Israel’s Ministry for Regional Cooperation was neglected until the new government was formed in June 2021. The ministry did not interest the Likud ministers who led it in recent years, and therefore it needs to be rebuilt. The ministry aims to develop economic and societal links with the Palestinians and to advance shared initiatives with Arab countries. In accordance with a 2009 government decision, the ministry is responsible for key economic matters related to the Palestinians, although previous ministers neglected this aspect. The Palestinian issue is Israel’s most central issue and must be given full prioritization.

The government could have integrated smaller ministries with larger ones, but as long as the Ministry for Regional Cooperation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including their leaders maintain a good working relationship, as they do today, there is justification for the existence of both ministries. There is a broad basis for cooperation when both offices adopt a positive and cooperative approach, and potential for significant success.

The Ministry for Regional Cooperation leads the renewed meetings between Israeli and Palestinian Authority ministers, following a long hiatus. Meetings with Palestinian ministers and discussion of mutual interests constitute a significant change and achievement. The very discourse with the Palestinians creates new opportunities, and advancement of societal and economic issues could eventually lead to discussion of policy issues and renewal of the peace process.

Despite the varying positions in the coalition regarding the peace process, we must do what is possible – within the government, on the civilian level and in terms of public diplomacy – to bring about the renewal of negotiations on the two-state solution. US President Biden also supports this, and there is no other way. The slogans voiced by Netanyahu about “peace in return for peace” with Arab states and Israel’s ability to forge ties with the Arab world while bypassing the Palestinians are false clichés.

The Palestinian Authority is facing great financial difficulties threatening its stability. Israel recently loaned it 500 million NIS, but the money will not last long. The Palestinian Authority must be strengthened. There are internal problems on the Palestinian side, especially regarding human rights, and Meretz has voiced its criticism at relevant forums. But the Palestinians elected Mahmoud Abbas, who heads the Palestinian Authority, and he is the one whom we must work with.

Over the past year, Arabs have brought Israel good news. Arabs from outside Israel have brought Israel economic promise through the Abraham Accords, and Arabs from within Israel saved it from a political and democratic crisis by joining the new coalition. Israel’s economic future lies in its integration in the Middle East. In order to fulfill this potential, Israel’s Arab minority must enjoy a status that can serve as an example of the potential for relationship with Arabs in the region. Arabs in the region must also be provided with a positive experience while passing at Ben Gurion Airport, as to not jeopardize their willingness to visit Israel.

Israelis are keen to do business with the United Arab Emirates. In the past, the symbol of wealth in Israel was Uncle Sam from the US. Now the “wealthy uncle” is an Arab from the Emirates. This is a major change. Arabs have become key to economic success. This must be leveraged in order to change the public perception of Israel’s Arab citizens and to free the Israeli public of its prevailing fear of Arabs. Nonetheless, the Emirates are not our cash machine and we must not view them as such. This is a country that is interested in strategic friendship and partnership with Israel.

The Ministry for Regional Cooperation has worked for years to advance two mega-projects envisioned by Shimon Peres – the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal and the free trade zone with Jordan (Sha’ar HaYarden project). These projects have been stagnating for over 20 years and Jordan has already withdrawn from the canal initiative. The State of Israel must announce formally whether it still regards these projects as relevant, as a decision to step back from them would free up budgets that the ministry could allocate to other initiatives.

Relations with Jordan under Netanyahu were the worst they have been since the signing of the peace agreement. Jordan claimed Israel was untrustworthy and fulfilled only some 10 percent of its promises to the Kingdom. During the new government’s first 100 days, Israel’s Prime Minister, President and Foreign Minister have already visited Jordan, in order to rebuild trust.

In honor of Saudi Arabia’s national day, the Minister of Regional Cooperation wishes its people a good life, prosperity, peace and growth. We must strive for direct flights between Ben Gurion Airport and Jeddah that will enable Israel’s Arab citizens to fulfill their religious pilgrimage. Israel’s Arab population currently goes through suffering and hardship in this regard, and that requires change.

Except for the Iranian axis, Israel has ties with all the states of the region, at one level or another. The Ministry for Regional Cooperation is focusing on promoting ties with those countries that have signed agreements with Israel and that are engaging with it openly. Other countries are waiting to see whether the Abraham Accords succeed in yielding mutual benefit. If so, they are also likely to move forward and establish diplomatic ties with Israel.

הפוסט Israel’s Ministry for Regional Cooperation: <br> A Snapshot After the New Government’s First 100 Days הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Mr. Michele Merloni, Policy Officer – Relations with Israel, The European External Action Service: The Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood comes 25 years after the initiation of the Barcelona Process, with its main themes being human development, peace and security, migration and mobility, the strengthening of resilience and new themes of digital and green transition.

Israel has a strong bilateral economic and technical cooperation with the EU.

The EU is the first trading partner of Israel, and in the region Israel is the second or third partner of the EU. In the field of investments Israel is no. 1.

Israel also engages in regional programs on various sectors, including climate, environment, and transport. By the end of 2021, we expect the implementation of the pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin (for those who complete the procedural adoption), which can help the economic integration of Israel in the South-Mediterranean region and with the EU.

In the Joint Communication on the Renewed Partnership between the EU and the southern neighbourhood, the Commission proposes to mobilize up to EUR 7 billion under the Neighbourhood and Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Israel is mentioned in the Joint Communication regarding digital transformation and research and innovation, in light of its great added value in those sectors.

In the same document, the EU mentions that it is willing and ready to explore regional, sub-regional or trilateral cooperation and joint initiatives, also in the light of the recent normalization agreements.

Now is the time to reflect and exchange ideas on how to operationalize the Normalization Agreements, how the EU can support the process, the ways in which Israel can contribute and receive economic and political added value from the Renewed Partnership and the areas that can be explored. We attach importance to P2P and initiatives between municipalities, SMEs, schools, universities, associations, etc. Climate change and digitalization are also of importance. It is time to come with initiatives. The participation of experts from Israel and the region is also welcomed.

Dr. Luigi Scazzieri, Research Fellow, Center for European Reform: The Renewed Partnership is an effort to broaden the EU agenda and give greater prominence to green and digital issues, while emphasizing a people-centered agenda on youth and women, rule of law, and democracy.

The question remains to which extent what the EU is offering to its partners is an incentive for them to undertake reforms. This is also because the European model is becoming less attractive and less visible in the region given that there are emerging alternatives such as Russia and China, and the Gulf model.

The Renewed Partnership points to the EU’s wish to play a bigger role in regional conflicts and in the field of security. But the EU has hardly been an influential security actor in the region. Member States have been divided in their positions, which hinders EU action. The EU is unwilling to take on hard security challenges and to think strategically about them. This also comes at a time when the EU is more likely to be focused on internal matters rather than on an external agenda.

Regarding implications for Israel, the Renewed Partnership does not bring major changes in EU policy. The EU will keep looking with Israel for ways to deepen the economic and other frameworks of cooperation. There is much potential to cooperate in the Green and Digital fields. The EU will try and preserve the two-state solution. This is explicitly stated in the document. This will amount to attempt to foster more democracy and accountability in the Palestinian Authority, and member states might want to take a look at the differentiation agenda in response to Israel’s settlement building. The legal framework is there, but it’s not fully implemented, so there might be gradual moves in that direction, but it’s not a priority for the EU, partly because of the internal divisions. If more member states become convinced that what emerges is a one state reality, that gradually would shift and undermine Israel – EU relations and cooperation.

Ms. Noa Ginosar, Political Counselor, Mission of Israel to the EU: The EU worked in partnership with its neighbours in producing the Renewed Partnership document. Foreign Minister, Gabi Ashkenazi, participated in the discussions that Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi (DG NEAR) and High Representative Joseph Borrel conducted with the Southern neighbourhood countries in order to better understand their priorities and challenges. This process was undertaken in order to engage in dialogue with the partner counties, and better understand their challenges and their ideas of projects they would like to advance The Covid-19 crisis has shown that we share joint challenges that cross borders, and those regions need to enrichen and deepen the dialogue and cooperation between them. The EU has a clear interest in tapping into this discussion and can utilize its leadership to foster better relations between different partners that can benefit from cooperating in order to address these challenges. Energy, climate and also defence and security are no longer phenomena which happen in separate countries. These are all regional issues that require dialogue.

From the perspective of Israel, it was significant that the EU’s approach to the Renewed Partnership recognized the most important development in the region in recent times – the normalization of Israel’s relations with new regional partners. In this way, the Renewed Partnership brings forth a tangible connection between regional developments, and EU-Southern Neighborhood relations. Normalization has brought a change of paradigm for the region, for Israel, for the Arab and Muslim world. We see in this process positive implications for the EU both internally and from a regional perspective.

Europe can strengthen its role in the region by tapping into these new developments. We’re looking forward to further exploring with our European partners how to take this forward, by looking at more operational elements and concrete ideas. This process should advance in parallel to the signature of a Partnership Priority agreement between Israel and the EU.

Normalization has already brought forward a myriad of concrete initiatives which are already occurring, with or without Europe. We wish to see the EU and the member states as a very clear partner in this. This would serve to embolden European relevance in the region, as well as in the context of bilateral Israel-EU relations, which can only benefit from cooperation in this area of mutual interest for Israel, the EU and the greater Southern Neighborhood.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Co-President, IASEI; Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations, Mitvim Institute: The normalization agreements bring hope for expanding regional stability and economic cooperation and development. They can serve as a new trigger for a renewed MEPP.

Within the Renewed Partnership, Israel and the Arab countries it has relations with (Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Morocco and possibly also the PA) should decide what regional and inter-regional projects to suggest to the EU. Many projects can be envisaged under the goals the EU set, be it infrastructure to enhance economic relations, or the green and digital transition, climate change, etc. The indirect opportunity is the improvement of EU – Israeli relations if such regional process would take place also under its auspice.

The next Israeli foreign minister should take advantage of the options in the Renewed Partnership, adopt a positive attitude towards the EU, and visit Brussels instead of visiting member states capitals only.

The EU, meanwhile, should consider renewing the Association Council with Israel. It is a commitment the EU and Israel took upon themselves in the 1995 Association Agreement. It will improve the relations with Israel and domestic public opinion on the EU. The EU’s model is to advance through dialogue. From all the countries in the region, not holding the Association Council with Israel is imbalanced.

The EU should also sign Partnership Priorities with Israel, as it did with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon in the past years.

Israel should also evaluate whether it desires to start negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area that deals with services, investments and removal of non-trade barriers.

However, even if no Partnership Priorities is signed, the Joint Communication allows to develop these priorities on the basis of “equivalent policy documents”. In 2005 Israel signed an “Action Plan” with the EU, which is the old generation of the Partnership Priorities. It is not updated but it is very elaborate, and can serve as the basis on which to further develop the relationship.

To watch the conference on the EU’s “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighborhood”, click here.

הפוסט Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: Implications for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Gil Murciano, CEO of the Mitvim Institute

Climate change has important implications on many regional and national security issues — from the civil war in Syria to water interests throughout the Middle East. There are three particular spaces of opportunity in the region, first the renewed commitment of the Biden Administration to climate change policy, in partnership with European actors. Second, how the long-term nature of climate change allows for the creation of a significant regional framework for international cooperation. EcoPeace has done crucial work in these efforts. Lastly, with a new Israeli government, new government officials could create new opportunities for regional cooperation specific to environmental policy.

Dr. Daniel Shapiro, Former US Ambassador to Israel

The Biden Administration is clearly making climate change a priority in both domestic and foreign policy, especially working to identify how climate change can serve other foreign policy interests. President Biden is hoping to create a policy that encourages new job growth in renewable industries in the US and to cooperate with both its allies and its global competitors, chiefly China and Russia. Crucially, addressing climate change and environmental policy provides opportunities for crisis mitigation, management and resolution. The Administration’s work in these areas and Israeli environmental technology innovation and climate issues in the Middle East create a deep understanding of the potential for diplomacy and climate action to achieve shared goals.

