הפוסט Jordanian-Israeli Food Security: A Road Map of Potential Collaboration הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The UAE’s Foreign Policy Anchors and Their Influence on Israel and the Region הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Key points:

1. The Gaza war reignited the Two-State Solution, with the US, EU, and Arab countries working together to achieve it through a “reverse engineering” approach.

2. The EU’s potential role is outlined in three stages of “The Israeli Initiative”:

Political Horizon: Establish a political vision and international monitoring forum.

Transitional Phase (peace-building): Demilitarize the Palestinian state, rebuild Gaza, hold elections, and begin regional projects.

Negotiation (peace-making): Final negotiations for Palestinian statehood and normalizing Israel-Arab relations.

The paper highlights the importance of the EU’s role in maintaining the viability of the Two-State Solution in the West Bank. In the short term, the EU should provide humanitarian aid, counter annexation efforts in the West Bank, stabilize the Palestinian Authority (PA), and address Iranian proxies. Its influence depends on trust-building with both sides and leveraging its status as both a financial and political player.

The conclusion calls on the EU to prepare for post-war diplomatic and economic opportunities, with a focus on revitalizing the PA, stabilizing the region, and gaining trust with Israel through continued engagement.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט The EU’s Possible Role in the ‘Day After’ the Gaza War according to a Reverse Engineering Roadmap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Deradicalization and Israeli-Palestinian Reconciliation: Lessons and Recommendations Based on Past Conflicts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document is one of a series of studies and policy documents that examine the relations between the local climate and foreign policy, as part of a project by the Mitvim Institute and with the support of the Glazer Foundation. The document was written in collaboration with SID-Israel, the umbrella organization of the Israeli professional community in the fields of humanitarian aid and international development. SID-Israel incorporates civil society organizations, government institutions, academic and research programs, private companies, consultants, and independent experts, and works to create a supportive professional environment, based on the exchange of knowledge and experience. Sid-Israel was established and operates thanks to the generous and ongoing support of Pears Foundation.

הפוסט Humanitarian Strategy in the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Palestine Is One Vote Short in the Security Council from Being Recognised as a State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A Blue Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Climate, Society and Regional Prosperity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט A Vision for Regional – International Partnership for Gaza Rebuilding and Palestinian Economic Leap הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Hydropolitics in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Climate-Political Migration in Israel and Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In order to prevent the election of extremists opposed to a political settlement, legitimate restrictions must be placed on the individuals and groups running for the post of president and for membership in the legislative council. These limitations will be based on the three conditions that the Quartet countries laid out for Hamas after its victory in the 2006 elections: abandoning the path of terrorism, recognizing Israel, and affirming the previous agreements it signed with the PLO.

The elections must take place in the context of an advanced political process offering hope to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and increasing their support for a settlement approach. To that end, Israel will have to declare its commitment to a political process designed to result in a two-state solution, and adopt confidence-building measures that demonstrate its intent to reach a political settlement, including a halt of construction in the settlements. At the same time, the international community, led by the United States and the European Union, will have to guarantee their recognition of a Palestinian state. The United States will also help train the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatuses, contribute to the development of its economy, and promote reforms in government institutions.

Israel and the international community must lay the groundwork for orderly, internationally supervised elections in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip that will ensure the election of a suitable national leadership for the Palestinian people. Having won the trust of the people, such a leadership will enjoy legitimacy and be able to promote a stable settlement with Israel. It will also contribute, over time, to strengthening the moderate elements in society and weakening extremist, religious, and nationalist opposition elements.

הפוסט Palestinian Elections: A Vital Step Toward a Stable Political Settlement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the war is being prosecuted will determine the range of political options in its aftermath. Despite the reluctance of the current Israeli government to engage in any substantial long-term political discussion about the “day after” in terms of any significant blueprints or scenarios, it is imperative to draw a coherent road map regarding the feasible diplomatic options for the immediate and long-term perspectives regarding Israel’s exit from Gaza in the aftermath of the war, including the political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Taking into consideration the lack of political willingness and/or ability of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships to advance peace after the war, the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, and the international and domestic political repercussions for several key actors (including the United States, Egypt, and Jordan), this paper examines the possible role and functions that an International Peace Conference (IPC) might fulfil in granting domestic and international legitimacy and the drawing of a coherent road map leading to de-escalation, stabilization, demilitarization, reconstruction, and governance of the Gaza Strip in the immediate term. Moreover, any IPC should also address the larger political issue regarding the ultimate diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the form of the fulfillment of UNGA Resolution 181 (1947) and the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, following UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973),1515 (2003), 1850 (2008), and 2334 (2016).

The policy paper draws on historical precedents from other conflicts, as well as reflecting on examples and experiences from the Arab-Israeli conflict, first and foremost the relevant and successful example of the Madrid Conference of October 1991. The major insight to be drawn is that an IPC is a necessary but not sufficient political diplomatic ingredient in the road map leading to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war in the immediate term, as well as to peace negotiations towards the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian State alongside Israel.

הפוסט An International Peace Conference in the Aftermath of the Israel-Hamas War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the prominent areas in which local government engages and cooperates with others today is the environmental and climate field, notably in light of the foot-dragging of nation-states around these issues.

Given this reality, the paper examines whether relationships and cooperation on the environment might be built between local authorities when their respective nation-states maintain no relations or only cold ones, or are in ongoing conflict. The paper analyses three theoretical axes: 1) the rising political power of local authorities vis-à-vis their nation-states, and as significant actors in global diplomacy; 2) growing local involvement with environmental problems; and 3) the promotion of environmental peacebuilding.

The paper analyses the feasibility of joining these axes, and gives relevant examples, focussing on the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian space. The main argument arising from the analysis is that local government has the tools and the effective opportunity to advance environmental cooperation as a stimulus to making peace; and further, that processes of this sort are particularly important when there is no political horizon. While Israel and its region are indeed the focus of this paper’s examination of local government and its potential for building relationships, the general insights derived are applicable to other regions of conflict.

הפוסט On the Role of Local Government in Promoting Peace and Political-Environmental Sustainability הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Providing clean drinking water and treatment of wastewater, along with the supply of food, shelter, and medicine, are critical security considerations for the following reasons:

● Granting legitimacy to the military action- Ensuring a humanitarian situation that is in line with international humanitarian law in the Gaza Strip is a key condition for mobilizing internal, international, and regional legitimacy for military action.

● Ensuring the safety of Palestinian civilians, Israeli hostages, and soldiers in Gaza – An outbreak of infectious diseases will directly endanger civilians, kidnapped Israeli citizens, and IDF soldiers in the Strip. In addition, there is concern that an outbreak of epidemics would likely spread into Israel and Egypt.

● Preventing long-term pollution that damages natural resources – A humanitarian disaster in Gaza will lead to long-term pollution damaging natural water sources such as the coastal aquifer and the many wells both in Gaza and in Israel.

●Conserving financial resources by preventing a humanitarian disaster – Prevention is always less costly.

● Maintaining Israel’s values and upholding its moral standing. Given Israel’s interests as detailed above, to prevent a humanitarian disaster occurring in Gaza, Israel must take concrete actions to improve the immediate humanitarian situation in the southern Gaza Strip. This requires that Israel:

– Allow the entry or provision of sufficient basic water supply for the civilian population, while protecting water/wastewater infrastructure and the operation of desalination facilities, supply of chlorine into the water systems, and maintenance equipment needed.

– Facilitate maximum sewage treatment by providing fuel for sewage pumping systems, and, as much as possible, operating treatment plants in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) professional bodies.

– Permit sufficient energy supply for water and sewage treatment needs by considering to re-activate parts of the power lines in the south of Gaza, (monitoring the transmission of electricity), supplying fuel under the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), and renewable energy systems that are disconnected from the grid.

– Open the Kerem Shalom crossing for the transfer of essential humanitarian aid – water, fuel, food, shelter, and medicine – in order to overcome the backlog at Raffa Crossing in the provision of humanitarian aid.

– Promote a framework that connects relevant factors in Israel to their counterparts in the UN in order to create a comprehensive mapping and status report of needs, locations, bottlenecks, contributions, assistance funding, and the like.

– Promotion of a vaccination program and health monitoring – support for monitoring disease in Gaza and promotion of a vaccination program under the auspices of an international organization in accordance with health developments in the Gaza Strip.

הפוסט Securing Critical Infrastructure in Gaza is a Necessity for Israeli National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed?

This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality.

Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank.

We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels.

To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas.

As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar.

In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners.

Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.

הפוסט Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system.

Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy.

An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

הפוסט A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip.

An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border.

An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks.

Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial.

Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control.

Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages.

Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community.

* This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.

הפוסט The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The policy brief was published on “MEI“, on May 25th.

הפוסט The slowing down of Israel-Arab relations under the Netanyahu government הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Leveraging Friction: Using Israel’s tensions with normalization countries to engage them in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a key hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict claimed by Israelis and Palestinians and left under temporary Israeli responsibility by the Interim Agreement (1995). For almost three decades, Israel has been reducing the Palestinian living space in the area and deepening its hold, managing all planning and building processes, expanding settlement areas and so-called “state lands” and demarcating “military zones” and “nature reserves” for itself. The collapse of the peace process also encouraged the Palestinian Authority (since 2009) to act unilaterally on the ground. While Israel has assumed a “piecemeal” approach and sees Area C as a vital space for settlement and security, the Palestinians have taken a “holistic” approach, viewing the area as a necessary space for a contiguous and sustainable state. The campaign currently being waged on the ground perpetuates friction and a bloody struggle over land and infrastructure, distances the chance of a stable Israeli-Palestinian agreement, prevents development and construction for Palestinians, poses a tangible danger to nature and the environment, and deepens humanitarian and legal challenges of population expulsion and relocation.

Turning this important area into a foundation for Israeli-Palestinian progress requires two types of policies – a reactive policy in the short term to prevent further deterioration, and a long-term policy of practical cooperation. In light of the new radical right-wing government’s policy advocating the de facto annexation of Area C to Israel, the pro-peace camp must take preventive measures: promote a campaign to “unmask” the government’s moves and intentions and expose the dangers of annexation as a fatal blow to Israel’s identity, security, and political and economic standing; expand demonstrations in conjunction with the overall protest against the new government’s anti-democratic policies; file objections to settlement construction and to harmful measures against the Palestinians. Down the line, Israel and the Palestinians must abandon their “zero sum game” approach and instead formulate joint systemic planning and promote positive steps in Area C: approve outline plans for Palestinian construction that were already submitted to Israel for approval, prevent crime and piracy, and promote joint projects with international and Arab assistance. These include solar power fields, agricultural and food cultivation areas, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and industrial zones. Advancing these measures without a political horizon will result, at most, in some specific improvement. On the other hand, advancing measures with a view to a political settlement – including the transfer of parts of Area C to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the advancement of a comprehensive economic plan for the Palestinians – will lead to a real change, strengthen Palestinian ability and motivation to prevent terrorism, and make it possible to gradually advance the two-state vision based on the “Creeping Peace” strategy.

הפוסט Area C: From a Hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict to a Space for “Creeping Peace” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

NATO has been undergoing profound reform in recent years, expanding its agenda to deal with additional issues of human security, such as the climate and energy crises, and stressing innovation. The war in Ukraine not only injected renewed vigor and political power into the alliance, it also hastened the processes of organizational renewal and emphasized the alliance’s geographical focus northward and eastward. Israel, too, has undergone change, its security enhanced by normalization agreements with Arab states, a strong Hellenic alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and warming relations with Turkey. Its technological capabilities and its business model orientation could turn its posture vis-à-vis NATO from a consumer of security to a supplier. NATO and Israel now have an opportunity to reshape, deepen and improve their relationship.

הפוסט Israel-NATO Relations: Developing a New Strategic Concept הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Partnership Priorities with the EU – What (If Anything) Is Israel Missing? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europol-Israel Police Operational Agreement: Enhanced cooperation with EU in combatting crime and terrorism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Summary:

• What is the Association Council (AC)? It is the institutionalization of an annual dialogue at foreign ministers’ level between Israel and the EU (usually represented by its High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Council rotating Presidency). It is assisted by an Association Committee of senior officials. Since 2005, eight issue-specific sub-committees and two working groups have been formed within its framework. The AC was established by the 1995 EU – Israel Association Agreement and operated regularly since the agreement’s ratification in 2000 through 2012. The AC is authorized to advance and deepen cooperation between Israel and the EU. 

• From regular meetings to AC suspension: Between 2000-2012 the AC convened regularly despite difficulties in EU-Israel relations throughout the second intifada (2000-2004) and the faltering peace process with the Palestinians (since 2009). It even continued to convene when the EU decided in 2009 on a “linkage policy” and avoided upgrading relations with Israel (specifically refusing to ratify the second “Action Plan”) pending progress in the peace process. 

• In 2013, Israel declined to hold the AC meeting to protest the EU’s ‘differentiation policy’, which introduced a territorial clause stipulating that all its agreements with Israel would apply only within the 1967 borderlines, not in the Occupied Territories. In 2014, it was the Europeans who did not convene the AC, and the disconnect continued. 

• An Israeli effort to reconvene the AC: about five years ago a significant number of EU member states objected to the convention of the AC. Their number has decreased significantly since then. Upon his appointment in June 2021, Foreign Minister Lapid set the resumption of the AC meetings as a major foreign policy goal. 

• Following the Foreign Affairs Council decision to reconvene the AC, and its scheduling for October 6, the EU has to adopt a Common Position on the matter. Israel is also expected to issue a declaration. 

• The cost of suspending the AC’s activity can be divided to political and practical costs. Politically, the cost was a diplomatic one concerning image, perception, and public attitudes. Most Southern Mediterranean countries maintain regular ACs with the EU. Its absence with the only democracy in the Middle East, especially given the excellent practical relations between the parties and mutual value, was unusual. The loud and accusatory “megaphone diplomacy” that replaced dialogue and discourse in the decade of the AC suspension contributed to the deterioration of relations, to Israeli incitement against the EU and to the deterioration of the EU’s image in Israel, and vice versa. High-level political meetings between the two sides rarely took place. Since the Abraham Accords and Normalization Agreements were signed (in 2020), the EU has not taken part in leveraging regional peace relations. 

• In terms of practical cooperation, while other countries have signed new and updated cooperation agreements with the EU, Israel and the EU still work according to their 2004 Action Plan. During this period (since 2013), Israel has not joined new EU programs nor did the sides upgrade their trade agreement. 

• Convening the AC in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Convening the AC is an opportunity for the EU to rethink the framing of its policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the Abraham Accords indicate that the US and Arab countries do not condition their relations with Israel on promoting peace with the Palestinians, leaving the EU as the main body to insist on such a stipulation. The EU’s ‘linkage policy’ has not reversed Israeli governments’ unwillingness to restart the peace process with the Palestinians since its collapse in 2014, and currently excludes it from involvement in the regional peace processes. 

• The conclusion is that Europe must reexamine the path to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. The EU will continue to support the two-state solution, to oppose the construction of settlements and any changes that jeopardize the two-state solution. Its differentiation policy is also expected to continue. However, the EU should examine its linkage policy, which harms trust between the parties. 

• One way for Europe to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace is by helping to link the Abraham Accords and Israel’s relations of peace/normalization with Arab countries in favor of promoting peace with the Palestinians. 

• Practical opportunities that may emerge once the AC is convened: Convening the AC is not just an end in itself; rather its success is in promoting practical cooperation between the sides. Specifically, the goal of reconvening the AC is to start talks on a Partnership Priorities agreement setting a number of common goals to advance in the next 3-5 years. Potential cooperation goals could include climate change (with an emphasis on energy, food, agriculture, water, and innovation in each), digitalization, cyber, artificial intelligence, health (including the handling of epidemics), as well as triangular/quadrennial cooperation between Israel, the EU, and an Arab peace/normalization state, leveraging the Abraham Accords in these and other areas. 

• In addition, Israel should conduct a more comprehensive and up-to-date review of the 20 EU programs for which it is eligible, decide which ones to join, and consider starting negotiations on a new trade agreement that will include the services sector as well as an investor protection agreement, or at the very least on removing barriers and an approximation of laws to facilitate trade. 

• Conclusion: The EU is Israel’s main economic partner, with which it has extensive strategic practical cooperation. Convening the AC would be the political highlight of the much-improved relations between Israel and the EU over the past year. For the EU, this is an opportunity to end the unhelpful and even harmful absence of regular high-level political dialogue with Israel. 

• The AC is not an instrument to goad the other side. It is a tool for dialogue, even if critical and harsh, to clarify the parties’ positions. Its renewal is both a constructive means and a symbol of the renewal of substantive dialogue between the parties. It is a tool to rebuild trust between two sides, as well as to strengthen the Abraham Accords and normalization agreements to encourage every opportunity to renew the Israeli – Palestinian peace process. 

• The renewal of the political dialogue should be leveraged for practical cooperation between Israel and the EU, which will also spill over into ties between Israelis and Europeans, between countries and citizens in the region, to promote prosperity and growth, peace, stability, and democracy, and to jointly combat regional challenges. Relations should be promoted for the benefit of both parties under any government. 

הפוסט The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The entire project will be published on July 12th, 2022. 

Dr. Toby Greene is a lecturer in the Department of Political studies at Bar Ilan University and Prof. Stephan Stetter is Professor of International Politics and Conflict Studies at the University of the Bundeswehr Munich.

Introduction

The global surge of illiberal trends, that has affected also Israel and several EU member states, has harmed the framework of shared liberal values that was an enabler of EU-Israel cooperation in the past. It caused EU-Israel relations to fall short of potential. Yet recent changes, including the displacement of Netanyahu and Trump, provide opportunities for reigniting EU-Israel relations. However, the threatened erosion of multilateral institutions based on international law and human rights and liberal democratic principles at home is neither inevitable nor irreversible. At this moment of opportunity, EU-Israel relations should be strengthened not only on the basis of shared interests. They should be more firmly based on a dialogue on how liberalism should inform domestic and international politics, informed by past experiences.

הפוסט Leaving Illiberalism Behind: An Opportunity to Establish a New Liberal Foundation in EU-Israel Relations? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The entire project will be published on July 12th, 2022. 

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Haifa, and a Board member of Mitvim.

The state of Israel’s democracy
The state of Israel (excluding the occupied West Bank) is a democracy. Leaders are replaced in the polls; the judiciary is independent and there is protection of civil rights. Israel is defined as free with a grade of 76/100 in the 2020 Freedom House index; it received a 33/40 in political rights, and 43/60 in civil liberties. This places it above most states in the international community, and at the medium to low end of the OECD.  At the same time, Israel has ruled the West Bank under “temporary” military control since 1967. Currently, there is no indication that it is moving towards relinquishing control over the region or awarding the local population full citizenship. Many Israelis see this challenge as external to Israel’s body politic, and therefore not a democratic deficit. Others, in Israel and outside of it, argue that since the same government exercises its authority both in Israel and in the West Bank (albeit shared, to an extent, in the West Bank with the Palestinian Authority), the whole region should be analyzed as a single political unit. Seen from this perspective, Israel is no longer a democracy.

The state of Israel’s foreign affairs

Against the background of a challenged democracy, Israel’s stature in the world is probably at its zenith. After decades in which Israel was shunned by a large number of states, by 2021, it had diplomatic relations with 164 states, and is represented abroad by 108 embassies and missions. Israel is also well integrated into the global economy. As of 2018, exports and imports accounted for some 60% of its GDP. Since the late 1960s Israel has been a close ally of the US, the most dominant actor in the international system. Washington provided over the years military, financial, and political support for Israel. Indeed, Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid since the Second World War. The two countries’ close relationship does not include a formal treaty of alliance, but both countries signed dozens of agreements that have institutionalized various aspects of the relationship. Israel further maintains close relationships with major European actors, most notably, Germany.

