’s brief hiatus from leadership, the relationship he had cultivated over the years with Putin has made Israel into a natural outlet for Russian capital and commodity exports. The conduct is not limited to Jewish Russian oligarchs, for whose welfare (more in the sense of their wealth than health) Israel could claim to care; enter any supermarket in Israel since Western powers imposed sanctions on Moscow, and the number and variety of products from Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea will settle any question as to where Israel truly stands.

Regardless of whether Israeli supply of arms to Ukraine would make a difference on the battleground, its blank refusal of Kyiv’s requests poked a hole in American efforts to present a unified front against Russian aggression. And although Israel has shifted its rhetoric of neutrality somewhat in favor of Ukraine and is reportedly ready to consider supplying it with some defensive weapons systems—the result, no doubt of Iranian military assistance to Russia and U.S. pressure—Netanyahu’s intimacy with Putin should be regarded as Israeli betrayal of the special relationship with the U.S.

A similar approach can be seen in Netanyahu’s policy toward China, the other global player determined to undercut American leadership. China’s rivalry with the U.S. alone should have restrained Netanyahu from forging a comprehensive partnership with it. Yet under his leadership, Israel has become a leading supplier of R&D and cutting-edge technologies and accelerated China’s transformation into becoming America’s “most serious competitor,” as President Biden has defined it.

Remarkably, Israel has also at least declared itself a a geo-strategic backer of China. At a 2017 meeting with President Xi, Netanyahu encouraged China to assume its rightful place “on the world stage,” and waxed romantic by describing the Israeli-Chinese relationship as “a marriage made in heaven.” Meanwhile here on earth, Netanyahu’s Israel has opened itself up to strategic investments by China in its infrastructure, such as the mass transit system in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, which will also run in sensitive underground locations abutting Israel’s military and defense compound, and parts of the Haifa Bay Port, which may steer the U.S. Sixth Fleet elsewhere.

Perhaps most egregiously, Netanyahu has had the temerity to meddle in American domestic politics. He has used Israel to sow divisions between Democrats and Republicans, to anathematize a sitting U.S. president (Barack Obama), and to manipulate—we are using this word advisedly—another one (Donald Trump) to withdraw from a hard-reached international agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. The withdrawal is widely recognized to have been a huge strategic mistake, not only for U.S. security interests but, ironically, also for Israeli ones.

Disagreements between allies are par for the course in international relations. Yet in the case of Netanyahu’s Israel, the kind and quality of its foreign-policy divergences with the U.S. are the stuff of an adversarial relationship, not a friendly one. That there is a certain reluctance to designate Netanyahu’s Israel an adversary of the U.S. is understandable. After all, the U.S. and Israel are bound by a special relationship. And in many ways they are. The very fact that it can contain and subsume the detrimental foreign policies of Netanyahu makes it a very special one indeed.

This article is from “TIME“, from March 23, 2023.

הפוסט Netanyahu Has Made Israel a U.S. Adversary הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Deep disagreements with the Biden administration also arose during the Bennett-Lapid government over the Palestinian and Iranian issues, but these were hammered out behind the scenes. Now, under the relentless bulldozer of the coalition agreements and the “legal reform”, which increasingly resembles a regime coup, the US smiles have become forced and the criticism is louder to ensure public attention.

Blinken’s January 31 news conference was intended to convey US discomfort with the Netanyahu government’s undemocratic direction. Addressing the media following his meeting with Netanyahu, Blinken spelled out US objections to Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue.

“The United States continues to oppose settlement activity, legalization of illegal outposts, violation of the status quo in east Jerusalem, home demolitions and incitement to violence,” Blinken said, adding that the US administration opposes “unilateral measures, which fan tensions, create a more dangerous environment for all, and lower the chances of advancing toward a two-state solution.” Blinken ticked off every single item on the list of US concerns to make it clear to the Netanyahu government the extent of the administration’s opposition to each of the measures it takes or seeks to take.

The Netanyahu government could conduct business as usual, ignoring and even attacking the Democratic administration, hoping for its replacement in two years by a Republican one but it would do well to heed these warnings. Blinken’s remarks to reporters were relatively pleasant compared to the criticism being voiced in closed rooms not only by Blinken but by senior Biden administration and Democratic Party officials.