Janet Rogan, Conference of Parties 26 UK Regional Ambassador to the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia

International politics and conflicts are immensely impacted by shared actions relating to the environment. Climate change threatens the stability and economic growth of the global population, especially in the Middle East, the most water scarce region in the world. As a result, international diplomacy has focused on coming together to address these shared challenges, particularly mitigating global warming (through renewable technologies), adapting human activity, determining means of implementation, whether financial or otherwise, and collaborating in a coordinated way. The importance of incorporating traditionally marginalized groups, such as women and indigenous folks, in these discussions cannot be overemphasized. Without international cooperation, these issues will continue to worsen and thus worsen conflicts.

Dr. Roee Kibrik, Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute

The Israeli government has taken a slow approach to prioritizing the climate crisis within its domestic and foreign policies. This is unfortunate, firstly because today one must embrace climate change as an essential, overarching framework in order to understand the world and operate within it. Secondly, because foreign policies that directly address climate change can help fulfill Israel’s most important foreign policy goals. Embracing policies that address climate change entails embracing regional cooperation, multilateralism and the pursuit of peace.  Thus, it could push Israel to cooperate with Jordan on water security, to search for energy connectivity to Europe, or to work with United Arab Emirates on food security. Furthermore, Israel is in a unique position to gain from these policies, not only from increased security and peace in the region, but because of the innovative technologies Israel has developed that will provide it with more opportunities in the international community.

Amb. Gideon Behar, Special Envoy for Climate Change and Sustainability,

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains the fundamental belief that regional cooperation on climate change is a necessity. The risks from climate change in the Middle East are catastrophic and cannot be addressed alone, but there can be tremendous opportunities from multilateral efforts. The Abraham Accords have opened new doors for investment and cooperation, providing just one example of the regional partnerships that can be created to address climate change. The ongoing cooperation between Israel and its neighbors has always been a priority of the Israeli government, and today there is increased prioritization of environmental issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA has formed a special team on climate change to work on these issues daily, and instructed all global diplomatic missions to reach the green standard in their offices, reducing their carbon footprints and raising awareness of sustainability.

Dr. Susanne Wasum-Rainer, German Ambassador to Israel

Germany is extremely committed to and highly prioritizes climate change within its foreign policy and diplomacy. The European Commission defines climate diplomacy as committing to multilateral economic policy, addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security, taking domestic action at all political levels, and enhancing international climate cooperation through outreach. Climate change requires a global response, chiefly through multilateral cooperation, such as the Paris Climate Accords. Israel is seen as a key partner in this endeavor, both due to its regional position and high level of innovation. Israel can play a huge role in the development of natural gas and energy, which can strengthen cross-border cooperation in the Middle East. The EU is seeking to invest more in environmental technologies, and Germany is committed to participating and working on these initiatives as needed.

Gidon Bromberg, Co-founder and Regional Director of EcoPeace

There are several policy opportunities for climate change and regional diplomacy in the Middle East. The Green Blue Deal for the Middle East plan addresses the positive correlation between water scarcity and the presence of conflict, as well as the heightened impact of climate change on the particularly vulnerable MENA region. If serious action is not taken at a regional level, several parts of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean will become uninhabitable; however, these proposals offer rich opportunities for peacebuilding and unprecedented cooperation. Jordan has an advantage for producing renewable energies, while Israel and Gaza hold the advantage for the production of water. The Israeli Ministry of Energy and Water Authority have already taken increased steps in acknowledging the need for renewable energy, including buying from neighbors such as Jordan. New initiatives include looking towards private interests, including investments from the Gulf States, to build up solar markets and water supply in Jordan and the broader region. The potential threat to Jordan’s water supply could destabilize the country, which would decrease Israel’s stability as well, however the availability of resources throughout Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories can allow for economic growth, regional interdependence, and peacebuilding.

Additionally, the climate crisis provides opportunities for increasing movement towards peace and the two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. To this end, the Green Blue Deal for the Middle East includes mechanisms for water technology sharing, from desalination to sewage treatment to increase Palestinian capacity building. Tackling water issues can provide both sides with a direct response to one of the historically intractable final status issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is no possibility for a zero-sum game in climate change policy, which can provide an important paradigm shift in the understanding of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Furthermore, by creating new projects to clean and resupply the Jordan River, new green jobs and economic opportunities can be created in the region. Lastly, there is extreme importance in educating and empowering Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians to work together to break the cycle of poverty and create a better environmental future for themselves and future generations.

The Green Blue Deal for the Middle East was presented at the United Nations Security Council, the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit, and will be presented at the upcoming G7 meeting, highlighting the willingness of the international community to move forward with climate action in the Middle East.

הפוסט The Climate Crisis as a Foreign Policy Issue:<br> Israeli Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Emilie Moatti, Labor:

Since Rabin’s assassination, the leadership of the Israeli left has internalized its own delegitimization perpetuated by the right, and it has tended to seek confirmation of its positions from the right-wing mainstream. People with liberal views generally refrained from expressing unpopular positions, and this has prevented the left’s leadership from speaking out on the Palestinian issue, despite the fact that the majority of the Israeli public supports negotiations and the two-state solution. Despite the delegitimization against the left, the majority of Israelis still believe that peace is the correct path and that conflicts are not resolved by war.

The pursuit of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is first and foremost an Israeli interest, which concurrently pursues justice for the aspirations of our Palestinian neighbors. This is important both strategically and morally. The right’s claim that the Palestinian issue can be ignored is childish and dangerous, despite the Abraham Accords. Even if Arab countries let go of the Palestinian issue, we must not do so. Labor has a clear interest in turning every stone to find a solution to the conflict, based on separation and the 1967 borders, to promote a vision of a secure Israel.

Labor has never abandoned the quest for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, and our entire list is in sync and share the same vision. In the next government, which hopefully will be an alternative to Netanyahu’s rule, Labor will lead a return to negotiations. Today there is not much cooperation with Jordan and Egypt, hence we will cultivate our peace with them, especially economically and culturally, as even a cold peace needs a nurturing hand and a caring shoulder.

We should stop claiming that the whole world is against us and that Israel’s existence is in doubt. It is in Netanyahu’s interest that we feel persecuted, but in practice, Israel is a significant player in the international arena and cooperates with many countries. Israel’s global reach should be expanded, but without aligning with non-liberal leaderships, such as Brazil, Poland, and Trump. The Americans were able to say goodbye to a populist president, who was bad for both them and us.

The powers of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have been dispersed to countless other ministries, and in recent years more and more professional diplomats left the ministry. This requires change. Professional diplomats should be preferred over political appointees, especially in major capitals around the world. Israel’s diplomats should represent the country, regardless of the political identity of the foreign minister, and feel part of an influential and meaningful Foreign Service.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair of Meretz:

The Israeli MFA is very weak as its powers have been stripped away for many years to form new, unnecessary ministries. This has ultimately harmed Israeli interests. The MFA has the knowledge and experience to lead Israeli diplomacy, and it needs to be strengthened. This can be done by passing the Foreign Service Act, which will solidify the status of the MFA and will prevent any political whim to weaken it. Israel’s foreign relations must highlight democracy and human rights. Israel must be on the side of democracy, as democracies around the world are deteriorating. Israel should not prefer countries that erode democracy, as Netanyahu does.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue is very relevant and the recent decision by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) shows how crucial solving the conflict is for Israel’s future. Meretz opposes the prosecution of Israeli soldiers and we are in favor of Israel and Israelis, but it is the right-wing government’s policy that drags Israel to the ICC. It is impossible to control millions of Palestinians, deny them basic rights, reject any international involvement, and then say that anyone who criticizes Israel is anti-Semitic and an enemy of Israel. Israel has a responsibility. We must take our destiny into our own hands and make a change in Israel’s policy that works towards solving the conflict. This will resolve the issue of the ICC.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is frozen and the situation on the ground is getting worse. We need to return to dialogue and negotiations, and leverage the renewed American support for a two-state solution under President Biden. The two-state solution will lead to breakthroughs in Israel’s relations with other actors, including in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. This is in Israel’s best interest. To realize and maximize the potential of normalization with Arab countries, we must concurrently move forward with the Palestinians. As long as there is a stalemate in the peace process, relations with the region will remain limited.

The situation in the Gaza Strip is severe. It is in our interest to allow the Gaza Strip to be developed and promote political unity between Gaza and the West Bank, under the Palestinian Authority’s rule. The Palestinian Authority is an ally of Israel and anyone who says that Palestinian President Abbas is a terrorist is detached from reality. The Israeli right has not repealed the Oslo Accords, which it likes to slander, because the accords serve Israel. It would be good if there were elections in the Palestinian Authority and if a democratic society prevails there. Palestinians living in East Jerusalem should also participate in the elections if they wish to, and the decision as to which parties will participate and in what way is an internal Palestinian matter.

The EU is a friend of Israel and is enormously important to Israel, also because of its commitment to democracy. The political right’s claim that the EU is hostile to us and persecutes us, just because it criticizes the settlements, is simply not true. The EU is a strong ally, and relations between Israel and European countries, such as France and Germany, are a tremendous asset to Israel.

MK Orna Barbivai, Yesh Atid:

The MFA is significant to Israel’s national security, as diplomacy is a strategic tool for maximizing Israel’s qualitative edge. Our national resilience lies not only in security, but also in foreign affairs. The erosion of Israel’s democracy also affects our diplomacy, as the latter has become synonymous with populism because of one man’s monopoly to determine with whom we build relations and with whom we destroy. Legislation is needed to regulate the status of the MFA and give it more legitimacy to influence policy.

Israel must strive for normalization and peace. Israel’s power, which occasionally needs to be demonstrated, is meant to be used to achieve peace with our neighbors. The discourse on peace and the two-state solution must be returned to the agenda. The normalization agreements with Arab states must be leveraged in favor of promoting dialogue with the Palestinians. Leadership is the ability to analyze risks and identify potential collaborations.

I welcome the normalization agreements, but they lacked transparency, which is not how foreign relations should be conducted. The accords were brought to the Knesset’s approval before Members of Knesset even knew what they included. The Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee needs to deal more with foreign affairs. The parliaments of many countries separate between security and foreign issues, and Israel should take a similar approach to increase the importance of foreign affairs.

In my opinion, the ICC’s investigation has no legitimacy. Israel does not, in any way, commit war crimes. It makes a great effort to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Every effort should be made to repel the investigation, beginning with leading a transparent procedure that will legitimize the Israeli position.

The EU is a friend of Israel and it preserves Israel’s interests. One-third of Israel’s trade is with the EU. We need to improve our dialogue with the EU, and advancing these ties should be defined as a policy objective. There are many differences of opinion between Israel and the EU, including on the lack of European condemnation of the BDS movement, which require change. But in order to bring change there is no escape from having a dialogue with Europe and promoting cooperation with it. A different approach is harmful to Israel and reinforces negative perceptions of Israel.

The Iranian threat is vital and Israel’s deterrence is an important tool for dealing with it. Iran is making a great effort to harm us. It should be shown to Iran that it is not worth provoking Israel. Israel must be involved in formulating the new nuclear agreement and ensure that the agreement addresses its interests. This requires a well-oiled decision-making system that is not based solely on Netanyahu’s interests. We will also have to work hard to rebuild the bridges Netanyahu burnt and the damage he has done to Israel’s relations with the Democratic Party.

Dani Dayan, Tikva Hadasha:

Netanyahu clipped the MFA’s wings due to a fundamentally wrong assumption that the ministry serves a political agenda. When I was appointed by Netanyahu to serve as the Israeli Consul-General in New York, I found a financially depleted ministry with very professional and stately staff. Crucial information should not be hidden from the MFA, which must also be empowered by abolishing unnecessary ministries.

It is blatantly irresponsible and inconceivable to me that we have a part-time ambassador in Washington DC, who simultaneously acts as Israel’s ambassador to the UN. It is an impossible task for one person and disrespectful to both the US and the UN. It is another symptom of a political system that has a state, and not a state that has a political system.