Despite its close relationship with the US, Israel is effective in maintaining close relations also with America’s current global challengers, China, and Russia. The latter is particularly important, as since 2015, Russian forces have been based in Syria and are serving, in effect, as a potential check on Israeli military activity in the region. Israel also experienced improved foreign relations in its immediate environment. Massive gas discoveries in Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean since 1999, serve as a basis for an Israeli “turn to the sea”. Israel developed a close alliance with the Hellenic states of Greece and Cyprus which includes, among other things, military cooperation, and plans for a joint gas pipe from Israel via Greece to Italy, though the plan’s feasibility remains unclear. Egypt also joined this axis, and indeed led the creation of a new regional organization, the EastMed Gas Forum. This is the first regional organization in which Israel took a leadership founding role. Joint concerns about Iran, the decline in the intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coupled with pressures from Trump’s Washington, led to closer relationship between Israel and Arab actors that traditionally shied away from it. A portion of these relationship came to the public eye with the fall 2020 Abraham accords, in which Israel embarked on diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. This was followed by similar moves with Morocco and Sudan.

Israel’s democratic makeup and its foreign affairs

Although scholars highlight the significance of domestic factors in shaping Israeli foreign policy, It seems that its democratic makeup is not part of this effect. The Knesset (Israel’s Parliament) is generally left outside of the foreign policy process and does not even have a separate committee for foreign relations. Structurally, Israeli foreign policy making is rather centralized and much of it is handled directly by the Prime Minister and his staff. In the broader bureaucracy, core aspects of foreign relations are led by security organs: the Defense Ministry, Israel’s external intelligence agency, the Mossad, the Israel Defense Force, and the National Security Staff. These institutions are less exposed to public scrutiny compared to other elements of the executive. The foreign ministry, an organ that might have been more open to the public, has been marginalized in the foreign policy process. For example, for most of the years, the top diplomatic positions, such as Israel’s ambassadorships in the US and the UN, were political appointees by the Prime Minister and not professional diplomats. Members of Knesset have small staffs, and for many years, did not have an independent ability to assess information, until a small research center was set up to help them. Civil society also has a limited role in foreign policy. There are very few think tanks that challenge government policy, and the matter has rarely attracted public interest in a way that could lead to collective action. There are a few exceptions, such as activists Eli Yosef and Itai Mack that seek greater transparency, public oversight, and limitations on Israel’s largest export industry – arms. Both activists oppose arms sales to governments that oppress their population. To date, however, these efforts had no substantial effect.

The lack of any major effect of Israel’s democratic make-up on its foreign policy is further a result of Israel’s strategic culture and approach. While diplomacy was central to the early Zionist efforts, the reality of a security challenge, meant that diplomacy had become, in the words of scholar Charles Freilich, “an instrument of defense policy”. As such, much of the strategic considerations are realist, based on raw power, rather than a normative outlook. Israel was willing to support whoever assisted it in its defense. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Israel felt especially isolated in the world, it had cooperated with blatantly non-democratic regimes, such as Apartheid South Africa, Pinochet’s Chile, and Argentina under the Junta. Cooperating with these autocracies was justified by another feature of Israel’s foreign policy: its commitment to world Jewry. Argentina and South Africa had sizable Jewish communities, and their governments had a history of antisemitism. The rationale in Jerusalem was, therefore, that closer relations with these governments will allow Israel to better protect local Jews.

Even if one underplays the role of security in shaping foreign policy, Israeli diplomacy was driven by the need to work with whoever was willing to do so. Uri Bialer argued recently that the “supreme goal” of Israel’s foreign policy was to “build a state and secure its existence”. Under these conditions, normative considerations of advancing democracy, or including morality in foreign policy, were marginalized.

Interaction with democratic countries

What is the effect of the interaction with other democracies on Israeli policies? The pre-state Zionist movement and the state it beget have been highly sensitive to the positions taken by its great power democratic allies. This contributed to an Israeli commitment to democracy. In 1953, David Ben Gurion, said that “Israel historically, culturally and spiritually [is] part of the free world.” In the 1950s and 1960s Israel devoted many resources to supporting young African nations in their newly created free states. Yet, by the 1970s this streak of Israeli “norms-based” foreign policy, retreated. In part, as Israelis were disappointed with the behavior of African nations, who swiftly cut diplomatic relations with it under Arab threats and promises between 1967 and 1973. Israel also learned that its foreign relations were affected much more by material capabilities, as opposed to normative preferences. Only once it demonstrated its military prowess after the 1967 war, and in light of Soviet support to its Arab foes, did the US launch into a closer relationship. More recently Israel scored progress with a number of Arab states, based on its military and political power, and its strong posture against Iran. Beyond the internal drive for a democratic procedure, the pattern could also be understood as stemming from external power relations. When the Zionist movement and then Israel were weak, they sought support from the international system. As the international system was led by democratic countries and values, Israel highlighted its commitment to liberal democracy. Once Israel had become stronger, it could rely more on material capabilities to attract allies, and it was its foes — mostly the Palestinians – who needed secure international support and turned to liberal-democratic arguments in doing so.

הפוסט Democracy and Foreign Affairs in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming relations between Israel and Turkey

Turkish foreign policy change – Turkey adopted an assertive and confrontational policy towards its neighbors in the Mediterranean and other countries in the Middle East over the past decade. Its relations with Greece and Cyprus deteriorated over conflicting claims to economic waters and control of potential gas reservoirs, as well as the continued conflict in Northern Cyprus; its relations with Egypt worsened over Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and involvement in the war in Libya; relations with Israel ran aground, mainly over the Palestinian issue. Turkey found itself isolated in the eastern Mediterranean Basin facing an expanding system of alliances and regional cooperation from which it was excluded. These developments prompted a turning point in Turkish foreign policy over the past 18 months aimed at thawing relations with countries in the region, including Israel. Although the Turkish moves began while Netanyahu was still in office, they gained momentum after the June 2021 swearing-in of the Bennett-Lapid government and subsequent inauguration of President Isaac Herzog.

Warming relations – Turkey began to express its desire for warmer relations with Israel, emphasizing a re-examination of potential cooperation in the field of energy and natural gas. Positive public messages were exchanged between the sides, replacing the negative ones conveyed by the parties in recent years mostly for domestic political purposes. The Turkish policy shift, together with the change of government in Israel and Herzog’s incumbency, formed the basis for slow progress in relations, which included expanded channels of communications between senior officials, the start of concrete cooperation, and a process of rebuilding trust. In March 2022, Herzog met with Erdogan in Ankara, and in May 2022, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu visited Israel, marking the first visit by a Turkish foreign minister in 15 years. In June 2022, the security cooperation between the countries came to light in the face of Iranian terrorist threats to Israelis on Turkish soil, prompting a quick visit to Ankara by Foreign Minister Lapid and meeting with his counterpart Çavuşoğlu despite the political chaos in Israel and the announced dissolution of the Knesset.

Cooperation potential – The warming relations hold out inherent potential for promoting cooperation, along three main channels. First, existing channels of cooperation can be expanded. These include upgrading diplomatic relations back to ambassadorial level, strengthening tourism, and expanding commercial channels. Second, thawing long frozen cultural, academic and economic cooperation channels. Finally, new avenues of cooperation must be examined – the world has changed since the freezing of relations over a decade ago. New opportunities have emerged in such fields as the need to develop renewable energy and address the climate crisis, as well as in technological advances, alongside a shared interest in regional political processes and opportunities for multinational axes. For example, Turkish moves to improve its relations with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, along with Israel’s strengthening relations with those countries, open up opportunities for trilateral and regional cooperation in a variety of fields.

Challenges and lessons – The current course of gradually warming relations begs the question of how these developments differ from previous attempts to warm relations, whether there was a significant learning process on the Turkish side that led to a real policy shift on Israel, and what Israel has learned from the past. Previous attempts to warm relations have encountered challenges and pitfalls stemming mostly from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli military operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem have generated repeated crises between the countries. The current process of warming relations is characterized by greater mutual sensitivity. This sensitivity was reflected in Turkey’s moderate reactions to the rising tensions in Jerusalem around the month of Ramadan, terrorist attacks, and Israeli responses. In contrast to the previous reconciliation attempt of 2016, this time the parties chose to conduct their dialogue at higher levels than in the past, to give the moves considerable public exposure, to use positive rhetoric, and propose ideas for consultation mechanisms to contain future crises between the sides.

Implications of the thaw with Turkey for Israel’s activity in the Mediterranean

Israel is Turkey’s doorway to regional integration – Turkish steps to warm relations with Israel reflect a broader move to thaw relations with countries in the region. Following a decade of assertive and confrontational policies, Turkey found itself isolated, precisely as the US was changing the nature of its involvement in the region, and a new cooperation-based regional architecture was taking shape. Given the emerging regional landscape, its isolation, and its desire to become a regional energy hub, Turkey now aspires for a role in forming regional initiatives and cooperating and strengthening its relations with countries in the region. However, relations between Turkey and other countries in the region – Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus – are even worse than those with Israel. Ankara is making efforts to reach out to Egypt, and Greece as well. But whereas its outreach to Egypt has fostered a similar process of warming relations as with Israel, the same cannot be said for the situation vis-à-vis Greece, prompting a renewed confrontational policy toward Athens. Turkey views Israel as a potential conduit to regional cooperation, not necessarily with Greece and Cyprus, but certainly with actors such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. While this assessment presents it with great opportunities, these must not come at the expense of Israel’s other partnerships in the region.

Learning from Egyptian-Turkish experience and the potential of Israeli-Egyptian cooperation vis-à-vis Turkey – Since Sisi’s rise to power, Egyptian-Turkish relations have been characterized by hostility and mutual distrust stemming from Erdogan’s repeated questioning of the legitimacy of Sisi’s rule. Tensions with Egypt have also arisen over Turkey’s stand with the Muslim Brotherhood, its intervention in Libya, the agreement marking the maritime border between Libya and Turkey, and its attempts in previous years to intervene in Gaza (moves perceived as intervention in Egypt’s backyard, while undermining its status and security); disagreement over the need to delineate Mediterranean maritime borders; and Egyptian condemnations of Turkish moves in the region. Nevertheless, like Israel, Egypt has maintained extensive bilateral trade with Turkey, which amounts to over $5 billion a year, a number that has grown at a dizzying pace of tens of percent in recent years. Meanwhile, Egypt is Turkey’s main source of liquefied gas imports. Starting in 2021, the two countries have embarked on a trend of cautious warming relations. This development is presented sympathetically in the media, but the Egyptian side is waiting to see how it translates into action. Given their similar situation and interests vis-a-vis Turkey, Israel and Egypt also face similar questions over their relations with Ankara, offering Israel an opportunity to learn and perhaps even cooperate with Egypt as part of the joint warming of relations with Turkey. At the very least, Israel must conduct itself with maximum transparency toward Egypt in the process of warming relations with Turkey in order to avoid crises in relations.

Relations with Turkey must not sacrifice relations with Greece and Cyprus – Israel and the Hellenic countries have built up a relationship of trust over the past decade, which allows room for maneuver vis-à-vis the Turkish issue. However, relations between Israel, Turkey, and the Hellenic countries are not a “zero-sum game” – warming relations with Turkey should not come at the cost of Israel’s relations with Greece and Cyprus. Israel succeeded in implementing this policy in 2016, and it can do so again. However, caution must be exercised, with maximum transparency and attentiveness to the concerns of Greece and Cyprus in order to prevent damage to relations. Israel is careful to accompany the warming of relations with Turkey with a series of reassuring messages to Greece and Cyprus expressing its commitment to the partnership that has been forged – public statements, visits by senior officials and tripartite meetings, and even joint military training. From the perspective of the regional framework, Israel cannot resolve the conflicts between Turkey Greece, and Cyprus, but Turkey’s integration into regional initiatives is an important process that can contribute to reducing tensions and promoting regional dialogue and stability.

Coordination with the US and Europe – Despite the widespread regional perception of an American pullout from the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin, the US clearly remains very involved, despite a change in its modus operandi. The war in Ukraine has also shuffled the deck, leading the US and Europe to invest considerable resources in the face of the Russian threat. These include strengthening ties with oil-producing countries in the Middle East and bolstering the NATO alliance, in which Turkey plays an important role. These circumstances explain the US and European desire to see Turkey integrate into the Mediterranean Basin and cooperate with their other allies in the region. To the extent that initiatives are advanced to integrate Turkey into the region and strengthen its relations with countries in the region, an open and coordinated dialogue with the Americans and Europeans must be maintained in order to leverage it optimally for Israel and the region. In contrast to the process of warming Israeli-Turkish relations in 2016, this time care must be taken to ensure that the warming of relations with Turkey progresses in a coordinated manner with the US and Europe, rests on a stronger and more robust foundation, progresses at an appropriate pace, and serves Israel’s desire to promote stability and regional cooperation over time.

Integration of Turkey into regional forums – Turkey aims to reduce its dependence on Russian gas and become a regional energy center, making cooperation in the field of gas and energy a major goal of the Turkish move to warm relations with Israel. Plans to export Israeli gas to Turkey via a pipeline seems to be unfeasible and unviable, and Israel must make this clear to Turkey at the outset and not create expectations that cannot be realized. Nevertheless, there is potential for Turkey’s integration into regional frameworks, which to some extent will meet the Turkish need and promote regional interests, and Israel can help in this regard. Potential new areas of cooperation could include the fields of renewable energy and climate change, serving as the basis for a new regional network that includes Turkey.

הפוסט Implications of Israel and Turkey’s diplomatic thaw on Israel’s Mediterranean Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been locked in a stalemate since the 2014 collapse of the US mediation initiative led by then-Secretary of State John Kerry. The relations between the parties have been all but severed and characterized by a series of crises and tensions that peaked over Israel’s 2020 West Bank annexation plan. While the Israeli-Arab normalization agreements removed the annexation idea from the agenda, this did not change the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Developments in recent months in the Israeli-Palestinian arena pose challenges and risks but also new opportunities and possibilities. Special attention should be paid to the impact of the May 2021 escalation, the deep crisis in the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the establishment of a new government in Israel.

This paper maps the international discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace under the current conditions, and constitutes a follow-up to the paper we published in April 2021. It is based on a series of dialogues held by Mitvim Institute experts in August and September 2021 with European, American and Palestinian diplomats and experts, as well as UN officials, and also on a series of discussions among a team of Israeli experts formed by Mitvim.^[1] The paper offers an analysis of the positions and perceptions of international actors regarding the effects of the latest developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and their insights and conclusions about the feasible and desired measures that could be undertaken to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace.

^[1] The dialogues were conducted under Chatham House rules. Accordingly, this article does not mention participants’ names and does not attribute direct quotes to them. The dialogues were led on the part of the Mitvim Institute by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Gil Murciano and Dr. Nimrod Goren.

הפוסט One step forward, one step back: International discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Ministry of Regional Cooperation was established in 1999 as a product of political bargaining. Then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak sought to find a job for Shimon Peres, the peace advocate whom he did not want as his foreign minister. Peres used the new ministry as a platform to advance his vision of a new Middle East, while Barak led an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

The Ministry was subsequently shut down (2003), reconstituted in 2009 and has been led since by various Likud party ministers whose agenda did not include advancing a two-state solution. These office holders directed most of their energy to largely futile efforts to advance projects with Jordan. “My ministry was born in sin and should have been shuttered long ago,” declared Likud’s Ofir Akunis upon ending his term as Minister of Regional Cooperation in mid-2021.

The appointment of Esawi Frej of Meretz as Minister of Regional Cooperation in June 2021 was a breath of fresh air. For the first time in years, the Minister heading the office is wholly identified with advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and relations with Arab and Muslim countries. “The Palestinian issue is the most central to Israel and must receive full priority,” Frej said after taking office. He added that although a 2009 government resolution tasked the ministry with handling key economic components of ties with the Palestinians, his predecessors from Likud had neglected the issue.

Frej announced plans to visit Ramallah and renew the work of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) with the Palestinians, founded within the framework of the Oslo Accords. His ministry stated that it will “formulate and implement measures to remove barriers and strengthen the economic, civilian, social and cultural ties with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and enhance trust between Israel and the PA”. More specifically, the ministry targets “managing and accompanying infrastructure, environmental, tourism, economic, trade, culture, education and sports projects; initiating investment plans; and identifying and lifting barriers to the movement of goods and people, and in the field of infrastructure”.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ avoidance of significant dealings with the PA left a more open field for the Ministry of Regional Cooperation. During his first six months in office, Frej focused on economic aspects related to the PA and to Israel’s relations with it. These issues were handled in the past by the ministers of finance and the economy. The Ministry of Defense and Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) continue to play a significant role in this regard. The activity of Frej in this field included moves on the domestic Israeli front and in the international arena, and bilateral steps vis-à-vis the PA.

Within Israel, the Ministry of Regional Cooperation made efforts to raise public and political awareness of the severe economic crisis in the PA and of the need to alleviate it in order, inter alia, to prevent negative repercussions on Israel. Frej raised the issue with Defense Minister Benny Gantz ahead of his meeting in Ramallah with Mahmoud Abbas, promoted Israeli loans to the PA to be repaid from the tax revenues that Israel collects for the PA, spoke publicly of the need to strengthen the PA to prevent its collapse, and declared his intention to encourage Israeli chambers of commerce to accelerate economic activity with the Palestinians and with Jordan.

In the international arena, Frej represented the Government of Israel at a November 2021 meeting of the international donor group for Palestine (AHLC) in Oslo, where he encouraged participants to financially support the PA. Frej also called on foreign businesspeople and corporations to invest in the Palestinian economy, in cooperation with Israel, and held international meetings to discuss economic issues.

The bilateral Israeli-Palestinian moves taken by the Ministry of Regional Cooperation, usually in cooperation with other Israeli government entities, included preparations for renewing the work of the JEC and implementation of the Paris Protocol (the economic annex of the Oslo Accords), issuing 500 work permits for Palestinians in Israeli high-tech companies, expanding the quota of permits for Palestinian construction workers in Israel, attempts to ease the passage of people and goods at border crossings, and support for establishing industrial zones in the West Bank.

Upon taking office, Frej declared that “everything possible must be done – by the government, on the civilian and public diplomacy levels – to bring about the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and advancement of the two-state solution”. Indeed, the Ministry of Regional Cooperation appears, to be trying to promote improved economic relations with the Palestinians. While six months are not sufficient time for extensive achievements, the ministry seems to have a set an agenda in this field, which could make its mark in 2022.

However, to make a larger impact towards Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, the ministry needs to step up its activity in the political-public, policy and civilian fields, including in linking Israeli-Arab normalization processes to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The ministry has only taken limited action in these fields to date, focusing in 2021 on renewing ties between Israeli ministers (among them Frej, Gantz, Nitzan Horowitz, Tamar Zandberg and Omer Bar-Lev) and senior PA officials, on meetings with foreign diplomats and special envoys, and on calls for local government and civil society funding to create links with neighboring states and the PA. These measures will have to be continued in 2022, in addition to the following new directions:

In the political-public field, Frej should continue to clearly advocate for the two-state solution and for urgent action in that direction. He would do well to ask for periodic hearings on the Israeli-Palestinian issue at the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In addition, the ministry could launch a ministerial forum for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace and coordinate its activities, lead staff work in preparation for the future resumption of the peace process, follow developments on the ground and their effect – whether positive or negative – on prospects of peace, and establish an experts’ forum to formulate recommendations on how to mobilize the normalization agreements with Arab countries for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace (the Israeli Climate Forum, recently formed by President Herzog could serve as an example).

In the policy field, it is incumbent on the Ministry of Regional Cooperation to expand the framework of meetings between Israeli and Palestinian ministers. Specifically, the ministries of foreign affairs, finance and economy, should be encouraged to develop ties with their Palestinian counterparts. Frej and his staff could initiate and facilitate such activity, making sure that meetings between ministers lead to an effective follow-up and produce tangible results. The ministry can also appoint a special envoy for contact with the PA, for example a diplomat with ambassadorial rank on loan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such an appointment would fill the vacuum resulting from the lack of official ties between the Israeli and Palestinian foreign ministries. Frej could also initiate a joint move with the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs to create a partnership with Jews around the world who are active in promoting peace and ties with the region. During the past decade, such Jewish activists have been often criticized by the Israeli right-wing leadership, and the new government should reach out to them and treat them as partners on the road to peace.

