This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט A Vision for Regional – International Partnership for Gaza Rebuilding and Palestinian Economic Leap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Hydropolitics in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Climate-Political Migration in Israel and Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli Initiative offers a three-phase plan. The first phase focuses on a shift from warfare to rehabilitation. The second phase aims to prepare the ground for a stable settlement. Finally, the third phase outlines a negotiation process over a two-state solution as part of a regional normalization process between Israel and the Arab World. The plan was created by the Foreign and Security Team of Mitvim and the Berl Katznelson Foundation, which was established 24 hours after the October 7th massacre, with the support of the New Israel Fund. It was crafted by a group of top-tier diplomatic and security experts with decades of experience.

The Initiative stands out as the first comprehensive alternative published by Israel since the beginning of the war, which provides a voice to the Israeli liberal majority. It aims to serve as a feasible policy plan for those who have long opposed the government’s policies and its unwillingness to offer, or even deal with, political planning for the day after.

The Israeli Initiative not only recognizes the importance of a two-state solution, but also emphasizes its significance in ensuring the safety and security of both Israelis and Palestinians. By presenting a pragmatic approach and considering the evolving dynamics on the ground, this publication sets a new benchmark for future discussions and negotiations.

הפוסט The Israeli Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The PA was established in 1994 as an outcome of the Oslo Accords, which envisioned it as a temporary body to be replaced by a permanent institution within five years. However, a permanent arrangement was not achieved, leaving the PA a “temporary” institution for over three decades, thereby contributing to its increasing weakness. While the Authority bears great responsibility for this weakness, it is not solely and accountable for the erosion of its standing. Israel, its Oslo Accords partner and main backer, has ignored the PA since 2009, clearly intent on dismantling it and rejecting all dialogue options. The PA today is an enfeebled body, lacking legitimacy and the capacity to enforce its authority and provide services for its people.

Reconstituting the PA would entail a lengthy process of reorganization, rehabilitation, and training to adapt its governance to the post-war era. Such a transformation would also necessitate the election of a new leadership that enjoys public legitimacy, enabling it to impose authority and enforce law and order. The PA will have to shed its corrupt image, proving that it can conduct its affairs transparently and use its tax revenues and international aid for the public good rather than the personal interests of its cronies. The education system will require revamping to rid it of anti-Israel content, and the judicial system will require restoration of its independence to provide a recourse for Palestinians seeking justice and protection from government arbitrariness. Israel must actively take part in the renewal process by outlining a real political horizon, declaring the PA a dialogue partner, and its existence as a vital interest. This commitment will require Israel to expand cooperation with the PA, unfreeze PA funds, coordinate measures to boost its economy, carry out confidence- building initiatives, and approve and coordinate reforms to strengthen its international standing.

An efficient and functioning PA is crucial to preserving Israel’s identity and security. The rehabilitation of the PA is feasible, as evidenced by its operation for over six years under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, which won Israeli and international praise. In 2012, the World Bank even ranked it higher than some established states in terms of the ease of doing business. A PA that undergoes the necessary reconstruction and reorganization could help Israel achieve security, take responsibility for the 5 million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, and form the basis for a lasting resolution of a century-old conflict.

הפוסט What is a Revitalized Palestinian Authority? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In order to prevent the election of extremists opposed to a political settlement, legitimate restrictions must be placed on the individuals and groups running for the post of president and for membership in the legislative council. These limitations will be based on the three conditions that the Quartet countries laid out for Hamas after its victory in the 2006 elections: abandoning the path of terrorism, recognizing Israel, and affirming the previous agreements it signed with the PLO.

The elections must take place in the context of an advanced political process offering hope to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and increasing their support for a settlement approach. To that end, Israel will have to declare its commitment to a political process designed to result in a two-state solution, and adopt confidence-building measures that demonstrate its intent to reach a political settlement, including a halt of construction in the settlements. At the same time, the international community, led by the United States and the European Union, will have to guarantee their recognition of a Palestinian state. The United States will also help train the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatuses, contribute to the development of its economy, and promote reforms in government institutions.

Israel and the international community must lay the groundwork for orderly, internationally supervised elections in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip that will ensure the election of a suitable national leadership for the Palestinian people. Having won the trust of the people, such a leadership will enjoy legitimacy and be able to promote a stable settlement with Israel. It will also contribute, over time, to strengthening the moderate elements in society and weakening extremist, religious, and nationalist opposition elements.

