1. The Israeli government keeps thwarting regional and international mediation attempts to end the war and promote a hostage deal in accordance with the Biden plan, signaling that it intends to maintain a military presence in Gaza and refusing to discuss the “day after the war” – The Western and Arab world undertook efforts to promote a clear outline for ending the war in Gaza and implementing a hostage deal, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, the re-entry of the Palestinian Authority, and initiating a clear political process to implement the two-state solution. Israel participated in various rounds of talks in Qatar and Egypt but steadfastly rejected Hamas demands to vacate Gaza and end the war. It also opposed the proposals for a reformed Palestinian Authority to replace Hamas and govern Gaza. Faced with opportunities to clinch a deal, Israel created obstacles, adding new terms and conditions (such as its insistence on a military presence along the “Philadelphi corridor”). Israel’s refusal to initiate or discuss post-war arrangements for Gaza placed it at odds with the rest of the world, contributed to renewing Hamas civilian control of the Gaza Strip and to the ongoing low-intensity war, prevented a hostage release deal, and signaled intentions to maintain a long-term presence in Gaza.

2. Israeli military action in Gaza and its deepening occupation of the West Bank result in international arrest warrants against the prime minister and defense minister, growing international allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and increasing ostracism – Israel moved to expel the Palestinian population of the northern Gaza Strip, while halting the delivery of humanitarian aid into the area (which was subsequently renewed to some extent under US pressure), and undertaking massive destruction of residential areas. Difficulties in the delivery of humanitarian aid due to the lack of an alternative to Hamas, the looting of aid trucks and risks to aid workers, together with the winter conditions, exacerbated the humanitarian disaster. Citing the scale of civilian casualties and destruction in Gaza, many international reports accused Israel of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide. The International Court of Justice ruled that the Israeli occupation is illegal and must end as soon as possible, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant, and Israel’s failure to establish a state commission of inquiry into the events of Oct. 7 and treat suspected violations of international law led to an international drive to prosecute Israeli soldiers in other courts around the world.

3. The Israeli government accelerates annexation processes in the West Bank thereby precluding the feasibility of the two-state solution, and supports and encourages settlement and outpost expansion without public discussion of the issue or official decisions. International sanctions on settlers and the settlement movement fail to change course – The Israeli government continued implementing measures in violation of the Oslo Accords in order to deepen annexation of the West Bank without a formal decision and political and public discussion of the issue. These measures included designating thousands of acrs as state land, constructing settlements, and establishing outposts. They also involved transferring millions of shekels for settlement development, building strategic infrastructure in Area C, and weakening the Palestinian Authority through legislation and withholding funds. Other actions included legislation against UNRWA, supporting settler violence backed by the military to abuse and expel Palestinian communities, assuming civilian authority over Area B, and changing status quo in Jerusalem by promoting prayer on the Temple Mount and evicting Palestinians from East Jerusalem neighborhoods. The government continued its efforts to weaken the Palestinian Authority despite the anti-Hamas campaign the PA mounted in the Jenin area, with Israeli military and international support. Some Western countries, led by US example, imposed sanctions on individuals and organizations of the settlement movement, and attacked the Israeli government’s annexation policy, but failed to prevent the push for annexation.

4. Israel escalates the campaign against Hezbollah, and successful military operations severely damage it and lead the parties to agree to a ceasefire and re-implement Resolution 1701 – Israel disregarded US efforts to prevent escalation in the north and mounted massive strikes against Hezbollah. These strikes killed its secretary-general Nasrallah, dismantled the group’s chain of command, and severely damaged the organization. With American and French mediation, Israel and Hezbollah subsequently agreed to a 60-day ceasefire based on the terms of Resolution 1701. The parties began implementing the deal, with the Lebanese army deploying in the south of the country and the IDF starting to withdraw its forces. However, Israel continued attacking Hezbollah activities to reshape the rules of engagement from the outset, aiming to foil any signs of militia buildup along the border.

5. With the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel’s military moves to counter potential risks, but the government does little to take political and diplomatic advantage of the opportunities for cooperation with other stakeholders in Syria – with the collapse of the Assad regime Israel seized a buffer zone along the border in Syrian territory, including the strategically placed Syrian Mount Hermon, and announced that the 1974 Israel-Syria force separation agreement had collapsed. The military took advantage of the opportunity to destroy many of the Syrian army’s military capabilities. Regional countries condemned the seizure of Syrian territory, and Israel failed to exploit the opportunity to initiate diplomatic moves within the framework of the regional reshaping.

6. The Israel-Iran conflict is reshaped by direct attacks between the sides given the collapse of Iran’s proxies, pushing Iran towards a decision on its nuclear program – The blow to Hamas in Gaza, the weakening of Hezbollah and its agreement to a ceasefire with Israel, the fall of the Assad regime, Russia’s resulting withdrawal from Syria, and the cessation of rocket fire by Iran-allied militias in Iraq, deprived Iran of significant capabilities to attack or deter Israel. Only the Houthis in Yemen intensified their attacks on Israel and continued to block the Red Sea’s maritime route. Iran launched a missile attack on Israel following the assassination of Haniyeh on its soil. Israel’s allies once again stood by it in repelling the attack, demonstrating the strategic potential of regional cooperation. Israel responded by targeting Iran’s air defense systems, leaving them vulnerable to further attacks, and attacked civilian infrastructure in Yemen. Amid Iran’s growing sense of vulnerability, indications emerged of a domestic struggle over the future of the country’s nuclear program – whether to pursue a nuclear bomb or an agreement with Trump’s United States.

7. Israel’s Arab allies are frustrated by its policy on the territories and the continued Gaza war, but nonetheless continue cooperating with it in the face of regional security challenges – Egypt tried unsuccessfully to mediate an end to the fighting in Gaza and bring about a hostage deal, accusing Israel of acting based on political considerations. Israel’s insistence on controlling the Philadelphi Route and the Rafah crossing, citing these as reasons to block a hostage deal, increased tensions between the two countries. Jordan expressed renewed concern about the change in the status quo in Jerusalem and the West Bank, leading to increased public pressure against its ties with Israel. The countries nonetheless continued their close security cooperation to counter Iran, while addressing the consequences of the fall of the Assad regime. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco did not sever relations with Israel, but refrained from promoting groundbreaking cooperation projects, while Saudi Arabia reiterated that it would not agree to normalize ties with Israel unless the war in Gaza ends and Israel agrees to a meaningful political process culminating in the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Abraham Accord states expressed willingness to assist Gaza’s reconstruction processes if Israel determines to resolve the Palestinian issue.

8. Israel benefits from an absence of European consensus on Gaza and the geopolitical changes that emphasize its equity, both of which blunt the harsh criticism of the war and violation of international law to some extent. The war in Gaza has become a political issue in the various countries that adopt an independent policy toward Israel, which in turn distances itself from criticism, and seeks more favorable places for connections among extremist and even neo-Nazi elements – The European Union attempted to play a significant role in ending the war and promoting peace in the region, while criticizing the death toll in Gaza and the continued Israeli occupation. Western European countries provided Israel with political and security backing, but also pledged to uphold international law including respecting the ICC’s arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, as well as to reduce arms trade with Israel. Israel closed its embassy in Ireland and cooled its relations and cooperation with Norway, while government ministers Redirecting its diplomatic efforts toward building connections with Eastern European countries and far-right parties and candidates. With the replacement of High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell with Kallas, Israel successfully lobbied for convening a meeting of the Association Council.

9. The crisis with Turkey deepens along its growing regional dominance, while Cyprus and Greece provide Israel with strategic depth – Turkey moved to expand its restrictions on trade with Israel, including blocking trade through third countries and the Palestinian Authority. However, oil imports from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Israel continued, as did Turkey’s use of Israel’s Haifa port to ship exports to the Gulf. President Erdogan came out against Israel’s policy in Gaza and Syria, seeking to isolate it on the global stage as his country increased its regional dominance with the fall of the Assad regime. Meanwhile, (and perhaps accordingly), Israel bolstered relations with Greece and Cyprus. While both countries affirmed their commitment to international law and Palestinian rights, they have also promoted security cooperation and arms trade with Israel.

10. Israel benefits from US cooperation, full security support and a political umbrella in international institutions, while sidelining US demands regarding an end to the war in Gaza, the promotion of a hostage deal, and easing the humanitarian crisis as it waits for Trump’s comeback – The Biden administration continued to support Israel’s security, the IDF and the US Central Command maintained close cooperation, with the US deploying deterrence forces and air defense systems, and forming an international coalition against Iranian attacks. The US adopted Israel’s position regarding the decisions of the International Criminal Court. While pressing for improved humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip, it refrained from taking a firm stance when Israel only partially complied, and failed to advance a hostage deal and an end to the war, as well as a plan for the “day after” in Gaza. Despite Biden’s unprecedented support for Israel, members of the Israeli government openly supported Trump during the campaign and hailed his re-election.

11. The world distances itself from Israel and Israel distances itself from the world – Despite positive formal relations between Israel and many countries, faced challenges including a negative immigration balance, and its ranking in the global democracy indexes declined from a liberal democracy to an electoral democracy. The major credit rating agencies downgraded Israel’s rating and issued a negative forecast for the state of the Israeli economy, which was reflected in a significant decline in foreign investment. Human rights organizations and international tribunals in The Hague condemned Israeli actions in Gaza and the Occupied Territories, and global efforts grew to locate and arrest Israeli soldiers abroad. The world’s major airlines suspended services to Israel due to the security situation, and public institutions and groups increasingly called for an end to cooperation with the country. Activist campaigns advocating an arms embargo on Israel grew louder, while Israel’s arms sales continue to flourish. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, weakened by declining influence, another ministerial change, and the resignation of key diplomats, chose to adopt a mostly aggressive and confrontational approach vis-à-vis governments critical of Israel.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July-December 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. The world wants to end the war and implement a two-state solution within a regional arrangement, while Israel firmly avoids presenting a plan for the day after the war. The U.S., Europe, and regional countries are pushing to end the war and build an alternative to Hamas in Gaza in the form of an independent Palestinian state managed by a revitalized Palestinian Authority, connecting this move to a regional arrangement. They have shown willingness to mobilize for this effort. However, the Israeli government expresses strong opposition to the two-state solution, refuses to promote the Palestinian Authority as an alternative to Hamas, and avoids presenting a vision for the post-war reality. Given Israel’s stance, countries have taken independent steps, including additional European countries recognizing the State of Palestine.

2. The hostage deal is stalled as Israel is unwilling to pay the requested price of ending the war, while Hamas benefits from the war’s continuation and the multi-dimensional damage Israel is experiencing because of it. The U.S., Qatar, and Egypt are making efforts to mediate a hostage deal that would end the war and secure the hostages’ release. Despite support from the Israeli public and security establishment for advancing a deal, and efforts by the hostages’ families in the diplomatic arena, the Israeli government opposes a hostage deal that would end the war, prioritizing political considerations.

3. Israel is coming to terms with an escalating and prolonged war of attrition with Hezbollah on the northern border, placing its hopes in deterrence and diplomatic efforts by the U.S. and France to prevent a full-scale war. Israel and Hezbollah continued to exchange fire, trying to understand the new rules of engagement and identify each side’s red lines to avoid escalating to a general campaign. Israel is cooperating with efforts by U.S. envoy Hochstein and French President Macron to achieve diplomatic solutions to the fighting in the north, while simultaneously threatening to launch a large-scale military operation.