On the regional level, the Ministry should link Israel’s improving ties with Arab states to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. Frej should raise the Palestinian issue and its importance in meetings with Arab representatives, work to integrate the Palestinians into the emerging Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati coordination on electricity and water, and meet regularly with international envoys tasked with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Frej should also encourage other governments to follow in the footsteps of the US and enhance financial support for peace organizations. Moreover, his office should leverage regional frameworks in which Israel and the PA are members – such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, the Union for the Mediterranean, UN institutions, and parliamentary diplomacy forums. International organizations often serve as a sparring arena between Israelis and Palestinians; they should be turned instead into spaces for advancing cooperation.

In the civilian field, the Ministry of Regional Cooperation should assist pro-peace civil society organizations. Under the Netanyahu governments, these organizations were often de-legitimized and attempts were made to curtail their freedom. Frej should work to lift barriers, support organizations, help entrepreneurs, ease Israeli-Palestinian shared activities, give visibility to successful projects and influential organizations, and create an ongoing framework for engagement with peace NGOs. The former UN Special Coordinator Mladenov adopted such an approach in his work to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, and it could serve as a model. This should also be reflected in the ministry’s operations – for example prioritizing project proposals submitted to the ministry that include Palestinian participants, launching small-scale, bureaucracy-free funding for specific activities of peace organizations, and encouraging involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in promoting peace. The ministry could also help the Israeli and Palestinian Olympic Committees end the exclusion of Israelis and Palestinians from the Mediterranean Games – the “regional Olympics” – and promote a shared event by the Israeli and PA pavilions at the Dubai Expo.

In conclusion, despite the structural limitations in which the Ministry of Regional Cooperation operates, it currently has an opportunity to positively influence Israeli-Palestinian relations and contribute to peacemaking efforts. The ministry is being led, in a rare occurrence, by a minister committed to the two-state solution, who identifies the urgent need to advance the matter, who is attentive to the needs of the Palestinian side, who hails from the Arab population of Israel, and whose staff is well acquainted with Israeli peace organizations. What is more, Frej is serving at a unique time in which political, regional and international circumstances enable the advancement of new initiatives vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Not only in the economic field, but also in the political-public, policy and civilian fields. Advancing such initiatives should be the leading task for the ministry in 2022. While doing so, Frej should make sure that his efforts are not used as fig leaves to cover actions on the ground by the Israeli right-wing that jeopardize the two-state solution.

A shorter version of this article was published by The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט The Ministry of Regional Cooperation<br> and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

* Dr. Rachel Frid de Vries is a senior lecturer for international economic law at Ono Academic College, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration (IASEI) and a former Senior Official for international affairs at the Israeli Ministry of Justice.

הפוסט Judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU on the EU’s Trade with Israel’s Disputed Territories הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Foreign Policy Plan for the 36th Government of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Several major developments marked significant change for Israel in the first half of 2021. President Biden assumed office, Israel ramped up its campaign against Iran’s nuclear program, Hamas and Israel engaged in another round of fighting, Knesset elections were held for the fourth time in two years and Netanyahu was replaced after 12 years in office. How are these developments shaping Israeli foreign policy trends?

1. A new government with Lapid as Foreign Minister augurs well for the continued rehabilitation of Israel’s Foreign Service. Lapid’s additional post as Alternate Prime Minister and his considerable political standing have placed an influential player at the helm of the Foreign Ministry. In keeping with the new government’s guidelines that expressly call for strengthening the Foreign Ministry, a decision was made to shutter the Ministry for Strategic Affairs and dozens of professional and diplomatic appointments were approved. The appointments were previously made by former Foreign Minister Ashkenazi, but Netanyahu blocked their approval.

2. Events in Jerusalem and Gaza demonstrate the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite political attempts to marginalize it. For years, Israel had adhered to a strategy of conflict management with the Palestinians, shunning diplomatic initiatives to advance the peace process. Its actions in Jerusalem generated international criticism and sparked widespread violence in May, which also stemmed from the cancelation of elections in the Palestinian Authority (PA). The violence with Hamas in Gaza and between Jews and Arabs in mixed Israeli towns, triggered by tensions in Jerusalem, highlighted the growing difficulty in Israel’s efforts to divide the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel itself. At the same time, Israel is dealing with the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to launch a war crimes investigation of its actions in the occupied territories.

3. Relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco survive challenges. The political instability in Israel, the coronavirus crisis, the fighting with Gaza and tensions in Jerusalem, and the advent of a new administration in Washington posed challenges to the newly established relations with the normalization states. Netanyahu’s political use of the Abraham Accords posed a special difficulty, as did his veto of visits by members of his government to the Gulf. Nonetheless, and despite the round of fighting with the Palestinians, the Abraham Accords displayed resilience and sustainability. Diplomatic missions were opened in Israel and Arab states, economic, civilian and security cooperation agreements were signed and moved forward.

4. Netanyahu policy undercuts Ashkenazi and Gantz’s efforts to improve relations with Jordan. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi and Defense Minister Gantz led attempts under the previous government to rehabilitate relations with Jordan, renewing a high-level dialogue with the Kingdom. However, the canceled visit by Jordan’s Crown Prince to the Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif compound and tensions in Jerusalem curtailed the impact of these moves and failed to significantly ease the crisis in relations, as reflected in the cutoff between Netanyahu and King Abdullah. Nonetheless, Israel stressed its support for the Kingdom’s stability, as was particularly evident in the context of the attempted coup in Jordan and strengthening of security coordination with Jordan. With the installation of the new government, Lapid highlighted the need to rehabilitate relations with Jordan.

5. Diplomatic, economic relations with Egypt expand, but not people-to-people links. Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation in Sinai and Gaza continued, along with cooperation on energy issues and in business. The saga of the Palestinian elections and the Israeli-Palestinian escalation underscored Egypt’s key role in internal Palestinian mediation and Israel-Hamas mediation. Nonetheless, the pervasive opposition to normalization with Israel persists among the Egyptian public and limits the expansion of cooperation between the two countries to other fields.

6. Israel gets to know the new American administration. The new US administration brought about change in American foreign policy, including restored support for the two-state solution and for a renewal of the nuclear agreement with Iran, and adoption of a multilateral approach to advancing democratic-liberal values and dealing with the climate crisis. The Biden Administration backs the normalization between Israel and Arab states and the gradual US withdrawal from the Middle Eastern arena. Israel adapted itself to these changed circumstances, undertaking to build a good working relationship with the Democratic administration and party and to restore the bi-partisan support of Israel eroded by Netanyahu’s favoritism toward the Republicans.

7. Israel continues to oppose Iranian nuclear program while adopting a new approach to US moves.  Ahead of the March 23 Knesset elections, parties running against Netanyahu on the political right, center and left advocated dialogue with the US administration on the Iran nuclear issue rather than the confrontational approach Netanyahu adopted vis-à-vis Obama at the time. On the professional level, and after the elections on the political one, too, Israel shifted to a policy of dialogue with the US, even as it continued its wide-ranging military and intelligence activity against Iran’s nuclear program, often assuming clear responsibility for its actions and abandoning its traditional policy of ambiguity.

8. Netanyahu puts a damper on Ashkenazi’s efforts to strengthen relations with the European Union (EU). Ashkenazi persisted in efforts to enhance relations with the EU as a strategic goal and sought to expand and deepen links with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, Israel’s political instability, Ashkenazi’s limited term in office and Netanyahu’s tight hold on power precluded significant progress in relations. Along with continued economic and civilian cooperation, tensions with the EU persisted over its commitment to the two-state solution and criticism of the ongoing and deepening occupation. Upon taking office, Lapid declared he would turn the page on Israel’s relations with the EU.

9. Israel plays a key role in advancing and bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Israel continued to bolster its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and advanced cooperation with them in the fields of security, energy, tourism and the coronavirus crisis. Israel also continued to advance the development of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and advocated for the UAE’s integration in the Mediterranean arena. It also displayed flexibility in renewed contacts over demarcating its maritime border with Lebanon. At the same time, Israel reacted coolly to Turkish feelers regarding a possible warming of relations.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Cyprus Relations

The State of Israel and Cyprus are similar in many respects – both feature island characteristics (in terms of geography and/or state of mind), both control natural gas reservoirs, and both endure a complex, prolonged national conflict. In addition to bilateral ties and partnerships, Israel and Cyprus are members of multilateral frameworks and alliances in the Mediterranean Basin, the most prominent being the trilateral alliance comprising Israel, Cyprus and Greece and the Cairo-based Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Israel and Cyprus cooperate on a wide variety of matters, among them security and military issues, tourism, energy and civil marriage. Their relations have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to ensure its interests in the Mediterranean Basin and realize its goals, such as maintaining regional stability, advancing energy cooperation, encouraging and rehabilitating tourism, and coping with the COVID-19 fallout, along with the ongoing issues of the climate crisis and the growing maritime traffic along regional sea routes. 

Three major developments led to the strengthening of Israeli-Cypriot ties over the past decade. The first was the discovery of gas reservoirs in the eastern Mediterranean Basin. The understanding that cooperation would benefit both sides led Israel and Cyprus to sign an agreement in 2011 demarcating their Exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and their commitment to advance energy cooperation. Second, the growing acrimony in Israel’s relations with Turkey, especially since the 2010 flotilla to Gaza incident, and the concurrent rise in Cypriot-Turkish tensions following the failure of negotiations to resolve the conflict over Northern Cyprus, enabled and encouraged closer Israel-Cypriot ties. Third, the regional instability stemming from the Arab Spring led Israel and Cyprus to seek cooperation that would contribute to regional stability. 

The strengthening relations between the two states was manifested in the rapid signing of agreements, arrangements and shared regulations. Given both sides’ growing recognition of the need and importance of these ties, they took advantage of regional developments to advance that goal. Although Cypriot President Christofias (2008-2013) was not particularly enthusiastic about promoting relations with Israel and tended to advocate for the Palestinian side in accordance with the traditional Cypriot position, he realized that his country’s interest lies in closer relations with Israel and set about promoting them. On the Israeli side, in February 2012 Netanyahu became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit the neighboring island. The trilateral relations with Greece grew out of the mutual relations forged between Israel and Cyprus, and in 2016 the leaders of all three states made it official with a formal strategic alliance. 

Interests and Challenges in Israel-Cyprus Relations

Cyprus holds several key interests for Israel, stemming especially from its strategic location and its membership in the European Union (EU). Each state, to some degree, regards the other as a security-strategic hinterland underpinning their military cooperation, even as Israel conveys a clear message that this security cooperation is not directed at a third party. Israel understands that cooperation with Cyprus is necessary for the exploitation of its gas reservoirs, gas production and export. Cooperation with Cyprus is an important component of Israel’s desire for regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Israel also views the Cypriot membership in the EU as an advantage in terms of exerting influence on the organization’s decisions regarding Israel, or at least preventing resolutions that Israel finds unpalatable. Along with the shared political, energy, security and economic interests, the two states cooperate in tourism, communications, the environment, culture, and more, and share a belief in democratic values. 

Israel’s interests prompted its decision to strengthen cooperation with Cyprus, but these relations do not come without challenges. A rapprochement between Israel and Turkey could intensify tensions with Cyprus. An eruption of violence in the conflict over Northern Cyprus or between Cyprus and Turkey over their maritime border, as well as an Israeli-Palestinian clash, could also have a detrimental effect on relations. For now, both states are trying to circumvent issues related to their own national conflicts. 

The core element of Israeli-Cypriot cooperation, energy, could also create challenges. The high potential and shared expectation of yields from these gas fields could challenge relations if the cooperation fails to meet the high expectations they each harbor. There has already been voiced doubts over the feasibility of some of the shared plans for the production and export of natural gas to Europe, chief among them the gas pipeline plan, thus the sides must consider alternatives. Geopolitical shifts, even positive ones such as the forging of closer ties between Israel and the Gulf States, could also challenge ties with Cyprus should they develop at the expense of the alliance, whether by diverting available resources from strengthening ties with Cyprus to benefit stronger ties with other states, or whether as a result of Israeli commitment to additional actors with clashing or different interests. 

Opportunities in Israel-Cyprus Relations 

The diverse, significant and abundant opportunities in the Israel-Cyprus relationship can be seen as a mirror image to the challenges. Israel and Cyprus must take advantage of their warm ties to deepen their roots and expand bilateral cooperation as much as possible in order to bolster the relations resilience in the face of frequent changes. 

Opportunities on energy issues are varied and include a deeper cooperation beyond natural gas resources to energy connectivity projects, such as the Euro-Asia electric cable, and the development of renewable energies. The Regional Gas Forum could also provide a platform for institutionalized cooperation on renewable energy and expand to additional fields such as commerce and maritime regulation. To this end, Israel and Cyprus could cooperate with other members of the forum to expand its mandate to include these issues. 

The fabric of cooperation in the region could presumably pose a challenge given the different interests of various actors, but it also opens up significant opportunities. Adding new partners to the varied Israeli-Cypriot regional cooperation ventures could actually strengthen and lend greater weight to relations between the two states and increase their prospects of success. Adding the UAE to energy projects, for example, or Morocco to climate change or maritime agriculture projects would also provide a beneficial opportunity for stronger regional cooperation. The warming of Israeli-Moroccan relations could open up opportunities for Israel to deepen its involvement in regional Mediterranean organizations of which Cyprus is also a member. This, in combination with the EU and its commitment to advancing green energy and a circular economy, and in partnership with the US, further increases the potential for regional cooperation. The political connection to Europe via Cyprus is significant and can be used not only to help Cyprus avert resolutions unfavorable to Israel but also to boost cooperation. The launch of the new EU Southern Neighborhood policy, which seeks to promote cross-border cooperation in the Mediterranean region, constitutes such an opportunity. 

Although Israel and Cyprus have generally avoided directly interfering in each other’s conflicts, the conflicts could in reality constitute areas of mutual cooperation. Israel and Cyprus can help each other move ahead with conflict resolution and peace by supporting implementation of concrete measures on the ground, providing the required political support for these peace processes and learning from each other’s experience in conflict resolution. 

הפוסט Major Potential in the Israel-Cyprus Friendship From the “Israel and the Mediterranean” Working Group הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Instead, talks petered out. Not only were the Israeli and Lebanese teams at odds over where negotiations should start, they couldn’t even look each other in the eye. Though the United States managed to bring the parties back to Naqoura in April 2021, the hiatus did little to soften the two sides.

In order to understand what went wrong, it is important to analyze the context of the meetings that took place and the developments that occurred between October 2020 and the present. The Israeli-Lebanese maritime boundary dispute isn’t simply about territorial claims but also economic and geopolitical interests. Identifying which of these three variables is driving the parties involved is the key to understanding whether negotiations will eventually resume or whether this corner of the Eastern Mediterranean will become more contentious.

Israel and Lebanon’s maritime dispute is a manifestation of deeply rooted territorial disagreements. The 1923 Paulet-Newcombe Agreement that demarcated the boundary between the British and French Mandates in the post-Ottoman era contained multiple inconsistencies that subsequently carried over into relations between Israel and Lebanon. Following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council produced documents intended to provide further clarification on the contentious border. But these efforts made little impact. Hezbollah, the radical Shiite political party and militia that has operated in southern Lebanon for decades and is today the most powerful actor in the country, has never recognized these agreements. As a result, the land border is still actively monitored by the Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the U.N., and Hezbollah militia.

None of these aforementioned documents addressed the territorial waters and maritime boundary between the two states. It was only in the mid-2000s, when international energy companies started to explore along the Levantine coast, that policymakers comprehended how an undefined border between two rival states could be problematic. But unfortunately, as is the case in many maritime disputes, Israel and Lebanon utilized different demarcation methods to map out their respective Exclusive Economic Zones. Israel marked the border as being at a 90-degree angle from the coastline. Lebanon marked it as a continuation of the land border. To further complicate the situation, the two parties disagreed from which point on land the maritime boundary should be drawn. These differences produced a disputed area of roughly 860 square kilometers (533 square miles).

Recognizing both the risks and rewards of mediating between these bellicose neighbors, the U.S. offered its services with both eyes open. From 2010 to 2012, Ambassador Frederic C. Hof shuttled between the parties and presented a proposal that would divide the disputed territory in a ratio of 55 to 45 in Lebanon’s favor (commonly referred to as the “Hof Line”). According to Hof’s account of the negotiations in Newlines, Israeli and Lebanese negotiators were disappointed with the U.S. proposal but begrudgingly accepted that it may be the best available compromise. Hof asserts that if not for the collapse of the Lebanese government in 2013, the parties would have reached an accord.

It took nearly a decade for Israel and Lebanon to restart negotiations. During that period, multiple offshore hydrocarbon discoveries were made in the waters of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum — an international organization committed to advancing energy development and cooperation opportunities — was established by Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. In 2021, France joined the forum as a full member.

Because of its ongoing dispute with Israel, Lebanon would not participate in these processes and struggled to attract international companies to explore its waters.

Several factors, including chronic government mismanagement of resources, a growing Syrian refugee population, the U.S. sanctions regime on Iran and its associates in Lebanon, the coronavirus pandemic, and the tragic blast at the Beirut port, created a perfect storm that incentivized talking with Israel. Though optimistic about the prospects of discovering meaningful offshore reserves in Blocks 8, 9, and 10 (designated areas leased to companies for exploration) and then successfully commercializing them in the post-COVID-19 energy market, the logic of the caretaker Lebanese government was that resolving the maritime boundary dispute with Israel was the first step toward bringing foreign investment back to Lebanon.

Israel welcomed the opportunity to settle the matter. The maritime dispute with Lebanon had not adversely affected the development of Israeli offshore hydrocarbons — although Block 72 runs up against these contested waters — neutralizing the threat of a possible Hezbollah attack and delinking the maritime boundary dispute with the enduring land border disputes would create more room for Jerusalem to maneuver in the crowded Eastern Mediterranean.

Israel and Hezbollah are enemies, yet Lebanese stability is crucial to maintaining Israeli security interests. From the Israeli perspective, if the discovery of natural gas buoyed Lebanon’s floundering economy, all the better.

Despite these incentives, the parties were at odds over how to restart talks: Who should facilitate future negotiations, the U.S. or the U.N.? Should negotiations include maritime and land border disputes? Eventually, Washington managed to convince the parties to accept a formula where the two sides would meet face-to-face under the mediation of U.S. Ambassador John Desrocher and with U.N. sponsorship. In an effort to demonstrate their opposition to normalizing relations with Israel, the Lebanese team reportedly spoke indirectly to their Israeli counterparts sitting across the room.

The Israeli negotiation team (and possibly the U.S. mediators) assumed that the starting point for negotiations would be the 2012 Hof Line. But the Lebanese team quickly poured cold water on that notion, presenting instead a maximalist position that claimed an additional 1,430 square kilometers (887 square miles) including the territory where Karish, a natural gas field operated by Energean and containing an estimated 32 billion cubic meters, is located.

From the Lebanese perspective, the negotiations led by Hof should have relied on the legal precedent set by other internationally arbitrated maritime disputes and emphasized the relationship between the land boundary and the maritime boundary. Instead, “to avoid provoking a controversy over who owned what rock,” the U.S. team started drawing the Hof Line three miles offshore. In addition, Lebanese negotiators argued that Hof’s proposed compromise granted undue weight to a rock called “Tekhelet” located less than a mile from the Israeli coastline that shouldn’t have been taken into consideration when assessing the equidistant line between the two sides.

While this position might carry weight among international maritime legal experts, it was a dead end in the negotiations. Israel isn’t a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and therefore didn’t feel committed to a rigid interpretation of international maritime law. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, who oversaw the negotiation process, called the Lebanese volte-face a “provocation” and tweeted to President Michel Aoun in Arabic that the two should meet in Europe in order to get things back on track. Steinitz has challenged Lebanon’s argument against the Tekhelet rock, citing that Lebanon has used similar land masses in identifying its maritime boundary with Syria.

Coincidentally, Lebanon’s northern neighbor is also driving a hard bargain. In March 2021, the Assad regime announced that it had signed a four-year contract with Russian energy company Kapital in two blocks that overlap with Lebanon’s maritime claims. The news triggered a flurry of Lebanese reactions. On April 1, 2021, Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces party, called on the government to resolve the maritime dispute with Syria and warn Russia against operating in the disputed area. Furthermore, it was reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had a telephone call with Aoun, during which he expressed resentment at the criticism voiced in Lebanon against Syria.