During my tenure in New York, I felt that Netanyahu did not back me on the three issues I devoted most of my time to, and which in my view were the most important to Israel’s foreign policy: (1) the need to maintain bipartisan support in the US. The spirit coming out of Netanyahu’s office, and of our embassy in Washington DC, was one of complete identification with a single party, not just with their president. Many ties were severed, and unnecessary rivalries were created; (2) We greatly missed an opportunity to address minorities in the US. We demand that the Americans understand us, but we did not make an effort to understand the Democratic Party. This requires a comprehension of the African-American narrative and the issue of immigration. If we continue this path, we will lose the Democratic Party; (3) We neglected the Jewish community and acted indifferently, or even worse, towards them.  For five years, there has been no meeting between Netanyahu and the president of the US Reform Movement. Gideon Sa’ar [the chair of Tikva Hadasha] will take a fundamentally different approach and will welcome all Jews with open arms.

We do not see eye-to-eye with the Biden administration regarding the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most of the disagreements revolve around the settlement issue, but it is still important to maintain a dialogue with the administration. The Biden Administration is the friendliest Democratic administration we could expect, and it will not force us and the Palestinians into a peace process. Everyone realizes an agreement is not feasible at the moment. On the Iranian issue as well, we can reach a fruitful dialogue with the White House. The administration wants to return to the nuclear deal. Dialogue with the administration can influence the way things are done, and perhaps it could even prevent a return to the nuclear agreement altogether.

Lastly, I am glad that we have recently forged diplomatic relations with three countries in Latin America, with which we have not had diplomatic relations before. I believe that we should now try to renew relations with Cuba as well.

MK Aida Touma-Suleiman, Joint List:

Israel does not conduct its foreign relations as a state of nine million people, but as a superpower because of its relationship with the US, which also affects other regional states’ foreign policy towards it. Israel will not integrate into the Middle East as long as the occupation continues. The prolong occupation impacts Israel domestically and diplomatically, especially with Europe, the US, international bodies, and the Middle East. If Israel is interested in normalizing its foreign relations, it must end the occupation and treat its Arab minority equitably. Thereafter, Israel will be better accepted in the world.

The Joint List’s attempt to explain to the world what is happening in Israel from our experience, as those who are fighting the occupation, is often considered in Israel as sabotaging its foreign affairs. In fact, the Israeli government wants to hide what is happening in Israel. When this is revealed to the outside world, it is considered sabotaging and a crime according to Israeli law. Only countries that have something to hide legislate such laws. Israel must not base its international relations on lies and lack of transparency.

We are asked “why have you not joined Israel’s Foreign Service?” First of all, until recently there was not a single Israeli political leader who said that the Arabs were legitimate partners in the government. Indeed, most Arab citizens have a problem representing Israel abroad, as Israel continues to occupy our people. A person with opinions like mine cannot fit into the Israeli Foreign Service and be happily accepted. The Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee already had Arab members, but I do not see myself sitting in a committee that almost completely discusses security issues. If we do participate, it will be a game of cat and mouse, as they will surely move the important issues to be discussed in subcommittees to avoid us.

Israel’s agreements with Gulf states are part of a power struggle in the Middle East. Israel instils fear in everyone regarding Iran, to preserve its hegemony and nuclear supremacy in the region. The agreements are meant for bilateral cooperation and have nothing to do with the Palestinian cause. They were promoted as part of the Trump plan, which did not promote peace. On the contrary, the agreements exclude and isolate the Palestinians. They are an attempt to impose a process and decisions on the Palestinians, to suit Israel’s goals. The normalization agreements do not contribute to peace but rather distance it.

הפוסט How to Improve Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies? <br> Summary of the Mitvim Institute’s Pre-Election Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Opening Remarks

Merav Kahana-Dagan, Deputy Head, Mitvim Institute

The year 2020 will be remembered as a particularly strange one. On the one hand, Covid-19 seemed to bring the world to a stop and freeze everything in place; on the other, it was a year of change and development, both globally and regionally. Despite and along with all the challenges, we at the Mitvim Institute continued to advance a fix in Israel’s regional foreign policies. We saw progress and positive developments on some issues, while on others, progress is yet to be seen. We were successful in promoting joint action with government representatives and MKs to improve Israel’s foreign policy and strengthen the Foreign Service. We conducted regional dialogues with think tanks and experts from Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey. We sought to underscore the importance of relations with the EU and aided Israeli efforts to improve these ties. Just recently, we released the 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, an annual survey conducted for the eighth straight year in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, providing information and insights into the Israeli public’s views on a variety of foreign policy issues.

Dr. Paul Pasch, Israel Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 

The Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung have been strategic partners since Mitvim was established in 2011. We are especially proud of the fact that the Mitvim Institute is one of the few Israeli organizations that still conducts policy dialogues with a variety of regional partners – Turks, Palestinians, Jordanians, as well as research institutes and organizations engaged in discourse about the Mediterranean. The Mitvim Institute, with its modest means, is ranked in a high and respected place on the University of Pennsylvania’s global think tank index, and this is certainly a source of pride. The Mitvim Institute plays an important role in preserving and improving the dialogue between Israel and the governing institutions of the EU. It currently appears there is an opportunity to renew and strengthen the significant Israel-EU relations, which have suffered over the last few years. In recent months, against the backdrop of the agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan, the Mitvim Institute helped us see beyond the sense of public euphoria and understand the process in a more nuanced perspective.

Israel’s Relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean

Dr. Roee Kibrik, Director of Research, Mitvim Institute

It is hard to pin down Israel as belonging to just one regional system. The State of Israel is somewhere in the middle, between and betwixt, inside and beside, and often outside several regions. That explains why respondents in the Mitvim Institute’s annual surveys, when asked “to which region does Israel primarily belong,” are usually rather evenly divided among the Middle East, Mediterranean and Europe. Israel seeks to advance its interests in all three, as part of the regional fabric and balance of power. We must remember that these regions are not separate from each other and are closely interlinked.

Many significant developments have occurred over the past year, some surprising, some initiated by Israel, some led by other players, and some the result of external circumstances. These developments present Israel with many challenges as well as opportunities. Israel is no longer the isolated, enemy-encircled island that it perceived itself as for many years. Israel is discovering that it has much to gain from cooperation and that it can conduct ties with various countries, even those in conflict with each other or with Israel.

Israel has adopted a complex and more nuanced regional foreign policy. While it appears that external circumstances led Israel to adopt this approach, rather than a reasoned, thought-out internal decision, Israel could benefit greatly if it develops a more sophisticated foreign policy in accordance with these changes and adapts its tools accordingly. To that end it must also transform its Foreign Service into a well-funded, effective and coordinated body that plays a significant role in Israel’s decision-making processes.

Prof. Elie Podeh, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

This was a difficult year, but it had some positive parts, and was clearly an unexpected one. Despite the heavy shadow of Covid-19, Israel signed three normalization agreements, with the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan. These contradict to a certain extent the accepted thesis that progress in Israel’s relations with the Arab world cannot occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Perhaps we failed to correctly assess the shift in parts of the Arab world, the extent of the Arab world’s impatience with the Palestinians, the level of US determination and the pandemic’s repercussions.

The biggest change stemming from the signed agreements is a tremendous improvement of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis its enemies. The second significant change is the benefit for Israel’s economy. What is more, Israel’s image in the media and civil society in some of the region’s states has been enhanced. This was no dramatic, immediate shift; we are talking about a gradual change. The Arab media’s attitude toward Israel is fundamentally negative, but the manner in which Gulf media views Israel has improved. There has also been a shift in the Arab attitude toward the concept of normalization. The peace with the UAE and Bahrain is a different kind of peace. It is substantially different from the peace with Egypt and Jordan, signed primarily with the regimes in those states. With the UAE and Bahrain, the change is also occurring from the bottom up, not just from the top down. This is another kind of peace.

However, we must not be lulled into euphoria, as we have been in the past. These are significant achievements, but they are taking place on the periphery of the Middle East and do not necessarily have a dramatic effect on some of the conflicts and problems plaguing the region. Ultimately, the Palestinian issue is the heart of the conflict and we cannot divert attention to the periphery and assume that this will resolve the conflict. We may have even distanced a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A political shift in the US could result in the hoped-for change that would place the Palestinian issue higher on the US agenda.

Dr. Moran Zaga, Research Fellow, Mitvim Institute

The agreement between Israel and the UAE is a groundbreaking event within a broader process. In recent years, the UAE has positioned itself as a regional power active on the regional and international level. The normalization with Israel signals another milestone in its quest for influence and its efforts to adopt courageous and reality-changing measures. The UAE has strategic and ideological motivations in this regard. Israel, for its part, has an interest in facilitating a significant role for the UAE in the Middle East because it holds regional views similar to our own and wields influence in places that Israel does not, such as in Syria and Iraq.

Israel has invested significant resources in developing ties with the UAE through government and civil society channels. The change in relations that will take place will find its expression not only in the openness of ties, but also in their extent, capacities, and wider array of cooperation – in research, culture, tourism and diplomacy. The two states have shared interests and potential for cooperation in additional fields, such as climate change, food security, energy, technology, regional security and the Iranian threat. The building of the joint platforms we are currently witnessing that encompass government ministries, dedicated task teams, civilian forums and Memorandums of Understanding is an encouraging signal of a firm foundation with continuity potential.

Maintaining the special fabric of relations woven between Israel and the UAE is important, as is expanding the ties created between a narrow stratum of decision makers into broader connections. Since the UAE is a federative state, it is worth trying to link up various local leaders to the process. Some of the emirates in the federation have yet to express their views on normalization, and it is important to monitor their attitude. The UAE needs additional legitimacy for the step it took, and it therefore hopes that other Arab states will follow. That is why the ties that it seeks to forge with Israel are regional and not just bilateral in nature. The two sides have a mutual interest: strengthening the Emirati move towards Israel and expanding Israel’s network of ties in the Middle East.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Director, Europe-Israel Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

Israel-EU relations started off in 2020 under the shadow of the Trump plan, deteriorated into threats of European punitive measures if Israel went ahead with its unilateral annexation intentions, and significantly improved under Gabi Ashkenazi as Israel’s foreign minister.

The EU is Israel’s biggest trade partner, providing it with a stick it can use against Israel with varying degrees of force that could all be harmful (for example, the possibility that was raised not to renew the EU’s research and innovation agreement with Israel for the 2021-2027 period). The suspension of the annexation plan paved the way for better relations, and Ashkenazi enjoys respect and a warm European embrace, not the least of which stems from European dislike of Netanyahu and Ashkenazi’s clear differentiation from him. Officials in Jerusalem, Berlin and Brussels are trying to leverage the archiving of the annexation plan in order to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012 and to which certain European states have objected in recent years.

Israel’s normalization agreements with Arab states is forcing the EU to recalibrate its course on a two-state solution, given that non-resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no longer poses an obstacle to normalization with some Arab states. In addition, in order for Israel to be more attentive to the EU, the organization would do well to undo the ineffective linkage it makes between progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the upgrading of Israel-EU ties. The government of Israel, for its part, must stop its incitement that depicts the EU as a foe rather than friend, and that encourages a negative attitude toward the EU in Israeli public opinion, which is without justification or foundation and is damaging to the relationship. The government of Israel must promote ties with the EU, which is a strategic partner of the State of Israel. We must base our relations on dialogue, even if a critical one, and manage to once again distinguish between politics and interests.

Gabriel Mitchell, Director of External Relations, Mitvim Institute

The combination of Israel’s economic and strategic capabilities has created many opportunities in the Mediterranean. The discovery of natural gas has allowed Israel to dialogue with its neighbors and expand contacts with them. This past year, Israel signed the convention that anchors the status of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) as an internationally recognized organization, signed agreements with the governments of Cyprus and Greece on gas exports via the planned East Med pipeline, and worked together with Greece and Cyprus to stem the spread of Covid-19 and maintain open skies for tourism. Israel also offered Lebanon humanitarian aid following the Beirut port explosion, named Amira Oron as Ambassador to Egypt, maintained open dialogue and cooperation channels with Turkey, and coordinated with Egypt, Qatar, the UN and other international players to allow goods into Gaza and avoid eroding the status quo.