4. Under the cover of the war in Gaza, Israel is deepening the annexation of the West Bank and working to weaken the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli government promoted Jewish settlement in the West Bank, supported the expulsion of Palestinian communities, fully backed settler violence, and transferred civil administration of the West Bank from the military to the Ministry of Defense. Simultaneously, the government acted to weaken the Palestinian Authority, particularly in the economic sphere, by stopping fund transfers. Sporadic decisions by the U.S. administration and other countries to impose sanctions on several prominent settlers and entities have not yet led to a change in Israel’s conduct.

5. The Israeli government is trying to stretch its relationship with the U.S. administration to gain greater freedom of action, without breaking it and risking the loss of crucial diplomatic and military support. The U.S. used the critical aid it provides to Israel to shape Israeli behavior and prevent regional escalation. It opposed massive action in Rafah and even delayed arms shipments, demanded more humanitarian aid, and criticized Netanyahu’s handling of the Gaza war and hostage deal as politically motivated. The U.S. also criticized the undermining of the Palestinian Authority and imposed sanctions on settlers for the first time. However, despite significant criticism of the Israeli government and pressure from internal opposition, the Biden administration and the Jewish community stood by Israel. The U.S. provided Israel with armaments, assisted in deterring Hezbollah, and led regional efforts to repel Iranian attack. Meanwhile, Netanyahu and his ministers blamed the Biden administration for preventing them from achieving victory, and Netanyahu promoted another speech in the House of Representatives with Republicans in an election year, against the wishes of the incumbent President, who had invited him to a meeting at the White House.

6. The legitimacy for the war against Hamas, and even for the State of Israel itself as part of the family of nations, has been damaged and is being challenged in international courts in The Hague and in international institutions. International support for the war against Hamas and for Israel’s right to defend itself has been replaced by sharp criticism. The war in Gaza has led Israel and its leaders to face accusations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in international courts in The Hague. Efforts to maintain international law, justify military action, and transfer of humanitarian aid to Gaza have been undermined by Israeli statements and actions driven by political considerations and extreme ideology, leading to increased international criticism. This was further compounded by the government’s ongoing actions to weaken the Israeli judicial system, despite relying on it to deflect international criticism, and its failure to uphold the law in the war in Gaza and in the occupied territories.

7. Regional cooperation focuses on managing aspects of the Gaza campaign and preventing spillover to other arenas, relying on necessity and professional domains while distrust and tension persist at political levels. Egypt is assisting in the humanitarian effort, managing Gaza’s southern border, and mediating the hostage deal; Jordan and Israel cooperated in bringing Jordanian humanitarian aid into Gaza and in repelling Iran’s drone attack, despite open hostility towards Israel in Jordan; Qatar assisted in mediating the hostage deal, Morocco sent humanitarian aid to Gaza, and the UAE became the closest partner in providing humanitarian aid in Gaza, enjoying Israeli trust and cooperation that other players did not receive. The connection and cooperation were based mainly on contacts between the security and intelligence forces of the countries, while at the political level there was at least tension, and sometimes even open hostility.

8. The formal normalization agreements holds, but the war in Gaza has halted the expansion and deepening of the regional normalization process, and the continuation of the war challenges the regional cooperation needed to deal with Iran – Israel’s regional relations showed resilience and were not formally severed despite the images from Gaza and the associated pressures, but their nature changed. The momentum to advance these relations was replaced by suspension and waiting. While Israel supported the Emirati effort to become dominant in the humanitarian field in Gaza, both countries lowered their profile in exposing their relations, and economic projects were not advanced. Public relations with Bahrain and Morocco entered a freeze, the multi-lateral regional frameworks that established in the normalization process were not convened, and the advancement of normalization with Saudi Arabia, which was on the agenda before the war, now depends on Israel’s willingness to end the war and promote the two-state solution. On the other hand, the necessity and potential for regional cooperation were demonstrated in repelling Iran’s direct attack on Israel.

9. Europe stands by Israel, supports advancing the two-state solution, criticizes Israel’s management of the war and occupation, and seeks to play a significant role. Europe supported Israel in its fight against Hamas, but this support has been replaced by criticism of how the war is being conducted, concerns about violations of international law, and growing public criticism, including increasing calls for boycotts. Seeking a significant role, several European countries chose to advance recognition of a Palestinian state, supported Israel in its struggle against Iran, helped secure funding for the Palestinian Authority, and imposed sanctions on settlers as well as on Palestinian terrorist organizations. In response, the Israeli government acted to strengthen its relations with right-wing and Euro-skeptic elements on the continent, against the backdrop of widespread changes in public attitudes and voting patterns within national institutions and the European Union.

10. While the crisis with Turkey deepens to new levels, Cyprus and Greece serve as a strategic rear for Israel. The crisis with Turkey reached new heights when for the first time trade between the countries was deeply affected by the diplomatic dispute, with Erdogan conditioning the export of goods to Israel on a ceasefire in Gaza. In response, Israel reduced its exports to Turkey, leading to a notable decline in trade relations. Greece assisted in bypassing direct trade challenges with Turkey, and Cyprus participated in international efforts, serving as a channel for transferring humanitarian aid to Gaza and supporting intelligence, diplomatic, and military efforts related to the campaign in Gaza and the northern front.

11. Israel disconnects from the world / the world disconnects from Israel? Israel has not yet become a pariah state, and most formal agreements and collaborations have been maintained despite the images from Gaza and government actions prioritizing local politics over Israel’s global standing. However, Israel’s credit rating plunged, external investment funds withdrew their investments, airlines suspended resuming flights to Israel, and Colombia severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Trade relations with Turkey declined, France and Canada announced arms embargoes on Israel, Israeli participation in major international exhibitions was prevented, exhibitions of Israeli artists were canceled, and academic collaborations were affected. Additionally, Israel’s standing in global democracy indices deteriorated, reflecting a loss of its liberal character.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January-June 2024 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout 2023, the Israeli government was preoccupied with promoting a deeply controversial judicial overhaul, and failed to focus on key security issues. Moreover, the internal division generated by the attempted judicial overhaul weakened Israel’s deterrence vis-à-vis its enemies, while the guiding policy concepts of conflict management with the Palestinians, and differentiation between Gaza and the West Bank, resulted in slaughter and war. Even while it engaged in war, the government continued to promote the same concepts and trends that led to the catastrophe – avoiding strategic decisions, promoting annexation and dispossession in the West Bank, and weakening the Palestinian Authority. In other areas, the war in Gaza led to a reversal of trends, or a change in their pace, tone, or public profile.

The war suspended the attempted judicial overhaul that had colored Israel’s foreign relations until Oct. 7. Despite their pronounced criticism of the government’s attempts to weaken Israel’s judiciary, the United States and Europe have been largely supportive of the war against Hamas. The normalization processes with the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Bahrain, along with significant indications of impending normalization with Saudi Arabia, were suspended with the start of the war. Relations with Greece and Cyprus continued, but the significant rapprochement process with Turkey turned into a crisis. The war exacerbated tension and suspicion underlying relations between Israel and the governments of Jordan and Egypt. Regarding the war in Ukraine, Israel maintained its fence-straddling strategy, avoiding voicing unequivocal support. for Ukraine, and refraining from publicly criticizing Russia.

1. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict returns to center stage with the Oct. 7 Hamas massacre and the resulting war in Gaza and other fronts. The Israeli government makes efforts to maintain its conflict management approach and avoid strategic decisions. Israel’s conflict management mechanism vis-a-vis Gaza, and its policy of differentiation between Gaza and the West Bank continued until October, inter alia through the ongoing transfer of Qatari funds, an increase in permits for Gazans to work in Israel, and measured responses to Hamas demonstrations along the fence. On Oct. 7, Hamas launched a surprise attack on the western Negev region, committing a horrific massacre. In response, Israel declared war with the primary objective of eliminating Hamas as its main goal. Israel launched a military campaign against Hamas, but continues to adamantly avoid discussing objectives for the day after the war.

2. Israel leads a contradictory policy concerning the Palestinian issue, simultaneously promoting annexation and transfer, and undermining the Palestinian Authority, but also trying to prevent its collapse. While the government has taken measures to avert the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, such as promoting economic concessions and transferring equipment to the Palestinian security forces, it has simultaneously deducted additional funds from the PA, backed settler violence, attacked the PA politically, and resisted international appeals to restore control of Gaza by a reformed PA. At the same time, the government continues to promote construction in the settlements, and annexation, allocating substantial budgets for these objectives. The war in Gaza has prompted some within the government to call for resettlement of the enclave and the transfer of its Palestinian residents.

3. The war undermines Israel’s relations with Arab states, demonstrating that the resolution of the Palestinian issue cannot be “bypassed”, but ties maintained Before the war, Israel and the normalization countries continued on their course of developing relations, while the United States worked to promote normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, the war in Gaza halted progress in relations with the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Bahrain, and lowered the profile of relations, although they remained. The normalization process with Saudi Arabia has been suspended. The political and diplomatic tension between Israel, Egypt and Jordan increased in light of the war – nevertheless, extensive collaboration at professional levels continued.

4. Escalating campaign with Hezbollah in keeping with informal agreed-upon framework. Hezbollah chose to raise the level of tension with Israel in July by erecting tents in Israeli territory, sabotaging border fence cameras, and even fiing at Israel. Israel responded with targeted fire, preferring to seek a diplomatic solution to the border dispute. Hezbollah refrained from fully joining the campaign against Hamas, and Israel complied with the US demand for restraint. Israel evacuated tens of thousands of residents from northern border communities and exchanged fire with Hezbollah within the constraints of the unspoken agreement. Israel supported diplomatic efforts by France and the United States to implement Resolution 1701, aiming to push Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, and threatened a military operation if diplomacy fails.

5. Israel is unable to present a coherent and effective foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran’s activity and the multi-front campaign it supports. Israel failed to present an effective policy on Iran’s accelerated uranium enrichment, its military activity against Israel through its proxies – Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and its loyalist groups in Iraq – and its diplomatic rapprochement efforts with Arab states in the region. Instead, Israel focused on containing the threat, relying on the United States and other countries operating against the Iranian- Russian axis, and refrained from presenting a regional political initiative against Iran which could hold potential implications for decisions in the Palestinian arena.

6. The Israeli government challenges the democratic world by attempting a judicial overhaul, adopting policies that clash with the Biden Administration, and avoiding unequivocal support for Ukraine. The government-led campaign to curtail the power of the judiciary was a focal point in the West’s relations with Israel until Oct. 7, eliciting criticism and concern. Despite unprecedented US support for Israel in its war against Hamas, the Israeli government rebuffed American demands to outline an exit strategy from the war and to adhere to international law in the fighting. Some government ministers voiced criticism of these demands. The Israeli government also continued to avoid unequivocal support for Ukraine and the West vis-a-vis Russia, and refrained from public criticism of Moscow.