The maritime dispute between Lebanon and Syria is no less complex than that with Israel. However, Lebanon is weighed down by the web of commercial and strategic interests that tie its competing political factions to Syria, Iran, and Russia. These considerations will likely force Beirut to make significant compromises on its northern maritime boundary. In light of the U.S. withdrawal from the region, Russia sees the Eastern Mediterranean — and the Levantine coast in particular — as a base from which it can project greater regional influence.

If decision makers in Beirut were mentally preparing to acquiesce to Syrian demands, then it helps explain why they adopted a hard line toward Israel, where there is no love lost and no strings attached. Just weeks before the resumption of talks, the Lebanese government discussed the possibility of changing resolution no. 6433 (which delineates Lebanon’s maritime borders) in order to include the maximalist positions recently brought forward by the negotiation team. U.S. Undersecretary of State David Hale met with Aoun reiterating the need for dialogue and reaffirming U.S. commitment to mediate “on the basis on which we initiated these discussions,” confirming the suspicion that Lebanon’s new position ran counter to the framework agreement arranged by Desrocher that enabled the recent round of talks. However, these efforts proved fruitless. When the negotiation teams met in April, the divide was still unbridgeable. It is difficult to predict if and when negotiations will continue.

There are several lessons to be gleaned from this episode. It was faulty to assume that the incentives that brought Israel and Lebanon together in 2020 were sufficient to deliver a comprehensive resolution to their maritime dispute. Compared to the past decade, conditions for direct negotiations were optimal, but too much time had passed since the Hof-led negotiations of 2012, and the positions of the actors reflected some of the changes that had occurred in the interim. Negotiating with Lebanon is particularly thorny due to the fragmented nature of Lebanese politics and the number of internal and external actors who can veto any progress. Lebanese stability may be an Israeli interest, but no maritime boundary agreement was going to guarantee something so indeterminate. After a long hiatus, it may have been wiser to ease into discussions gradually and set expectations for conduct within the negotiating room.

Relations between Israel and Lebanon will always be influenced by regional developments. While there is no evidence to suggest a causal link between the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on Nov. 27, 2020, and the postponement of direct talks, there has been a steady uptick in hostilities between Israel and Iran over the last few months in the maritime space and surrounding the Iranian nuclear program. Hezbollah may give the Lebanese government a green light to resume negotiations, but it is unlikely that an Iranian proxy will permit the sides to come to an agreement so long as regional tensions run high. Following the escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas in May, it is fair to assume that Hezbollah will veto efforts to restart negotiations in the near future.

The recent news of a maritime dispute between Lebanon and Syria is also a reminder that the Eastern Mediterranean is an evolving geopolitical space, and once-dormant actors may soon return to the regional picture. The last decade of offshore exploration focused on Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus’ waters. But as the Syrian civil war reaches a relative degree of stability, international energy companies are likely to turn their attention to the northernmost corner of the Eastern Mediterranean. This means that Russia — the Assad regime’s protector — will begin to flex its muscles more assertively in regional affairs. Future negotiations between Israel and Lebanon should give serious consideration to Russian interests when trying to assess how to best reach an agreement.

The construction of a regional framework for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean could further incentivize Lebanon to seek a compromise. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is a nascent organization, yet membership within the gas forum could yield commercial dividends for Lebanon so long as a creative solution can be found around its opposition to Israel. That may seem far-fetched, but in an increasingly digitized world it would behoove the forum’s member states — France in particular — to find a creative solution. The maritime dispute between Israel and Lebanon has implications upon the maritime claims of other states — such as Cyprus — and the energy industry’s perception of the region as a viable space for exploration and development. If Israel and Lebanon manage to work out their differences, others may follow suit.

The U.S. has done an admirable job trying to get the parties to the table. No one else in the international community has the combination of gravitas and leverage on both Israel and Lebanon. But U.S. interest in resolving this dispute shouldn’t be taken for granted. The U.S. is withdrawing from the region, and it is easy to imagine a scenario where Israel and Lebanon return to their respective corners empty-handed. Lebanon would struggle to attract foreign investment, and Israel would continue to look over its shoulder with concerns about the safety of its offshore investments. The path forward requires a political compromise that accepts a technical solution in exchange for economic benefits. The onus is now on both Israel and Lebanon, in their own ways, to demonstrate to Washington what compromises they are prepared to make in order to put this issue to rest and why the U.S. should remain invested both in this process and the region at large.

**The article was published on NEWLINES magazine, 2 June 2021

הפוסט Lines in the Sea: How resolution of Israel and Lebanon’s <br> maritime dispute could set a regional precedent הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

2020 was a year of tremendous disruption. Israel, like the entire world, was shut down by the coronavirus pandemic. Elections were held, the new government weighed the possibility of pursuing annexation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank, only to pivot towards signing normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.

Throughout the year, Mitvim generated new progressive foreign policy knowledge for fast-developing situations. Mitvim applied this knowledge to foster change in the policy world by engaging with Israeli and international actors in politics, diplomacy, and civil society. Mitvim executed its mission by producing original research, developing policy recommendations, organizing public online events, participating in regional and international policy dialogues, conducting Israeli public opinion polling, and giving briefings to Members of Knesset (MKs), government officials, and foreign diplomats. In addition, Mitvim experts regularly appeared in leading media outlets to provide commentaries and spell out possible paths forward regarding a variety of foreign policy issues.

To improve Israel’s foreign policy, Mitvim worked in 2020 to highlight foreign policy issues throughout the general elections, impact the new government’s foreign policy priorities and conduct, monitor developments and assess trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy, study Israeli public opinion, convene its fourth annual conference, strengthen the democracy component in Israel’s foreign policy, and empower Israel’s Foreign Service after several years in which it was constantly marginalized. Mitvim regularly engaged with Members of Knesset (MKs), ministers, and senior government officials, and its experts appeared before relevant Knesset committees.

הפוסט The Mitvim Institute 2020 Annual Report הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Eastern Mediterranean has attracted significant attention over recent years. New economic opportunities and geopolitical developments are contributing to this trend and are turning the region into a central tenet of Israel’s foreign policy. Together with regional alliances and bilateral relations that Israel is advancing in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Israeli public has also begun to perceive the area as a new space for regional belonging. In the 2020 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 25 percent of the Israeli public considers Israel primarily as part of the Mediterranean (as opposed to 29 percent who answered that Israel belongs more to the Middle East and 24 percent to Europe).

Throughout history, the Eastern Mediterranean played a central role in global political, economic, and social transformations. The recent far-reaching changes and developments in the region have repositioned it as a distinct and central region in the international arena. Environmental concerns, the movement of refugees, the struggle between powers over trade routes, political conflicts among and within the countries, economic cooperation, the emergence of security communities and the discovery of natural gas reserves, are all processes that tie regional members to the geography of the Mediterranean. These new issues can and should be taken into consideration alongside old issues that characterize the region – a common history, similar climate, the diasporas, shared values, and Mediterranean culture.

Israel is not only active but dominant in the Eastern Mediterranean, with its policy characterized by a myriad of relations and unique approach of non-exclusive policy. Israel strives, with considerable success, to maintain and promote relations with different countries that hold different or conflicting interests, without the relations with one necessarily coming at the expense of relations with the other. Israel is a partner in regional alliances (such as the Alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – EMGF), maintains bilateral relations with many countries openly and formally, and maintains informal relations with other countries. The discovery of natural gas reserves in Israel’s economic waters gives it economic and political power in the region and allows it a wider range of political manoeuvrability. Notably, however, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip on the shores of the Mediterranean, restricts Israel’s ability to reap the potential benefits that the area holds for it.

The political, economic and social developments in the Mediterranean are ongoing and constantly evolving. The region’s consolidation offers many opportunities and challenges for Israel, and is accompanied by both cooperation and struggles over the region’s desired characteristics, the regional institutions that should be established, common values, geographic boundaries, and each member state’s role and political power.

To assess possible developments, identify opportunities and challenges, and thus discover the necessary political actions, it is first necessary to understand the arena and identify trends, processes, different issues at stake, and active players and their various interests. To this end, in 2019 Mitvim – the Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policy, the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Center for National Security Studies at the University of Haifa, formed a research and policy group. The group’s goals were to better understand the Mediterranean arena and Israel’s place therein, to formulate guidelines and policy recommendations, and to promote political dialogue with various regional actors.

This paper summarizes the first series of meetings of the research and policy group in 2019-2020 and presents the key insights that emerged throughout it. The meetings focused on global and regional powers’ activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, energy and environmental issues, the impact of the coronavirus epidemic, conflicts and collaborations, and questions of identity and norms. These summaries portray a perspective of what is currently happening in the Mediterranean, the opportunities and challenges facing Israel, as well as a reference to the guiding principles and recommended courses of action for Israeli foreign policy.

הפוסט Israel and the Mediterranean<br> A New Space for Regional Belonging <br> Meeting Summaries from a Research and Policy Group הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Restoring Calm in Jerusalem Requires Responses to Structural Problems;
President Biden Can Help

Dr. Lior Lehrs
Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at the Mitvim Institute

Although Trump declared in January 2018 that he had “taken Jerusalem off the table”, the issue remains center stage, as it reminds us over and over even when politicians try to avoid it. The current round of violence, as well as previous ones (for example in 2014 and 2017) should be analyzed on two levels: The immediate triggers and the in-depth processes stemming from the political situation in the city in the absence of a diplomatic solution. Israel tends to focus on immediate causes and ignore key structural problems, such as the different legal and civilian status of 40 percent of the city’s population, the provocations by ultra-nationalist organizations in Palestinian neighborhoods and the legal and political framework enabling them, and continued planning discrimination in East Jerusalem. These issues require a response, and the Biden Administration could have a key role in restoring calm in the city and advancing a substantive policy change on the question of Jerusalem.

Tensions in Jerusalem Stem from Government Neglect,
Which Risks Exacerbating Tensions with Jordan

Former MK Ksenia Svetlova
Director of the Program on Israel-Middle East Relations at the Mitvim Institute

The Israeli government continues to ignore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and tries to downplay events in Jerusalem and portray them as the result of a simple real estate dispute. That is not the case. The violence stems from ongoing criminal neglect that not only damages the delicate fabric of Jewish-Arab relations in the city and increases terrorist activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This neglect also risks undermining Israel’s strategic relationships with Arab states. Israel’s deteriorating relations with Jordan risk explosion if Israel continues on its current path in Jerusalem. Moreover, by ignoring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its centrality, Israel is risking its relations with other Arab states. The current escalation reminds us that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be ignored. It requires a return to negotiations, creative solutions and new policies.

The Jerusalem Escalation Should Convince Left-Wing Parties
to Demand Diplomatic Portfolios in the Emerging Government

Dr. Nimrod Goren
Head of the Mitvim Institute

The escalation in Jerusalem should convince left-wing parties to demand influential governmental positions related to foreign policy and the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and not make do with only social-economic portfolios, which they seem to currently focus on. The argument that the ideological differences between the various components of the emerging government will preclude any action in the foreign policy and national security arenas is false. Events in Jerusalem underscore the absence of a status quo in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Every decision or event related to the conflict has repercussions on personal safety, Israel’s ties with Arab countries, and its international standing. Additional conflict-related events, opportunities and challenges are bound to appear, even if the government will prefer to focus on other issues, and they will require responses, initiatives and leadership. It is important that those who believe in peace, dialogue and regional cooperation are central in shaping governmental policies on these issues, and not only on domestic issues such as transportation, health and environment – important as they are.

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas are Backing the Jerusalem Protests;
Hamas Hopes to Emerge Strengthened

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz
Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute

The tensions in Sheikh Jarrah and at al-Haram a-Sharif were sparked by a Hamas and Palestinian Authority (PA) campaign against Israeli attempts to evict Palestinian residents from their homes and replace them with Jews. The evictions were the trigger for escalation, as tensions escalated into severe rioting against the backdrop of the continuing friction between Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and Israeli security forces, and the absence of clear Israeli policy on East Jerusalem. This was evident in the violence prompted by Israeli limitations imposed on gatherings at Damascus Gate. Hamas is encouraging this escalation, riding the religious winds of Ramadan, in order to draw the support it was denied by the PA’s cancellation of Palestinian elections and to portray itself as the defender of Jerusalem. The Palestinian public in Jerusalem feels abandoned, oppressed and angry, sentiments that prompt protests, especially by the younger generation. The current escalation is a direct result of the struggles taking place in the eastern part of the city since the 2017 rioting over the placing of metal detectors around Muslim holy sites.

Human Rights Violations and Attempts to Undermine the Status Quo
are Fueling the Escalation in Jerusalem

Former Diplomat Nadav Tamir
Board Member at the Mitvim Institute

Significant violations against Palestinian human rights, which run counter to Jewish and universal values, have been taking place in the holy city since it was “reunited” under Israeli control 55 years ago. The current events risk setting the Middle East and Muslim world on fire, but as usual, Israel tends to identify impending disasters when it is already too late. Protests by young Muslims denied the right to congregate at the Damascus Gate, as is their custom on Ramadan, and video clips posted on TikTok showing a handful of Arabs attacking Jews in Jerusalem, drew widespread attention. So did the violence and provocation by the ultra-nationalist Lehava organization, beefed up by unemployed ultra-Orthodox men who channelled their boredom to beat up Arabs. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. The far larger problem that fails to generate enough attention is the cruel and strategic effort to kick Palestinians out of their Jerusalem homes and violate the status quo around the city’s holy Muslim sites.

Who has an Interest in Setting the City on Fire?

Merav Kahana Dagan
Deputy Head of the Mitvim Institute

הפוסט Tensions in Jerusalem: <br> Initial Commentaries by Mitvim Institute Experts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Principles and Recommendations for Israel’s Foreign Policy Towards the EU; Recommendations from a Mitvim Institute Task-Team הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government.

הפוסט Morocco and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government.

הפוסט The UAE and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Historical Background
3. For the better part of Israel’s modern history, relations with Greece and Cyprus could be described as something between dormant and strained. Israel enjoyed full diplomatic ties with both countries, however Greek and Cypriot support for the Palestinian cause and Israel’s cooperation with Turkey were obstacles that prevented the parties from fostering meaningful relations. In the 1980s, the governments in Athens and Nicosia were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and frequently hosted PLO head Yasser Arafat. In 1988, Cyprus officially recognized the State of Palestine. Supporting the PLO was a red line for Israel, who was actively pursuing Arafat and trying to thwart his operations. At the same time, both Greece and Cyprus viewed Jerusalem’s strategic cooperation with Ankara from the lens of their shared conflict with Turkey. These positions only began to soften during the 1990s, following the interim agreements with the Palestinians (1993-1995) and the peace agreement with Jordan (1994).^[1] But even then, the continued partnership between Israel and Turkey in the 1990s and early 2000s seemed a bridge too far to cross.

It was only after 2009, following the collapse of the Greek economy, the Arab Spring, and the disintegration of Israel-Turkey relations, that a window of opportunity opened for the three countries to improve their ties. During this period of time, offshore natural gas reserves were discovered in the waters of Israel and Cyprus, further incentivizing cooperation between Jerusalem, Athens, and Nicosia. Today, the tripartite alliance is one of Israel’s most significant strategic partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was not a welcome sight for the Palestinian Authority (PA), whose leadership had enjoyed positive relations with Greece and Cyprus for decades. Inter-Palestinian divisions between Fatah and Hamas had weakened the PA’s legitimacy and it had little leverage on the now pro-Israel governments in Athens and Nicosia. Despite the continuation of high-level meetings between Palestinian officials and their Greek and Cypriot counterparts, in 2015 the Greek parliament stopped short of fully recognizing Palestinian statehood.^[2]

Contemporary Greek and Cypriot Policies on Israeli-Palestinian Affairs

The current policies of Greece and Cyprus on Israeli-Palestinian affairs are understandably nuanced. Both countries regularly engage with the Palestine Authority and are committed to the official positions of the EU (e.g., support for a two-state solution along the 1967 borders and opposition towards unilateral Israeli measures such as settlement construction and annexation). This reflects public support for a resolution of the conflict and sympathy towards Palestinian national aspirations. However, neither country is a leading voice within the EU on this issue and Israel has relied on each of them – along with members of the Visegrad Group – to soften (and sometimes block) European reactions to its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2015, for example, Greece defied European labeling policies on goods manufactured over the pre-1967 lines.^[3] Despite PA efforts to convince Greece to take an official stance against Israel’s annexation ambitions in the summer of 2020, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis did not publicly reference the matter during his visit to Israel in mid-June, focusing instead on other aspects of the bilateral relationship.^[4] Similar efforts were reportedly made by Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi vis-a-vis his counterparts in Nicosia.^[5]

Greece and Cyprus do not require instruction from Israel to keep their distance from the conflict. Embroiled in their own ongoing disputes with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the divided island of Cyprus, both countries prefer having a relationship with Israel that does not necessitate one party meddling in the affairs of the other. This approach should not be confused with a lack of interest. At an official level, Greece and Cyprus want to see a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Greek Orthodox Church remains a principal religious institution and landowner in Israel and the Palestinian territories.^[6] Both countries enjoy robust commercial and strategic relations with Arab countries in the region. Despite being separated by the sea, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is never too far away.

Still, the importance of the strategic relationship with Israel, and the desire to marginalize Turkey’s regional partnerships, has compelled Greece and Cyprus to take a back seat on Israeli-Palestinian affairs. Bilateral trade with the Palestinians – which was never robust – has decreased over the past two decades.^[7] PA officials now reference their strong ties with Athens and Nicosia in the past tense.^[8] Other regional players, such as Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Turkey, and Qatar play a more central role in intra-Palestinian politics and delivering messages between various Palestinian factions and Israel. In sum, Greece and Cyprus have little incentive to involve themselves in Israeli-Palestinian affairs and are more likely to wait until international actors – or the Israelis and Palestinians themselves – renew their interest in negotiations and invite them to contribute to the peace process.

Potential Greek and Cypriot Contributions to Advancing Peace

Greece and Cyprus are limited both in their capacity and interest to perform a central role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. However, under the right conditions, they could support a number of focused elements in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

First, Cyprus could play a role in supporting the reopening of the Gaza Strip. Gaza remains under a strict blockade – facilitated both by Israel and Egypt – and the humanitarian conditions remain fragile. Israel’s restrictive list of banned import/export goods hampers economic growth and is easy fodder for anti-Israel criticism in the international community. There is some evidence that Israel wants to change that. In February 2021, Qatar announced that it – along with the Office of the Quartet – had successfully negotiated an agreement with the Israeli government and Delek Group to construct a pipeline between one of Israel’s natural gas fields and the Gaza Strip. Just a few days later, Egypt agreed to help develop the Gaza Marine field, a natural gas reserve located just off the coast. Both of these developments demonstrate that there are areas where regional actors can make an impact on the ground.

As recently as 2018, Israel and Cyprus were in discussions about establishing a floating dock in Limassol to receive and monitor goods bound for the Gaza Strip. The concept of the floating dock was a creative one, but the conditions – that Hamas return Israeli civilians Abera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed and the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war – were a nonstarter. It was also unclear whether the initiative was serious or just part of a public relations campaign to undermine Hamas’ credibility in the Gaza Strip.^[9] Cyprus had its own set of concerns at the time and was reluctant to interfere in Israeli-Palestinian affairs.

However, the economic and humanitarian circumstances in the Gaza Strip remain the same (if not worse), and the recent announcements by Qatar and Egypt suggest that this project is worth reviewing once more. As highlighted by Ambassador (ret.) Michael Harari, a port solution would benefit all parties and should be “dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians.”^[10] This would require significant coordination between Israel, Cyprus and the PA, as well as other international actors like Egypt, the EU, and the US. If the project was revived under new US and EU leadership, this would be a feasible, low-cost way to reduce Gaza’s isolation.