The current administration’s sympathy for Israel and first and foremost that of President Joe Biden is sincere and strong. It does not stem from political interests alone and cannot be undermined as quickly as it was built, which was the case with Trump’s instrumentalist relations with Israel but from an abiding respect for Israel and the values it represents, as reflected throughout Biden’s five-decade political career.

But the greater the friendship, the more intense the criticism because it emanates from a sincere concern for the shared democratic values on the basis of which the historic alliance between the countries was built. The concern for Israel’s image and democratic character also stems from the fact that the vast majority of American Jewry supports the Democratic Party, with many seeing the current struggle over the nature of Israel as one directly impacting their own identity.

Thus, it is the sympathy and connection to Israel that makes the criticism more powerful, unequivocal and clear. The Book of Proverbs teaches us that “faithful are the wounds of a friend,” and this is how we must address American criticism, not denying and ignoring it but trying to understand its origins – concern for American interests but no less so for Israel.

Israel should not ignore US warnings

IGNORING THE warnings will only intensify the criticism and may cause a dangerous rift between the US administration and the Israeli government. At the time, the Obama administration was able to overcome disagreements with Israel, including Israeli audacity that culminated in Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress in 2015, approving the largest security aid agreement ever for Israel. But this Netanyahu government should not be complacent and think it can count on that precedent.

The Biden administration has learned the lessons of the Obama era, when the rift was not only between the administrations but was also reflected in the clear unjustified lack of sympathy of Israeli citizens for the president. That is why, along with the pressure and criticism, the Biden Administration is embracing the citizens of Israel by promoting a visa exemption process.

The person who delayed the process was Netanyahu, who, as leader of the opposition, refused to advance the legislation on the subject promoted by former interior minister Ayelet Shaked. The administration seeks to criticize with one hand and caress with the other but it is uncertain that it can do so for long. Even before Blinken’s departure from the region, National Security Minister Ben-Gvir decided to challenge US demands to grant freedom of movement to American citizens of Palestinian origin, boasting of standing up to the Americans but in fact risking the interests of Israeli citizens.

The coming period will test relations between the countries. In an unusual move, Blinken asked Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf and Special Representative for Palestinian Affairs Hady Amr to remain in Israel and keep an eye on the government decisions. Blinken doesn’t need Leaf and Amr on the ground in order to know what’s going on but he needs them to make his warnings to Netanyahu on every settlement construction and Palestinian home demolition tangible and clear.

Due to its aggressive statements and the revolution it is promoting, the Netanyahu government has lost what credit it had with the US administration. The US will no longer let policies slide that it overlooked under previous governments.

Israel no longer needs to approve construction in the strategically sensitive E1 area of the West Bank to earn a stinging US rebuke. The bar will be much lower as the government accelerates like a driverless train toward a head-on collision with the Biden White House.

This article is from “JPost“, from February 8, 2023.

הפוסט Israel’s government needs to heed US warnings הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Biden expressed his hope that such a moment will someday be reached. This statement reflects Biden’s approach to the Palestinian issue as expressed during his visit to the region: on the one hand, empathy and the outline of a long-term political vision, on the other hand, skepticism about progress in the short term and avoidance of discussing a tangible peace plan.

What can we learn from Biden’s visit about the administration’s policy on the Palestinian issue? Israeli commentators explained that the Palestinian issue had disappeared, while senior figures on the Palestinian side expressed disappointment with the visit. But the Palestinian angle of the visit requires a more complex analysis.

A discussion of the issue is, of course, influenced by the point of reference, whether we compare Biden’s policy to those of Trump or Obama or to the expectations of Israel and the Palestinians. A distinction must also be made between the declarative level of the visit and the measures discussed.

An analysis of Biden’s rhetoric shows that the administration reaffirms support for the two state solution and the importance of maintaining a political horizon. Biden emphasized, in his remarks in Bethlehem, that the solution should be based on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps. In other words, he reiterated American policy that preceded Trump, which was supported by Presidents Bill Clinton, George Bush and Barak Obama. Biden expressed solidarity with the suffering of the Palestinians (referring, among other things, to restrictions on movement), and stressed that both sides deserve equal measure of freedom and dignity.