Israel currently faces three significant challenges in the region. It can no longer rely solely on the US, which is in the process of withdrawing from the region, and it must therefore look out for its own strategic interests and find additional pathways to advancing its goals in the region. The two other challenges stem from the collapse of global energy prices and the freeze placed on gas exploration in the Mediterranean as a result of the Covid-19 crisis, and Turkey’s challenge to the regional order with an aggressive foreign policy in a bid to expand its sphere of influence. In order to advance its interests in the Mediterranean, Israel could bolster ties with its EMGF partners, expand cooperation with them on issues such as the environment, renewable energy, tourism, cyber and maritime security. Israel could also strengthen ties with European states invested in the region’s future, encourage US participation in the EMGF and expand joint Israeli-American research projects to additional states, display willingness to resolve the maritime border issue with Lebanon, find a solution to the Gaza energy crisis, and maintain open communication channels with Turkey.

Israeli Diplomacy in Muslim and Arab States

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Mitvim Institute

New opportunities have opened for Israel in the Middle East in recent years. Relationships with Arab states are changing, facilitating new and expanded cooperation. The ties are no longer mostly clandestine and security-focused as they were previously; they are increasingly open and also include civilian, economic and diplomatic aspects. The Israeli public and decision makers have identified this shift and are increasingly viewing the Middle East as a region with potential for cooperation and not just as an arena in which Israel must defend itself from its neighbors. The realization of the full potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. That is true even as some Arab states are willing to normalize ties with Israel in return for suspension of Israel’s annexation intentions, even without concrete progress toward peace with the Palestinians. However, other factors are also delaying the realization of the potential in Israel-Arab relations, among them the Israeli government’s domestic conduct.

The State Comptroller’s report issued this year pointed to serious shortcomings in Israel’s Foreign Service. Other than the Foreign Ministry, which has been significantly and deliberately weakened in recent years, over 30 other government ministries and agencies are active in the foreign policy arena, without a central body to coordinate their activities. This is apparent in the management of Israel’s ties with Arab states, and examples of the issues that arise due to this lack of centralization have emerged over the past two months since the announcement of normalization with the UAE. Key examples include tensions between the security and diplomatic echelons and the continued dominance of security officials on foreign policy issues; the rivalry and lack of cooperation among various government ministries operating vis-à-vis Arab states; the absence of effective Knesset oversight, particularly by the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, over the government’s implementation of foreign policy; and the need for a more effective interface between government agencies and the business and civil society sectors.

With Israel facing new opportunities and forging new ties in the region, a greater synergy must be created among the various elements involved in Israel-Arab relations, and their friction and rivalry must be set aside. Management of the evolving ties with our neighbors must be entrusted to the professionals most equal to the task, with a leading role for the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats. The emerging new period in the Middle East opens a window of opportunity to re-examine Israeli diplomacy in Arab and Muslim states.

Dr. Ehud Eiran, Board Member, Mitvim Institute

The Abraham Accords stemmed primarily from security-strategic interests, such as the need to confront Iran and prepare for the apparent decline in the US commitment to the Middle East. That explains the significant role of Israeli security officials in progress toward the normalization agreements, in dialogue and contacts with Gulf regimes and security counterparts there.

Years ago, diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the Arab world were managed by the agency that preceded Israel’s Foreign Ministry – the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, which also conducted intelligence gathering activities in the Middle East. In later years, Israel’s contacts with Arab states became a military issue (for example, meetings of the armistice committees), largely clandestine in nature (for example, smuggling Jews out of northern Africa), leading to the “securitization” of Israeli relations with the Middle East. There is also a lateral-generational aspect involved. The first Foreign Ministry officials to deal with the Arab issue (such as Eliyahu Eilat and Eliyahu Sasson) were products of an open Middle Eastern environment that closed after Israel’s establishment.

The peace with Egypt and Jordan and the diplomatic processes of the 1990s brought the Foreign Ministry back, to a certain extent and at least at the time, to the Middle Eastern arena with the opening of several representative missions in regional capitals. In other words, the type of interaction between Israel and Arab states has generally determined the identity of the Israeli agency leading the relationship. The undermining of Foreign Ministries in the conduct of foreign relations both in Israel and elsewhere in the world has also affected this aspect.

An opportunity has now opened up to expand the Foreign Ministry’s role in relations with Arab states. Hopes of civilian ties, nurtured at the time of the peace agreement signing with Egypt and Jordan, were dashed; security issues have since dominated those relations. However, Israel’s emerging ties with Gulf states hold a promise of success. There is already a history of civilian cooperation with those states that can be leveraged, Gulf states are far from the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and their general agendas underscore greater openness to the world. An example of the Foreign Ministry’s importance in the renewed ties with the Arab world comes into play in multilateral aspects, such as the formal Israeli mission to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi and Israel’s membership in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum headquartered in Cairo.

Haim Regev, Deputy Director General for Middle East, Foreign Ministry

Israel’s Foreign Ministry under a full-time minister is in a different and better place these days than it was six months ago, and that includes participation in decision making, a significant budget, broader areas of responsibility, and more. In examining the Foreign Ministry’s activity in the Middle East, we have to keep in mind who Israel’s interlocutors are in those states. Often, they are security and intelligence officials associated with the rulers of those states, and therefore their natural partners on the Israeli side are also security officials. Links with the Foreign Ministry are often perceived in Arab states as the final stage before normalization of relations. Nonetheless, since the 1990s, the Ministry has had varied ties in the Middle East with relevant elements, especially in the Gulf. The Ministry’s greatest achievement has been the “routinization” effect – accustoming Arab states to Israeli presence in their territory. Since 2016, an Israeli mission has been operating in Abu Dhabi within the framework of IRENA, with Israeli representatives allowed to enter the UAE on an Israeli diplomatic passport, thus creating a basis for expanded relations.

Links with Gulf states up until now have existed on four levels: diplomatic – dialogue with a small circle of senior figures; economic – widespread Israeli business activity in the Gulf, which would not have been possible without Foreign Ministry involvement; people-to-people – connecting civil society organizations and preparing public opinion for links with Israel; social media – the Ministry is heavily invested in Arabic-language social media, creating a public platform for relations to develop once official ties are declared. The Ministry has learned the lessons of the peace processes with Egypt and Jordan, ones that lacked sufficient preparation of public opinion and routinization. The recent breakthrough with Gulf states provides the Ministry with broad opportunities in terms of business, tourism, culture and more.

The Jordanians and Palestinians are closely aligned on the regional scene and they are beginning to internalize the change in Israeli-Arab relations and the fact that the more they lag behind, the more they stand to lose. Now, with the annexation issue delayed and in light of the fact that the UAE is an important ally of Jordan’s, new Palestinian and Jordanian thinking may emerge. It is important to remember that the peace with Jordan is of great strategic importance to Israel.

Ksenia Svetlova, Director, Israel-Middle East Relations Program, Mitvim Institute

The recent agreements and developments with Gulf states have spotlighted the weakness of the Knesset, especially of its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The Knesset is tasked with government oversight, but it does not carry out its mandate. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee has hardly held any discussions on the regional processes that have matured in recent years. Even when lawmakers wanted to deal with these issues, information was not available to them. Some MKs tabled questions but did not receive answers and were dismissed out of hand on vague security grounds. Security issues have dominated the committee’s work for years and the subcommittee for foreign affairs is very rarely convened.

We at the Mitvim Institute recently published a study on how the government conducts issues related to regional cooperation. The study’s main finding was the absence of an overall coordinating body for the many agencies and ministries active in the region. Such a body, responsible for ties with Arab states and tasked with shaping a national diplomatic strategy, must be established. Specific plans must be drawn up for dealing with each country in the region, and uncoordinated overlaps between different governmental agencies must be avoided. One single body must be tasked with planning and promoting regional cooperation, and all the information available to various governmental agencies must be shared. The Foreign Ministry’s tasks have been generously farmed out to various ministries in recent years while the security establishment enjoys prominence and superiority in decision making processes. In the past six months, the Foreign Ministry’s standing has improved and it is clearly participating and leading more. The Foreign Ministry must be the lead agency in diplomatic relations in general, and in those with Arab states specifically.

We are at the start of an important process turning Israel into a member of the Middle Eastern family after many long years. Along with the clear advantages and opportunities this integration brings, it raises complex challenges, and dealing with them requires cooperation among government agencies. The signing of historic agreements without any Knesset oversight or input is a deeply unsound practice that must change.

Yael Ravia-Zadok, Head of Economic Diplomacy Division, Foreign Ministry

Economic diplomacy is the Foreign Ministry’s growth engine. The Covid-19 crisis has illustrated the Ministry’s essential role in acquiring medical equipment, arranging travel for stranded Israelis, ensuring continued flights to Israel, and more. The Ministry is working to leverage Israeli innovation and capabilities for the needs of other states as well, strengthening Israel’s diplomatic equity and identifying new business opportunities for Israeli firms. Over the past two years, Israeli representative offices have helped advance deals worth 7.6 billion USD, which created over 65,000 new jobs for Israelis. The Ministry thus contributes not only to Israel’s strategic security, but also to its economic security.

The Foreign Ministry is flourishing. It is leading a rich diplomatic agenda and has secured additional budgets. The presence of Israeli diplomats on the ground is an asset, as they forge the connection between local needs and Israeli capabilities (and vice versa), and strengthen ties with countries where they are posted. These needs pave the way for action. In 2011, we identified Jordan’s need for alternative trade routes after its main route through Syria was blocked. The Foreign Ministry initiated the creation of an overland bridge for goods from and to Jordan, thereby strengthening Israel’s regional standing and its equity vis-à-vis Jordan.

The economic dimension is a central axis to promoting ties in the region. The QIZ agreement with Egypt has increased Egyptian exports and created 300,000 jobs. Think of the fact that hundreds of thousands of households make a living off the fruits of the peace with Israel. This is no small achievement. The natural gas discoveries have changed Israel’s standing in the region and turned it into an energy exporter to its neighbors. Energy diplomacy facilitated the founding of the EMGF, established this year in Cairo at the initiative of the Israeli and Egyptian energy ministers.

The Abraham Accords are a historic event affecting the entire region. The trilateral fund announced by the Americans will constitute an important tool for promoting joint economic projects. The agreements already signed (on aviation, visas and investment protection) are laying the foundations for future ties and building trust. We will strive to promote trade, innovation, renewable energy and infrastructure projects in the region. Israel seeks to solidify the new partnerships for the benefit of the region, and beyond. The sky is the limit.

Political Perspectives

Minister Orit Farkash-Hacohen, Minister of Strategic Affairs and Tourism

In dealing with strategic issues, it is important to focus on the campaign being waged on social media against Israel. This is a daily struggle and it is not simply about our image, but about the truth. This is a battle for consciousness and for Israel’s good name. Manipulations of consciousness and awareness generate negative discourse on social media against Israel, born of a desire to influence the public agenda in a way that negates Israel’s existence, its legitimacy and its interests. The Ministry of Strategic Affairs is also active in combating hate speech on the web. I recently inaugurated a new smart communication center with the head of the Julis local council and the Council for National and Civic Service, and this year six young Druze women will operate a digital communications room in Arabic.

In 1967, following the Six Day War, Sudan hosted the Khartoum Summit at which Arab states adopted the notorious “Three No’s” negating Israel’s existence – “no to recognition, no to negotiations, no to peace.” Today, this trend has been reversed to one of recognition. Yes to dialogue, yes to connections, no to boycotts.

Tourism is the best expression of peace between nations.  That was why Begin underscored the importance of tourism for building bridges in his speech during Sadat’s visit to Israel. Governments are the ones that sign agreements and treaties, but true peace is built when people meet each other. The State of Israel and I, too, expect tourists from Arab and Muslim states. This is the way to infuse content into sustainable peace between states. We will continue to strengthen Israel’s standing and legitimacy in the region and the world.

