Thus, for example, at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, the spread of the disease spawned racism and xenophobia directed at Chinese people the world over. This was also reflected in the intensification of ethnic tensions in states with a Chinese minority. Unprecedented violence was recorded against the Chinese-Muslim Dungan minority in Kazakhstan, and representatives of the Chinese minority in the Philippines complained of incidents of discrimination and racism. Fear of the virus has also led to isolation and border closings, a sensitive issue in conflict areas that can raise tensions even further. For example, the border between the two parts of Cyprus, first opened in 2003, was closed at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, prompting protests.

Studies point to a link between the spread of disease and civil conflicts. A 2017 study found that exposure to contagious disease increased the risk of a violent civil conflict. An additional study, focused on the Ebola epidemic in western Africa in 2014-2015, pointed to a similar correlation. It should be noted that following the Ebola epidemic in western Africa, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to define the outbreak in this region as a threat to international security and peace. The study determined that in conflict areas, or countries recovering from internal wars, unusual government measures to deal with epidemics can serve as fertile ground for increased tensions and hostility resulting in unrest and violence. In areas where tension and mistrust prevail between various groups or regions and the central regime, such situations can be perceived as an excuse for the government to exercise its power, generating resistance and counter-reaction. In various central Asian states, among them Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, the Corona crisis prompted protests by residents against government measures.

The Corona crisis is monopolizing the attention of all the countries in the world, including the superpowers, making it difficult for the international community to deal with other issues and divert resources to other causes. The restrictions on movement also undermine such efforts. A report by the International Crisis Group argues that the Covid-19 pandemic undermines the ability of international institutions to deliver humanitarian aid, advance diplomatic initiatives and operate peacekeeping forces. It should be emphasized that areas of war and conflict are particularly vulnerable, raising deep concerns about the spread of the epidemic in such countries as Libya, Syria and Afghanistan. This is well illustrated in the difficulties experienced by international organizations in eradicating Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo due to fighting that prevented access to infected regions and also resulted in injury to medical personnel.

However, along with the risks and negative repercussions, disasters and epidemics can also demonstrate to rivals that they are facing a common enemy and must join forces to confront it, as President Rivlin argued. Agreement on such cooperation could spill over into other issues and serve as a confidence building measures and an eventual turning point in the relationship between sides to a conflict. Such events underscore similarities between rival parties and the immediate need for humanitarian aid, unrelated to politics, and the crisis can turn into an opportunity. Such situations have given rise to what is known as “disaster diplomacy” in which rival parties help each other in a time of crisis as a goodwill gesture. The United Arab Emirates, for example, recently transferred humanitarian relief to Iran, hard hit by Covid-19, despite the tension between these two states.

Such crises can also lead to ceasefires. That was the case, for example, when the “Guinea Worm” disease started spreading in Sudan in 1995, prompting six-month ceasefire between the north and south to tackle the deep crisis afflicting numerous villages. In the current crisis, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued a call for a global ceasefire in order to combat the Coronavirus, and warring sides in various conflict areas, such as Yemen, Libya and the Philippines expressed support for the initiative.

The massive 2005 earthquake that hit India and Pakistan, including the disputed territory of Kashmir, provides another example of rivals helping each other. India transferred huge amounts of aid to Pakistan, whose President publicly acknowledged the assistance and offered his thanks. Shortly thereafter, the sides advanced initiatives on linking the two parts of Kashmir – initially, through phone lines connecting the two sides and then free passage in order to provide disaster relief. These moves generated hope, but violence eventually resumed and the “disaster diplomacy” failed to yield a breakthrough.

However, in some cases disasters did result in real, long-term change. A special case in point was the effect of the December 2004 Indian Ocean quake and tsunami on the conflict between Indonesia and the Aceh Province, which was an epicenter of the disaster that killed over 200,000 people. Following the quake, the President of Indonesia lifted the state of emergency imposed on Aceh, and the Free Aceh Movement declared a ceasefire. In early 2005, Indonesia called for negotiations, which were held in Finland and culminated in a peace agreement in August of that year. It cannot be argued that the disaster led to peace, and the breakthrough was the result of many other weighty elements (among them a political change in Indonesia and successful mediation efforts of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari), but the heavy disaster and the global attention it drew, affected the sides, pushed them to compromise and served as an opportunity for constructive diplomacy.