On the other hand, Biden’s statements made it clear that the US does not believe prospects for political negotiations have matured at this time, and in remarks he delivered upon landing in Israel, he said that while he advocated the two state solution, he was aware it would not materialize anytime soon. The lack of urgency of the issue was also reflected in the ambiguous wording of the Jerusalem Declaration, signed by Biden and Prime Minister Yair Lapid (with a commitment to “discuss challenges and opportunities in Israeli-Palestinian relations”). The Palestinians were discouraged by Biden’s failure to address the settlements and the occupation.

On the question of Jerusalem, Biden took a cautious stance and spoke of a city for all its people, central to both sides’ national visions. He noted that the US recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, but added that the division of sovereignty over the city would be determined by negotiations.

His visit to a Palestinian hospital in east Jerusalem, unaccompanied by any Israeli official, was unusual (he was preceded by a Blinken visit to America House in east Jerusalem), but Biden was careful to present it as a private humanitarian visit, and he did not repeat his promise to open the US consulate in Jerusalem, which served as the liaison with the Palestinians but was closed during the Trump era.

Therefore, given that the Biden administration clearly does not intend to advance any peacemaking effort in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in the near term, where is it going? Biden’s statements and actions suggest several policy directions. First, since taking office, Biden has renewed ties between Washington and Ramallah (after a rift created during the Trump era) and restored the economic aid that had been discontinued. In this context, on his visit Biden announced an aid package for hospitals in east Jerusalem, for UNRWA, and for food security.

These measures are part of an American policy aimed at improving Palestinians’ daily lives. Support for initiatives to strengthen the Palestinian economy are also mentioned in the Jerusalem Declaration, which is in keeping with the shrinking-the-conflict approach supported by senior Israeli government officials.

New economic and civil measures

IN THIS context, Biden took advantage of the visit to announce a number of economic and civil measures, with Israeli consent, including upgrading the cellular phone network in the West Bank and Gaza to 4G technology, opening the Allenby Crossing (between the Occupied Territories and Jordan) 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and reviving the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Committee (JEC). These and other measures were discussed in the past, but did not materialize.

Palestinians have been critical of Biden’s focus on the economic context, without promoting a structural change in the current situation. A Palestinian nurse who attended the president’s speech at Augusta Victoria thanked him for supporting the hospital, but added, “We need more justice, more dignity.”

In his remarks in Bethlehem, Biden tried to link these steps to a political vision, portraying them as measures that could feed the flame of hope, but they appear to be disconnected from a political context. This is compounded by Palestinian anger at the administration for failing to re-open the consulate in Jerusalem and the PLO’s offices in Washington.

Second, Biden pointed to an additional interim goal of steps to bring Israelis and Palestinians closer together. That includes measures to promote dialogue at the leadership level (such as between Lapid and Abu Mazen) and to encourage people-to-people ties. During his visit, Biden announced two additional grants within the framework of the MEPPA (Middle East Partnership for Peace Act) initiative for joint civil society projects in healthcare and technology.

Third, Biden presented another policy direction of using the normalization process in the region as a tool to renew the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This was reflected in part by Morocco’s involvement in the contacts between Israel, the US and the Palestinians on expanding the Allenby Crossing hours of operation and in reported American efforts to integrate the Palestinians into regional forums being created in the wake of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Summit.

On the other hand, Mahmoud Abbas stressed to Biden that the process had to be reversed, starting with an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and then moving on to a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative (2002). Senior Saudi officials backed this position, despite the aviation normalization measures, and declared during Biden’s visit that normalization would be possible only after the two state solution was implemented. In doing so, Saudi Arabia reiterated its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative and made clear that its relations with Israel are limited by a glass ceiling.

At the same time, the administration has been drawing red lines regarding Israeli policy on the ground. While Biden did not refer publicly to the settlements, he made it clear behind closed doors to his colleagues in Jerusalem that he expects zero surprises on the Palestinian issue, including measures in east Jerusalem and the expansion of West Bank settlements.