MK Ofer Shelah, Yesh Atid-Telem

The chasm in the heart of the Middle East between states striving for stability and radical Islam offers Israel opportunities to improve its standing in the region. Israel was for decades excluded from regional processes, and decisions on substantive issues (such as the war in Syria and the Iranian nuclear program) were adopted without input regarding its interests and those it shares with its neighbors. Putin may invite Netanyahu for a photo-op, but on matters such as the war in Syria, he talks to Rouhani and Erdoğan. They are players in the arena; we are not. The same goes for the US pullout from the Middle East. The true “deal of the century” would be to offer the US a Middle East led by its allies – Israel and the other states striving for stability.

Following the recent normalization agreements, Netanyahu may be celebrating his argument that we can improve our standing in the region without placing the Palestinian card on the table, but separation from the Palestinians is a paramount Israeli interest if it seeks to remain Jewish and democratic. The Palestinians are paying a heavy price for their rejectionism. If we do not take advantage of the momentum with Gulf states to effectuate a separation from the Palestinians, then the normalization too will boil down to a deal intended to improve the standing of various regimes in the Middle East concerned about losing touch with the US once Trump is replaced.

Just like those surveyed by the Mitvim Institute for its annual Israeli Foreign Policy Index, I do not see a recent change in the standing of the Foreign Ministry. The weakening of the Ministry and the parceling out of its tasks to other ministries for political expediency began a long time ago and has been damaging to Israel. This is not just a technical issue related to the Ministry’s presence or absence at crucial decision-making junctions. It is also about the absence of coordinated Foreign Service activity and lack of backing for it to promote vital Israeli interests.

Netanyahu thinks US Jewry will disappear from the map given the high rate of assimilation and loss of contact with Israel. This must be confronted, and the US Jewish community must be reconnected to Israel. That is a job for the Foreign Ministry to do.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chair, Meretz

The new agreements with Gulf states are important and must be backed. Nonetheless, the argument made by the government and the Israeli right that these agreements cancel out the Palestinian issue is fraudulent and damaging to Israel’s interests. Progress in negotiations with the Palestinians is in Israel’s interest in order for us to live here peacefully and securely. The new agreements could help advance negotiations with the Palestinians and achieve a two-state solution.

In recent years, we have witnessed a rise in reactionary, anti-democratic and anti-liberal regimes and leaders. Israel has forged and strengthened ties with some of them at the expense of relations with democratic, liberal governments. Regarding Europe, Israel must invest resources and preserve its ties with the democratic states that have been and remain our allies. The government-backed claims that the EU is hostile to Israel must also be silenced. This is a fundamentally unacceptable and unworthy idea.

Israel’s democratic essence does not allow us to distance ourselves from liberal democracies such as Germany and France, and from an organization such as the EU. Israel’s place in the world is among the enlightened and democratic people who defend human rights and seek peaceful conflict resolution. The current government of Israel will not change its policy in that regard, but even it has sufficient members who are supposed to understand our affinity for and closeness to the democratic and liberal world.

Political change in the US could result in renewed thinking in Jerusalem regarding the direction of our foreign policy. Israel has always enjoyed bipartisan consensus in the US. That consensus has been cracked in recent years and Netanyahu and the government of Israel played a key role in this deterioration. The Jewish community in the US traditionally votes overwhelmingly for Democrats. In its ties with the Jewish communities there, Israel’s government must underscore the shared values and interests we have with them and realize its mistake in undermining relations with the Democratic Party and over-relying on Trump and the Republicans.

MK Aida Touma-Suleiman, Joint List

This would seem to be the most successful period ever for Israel in terms of regional politics, with a new announcement of a supposed peace agreement emerging every few days. However, the states with which Israel is reaching agreements fit the profile of regimes that oppress their people. That happens in Europe, Africa and in the Gulf and the broader Arab world. Despite the general impression of success of the Netanyahu government’s regional policy, we are in fact deteriorating toward a more complex situation. Economic trade agreements are a diversion from the true attempt to resolve the situation that led us to the conflict in the first place. Israel is an occupier of another people and Netanyahu’s policy provides an alibi for continued occupation. The Trump plan is not a peace plan; it fails to advance the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, this is a mega-annexation plan thwarting the founding a Palestinian state. The agreement with the UAE is part of this plan.

The agreements with Gulf states distance us from peace. If these agreements serve the goal of isolating the Palestinians and are intended to bring them to their knees, they cannot be considered peace agreements. Do these agreements serve the interests of the people? In my view, they do not, despite their economic potential. Only the wealthy will profit. Netanyahu and his government have launched a dangerous arms race in the region. Since the signing of the agreements, all we hear about are preparations for war and acquisition of fighter jets. This is not a climate that bodes well for peaceful relations.

Anyone who thinks Israel can conduct a regional policy as an occupying power leaves us with a heavy and explosive legacy. Even after Trump and Netanyahu step down, we will have to deal with the obstacles that they sowed into the road to peace. The question that we, and especially Israel’s Jewish majority, must ask is what kind of future and state we want. Netanyahu is building an apartheid state, and his moves do not help us build a true democracy and end the occupation. The alleged success recorded today in relations with the region actually signals a troubling deterioration.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment, November 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On 24 September 2020, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted an online conference on “EU Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Can Europe Effectively Promote Peace?” The event featured Dr. Anders Persson, Prof. Joel Peters, Prof. Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Attorney Gilad Sher, Dr. Mostafa Elostaz, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu.

Dr. Anders Persson, Linnaeus University: The Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict has been more important to the EU than other conflicts. However, the thesis that if this conflict is resolved, other regional problems and conflicts would be resolved has been proven wrong in the last decade. The EU has not achieved its objectives in its attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it was probably never realistic to believe it would be able to do so. It never led high-level diplomacy in the peace talks, but it had a major normative role and it played a technocratic role in building Palestinian institutions. There is a big gap between having leverage and using it. The EU has an enormous economic leverage both over Israel and the Palestinians, including the agreements it signed with Israel in the field of research and beyond. Compared to other international actors, the EU is highly consistent, predictable and transparent in its positions. The EU has been committed to an “inside-out” approach to conflict resolution: first Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution should be reached, then Israeli-Arab. But the current trend is the “outside-in” approach (promoting Israel-Arab normalization prior to progress in the peace process), and this might, to the EU’s concern, bypass direct negotiations with Palestinians and the promotion of the two-state solution. Over the years, three European policies have stood out: (1) Its decades-long legitimization of the Palestinians, including the PLO, and their right to statehood; (2) Its firm recognition of Israel’s right to securely exist within internationally recognized borders without being subjected to terror or boycotts; (3) Its early and continuous singling out of the settlements as a serious obstacle to the peace process. Nowadays, the EU is too divided to be effective. Regarding Israeli criticism of EU funding to the Palestinians in recent years, the Israeli strategy is to have the cake, eat it, and complain about it. When push comes to shove, Israeli policymakers want EU aid to the Palestinians to continue flowing.

Prof. Joel Peters, Virginia Tech University and Mitvim Institute: The EU’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout the 1970s and 1980s can best be described as performative diplomacy.  Europe was keen to forge a common foreign policy and identity, and to gain visibility.  Europeans took pride in their ability to develop a common set of positions and principles on the conflict.  Europe’s involvement in the conflict was driven by an outlook that its traditional ties with the Middle East obligate it to play a special role in the resolution of the conflict, even though it was never made clear what these obligations consisted of and why that afforded it a special and unique role. During the Oslo years, Europeans were resentful of being sidelined from the negotiations.  Europe wanted to be a player, not just a payer, and thought it should be given a role commensurate with its standing in global affairs.  With the 1980 Venice Declaration, Europe recognized the Palestinians right of self-determination. Yet it took another 20 years for the EU to call explicitly for a Palestinian state, and that took place only after the Oslo process collapsed. Looking back this can be seen as a failing in European diplomacy towards the conflict, which continued to speak of the Palestinian right to self-determination rather than explicitly call for Palestinian statehood.

Prof. Raffaella A. Del Sarto, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS Europe: Europe remained trapped in the logic of the Oslo period despite the changes in recent decades, e.g., the collapse of the Oslo process, the split within the Palestinian leadership, the expansion of Israeli settlements, the rightward shift in Israeli politics and public opinion, and the emergence of a binational reality on the ground. The Europeans remain bound to the Oslo logic for three main reasons: (1) The institutional setup of EU foreign policymaking, e.g., the separation between trade relations and other foreign policy issues requiring consensus among member states; (2) The lack of an international consensus on an alternative resolution to the conflict, with the US remaining the key player, and Israel not being interested in a greater European role; (3) European desire for stability and economic benefits in its neighborhood and the hesitation of rocking the Israeli-Palestinian boat too much. The EU and its members remain the largest donor to the Palestinians, with Israel’s tacit blessing. Yet, Europe is being criticized and regularly attacked by Israelis for this funding, which is actually in Israel’s interest. The EU maneuvered itself into an absurd situation, helping to maintain a situation that makes the achievement of the two-state solution less likely while also maintaining excellent trade relations with Israel. The EU has not been effective in promoting peace in recent decades, but the current international climate offers important opportunities to do so. Proposals that have been circulating include a clear definition of incentives and ‘red lines’, addressing asymmetry by recognizing Palestinian statehood, pushing for Palestinian elections, or the phasing out of aid to the Palestinian Authority, thus forcing Israel to pick up the costs. But the institutional setting of European foreign policymaking remains a serious obstacle to reaching common ground.

Attorney Gilead Sher, Chief of staff to former Israeli PM Barak and former senior peace negotiator: Europe could play an important political and economic role in any future resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by preserving the conditions for an eventual two-state solution. Indeed, it played second fiddle to the US. Over the past three decades, however, important benchmarks in the political process occurred on European soil or were facilitated by European mediators, pointing to the role Europe could take up in the future. This is particularly relevant considering developments such as the possible reelection of US President Trump, the stepping down of Palestinian President Abbas and Israel’s normalization of ties with Gulf states. To effectively promote peace, the EU should embrace a three-pronged and gradual approach, operating at bilateral, regional, and international levels, and not insist solely on a paradigm of direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. For example, providing locations for secret talks, or reviving the Quartet, engaging with regional allies, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other parties. It could also support independent and coordinated efforts: alongside regional and bilateral tracks, within the framework of the Quartet, the EU should push independent and coordinated measures for gradual advancement to a two-states-for-two-peoples solution. This goes beyond simply sanctioning conduct. It requires incentives and international support for constructive steps by both sides in implementation of agreed segments of treaties, consistent with the two-state solution, e.g. unilateral withdrawal from certain areas of the West Bank, Palestinian education, subsiding terror, and state-building. Europe should try to intertwine its engagement with Israeli-Palestinian affairs together with the new normalization process that has been jump started by Gulf States.

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Founder and Head of the Mitvim Institute: Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be a top priority for Israel, and Israel’s recent normalization agreements with the UAE and Bahrain should not come at the expense of promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace. International actors, among them the EU, can play a central role in advancing peace. However, in recent years, the EU has not been very effective in doing so. Internal divisions among EU member states prevents the EU from taking joint action regarding the Middle East Peace Process. EU leaders did voice clear opposition to Israel’s annexation intentions in the West Bank, but could not go beyond that. To more effectively promote peace, Europe could put forward a counterproposal to the Trump plan, which will offer a constructive pathway to a two-state solution. The EU can increase its support to pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations, as to enable more positive interaction between societies. The EU can also advance the establishment of a new international mechanism to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, updating or revising the existing Quartet. The EU, which already offered Israelis and Palestinians an incentive for peace (the 2013 offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU), should work with other regional and global actors to introduce a coordinated international package of incentives for peace. The EU’s Foreign Affairs Council already acknowledged the need to do so, but did not follow-through. The EU and Israel should relaunch their high-level political dialogue (the Association Council, suspended since 2012), and utilize this platform to also discuss peacemaking and the EU’s role in the process. Finally, the EU can encourage Palestinian participation in joint endeavors between Israel and other regional states, whether in the Eastern Mediterranean or in the Gulf.