הפוסט Palestinian Elections: A Vital Step Toward a Stable Political Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the war is being prosecuted will determine the range of political options in its aftermath. Despite the reluctance of the current Israeli government to engage in any substantial long-term political discussion about the “day after” in terms of any significant blueprints or scenarios, it is imperative to draw a coherent road map regarding the feasible diplomatic options for the immediate and long-term perspectives regarding Israel’s exit from Gaza in the aftermath of the war, including the political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Taking into consideration the lack of political willingness and/or ability of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace after the war, the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic political repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), this paper examines the possible role and functions that an International Peace Conference (IPC) might fulfil in granting domestic and international legitimacy and the drawing of a coherent road map leading to de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, any IPC should also address the larger political issue regarding the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of the fulfillment of UNGA Resolution 181 (1947) and the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, following UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), 1850 (2008), and 2334 (2016).

The policy paper draws on historical precedents from other conflicts, as well as reflecting on examples and experiences from the Arab-Israeli conflict, first and foremost the relevant and successful example of the Madrid Conference of October 1991. The major insight to be drawn is that an IPC is a necessary but not sufficient political diplomatic ingredient in the road map leading to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war in the immediate term, as well as to peace negotiations towards the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State alongside Israel.

הפוסט An International Peace Conference in the Aftermath of the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the prominent areas in which local government engages and cooperates with others today is the environmental and climate field, notably in light of the foot-dragging of nation-states around these issues.

Given this reality, the paper examines whether relationships and cooperation on the environment might be built between local authorities when their respective nation-states maintain no relations or only cold ones, or are in ongoing conflict. The paper analyses three theoretical axes: 1) the rising political power of local authorities vis-à-vis their nation-states, and as significant actors in global diplomacy; 2) growing local involvement with environmental problems; and 3) the promotion of environmental peacebuilding.

The paper analyses the feasibility of joining these axes, and gives relevant examples, focussing on the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian space. The main argument arising from the analysis is that local government has the tools and the effective opportunity to advance environmental cooperation as a stimulus to making peace; and further, that processes of this sort are particularly important when there is no political horizon. While Israel and its region are indeed the focus of this paper’s examination of local government and its potential for building relationships, the general insights derived are applicable to other regions of conflict.

הפוסט On the Role of Local Government in Promoting Peace and Political-Environmental Sustainability הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed?

This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality.

Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank.

We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels.

To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas.

As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar.

In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners.

Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.

הפוסט Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system.

Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy.

An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

הפוסט A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Adapting the foreign system to the challenge of the climate crisis requires, first and foremost, a profound conceptual change. It calls for a shift from the logic of dealing with the climate issue as a “foster child” of secondary importance to core strategic issues to a new approach of climate diplomacy that sees the climate crisis as a political strategic game changer of prime importance to foreign policy and its implementation. Dealing with the climate crisis as a political issue challenges traditional thinking about the practices shaping foreign relations and about the actors expected to lead these processes. For example, it redefines the importance of non-governmental actors – civil society organizations, the scientific technological community, and the business sector – and positions them as active participants in shaping foreign policy. More broadly, adopting climate diplomacy provides an opportunity to reexamine the relationship between the government and non-governmental sectors in shaping Israel’s foreign relations as a whole.

Based on a review of the structure and activities of Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus on climate issues and case studies from other countries and interstate bodies, the aim of this policy paper is to propose recommendations for conceptual and structural-systemic changes to upgrade Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus handling of climate change challenges. Implementation of conceptual change in the field of climate diplomacy at the national level relies on three main components: a) anchoring and defining the role of Israel’s foreign policy within the framework of Israel’s national effort to confront climate change; b) a structural change in the foreign affairs system itself – defining a strategic integrating actor to deal with the international pillar of Israel’s climate policy; a clear internal division of roles within the system and improvement of inter-ministerial coordination through a permanent government forum; and substantial increase of resources and managerial inputs devoted to the field within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, we see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a national integrator in shaping Israel’s climate diplomacy. c) the creation of new multisectoral systems of cooperation between Israel’s governmental and non-governmental sectors.

הפוסט Upgrading the Capacity of Israel’s Foreign Policy Apparatus to Deal with the Climate Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip.

An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border.

An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks.

Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial.

Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control.

Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages.

Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.

הפוסט The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The policy brief was published on “MEI“, on May 25th.

הפוסט The slowing down of Israel-Arab relations under the Netanyahu government הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Leveraging Friction: Using Israel’s tensions with normalization countries to engage them in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Foreign Policy Plan for the 36th Government of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Cyprus Relations

The State of Israel and Cyprus are similar in many respects – both feature island characteristics (in terms of geography and/or state of mind), both control natural gas reservoirs, and both endure a complex, prolonged national conflict. In addition to bilateral ties and partnerships, Israel and Cyprus are members of multilateral frameworks and alliances in the Mediterranean Basin, the most prominent being the trilateral alliance comprising Israel, Cyprus and Greece and the Cairo-based Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Israel and Cyprus cooperate on a wide variety of matters, among them security and military issues, tourism, energy and civil marriage. Their relations have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to ensure its interests in the Mediterranean Basin and realize its goals, such as maintaining regional stability, advancing energy cooperation, encouraging and rehabilitating tourism, and coping with the COVID-19 fallout, along with the ongoing issues of the climate crisis and the growing maritime traffic along regional sea routes. 