This stance continues the Biden administration’s involvement in issues such as foiling the plan to build a neighborhood in Atarot or preventing the evacuation of Palestinian families in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. The current administration is clearly acting quietly on these matters, avoiding public statements, apparently as a lesson from the Obama era. What is more, Biden does not want to politically hurt the current government and; therefore, prefers to deal with these issues behind closed doors.

In conclusion, the Biden administration has signaled from the start that the Palestinian issue is not a high priority on its agenda and while it boasts of reversing various moves made by Trump, in other areas it has not undone the changes he made. The administration has taken a two-pronged approach, promoting measured civil-economic steps and actions to prevent escalation, and offering a distant political vision of two states, and an equal measure of freedom and dignity.

With the visit over, the administration must work to connect the two components and formulate a strategy that connects the near-term steps to the long-range vision. Although we are under a transitional government and in the midst of another election campaign, the administration should take advantage of this stage to translate the declarations on a political horizon into an action plan for the day when hope and history rhyme.

This article was posted in “JPost” on July 26th, 2022

הפוסט Biden’s Israel visit reiterates his views on the two state solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States has lost influence in Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country and seat of the African Union, whose Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed overnight went from being a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Washington darling to the target of U.S. condemnation and sanctions. This turnaround stemmed from the U.S.’ decision to side with Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia over the issue of the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile – the largest hydroelectric plant in Africa, which seriously threatens Egypt’s water, food and economic security.

This was compounded by U.S. demands that the Ethiopian government end its raging civil war and cease the human rights violations that led to its November 2021 ouster from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (an important trade agreement aimed at helping African economies and improving their economic ties with the United States).

Against this backdrop, Ethiopia tightened its diplomatic relations with Russia, signing a military cooperation agreement with it and receiving strategic weapons for the defense of the Renaissance Dam. Prime Minister Ahmed was also assisted by drones from China to bomb the Tigrayans and their allies who are threatening his rule.

Sudan, meanwhile, was driven into Russia’s arms after the October 2021 coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, president of the provisional Sovereignty Council, against his civilian government partner. That prompted U.S. and Western opposition, and the suspension of $700 million in U.S. aid to the country. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemeti), al-Burhan’s deputy, visited Moscow on February 24 – the day Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine – and publicly expressed support for Russia’s right to protect its citizens in Ukraine’s separatist regions.

הפוסט Biden’s America Is Returning to the Red Sea Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States has lost influence in Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country and seat of the African Union, whose Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed overnight went from being a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Washington darling to the target of U.S. condemnation and sanctions. This turnaround stemmed from the U.S.’ decision to side with Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia over the issue of the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile – the largest hydroelectric plant in Africa, which seriously threatens Egypt’s water, food and economic security.

This was compounded by U.S. demands that the Ethiopian government end its raging civil war and cease the human rights violations that led to its November 2021 ouster from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (an important trade agreement aimed at helping African economies and improving their economic ties with the United States).

Against this backdrop, Ethiopia tightened its diplomatic relations with Russia, signing a military cooperation agreement with it and receiving strategic weapons for the defense of the Renaissance Dam. Prime Minister Ahmed was also assisted by drones from China to bomb the Tigrayans and their allies who are threatening his rule.

Sudan, meanwhile, was driven into Russia’s arms after the October 2021 coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, president of the provisional Sovereignty Council, against his civilian government partner. That prompted U.S. and Western opposition, and the suspension of $700 million in U.S. aid to the country. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemeti), al-Burhan’s deputy, visited Moscow on February 24 – the day Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine – and publicly expressed support for Russia’s right to protect its citizens in Ukraine’s separatist regions.

It is therefore possible that under these circumstances, Russian attempts to advance a deal for a 25-year lease of territory on the Sudanese coast to establish a logistics base there – which have so far been successfully torpedoed by the Americans – will eventually succeed.

Eritrea was pushed into China’s and Russia’s embrace after the United States imposed sanctions on the Eritrean army, the country’s ruling party and two senior government officials in November 2021, over the involvement of the Eritrean army in the Ethiopian civil war. As a result, Eritrea joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative that same month.