Dr. Mostafa Elostaz, Former head of Human rights and international law department, Al Quds Bard College; The Geneva initiative, Ramallah: The Palestinians are in a desperate situation. There is no agreement how to proceed vis-a-vis the Trump administration or the Israeli government that are completely ignoring the Palestinians. There is total dismissal by the Trump administration of the Palestinian side and full support of the Israeli side. Among the Palestinians there is no acceptance of the peace agreements between Israel and the UAE. Therefore, it seems the situation is about to deteriorate for the Palestinians. There is a total failure of the Palestinian leadership and failure of the Israeli side to advance the two-state solution. It seems that the Palestinians do not know what to do in this situation. The Europeans are ineffective vis-a-vis the Israelis due to their history with the Jews, though the EU does have leverage over Israel. For example, it can impose on Israelis a visa requirement to enter the EU, as the Palestinians are required. The Palestinians are increasingly discussing the one-state option, also due to lack of effective Palestinian leadership.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration and Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute: The different speakers agreed that Europe has been ineffective in the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, although it has tools and leverage which enables it to influence both sides of the conflict. The EU is unable to use these tools due to its historical past with Israel and due to internal political disagreements. Towards Israel, the EU has many sticks, while the carrots it can offer are not as significant. There was also agreement among the speakers that the EU can become more effective and put forth renewed or new ideas and initiatives. After Foreign Minister Ashkenazi’s recent visit to the European Foreign Affairs Council in Berlin (September 2020), the possibility of reconvening the Israel-EU Association Council should be advanced.

הפוסט EU Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Can Europe Effectively Promote Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper focuses on the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin and the optimal policies Israel should adopt in response. It is based on the main points raised at the seventh meeting of the research and policy group: “Israel in the Mediterranean” held on July 28, 2020 at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center. The paper briefly describes the nature of the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin and examines Israel’s interests and relevant policy, the essence of which is to strive for stability, realize gas deposit profits, and expand regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. The paper does not reflect agreement among all session participants.

1. The nature of the Eastern Mediterranean Basin conflicts

Multiple conflicts and players – Along with many cooperative ventures emerging in the Mediterranean Basin, many conflicts are also being waged – some prolonged and others relatively new, some violent and others diplomatic or economic in nature. The most prominent are the conflicts between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus; between Israel and the Palestinians; between Turkey and Egypt; between Israel and Lebanon; the Syrian civil war; and the multi-party war in Libya. Some of the conflicts have spread into other arenas (in terms of combatants, weapons, interests and alliances). In addition to the states directly involved, local groups are also involved, as are other states in the region, world powers, and global energy groups.

Turkey vis-à-vis the region – Turkey has found itself largely isolated in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. It is engaged in conflicts with Greece over maritime border delineation, with Cyprus over demarcation of economic waters, as well as in the ongoing conflict in Northern Cyprus. It is at odds with Egypt against an ideological backdrop and competition over predominance as a regional energy hub. Tensions between Turkey and Israel have increased with the declining prospects of the proposed gas pipeline from Israel to Turkey and the strengthening of Israel’s ties with Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. Turkey is also involved in the Syrian civil war, where it is fighting primarily against Kurdish forces, and it has intervened in the Libyan civil war on the side of the Sarraj regime in Tripoli, with which it has even signed an agreement on maritime borders. The agreement infringes on Greece’s economic waters claims, generating broad opposition on the part of other states in the region. Turkey’s isolation is also reflected in its absence from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). In order to ease its isolation and bolster its regional standing, Turkey has adopted an assertive strategy it dubs “the Blue Homeland”, using its maritime power and willingness to project military force to command attention to its maritime claims and regional interests. Given this state of affairs, the renewal of the peace process in Northern Cyprus does not appear to be at hand.

Syria and Lebanon – These states are focal points of regional instability and Iranian influence. Syria has deteriorated into a prolonged civil war with involvement of Iranian, Russian, Turkish and other forces in the region. The internal and regional migration flow prompted by the war is destabilizing the region beyond its borders. Hezbollah appears to be serving Iran’s interests rather than those of Lebanon. As a whole, Iran is deeply vested in turning Syria and Lebanon into a land bridge between itself and the Mediterranean. In addition, Lebanon, for its part, has also land and maritime border discords with Israel.

Energy as a source of cooperation and conflict – The natural gas deposits discovered in the Mediterranean are an important element in the cooperation among Israel, Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. In the not-so-distant past, cooperation between Israel and Turkey also rested on energy cooperation potential. The establishment of the EMGF in Cairo in early 2019 is a clear example of how energy can advance cooperation. The gas export agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan are another example. Nonetheless, energy is also at the heart of many conflicts. It is a key element in the conflict between Turkey and Cyprus over their maritime border demarcation, it is an additional irritant in the competition between Turkey and Egypt over their role as regional energy hubs, and it is key in Libya, where local and regional players and world powers are fighting for access to oil resources.

The expression of the global power balance and conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean – The American decision to limit its presence in the Mediterranean Basin region, as expressed in the drawdown of the Sixth Fleet, creates a vacuum being filled by other players. Russia is enjoying the US withdrawal and expanding its activity and influence in the region, as is the Turkish fleet, which enjoys greater freedom to maneuver. The US pullback from the region is accompanied by its distancing from Turkey, resulting in growing tensions between Turkey and NATO and Turkish-Russian rapprochement. This is particularly obvious in weapons deals that Turkey is promoting and in the issue of its involvement in NATO defense projects. In Libya, on the other hand, Turkey and Russia are on opposite sides of the divide. The conflicts in the Mediterranean challenge European consensus, as various European states have different interests concerning the conflicts in the Mediterranean Basin. French interests, for example, are opposed to those of Italy in the Libyan arena and vis-à-vis Turkey. Germany, given its centrality in the European Union and its ties with Turkey, is promoting arbitration measures among Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.

1. Israel’s policy and interests regarding the regional conflicts

Israel as a stabilizing element in the Mediterranean Basin – Israel has an interest in stability and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, wherever it can help settle conflicts and mediate between rivals, it should do so based on its experience from the conflicts in which it was involved itself. Israel should diversify its regional relationships, establish ties with as many players as possible, and expand its fields of cooperation. Israel should also cooperate with regional institutions and organizations – on the governmental and civil society levels – to help promote their activities and encourage them to be as inclusive as possible.

Israel cannot remain impartial. It must stand by its closest allies – In dealing with the Syrian civil war, Iranian entrenchment, and instability in Lebanon, one of Israel’s greatest assets is its ability to conduct discourse and dialogues with Russia and China. Both these powers are deepening their involvement in these countries and Israel should mobilize their help to protect its interests. Israel should also strive to improve its relations with Turkey, without endangering the interests of its main allies in the region – Cyprus, Greece and Egypt. But, along with the desire to maintain a non-exclusive policy and distance itself from the conflicts to the extent possible, Israel must stand by its close allies and look out for its own interests in the tangle of conflicts. It must support Egypt as an important strategic ally as well as Greece and Cyprus, with which it maintains and develops a close relationship. Israel must not accept the Turkish demarcation of a maritime border with Libya.

Continued mobilizing energy to promote regional cooperation – The potential that lies in the natural gas deposits in Israel’s exclusive economic zone is declining given the current energy crisis, market conditions, and existing alternatives. Israel has a surplus production capacity for the local market, and the entry of the Tanin and Karish gas fields into the market, now delayed to the last quarter of 2021, raises additional doubts about the economic viability of the drilling. At the same time, this provides additional gas export opportunities. There are also increasing question marks over the profitability of the EastMed pipeline from Israel to Europe. For now, Israel should keep alive the gas pipeline idea to bolster ties with Cyprus, Greece, and possibly Italy. The coronavirus and its attendant energy crisis have also affected the EMGF, but the forum continues to hold great potential for strengthening regional cooperation. Israel must promote the expansion of the forum to include the foreign ministers of the participating states and not just their energy ministers, and to focus on energy issues in general, not just natural gas, with an emphasis on renewable energy. In any case, Israel must prepare to shift to renewables and take advantage of its gas reserves for the exports of advanced products (hydrogen, for example).

Harnessing stabilizing elements from outside the region – Israel’s special relationship with the US is one of its key assets. These relations boost Israel’s regional power, and it can use them to help its allies in the region. Israel should encourage the US to maintain its presence in the region. To that end, it should nurture bipartisan ties with the US, considering the possible entry of a Democrat into the White House in January 2021. Additional states with which Israel should cooperate in the region are France, which supports Greece and Cyprus in their conflict with Turkey, and Germany so that Israel able to promote regional dialogue and achieve agreements. Israel can and should cooperate with additional international elements that seek to stabilize the region or that have the potential to do so.

הפוסט Israel and the conflicts in the Mediterranean Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Mitvim Institute: The EU and almost all its member states have in recent weeks expressed strong opposition to any course of Israeli annexation in the territories. Europe has emphasized that any annexation — large or small — is in violation of international law, will lower the chances of peace and will lead to negative implications with regards to relations with Israel. Europe has so far avoided presenting the practical price an annexation would have on Israel-Europe relations, and is focusing on diplomatic and public  endeavors to prevent it from happening. And yet, Europe has limited influence on decisionmaking processes in Israel, on Israeli public opinion and on the policy of the Trump Administration. If it wishes to do more than simply watch from the sidelines as events unfold in coming weeks, Europe will have to move from declarations to actions, and to present the people and leaders of Israel with the tangible implications that annexation would have regarding Israel-Europe relations.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chairperson, Meretz; Member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee: An Israeli annexation in the West Bank will put an end to the two-state solution, to the vision of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and to the peace process. It will make Israel a de facto apartheid state. To date, no preparations have been carried out ahead of annexation, whether militarily, administratively, or judicially. There is still ambiguity and possibility for change, including the scope of an annexation move. Therefore, the opposition is working to prevent annexation from taking place, to mobilize public opinion against annexation, and to generate support to this effort from Israel’s friends abroad and from our neighbors in the region. The goal is not only to stop the annexation from happening, but also to resume the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and promote the two-state solution, which remains the only viable solution to the conflict. If annexation is eventually prevented, but military occupation persists, then not much will be gained.

Dr. Nils Schmid, Spokesperson on Foreign Affairs, SPD Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag: An Israeli  annexation in the West Bank would be a clear breach of international law and lead to an end of any attempt at realizing the two-state solution that has been the general consensus among the international community and among the EU for many years. Any kind of annexation, even a so-called ‘small solution’ such as annexing parts of the settlement blocks close to Jerusalem, will still be regarded as a breach of international law and would be criticized and opposed by Germany. Germany is avoiding discussions of sanctions because no annexation has taken place yet and will not be the one to initiate European discussions about punitive measures to be taken against Israel if it goes through with it. However, a large majority of its political parties are making known that annexation is a bad idea that will not have German or EU support. The Bundestag is about to adopt a resolution calling not to go ahead with annexation as a warning or a stop sign to Israel. It will not debate the issue of consequences, as this is to be debated at the EU level. At the time being we focus on preventing annexation.

Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Director, Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI); Special Adviser to EU HRVP Josep Borrell: Europeans would have liked to imagine a world in which annexation can be prevented, but we also know there is very little we can do to stop it. Therefore, we are in a political process thinking of consequences, also as a signaling effect to Israel that can be dissuasive. European responses could result in three spheres: economic, political and legal. On the economic front, the most obvious consequences would be restrictive measures, and these would depend on what sort of annexation would take place and its immediate repercussions. With Russia, sanctions were adopted after annexation of Crimea – not a preventive but reactive step, which is never effective in reversing a particular course. On  the political front, European states could recognize the State of Palestine, but this would not be a meaningful move. Instead, a more consequential course of action would be to stop financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority should the two-state solution no longer be pursued. On the legal front, a European response could be a revamp of the differentiation agenda, which could include revisiting arrangements such as Horizon Europe and completing different marketing standards to produce originating from Israel and the territories. There is a difference between violation of international law under occupation and illegal annexation, the latter being a more severe breach of international law. This is why the EU’s differentiation policy is expected to be stepped up, and why an Israeli annexation will be treated differently than the cases of Northern Cyprus, West Sahara, Abkhazia. The eventual European response will be determined by a number of factors, including how exactly the annexation will take place and its immediate consequences, the political conditions in EU member states, the political climate in the US and the reactions of other players in the region, mainly the Arab countries.