7. Europe’s harsh criticism of the judicial overhaul is replaced by unprecedented support for Israel in its war against Hamas. EU member states and other European countries strongly criticized the judicial overhaul promoted by the Israeli government. However, Europe staunchly backed Israel’s war in Gaza in light of the horrific Hamas massacre, taking an unusual stand in the Palestinian context. Senior European officials paid visits to Israel to express support and condolence to Israel, and provided it with diplomatic support. However, despite this support, the war generated severe anti-Semitic incidents in Europe, impairing civil cooperation. As images of widespread civilian casualties in Gaza surfaced and Israel refrained from discussing the day after the war, more critical voices emerged. While diplomatic support for Israel remained high, signs of erosion appeared.

8. Relations with Greece and Cyprus continue to strengthen, whereas the rehabilitation of relations with Turkey is reversed and reaches a point of crisis. Leaders and senior officials from Greece, Cyprus, and Israel engaged in multiple summit meetings and joint military exercises. Israel also provided assistance in extinguishing wildfires, and tourism flourished as collaborations deepened. Efforts were made to foster a rapprochement with Turkey, including a Netanyahu-Erdogan meeting. With the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Greece and Cyprus stood by Israel, with Cyprus offering to provide a humanitarian corridor to Gaza in coordination with Israel. Conversely, relations with Turkey deteriorated amid mutual vitriol between Erdogan and Netanyahu.

9. Israel’s foreign affairs system is weakened and its officials are excluded from governmental decision making. The weakening of the Foreign Ministry continued, marked by labor disputes, budgetary shortfalls, a rotation of foreign ministers, and exclusion of the Foreign Ministry from high-level decision-making tables. Strategic Affairs Minister Dermer and NSC head Hanegbi took the foreign minister’s place in strategic missions. During the campaign in Gaza, the Foreign Ministry focused on public diplomacy efforts to promote support for the military campaign, but was not included in political efforts to serve the goals of the war. The inefficacy of the foreign affairs system spawned an array of civilian volunteer initiatives aimed at explaining government policy and promoting the release of Israeli abductees.

10.Climate crisis policy is relegated to the sidelines. The Israeli government has not perceived the climate crisis as a central agenda item, but before the war in Gaza, it adopted a limited climate law, promoted inter-ministerial staff work, and planned to send a large ministerial delegation headed by the prime minister and president to the climate conference in Dubai. The war in Gaza shifted governmental priorities, leading to the exclusion of the climate crisis from the policy agenda. The president alone led the Israeli delegation to the Dubai conference. Furthermore, the Emirati-Jordanian-Israeli water and electricity project was suspended due to the war.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July-December 2023 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document presents key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy from January to July 2023, corresponding to the first six months in office of Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government. This government’s composition and policies distanced Israel from the league of liberal-democratic countries – even as the continuing war in Ukraine divided the world between democratic and autocratic forces, geopolitical developments shifted the system of Middle East alliances (including China’s successful Iranian-Saudi mediation), and the spreading climate crisis consequences underscored the urgency of cooperation. The government promoted an anti-democratic judicial overhaul and deepened the occupation and defacto annexation of the West Bank, generating growing tensions in relations with the United States as well as much international criticism. An attempt was made to continue managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the assistance of regional and international forces, and strategic cooperation with Egypt and Jordan was maintained. Relations with the normalization countries progressed, but the Palestinian issue prevented additional countries from joining the process and convening multilateral frameworks. Israel encountered difficulties in persuading other countries to adopt its position on Iran’s nuclear program, and its attempt to avoid taking sides on the war in Ukraine drew increasing criticism in the West. The rehabilitation of relations with Europe that began under the previous government was replaced by cooperation based on specific interests. The government continued to strengthen relations with Turkey, and at the same time, with Greece and Cyprus. Still, the standing of the Foreign Ministry was undermined, and it was removed from its place at the decision-making table.

1. Israel pays the price for the makeup of its government and its attempts to engineer a regime coup – Many in the Western world, including heads of state, legislators, jurists, economists, and public and intellectual figures, spoke out against the proposed regime coup in Israel, as did Jewish institutions and communities around the world. Israel’s ranking on international democracy indices deteriorated, and its credit rating suffered. The Prime Minister and his cabinet members were no longer welcomed in world capitals, and some were actively boycotted by Israel’s closest allies. Government representatives were challenged by Israeli and other demonstrators on their visits to Western countries and by increasing criticism from their hosts.

2. In the face of international condemnation, the government promotes annexation and deepens the occupation at an unprecedented pace and scope – The government transferred authority over building in the settlements to pro-settlement hardliner Bezalel Smotrich and promoted massive Jewish construction in the West Bank, granted significant budget preference to settlement development, repealed the 2005 Disengagement Law and promoted a renewed permanent settlement in Homesh in violation of its commitment to the US. These and other developments provided a tailwind for violent settler rampages against Palestinians and undermined the perception of a status quo on the Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif. Palestinian terrorist attacks were exploited to legalize illegal outposts and enable the establishment of others. The international community condemned these measures and urged a halt to further settlement construction and settler violence.

3. Regional and international actors mobilize to help Israel’s continued efforts to manage the conflict with the Palestinians – The regional and international community, headed by the United States, Egypt, Jordan, and Europe, mobilized to help prevent the escalation of violence during Ramadan. These allies also hosted two regional meetings on Israeli-Palestinian security coordination – in Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh; some Israeli ministers contacted senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials to urge calm, promises were issued of supportive Israeli measures to strengthen the PA and the Palestinian economy, and pressure was exerted on Israel to refrain from building in the territories and other unilateral actions. Ramadan was relatively calm but was followed by another bout of fighting between Israel and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza that ended only with the help of Egypt, Qatar, and the United States.

4. Strategic cooperation continues with Egypt and Jordan to ease Israeli-Palestinian violence and specific crises – Jordan and Egypt cooperated in the international effort to prevent escalation in the Palestinian arena, hosted regional meetings in Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh, and stressed their commitment to advancing a solution to the Palestinian issue. Both countries strongly condemned the deepening Israeli annexation and settler violence, but continued to promote joint projects with Israel, especially in the energy sector. Specific crises, such as a deadly attack on Israeli soldiers on the Egyptian border and an attempt by a Jordanian lawmaker to smuggle weapons, were resolved through bilateral cooperation.

5. Normalization continues with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, but the Palestinian issue restricts, delays and damages the process and efforts to expand it – Previous agreements between governments and business companies have been implemented and new ones have been signed, civil society organizations have promoted cooperation, tourism from Israel to normalization countries continued, and trade expanded. Government ministers visited Morocco, and teams within the multilateral frameworks continued their work. However, the tension in Jerusalem, the Gaza campaign in May, settlement construction and violence in the territories gave prominence to the Palestinian issue in the normalization process, with Israel’s new allies condemning Israel’s actions in the territories, the UAE increasing its political involvement and financial support for the Palestinians and halting planned cooperation with Israel. Netanyahu’s planned first visit to the UAE was postponed following Ben-Gvir’s ascent to the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif, and the Negev Forum meeting in Morocco was postponed several times and finally canceled due to the boost in settlement construction. The Americans and Saudis made clear to Israel that its actions in the Palestinian arena make it difficult for them to advance public normalization of ongoing unofficial Saudi-Israeli contacts.

6. Israel keeps challenging Iran in various arenas, but has trouble persuading other countries to adopt its position – Israel continued to act against Iran’s efforts in the region and against its nuclear program. It operated clandestinely on Iranian soil, attacked Iranian forces in Syria and Lebanon, strengthened ties with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, cooperated with Cyprus and Turkey, and held joint military exercises with the United States to promote deterrence. The Israeli government acted on the diplomatic level in a bid to persuade other countries to increase pressure on Iran, and tried to leverage Iran’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine to that end. US-Israel tensions over Iran arose despite ongoing dialogue between them on this issue, while the administration made progress toward an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program.

7. Israel continues to refrain from expressing full support for Ukraine and condemning Russia, and is increasingly criticized by Ukrainians and their Western partners – Israel kept up its humanitarian aid to Ukraine but avoided condemnation of Russia and declined Ukrainian requests for more significant support. Foreign Minister Cohen made his first visit to Ukraine but also refrained from condemning Russia. His promises to provide Ukraine with aerial warning systems have yet to be realized and, in any case, do not correspond with Ukraine’s request for Israeli air defense systems. Ukraine made it clear that Israel’s neutrality is in fact a pro-Russian position.

8. The process of rehabilitating relations with the EU is replaced by promoting functional relations, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and European criticism of the occupation and the regime coup – Israel accepted the EU’s proposal to schedule a meeting of the Association Council, although no date has yet been set, and continued to promote joint regional projects with the Europeans. Israel continued its dialogue with European leaders on the Iranian issue, the fight against anti-Semitism and the Abraham Accords. The war in Ukraine boosted Israeli arms sales to EU member states, even as the government’s regime coup became a regular agenda item in conversations between the sides. Netanyahu’s government was in touch with Orban’s government in Hungary and Duda’s in Poland in the context of the regime coup, boosting relations with Poland by reaching an agreement that accepts the Polish narrative on Holocaust remembrance.

9. Israel continues to restore relations with Turkey, at the same time strengthening relations with Greece and Cyprus – Despite Turkey’s public criticism of the Israeli government’s moves in the Palestinian arena, efforts continued to improve bilateral relations. Israel assisted Turkey in the wake of the disastrous February earthquake, aid that was highly appreciated by the Turks. At the same time, Israel continued to bolster its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, with an emphasis on security and energy.

10. Israel and the United States try to ease growing tensions over the planned Israeli regime coup and its deepening West Bank occupation and to prevent these issues from turning into a deep rift between them – The United States expressed its opposition to the government-led coup, emphasized the democratic values on which its alliance with Israel is based, and pressed for controversial legislation to be achieved through broad consensus. The Israeli government tried to calm US concerns about the threat to Israeli democracy emanating from its judicial overhaul, while at the same time making clear it views the US stand as interference in its domestic affairs. Nonetheless, relations deteriorated over Israel’s continued efforts to weaken its judiciary, its repeal of the Disengagement Law and settlers’ return to Homesh contrary to Israel’s commitment to the United States. Tensions were also exacerbated by the transfer of building authority in the territories to Smotrich, by settler pogroms against Palestinians, and condemnation of Biden and his administration by several government ministers. The White House continued to shun Netanyahu by refusing to issue an invitation to the White House, also boycotting his top allies, Finance Minister Smotrich and Public Security Minister Ben-Gvir. The administration tried to distinguish between continued US support for Israel, for example through participation in marking Israel’s 75th anniversary celebrations, visits by senior US officials to Israel, continued security and political coordination, and a White House invitation issued to President Herzog, and between the current government’s actions, especially its attempted regime coup and occupation. The administration reverted to past US policy of refusing to cooperate with Israeli academic institutions located in the settlements.