Turning back to our region, initial indications at the outset of the crisis pointed to encouraging cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. The sides established a special mechanism for close, ongoing coordination, Israel’s Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon met with his Palestinian counterpart Shukri Bishara to discuss economic aspects of the crisis, and Israel transferred aid and equipment to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov praised the cooperation between the sides. However, at the same time, the Palestinians complained on continued operations of the Israel Defense Forces in Palestinian cities and villages, and Israel complained about Palestinian declarations claiming Israel was working to spread the virus. In addition, Hamas leaders threatened that the spread of the disease in Gaza would lead to an escalation with Israel.

It is too soon to say at this stage how the Coronavirus crisis will play out and how it will impact conflict areas. Examples from around the world illustrate that the link between a humanitarian or health disaster and political tensions could be dangerous. Therefore, the Israel-Palestinian cooperation should be welcomed and the parties should make every effort to avert a deterioration into a harsh health or economic crisis that might increase the threat of escalation. Leaders in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority could learn from efforts made in the past by other rival parties to exploit such crises to advance conciliatory moves and a diplomatic breakthrough.

הפוסט War and Peace in the Age of Coronavirus הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Surprisingly, all those interviewed hold similar views despite their different political stripes. However, they are suggesting tactical solutions, rather than strategic and diplomatic goals, which are therefore bound to be short-term in nature.

A strategic approach to Gaza must relate to the overall Palestinian issue, not just to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The policy of recent Israeli governments separating the Gaza issue from the West Bank one has convinced Israelis that this split is, indeed, the desired goal. But it is a flawed assumption. Ironically, the Trump plan, which undermines prospects of peace in many respects, pointed to the inevitable solution of linking Gaza and the West Bank.

Any solution to the Gaza issue must include the Palestinian Authority (PA). But we have made the PA irrelevant to Gaza and thus achieved a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Israeli government has thwarted all attempts at rapprochement between Gaza and the PA. Such was the case when PA President Mahmoud Abbas sought to hold Palestinian elections, or when he tried to form a government of technocrats that could have enabled Hamas to move forward vis-à-vis Israel without initially abandoning its ideology.

We have weakened the PA by refusing to credit and encourage its non-violent, pro-diplomacy policies. From his first day on the job, Abbas sought agreement, if possible through bilateral negotiations, and if not, by appealing to multinational organizations.

We have turned his attempts at dialogue with Israel into pathetic overtures by continuing to build in the settlements and using negotiations to buy time and create facts on the ground. When the Palestinians tried to achieve their aims by taking multilateral steps, we dubbed their measures “diplomatic terrorism” and exerted pressure on the Americans to block them, even though the same measures – appealing to the UN – gained Israel its own independence.

While Abbas supports a two-state solution and recognition of Israel in its 1967 borders with land swaps, and even accepts the principle of a demilitarized Palestinian state, we insist instead on dealing with Hamas, which rejects our existence. Whereas Abbas continues to instruct his security forces to cooperate with the IDF and Shin Bet in foiling terror attacks, and is therefore accused by many Palestinians of collaboration with Israel, we reward Hamas with benefits and payments from Qatar.

A strategic, long-term solution to the Gaza issue is linked to renewal of the diplomatic process with the PA, and to the encouragement of a technocratic unity government in Gaza with which gradual progress can be made on demilitarization and rehabilitation. A long-term solution must be diplomatic. All our previous attempts to create deterrence have taught us that there is no military solution.

We currently have much better Palestinian partners for peace than we had in the past. The terrorist Arafat has been replaced by Abbas, who reviles terrorism; the three “No’s” (no to peace with Israel, no to recognition of Israel, no to negotiations with Israel) of the 1967 Arab League summit in Khartoum have been replaced by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The key message of that initiative is, “please move ahead with a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian issue so that we can normalize relations with you based on the understanding that Israel could constitute part of the solution to regional problems, rather than the problem itself”.

While all these positive changes were occurring around us, our leaders continued to explain why Israel has no Palestinian partner and to empower Hamas. That is why Israeli discourse keeps going back to the same tactical suggestions that resolve nothing. These solutions only sound logical absent of a strategic alternative. But such an alternative exists and it requires courageous and sober leadership rather than political slogans and hollow clichés.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is time to revisit the one peace initiative that gained support from every Arab state in the Middle East: the Arab Peace Initiative.