Martin Konecny, Director, European Middle East Project (EuMEP): Indeed, Europe is not likely to adopt immediate, major sanctions against Israel in response to annexation in the West Bank. Israel enjoys an exceptional status according to which it is taboo to inflict sanctions on it or even on settlements. But in the context of annexation, this taboo is being eroded. Regarding Horizon Europe, the decision is in the hands of the European Commission. It is unlikely that Israel would be cut entirely from the program, but a scale down may be possible. To protect its own legal order, the EU would need to further insulate its relations from what Israel conducts beyond the Green Line, which could have a significant impact on bilateral relations. Friction surrounding the issue of differentiation is likely to come from both sides: not only will the EU double down on differentiation, but Israel will also show greater reluctance to accept any territorial differentiation (as was with Creative Europe Agreement rejected by Minister Miri Regev in 2017), resulting in the straining of ties. The European Court of Justice may also come into play due to increased legal friction. We have seen its rulings in the past years regarding Israeli settlements, Western Sahara and two decades ago with regards to Northern Cyprus. Long-term consequences of annexation on EU-Israel relations could be more significant: it would be harder to update the EU-Israel agreements, while the economic and technological environment keeps on changing.

Dr. Muriel Asseburg, Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP): Germany is a key player. From 1 July it will hold the presidency of both the EU Council and the UN Security Council. The European Commission is also currently presided by a German. What to expect of Germany? As a friend of Israel, and due to the historical lessons it drew from the Holocaust, annexation is a particular challenge for Germany. While Germany has spoken out clearly against annexation, it has also been signaling to Israel through its actions that annexation will come with no price tag as far as Germany is concerned. Not even recognition of a Palestinian state. German Foreign Minister even marked the difference between annexation of Crimea by Russia and the one to be done by Israel. Not having the EU’s “option paper” vis-à-vis Israel ready yet is another failure by the EU to be the geopolitical proactive and forward-looking player the European Commission declared it aspires to be in 2019. EU is divided on the matter. Yet, while sanctions by the EU require unanimity, so do new agreements with Israel. While Europeans will not throw overboard the two-state solution, they will have to open up to other options of conflict resolution.

Hugh Lovatt, Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): As things stand, it seems that the EU’s response to Israeli annexation in the West Bank will fall short of the sanctions that it put in place against Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But there will nonetheless be consequences as such actions will likely burden the relations between the EU and Israel, and create obstacles for future relations. The major vector of any EU response would be enhancing the differentiation policy, which can be done by the EU institutions based on existing legal and policy positions, without having to get further approval from all 27 Member States. While Israel is still largely perceived in Europe as a liberal and democratic state, annexation will contribute to the change of this image. Relations with Israel would become much more problematic and the equation of Israel as an apartheid state will grow in the public and the policy discourse. If it would become apparent that a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict is no longer possible, the only other alternative that would be acceptable to the Europeans would be equal rights within one state. Meanwhile, Europe should not remain complacent even if formal annexation does not take place given that the Oslo-configured Middle East Peace Process has already collapsed and de-facto annexation will continue to undermine prospects for reaching a two-state solution.

Noa Landau, Diplomatic Correspondent, Haaretz: On the eve of the target day for Israeli annexation in the West Bank, Israeli decision-makers are still not quite sure what annexation means. Similarly, while the Europeans are discussing responses to a full implementation of the annexation plans, it seems they are not prepared for the more likely scenario in which a smaller, more symbolic annexation takes place (such as annexation of Ma’ale Edumim or Gush Etzion). It is worthy to keep in mind that the prevailing argument that Europeans do not have a way to impact Israeli policy is to some extent incorrect: when the European community wanted to prevent the evacuation of the West Bank Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, it was capable of doing so.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Co-President, IASEI; Director of the Program on Israel Europe Relations, Mitvim Institute: In a demonstration of the built-in expectations capabilities gap, the European responses to an Israeli annexation in the West Bank have again proven that the EU is much better at rhetoric and much less capable and influential when it comes to action. The EU has not presented Israel with any heavy economic consequences in case of annexation, and perhaps this is one of the reasons why the EU is not taken so seriously by some in the government. There are not many sticks the EU is willing to use, and not many carrots to give. And yet, to put such measures in a wider perspective, the EU via its linkage policy since 2009 can take its toll by not advancing the relations with Israel further. If there were any hopes to reconvene an EU-Israeli Association Council (high-level political dialogue between the two sides), they are most likely to disappear with annexation. It may be that the “window of opportunity” for annexation is closing down as the polls in the US indicate Trump may not be re-elected. Other considerations are the economic implications of the coronavirus crisis. The EU can play a role in postponing annexation until this window closes.

הפוסט European Responses to an Israeli Annexation in the West Bank: From Statements to Actions? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The recording of the conference can be watched here. 

הפוסט The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Challenges and Opportunities for Gaza: A Mediterranean Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Democracy and Foreign Policy in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections Results: Possible Significance for Europe and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Alternative Directions for Israeli Foreign Policy on the Eve of an Election Year הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Regional Opportunities to Improve the Situation in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Towards an Increased Role for the Knesset in Foreign Affairs: Summary of a Knesset event held by the Mitvim Institute and the Caucus for Strengthening Israel’s Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Changes in Domestic Palestinian Politics and Their Influence on Israel and the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Policy toward the Far-Right Party in Austria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Collapse of the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Crisis in Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Opportunities for Israel’s Foreign Relations towards 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A total of 25 participants, including the EuroMeSCo researchers involved in the project, as well as additional experts and scholars attended the workshop, which aimed at presenting and discussing the initial research results of the Joint Policy Study. Participants analyzed various factors that may constitute both opportunities and threats to an increasing cooperation between some Eastern Mediterranean countries, such as newfound energy reserves and the war in Syria.

In the first session, Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panagiotis Tsakonas from ELIAMEP (Greece) kicked off the discussion on whether the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a separate sub-regional security system and on ways to promote collective security schemes in the region. During the second session, Dr. Ehud Eiran of Mitvim (Israel) analyzed the energy and regional integration in the Eastern Mediterranean while in the third session, Dr. Muriel Asseburg of SWP (Germany) examined the Eastern Mediterranean dynamics and the evolving war in Syria. In the final session, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin of Mitvim (Israel), Walid Salem of CDCD (Palestine) and Prof. Ahmet Sözen of the Eastern Mediterranean University (northern Cyprus) debated over conflict resolution methods and approaches in the Eastern Mediterranean, and over the benefits of conflicts comparisons and mutual conflict resolution support.

הפוסט New Euro-Mediterranean Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

“Today we commemorate the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, of blessed memory. On this occasion, it is important to talk about the rift within the nation of Israel. I would not have believed that 22 years after such a horrifying, callous and shocking political assassination we would find ourselves again surrounded by so much incitement, verbal violence and fanaticism. We can sense the incitement and the rift: they are constantly intensifying. Yet in my opinion, 80 percent of Israelis, Jews and Arabs alike, really want the same things: they want security, they want the government to offer them a political vision for the future and they want a just economy. We can consolidate a consensus around these principles, and we should strive to achieve them every day.”

הפוסט Avi Gabbay: How to improve Israel’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Service? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט What do the German Election Results Mean for Israel, Europe, and the Peace Process? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Impact of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On 21 March 2017, scholars, diplomats and politicians, together with directors of think tanks and NGOs, gathered at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to discuss the API on the 15th anniversary of its announcement and to examine how it can serve as a more effective incentive for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Speakers from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Turkey, the EU, and the UN participated in the conference, which was initiated by the Mitvim Institute and the Leonard David Institute.

The conference included four sessions: The first session focused on the past – the content of the API, its background and the processes which have taken place since it was first presented. The second session focused on the present day and examined the current status of the API, how changes in the Middle East have affected its viability, and Israel’s recent policies and attitudes towards the API. The third session covered the future of the API and highlighted policy directions via which the API can help advance the peace process. Lastly, in the concluding session, senior diplomats serving in Israel presented their assessments of the API. The conference closed with a lecture by Member of Knesset (MK) Member Tzipi Livni, former Minister of Foreign Affairs. This document summarizes the presentations that were made during the conference. The entire conference can be watched on the Mitvim Institute’s YouTube channel

הפוסט The Arab Peace Initiative at 15 Years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The trialogue provided a venue for increased strategic dialogue and cooperation between progressive experts from three countries. It was attended by diplomats, politicians, think tank representatives, scholars, and activists. Participants addressed specific policy challenges in the Middle East, German policies towards the region, and the new US administration. This round of talks focused on German perspectives, and it included briefings by members of the Bundestag and other policymakers. This paper summarizes the highlights of the presentations, discussions and insights of the trialogue. It does not necessarily reflect a consensus of the participants or hosting organizations. Summaries of the first two trialogue meetings, held in Washington and in Jerusalem, are available in the footnotes.

הפוסט Progressive Policymaking in a Changing Region: Trilateral Strategic Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Impact of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Foreign Policies: Summary of a briefing with Dr. Karen E. Young הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The U.S. Elections and the Future of the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The conference was attended by politicians, diplomats, and experts on regional affairs. The speakers included: Co-chairs of the Lobby for Regional Cooperation, MK Merav Michaeli, MK Yaakov Peri, and MK Michael Oren; Minister of Tourism MK Yariv Levin; Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation MK Ayoob Kara; MK Ksenia Svetlova, MK Zuheir Bahloul, MK Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin, MK Nachman Shai; Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Walid Obeidat; Ambassador of Bulgaria, Dimitar Mihaylov; Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, Thessalia-Salina Shambos; UNSCO Director of Regional Affairs Unit, Ms. Jody Barrett; Head of Political and Press Section at the Delegation of the European Union, Mr. Mark Gallagher; Political Counselor of the United States Embassy, Keith Mines; Professor Uzi Arad, Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and the head of the National Security Council; Head of Mitvim, Dr. Nimrod Goren; Mitvim Board Member, Professor Elie Podeh; Director of the Israeli Peace Initiative, Koby Huberman; Adv. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Head of the Tamar Regional Council, Mr. Dov Litvinoff; EcoPeace Middle East’s Director of Government Relations, Mr. Uri Ginot.

This document presents an edited version of the remarks that were made at the conference. The full conference can be viewed on Mitvim’s YouTube channel.

הפוסט Time for an Israeli Regional Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nevertheless, Israeli foreign policy is still considered the exclusive domain of experts. Indeed, significant sub-groups of the population – women, Palestinian citizens of Israel, ultra-Orthodox Jews, new immigrants and residents of the country’s geographic periphery – do not participate meaningfully in the Israeli public debate concerning foreign affairs, let alone the corresponding decision-making process.

In light of this, the Mitvim Institute and the Israel Democracy Institute convened a workshop comprised of experts to explore ways to advance a more inclusive Israeli foreign policy, through increasing the involvement of diverse population groups. The workshop was attended by scholars, diplomats and representatives of relevant population groups. The discussion centered around the need for a broader debate on foreign policy issues, the challenges and barriers that prevent certain groups from getting involved, and the added value that each group can bring to the foreign policy debate.

הפוסט Towards an Inclusive Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The conference featured presentations from the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), Shatil – The New Israel Fund’s Initiative for Social Change, and the Abraham Fund Initiatives. A robust list of speakers included MK Ofer Shelah, MK Yossi Yonah, MK Nachman Shai, former MK Ronen Hoffman, and Dani Dayan, Israel’s recently appointed Consul-General in New York. The conference addressed challenges to democracy and social cohesion in Israel, Germany, and the US, and included a roundtable discussion on recommendations to counter anti-democratic trends and clarify a path for multilateral progressive partnerships. Discussion focused on challenges in the political, legislative, and public spheres. Participants addressed these challenges in the context of global instability, mass immigration, and shifting borders. This paper summarizes the highlights of the presentations, discussions and recommendations of the trialogue. It does not necessarily reflect a consensus of the participants or hosting organizations.

הפוסט Challenges to Democracy and Social Cohesion: Trilateral Strategic Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Supporting Israel-Turkey Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This European offer, which was reaffirmed by the EU in January 2016, has not yet succeeded in promoting the peace process. The Israeli government has avoided giving a positive response to the offer, and the vast majority of the Israeli public is not even aware of its existence. In addition, there is ambiguity and lack of clarity regarding the concrete content of the offer.