The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to the country last January resulted in a $15.7-million pledge of Chinese aid and an expression of Chinese readiness to develop Eritrea’s coast.

Eritrea was also the only African country to publicly side with Russia on Ukraine, voting against the March 2 UN General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia immediately cease its military activity there. Contacts are currently underway between Russia and Eritrea to establish a Russian logistics base off the coast of Eritrea.

China attaches great importance to the Horn of Africa, and has been promoting its status as a major player and conflict-resolution mediator within and between the countries of the region.

In January, Wang made his first visit of the year to countries on the Horn of Africa and East Africa. During this round of visits, he announced China’s readiness to raise the “Peaceful Development Initiative in the Horn of Africa,” and to support the region’s countries in tackling the trilateral challenges of security, development and governance.

In the security sphere, he suggested that the region hold a conference with in-depth discussions on peace in the Horn of Africa, reach a political consensus and coordinate joint actions.

In terms of development, he proposed expanding the railroads connecting the Kenyan port city of Mombasa with the capital, Nairobi, and the state of Djibouti with Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. He also suggested accelerating the development of the Red Sea and East African coasts.

At the governmental level, meanwhile, he proposed that ethnic, religious and regional conflicts be resolved in a way that would create a unified, stable and harmonious development environment in the Horn of Africa.

Last February, the Chinese government appointed senior diplomat Xue Bing as the country’s special envoy to the Horn of Africa, supporting its initiatives in the region. And last month, China held the first China-Africa Security, Governance and Development Conference, in Addis Ababa. During the event, Xue offered his mediation services for peaceful conflict resolution in the region and declared China’s readiness to support food security, agricultural, transportation, trade promotion and capacity building projects.

In light of these developments, and in an attempt to curb the spread of Chinese and Russian presence and influence in the region, the United States is taking two parallel steps in the southern and northern Red Sea.

Last May, immediately after the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president of Somalia, the White House announced it would be redeploying 450 to 500 U.S. troops in the country, to advise and assist Somali forces in their war against the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization (after the Trump administration withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia in 2020). The timing of the move was apparently dictated by Sheikh Mohamud’s cool relations with the president of Eritrea and prime minister of Ethiopia, both allies of China and Russia.

At the same time, the United States is investing considerable efforts in negotiations on ratifying the agreement between Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the return of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, with a Saudi commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation of Israeli ships in the region. In return, Saudi Arabia will agree to the passage of Israeli flights over its territory to the Far East, and may also allow direct flights from Tel Aviv for Arab Israelis to pilgrimage in Mecca.

A number of developments on the eastern and northern sides of the Red Sea in the past two years have made it possible for the Biden administration to take these steps. The 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, with the approval and support of Saudi Arabia, has made it possible to bring Israel into the Red Sea Basin as a partner in an emerging Middle East alliance. And the Gulf reconciliation agreement signed on January 5, 2021, which ended a three-and-a-half-year rift between Qatar and its ally Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt, has brought all these countries closer together.

This rapprochement allows the United States to promote a regional security alliance. The U.S. Army’s transfer of Israel from the responsibility of the European Command to Central Command in January 2021 has facilitated military cooperation between Israel and other countries under that command. In November 2021, the naval forces of Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and U.S. Central Command held a joint naval exercise in the Red Sea simulating a clash with Iran. And last month, a secret meeting was held in Sharm el-Sheikh between Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi and his Saudi counterpart, and between senior IDF officers and their counterparts from the armies of Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE and Bahrain.

Finally, the cease-fire in Yemen, which is now entering its fourth month, allows the Biden administration to take these steps without facing domestic and external criticism of its cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

This U.S. activity contributes to restoring influence in the Red Sea Basin and to the continued construction of a new geopolitical space that extends from India to France, crossing through the Gulf states, the northern Red Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean Basin.

Israel is meant to play a central role within this space, stemming from its location between the eastern Mediterranean Basin and the Red Sea and Gulf states, and resulting from its military strength, its commitment to freedom of navigation and to dealing with the Iranian threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

There is no doubt that this American activity also raises the importance of the Red Sea Basin in Israel’s eyes – not only in terms of security, as part of its commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation against Iranian threats, but also politically and in terms of the potential it holds for environmental and economic cooperation.