Today, when uncertainly about the future of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rising, the Arab Peace Initiative could serve as a good basis for relaunching negotiations between the two sides. Almost 18 years ago, then-Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud presented his peace vision during the Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This plan was adopted by the Arab League members and it is still valid today.

Sadly, no Israeli government has so far officially reacted to this peace proposal that aims at providing a just and acceptable solution for the conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Almost two decades have passed since its inception, and while some updates may be required, this initiative is still by far the best platform for resuming the bilateral negotiations with much needed regional support.

What will happen if the Trump administration’s “deal of the century” does not take off? Many in Israel believe the status quo is not such a bad thing. We live our lives, there is no major violence, and the world seems to be less and less interested in what is happening in this part of the region. But, in fact, nothing can be farther from the truth, as the status quo is nothing but illusion.

Escalation is here already, even if it doesn’t affect daily life of the majority in Israel – yet. In recent weeks there were more attacks, more clashes in Jerusalem, and more desperate and disillusioned young Palestinians that increasingly support the one-state solution.

In fact, a status quo takes us back to the dangers of recent past when the two nations and their leadership lacked communication, understanding, and compromise. While the settlements will grow and the Israelis will be busy annexing segments of West Bank, more and more Palestinians will depart from the two-state solution and opt for one state where they will seek equal political and civil rights. The possibility to separate and draw the border between two warring nations will be lost forever.

Naturally, the Israelis and the Palestinians will be the biggest losers, but the consequences might be quite dangerous for the broader Middle East region, as well. As the situation in Israel and West Bank deteriorates – according to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chiefs and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) leaders, it will, barring real progress with negotiations – it inevitably will affect the stability of the West Bank and Jordan, and also damage relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The dream of regional integration, as well as forging a powerful alliance between all those in the region who seek stability and peace will remain just a dream. No positive development between the Palestinians and Israelis will also mean no normalization, integration or advancement of cooperation. We don’t need a status quo, but a reasonable base to resume the negotiations and regional support of the process. The Arab Peace initiative provides this foundation.

Today we have a clear vision of how a partnership in the spheres of technology, trade, tourism and defense might look like between Israel and the Arab states. The only way of getting there is by first taking care of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Whoever emerges as the winner in Israel’s upcoming parliamentary elections will need to focus on two issues: how to prevent the deterioration between Israel and Palestinian Authority, and how to promote Israel’s integration in the region. These two issues are interconnected, and the Arab Peace Initiative should be the key. It’s not too late for that today, however it might be too late tomorrow.

Ksenia Svetlova is a former member of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset. Today she serves as Director of the Program on Israel-Middle East relations at the Mitvim Institute and is a senior research analyst at Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya.

(originally published in al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Revisiting Arab Peace Initiative is best hope to solve Israel-Palestine conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During the Oslo process, Israel had a two-track policy. It conducted talks with the PLO, which had officially and publicly recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” in the hopes of reaching a final status agreement, and at the same time Israel waged uncompromising war on Hamas, which refused to recognize both Israel and the Oslo Accords. That policy was shared by both the left-wing and right-wing Israeli governments through the 1990s. Suggestions by certain Israeli figures, among them Rabbi Menachem Froman and Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy to promote dialogue with Hamas were rejected out of hand. However, it became increasingly obvious over the years that ignoring Hamas and excluding it from the process would be very hard given its standing in Palestinian society, especially after its 2006 election victory and takeover of the Gaza Strip.

One way of understanding Israel’s dilemma is through the concept of “peace spoilers.” In the 1990s, there was a growing discussion among academics in the field of conflict analysis, about how to relate to actors, often non-state ones, who undertake concerted efforts to thwart peace processes or agreements that they view as a threat to themselves and their goals. One of the main examples discussed in those days were Hamas and Jewish extremists, both of whom sought to foil the Oslo process. Other peace processes in the 1990s encountered a similar phenomenon. In Northern Ireland, the Real Irish Republican Army split from the IRA and carried out terror attacks in a bid to prevent a peace agreement. In South Africa, deadly violence in the early 1990s threatened to undermine attempts of reconciliation. Scholars debated how best to deal with such actors – whether to fight against them or to communicate with them and try to integrate them into the process.