11. The Foreign Ministry is removed from the decision-making table and struggles to maintain its standing and budget – Netanyahu reversed the previous government’s efforts to restore power and authority to the Foreign Ministry and rehabilitate its status, reestablishing the Ministry of Strategic Affairs headed by his confidante Ron Dermer. In fact, Dermer has become a leading figure in diplomatic moves, more so than the foreign minister. In addition, the government decided to rotate the foreign minister’s post between two Likud contenders for domestic political reasons, established a Ministry of Information, and weakened the Ministry of Regional Cooperation. The foreign minister and his ministry were kept out of security-political decision-making and Foreign Ministry employees resumed their fight for improved working conditions and a return of their trusted standing.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies January-June 2023 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Editors: Dr. Roee Kibrik and Dr. Orni Livny

This document reviews key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policy for the July-December 2022 period, which began under Lapid as prime minister and ended with the formation of a far-right government headed by Netanyahu. During Lapid’s tenure, the government continued its conflict management strategy in the Palestinian arena, coordinated its moves vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip with Qatar and Egypt, which achieved relative calm; strengthened and developed relations with the new normalization states and continued attempts to draw Saudi Arabia into the circle; enhanced relations with its veteran peace partners Egypt and Jordan; kept up its campaign against the Iranian nuclear program; warmed relations with Turkey while ensuring the resilience of ties with Greece and Cyprus, and restored relations with the European Union and the US administration. Despite a more favorable attitude towards Ukraine, Lapid’s government continued to refrain from expressing unequivocal support for it, and was careful not to upset Russia. Energy resources in the Mediterranean contributed to a historic agreement with Lebanon and growing regional cooperation, with the climate crisis remaining a secondary issue in policy considerations. The choice of a far-right government has generated concerns among Israel’s partners and neighbors. Jordan expressed grave concern, tensions with Europe reawakened, the US administration was called upon to draw red lines for the new government, the Palestinian Authority expressed its concern over impending annexation moves, and the UN asked the International Court of Justice in The Hague to examine whether the occupation is truly temporary as Israel claims.

1. The conflict management strategy, increasing violence, and creeping annexation bring Israel to the doorsteps of the International Court of Justice in The Hague – The Israeli government continued its policy of conflict management, with an emphasis on security coordination and improving the economic and civil lives of the Palestinians, along with continued promotion of creeping annexation and avoidance of political measures. In Gaza, Israel continued to work with Egypt, the UN, and Qatar to manage the enclave and maintain calm. Increasing settler violence, the high number of Palestinian fatalities, and the outlawing of Palestinian civil society organizations turns into an international issue, undermining security coordination with the Palestinian Authority and contributing to its ongoing weakening. In the absence of a political process, and in light of concerns ahead of the installation of a far-right government, the international debate over the ostensibly temporary nature of the Israeli occupation intensifies, and the UN General Assembly seeks a ruling from the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

2. Relations with the normalization countries deepen and expand, and efforts continue to draw Saudi Arabia into the normalization process – Reciprocal visits by senior officials continued between Israel and the normalization states – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, economic agreements were signed and bilateral trade increased, new civilian cooperation initiatives were launched, and security cooperation and arms trade were strengthened. Cooperation between Israel and the normalization countries also expanded in multilateral arenas, such as the Negev Forum, the Central Command of the US Army and NATO, and the I2U2 quadrilateral framework that includes Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and India. Early signs of possible progress in the normalization process with Saudi Arabia were reflected in cooperation through a third party or an international framework. The new government has stated that it will continue strengthening the normalization process, and try to expand it.

3. Israel steps up its campaign to block a renewed nuclear agreement with Iran and to cripple the Iranian nuclear program – The Israeli government acted against a return to the nuclear agreement in the diplomatic sphere, taking care not to engage in a public confrontation on the issue with the US administration. In view of the decline of the nuclear agreement at this time, Israel and the United States signaled that the military alternative to the Iranian nuclear attack exists. Israel has acted against the Iranian presence in Syria, Lebanon, and the shipping lanes, and stressed to Europe Iran’s position on Russia’s side in its war in Ukraine, as evidence of Iran’s negative role in the international system and the need to impose additional sanctions on it.

4. Israel continues to strengthen its ties with Egypt and to rehabilitate relations with Jordan – Israel and Egypt continued to cooperate in the management of the Gaza Strip, and in promoting regional activities, mainly in the energy sector. Among other things, the countries tried to restart the efforts to develop the gas field in Gaza. Israel continued its activities to rehabilitate and strengthen its relations with Jordan, the leaders met, promoted agreements in the fields of tourism and cooperation in the rehabilitation of the Jordan River as in the joint energy and water project between Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, and an attempt was made (unsuccessfully) to connect Jordan to the Negev Forum. Egypt and Jordan have expressed their desire for continued cooperation with Israel under the new government, but Jordan has also expressed strong concern and even willingness to enter a confrontation in view of a change in the status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem or the development of a third intifada.

5. Two years of warming relations with the EU culminate in a meeting of the Association Council and end with a new government pouring cold water over the process – Israel worked to strengthen relations with Europe despite its ongoing criticism of the Israeli occupation, and succeeded in bringing about a convening of the Joint Association Council. Israel and the EU agreed on Israeli participation in European cultural and police programs, but the continued European policy towards the occupation and settlement project, and the installation of the new right-wing government, halted these moves before they were officially signed. 

6. Israel tries to support Ukraine without upsetting Russia, but ends up losing out both ways – The Lapid government adopted a more favorable policy on support for Ukraine compared to the policy during Bennett’s tenure, but refrained from supplying it with weapons. It settled for sending humanitarian aid, and did not join to the international sanctions against Russia in its continued bid to avoid clashing with Moscow. Iranian aid to Russia nudged Israel toward closer cooperation with the West on Ukraine, but neither side was satisfied and both criticized Israel’s policy. Russia warmly welcomed Netanyahu’s return to office. 

7. Israel advances normalization of relations with Turkey while advancing ties with Greece and Cyprus – Lapid and Erdogan agreed to restore full diplomatic relations, new ambassadors were appointed, and Israeli ministers met with their Turkish counterparts. Cooperation in trade, aviation, and security deepened, and Turkey moderated its condemnation of Israeli actions on the Palestinian front. Both sides have declared their intention to maintain the process with the new government, too. At the same time, cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus continued to deepen and expand, particularly in the security field.

8. Israel and Lebanon sign an agreement marking their maritime border – Decade-long negotiations came to a successful end when intensive American mediation and guarantees enabled Israel and Lebanon to reach agreements on the demarcation of their economic maritime border, and to allow each country to turn to the development of the underwater energy resources in its territory, while deepening their interdependence and presenting a possible example of regional cooperation between rival states.

9. The restoration of the “special relationship” with the US is interrupted by the new government – Lapid and Biden signed the “Jerusalem Declaration” emphasizing their countries’ shared values of democracy and the rule of law. Cooperation against the Iranian nuclear program was tightened, a technological-strategic dialogue was launched, and Israel acceded to the US request to establish a mechanism for examining foreign (Chinese) investments in Israel. However, the US administration and the American Jewish community have expressed growing concern over the new far-right Israeli government. The administration stressed that it would continue to work with any government, but stressed its opposition to annexation and the importance of the rule of law.

10. The disappointing hopes of rehabilitating the foreign affairs apparatus under Lapid, dashed by the advent of the new government that resumes previous Netanyahu policy of dismantling it – After the upgrading of the Foreign Ministry’s status under Lapid, including its significant inclusion in political processes and decision-making, the momentum stalled when Lapid failed to appoint a foreign minister upon his move to the Prime Minister’s Office, ambassadors were excluded from Lapid’s meetings with heads of state, and Foreign Ministry employees were forced to continue their fight for improved working conditions, facing an attempt to bypass their labor actions through the privatization of certain foreign services. The formation of the new government led to a renewed split in the foreign affairs system in view of the re-establishment of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs, the establishment of a separate publicity ministry, the transfer of regional cooperation affairs to the purview of the Minister of Education and the handling of the boycott movement to the Minister of Diaspora Affairs, as well as a job-sharing rotation in the Foreign Minister’s position.

11. The climate crisis is mobilized for regional cooperation, but remains of secondary importance in shaping foreign policy – Although Israel set up a booth at the 2022 international climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh for the first time, dispatched a diverse and larger delegation than ever before, joined the international zero emissions initiative by 2050, and took advantage of the opportunity to establish regional ties on climate issues, it did not update its greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, already low compared with those of Western countries, did not complete the enactment of a climate law, and promoted diplomatic projects at the expense of the joint fight against the climate crisis.

הפוסט Semi-Annual Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policy July– December 2022 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. The government maintained its policy of managing the conflict with the Palestinians, without setting a political horizon – In an attempt to avoid internal political tensions, the government refrained from promoting a political process with the Palestinians, and adhered to the policy of conflict management. New arrangements vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip yielded a prolonged decline in security tensions. The government chose to use prior coordination with Jordan to contain violence with the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and to bolster security and civilian coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, reflecting a desire to strengthen the PA vis-à-vis Hamas. Relations with the Palestinians were managed by the Ministry of Defense and efforts to link civilian government ministries with their PA counterparts halted. The international community refrained from exerting pressure on the government over its policy on the Palestinian issue. In the absence of a political decision, creeping annexation continued in the West Bank under this government, including the evacuation of Palestinian residents, the expansion of settlement construction and mounting settler violence, which reached new heights and turned into a hot button diplomatic issue.

2. Relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco expanded and deepened, even in light of challenges posed by the Palestinian issue – Israel and the normalization countries – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco – continued to deepen their burgeoning relations, signing a variety of cooperation agreements in the fields of security, trade, health, culture, and more, and overcoming with relative ease various obstacles as well as the challenges posed by the violence in Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. It became increasingly clear that progress in relations between the countries stemmed from the partners’ intrinsic motivations with no need for any prompting or other American political or security incentives. Contrary to previous statements, relations with Morocco have not yet been formally upgraded to the ambassadorial level.

3. Israel was a leading partner in the formulation and institutionalization of a multilateral regional architecture – Israel led and hosted the Negev Summit with the intention of turning it into a permanent regional forum with working groups and the participation of the United States, Egypt, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, with efforts to include Jordan as well. Given the perception of Iran’s actions as a common threat, Israel took part in multilateral security meetings in Egypt and the Gulf, in which Saudi Arabia and Qatar also participated, and promoted a preparatory process to strengthen cooperation with Saudi Arabia under US auspices and with Egyptian involvement.

4. While relations with Egypt improved, the process of restoring trust with Jordan stalled over the issues of Jerusalem and the Palestinians – Israel and Egypt have chosen to increase their cooperation beyond the areas of strategy, security, and energy to the fields of trade and the economy. Egypt served as a key partner in Israel’s diplomatic steps, including promoting regional cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Basin and the sale of gas to Europe. On the other hand, Israeli efforts to restore relations and trust with the Hashemite Kingdom and to draw it into various regional cooperation measures have not matured, as the violence and Israeli actions in East Jerusalem, on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and other policies towards the Palestinians continued to cloud and damage relations. Cooperation with Jordan did continue in the fields of water, security, and energy, which are perceived in Jordan as a necessary strategic cooperation even in the face of widespread public opposition to relations with Israel.

5. Israel continued to express public opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, but some voices expressed their support for advancing the deal – The Israeli government continued to conduct a dialogue with the Americans on Iran’s nuclear development in an orderly and discrete manner in light of Iran’s progress towards nuclear breakout capability resulting from its withdrawal from the 2015 agreement. While the Prime Minister and his associates expressed vehement public opposition to a return to the nuclear agreement, other voices in the foreign and defense establishment argued that a return to the agreement is the best alternative available, a view they shared with the Americans. Israel worked intensively to prevent a US administration decision to remove the IRGC’s from the list of terrorist organizations, and with the IAEA to exert increasing international pressure on Iran. Israel continued to mount intelligence-based operations against the Iranian nuclear program, slightly shifting its policy of full ambiguity by indirectly taking responsibility for some of these actions.