The recent news about potential Gaza Strip projects also relate to the second arena where Greece and Cyprus could play a constructive role: regional energy cooperation and Palestinian participation in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The forum is a regional body established in 2020 that includes both Israeli and PA representation, a rare phenomenon considering the current nadir in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Energy security is a serious matter for Palestinians – especially in the Gaza Strip, where electricity shortages are commonplace – and initiatives that improve reliability and affordability of supply would help stabilize the Palestinian economy and raise the quality of life. As mentioned above, there is already momentum in this space, so Greece and Cyprus would not be taking bold positions by offering to play a facilitating role on energy-related matters that come up in the forum, encouraging foreign companies to look into supporting the development of Gaza Marine field, and making sure that their Palestinian counterparts feel heard. The current mission of the EMGF focuses solely on energy issues, but its mission is likely to expand with time. It is increasingly obvious that Eastern Mediterranean states need to be in dialogue on a litany of topics, both economic and environmental, and this is an area where Greece and Cyprus could ensure a Palestinian presence.

As member states of the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus have a major voice in the formulation and execution of the European Neighborhood Policy in the Mediterranean as well as the Southern Neighborhood that includes Israel and Palestine. Within this framework, the Athens and Nicosia could proactively identify regional projects that include Palestinian and Israeli participation, increasing the engagement and interconnectivity between the two sides, as well as participate in initiatives that support the growth of trade opportunities, European investment in the Palestinian economy, and academic exchange. While commendable that Greece and Cyprus support Israeli positions within the EU, a neutral approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue could better ensure a sustainable, long-term relationship.

In the past, Cyprus functioned as a location for Israeli and Palestinian civil society engagement. Student programs brought together Israelis, Palestinians – as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots – to learn about one another’s narratives, and map the successes and shortcomings of conflict resolution methods in other countries. Resuming these activities would allow Cyprus to serve as a neutral venue and draw from the Cypriot community’s professional know-how. With US Congress approving 250 million USD in funding to Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding efforts in December 2020, there is an opportunity for third-party actors to take part in new initiatives.[11]

Finally, in the event that there is a genuine international effort to bring Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table, Greece and Cyprus can support those processes as comparatively neutral parties, knowing that Israel will trust its Eastern Mediterranean allies to have its best interests at heart. This is no small thing. Often in negotiations, there is a concern that international actors are trying to force a solution that is not in the interests of one or both of the conflicting parties. Having the support of friends goes a long way to easing those concerns.

Greece and Cyprus’ association to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has changed in recent years, however they can play a constructive role in improving on-the-ground conditions in the Palestinian territories as well as supporting regional and international initiatives that encourage Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Resolving the conflict is not only about final status issues. There are countless, smaller matters concerning the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations that have yet to be resolved and could benefit from external engagement. Greece and Cyprus are likely to wait until Israelis and Palestinians demonstrate a readiness to resume negotiations, but future mediators should include them amongst the select number of international actors who can play a modest role in advancing the cause of peace.

**This report is part of an initiative funded by the UK Government, but the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Government. A special thank you to Jenna Kaplan for her research on this report.

^[1] Gallia Lindenstrauss and Polykarpos Gavrielides, “A Decade of Close Greece-Israel Relations: An Assessment,” INSS, April 2019.

^[2] Raphael Ahren, “Greece officially starts using term ‘Palestine’,” Times of Israel, June 8, 2015 and Representative Office of the Republic of Cyprus to the State of Palestine, Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 15, 2021 and Greek-Palestinian Relations, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 15, 2021.

^[3] Raphael Ahren, “Greece to defy EU order on labeling settlement goods,” Times of Israel, November 30, 2015.

^[4] “Palestine urges Greece to oppose Israel’s West Bank annexation plan,” Middle East Monitor, June 19, 2020 and “PM Netanyahu’s remarks at the joint statements with Greek PM Mitsotakis 16 June 2020,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on March 14, 2021.

^[5] “Israel seeks Cypriot help in softening EU opposition to annexation,” Times of Israel, June 23, 2020.

[6] The Greek Orthodox Church is an important institution in Jerusalem’s religious landscape. In light of the Abraham Accords, one could imagine a scenario where Athen’s interests in Jerusalem’s interfaith balance results in a more proactive Greek role alongside the Gulf states.

^[7] “Greece (GRC) and Palestine (PSE) Trade | OEC,” and “Cyprus (CYP) and Palestine (PSE) Trade | OEC,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed on March 13, 2021.

^[8] Nabil Sha’ath, “Will Greece betray the Palestinians?” Ha’aretz, January 27, 2016; “Greece has historical ties of friendship and solidarity with the Palestinian people, Ambassador Toubassi says,” ANA-MPN News, April 7, 2019.

^[9] Stuart Winer, “Israel reportedly agrees to set up seaport for Gaza in Cyprus,” Times of Israel, June 25, 2018 and “Cyprus mulling Israeli request for port to send goods to Gaza,” Times of Israel, June 26, 2018.

^[10] Michael Harari, “A port in Cyprus for Gaza’s humanitarian crises,” Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2018.

[11] Jake Epstein, “Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilders prepare for $250m US government injection,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2021.

הפוסט Greece, Cyprus, and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper maps out the international discourse on advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace under the current circumstances, based on a series of dialogues conducted by Mitvim Institute experts in February and March 2021 with various European, Arab, American and UN diplomats and experts.[1] The paper offers an analysis of the positions and perceptions of international actors regarding the effects of the latest diplomatic developments on the Israeli-Palestinian arena, and their insights and conclusions about the measures the international community could undertake to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace that are feasible and desired.

[1] The dialogues were conducted under Chatham House rules. Accordingly, this article does not mention participants’ names and does not attribute direct quotes to them. The dialogues were led on the part of the Mitvim Institute by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Victoria Solkovits.

הפוסט Where Do We Go from Here? <br>The International Discourse on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Incentives are an important tool in peace processes and have the potential to contribute to the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. A team of Israeli and Palestinian policy experts developed a joint proposal for an international package of incentives for peace. The proposal defines the central needs of the parties that the incentives package must address, focusing on security, recognition and legitimacy, religious rights, economic prosperity and domestic needs. It examines which international actors can be relevant in addressing those needs and should be part of an international incentives package, elaborating on the potential role of the US, the EU, and the Arab and the Muslim world. The proposal also discusses when and how a package of incentives should be introduced and delivered, and what should be the international mechanism required to promote it.

** The project was carried out by the Mitvim Institute, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Addressing Needs, Promoting Peace: A Proposal for an <br> International Incentives Package for Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The counter reaction we are witnessing to the global rise of nationalism, populism and the far-right encourages connections among progressive forces around the world and the creation of shared frameworks and coordinated action. Such cooperation occurs in both the political arena and civil society. The grim state of Israel’s progressive political camp makes it hard to realize potential ties with political parties and leaders in other countries. However, Israeli civil society is forging significant international cooperation born of its distinct and well-honed progressive ideology and wide array of highly motivated organizations and activists seeking change.

Greater emphasis on forging international partnerships is a key stage in the renewal of Israel’s progressive camp and its empowerment. This article presents the developments, trends, needs and opportunities relevant to the issue, which could encourage positive change.

הפוסט The Importance of International Partnerships <br> for Israel’s Progressive Camp הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For the full version of this document, click here .

Joe Biden began his term as US President at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in a deep and continued stagnation. The Trump Administration’s policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only served to create a rift between Washington and Ramallah, compromising the traditional American role as mediator in the conflict. The incoming administration faces a host of challenges, both domestic and global. While the Israeli-Palestinian issue is not expected to figure prominently on the administration’s short-term agenda, Biden’s foreign policy and defense appointees are expected to deal with the issue.

The early days of a new administration are an important period of organizing, learning and preparing. Patterns consolidated during this period impact the administration’s future course, and the mechanisms and principles adopted serve as the basis for policy and set the tone for the coming years. Administrations have maximum power and enjoy abundant credit in their early days. That is particularly true for the Biden Administration that also enjoys a majority in both houses of Congress, and which could make good use of this period to create a momentum for advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. To that end, the Mitvim Institute task-team recommends the following policy directions.

1. Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been marginalized in recent years on the international agenda, with global actors shifting to domestic concerns and more burning regional issues, and to the Covid-19 crisis. Despite the myriad of challenges it faces, the Biden Administration must signal at the outset that it attributes importance to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiating declarations and steps attesting to its intention to restore the issue to the international agenda.

2. Renewing ties and building trust with the Palestinian leadership. The incoming administration must announce at an early stage the renewal of US ties with the Palestinian leadership and launch a high-level political dialogue. The renewed ties should walk back Trump-era measures by re-opening the PLO offices in Washington and the US Consulate in East Jerusalem, and resuming USAID assistance to the Palestinians and funding for UNRWA. The administration could also advance confidence-building measures vis-à-vis the Palestinians, such as promoting economic projects in Area C and assisting in alleviating the Covid-19 crisis. Declaring the return of the US to its traditional support of the two-state solution and opposition to settlements would also be of importance.

3. Emphasizing US commitment to the two-state solution and formulating parameters for a final-status agreement. The Biden Administration must declare its commitment to the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and mutually agreed land swaps as its vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a declaration would ratify the US commitment to international norms, the principles of international law and UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the administration should start formulating parameters for a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, to serve as a clear framework for future negotiations and shape the domestic and international discourse. However, the administration should also weigh the challenges in such a move and carefully consider the correct timing and manner of unveiling such parameters.

4. Preserving the feasibility of the two-state solution and drawing red lines. The Biden Administration must ensure that the two-state plan is preserved as a feasible and concrete solution, blocking efforts on the ground designed to make it irrelevant. The administration will have to draw clear red lines against creeping annexation measures, expansion of settlements, legalization of outposts and Israeli construction in the E1 Area and Givat Hamatos. At the same time, the administration could demand that Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) ratify their commitment to their previous agreements and maintain security and civilian coordination, while demanding that the Palestinians mount a determined campaign against terrorism, condemn terror attacks and counter incitement .

5. Leading multilateral steps, such as creating a new international mechanism and an incentives package. The Biden Administration should lead the formation of an international mechanism for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such a mechanism could be based on the P5 + 1 model (which negotiated the Iran nuclear deal) or on the Quartet, with the addition of key Arab and European states. This mechanism should put together an international incentives package for peace and outline international parameters for resolution of the conflict. It could also serve as a platform for additional multilateral measures, such as forming regional working groups, harnessing regional organizations of which Israel and the PA are members and convening an international peace conference.

6. Leveraging Israeli-Arab normalization to advance the peace process. The administration should harness progress in relations between Israel and Arab states for the benefit of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. In doing so, it could integrate the states that have normalized relations with Israel into joint forums with Israel and the Palestinians, and into economic and energy projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In attempting to promote normalization agreements with additional Arab states, especially with Saudi Arabia, the administration could create a linkage to the Palestinian issue, inter alia by conditioning normalization on a halt of settlements’ construction and creeping annexation.

7. Improving the situation in Gaza and ending the internal Palestinian divide. The Gaza Strip is facing a harsh humanitarian crisis, beset by explosive tensions that could escalate into violent clashes at any moment. The US has consistently distanced itself from the issue, but the new administration must stop avoiding it and help advance a solution. The administration should advance plans and projects with international partners to improve the well-being of Gaza’s residents, on issues such as energy, border crossings and vaccines. The administration would also do well to increase its involvement in efforts to avoid clashes between Israel and Hamas, help the UN envoy’s efforts on this front, and seek to advance a long-term solution to the Gaza issue under the aegis of the PA.

8. Empowering pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian actors, including in civil society.The Biden Administration should advance dialogue and cooperation between citizens on both sides of the conflict. The administration should provide backing for pro-peace civil society organizations in Israel and the PA, including regular meetings of administration representatives with them, and seek effective implementation of recent legislation that aids organizations engaged in Palestinian-Israeli cooperation (Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act). At the same time, the administration should appeal directly to various elements within Israel society in order to strengthen support for the two-state solution and promote a discourse on this issue, while working on the Palestinian side to stem the anti-normalization trend undermining joint Israeli-Palestinian activity.

9. Setting a constructive tone to relations with the Israeli leadership and public. The administration should shape relations with Israel in a manner conducive to the advancement of peace and creation of mutual trust. It should learn lessons from the Obama years regarding the relationship with Israel’s government and society, and pay attention to the tone and style of the discourse even when expressing criticism. The Biden Administration could initiate public goodwill gestures toward Israelis, and display public expressions of sympathy for Israel, and at the same time present the government with clear demands on the Palestinian issue and set red lines.

הפוסט Initial Biden Administration Policy Steps to Advance <br> Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking – Summary הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These are the goals outlined in the document: (1) Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; (2) Renewing ties and building trust with the Palestinian leadership; (3) Emphasizing US commitment to the two-state solution and formulating parameters for a final-status agreement; (4) Preserving the feasibility of the two-state solution and drawing red lines; (5) Leading multilateral steps, such as creating a new international mechanism and an incentives package; (6) Leveraging Israeli-Arab normalization to advance the peace process; (7) Improving the situation in Gaza and ending the internal Palestinian divide; (8) Empowering pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian actors, including in civil society; (9) Setting a constructive tone to relations with the Israeli leadership and public.

The document is the product of a Mitvim Institute task-team comprised of (in alphabetical order) Kamal Ali-Hassan, Dr. Ehud Eiran, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Merav Kahana-Dagan, Dr. Roee Kibrik, Dr. Lior Lehrs, Gabriel Mitchell, Prof. Elie Podeh, former MK Ksenia Svetlova, Nadav Tamir and Yonatan Touval. The recommendations were presented for feedback to Mitvim’s Palestinian partners. This document adds a local perspective of pro-peace Israeli experts to the international discussion on Biden’s anticipated policies in the Middle East. Its basic premise supports the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace based on a two-state solution as a vital Israeli interest. The document seeks to balance between acknowledging existing challenges and the desire to outline an ambitious vision for a future of peace.

הפוסט Initial Biden Administration Policy Steps to Advance<br> Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper presents insights and recommendations from a policy workshop of the “Israel in the Mediterranean” group led by the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center. The workshop, convened on 19 November 2020, focused on key diplomatic, economic, energetic, environmental and identity issues that Israel faces in the Mediterranean. The document does not necessarily reflect agreement by all participants.

The Mediterranean has become a central arena of Israel’s regional foreign policies in recent years. Developments in this region present Israel policymakers with questions regarding diplomatic, economic, energetic, environmental and identity issues. The separation and differentiation between these fields is largely artificial given that they are intertwined, with policy in each sphere derived from, and projecting on, activity in the others. This document sums up the insights and recommendations emerging from a discussion of specific issues that concern or should concern Israeli decisionmakers.

On issues of diplomacy, the discussion focused on the questions of how Israel can maintain open channels of communication with Turkey, expand its alliance with Greece and Cyprus beyond the energy field, and contribute to the successful conclusion of maritime border negotiations with Lebanon. The economic discussion centered on how normalization with the Gulf States can be leveraged to bolster relations with Egypt and Jordan, and how the Mediterranean can be mobilized to strengthen Israel’s circular economy. Discussion of energy issues dealt with the advantages and disadvantages of connecting Israel to regional power grids and with alternatives to the exploitation and export of Israel’s natural gas. On environmental issues, participants discussed how Israel could mobilize the help of the international community and states in the region to deal with the climate crisis, and the potential contribution of the Mediterranean to a zero-emissions Israeli economy. Participants also discussed the potential contribution of forging a Mediterranean identity to relationships in the region.

Diplomatic Questions and Answers  

How to maintain open channels of communication between Israel and Turkey? 

The working group’s previous discussions underscored the importance of maintaining open channels to Turkey despite the tensions between the two states, an issue that is increasingly germane given perceptions by some in Israel of Turkey as a hostile nation. The current level of ties between Israel and Turkey seems to be serving both sides. Israel’s partnership with the counter-Turkey Mediterranean axis does not disrupt its relationship with Turkey to any significant extent and does not force it to choose between its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and its relations with Turkey. Nor does Turkey pay heavily for tensions with Israel. Its criticism of Israeli policy boosts Turkey’s image in the Middle East. Although Turkey has de-facto downgraded diplomatic ties with Israel, trade has increased, tourism was on the rise in 2019, and Israeli artists and performers appear in Turkey.

Nonetheless, several factors could lead Turkey to try and ease tensions with Israel. Turkey’s isolation in the Mediterranean is taking a heavy toll and of all the states in the region, Israel would be the easiest with which to rehabilitate ties. Another factor is concern about the UAE turning into an alternative tourism destination for Israelis and a transit point for connecting flights, hurting Turkish Airlines. Also at play is Turkey’s desire to play an active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under a Biden Administration that is expected to adopt a multilateral approach to the issue. Biden, who played a significant role in Israeli-Turkish reconciliation in 2016, could once again contribute to a warming of relations.

Israel and Turkey have shared interests in a number of arenas, which Israel could mobilize to advance relations with Ankara. For example, shared opposition to the decision by Belgium, Holland and Denmark to ban circumcision of minors could serve as the basis for cooperation at relevant international institutions. Members of the Turkish diaspora in Europe are seeking business opportunities with Israel. The Coronavirus pandemic has seen growing online interaction between Israeli and Turkish research and policy institutes. Israel must continue to convey the message that its alliance with Greece and Cyprus does not come at the expense of reconciliation with Turkey. The political power of both leaders, Netanyahu and Erdoğan, allows them to restore relations between their countries without paying a heavy public price or prompting domestic opposition.

How to expand Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus to non-energy issues? 

Israel has a history of relationships that started out with a “honeymoon” but did not have a happy end. Israel must ensure that its alliance with Greece and Cyprus rests on firm foundations that can withstand shocks and challenges and continue to serve stability and Israel’s long-term interests.

The main obstacles facing the alliance are the conflict between the Hellenic states and Turkey, and the gas pipeline to Europe. By its very nature, the conflict between Turkey and Greece and Cyprus endangers Israel’s non-exclusive policy in the Mediterranean and challenges its ability to maintain good relations with both sides. There is concern that escalation of the conflict could force Israel to take sides and affect its relations with the other. The feasibility of the gas pipeline to Europe, which was expected to serve as a political and diplomatic tool to strengthen ties among the countries involved, is in doubt. Israel must act to prevent a gap in expectations with other countries involved that could eventually result in deteriorating ties and unnecessary tensions.

To confront these challenges and to take advantage of the opportunities that lie in strengthening ties with Greece and Cyprus, Israel must continue to imbue relations with concrete and varied content that goes beyond the fields of security and economy. Israel acted correctly in pooling government resources to build cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. It wisely took on the leadership and costs of advancing ties in the field of innovation with these two states. Cooperation has already been forged between chambers of commerce, as well as on environmental issues, tourism, and communications. There are also many civilian initiatives, meetings, Diaspora-related activities led by the Jewish Agency, and more. The Coronavirus pandemic suspended many of these projects and cooperation ventures, but in itself provided a channel for cooperation with these states. Israel can and should take advantage of the European affiliation of Greece and Cyprus to promote cooperation with them through programs and frameworks of the EU, for example in research and development. Israel should continue underscoring the democratic character of all three states, as was done at the start of the warming relationship, in order to boost the democratic component of Israeli foreign policy.

Cyprus is interested in establishing a secretariat for the trilateral relationships that it and Greece maintain with states in the region. This plan is moving slowly despite its importance to the Cypriots, who view it as upgrading their role the region.  Israel’s ambassador to Cyprus has been named as the Israeli representative to the secretariat, and the Foreign Ministry has appointed a political coordinator to support and strengthen the move. An additional supplementary move that Israel must promote in light of its new agreements with Gulf states is the integration of the Gulf and Hellenic arenas to create synergy that would boost cooperation, without attention to the Gulf arena undermining attention to the Hellenic one.

How to achieve positive outcome of maritime negotiations with Lebanon?  

The ongoing negotiations between Israel and Lebanon on marking their maritime border are important in themselves, even if no breakthrough has been achieved, yet. The talks have a “regularizing” effect that habituates the sides to talk with each other for the first time in many years, and create a model that could serve other conflicts in the region. The talks may end up serving an entirely different purpose, not necessarily agreement on the maritime border.