הפוסט Biden’s America is returning to the Red Sea Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The scorching summer of 2022 probably isn’t the best time to tour the region. A popular Israeli joke has it that there are only two seasons in the Middle East: the hot sandy winds and elections—and now both are occurring together. All three of Biden’s stops in his regional tour are currently experiencing some degree of turmoil: Israel’s government just fell; the Palestinian Authority (PA) faces the heavy atmosphere of an impending leadership transition; and Saudi Arabia is reinventing itself and reshaping its foreign policy, while preparing for the inevitable transition of power from ailing King Salman to his energetic son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The current regional turbulence might seem to be an inhospitable backdrop for a US presidential visit. However, the importance of the United States asserting its regional leadership role and driving its strategic interests cannot be underestimated. During periods of regional and global instability, it is critical that the US indicate to its regional allies that they matter and their needs are being taken into consideration. Transitions might be messy, but they also present an opportunity to start afresh and to reboot lagging ties or to develop new relationships.

Israelis and Palestinians know well that, while they will be getting their share of attention, the most important and perhaps most difficult part of Biden’s Middle East tour will take place in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom is important, not only because of its ability to provide some stability to global oil markets, but also due to its rising regional influence. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, not only survived the turmoil, but also emerged as one of the Middle East’s leading countries. Saudi Arabia’s divorce from radical Wahhabi ideology, support for the 2020 Abraham Accords, and buttressing of moderate Arab regimes in the region are all extremely important.

The rise in Saudi Arabia’s regional influence coincided with sharp ups and downs in its relations with the United States. Saudi Arabia provides Egypt with financial aid that helps Cairo stay afloat, but, at the same time, it is unable to protect its oil installations and airports from foreign aggression. Emboldened Saudi enemies, such as Iran and their Houthi proxies in Yemen, triggered a chain reaction in Riyadh. When the Saudis felt that they didn’t get sufficient reassurances from Washington, they began looking at diversifying their foreign relations and weapons purchases, with particular focus on Moscow and Beijing.

Israelis share the same fear of US disengagement from the region as the Saudis. This sentiment—concerns of further security destabilization in the Middle East while the Americans pull out from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—also shapes Jerusalem’s current policy on Russia, including its efforts to seek a middle ground on the war in Ukraine.

In addition to the Saudis, the Palestinians have been suffering from extreme ups and downs in their relations with the White House over the years. This began with the deep involvement in peace talks between Ramallah and Jerusalem during the Barack Obama administration—only for an unofficial boycott during the Donald Trump era. Now, under the Biden administration, there appears to be an atmosphere of indifference and stalemate. The guideposts in Palestinian relations with Washington were lost, with the constant reference point having disappeared.

The situations in Israel and the Palestinian Authority are, of course, very different. Despite all its fears and insecurities, Jerusalem is a staunch US ally. At the same time, Ramallah openly wishes for a different broker that is less sympathetic to Israel. In November, Israel will go through its fifth election in three years after the Naftali Bennett-Yair Lapid government collapsed on June 20. Meanwhile, Palestinians yearn for elections that haven’t happened since 2006, when Hamas won a legislative majority in an upset victory against Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah party. Even so, the current endgame is similar, as both sides go through an undefined period of political instability and a power vacuum that prevents any possibility of serious dialogue or negotiations.

Precisely due to this precarious situation, the United States needs to reaffirm its commitment to the two-state solution, as there is no other proposed alternative. This commitment should be reinforced not only by statements—although they are, of course, important—but by concrete positive steps designed to stabilize the situation and inspire hope. Some of these steps involve fulfilling earlier promises to the Palestinians regarding reestablishing a US consulate in Jerusalem, which closed in 2019. Others require conveying a clear message to Israel that mass evictions of Palestinians from their homes or home demolitions are counterproductive, dangerous, and generally unacceptable.