6. Ties with Europe strengthened in the shadow of the conflict in Ukraine and the marginalization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – The consequences of the war in Ukraine have led Europe and Israel to cooperate in the field of energy and security. Civil cooperation agreements and Israel’s accession to European treaties were promoted. Cooperation in the field of culture was strengthened with the decision to include Israel in the ‘Creative Europe’ program, subject to the exclusion of settlements, and additional agreements were promoted in other civilian areas. Europe has refrained from taking strong and public action against government policy on the Palestinian issue, but has also refrained from promoting the reconvening of the Association Council, despite growing support for the idea from European countries that previously opposed the move. Instead, the outdated 2005 EU-Israel cooperation program was extended for an additional three years.

7. The government maintained its efforts to avoid fully siding with either Russia or Ukraine in the ongoing war, hoping the price to pay would not be too high – Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Israel has refrained from fully and completely supporting Ukraine. At first, Israel tried to make exceptional and conspicuous use of the mediation tool to explain its failure to adopt the Western position towards Russia, and later used Russia’s presence in Syria and Russian Jewry as reasons for the ambiguity of its position. As part of this strategy, Prime Minister Bennett and Foreign Minister Lapid expressed different messages to different audiences around the world and in Israel, with Lapid clearly articulating Israel’s stand alongside Ukraine, and Bennett trying to avoid disrespect toward Russia. Israel sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but failed to provide weapons and defense systems. The Israeli government created obstacles for refugees and migrants from Ukraine, refrained from joining the global sanctions mechanism against Russia, and clashed with Russia in the Ukrainian context only when the latter invoked anti-Semitic arguments.

8. Israel continued to promote relations with Turkey, while taking care to maintain and cultivate relations with Greece and Cyprus – The gradually warming relations with Turkey were further enhanced by President Herzog’s visit to Turkey and a meeting with President Erdogan, reciprocal visits by the foreign ministers of both countries, and close and successful security cooperation in preventing Iranian terrorism against Israelis on Turkish soil. The two sides also decided to renew cooperation in civil aviation. Even in light of the challenges posed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the clashes in Jerusalem during the month of Ramadan, the parties adopted measured and positive rhetoric towards each other. At the same time, Israel held a number of trilateral meetings with Greece and Cyprus at the executive and ministerial levels, as well as bilateral meetings with each, placing an emphasis on security and energy cooperation.

9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) standing in government was enhanced but remained weak in structure and budgets – Minister of Foreign Affairs Lapid’s role as a major political player led the MFA to take a more significant role in shaping and executing Israel’s foreign policy. Coordination was achieved between the Prime Minister’s Office and the MFA regarding their respective purviews and issues, and the presidency was widely used to take an active part in promoting Israel’s foreign policy, due in part to President Herzog’s willingness to effectively utilize his office. At the same time, the structural and budgetary problems of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs persist, and an ongoing labor dispute has not been resolved.

10. The climate crisis has not gained much weight in shaping Israel’s foreign policy – Israel has not adopted significant steps to deal with the climate crisis in the long term through advanced legislation, regulatory changes, or regional and international cooperation. The Israeli government, which pledged serious attention to these issues, has chosen to promote short-term fossil fuel-based energy cooperation (vis-à-vis Egypt, Europe, and even Lebanon) and has even expanded its investment in gas reservoirs in its exclusive economic zone. This fact stands out in light of the scheduled international climate conferences in Egypt this year and in the Emirates in 2023. President Herzog continued to promote the idea of a climate-based regional partnership in his talks with regional leaders and through the climate forum he established.

הפוסט Semi-Annual Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policy January – June 2022 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Israel renews dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, but declares it will not advance a peace process – Internal government disagreement over the Palestinian issue was reflected in its inconsistent policies; On the one hand, the government designed policies to strengthen the Palestinian Authority and the dialogue with it, but concurrently opposed negotiations that would offer a political horizon and promoted creeping annexation. Ministers from the center-left parties met with Mahmoud Abbas and their Palestinian counterparts to promote and deepen cooperation after years without such meetings. The government successfully implemented measures toimprove Palestinian lives in order to ease international pressure on the Palestinian issue. At the same time, however, creeping annexation, settlement construction, and the eviction of Palestinian families in East Jerusalem continued, and settler violence in the occupied territories set new records.

2. Israel cooperates with Qatar, Egypt and Hamas to rebuild the Gaza Strip and maintain calm – The Israeli government stated its intention to build a new mechanism for managing and rebuilding Gaza, which, among other things, would support an end to the internal Palestinian split, restore the Palestinian Authority to its position in the Gaza Strip, and prevent direct money transfers to Hamas. Within this framework, Foreign Minister Lapid presented an economic plan for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in return for increased security. As part of the newly formulated measures to assist and rebuild Gaza, Qatar transferred funds for humanitarian aid and diesel fuel to the Gaza Strip and provided Hamas with fuel through Egypt, Israel eased restrictions on employment and trade, and Egypt advanced reconstruction plans and mediated between the parties.

3. Israel seeks to restore relations with Jordan and turn a new page after Netanyahu – Israeli and Jordanian efforts to restore relations, which were restricted by Netanyahu, bore fruit. After years of severed ties between King Abdullah and Netanyahu, the King hosted Prime Minister Bennett and Ra’am Party Chair Abbas at his palace, and was in contact with President Herzog. The economy, energy and agriculture ministers of both countries met and signed cooperation agreements. Israel increased the quotas of water sold to Jordan, and enabled expanded trade between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates signed an agreement in Dubai to promote water and energy exchanges, an initiative promoted by EcoPeace Middle East and an example of multilateral cooperation in the region. Jordan continued to emphasize its commitment to the two-state solution, and public opposition to normalization with Israel remained widespread.

4. Diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt expand, as does Egypt’s willingness for increased visibility – Security cooperation continued between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai, as well as cooperation in the Gaza Strip and in the energy and business fields. In an unusual move, Egyptian President a-Sisi hosted Prime Minister Bennett for a high-profile visit, increasing the visibility of relations with Israel, and Foreign Minister Lapid met with his counterpart in Egypt. Israel softened its travel alert on the Sinai, and examined options for expanding trade between the two countries. However, public opposition to normalization with Israel still dominated the Egyptian street, limiting the expansion of cooperation to additional areas.

5. Normalization process with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco deepens, and formal agreements lay the foundation for broad-based cooperation – The government continued to lay a diplomatic and formal infrastructure for relations and cooperation with the normalization countries – the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco . Relations and high-level meetings previously restricted by Netanyahu were revived, ambassadors were appointed, and Israeli leaders visited the three countries. The developing relationships are characterized, unusually so for Israeli ties in the region, by significant weight given to the civilian and business dimensions, and with the broad and varied involvement of civil society. The normalization process demonstrated resilience in the face of challenges, such as Israel’s activities in East Jerusalem and steps to cancel an energy deal with the UAE in the face of domestic Israeli criticism. Morocco did not open an embassy in Israel, despite declarations that it would do so by the end of 2021.

6. Israel continues to publicly oppose a return to the nuclear deal with Iran while maintaining dialogue with the US – Israel persisted in opposing the Iran nuclear deal and continued its activity to counter Iran’s entrenchment in the region. The US-Israel Strategic Consultative Group, led by the two countries’ national security advisers, resumed its confidential dialogue. Israeli representatives continued to bring up Iran’s nuclear program as a key issue in their meetings with US officials and their European allies, sharing information on the progress of Iran’s program and warning against Iran’s negotiation tactics. A growing number of Israeli officials and experts expressed regret over supporting the US’ withdrawal from the original agreement with Iran.

7. The Israeli government focuses on improving ties with the US administration and return to bipartisanship – Israel launched an intimate, primarily confidential dialogue with the United States, including on issues of disagreement such as the Iran nuclear deal, the American consulate in East Jerusalem, the banning of Palestinian human rights groups, the NSO spyware affair, and relations with China, while taking care to avoid harming US interests. The new government also promoted dialogue with the liberal, non-Orthodox Jewish community in the US.

8. Israel bolsters ties with the European Union despite ongoing disagreement on the Palestinian issue – Foreign Minister Lapid continued his predecessor Ashkenazi’s efforts to strengthen ties with the European Union (EU), conducting one of his first foreign trips to Brussels, where he participated in a meeting of EU foreign ministers. Israel joined the EU Horizon research and development program, and signed additional cooperation agreements with the EU, but failed to bring about the resumption of the Israel-EU Association Council meetings. Israel strengthened its cooperation and bilateral dialogue with individual European states, while distancing itself from populist leaders and underscoring liberal-democratic values. Positive contacts were renewed with Sweden. Europe, for its part, did not exert pressure on the new government regarding the occupation and settlements, but adhered to its commitment to the two-state solution and to its policy of excluding the occupied territories from any agreements with Israel. The use of Israeli spyware provoked harsh criticism and prompted a diplomatic crisis with France.

9. Israel renews leadership dialogue with Turkey, and continues to bolster relations with Greece and Cyprus – Israel, Greece and Cyprus continued to deepen their cooperation, holding an additional summit meeting in Israel. Israel supported Greece and Cyprus against unilateral Turkish steps in the northern Cypriot town of Varosha. At the same time, dialogue between the leaders of Israel and Turkey was renewed, especially between Presidents Erdogan and Herzog, even as Israel clearly stated that the moves would not undermine its strong ties with Greece and Cyprus.

10. Israel declares a more serious attitude towards the climate crisis and its integration into foreign policy considerations – The Israeli government set targets and formulated plans for a shift to a low-carbon economy and instructed the National Security Council to include climate crisis issues in the annual assessment it delivers to the foreign affairs and security cabinet. Prime Minister Bennett and Minister of Environmental Protection Zandberg led a large Israeli delegation to the climate summit in Glasgow, and Israeli representatives took part in other international climate conferences, including the multinational forum being led by the special US Climate Envoy Kerry. President Herzog established anadvisory climate forum led by former MK Dov Hanin to promote regional cooperation on climate issues, and the Foreign Ministry adopted a green standard for its overseas missions.

11. Measures by the Foreign Minister and the new government to bolster the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deemed insufficient – Lapid’s appointment as Foreign Minister raised hopes for the ministry’s regeneration, stunted under Netanyahu. Officials from the dissolved Ministry of Strategic Affairs were incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, new ambassadors were appointed, and following a long hiatus, a new training course was launched for administration cadets. However, subsequent criticism over Lapid’s political appointments arose, and employees expressed disappointment over their working conditions, launching a public campaign against him. There was a sharp decline in t he number of applicants to this year’s foreign service cadet training program.

הפוסט Semi-Annual Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policy July – December 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Several major developments marked significant change for Israel in the first half of 2021. President Biden assumed office, Israel ramped up its campaign against Iran’s nuclear program, Hamas and Israel engaged in another round of fighting, Knesset elections were held for the fourth time in two years and Netanyahu was replaced after 12 years in office. How are these developments shaping Israeli foreign policy trends?