As a lesson of previous talks with Lebanon, Israel must lower its expectations and keep a low profile, focusing only on the technical aspects of the negotiations and avoiding boastful statements about peace and normalization that would likely undermine this move. While Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be involved in the negotiations in order to provide a diplomatic framework, the Ministry of Energy can continue playing a leading role, in order to assuage Lebanese concerns that Israel views the talks as diplomatic negotiations.

The Obama Administration and subsequently the Trump one were invested in efforts to promote an Israeli-Lebanese agreement, eventually bringing about the launch of negotiations. Israel must convey to the Biden Administration the value of continued US mediation. It is important that the Biden Administration not regard the talks as a political issue on which it must overturn Trump’s policy, but rather an important professional and diplomatic issue that must be resolved.

Economic Questions and Answers

How to leverage normalization with Gulf States for stronger economic ties with Egypt and Jordan?

The UAE, especially Dubai, is a world-leading expert in air-sea connectivity and logistics capacity that has far reaching potential for Israel’s supply and trade chain, as well as for regional tourism. The Emirates’ logistics capacity and abilities could also help develop shared regional transportation routes, such as a shared Israeli-Egyptian maritime route and a land route in which Jordan plays a significant role. Exploiting the potential of overland and air transport through Jordan largely depends on Saudi cooperation. Development of this route could provide Jordan with a significant and critically needed source of revenue and employment, especially with the declining importance of the Aqaba Port given its difficult access for large vessels. Completion of the overland route and a link of the Israeli and Jordanian rail networks would contribute greatly to the development of such a route. Regarding development of the route between the Gulf and the Mediterranean through Israel, Israel must ensure that Egypt is not harmed and that traffic through alternative routes does not reduce its Suez Canal income.

Israel’s agreements with the UAE and Bahrain present an opportunity to advance significant economic projects. Israel would do well to promote projects with the UAE and third countries whose stability it seeks to strengthen and from which it stands to derive economic benefits. The assets Israel could bring to such regional partnerships include its technological abilities and expertise in confronting the challenges of desertification, healthcare, water, food security, agriculture, finances, and more. Israel should also consider promoting joint projects with the Emirates in Egypt, Jordan and even Sudan. In addition, energy is a standalone issue that encourages cooperation among Israel, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan (and perhaps even the Palestinian Authority, for example within the framework of the Cairo-based Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum) and multinational cooperation between the Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

How can Israel leverage the Mediterranean to advance its circular economy? 

Developed countries with a high-level of environmental awareness are turning increasingly to adoption of a circular economy that strives to end dependence on fossil fuels and treat waste as a reusable resource. Israel’s potential for circular economy cooperation lies in Europe and the UAE, sharing with them its relevant technological and innovative edge. Various agencies in Israel are promoting circular economy projects, among them the Ministry of Economy, the Manufacturers Association of Israel and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Israel must also strive to join the EU’s Green Deal program. Intensification of a circular economy and regional cooperation on the issue could result in significant cost reductions. Nonetheless, the circular economy concept is still new to the region. Egypt and Jordan are very far from adopting the idea, nor does Israel do enough in this regard.

Energetic Questions and Answers

Should Israel hook up its power grid to those of Jordan, the Gulf and Europe?

Maintaining energy stability and security is one of the challenges posed by the shift from fossil fuel to renewable energies. A regional power grid hookup contributes to energy stability and enables daily electricity trade. The more such connections Israel has – to Jordan, Egypt, Europe and the Gulf – on separate and unconnected grids, the greater its energy security. The connections could be of significant value, but in themselves cannot guarantee energy stability. The EU, which is advancing renewable energy development and encouraging such connectivity, has set a target of hooking up Cyprus and eventually the Middle East to European grids. It therefore has an interest in promoting a connection between Cyprus and Israel, too, and might be willing to bear some of the cost with local governments making up the rest. Connection to a regional grid would also allow Israel to sell its energy surplus, even if at a low price, as long as there is no effective energy storage system. Strategically speaking, Israel must maintain its energy independence, especially during times of crisis, and avoid dependence on an external energy source. Along with energy and economic considerations, connections to regional grids also involve diplomatic considerations. For example, Jordan has a surplus of renewable energy, but when Jordan does, Israel does too. Importing renewable energy from Jordan, along with the idea of combining it with water desalination for Jordan, could contribute to strengthening ties with Jordan and protecting Israel’s gas export agreement with Jordan, which has generated opposition there. The decision to expand the electricity link between Jordan and Jericho is a positive political move.

What is the preferred gas export alternative for Israel, if any?

The world will shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy within the coming years. The transition period will likely last 15 to 30 years, depending on technological progress as well as the economic and political will to speed up this shift. During the transition period, Israel must enhance its production of natural gas rather than using more polluting fossil fuels in order to maximize the economic benefits for its citizens and utilize the gas to create regional interconnections. Potential connections for gas exports include cooperation with Egypt at its coastal gas liquefaction facilities, establishment of maritime liquefaction facilities, and the proposed gas pipeline from Israel to Cyprus and Greece, the option of which serves as an important diplomatic tool. Another potential connection for Israel is with Saudi Arabia, which has demand for natural gas. Under improved political circumstances, gas could be exported to Saudi Arabia easily through a pipeline from Israel transiting Jordan.

Environmental Questions and Answers

How can the international community mitigate regional climate change effects? 

Israel should cooperate in this field first and foremost with the EU, which constitutes part of the region, is close by, knowledgeable and oriented toward the issue, and advances a well-defined environmental policy aided by generous budgets. Under a Biden Administration, the US is expected to be far more engaged in confronting the climate change crisis, and may be willing to intervene in such matters also in the Mediterranean. UN agencies are also relevant to the issue, whereas China and Russia are less so. Two important platforms that should be examined in terms of potential future cooperation are the Barcelona Treaty and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Israel would do well to build regional and international cooperation centered on concrete action – for example, joint emergency drills by Mediterranean states together with world powers to prevent maritime pollution and contamination or collect and aggregate information in order to obtain a comprehensive overview of sea-rise levels (Israel does not have systematic, official and sufficient data collection on this issue).

How the Mediterranean can help achieve a zero-emissions goal?

A zero-emissions economy is energy efficient, relying largely on renewable energies and absorbing existing emissions by mechanical and other means. Israel has difficulty reaching a zero-emissions target on its own. Israel is an energy island, it lacks sufficiently varied sources of renewable energy (such as wind and water), other than the sun. Its land mass is small, limiting space for solar energy production. Regional cooperation in acquiring green energy from states in the area and through an electricity cable from Europe, and eventually through cooperation with Gulf states once they become solar energy producers, could offer opportunities for Israel to achieve zero-emissions.

Identity Questions and Answers

How to harness the Mediterranean identity for the benefit of Israeli foreign policy? 

The Mediterranean identity rests on a geographic and topographic space and includes shared elements and characteristics in terms of popular culture, music, food, agriculture, and more. However, the variety of religions, languages and nations, as well as political conflicts, challenge its formation. Some find in this variety the basis for an identity appropriate to the region. The existence of a shared identity, or at least of shared identity elements and a sense of affinity, has far-reaching impact on the ability to promote cooperation in the Mediterranean. Many projects have been carried out over the years in an attempt to form a Mediterranean identity, in a bottom-up manner that starts from the grassroots and would impact decisionmakers.

Activity in the opposite direction is also feasible and advisable – investing resources in building a Mediterranean identity from the top-down, under the leadership of decisionmakers, as a supplementary and necessary move for regional integration and cooperation. There is a fairly positive attitude in Israel toward the idea of the Mediterranean identity, which is easier for Israeli to accept than adopting either a European or Middle Eastern identity. In attempting to forge a Mediterranean identity, one must keep in mind all existing identities in the region and recognize that the EU could view such a process as competing with its efforts to consolidate a European identity. In the process of identity formation, there may be a more limited option, which does not encompass the entire Mediterranean, but rather focuses on the sub-region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

הפוסט Israel in the Mediterranean: Policy Questions and Answers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and the European Union (EU) have built a special, strategic relationship over decades, since the 1960s. Following centuries of war, two world wars, tens of millions dead and destruction across the continent, the EU can be declared as the most successful expression of Europeans’ aspiration for peace and prosperity. With a population of 450 million, the EU is not only Israel’s biggest trade partner, it is also the biggest and most generous aid donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA), without which Israel would be forced to allocate extensive budgetary resources for the PA’s preservation and its commitments. Moreover, a large part of the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora has its roots in Europe. Many Israelis aspire to the continent’s standards of moral and cultural values and to its political systems. At the same time, many in Europe see Israel and the Israelis as members of the European family. Agreements on economic, trade, science, and other matters of vital value to Israel have been signed over the years within the framework of the special relationship that has developed with the EU.

However, for the past two decades, in fact since the second intifada broke out in September 2000 and since Israel gradually distanced itself from the Oslo Accords, these special relations have been on a collision course due to growing differences over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Europe has taken a committed stand in favor of diplomatic negotiations and an agreed two-state solution; often, it seems, Europe is a lone voice in this regard (other than lip service paid by other players). It makes an effort to preserve its standing as the guardian of the Oslo Accords. Europe sees itself as the ultimate barrier against what it views as continued Israeli efforts to erode and even bury the option of two states, Israel and Palestine, living peacefully side by side.

An additional explanation, which I heard from quite a number of sources in Brussels, attributes Europe’s commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state to the same moral values and compass that explain its historic sense of guilt toward the Jewish people. In other words, some in Europe view support for the establishment of Israel to compensate for the injustice of the Holocaust as the source of deep European injustice toward the Palestinians. Europe now feels bound to atone for that injustice, too, and to strive for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Israel finds this worldview hard to digest. Some perceive it as a skewed and even anti-Semitic attitude, which intensifies the alienation and friction between Israel and Europe.

Against this backdrop, the Israeli government constantly maneuvers between the need to improve or, at least preserve, the economic achievements and cooperation with the EU and its concerns over any European involvement in the management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (or in efforts to resolve it). Israel set out to differentiate between its supporters and opponents among the EU member states, and succeeded (to a large extent) with the help of the friendliest among them in averting resolutions critical of its policies by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council (which require consensus) and often by the European Parliament, too. Countries critical of Israel also utilize that same consensus tool to prevent upgrades in the EU’s agreements with Israel and to link them to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. For example, the Israel-EU Association Council, which brings together foreign ministers from both sides, has not been convened since 2012. The goal of Association Council meetings is to set in motion working groups to discuss improvements that each side seeks to make in the relationship. The 2004 ascension of central and eastern European states to the EU, which prompted Israeli hopes of a positive change in terms of the internal European balance of power, only helped slow the Israel-EU collision trajectory to a minor extent. What is more, the weakness of center-left liberalism in Europe and elsewhere in the world over the past decade has contributed to the rise of the European far-left, which holds anti-Israeli positions.

Unfortunately, Israel deals with EU criticism in a tactical manner, mostly responding only to immediate and specific. Israeli political leaders devote too little attention to the complex relationship with EU, whereas the Israeli public is almost totally unaware of the strategic importance of Israel-EU ties and the potential that lies in them. The fact that the last Israeli prime minister to officially visit Brussels was the late Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 is uncontestable proof of Israel’s desire to limit diplomatic ties with the EU and its institutions to a bare minimum. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did meet in Brussels in December 2017 with the EU’s foreign ministers (for an informal breakfast) as part of his lobbying campaign for President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem, but he did not visit the EU institutions.

The struggle that Israel is waging to distance Europe from diplomatic influence in the Middle East blends in well with other regional and global campaigns that trap the EU in a position of international disadvantage. Among the developments undermining the EU’s leadership are its attempts to overcome the 2008 economic crisis, the Arab Spring and the decline of the Palestinian issue in the eyes of key Arab states, the rise of the Islamic State, the drop in oil prices and in the importance of Middle Eastern oil for Europe, China’s rising power, the migrant crisis in Europe, Trump’s election and his humiliating attitude toward leaders of the continent and NATO, Brexit, and most recently the coronavirus crisis. All of the above require the best efforts, time and diplomatic energy of Europe’s leaders. Given this wide array of challenges, Israel thinks it can continue enjoying the best the continent has to offer without overly risking censure.

Germany’s growing power within the European block and the weakness of others (mainly France) is perceived as helpful to Israel in this regard. In the differentiation policy that Israel has adopted toward EU member states and in its identification with the most pro-Israeli among them, Israel often joins “rogue” states such as Hungary and Poland as well as far-right parties and groups. These provide Israel with support for the Greater Land of Israel and annexation ideas, and in return, Israel provides them with legitimacy despite their anti-democratic, anti-European, racist and even anti-Semitic positions. Such is not the case, obviously, regarding Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus. Here, the severe crisis in relations between Israel and Turkey and the discovery of natural gas reserves in Israeli waters are the key factors in these states’ openness toward Israel and their cooperation with it. In addition, the shared values of these three states are presented as one of the foundations for the cooperation among them. However, what is perceived and presented in Europe as the distancing of Israeli governments under Netanyahu from the two-state vision necessarily leads to a widening diplomatic gap, deepening mistrust and lack of sympathy toward Israel among some EU members, especially the Western ones.

That’s Just the Way It Is! Indeed?

Such was the “reality” I encountered upon my arrival in Brussels in August 2012 as Israel’s head of mission to the institutions of the EU and NATO. It reflected the prism through which Israeli politicians, even the most senior ones, viewed the EU. Regrettably, many Israeli diplomats share this view (most are imbued with an American orientation from their initial days as foreign ministry cadets) as do many in Israel’s security establishment. In their eyes, Europe (the EU, Brussels) is an anti-Israel body that is best distanced from every focal point of influence over Israel and allowed only the minimal role (accepting EU membership in the Quartet, ignoring some uncoordinated EU aid to the Palestinians in Area C, and more)  needed for Israel to benefit from relations with it. This, sadly, is a very narrow prism that precludes a fundamental examination of the entire array of Israel’s relations with Europe, the tremendous benefits they yielded for Israel in better days (such as the 1995 association agreement during the Oslo process), and the potential that lies ahead if Israel decides to warm up relations with the EU and not just with some of its member states.

Throughout my four years in Brussels, I was invited regularly to meetings of “regional groups”, such as the Visegrad and Nordic groups, held several times a year. Our access to these frequent sessions allows Israeli representatives to understand what is “cooking” in terms of issues of interest and to inform our friends of our positions and requests, which they in turn pass on to their home countries, briefing their foreign ministers prior to the monthly EU foreign ministers’ meetings, for example. Often, when the issue is sensitive or sufficiently important, this discourse is conducted at the foreign ministers’ level or even the heads of state level.

The negative image of the EU in Israel leads to disinterest and reluctance on the part of Israeli decision makers to invest in relations with it, as proven by the limited number of Israeli ministers and Members of Knesset who visit the EU institutions. Faced with this disinterest, we have been witnessing attempts by far-right Members of the European Parliament in recent years to hold meetings and seminars about “support for Israel”. They mostly invite representatives of the settlements (e.g. the Yesha Council) and largely deal with “Israel’s right to the entire Land of Israel”. Most participants at these meetings are members of European Parliament groups as well as staunch Palestinian supporters who show up to challenge the speakers. Sadly, perhaps because of their political weakness, Israel’s Labor and Meretz parties rarely hold meetings with the Socialists & Democrats Group in the European Parliament. Endless attempts on the part of the Israeli embassy in Brussels to promote discourse between Likud party representatives and representatives of the center-right majority in the European Parliament have yielded few results.

Avigdor Liberman, who served as the Netanyahu government’s foreign minister from April 2009 to December 2012 and again from November 2013 to May 2015, correctly identified the focal points of criticism toward Israel in Brussels (and Strasbourg). Liberman appointed me to my post despite, and perhaps because, of my known political views. My previous posting as head of the Ministry’s Center for Policy Research required quite a few meetings with the minister, including one-on-one. At a meeting prior to my departure for Brussels, Liberman said that in his view, the greatest challenge facing Israel lies in the EU. With his approval, the Foreign Ministry accepted our request and significantly beefed up the embassy department tasked with ties with the European Parliament. Unfortunately, 2019 cuts affected the embassy’s operating budget, doing away with the parliamentary liaison’s slot (already in the 1980s, the Israeli mission in Brussels suggested that its staff be augmented ahead of every European Parliament session with Israeli diplomats posted in European member states).

Wanted: A Broader Prism and A Strategic Israeli Policy on Europe

In early 1994, ahead of the scheduled December summit in Essen of the EU Council under Germany’s presidency, Chancellor Helmut Kohl asked Israel’s then-Ambassador to Germany Avi Primor, “What do you want?” The Chancellor, a friend of Israel, also sought to take advantage of the positive climate in the region and told then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, “I am willing to serve as the engine to advance Israel’s relations with Europe. Tell me what you want”. The Israeli government had a hard time answering the question of the depth and extent of closeness we wanted with the EU. Would we want full membership in the EU (probably not possible)? Would we want a model similar to the EU’s relations with Switzerland? With the EFTA states (the trade bloc consisting at the time of Austria, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein)? Or a model of our own?

This was not the only time the question was put before the Israeli government. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher once told his Israeli counterpart Shimon Peres, half-jokingly, “Make peace and we will accept you and the Palestinians into the EU”. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi proposed that Israel be accepted into the EU without linking the Palestinians to such a move. These proposals generated very little interest within Israeli government circles, the media and public. Unfortunately, the Israeli public is exposed to our relations with the EU mostly through negative reactions of Israeli politicians to critical remarks by European officials on the settlements, violation of Palestinian rights and, more recently, the annexation issue.

As I often told senior officials in Brussels, both the EU and the Israeli establishment are not doing enough to inform the public in Israel about the potential of improved relations with the block. Israel’s trade agreements with the European Community, starting in the mid-1960s and the subsequent 1975 Free Trade Agreement, have contributed hugely to Israel’s shift from a largely agrarian society and economy to an advanced industrialized country. The research and science agreements with the EU have yielded billions of euros from the block’s joint fund (to which Israel also contributes, obviously) for Israeli research and development. The “open skies” agreement has contributed significantly to the development of incoming and outgoing tourism, and more. The public at large knows very little about all of the above.

In December 2013, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council suggested upgrading the relationship with Israel to a special privileged partnership once Israel and the Palestinians achieve peace. A similar proposal was made to the Palestinians. The EU reiterated its suggestion in early 2016. The proposal obviously did not facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, but for the matter at hand in this article it is important to note that Israel avoided responding to the proposal and the vast majority of Israelis is completely unaware that it was presented. The European proposal generated very limited discourse among Israel’s political echelon. Then-President Shimon Peres issued a favorable response, but the Foreign Ministry did not instruct Brussels (nor any other Israeli embassy in EU capitals) to examine the seriousness of the idea and what it entailed. We did so informally at our own initiative. Indeed, the Council was wrong in issuing a general and somewhat vague proposal, but what bothered Israeli decision makers was the proposal’s linkage to an Israeli commitment to a peace agreement.

Summary, Or Where Do We Go From Here?

Europe is struggling to overcome the crisis into which it has been plunged by the developments of the past decade and more, exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic and Brussels’ initial ineffective response that left each member state to deal with the disease on its own with very little block-wide coordination. Combined with the expected retirement of Chancellor Angela Merkel, France’s weakness, and failure thus far to achieve agreement on post-Brexit relations with the UK, Europe is hard pressed to play a leading role in the global arena. Nonetheless, it still constitutes the West’s largest economic bloc with a population of 450 million, and is moving toward deeper integration by seeking to jointly raise investment capital for a coronavirus recovery fund. The EU is a close, accessible and familiar neighbor to Israel and Israelis.

In order to indeed be part of the European family, or at least to reduce the friction with Europe, the government of Israel must devote time and resources to understanding the European DNA. It must have an answer (or at least an opinion) to the question of “what is Europe”. Are we talking about Germany, the Netherlands, France and the Scandinavian states, or perhaps Hungary and Poland? And beyond those questions, what do we want from Europe? What type of relationship do we wish to forge with it? And deriving from that answer, which EU group would we like to join, and can we count on the support of so-called rogue states and far-right groups in the long term?