While it’s clear that the path to the negotiation table is currently blocked due to the unstable political situation in Ramallah and Jerusalem, much more can be done to prevent the collapse of the PA and what is left of the Oslo Accords through regional initiatives. After initial hesitancy about how to respond to the Abraham Accords, the Biden administration has rightly embraced them as the only ray of light in an otherwise troubled region. Biden himself said there are “much larger issues than just energy” motivating his upcoming trip on July 16 and indicated that he is going to Saudi Arabia to discuss normalization efforts, as well as regional security challenges.

There is no doubt that, today, the most pressing regional concern to US allies—Israel and Saudi Arabia—is Iran and the possibility that it might soon become a nuclear threshold country. Yet, despite being sidelined for the last decade, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hasn’t faded into thin air. It remains a major strategic challenge to Israel’s national security and regional stability. Both the previous inflation of its centrality and the current underestimation of its graveness is dangerous to Israel and the Palestinians, as well as for their closest neighbors, Jordan and Egypt. The United States and its Middle Eastern allies cannot allow inertia to dictate the course of events, as the outcome it will produce might be too grave. To influence the course of events and prevent escalation, the United States must act as a stabilizing force, presenting its regional approach and involvement with clarity and consistency.

When China and Russia are keen to deepen their influence in the Middle East and American allies in the region are doubtful about the future, it is up to the United States to connect the dots and provide the stability and firmness that is lacking in today’s regional landscape. Biden’s visit to the Middle East must not be an isolated event, a band-aid for other people’s problems. Instead, it should powerfully relaunch relations between the United States and its long-term allies and partners in the Middle East. If stability cannot be derived from the inside, it might be injected from the outside.

This article is from “Atlantic Council“, from July 6, 2022

הפוסט There’s uncertainty in Israel and within the Palestinian Authority. The US’s stabilizing role is critical more than ever. הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Some would say that the Abraham Accords have not made a significant difference since intelligence cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states existed way before the accords were reached. However, the unveiling of those clandestine ties offers an opportunity for diplomatic cooperation and construction of “defense umbrellas” – multilateral security frameworks for Israel and its partners in the Gulf to cooperate against Iranian threats. Reflecting this significant change, Israel’s aspirations to promote a regional defense alliance resurfaced in recent talks between Israeli and regional leaders, with some even dubbing the ambitious undertaking “a Middle Eastern NATO.”

A strategic alliance between Israel and other Middle Eastern nations could undoubtedly bear significant fruits for Israel – not only in containing Iran’s regional influence, but also, and especially – in deepening Israel’s integration into the region and removing the concept of war from its relations with the moderate Arab states. However, it is absolutely clear that the talk of a regional NATO does not hold water.

The principle of collective defense in the foreseeable future is irrelevant in the relations between Israel and its partners in the Middle East because it would require the partners to respond to any attack on one of the alliance members as if they were attacked themselves. A scenario in which the Israel Air Force strikes Houthi targets in response to UAV attacks on the UAE or the Egyptian air force attacks Hamas targets in Gaza in response to missile attacks on Israel is highly unlikely.

Collective security is based not only on a confluence of interests but on elements of shared identity. Israel’s integration into the Middle East has made great progress in the past two years, but it is a far cry from a concept of shared identity. In any case, it is irrelevant as long as there is a fundamental disagreement between Israel and its potential partners on the question of where Israel’s borders should be drawn.

Although a collective defense alliance is currently irrelevant, the concept raises more modest possibilities for strategic security alliances. The emerging model consists of ongoing strategic dialogue, security-political coordination, intelligence cooperation, joint exercises, and the supply of advanced weapons systems. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s idea of air defense cooperation could constitute a first layer in such cooperation.

AT FIRST glance, this model appears to be applicable in the current state of relations between Israel and the Gulf states. The basis of such regional defense alliances is the existence of a common threat. In this regard, there is no doubt that Israel and the Gulf states face three shared threats: Iran’s efforts to develop military nuclear capabilities, its attempts to expand its regional influence – from Iraq through Syria and Lebanon to Yemen and Bahrain – and its military maritime operations, mainly in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

However, while Israel and the Gulf states face a common threat, their set of constraints and their modus operandi are very different. Israel tends to view the region as divided into clear camps, with rigid and uncompromising lines separating them. Thus, we tend to place the UAE and Saudi Arabia (alongside Egypt) on our “side” in a zero-sum struggle against Iran.