Three major developments led to the strengthening of Israeli-Cypriot ties over the past decade. The first was the discovery of gas reservoirs in the eastern Mediterranean Basin. The understanding that cooperation would benefit both sides led Israel and Cyprus to sign an agreement in 2011 demarcating their Exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and their commitment to advance energy cooperation. Second, the growing acrimony in Israel’s relations with Turkey, especially since the 2010 flotilla to Gaza incident, and the concurrent rise in Cypriot-Turkish tensions following the failure of negotiations to resolve the conflict over Northern Cyprus, enabled and encouraged closer Israel-Cypriot ties. Third, the regional instability stemming from the Arab Spring led Israel and Cyprus to seek cooperation that would contribute to regional stability. 

The strengthening relations between the two states was manifested in the rapid signing of agreements, arrangements and shared regulations. Given both sides’ growing recognition of the need and importance of these ties, they took advantage of regional developments to advance that goal. Although Cypriot President Christofias (2008-2013) was not particularly enthusiastic about promoting relations with Israel and tended to advocate for the Palestinian side in accordance with the traditional Cypriot position, he realized that his country’s interest lies in closer relations with Israel and set about promoting them. On the Israeli side, in February 2012 Netanyahu became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit the neighboring island. The trilateral relations with Greece grew out of the mutual relations forged between Israel and Cyprus, and in 2016 the leaders of all three states made it official with a formal strategic alliance. 

Interests and Challenges in Israel-Cyprus Relations

Cyprus holds several key interests for Israel, stemming especially from its strategic location and its membership in the European Union (EU). Each state, to some degree, regards the other as a security-strategic hinterland underpinning their military cooperation, even as Israel conveys a clear message that this security cooperation is not directed at a third party. Israel understands that cooperation with Cyprus is necessary for the exploitation of its gas reservoirs, gas production and export. Cooperation with Cyprus is an important component of Israel’s desire for regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Israel also views the Cypriot membership in the EU as an advantage in terms of exerting influence on the organization’s decisions regarding Israel, or at least preventing resolutions that Israel finds unpalatable. Along with the shared political, energy, security and economic interests, the two states cooperate in tourism, communications, the environment, culture, and more, and share a belief in democratic values. 

Israel’s interests prompted its decision to strengthen cooperation with Cyprus, but these relations do not come without challenges. A rapprochement between Israel and Turkey could intensify tensions with Cyprus. An eruption of violence in the conflict over Northern Cyprus or between Cyprus and Turkey over their maritime border, as well as an Israeli-Palestinian clash, could also have a detrimental effect on relations. For now, both states are trying to circumvent issues related to their own national conflicts. 

The core element of Israeli-Cypriot cooperation, energy, could also create challenges. The high potential and shared expectation of yields from these gas fields could challenge relations if the cooperation fails to meet the high expectations they each harbor. There has already been voiced doubts over the feasibility of some of the shared plans for the production and export of natural gas to Europe, chief among them the gas pipeline plan, thus the sides must consider alternatives. Geopolitical shifts, even positive ones such as the forging of closer ties between Israel and the Gulf States, could also challenge ties with Cyprus should they develop at the expense of the alliance, whether by diverting available resources from strengthening ties with Cyprus to benefit stronger ties with other states, or whether as a result of Israeli commitment to additional actors with clashing or different interests. 

Opportunities in Israel-Cyprus Relations 

The diverse, significant and abundant opportunities in the Israel-Cyprus relationship can be seen as a mirror image to the challenges. Israel and Cyprus must take advantage of their warm ties to deepen their roots and expand bilateral cooperation as much as possible in order to bolster the relations resilience in the face of frequent changes. 

Opportunities on energy issues are varied and include a deeper cooperation beyond natural gas resources to energy connectivity projects, such as the Euro-Asia electric cable, and the development of renewable energies. The Regional Gas Forum could also provide a platform for institutionalized cooperation on renewable energy and expand to additional fields such as commerce and maritime regulation. To this end, Israel and Cyprus could cooperate with other members of the forum to expand its mandate to include these issues. 

The fabric of cooperation in the region could presumably pose a challenge given the different interests of various actors, but it also opens up significant opportunities. Adding new partners to the varied Israeli-Cypriot regional cooperation ventures could actually strengthen and lend greater weight to relations between the two states and increase their prospects of success. Adding the UAE to energy projects, for example, or Morocco to climate change or maritime agriculture projects would also provide a beneficial opportunity for stronger regional cooperation. The warming of Israeli-Moroccan relations could open up opportunities for Israel to deepen its involvement in regional Mediterranean organizations of which Cyprus is also a member. This, in combination with the EU and its commitment to advancing green energy and a circular economy, and in partnership with the US, further increases the potential for regional cooperation. The political connection to Europe via Cyprus is significant and can be used not only to help Cyprus avert resolutions unfavorable to Israel but also to boost cooperation. The launch of the new EU Southern Neighborhood policy, which seeks to promote cross-border cooperation in the Mediterranean region, constitutes such an opportunity. 