1. A new government with Lapid as Foreign Minister augurs well for the continued rehabilitation of Israel’s Foreign Service. Lapid’s additional post as Alternate Prime Minister and his considerable political standing have placed an influential player at the helm of the Foreign Ministry. In keeping with the new government’s guidelines that expressly call for strengthening the Foreign Ministry, a decision was made to shutter the Ministry for Strategic Affairs and dozens of professional and diplomatic appointments were approved. The appointments were previously made by former Foreign Minister Ashkenazi, but Netanyahu blocked their approval.

2. Events in Jerusalem and Gaza demonstrate the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite political attempts to marginalize it. For years, Israel had adhered to a strategy of conflict management with the Palestinians, shunning diplomatic initiatives to advance the peace process. Its actions in Jerusalem generated international criticism and sparked widespread violence in May, which also stemmed from the cancelation of elections in the Palestinian Authority (PA). The violence with Hamas in Gaza and between Jews and Arabs in mixed Israeli towns, triggered by tensions in Jerusalem, highlighted the growing difficulty in Israel’s efforts to divide the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Israel itself. At the same time, Israel is dealing with the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to launch a war crimes investigation of its actions in the occupied territories.

3. Relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco survive challenges. The political instability in Israel, the coronavirus crisis, the fighting with Gaza and tensions in Jerusalem, and the advent of a new administration in Washington posed challenges to the newly established relations with the normalization states. Netanyahu’s political use of the Abraham Accords posed a special difficulty, as did his veto of visits by members of his government to the Gulf. Nonetheless, and despite the round of fighting with the Palestinians, the Abraham Accords displayed resilience and sustainability. Diplomatic missions were opened in Israel and Arab states, economic, civilian and security cooperation agreements were signed and moved forward.

4. Netanyahu policy undercuts Ashkenazi and Gantz’s efforts to improve relations with Jordan. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi and Defense Minister Gantz led attempts under the previous government to rehabilitate relations with Jordan, renewing a high-level dialogue with the Kingdom. However, the canceled visit by Jordan’s Crown Prince to the Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif compound and tensions in Jerusalem curtailed the impact of these moves and failed to significantly ease the crisis in relations, as reflected in the cutoff between Netanyahu and King Abdullah. Nonetheless, Israel stressed its support for the Kingdom’s stability, as was particularly evident in the context of the attempted coup in Jordan and strengthening of security coordination with Jordan. With the installation of the new government, Lapid highlighted the need to rehabilitate relations with Jordan.

5. Diplomatic, economic relations with Egypt expand, but not people-to-people links. Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation in Sinai and Gaza continued, along with cooperation on energy issues and in business. The saga of the Palestinian elections and the Israeli-Palestinian escalation underscored Egypt’s key role in internal Palestinian mediation and Israel-Hamas mediation. Nonetheless, the pervasive opposition to normalization with Israel persists among the Egyptian public and limits the expansion of cooperation between the two countries to other fields.

6. Israel gets to know the new American administration. The new US administration brought about change in American foreign policy, including restored support for the two-state solution and for a renewal of the nuclear agreement with Iran, and adoption of a multilateral approach to advancing democratic-liberal values and dealing with the climate crisis. The Biden Administration backs the normalization between Israel and Arab states and the gradual US withdrawal from the Middle Eastern arena. Israel adapted itself to these changed circumstances, undertaking to build a good working relationship with the Democratic administration and party and to restore the bi-partisan support of Israel eroded by Netanyahu’s favoritism toward the Republicans.

7. Israel continues to oppose Iranian nuclear program while adopting a new approach to US moves.  Ahead of the March 23 Knesset elections, parties running against Netanyahu on the political right, center and left advocated dialogue with the US administration on the Iran nuclear issue rather than the confrontational approach Netanyahu adopted vis-à-vis Obama at the time. On the professional level, and after the elections on the political one, too, Israel shifted to a policy of dialogue with the US, even as it continued its wide-ranging military and intelligence activity against Iran’s nuclear program, often assuming clear responsibility for its actions and abandoning its traditional policy of ambiguity.

8. Netanyahu puts a damper on Ashkenazi’s efforts to strengthen relations with the European Union (EU). Ashkenazi persisted in efforts to enhance relations with the EU as a strategic goal and sought to expand and deepen links with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, Israel’s political instability, Ashkenazi’s limited term in office and Netanyahu’s tight hold on power precluded significant progress in relations. Along with continued economic and civilian cooperation, tensions with the EU persisted over its commitment to the two-state solution and criticism of the ongoing and deepening occupation. Upon taking office, Lapid declared he would turn the page on Israel’s relations with the EU.

9. Israel plays a key role in advancing and bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Israel continued to bolster its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and advanced cooperation with them in the fields of security, energy, tourism and the coronavirus crisis. Israel also continued to advance the development of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and advocated for the UAE’s integration in the Mediterranean arena. It also displayed flexibility in renewed contacts over demarcating its maritime border with Lebanon. At the same time, Israel reacted coolly to Turkish feelers regarding a possible warming of relations.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2021 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document presents key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies in the July-December 2020 period: Establishing diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco; advancing normalization with additional Arab states, but not with Egypt and Jordan; freezing formal annexation but continuing a creeping annexation; capitalizing on US elections to advance diplomatic interests; bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean along with cautious involvement in regional conflicts; leveraging natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean for diplomatic benefits; leading diplomatic efforts to forge a regional and international front against Iran; adopting a more positive approach to the EU despite disagreements on the Palestinian issue; empowering Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) in terms of professionalism, policy influence and public image.

1. Establishing diplomatic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco – Israel forged diplomatic relations with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco and announced progress in normalization with Sudan. These moves were underpinned by US encouragement and support, as expressed in significant defense, diplomatic and economic benefits for the participating Arab states. The formal relations led to advancement of agreements and cooperation in a wide array of fields, with official delegations conducting mutual visits. Attempts were made to harness Saudi participation in the normalization wave, including a reported trilateral meeting between Netanyahu, Bin Salman and Pompeo.

2. Advancing normalization with new Arab states, but not with Egypt and Jordan – The agreements with the UAE and Bahrain prompted a flourishing of security, economic and civilian cooperation encouraged and promoted by the governments. Direct flights were launched between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval to overfly its air space, and maritime trade routes were advanced. Israel and the UAE reacted with enthusiasm to the new relationship, as reflected in the agreement on mutual visa exemptions and the visit of tens of thousands of Israelis to the UAE. The advancement of normalization with Gulf states was particularly pronounced compared to the ongoing freeze in Israel’s civilian relations with Egypt and Jordan.

3. Freezing formal annexation but continuing a creeping annexation – Under international and local political pressure, and the conditions set by the UAE for normalization, Netanyahu announced a freeze of his West Bank annexation intentions. Nonetheless, his government continued to move ahead with de facto annexation, without formal declarations, including construction plans in East Jerusalem and the settlements, along with demolitions of Palestinian homes in Area C, special funding transfers to the settlements and Knesset initiatives to legalize outposts.

4. Capitalizing on US elections to advance diplomatic interests – Ahead of the US presidential elections, Israel took advantage of the Trump Administration’s desire to display foreign policy achievements in order to promote normalization agreements with Arab states, despite the absence of progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. Following Biden’s victory, Israel sought to capitalize on Trump’s final days in office to promote US recognition of the legality of the settlements. The election results also prompted the Palestinian Authority to resume security and civilian coordination with Israel. Israel’s preparations for the Biden administration focused on the Iranian issue in light of an expected US intention to resume negotiations with Iran on the nuclear agreement.

5. Bolstering cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean along with cautious involvement in regional conflicts – Israel has strengthened its alliance with Greece and Cyprus, especially in the fields of security, energy, health and tourism, and accepted a Cypriot initiative to form a trilateral secretariat of the alliance in Nicosia. Israel backed Greece and Cyprus in their maritime border disputes with Turkey, but did so cautiously. It wanted to avoid being dragged into a conflict to which it is not a side and not to exacerbate relations with Turkey, also given recent signals of Ankara’s interest in warmer ties.

6. Leveraging natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean for diplomatic benefits – Israel took advantage of its energy resources and geopolitical location to advance regional cooperation. It promoted, in cooperation with Egypyt the formalization of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as a recognized international organization, and ratified its foundation charter. Israel also entered US-mediated negotiations with Lebanon on marking the maritime border between the two states. It approved the plan for a gas pipeline to Europe via Cyprus and Greece, and advanced cooperation with the UAE on conveying energy through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline.

7. Leading diplomatic efforts to forge a regional and international front against Iran – Israel continued its military activity against Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria, in coordination with Russia, and its diplomatic activity against the nuclear agreement and in favor of broader sanctions on Iran, in cooperation with the US. The Israeli MFA’s efforts affected decisions by additional states to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to Iran played a significant role in bolstering Israel’s relationship with Gulf states and in Israel’s decision to supply arms to Azerbaijan as part of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

8. Adopting a more positive approach toward the EU despite disagreements on the Palestinian issue – The EU harshly condemned Netanyahu’s planned West Bank annexation intentions and expanded Israeli construction in the settlements and East Jerusalem. Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi adopted a positive attitude toward the EU and underlined the importance of improved ties with it. He participated in an unofficial meeting of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, and advanced ties with his European counterparts. Nonetheless, attempts to reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council have yet to bear fruit. Israel’s ties with populist, a-liberal leaders in Central and Eastern Europe were sidelined, contrary to Netanyahu’s boasting of these relationships in previous years.

9. Empowering Israel’s MFA in terms of its professionalism, policy influence and public image – The MFA instituted new working procedures and promoted dozens of professional appointments, some of which are still awaiting government confirmation. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi sought to ensure the participation of MFA representatives in all relevant government forums, and to strengthen coordination with other government ministries. The MFA also intensified its media exposure efforts, including spotlighting its contribution to the promotion of relation with Arab states against the backdrop of the Abraham Accords. The MFA stepped up its recruitment efforts, resulting in higher enrollment than in previous years for its cadet training and making the upcoming cadet course the biggest in recent years.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July-December 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Editors: Dr. Roee Kibrik and Dr. Nimrod Goren

This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

1. Attempts to influence the American peace plan – Israel maintained a relatively low profile with respect to the peace plan reportedly being developed by the Trump administration, with government representatives avoiding criticism of the initiative. At the same time, Israel made diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis the US to influence the content of the plan and to ensure coordination with the American administration regarding it.

2. A focus on economic and security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, while pushing aside the peace process – Israel continued to criticize the Palestinian Authority, describing Palestinian President Abbas as an obstacle to peace rather than a partner. In the absence of peace negotiations, Israel’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority focused on economic aspects, under the leadership of Israel’s Ministers of Finance and Economy, as well as on maintaining security coordination. 3. Efforts to relocate foreign embassies to Jerusalem – Israel endeavored to leverage Trump’s declaration on Jerusalem and decision to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem. It made efforts to persuade additional countries to move their embassies to Jerusalem – with an emphasis on Central and South American nations, as well as East European countries – and was successful in the cases of Guatemala and Paraguay.

4. Participation in international fora regarding Gaza – While continuing the siege over Gaza and adopting a strong hand vis-à-vis a series of protests in the Gaza Strip, Israel tried to contain the humanitarian crisis there, while supporting US efforts to weaken UNRWA. It participated in international fora debating how to provide aid to Gaza, which were led by the donor countries and the US, and were conducted in partnership with Egypt and the Gulf States.