Even after the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2007, Israel continued with its parallel policy: Security coordination and peace talks (until the 2014 collapse of negotiations led by US Secretary of State John Kerry) vis-a-vis the PLO-led Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas, along with a blockade of Gaza and repeated rounds of fighting with Hamas, whom Israel saw as “peace spoilers” who must be fought.

Successive Israeli governments insisted that they would not conduct any dialogue with a Palestinian unity government if it included Hamas. In October 2017, the Netanyahu government’s security cabinet reiterated this stance in light of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation attempts, announcing that Israel would engage with such a Palestinian government only if Hamas recognized Israel, stopped its terrorist activity, disarmed and severed ties with Iran.

But over the last decade, the ground started shifting, gradually. In 2011 Israel and Hamas reached an agreement on releasing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners; the parties also negotiated indirectly on ceasefires to end several rounds of fighting. But these contacts were a precursor to a far more dramatic and significant move. Ironically, the most right-wing government in Israeli history, formed in 2015, which did not include representatives of centrist or left-wing parties, was the one that eventually led to a radical shift of Israel’s position. During 2018, Israel and Hamas launched indirect intensive negotiations, mediated by Egypt and UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov.

This shift has several reasons: Both parties were finally open to the idea of dialogue, after a decade of repeated and indecisive clashes, and a primed for a more pragmatic recognition of reality. But at the same time, it also stemmed from a mutual interest in managing the conflict rather than resolving it – and in weakening the PA under Abbas. The same dynamics are true today. The Netanyahu government is not interested in fostering a peace process that would entail territorial concessions in the West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state, whereas Hamas is interested in preserving its power and standing. Netanyahu declared in March 2019 that contacts with Hamas were maintaining the split between Gaza and the PA-controlled West Bank, thus scuppering the possibility of establishing Palestinian state. A close Netanyahu campaign aide, Jonathan Urich, boasted in an April 2019 interview that his boss had “managed to achieve a split between Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and in fact crushed the vision of a Palestinian state in these two areas. Part of this achievement is linked to the Qatari money reaching Hamas each month.”

This in itself constituted a turnaround in Israel’s position: for years, it had demanded that control over Gaza be restored to the PA. Looking at the Israel-PA-Hamas triangle, it appears that any real dialogue between Israel and the PA has collapsed; contacts between Hamas and the PA have reached a dead end; and only the channel between Hamas and Israel is still working. During the 2007-2008 Annapolis process, Israel’s goal was to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas and reach a final status agreement with him, which would be expanded in its next phase to include Gaza. However, Israel is now working to preserve the split between the two Palestinian entities, and no longer seeks to create any affinity between Gaza and the PA, or to push for a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It’s worth taking a step back to see just how unthinkable (until very recently) Israel’s pivot has been, and how dramatically expedient, or pragmatic, its redefinition of an acceptable partner for dialogue has been. If, as recently as some two years ago, the Israeli government rejected the idea of talks with a Palestinian unity government due to its affiliation with Hamas, today the Israeli government is talking to Hamas, while not conducting any diplomatic dialogue with Abbas, and even adopting an increasingly harsh tone toward him and the Palestinian Authority. The emerging message is that Israel is rewarding Hamas, which uses violent means against Israel (firing rockets and incendiary devices at Israel), and punishing the PA, which has adhered to tight security coordination with Israel.

Lior Lehrs is the Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Peace-Spoilers or Negotiation Partners? Netanyahu’s Understandings with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Greenblatt was appointed shortly after Trump’s election victory and initially it appeared both the Israeli and Palestinian sides were willing to work with him. During his first months on the job, Greenblatt met several times with Palestinian President Abbas and other senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, even visiting a Palestinian refugee camp and meeting with Palestinian and Israeli students and religious leaders. At first, he also tried to promote cooperation between the sides and was involved in the contacts on the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal that resulted in understandings between Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation Hanegbi and the Head of the PA’s Water Authority Ghuneim. However, these first steps were upended with a series of Trump Administration measures against the Palestinians, starting in late 2017. These included the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, aid cuts, shuttering the PLO office in Washington and departure from the twostate principle – all of which led to a complete and unprecedented rift between the US administrations and Ramallah. Greenblatt became the first US Envoy in the annals of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process who lost contact with one of the sides and the ability to serve as a broker.