We must remember that due to its long colonial history in the Middle East and its physical proximity to the region, Europe knows our neighborhood and its problems better than most international players. We must concede that Europe is very cautious and sensitive in its relations with Israel. It expresses vocal displeasure with our conduct toward the Palestinians, but is not interested in bringing things to a head. Europe is, indeed, delaying upgrades in its relations with Israel, issuing guidelines on settlement product labeling and condemnations of Israeli behavior that it views as unacceptable, but it has avoided imposing sanctions or concrete steps significantly harmful to Israel’s ties with the continent. Given this state of affairs, even sanctions in response to possible Israeli annexation in the West Bank were more by the way of wishful thinking on the part of some Europeans than a realistic option.

Reality in the Middle East, the convergence of interests between Israel and key Arab states, the drop in global oil prices, the threats of Islamic terrorism and Israel’s affinity for the European family create opportunities for continued development of Israel-Europe relations. Finally, Europe and its positions must be brought up for public discussion in Israel, and even more so, the government of Israel must be willing to converse with the EU and hear out its views (without committing to accept them, of course) rather than alienating Brussels and labeling it as “anti-Israeli”.

הפוסט Israel and the European Union: Enemies, A Love Story הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Merav kahana-Dagan and Burcu Degirmencioglu

SUMMARY

October 2020 marks the 20th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security. This marks a fitting moment to assess the resolution’s challenges and achievements and to offer some suggestions for better implementation of the resolution in two Middle Eastern countries – Israel and Turkey. Two countries with shared bilateral and regional interests as well as disputes and critical roles in many of the area’s conflicts. Israel and Turkey responded to UNSCR 1325 positively, but did not implement it on the ground. UNSCR 1325 led many United Nations (UN) member countries to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) to implement the ideas and ideals of the resolution (Peacewomen 2020). Most of those countries are in Europe, while only a few of them are in the MENA region. There are eleven Regional Action Plans (RAP) around the world, but there is no formal RAP for the MENA region. Due to many barriers, such as political divisions between countries in the region, ongoing conflicts, and women’s underrepresentation in politics and in decision-making, the push for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the MENA region must be supported by the international community. Though the implementation of UNSCR 1325 through a regionwide framework is unlikely, due to political and cultural differences and the ongoing disputes between states, a push for its implementation could also originate from sub-regional cooperation and bilateral agreements.

The 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 should also serve as an opportunity to prioritize it on the agenda of Israeli Turkish civil society activities. Furthermore, international exchange amongst female diplomats and security services and gender trainings as well as leadership programs for women in such positions can support the acceptance and the career opportunities for women in foreign and security policy.

Jointly, motivated women from the region and a push from the international community together can achieve improvements for women through inclusion in peace building processes and regional cooperation. This needs long term commitment from young women, who can take up the issues and set the groundwork for the next generation of Middle Eastern women.

INTRODUCTION

Israel and Turkey are important powerful players in the MENA region with a complicated relationship and shared interests such as security, economy, and energy. They are both involved in local and regional conflicts while managing an ongoing dispute between one another, which is highly connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both countries formally adopted National Action Plans in the spirit of UNSCR 1325. UNSCR 1325 touched upon two main issues – women are much more affected by conflicts, yet their voices are underrepresented in decision-making. Research shows that women’s participation in peace negotiations increases the sustainability and the quality of the agreements (UN Women 2019). However, for more women to be included in such processes, many steps need to be taken. Israeli-Turkish relations are unstable and complicated. In 2010, after the Mavi Marmara Gaza flotilla clash, diplomatic relations reached their lowest point. Since then, the two countries reached a reconciliation agreement and for two years worked on normalizing their bilateral ties. These efforts did not last long when in May 2018 another political crisis occurred in the wake of the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem, and ambassadors from both countries were sent back to their countries. During the past 10 years, NGO’s, think tanks, and civil society organizations worked in order to strengthen Israeli-Turkish relations. The work of NGOs touched upon many aspects of the Israeli-Turkish and regional relations but did not focus on women empowerment or women inclusion in particular. The attached paper argues that it should.

הפוסט UNSCR 1325: IMPLEMENTATION IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Even prior to recent normalization agreements, Israel had a wide record of ties with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These ties intensified in recent years and created an infrastructure conducive to the normalization of relations, with multinational and multicultural platforms as the key component. Multilateral engagement on events and agreements or in organizations, agencies, drills, and forums has several advantages for states that do not maintain official diplomatic ties: It legitimizes cooperation by blurring direct contacts, forges collaboration through broad alliances with many players, and facilitates unofficial ties without having to formalize them.

Both the UAE and Bahrain regularly host a variety of multilateral events, reflecting their ambitions to become global hubs for diplomatic, cultural, and economic affairs. Within this framework, they expanded their engagement with Israel and increased the visibility of their ties. Each year, new breakthroughs in relations were achieved under the auspices of international umbrellas, challenging the opposition to normalization with Israel and presenting different interpretations of it.

In the early 2010s, the UAE began permitting Israeli participation in international sporting events hosted in the country. In 2015, Israel opened a formal mission in Abu Dhabi within the framework of the United Nations’ International Renewable Energy Agency. As a host country, the UAE clarified that the presence of the Israeli office did not alter the status of the formal diplomatic relations between the two. In 2018, the UAE allowed Israeli delegations to display national symbols at international events, taking yet another step toward the normalization of relations. Over the next year there was a strengthening of civilian ties, mostly through interfaith initiatives on the part of the Gulf Arab states and their increasing openness toward Judaism. The UAE declared 2019 its “Year of Tolerance.” Within this context, the county announced the establishment of the Abrahamic House, with a mosque, church, and synagogue together in one complex. Already, in 2017, a Bahraini delegation visited Israel to promote religious tolerance and, in 2019, Jerusalem’s chief rabbi visited Bahrain for an interfaith event. Then, in 2020, an additional aspect of direct, public ties emerged with the arrival of two Emirati planes in Israel carrying humanitarian aid for the Palestinians. In June, Israel and the UAE made a joint announcement on scientific cooperation on developing a coronavirus vaccine.

Moreover, ongoing ties reflect the stability of these relations. The UAE admits Israeli visitors bearing foreign passports, even those issued in Tel Aviv; a dual passport bypasses direct ties, by channeling them through an Israel-Gulf-third country triangle. And outside the UAE and Bahrain, international conferences in third countries provided a venue for senior Israeli figures to meet with top Emiratis and Bahrainis.

Multilateral and Bilateral Interactions Between Israel and the UAE or Bahrain

There has been a wide gap between multilateral and bilateral interactions. In the diplomatic sphere, numerous Israeli ministers have visited Bahrain or the UAE, usually for international events hosted in either country. Economically, trade and business deals occurred mostly through third parties, as did overt security deals and drills. And on the civil channels, sports and religion connected Israelis, Bahrainis, and Emiratis in joint platforms. While bilateral relations were covert for the most part and few in number, the international frameworks provided much more significant platforms for engagement, which included exposure and enabled a gradual warming of ties. These ties were a significant element helping to pave the way over time for formal normalization of relations.

Drawing from the experience of the building of ties with the UAE and Bahrain, Israel and other Arab countries can mobilize governmental and civil society players to cultivate relations. An initial step would include mapping multilateral platforms to identify potential opportunities, such as with international business collaborations, research institutes, sporting and cultural events, international forums, and humanitarian aid agencies. Then, proactive outreach could increase potential invitations and engagements. Further, Israel can invest in efforts to host multinational and multicultural organizations and conferences and invite Arab states to take part.

It will take time until such initiatives coalesce into warmer relations and potentially significant diplomatic ties between the states involved. Nevertheless, the “routinizing effect,” created by increased opportunities to engage, promotes ties and brings nations closer. The process requires a large degree of diligence and persistence. But it holds the potential to create a firm basis for stable, long-term ties and perhaps normalized relations.

The article was published on AGSIW.

הפוסט Multilateral Platforms Built Framework for Ties with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The second wave of the coronavirus sweeping Israel has overtaken the annexation issue in the headlines and relegated it to the margins of the public agenda. However, although Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ministers have rarely mentioned the annexation since July 1, and have abandoned public activity related to the issue, the world keeps discussing the inherent dangers of such a move. Warnings against the hasty move that could have crucial repercussions for regional processes continue to be heard, especially in Europe and the Hashemite Kingdom. King Abdullah recently declared that his country would reject any kind of territorial annexation, big or small, warning that “annexation would undermine prospects of achieving peace”. His restrained diplomatic language reflects a real fear that prompted by political considerations of one kind or another, the annexation issue will soon be restored to the table and the headlines. In July 2020, Mitvim Institute experts conducted a policy dialogue with several leading Jordanian figures from the diplomatic, political, academic and military fields, in order to understand the thinking in Amman about annexation and what Jordan fears in that sense. This document sums up key insights from the dialogue.

A. Jordan Stands Alone Against Annexation

The former senior military officials, veteran diplomats and political figures, and scholars with whom we spoke are under no illusions. They all agree that the Arab world is busy with its many problems more than it is with prospects of annexation. The Europeans are perceived in Amman as incapable of exerting significant pressure on Israel to block the move. “Most Arab states are currently busy with other issues and that gives Netanyahu and his government room to move ahead with annexation. The Arab world is not coordinating within itself, not even on the Arab Peace Initiative. There is currently no single, solidified Arab position as regards annexation. It clearly does not go down well with the citizens of these states, and therefore no Arab leader will accept it, but it is unclear whether condemnation would be translated into real action,” a former senior official told us.

“When Israel was advancing toward annexation, the only protest in the region took place in Tel Aviv, not in any Arab capital. Opposition to the Trump Plan did not gather momentum, either,” another senior Jordanian dialogue participant summed up. Nonetheless, according to the assessments voiced by of our interlocutors, Jordan is not expected to amend its regional treaties nor to draw closer to elements hostile to Israel. Jordan feels it is on the frontlines of the battle against annexation, whereas other states in the region and beyond are busy with their own issues. It assumes that even if the annexation plan has been sidelined in recent weeks, slightly easing the pressure level in Amman, the issue is likely to resurface on the agenda.

 B. Annexation Violates the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty

Our Jordanian counterparts have firm views regarding the development of relations with Israel since the 1994 signing of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. In October 2019, when a Mitvim Institute delegation visited Jordan, it heard disappointment about the state of bilateral ties. The Jordanian frustration stems from Israel’s failure to implement a single major, significant project proposed in the 1990s – such as the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal, a shared airport, industrial parks and more. The peace agreement has thus failed to yield the anticipated prosperity. The Jordanians sense that Israel has neglected their country despite the major potential of the relationship and is not trying to imbue the peace agreement with substance.

Annexation is perceived in Jordan as a flagrant violation of the treaty. When Jordan signed the agreement, “It left the issue of the border with the Jordan Valley open for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, hoping these borders would be determined within the framework of a peace agreement. Israeli annexation of territory in the northern Jordan Valley would violate the peace agreement with Jordan,” a former senior military official told the Israeli team. “The Jordan-Israel treaty recognizes Jordan’s role in negotiations with the Palestinians, so that what is going on now with annexation violates the agreement. The idea of the treaty is that each side respects the sovereignty of the other, and annexation is a measure that threatens Jordan’s sovereignty. Therefore, Jordan will be entitled to re-open the agreement and its economic annexes with Israel” in case annexation takes place.

C. Annexation Might Eventually Lead to Transfer of Palestinians

As far as the Jordanians are concerned, any annexation, whether large or small, is dangerous. In their view, annexation will gradually cut off the West Bank Palestinians from Jordan’s Palestinians (two groups that conduct significant communal ties) because the Palestinians will have to go through Israeli territory to get to Jordan and the West Bank. Currently, Palestinians go back and forth directly through the Israel-run Allenby crossing.

The continued construction in the settlements and other obstacles for Palestinians in the West Bank are perceived as intended to catalyze a Palestinian exodus eastward. In recent months, Netanyahu has personally declared that the government would not grant Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians residing in annexed areas. Absent prospects of establishing a Palestinian state, and with no hope of obtaining citizenship, the Palestinians would be completely controlled by Israel. If that happens, Israel will be able to expel them immediately if it decides to do so, or to create conditions that will make people leave, several senior Jordanians said. Many in Jordan also believe annexation will once revive the “Jordan is Palestine” concept, which the radical Israeli right advocates.

Our interlocutors remind those in Israel who support undermining Jordan’s security and regime of the Jordanian role in ensuring Israel’s security. “The border between Israel and Jordan is the longest front between Jordan and its neighbors and the most stable border right now. It must be protected. The Jordanian army and the IDF do the job, but instability along the border would open the way for nearby radical groups – ISIS, the Iranian militias in Iraq, and Hezbollah. Border instability is a regional danger. The argument put forth repeatedly by the Likud and by radical elements in Israel that Jordan is the homeland of the Palestinians constitutes a threat to Jordan and the Hashemite regime, but in fact, such a development would be no less risky for Israel,” according to Jordanians who have maintained close contact with their Israeli military and government counterparts for years.

D. “The Sky Will Not Cave In”, but Israel-Jordan Ties Will Be Harmed

How will Jordan react if annexation takes place at some point? Our interlocutors are certain that Jordan will have to look out for its own interests, first and foremost, and will try to do all it can to stabilize the situation. They differ on the concrete measures Jordan might take – for example, would it recall its ambassador and ask Israel’s ambassador to leave Amman? All agree that Jordan would launch a diplomatic initiative against the Israeli move, including an appeal to the EU, the UN, the Arab League, the Quartet, and more. And what about the natural gas deal that Jordan recently signed with Israel and the security coordination between the sides? “Undermining cooperation on security, water issues, Jerusalem and agriculture would be detrimental to Jordan’s interests. The Jordanian response to annexation is expected to be cautious in order to protect Jordanian interests, which include preserving relations with Israel. It is important for Jordan first to see what the US says, how the Palestinians respond and what will happen in Israel itself,” we are told.

The natural gas issue has generated significant controversy in Jordan from the get-go, and some in the Kingdom told us that they believe annexation could provide an excuse for Jordan to exit the expensive gas deal. “There is an uncomfortable feeling in Jordan that it is paying too much for the gas. An amendment of the agreement with Noble Energy could occur even unrelated to annexation. The price of gas from Israel must be cheaper than that of liquid gas, because it is supplied directly, without the need for liquefaction or gasification. It is quite possible that the annexation will provide a legal out from the expensive agreement with Noble Energy.”

The senior Jordanians emphasize that even if annexation does not result in immediate upheaval, it would encourage radicals and weaken moderates in the region. “Annexation would strengthen the standing of Iran and Turkey in the region and benefit the radicals. If Israel wants to be a key regional player in terms of technology and security, a decision to annex and revoke Palestinian rights would make that impossible. Turkey is successfully expanding its influence in Syria and Libya. Iran is successfully advancing its interests in Yemen and Iraq. Annexation would provide these states with a tailwind and undermine efforts by pragmatic Sunni states to create a different reality in the region,” they sum up.

Jordan continues its close monitoring of political developments in Israel. It expects annexation to resurface, at which point it will confront the move and try to block it with the help of its friends in the Arab world and elsewhere, even if it cannot completely prevent it.

הפוסט Senior Jordanian Officials: Annexation Endangers Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The EU’s differentiation policy seeks to maintain trade and cooperation with the State of Israel within its 1967 borders, in adherence to international law and Europe’s consumer protection laws – unlike the BDS movement that seeks to boycott and sanction the entire State of Israel. Recognizing the value of EU-Israel relationship, the EU’s differentiation policy aims to incentivize Israel to resume negotiations with the Palestinians. The BDS movement, on the other hand, sets goals (such as revoking the right of return and abrogating the Law of Return) that if fully achieved would mean Israel’s end as a Jewish state. The differentiation policy includes an element of normative condemnation but not delegitimization of the State of Israel as a whole, as espoused by the BDS movement. Whereas the differentiation policy implements existing international law, the BDS movement aspires to change the international perception of Israel even within its 1967 borders.

Currently, the economic implications of both the differentiation policy and the BDS movement are negligible. However, in the long term, the threat posed by the BDS activities is greater than that of the differentiation policy, since the BDS is not limited to the settlements. The UN recently issued a list of companies operating in the settlements, which could serve in the future to boycott the settlements and damage major companies that play a significant role in Israel’s economy. The EU does not see any connection between its differentiation policy and the BDS movement, to which some European states oppose.

הפוסט The Differences between the EU’s Differentiation Policy and the BDS Movement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A. What is the “Horizon” Program?
• “Horizon” is the world’s biggest publicly funded research and development program in terms of budget and number of participating states. The seven-year Horizon 2020 program launched in 2014 provided funding of some €80 billion. Grants under the follow-up seven-year “Horizon Europe” program are expected to total over €100 billion.

• Participants include the EU’s 27 member states, the UK and 16 additional states (among them Israel, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine). In 1996, Israel was the first non-European state to join the program since its 1984 launch.

• To be eligible for program funding, R&D institutes from several countries form consortiums and submit research proposals in accordance with the program’s calls for proposals. Leading specialists in each field evaluate the proposals and grants are allocated in accordance with their professional decisions.

B. Why Is Participation in “Horizon” Important for Israel?
• Government officials and experts have for years described Israel’s participation in the EU’s R&D programs as being of strategic importance for Israel in strengthening and advancing research, development and innovation. It enables cooperation among research, industry, high-tech and academic groups from various states in all major study areas, from the basic research level, through applied research, and all the way to development and product enhancement.

• As of the end of 2019, the acceptance rate of Israeli proposals submitted to the “Horizon” program reached 13.5 percent of all proposals submitted, higher than the 11 percent European average. This reflects, both domestically and externally, the Israeli excellence and leadership in research, development and innovation.

• Participating states are expected to cover their respective part of the “Horizon” program budget. They can reimburse the investment back (and possibly more) through winning research grants. Within the framework of FP7, the predecessor of “Horizon 2020”, Israel contributed €535 million from 2007 to 2013 and received grants at the sum of €875 million. Israel has invested some €1 billion in “Horizon 2020”, receiving to date €1.2 billion in grants (the total is expected to increase by the time the program ends).

• Participation in “Horizon” also benefits Israel in non-quantifiable terms: (1) Opportunities to develop significant international cooperation, strengthen Israeli research capabilities, and build knowledge and advanced technologies; (2) Development of economic ties and a business presence in Europe, Israel’s largest trade partner and natural research partner; (3) EU research grants are a high-level expression of trust in a project and could help attract foreign investment; (4) Formulating research proposals and setting them in motion creates jobs, economic growth and innovation, contributing to Israel’s competitiveness, which, in turn, affects economic performance.

C. What Are the Implications of Curtailing Israel’s Terms of Participation
in the “Horizon” Program?

• Preventing Israeli participation in “Horizon Europe” over the coming seven years does not require a consensus decision by all EU member states. The program can bypass the veto power used by certain EU states to scuttle measures deemed critical of Israel, which require full consensus. That is why measures related to the R&D program are under consideration in response to Israeli West Bank annexation moves.

• Preventing or curtailing Israeli participation in the “Horizon Europe” program would deal a severe blow to Israeli research, industry and academia. It would undermine Israel’s international cooperation and its access to research infrastructure (e.g., specialized labs and facilities) and scientific databases. In a broader context, it would mark a significant setback to Israel’s relationship with the EU.

• In 2013, ahead of the “Horizon 2020” launch, the EU published new guidelines that forbade Israeli entities beyond the 1967 Green Line’s eligibility of benefiting from program grants. The Israeli government opposed these guidelines and considered not joining “Horizon 2020”. This set off a storm among academic and research bodies in Israel that feared being left out of this vital program. The government, realizing the extent of the potential loss and the risk it was taking, relented and joined the program on the EU’s terms.

הפוסט Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan also opined it was a mistake to use the term “Arab spring” and explained that “whoever coined the phrase drew it from events that occurred in Europe in 1848, when liberal ideas proliferated in the world. The truth is there is no liberal message.” Former head of military intelligence Amos Yadlin said “we understand today that the pair of words ‘Arab spring’ did not describe correctly the phenomenon that rocked the Middle East in 2011.”