5. Working to marginalize Iran in Syria and to cancel the Iran nuclear deal – In light of the fighting in Syria and the growing Iranian presence there, Israel took military action against Iranian targets in Syria, and increased its diplomatic efforts to ensure coordination with Russia. Israel encouraged the US to leave the Iran nuclear deal and to avoid a withdrawal from Syria. It pressured key EU countries (unsuccessfully) to join the American decision, and conveyed deterring messages to Iran through them.

6. Restoration of ties with Jordan – Israel achieved an agreement with Jordan to end the crisis that erupted between the countries in July 2017. Israel subsequently dispatched a new ambassador to Jordan, and the Israeli embassy in Amman resumed full activity. Although differences between the countries remain on issues related to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the agreement enabled a meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and King Abdullah and strengthened bilateral cooperation.

7. Criticism of the EU and working to deepen disagreements between its members – Israel adopted a more critical line towards the EU, including the casting of accusations and insults by Israeli officials towards Brussels, and questioning the importance of the EU for Israel. In parallel, Israel endeavored to deepen and utilize the existing divisions among EU member states regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to prevent the EU’s from reaching the required consensus on actions and statements.

8. Boycotting Austria’s Freedom Party and cooperating with the Visegrád Group – Following discussions in the Knesset and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Israel chose to boycott Austria’s far-right Freedom Party due to anti-Semitic characteristics. Simultaneously, Israel continued to nurture cooperation with the Visegrád Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) despite the fact that leaders of these countries are pushing their states away from liberal democracy.

9. Stalemate and deterioration in relations with Turkey – Crises in East Jerusalem and Gaza led to harsh Turkish criticism of Israeli policies, to a stalemate in the Israel-Turkey reconciliation process, and eventually to a deterioration leading to the return of ambassadors. While economic relations between the states showed signs of improvement, the possibility that Israel will export gas to Turkey became less feasible. The countries currently lack a shared agenda that would facilitate greater cooperation.

10.Deepening and broadening the alliance with Greece and Cyprus – Israel, Greece and Cyprus deepened their alliance through meetings of leaders and top officials, joint steps regarding natural gas, military exercises, and cooperation on environmental, economic, and communication issues, as well as on coordination between their diasporas. The countries work to positively brand the alliance, to emphasize its shared democratic values, and to bring Egypt into its orbit, via cooperation on natural gas.

11.Attempts by the Israeli MFA to improve its status – The MFA, still without a full time minister, worked to confront efforts to undermine its status. It battled against budget cuts and closure of diplomatic missions, aimed at increasing its impact on decision making, criticized the Ministry of Strategic Affairs for its handling of the BDS issue, launched a policy dialogue with the US State Department, and acknowledged the need to share more information about its work with the public. Nevertheless, the MFA still plays only a marginal role in core issues of Israel’s foreign policy.

12.Efforts by the MFA to excel at digital diplomacy – The MFA increased its activity in the field of digital diplomacy, acknowledging the potential it holds and attempting to establish itself as one of the leading Foreign Ministries in it. The MFA launched new initiatives on social media, including in Arabic (i.e. a Facebook page aimed specifically at Iraqis), and hosted international meetings on digital diplomacy.

* This document is published in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January-June 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two major developments affected Israeli foreign policy over the past six months: The Covid19 crisis that spawned new regional and international cooperation, and the declared annexation intentions that prompted international opposition and warnings of damage to Israel’s ties with Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, Israel’s new Foreign Minister demonstrated a desire to empower the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These are the major semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, in January-June 2020:

1. Israel welcomes the Trump Plan but does not advance its implementation – The Trump Plan, unveiled in late January in the midst of Israel’s election campaign, was described by frontrunners Netanyahu and Gantz as a great opportunity. However, the plan drew support only in Israel and the US, whose standing in the world has significantly declined under President Trump. As it heads for the November presidential elections under the Covid19 crisis, US interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue has waned. Israel did not take operative steps to implement the Trump Plan, except Netanyahu’s intention to take the opportunity it provides for annexation and map drawing by an Israeli-American team. The Palestinians vehemently opposed the plan.

2. Israel declares annexation intention, prompting widespread international opposition – The Trump Plan boosted Netanyahu’s pledge to annex territories in the West Bank, which dominated the public and political agenda. Gantz did not express opposition in principle, but conditioned annexation on regional and international approval and preservation of existing peace treaties. Annexation declarations drew harsh condemnation by the EU and key European states, Jordan, the Gulf States, US Democrats, the UN, Russia, and the Palestinians. Opponents argued that annexation violates international law, and warned that it would destabilize the region, damage Israel’s bilateral relations and distance prospects of peace.

3. Israelis and Palestinians cooperate on Covid-19, but clash over annexation – The Covid-19 outbreak spawned Israeli cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and even with counterparts in Gaza on staff training, medical equipment and supply transfers, knowledge sharing, and movement coordination to contain the disease. However, the PA ceased security and civilian coordination with Israel over Netanyahu’s annexation intentions. At the same time, Israel continued to ensure the transfer of Qatari aid to Gaza, to prevent an escalation of violence and a humanitarian disaster, while trying to advance a prisoner swap with Hamas.

4. The Crisis with Jordan deepens – The mistrust between the Israeli and Jordanian heads of state continued, with King Abdullah reportedly refusing to take Netanyahu’s calls but agreeing to meet with the Mossad chief. The Tzofar land reverted to Jordanian control, due to the expiration of the land lease agreement and after a failed attempt to keep it under Israeli cultivation. Jordan became a leading anti-annexation voice, warning Israel against negative repercussions for the peace treaty and working to mobilize international action, especially in Europe and the US, to prevent the move.

5. The UAE advances ties with Israel, warns against annexation – The UAE took positive measures toward Israel, cooperating with it on preparation for Expo 2020 in Dubai (now postponed to 2021), and on tackling Covid-19. The Emirates helped Israel obtain medical equipment and openly flew planeloads of equipment for the Palestinians to Israel’s BenGurion Airport. The UAE also displayed a supportive attitude toward its Jewish community, and senior Emirati officials legitimized ties with Israel even as they disagreed with its policy on the Palestinians. UAE officials directly appealed to the Israeli public, urging Israel to abandon the annexation idea and warning that it would be detrimental to relations and prevent normalization.

6. Diplomatic efforts and escalation against Iran and its proxies – Israel urged European states to outlaw Hezbollah, as Germany and Austria advanced, and to join US sanctions against Iran. Israel continued to strike Iranian targets in Syria and Hezbollah targets in Syria and Lebanon, and the confrontation escalated into mutual cyber-attacks and reports of Israeli sabotage of sites related to Iran’s nuclear program. Senior Israeli and US officials frequently discussed the Iran issue. Israel also pointed to potential threats from Lebanon, which suffers a deep economic crisis.

7. Indications of a more positive Israeli attitude toward Europe despite the shadow of annexation – Israel’s new Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi opted for a more positive approach toward the EU, emphasizing the importance of the relations with it for Israel. He conducted talks with European foreign ministers and with the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs Borrell. Ashkenazi also dismissed the phrasing of Hungary’s statement of support for Israel, which included a reference to “shared patriotic values” that are opposed to the European discourse. However, the annexation intention, which the EU clearly opposes, overshadowed attempts to turn a new page in Israel-Europe relations.

8. Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus expands – Israel is reaping the fruit of its expanded cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, which extends beyond the energy field. The Covid-19 crisis, which created a global gas price slump, impaired the countries’ ability to profit from their natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean. However, the civilian infrastructure of the relationship built by Israel, Cyprus and Greece facilitated cooperation among them on new medical, technological, security and tourism challenges. Israel was the first destination of visits by the Greek Prime Minister and Cypriot Foreign Minister at the end of the first Covid-19 wave.

9. Israel maneuvers between cooperation and disputes in the Mediterranean – Natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean exacerbated the conflict between Turkey and Greece/Cyprus over maritime boundaries and drilling rights. In addition, the Libyan civil war embroiled foreign actors and further intensified tensions in the Mediterranean. Israel tried to stay out of these conflicts and to avoid a clear anti-Turkish stand, working instead to preserve channels of communication with the various actors. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum continued its bid to become an international organization, but lost its centrality after the regional focus shifted from energy-economic cooperation to geo-political tensions.

10. International and regional cooperation against Covid-19 – Israel worked with international institutions and other countries to curb the Covid-19 pandemic and its repercussions. It mobilized the help of international partners in repatriating its citizens from abroad and obtaining medical equipment and supplies, shared information and tried to work with other countries on a controlled re-opening of its economy and tourism – before it suffered from significant resurgence of the disease. The Israeli MFA played an important role in all these efforts, displaying its significant added value in dealing with such crises.

11. Foreign Minister Ashkenazi tries to rehabilitate the MFA – Ashkenazi’s entry into the position of Foreign Minister lifted spirits in the MFA. He managed to mobilize budget for operations, recognized the importance of diplomacy as a key component of national security, expressed public appreciation for the Foreign Service’s professionalism, and advanced new diplomatic appointments, chief among them of Alon Ushpiz as the MFA’s Director General. Ashkenazi also displayed willingness to benefit from the experience of retired diplomats. However, many foreign policy issues remain under the responsibility of other ministries, and the Foreign Service is still not efficiently coordinated and arrayed.

*Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. This document outlines major semi-annual trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, based on Mitvim’s monthly reports on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and Israel’s Foreign Service. The document is published in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, January – June 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Party leaders utilize foreign policy as an election campaign tool, but avoid in-depth discussion of the issues. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu used the foreign policy arena to boost his 2019 election campaigns, instigating meetings with foreign leaders in a bid to underscore his international standing and diplomatic influence. Opposition parties, for the most part, avoided challenging him, given Netanyahu’s image as an effective player in this arena, and did not present a viable alternative on foreign policy issues. They, too, tried to utilize the diplomatic arena to upgrade their standing. Labor’s Avi Gabbay visited the UAE, Blue and White’s Benny Gantz addressed AIPAC and the Munich Security Conference, Blue and White’s Yair Lapid met with Emmanuel Macron and Meretz Chair Tamar Zandberg with Mahmoud Abbas. However, the issues themselves, including the peace process with the Palestinians, were relegated to the sidelines of public discourse.

2. Netanyahu openly announces policy goals he concealed in the past. Netanyahu has traditionally avoided explicit declarations regarding his goals on sensitive foreign policy issues. However, a shift is underway. In 2018, he declared that Israel was seeking to deepen divisions among member states of the EU to prevent consensus against Israeli policies, and stepped back from the Israeli policy of ambiguity regarding attacks on Iranian targets in Syria. In the first half of 2019, he continued with pronouncements on these issues, adding clear statements about Israeli efforts to maintain the Palestinian split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to avoid the need for progress in peace negotiations, and saying Israel was seeking to advance de facto annexation of settlements. Netanyahu takes advantage of strong backing by the Trump administration to openly promote policies deviating from international norms, without paying an international price and without incurring significant opposition.