Although Israel and Cyprus have generally avoided directly interfering in each other’s conflicts, the conflicts could in reality constitute areas of mutual cooperation. Israel and Cyprus can help each other move ahead with conflict resolution and peace by supporting implementation of concrete measures on the ground, providing the required political support for these peace processes and learning from each other’s experience in conflict resolution. 

הפוסט Major Potential in the Israel-Cyprus Friendship From the “Israel and the Mediterranean” Working Group הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean has attracted significant attention over recent years. New economic opportunities and geopolitical developments are contributing to this trend and are turning the region into a central tenet of Israel’s foreign policy. Together with regional alliances and bilateral relations that Israel is advancing in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Israeli public has also begun to perceive the area as a new space for regional belonging. In the 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 25 percent of the Israeli public considers Israel primarily as part of the Mediterranean (as opposed to 29 percent who answered that Israel belongs more to the Middle East and 24 percent to Europe).

Throughout history, the Eastern Mediterranean played a central role in global political, economic, and social transformations. The recent far-reaching changes and developments in the region have repositioned it as a distinct and central region in the international arena. Environmental concerns, the movement of refugees, the struggle between powers over trade routes, political conflicts among and within the countries, economic cooperation, the emergence of security communities and the discovery of natural gas reserves, are all processes that tie regional members to the geography of the Mediterranean. These new issues can and should be taken into consideration alongside old issues that characterize the region – a common history, similar climate, the diasporas, shared values, and Mediterranean culture.

Israel is not only active but dominant in the Eastern Mediterranean, with its policy characterized by a myriad of relations and unique approach of non-exclusive policy. Israel strives, with considerable success, to maintain and promote relations with different countries that hold different or conflicting interests, without the relations with one necessarily coming at the expense of relations with the other. Israel is a partner in regional alliances (such as the Alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – EMGF), maintains bilateral relations with many countries openly and formally, and maintains informal relations with other countries. The discovery of natural gas reserves in Israel’s economic waters gives it economic and political power in the region and allows it a wider range of political manoeuvrability. Notably, however, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip on the shores of the Mediterranean, restricts Israel’s ability to reap the potential benefits that the area holds for it.

The political, economic and social developments in the Mediterranean are ongoing and constantly evolving. The region’s consolidation offers many opportunities and challenges for Israel, and is accompanied by both cooperation and struggles over the region’s desired characteristics, the regional institutions that should be established, common values, geographic boundaries, and each member state’s role and political power.

To assess possible developments, identify opportunities and challenges, and thus discover the necessary political actions, it is first necessary to understand the arena and identify trends, processes, different issues at stake, and active players and their various interests. To this end, in 2019 Mitvim – the Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policy, the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Center for National Security Studies at the University of Haifa, formed a research and policy group. The group’s goals were to better understand the Mediterranean arena and Israel’s place therein, to formulate guidelines and policy recommendations, and to promote political dialogue with various regional actors.

This paper summarizes the first series of meetings of the research and policy group in 2019-2020 and presents the key insights that emerged throughout it. The meetings focused on global and regional powers’ activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, energy and environmental issues, the impact of the coronavirus epidemic, conflicts and collaborations, and questions of identity and norms. These summaries portray a perspective of what is currently happening in the Mediterranean, the opportunities and challenges facing Israel, as well as a reference to the guiding principles and recommended courses of action for Israeli foreign policy.

הפוסט Israel and the Mediterranean<br> A New Space for Regional Belonging <br> Meeting Summaries from a Research and Policy Group הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Principles and Recommendations for Israel’s Foreign Policy Towards the EU; Recommendations from a Mitvim Institute Task-Team הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government.

הפוסט Morocco and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government.

הפוסט The UAE and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper maps out the international discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace under the current circumstances, based on a series of dialogues conducted by Mitvim Institute experts in February and March 2021 with various European, Arab, American and UN diplomats and experts.[1] The paper offers an analysis of the positions and perceptions of international actors regarding the effects of the latest diplomatic developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and their insights and conclusions about the measures the international community could undertake to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace that are feasible and desired.

[1] The dialogues were conducted under Chatham House rules. Accordingly, this article does not mention participants’ names and does not attribute direct quotes to them. The dialogues were led on the part of the Mitvim Institute by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Victoria Solkovits.

הפוסט Where Do We Go from Here? <br>The International Discourse on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.