The Mitvim institute sees potential in regional peace incentives – such as the European offer and the Arab Peace Initiative – as a tool for promoting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and works to advance and improve the use of these incentives.

In this framework, the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted in March 2016 a policy-planning workshop that examined the European offer and ways to transform it into a more efficacious peace incentive.

This workshop was part of a series workshops, each focusing on a different incentive. A previous workshop focused on the Arab Peace Initiative. The workshop was attended by Israeli experts on Israeli-European relations, Israeli foreign policy, and the peace process, as well as by Mr. Jan Freigang of the EU Delegation to Israel. This document summarizes the different points and recommendations that were raised during the workshop.

הפוסט A Special Privileged Partnership with the EU as an incentive for Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט How to Make the Arab Peace Initiative a More Effective Incentive for Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In light of this reality, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the Knesset Lobby for Strengthening Israel`s Foreign Affairs System, Chaired by MK Dr. Nachman Shai (Zionist Union), convened on 28 December 2015 a special conference at the Israeli parliament.

The conference was attended by Members of Knesset, diplomats, experts and journalists. It focused on mapping the key problems faced by the MFA, offering solutions and recommendations, and debating the importance of a strong MFA to Israel’s foreign policy and national security.

This document summarizes the remarks made at the conference by: MK Isaac Herzog, MK Tzipi Livni, MK Dr. Nachman Shai, MK Dr. Michael Oren, MK Ksenia Svetlova, MK Prof. Manuel Trajtenberg, MK Eyal Ben-Reuven, MK Haim Jelin, MK Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin, Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute), Colette Avital (former MK and ambassador), Magali Wahaba (former MK and deputy foreign minister), Barak Ravid (Haaretz diplomatic correspondent), Victor Harel (former ambassador), Eran Etzion (former director of policy planning at the MFA), Prof. Yossi Shain (Tel Aviv University), Daniel Shek (former ambassador) and Hanan Goder (Head of the MFA worker’s union).

In addition, the full conference can be viewed (in Hebrew) on Mitvim Institute’s YouTube channel.

הפוסט The Role of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discussions took place as part of the 2015 Annual Conference of the EuroMeSCo Network. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni was the keynote speaker of the conference, which was attended by four Israelis, alongside representatives from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and the Gaza Strip.

In recent years, discussions at such regional conferences focused on assessing the developments in Arab countries in light of the Arab Spring. However, this year the emphasis was on taking stock and critically examining the European policies toward the Mediterranean just weeks before the unveiling of the EU’s review of the European Neighborhood Policy, which pertains to the countries that border the Union.

The Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the internal conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, are impacting Europe and require a reevaluation of EU policy. As one of the speakers observed, today Europe is enveloped by crises but it has not taken a leading role in any of them. The result is a highly unstable Mediterranean and a European policy toward the region that is increasingly shaped by domestic concerns.

הפוסט Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Strategic Outlook in a Disintegrating Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Participants debated Israel’s internal political situation and the constraints of a stalled peace process on Israel’s ability to engage the region. Participants also explored the future of Israel’s relations with the United States, Europe and the Arab world as regional dynamics change and power balances shift. The discussion took place on November 20, 2015, bringing together 19 experts, including diplomats, politicians and think tank leaders. This paper summarizes main points from the analysis and recommendations voiced by various participants during the discussion. It does not reflect a consensus of all or even some of the participants or the hosting organizations.

הפוסט Israel’s Strategic Outlook in a Disintegrating Region: Trilateral Strategic Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Empowering Israeli Diplomacy through Legislation: Promoting a Foreign Service Bill הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israeli Foreign Policy and the Modern Diplomacy of the 21st Century הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The working sessions of the dialogue included opening remarks by Prof. Mensur Akgun and Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki of GPoT Center, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Gabriel Mitchell of the Mitvim Institute, and Alan Makovsky, former top Middle East Advisor at the House Foreign Affairs Committee. These remarks were followed by a discussion among all participants, which is summarized in this document.

הפוסט The US role in Israel-Turkey relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Policy: Towards Isolation or Integration? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Turkey Relations after the War in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The workshop addressed the changing dynamics in the Middle East, regional and international mechanisms for mediation and ceasefire implementation, the need to move from conflict management to conflict resolution, the difficulties of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, the economic rebuilding of Gaza, the future of the Palestinian unity government and the Arab Peace Initiative.

The workshop aimed to understand the issues that led to the recent flare-up in Gaza and the favorable circumstances that could arise following a truce. This paper summarizes the main points raised in the workshop. It focuses on the analysis of key players and the assessment of future options.

הפוסט Israel, Gaza and the Region: Post-Ceasefire Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The workshop, facilitated by Ms. Mireille Surowicz, featured Mr. Mark Gallagher (Deputy Chief of Mission and Head of the Political Section, the European Union Delegation to Israel), Ms. Avivit Bar-Ilan (Director, Department for European Organizations, Europe Division, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu (The European Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Dr. Werner Puschra (Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Israel), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Chairman, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies).

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections and Israeli-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט US Foreign Policy towards Israel and the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The keynote speakers at the symposium were MK Dr. Ronen Hoffman (Yesh Atid), Chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and Public Diplomacy; Dr. Yuval Benziman of the Mitvim Institute, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and Tel Aviv University; and Prof. Joel Peters of Virginia Tech University and the Mitvim Institute. .

הפוסט Key Elements of Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Discussions focused on the following questions: Has the Arab Spring created new opportunities for increased involvement of Israel’s Arab-Palestinian minority in regional politics and diplomacy? What are the challenges of, and the obstacles to involvement of Arab citizens in Israeli foreign policy?

Following opening remarks by Prof. George Kanazi, President of NAI; Kamal Hassan, Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute; and Amnon Be’eri Sultzeanu, Co-Executive Director of The Abraham Fund Initiatives, attendees participated in a discussion facilitated by Mitvim Chairman Dr. Nimrod Goren. This paper summarizes the main issues and positions discussed in the workshop

הפוסט Israel’s Arab Citizens and Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Paradigm Shift in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Changing Paradigms in Israel’s Foreign Policy: Do Think Tanks Matter?

A summary of a workshop with:
Prof. Donald Abelson,
University of Western Ontario, Canada;
Herzliya, Israel; May 18, 2011

On May 18, 2011, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, held a workshop with Prof. Donald Abelson from the University of Western Ontario, Canada.The workshop resulted in a set of advice on think tanks and their impact on foreign policy, in the context of Mitvim’s work to promote a paradigm shift in Israel’s regional foreign policies.

Relevance to the Israeli Arena

Think tanks are not only relevant to the American arena. Although the United States does contain the optimal conditions for their activities, these institutes are not an American invention. They have become a global phenomenon that has been adapted to each specificregion.

There is not just one model to emulate. Not every think tank needs to or can be like The Brookings Institute, the number-one think tank in the World. Even in the United States, the most successful and well known institutes constitute just one percent of the number of existing think tanks.

Every institute is unique from the other, and every political context requires a different type of activity. The specific needs of the Israeli political culture and appropriate activities that can address these needs, have to be examined. There may be a necessity for a trial and error stage, and it is possible to do so by learning from the several models around the World.

Independence and Cooperation

It is important to maintain organizational independence and therefore, one should avoid linking the institute too much to another organization. In addition, donor diversity should be ensured in order to avoid dependence on one benefactor. Cooperation with third parties should also be established, in a manner that will best address the needs of Mitvim.

The institute should cooperate with organizations that offer new fields of work and access to new audiences, which are ready to provide the space for the institute’s ideas to be developed, and that allow a political space for discussions that could not be held elsewhere. The institute needs to be a catalyst and not a single voice.

A culture of cooperation, and not competition, should be created. Regardless of the competition and the crowded nature of the “idea market,” it is important to share information with other institutes, to initiate cooperative research, build networks, learn from others, and share effective work methods.

It is beneficial to cooperate with other institutes in the World. More and more institutes are opening branches in other states and cooperating with related institutes around the World. Cooperation with institutes in the United States, Europe, and Turkey can assist us in the contact-making and in launching policy dialogues with think tanks in the Arab/MuslimWorld.

Political bodies occasionally try to exploit institutes to do their work for them, togain new networks and additional audiences, and to strengthen them and give legitimacy to their positions. It is important to be aware of this as well as to remember that in certain cases when the issues coincide with the goals of the organization, there is potential for productive cooperation that will serve both sides. In order to make political impact, it is a necessity.

Long-term research alongside immediate responses to current events

It is important to find balance between dealing with long-term strategic thinking and immediate responses to current events. This type of work requires a broad and adaptable financial infrastructure.

High-quality and relevant research is a crucial component to the success and survival of the institute. A research agenda must be created gradually in order to prevent being overtaken by current events. In addition, it is important to always remember the institute’s vision, the goals, and the direction in which you want to guide the public and the policy-makers.

An additional element for success is the ability to present the right idea to the right person at the right time. Issues should be dealt with in a timely manner, but a think tank should always try and anticipate future scenarios, and be ready towards them in advance.

In the framework of the institute’s research program, there should be some staff that deal with issues that seem to be currently irrelevant. Efforts should be invested in the identification of future trends, and the institute should be prepared to break onto center stage when they occur. To do this, it is important that there isa collection of available research projects that are completed in advance and are waiting to be published at the appropriate time.

Concurrently, the institute should propose analyses and interpretations of current events. Short papers should be made available in a timely manner to the written and electronic media. These papers should be backed up with longer and more extensive papers that will be accessible to those that are interested in additional information.

Target audiences and products

It is important to accurately identify the target audiences and their needs. Adaptable types of work are required, which will allow tools and products to be modified according to the different target audiences, and that ensure balance between addressing their needs and articulating new ideas and issues on the agenda in an independent and proactive manner.

Therefore, the institute needs to create several products – for example, op-eds, position papers, surveys, extensive research, and video clips. A sequence of products should be created as such that a short op-ed will include a link to a longer position paper, which will include a link to the more extensive research paper. This will ensure that anyone who wants to know more can easily obtain such information, and that positions will be based on broader research and facts.

The advantage an institute should aspire for, especially at its formative stages, is that of human capital – the researchers and the experts that it is in contact with. This capital should be used in order to create new, innovative ideas, and in order to provide regular insights about events and trends.

It is unnecessary to employ the experts and researchers as in-house staff, especially at the beginning when the financial resources are limited. A list should be assembled including those experts that identify with the institution and that are willing to appear in its name and write papers per-request.

Impact and public visibility

There is frequent confusion regarding impact and public visibility. The number of appearances in the media does not indicate the influence of the institute, albeit several institutes present this as a measure thereof, mostly due to public visibility pressure from donors and members of the board.

Media exposure is important to promote name-recognition, to establish the institute’s status and to distribute its products. Therefore, the institute requires the formulation of a coherent media strategy. Nevertheless, the impact on policy can be done by professional organizations that work far away from the public eye.

Alongside the public work, the institute has to act behind the scenes – for example, in personal advisory meetings with decision-makers from Israel and the World, and through discreet activities with organizations from the Arab World.

Accessibility to decision-makers and opinion-makers is based on personal relationships. It is important for the institute to create a social and political network. This will assist in the positioning of the institute, its branding, and impact-making.

In order to have impact, the institute needs to play to its strengths and advantages. The institute needs to examine which stage of the policy cycle it has the ability to contribute to the most and through which tools. Is this through the introduction of a new idea into the public or political discourse? Is it through the promotion of legislation among decision-makers? Is it through assistance in the implementation of legislation that was already passed?

Think tanks tend to have more impact during the earlier stages of the policy cycle, in which the public and political discourse are shaped around new issues. Periods of political change are also ones in which think tanks are usually capable of making an increased impact. A think tank needs to be prepared to give credit for the idea it had conceived to the political actors that are ready and able to promote that same idea and turn in it into actual policy.

הפוסט Changing Paradigms in Israel’s Foreign Policy: Do Think Tanks Matter? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.