3. Israel avoids war in Gaza, props up Hamas regime and undermines the Palestinian Authority. Despite several rounds of escalation that nearly resulted in a broad military offensive in the Gaza Strip, Israel opted to avoid war. It negotiated with Hamas, agreed to mediation by Qatar, Egypt and the UN, and approved the transfer of large sums of Qatari money to Gaza. In doing so, the Israeli government sought to preserve Hamas rule and fuel the internal Palestinian split in order to undermine the feasibility of a two-state solution. At the same time, Israel weakened the  Palestinian Authority by withholding tax money it collects for the Palestinians, and then tried to limit the damage in order to avoid the Authority’s collapse and ensure its continued security coordination with the Israelis. Israel’s security apparatus and finance ministry are the ones leading relations with the Palestinians.

4. Israel cooperates with the Trump plan but keeps a low profile. The Trump plan regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not play a central role in the run-up to the April 2019 elections. Repeated delays in unveiling the plan enabled the Israeli government to put a positive face on its response without having to clash with the US administration over specific details, which it might find less palatable. Israel’s anxiety over the plan ebbed the closer its coordination became with Trump’s envoys, and it welcomed the US decision top resent the economic part of the plan first, avoiding the need to express any opinion on political aspects. Nonetheless, the economic plan did envision a link between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which runs counter to Israel’s policy of driving a wedge between the two Palestinian territories.

5. Ties with Egypt grow warmer, while ties with Jordan cool down. As Israel and Egypt marked the 40th anniversary of their peace treaty, economic and defense ties were growing stronger – as publicly manifested in a declaration by President a-Sisi on security cooperation with Israel and an invitation to Energy Minister Steinitz to the Cairo launch of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Other ties are still very limited despite Israeli efforts to connect with the Egyptian public through social media and increasing Israeli tourism to Sinai. Relations with Jordan, on the other hand, have deteriorated with heightened tensions over Israeli policy on Jerusalem and large opposition in Jordan to normalization. There are no indications of an Israeli effort to reverse this trend, nor of attempts to leverage the 25th anniversary of the Israeli-Jordanian peace accord to improve relations.

6. Israel promotes alignments and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel played a generally positive role in the Eastern Mediterranean, supported Egyptian and Cypriot efforts to forge new regional alignments, kept boosting its trilateral alliance with Greece and Cyprus, and preserved ties with Turkey while making new appointments at its diplomatic missions there. Israel cooperated with American efforts to mediate between it and Lebanon, in a bid to launch maritime border negotiations. During the first half of 2019, Israel avoided intervention in tensions between Cyprus and Turkey over gas drilling and on issues related to Israeli tourism to the northern (Turkish) part of Cyprus. Under US pressure, Israel scaled back some of its ties with China, which is seeking deeper involvement in the Mediterranean.

7. Netanyahu develops ties with populist and far-right leaders amid growing Israeli understanding of the cost. The rise in power of far-right actors around the world raises questions regarding Israel’s policy towards ties with them and its willingness to compromise on historic memory and anti-Semitism. Israel has yet to formulate a coherent policy on the issue, although it continues to boycott the far-right parties in Austria and Germany. However, due to an ideological affinity with the global non-liberal axis and a desire to generate pro- Israel policies, Netanyahu bolstered ties with controversial leaders, such as Brazil’s Bolsonaro, Hungary’s Orban, Italy’s Salvini and Russia’s Putin. The crisis with Poland over Holocaust commemoration pointed to the limitations of this policy, as did opposition on the part of Jewish Diaspora communities and President Reuven Rivlin to Israel’s contacts with leaders tainted by anti-Semitism.

8. Deepening crisis with US Jewry and the Democratic Party. Suspicions of corruption against Netanyahu and the seal of approval he gave far-right parties in Israel; political campaigns with racist and fascist overtones; campaigns against civil society and BDS activists; profiling at border checkpoints; reported arms sales in Africa, Asia and eastern Europe; and attempts to curb the Supreme Court’s authority and ensure immunity from prosecution for Netanyahu – generated international contempt and further eroded Israel’s image as a liberal democracy. Along with Israeli moves to undermine the two-state solution, these developments deepened the crisis with US Jewry (incurring unusual AIPAC criticism) and led to unprecedented and harsh personal criticism by presidential candidates from the Democratic Party against Israel’s Prime Minister.

9. Israel digs itself into diplomatic holes and then seeks a way out. After encouraging a tough US stance on Iran, Israel seemed anxious about a possible US military operation and toned down its rhetoric. After encouraging American criticism of the Palestinian Authority to such an extent that Congress adopted a bill harmful to the Palestinian economy, Israel asked the US to ease its pressure to prevent the Authority’s collapse. After making allowances for the Polish Holocaust law, Israel understood that it had gone too far and adopted damage control measures, with criticism of the Poles resulting in Poland’s cancellation of a planned Visegrad Group summit in Jerusalem. After making the transfer of foreign embassies to Jerusalem a central policy goal, following the US Embassy’s relocation, Israel scaled back its rhetoric on the issue given its limited success.

10. Ongoing efforts to boost the foreign ministry’s standing and authority. The status and budget of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to decline, and ahead of the April 2019 elections, opposition parties and civil society began calling for change. Netanyahu appointed Israel Katz as acting Foreign Minister after holding the portfolio himself for some four years, and then made the appointment permanent. The ministry cooperated with other government agencies to fight looming budget cuts and tried to boost public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the need to upgrade its status. Former diplomats stepped up their public activity, speaking out against the ministry’s eroding standing and Netanyahu’s intention (which fell through) to name a controversial political associate, Ayoub Kara, as Israel’s ambassador to Egypt.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies January – June 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

Trends:

1. From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players,among them Democratic US presidential candidates, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

2. Efforts to achieve a long-term truce with Hamas, while preserving the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) just short of collapse – Israel and Hamas conducted indirect contacts via Qatar, Egypt and the UN special envoy in a bid to achieve a long-term truce, which will also enable the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip. Despite occasional flare-ups of violence, Israel opted to forego another round of war with Gaza and instead sought to reach understandings with Hamas and implement them. At the same time, Israel gave the PA funds it had deducted from its budget in order to avert its collapse but did not support it politically and continued to encourage the intra-Palestinian divide.

3. Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements, while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the BDS movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4. Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders, without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdallah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer.  President Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5. Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf States and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf States, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations towards its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf States, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf States, which was not met with a significant American response.

6. Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders, and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7. Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement, while Israel dials down its Visegrad Group links – The EU continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public opinion’s perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrad Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8. Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9. Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign, but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes cancelled) international visits and meetings to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Trump and Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10. Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister, but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointed was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, on the expense of diplomats.

*This document is published in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and with the assistance of former diplomats Arthur Koll, Nadav Tamir and Michael Harari.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July – December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

1. Supporting international efforts to prevent war in Gaza. Israel and Hamas were once again on the brink of war. Israel chose to avoid another round of warfare in Gaza and to help prevent a greater humanitarian crisis there. It held indirect talks with Hamas, supported Egyptian and UN mediation efforts, and encouraged Qatar to transfer funds and fuel to Gaza. In parallel, Israel worked to prevent international recognition of Hamas and to maintain the split between the West Bank and Gaza.

2. Efforts to postpone the publication of the US peace plan. Israel made efforts to delay the announcement of Trump’s peace plan, while trying to influence its content. For the first time, an Israeli minister publicly criticized the plan. Israel did not take steps to advance the peace process. It maintained security and economic coordination with the Palestinian Authority, but also advanced legislative measures and settlements’ construction that go against the two state solution.

3. Unsuccessful attempts to relocate additional embassies to Jerusalem. Israel lobbied  various countries to encourage them to relocate their embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (as was already done by the US and Guatemala). These efforts did not yield results. They led Australia to declare that west Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and the Czech Republic to open a cultural center in Jerusalem. On the other hand, Paraguay withdrew its embassy from Jerusalem, shortly after moving it there.

4. Increased cooperation with Egypt and new tensions with Jordan. Israel and Egypt stepped up their cooperation on Gaza, natural gas, and the war against terror. This led to an improvement in bilateral relations, which was made evident through positive public engagement between the countries, including between Netanyahu and a-Sisi. At the same time, Jordan’s decision not to renew the lease to Israel of lands in Naharayim and Tzofar created new tensions between the countries. Israel tried to ease these tensions by advancing water projects that are of interest to Jordan.

5. Visits by Israeli officials to the Gulf and support to the Saudi regime. Netanyahu publicly visited Oman and several Israeli ministers participated in international forums that convened in Gulf states. In addition, several positive statements were made by Gulf states towards Israel. This coincides with signs of warming ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which led Netanyahu to back the Saudi regime following the Khashoggi murder. These developments are influenced by joint interests against Iran and by coordination with the US administration.

6. Attempts to overcome tensions with Russia and continued action in Syria. The downing of a Russian plane in Syria led to tensions between Israel and Russia. Israel pursued Putin and conducted contacts with Russia in order to restore the coordination mechanism that enables Israel to act against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. This has become more acute for Israeli given the transfer of advanced Russian anti-aircraft missiles to Syria, the announced US withdrawal from Syria, and efforts by Hezbollah to transfer weapons from Syria to Lebanon.

7. Criticizing the EU and encouraging the split between its member states. The Israeli government has been increasingly criticizing the EU. It described the EU as a foe to Israel, and accused it of funding organizations that support terror and boycotts. Israel continued to developed alliances with central and eastern Europe countries, in order to weaken the EU’s capacity to reach decisions and take action on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In parallel, Israel continued to develop its ties with the EU in various areas, and even signed additional agreements with it.

8. Weakening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. The Israeli government drew closer to several non-democratic leaders around the world and far-right figures in Europe, tightened restrictions on entry into Israel, delegitimized criticism of its policy toward the Palestinians by labelling at as anti-Semitism or as part of the anti-Israel boycott movement, and passed the harshly criticized Nation State Bill. Undermining Israel’s liberal and democratic values has created a growing rift between the Israeli government and Jewish communities in the US and Europe.

9. Strengthening ties with Greece and Cyprus, while tensions mount with Turkey. The tripartite Israel-Greece-Cyprus alliance continues to strengthen through meetings between heads of state and parliamentarians, signing new agreements, advancing a joint gas pipeline to Europe, and cooperation on security, diplomatic, diaspora, environmental, and cultural affairs. In parallel, the crisis between Israel and Turkey, sparked by harsh Turkish criticism of Israeli actions in Gaza and Jerusalem, has not been resolved. It even deepened after anotherround of verbal skirmishes between Erdoğan and Netanyahu towards the end of the year.

10.Diversifying foreign policy by pursuing ties in Asia and Africa. Israel has made efforts to deepen ties with Asia and Africa, due to their growing global influence. It promoted economic relations with East Asian countries by signing new agreements, opening up development hubs and holding high-level visits. Special emphasis was placed on promoting relations with China, despite a growing recognition that this poses strategic challenges. In Africa, Israel worked to renew diplomatic ties with Chad and Sudan. This goal was not yet achieved despite the progress made.

11. Budget cuts and the lack of a minister further weaken the Foreign Ministry. The status of Israel’s Foreign Ministry continued to be weak. It was eroded even further due to an announcement of additional budget cuts and the lack of implementation of wage agreements reached with the Finance Ministry. Foreign Ministry employees tried to publicize the diplomatic implications of these steps, but have not yet succeeded in changing this decision. Moreover, Netanyahu did not yet appoint a full-time foreign minister, despite promises to do so following the resignation of his defense minister in November.

*Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute; Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. This document is published in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, July-December 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.