An in-depth examination of the Gulf states’ strategy towards Iran over the past year presents a far more complex picture reflecting their efforts to play both sides of the fence, maintain open channels with Iran, and even seek understandings with it. The Emirati national security adviser’s visit to Iran last December, and the resumption of dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year, demonstrate the key principle guiding the Gulf states’ strategy working with all the players on the field – including and especially Iran – to reduce risks to their own security.

One can understand the Gulf states. Given the current circumstances, they cannot afford to play Israel’s zero-sum game against Iran. Although the United Arab Emirates is a regional power with notable influence from the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa, it is also a small country with limited military capabilities, which shares a long maritime border with Iran. Its energy production facilities and maritime trade routes are very vulnerable. The Emiratis and the Saudis also recognize the limitations of American intervention in the event of an escalation with Iran. The Trump Administration’s limited response to the 2019 attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia made it clear to the Gulf states that in the event of a military attack, the most they could hope for from the US are economic sanctions.

Entering into a security alliance with Israel will impair the Emirati ability to balance its risks and put an end to its multilateral juggling. It will place the UAE on a direct collision course with Iran. These considerations explain why many in the UAE (and even more in Saudi Arabia) would be reluctant to underpin the Abraham Accords with an overt security pillar.

These constraints highlight the importance of active American sponsorship as a precondition for a regional defense alliance between Israel and the Gulf states. The road to a regional security alliance runs through Washington, and US security guarantees are essential for any security partnerships between Israel and the Gulf states.

The US is the only actor whose strategic assets can provide the necessary incentives for the Gulf states to engage in overt security cooperation with Israel. These include CENTCOM forces in Qatar, the 5th Fleet, American sponsorship of the International Maritime Security Construct based in Bahrain and the symbolic but important presence of US forces in eastern Syria.

AMERICAN SPONSORSHIP of a regional alliance, however, would require a fundamental change and an almost complete reversal of Washington’s current approach to the Middle East. The past year has emphasized the waning US commitment to this arena, if not its actual withdrawal, as it shifts resources to the conflict with Russia and China.

The American approach occasionally seems to be intent on tying up loose ends in the Middle East in order to focus on more important goals. Its willingness to consider the removal of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps from the list of terrorist organizations bolsters this impression.

Nonetheless, the impending nuclear agreement with Iran provides an opportunity to redefine US relations with the countries of the region. Since the nuclear deal will not address regional issues, the countries of the region, including Israel, should strive to obtain separate security guarantees from the US and the international community to contain Iran’s regional activities. The US interest is clear – an aggressive Iran will undermine regional stability and open the door to a broader regional conflict damaging energy production and global trade routes. It would also indirectly enable their major rivals, Russia and China, to expand their influence in the region.

Israel has a special role to play in creating a strategic relationship between the US and the region. Its strategic relationship and political influence in Washington have been proven as pivotal incentives for regional partners to establish relations with Israel, from the Camp David agreements with Egypt to the signing of the Abraham Accords.

The recent Negev Summit emphasized Israel’s unique role as a liaison between the Gulf states and the United States – especially in light of the cooling of US-Gulf relations in the Biden era. The roles have thus been reversed. Whereas the US previously enabled the development of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states through its sponsorship resulting in the Abraham Accords, Israel is now maintaining and bolstering relations between the Gulf and Washington, if not for their sake, then for its own.

The nuclear deal taking shape in Vienna is far from perfect – it is probably the lesser of the evils that Israel will have to accept given the Trump administration’s reckless pullout from the original agreement. But it opens the door to unprecedented strategic cooperation between Israel, the US and the Gulf states to complement the elements they view as glaringly absent from the deal.

The strategic dialogue that began last week in Sde Boker redefines Israel’s strategic importance for the region and the value of its integration. Israel should cement these ties, not in a confrontational move vis-à-vis the US, rather as an alliance that includes the United States as an integral part of the regional architecture.

The op-ed was published in JPost in April 2022.

הפוסט The road to alliance in the Middle East is through Washington הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.