The Israel Defense Forces’ intelligence branch discussed the issue and decided that the term “Arab spring” was unsuitable and decided to use the term “upheaval” as the official term describing the events.4 Many other people in Israel, as shall be described below, began using the terms “Arab winter” or “Islamic winter” as terms to challenge the original term and express a negative reading of the events. This article wishes to present an analysis of the Israeli discourse following the Arab Spring events as articulated by different parties in diverse forums of conversation. The article analyzes the public and media conversation in Israel and includes an analysis of statements, articles and public opinion surveys and refers to different players (politicians, public figures, journalists and military commanders) and different issues and questions that have arisen as part of the conversation on the subject.

הפוסט Egyptian Plague or Spring of Youth? The Israeli Discourse regarding the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט An Alternative Model of Israeli-Arab Encounters הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper focuses on the impact of the coronavirus on Israel’s relations with the Mediterranean Basin. It is based on the main points raised at the sixth meeting of the research and policy group on “Israel in the Mediterranean” held on May 14, 2020 at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center. The paper highlights the key insights emerging from the Eastern Mediterranean’s handling of the coronavirus epidemic, including the importance of regional cooperation for Israel’s national resilience, the strengthening of Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus, the economic importance of the Mediterranean for Israel, the energy crisis and its impact, and Israel’s ties with Arab states. The paper does not reflect agreement among all the meeting participants.

 Regional Cooperation as a Key Component of National Resilience 

When the coronavirus epidemic began, states exerted greater rigidity and control over their borders and the passage of people and goods as a manifestation of national interests. Cooperation between states revolved mainly around knowledge exchange and border controls. The EU’s response to the crisis among its member states was unsatisfactory at first, although it improved with time. The US’ handling of the crisis in the international arena was strictly limited. Israel compiled strategies for different scenarios that included a wide variety of extreme situations, the spread of the disease being one of them. Nonetheless, its handling of the coronavirus exposed failures in terms of readiness and crisis management, highlighting the importance of regional cooperation and its contribution to Israel’s national resilience. International coordination helped Israel manage border controls, learn about the virus from the experience of others, seek help in obtaining needed materials and equipment, and preserve a relatively high level of trade and economic activity. Israel is a small state that depends on connections with the region and the world, a fact it must keep in mind when formulating regional policy in normal times, and as part of its preparedness to deal with future emergencies and crises.

The Coronavirus Bolsters Israel’s Alliance with Greece and Cyprus

The trilateral Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance is unique in its nature and pace of progress. It allowed for a significant degree of cooperation despite the epidemic, and because of it. The crisis led the three states to place an emphasis on tourism, health and entrepreneurship. Israel maintained close ties with the Hellenic states in trying to tackle the coronavirus challenges, evident in cooperation with Cyprus in knowledge sharing and efforts to obtain medicine and equipment. Israel’s Prime Minister and the President of Cyprus were in close contact throughout the period and Israel served as a point of transshipment for raw material from India to Cypriot pharmaceutical companies that manufactured medicine for Israel’s campaign against the coronavirus. Israel obtained from Cyprus vital goods that it lacked, such as coronavirus swabs to allow widespread testing and resumption of economic activity. Research cooperation also continued, with a focus on efforts to produce a vaccine. The states subsequently sought to create a safe zone for summer tourism.

The Mediterranean Basin’s Importance for the Israeli Economy

The states of the Mediterranean region are of central interest to the Israeli economy. The Israeli industry was less affected by the coronavirus than other economic sectors, but declining demand caused by the crisis undermined Israeli exports. Turkey is Israel’s most important trade partner in the Mediterranean, both in terms of exports and imports. In comparing first quarter data from 2019 with the same period in 2020, the crisis does not appear to have had much of an impact on bilateral trade volume, although objective indexes in the coming months may reflect such an impact. In addition to Turkey, Israel’s other important Mediterranean trade partners are Italy, Spain and France.

Tourism is a crucial resource for countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy and France. The suspension of tourism has also had a significant impact on Israel, but its economy is less dependent on tourism than those of Greece and Cyprus. Israel’s tourist industry helps it present equity to its regional partners, promote cooperation and even display technologies that could enable tourism to recover and develop. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has promoted tourism cooperation among states with relatively low incidence of coronavirus. Greece and Cyprus are some of the eligible states briskly working to attract summer tourism, while Israel is keen to cooperate.

The Energy Crisis Requires Re-Examination of Agreements

The coronavirus crisis has dealt a severe blow to the energy market. Declining demand has led to an oil market crash, plummeting prices and causing difficulties in storage and supply. At the same time, the price of natural gas experienced a global drop, with customers cancelling orders and the price plunging to about 2 USD a barrel (with Israel still paying 6.3 USD per heat unit under a deal between the state and private offshore gas producers). The significant energy price fluctuation is expected to continue at least over the next 18 months.

The global crisis has also affected the Mediterranean. Energy companies have postponed planned projects in Cypriot waters; Lebanon, on the verge of an economic collapse, received bad news when Total announced it had not found gas in its waters and stopped searching. There has also been a significant decline in Egypt’s gas consumption, resulting in the suspension of operations at its LNG facilities for the liquefaction of gas exported by Israel. The Egyptians are trying to sell their gas inventories, lowering the price to 5 USD per heat unit, but are unable to find buyers. Israel is still committed to its contracts with the Delek and Noble Energy companies, paying 6.3 USD per unit of heat. The energy companies themselves are also having trouble. Noble Energy laid off thousands of employees around the world and Yitzhak Tshuva’s Delek is in financial difficulties.

The global and regional energy crisis is overshadowing existing and potential regional cooperation. Israel and the states of the region must deal with the declining feasibility of the ambitious gas pipeline from Israel to Europe, and promote dialogue on resolving disputes and conflicting interests among them. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) is a potential framework for advancing such discussions. It can provide a platform for regional players to seriously discuss the issue of regional gas exploitation as an alternative or supplement to discussion of gas exports to Europe or Asia. The governments involved in the forum must understand how to adapt their domestic economies to enable regional cooperation.

The global price plunge has highlighted the high cost of gas for Israeli consumers, but is also undermining the long-term agreements Israel signed with Jordan and Egypt, locking them into significantly higher payment than current market prices. These developments threw into question whether the interest of these states is to adhere to these agreements. Israel must examine whether it wants to engage in new negotiations with the gas companies in order to bring down prices.

The energy issue is also tied to regional political developments. The developments in the Palestinian arena and Israel’s annexation intentions in the West Bank could affect the regional arena. Annexation could lead Jordan and Egypt to re-open their gas agreements with Israel as a political protest measure, which would also serve their economic interests. Abrogation of the agreements as a response to annexation, a measure that would fall short of cutting off diplomatic ties, is possible. The Israel-Jordan agreement allows Jordan a relatively easy out from its commitment to import natural gas from Israel, stipulating that the US would cover its remaining debt to Israel.

Cooperation with Arab States

Cooperation between Israel and the states of the region has not been limited to the Hellenic states. Israel is engaged in many cooperative ventures with Arab states, including ones in the Mediterranean, with information exchange and knowledge sharing constituting key elements of the cooperation. Israel has also reportedly imported goods through Arab states, including ones with which it does not have diplomatic ties. Israel has vital interests in relations with Egypt and Jordan, and ties with them could play a significant role in blocking or curtailing the spread of the next epidemic. Obviously, cooperation with the Palestinians is essential for successful containment of the coronavirus. Israel’s economic contribution to Jordan was particularly evident during the crisis. Border closures between the two states blocked the passage of goods shipped to Jordan via Israel’s Haifa port. In addition, Israelis stopped tourist visits to Aqaba (as did the many international tourists Jordan had hoped for in the spring), and the pilgrimage of Arab Israelis to Mecca through Jordan was also halted. These two Israeli tourism sources are an important source of revenue for Jordan, which faces a significant economic crisis threatening the stability of the regime. Jordan needs assistance from bilateral ties and international frameworks to improve its economic status.

הפוסט Israel and the Mediterranean Basin Amid the Coronavirus Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and the Environment in the Mediterranean Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2019 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(originally published by IAI)

הפוסט The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Jordan: Continued Deterioration / Yitzhak Gal
Israel-Egypt: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness? / Dr. Haim Koren
Israel-UAE: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs/ Dr. Moran Zaga
Israel-Morocco: Warming from the Bottom Up / Einat Levi
Israel-Iraq: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming / Dr. Ronen Zeidel

הפוסט Israel’s Relations with Key Arab States in 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To read the full document, click here

(Originally published in the Palestine-Israel Journal)

הפוסט Beyond the Trump Plan: How Can the International Community Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Role of Economy in US Efforts to Promote Israeli-Arab Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Egypt’s international standing as an important regional leader. Egypt’s role as a mediator acceptable to all sides allows it to ensure that the “arrangements” it helps broker serve its own interests as well, including its desire to pursue cooperation with Israel on strategic issues such as security and energy. Addressing the 2019 Herzliya Conference, Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Khaled Azmi expressed his country’s key interest in preserving its stability as a nation-state in the face of regional challenges. He also emphasized the importance of providing a response to the aspirations of millions of young people in the Middle East (where 60% of the population is below the age of 30).

Israel perceives its peace with Egypt as a highly important asset. Four decades of peace have proven its resilience in the face of changes and shockwaves, and have provided a potential platform for strategic cooperation. However, relations between Israel and Egypt are characterized as a “cold peace”. Egypt is unwilling to fully normalize with Israel, despite crucial shared interests, as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. Although this position has become somewhat muted considering the growing defense strategic cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states in the region, it still dictates the nature and extent of relations. A 2018 study that examined existing cooperation between Israel and Egypt pointed to strategic cooperation between the states, as well as cool bilateral relations on all other fronts. This article follows-up and looks at the 2019 developments in the relations.

הפוסט Israel-Egypt Cooperation in 2019: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Eastern Mediterranean States and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Assessing Israel Katz’s First Year as Foreign Minister הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 4 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for a New Israeli Foreign Policy Paradigm הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the feelings of frustration, anger and disappointment on the Jordanian side, we returned from Amman with a distinct feeling that the relations could be recharged and saved. After all, both countries have a clear interest in cooperation, and the relationship has survived for 25 years despite all odds, regional challenges and crises, such as the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the terror attack at Naharayim, the second Palestinian intifada, military operations in Gaza, several crises over the issue of Jerusalem (including the relocation of the American embassy) and hostile public opinion in Amman.

However, the extraordinary potential of relations is yet to be fulfilled. Not only can Israel successfully advance bilateral cooperation with Jordan in tourism, water and high-tech, there are also many prospects of wider, regional cooperation that will allow for increased trade and regional stability. Jordan can also play an important role in the political arena: leveraging its position in relation to Jerusalem’s holy places, supporting advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and as a stabilizing force in the region at large.

In order to achieve these goals, a restart of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship is required. It is necessary to rebuild communication channels, put the relations with Jordan high on the Israeli agenda, pay attention to Jordan’s needs and grievances, and rethink joint projects accordingly. Politicians and decision makers on both sides must fully understand that the cost of non-action and neglecting the relations is extremely high.

This report starts with a snapshot of Israeli-Jordanian relations after 25 years of peace, followed by a discussion of challenges and key issues that were presented by our Jordanian counterparts during the policy dialogue, and ending with recommendations and suggested actions for the immediate term.

הפוסט 25 Years of Israel-Jordan Peace: Time to Restart the Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quality of Israel’s Peace with Jordan is Dependent on the Israeli-Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Importance of Ties between Palestinian Citizens of Israel and Diaspora Jewry: A View from Britain הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in recent years, the Israeli government has been leading a negative campaign against the EU. It has been criticizing the EU for being anti-Israel, while making efforts to increase divisions between EU Member States in order to limit the EU’s capacity to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Toward the formation of a new Israeli government in late 2019, this article presents ten guiding principles for an improved Israeli foreign policy toward the EU, based on the work of a Mitvim Institute task team.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the EU הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Role of Former Diplomats in Israel’s Public Sphere הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: Strategic Partnership, Civil Remoteness? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was also decided that the forum is open to accept additional countries, insofar as they accept the its governing rules. Obviously, the message addresses the two absentees from the forum – Turkey, which sees the new forum as a confrontational act (considering that some of the member countries are in various levels of conflict with Turkey); and Lebanon, which presumably could not allow itself to participate in a forum that also includes Israel, even though potentially natural gas (and possibly oil) could be found in its economic waters as well. The presence of the US Deputy Secretary of Energy at the Cairo meeting was important, as it could be interpreted as American support of the new forum and of the cooperation that is taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The main beneficiaries of the new forum are of course the seven members. However, some countries are expected to benefit from it in particular:

Egypt: The kick-off meeting was held in Cairo. Egypt will serve as the Chair of the forum and will also host its headquarters. Thus, Egypt has established its central geo-strategic standing in the region, both as an energy producer (with known reserves) and as a leading political player. It may restore, even slightly, its regional standing, which has been significantly eroded since the events of the Arab Spring.

Cyprus: Cyprus has been long aspiring for a regional forum that emphasizes the need to respect the rights to natural resources of its members, pursuant to international law. The forum may provide significant backing for its political and energy-related positions vis-à-vis Turkey, including a kind of “defense shield” against confrontational actions on the part of Ankara. The Egyptian leadership of the forum is convenient for Cyprus (as well as for Greece), although along the way there may be conflicts of interest over the vision of the East Med pipeline, which currently does not include Egypt.

The Palestinian Authority: It may be assumed that the Palestinian Authoirty was invited to the forum by Egypt, with the intention to convey Cairo’s continued support for the Palestinian issue. By so doing, Egypt addressed the Egyptian public opinion, as well as to the rest of the Arab world. Moreover, having the Gaza Marine gas field off the coast of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority also has practical relevance to the regional natural gas market. The new forum should explore whether it can leverage the potential embedded in this gas field also for the benefit of the Palestinians.

Israel: From Israel’s point of view, this is a very important and positive development, that brings along the opportunity to take a leading role in a regional forum, bringing together both Arab countries and the Palestinians. Israel has been hoping for a regional forum such as this one, which is a political and economic dividend deriving from the gas reservoirs found in Israel’s economic waters. The underlying reason for the Egyptian leadership of the forum is the convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt in recent years, and in any event, considering the complex regional circumstances, only Egypt could sponsor such a project and make it happen. Being backed by such a forum, it would possibly be easier for the Egyptian government to deal with domestic as well as regional criticism and resistance regarding gas import from Israel. It is possible that in the future, conflicts of interest will emerge between the member countries and it would be difficult for Israel to maneuver in terms of export destinations or to maintain its status as a regional energy hub. However, it appears that the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages.

The US: This forum is a structure that well serves US interests, despite its not being a member. The member countries have close relations with Washington and would like to see an effective American involvement in the region, even in the context of natural gas. It will be particularly interesting to observe Russia’s reaction to the forum, since it is a major player in the global energy sector and a global power that is back in the region (from which the US is gradually withdrawing).

It is still too early to say whether the new forum will succeed in playing an important role in the region and beyond, both politically and with regard to the energy sector. However, it is a structure that provides the framework for potential regional cooperation, and for the time being it seems that the member countries have strong shared interests to make it a success.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Benefits from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Tunisia and Its Relations with Israel Following the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout the dialogue, there was a sense that Turkey and Israel can find a way to overcome their current crisis and to reinstate ambassadors. Nevertheless, such progress is not expected to lead to a significant breakthrough in the relations. The Turkish counterparts expressed hope that Israel and Turkey will resume talks on natural gas export from Israel; shared their concern over what they perceive as Israel’s support of the Kurds in northern Syria; and pointed out that Turkey and Iran should not be considered by Israel as allies, but rather as countries that cooperate at times regarding shared interest but are also competing with each other and adhering to different ideologies and beliefs. The dialogue also emphasized the importance attributed in Turkey to Jewish community in the US, and to the impact it has on the American discourse towards Turkey as well as on US policy towards the Middle East.

This paper highlights key insights from the meetings and discussions that took place throughout the policy dialogue. It does not reflect consensus among all participants

הפוסט The 2018 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Welcome to the New Normal: Israel and Turkey’s Turbulent Relations in the Post-Reconciliation Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Iraq: Taking the Civilian Path to Improve Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In an effort to discuss the future of this volatile relationship, a group of US-based Israelis and Iranian experts met over the course of several weeks in late 2017. The meetings, organized by Mitvim Policy Fellow (and then-US representative) Gabriel Mitchell and Middle East Institute senior fellow Alex Vatanka, focused on increasing knowledge and awareness between elites, establishing new policy dialogue channels, and identifying possible mechanisms for reducing tensions between Jerusalem and Tehran.

The meetings generated four main policy insights:

A. Long considered a cold war, the Israeli-Iranian relationship is heating up. Despite a shared history of public animosity, the two states have never been engaged in direct conflict within each other. However, due to regional developments this dynamic appears to rapidly be shifting from a cold war to a hot war, as Israel feels compelled to deter Iranian entrenchment in Syria. This change in the bilateral relationship could have serious regional consequences.

B. Hostility and distrust is deeply embedded within both societies. While moderate voices exist in both countries, there is not a clear set of domestic or international incentives for Israeli and Iranian politicians to tone down their public rhetoric against one another.

C. Diaspora populations are a critical link in establishing dialogue between Israel and Iran. Direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and Iran are not happening anytime soon, and interaction between civil society actors is very hard to achieve. Still, the potential for dialogue remains, thanks in part to social media. There is a role that Israeli and Iranian diaspora communities can play in bridging the divide.

D. The US remains the most critical outside actor in the Israeli-Iranian relationship, but under the Trump administration has abdicated some of that influence to Russia, who has now taken a central role in negotiating between Israeli and Iranian interests in Syria.

The dialogue channel was held under Chatham Rouse rules. Therefore, participants’ names are kept private.

הפוסט Exploring New Bridges between Regional Rivals: Overview of a Dialogue Channel between US-Based Israeli and Iranian Experts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quest for an Honest Broker in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This situation changed dramatically in 1980, following the Israeli decision to annex East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council condemned Israel and – with the US abstaining – passed Resolution 478 that called upon “states that established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City”. As a result, foreign embassies began leaving the city and relocating to Tel Aviv and the surrounding area. Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries to maintain embassies in Jerusalem, after leaving the city in 1980 and re-opening their embassies there in 1982 and 1984 respectfully. Eventually, they too decided to relocate their embassies in 2006, following Arab pressure.

In the U.S. political arena, the issue of relocating the embassy was first raised in the leadup to the 1972 presidential elections. Since, it has become a regular and popular preelections promise, and in every instance, that promise was walked back after the election dust had settled. In the early 1980s, legislative attempts to formalize the embassy move began circulating in Congress. These legislation attempts reached their peak in the 1990s, in the days of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Right-wing Israeli politicians, together with partners in AIPAC, advanced legislation in Congress to move the U.S. embassy.

It was clearly a move to jeopardize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, by highlighting Jerusalem as an issue of controversy. Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who felt obliged to publicly support a move nominally aimed at strengthening Israel’s capital, conveyed behind closed-doors his opposition to the legislation. He regarded it as a politically motivated move to undermine his policies. The legislation eventually passed in Congress in 1995. Since then, until the May 2018 embassy relocation, every six months – in June and in December, the U.S. President, whether Democrat or Republican, has signed a waiver postponing the implementation of the bill on the grounds of U.S. national security considerations. Among the reasons leading to the signing of these waivers was the concern that relocating the embassy would jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to serve as an honest broker and as a credible negotiator between Israel and the Arab world.

הפוסט The History of Embassies in Jerusalem and Past Attempts to Relocate the U.S. Embassy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Improving Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Others remain committed to a political resolution rather than an endless horizon of conflict and violence. But they have few answers for breaking down obstacles that are growing worse as time goes by. New ideas are badly needed; few are forthcoming.

In this bleak political landscape, the Mitvim Institute embarked on an effort to learn from the experience of other societies in conflict or facing related challenges. We believed that the experience of attempts to resolve conflicts in other places may serve as a source of policy options, lessons to be learned, or test cases in other regions, for assessing local developments and options in Israel-Palestine.

הפוסט Fresh Thinking for Old Problems: Comparing Conflicts to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.