At that point, rather than taking advantage of his position to calm tensions and to try and restore trust and to facilitate dialogue with the Palestinians through back channels, Greenblatt actually sought to escalate the crisis and exacerbate the public verbal and media conflict with the Palestinians. He did so in contravention of the basic principles of mediation, which every first-year student of international relations learns. Greenblatt began facing off against various Palestinian representatives on Twitter, and tweeted blatant attacks on the Palestinian leadership. His remarks also disavowed the basic principles of the peace process. He spoke, for example, about Israel’s right to annex territories, and expressed disregard for the international resolutions on the conflict. The photos showing Greenblatt taking a hammer to breach an ancient tunnel under the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem, at an inauguration ceremony of the “Path of the Pilgrims” that was organized by the Elad organization, was a jarring final note that faithfully reflected the direction in which Greenblatt had taken his role. The much-touted Trump peace plan (dubbed “the deal of the century), over which Greenblatt had labored with Kushner and Amb. Friedman, has yet to be unveiled, with its publication date put off repeatedly, whereas the economic component of the blueprint, which the US team presented in Bahrain, failed to leave its mark.

Despite Greenblatt’s inexperience when he took over his position, he did have several levers of influence he could have used, chief among them the personal ties and trust with President Trump. He also enjoyed the initial willingness of both sides to cooperate with him. However, his mission has come to a crashing end with the unprecedented rift between the US administration and the Palestinian side and his inability to play any significant role in the different issues and aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian arena. We do not know, yet, the reason for Greenblatt’s decision to step down, but it undoubtedly illustrates the pointlessness of the measures to achieve the “deal of the century”, thus far. It will be interesting to see whether Greenblatt’s departure signals a change in approach and policy or whether the remaining Kushner-Friedman team will adhere to the current policy guidelines.

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at the Mitvim Institute. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and The Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Resignation of Jason Greenblatt, the Peace Envoy Who Did Not Broker הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s warm relationship with the US administration, the enhanced alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, and burgeoning relations with Gulf States could bolster these claims. However, missing from this rosy picture are the stagnated peace process with the Palestinians, the inability to resolve the festering conflict with Hamas in Gaza, tensions with the EU, crises with Russia and Turkey, difficulties with key Jewish communities, troubling embraces of illiberal leaders from Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, and more.

It will be up to the next Israeli government to reevaluate and provide alternatives to Israel’s current foreign policy, to the values guiding it, and to the status of those government agencies tasked with implementing it. Should the next foreign minister – assuming a fulltime minister will be appointed, unlike after the 2015 elections – will have interest in promoting a pro-peace, multi-regional, internationalist, modern and inclusive Israeli foreign policy, he or she should take the following steps during the first 100 days in office:

First on the agenda is launching a process to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on previous agreements and international resolutions, in accordance with the accepted parameters of a two-state solution. Such a move could be launched with a public statement of intent regarding the final goal of the negotiations as proof of seriousness, a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the creation of a bilateral channel for talks (with an initial clandestine component). Israel should also support the establishment of an updated multilateral mechanism to support the peace process, as an improvement to the existing Quartet, in which specific European and Middle Eastern countries will also take part. While advancing such an initiative, the next Israeli government must recognize the need for a renewed political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the current split poses a major obstacle on the way to a two-state solution.

The second step to follow the first should be leveraging the move vis-à-vis the Palestinians to realize the unfulfilled regional potential. Israel has been presented with unique opportunities in recent years to significantly upgrade its standing in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe, most of which remain unrealized due to the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Progress with the Palestinians would enable the next government to take relations with Arab countries to the next level, making them more public and diverse, rather than focusing mostly on behind-the-scenes security coordination. It would also revive regional incentives for peace that previous Israeli governments wrongly ignored – the Arab Peace Initiative and the EU’s proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership, and enable the leveraging of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean to affect change in the diplomatic, civil and security spheres. Finally, it would remove significant obstacles to upgrading Israel’s relationship with the EU.

The third measure is strengthening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. In recent years, the Israeli government eroded basic principles of Israeli democracy. Along with the repercussions of these actions on Israeli society, they have also had an impact on the state’s foreign relations. The next foreign minister will have to prioritize relations and alliances with democratic states, even those critical of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. As a rule, Israel must recognize the legitimacy of criticism and conduct dialogue with those voicing it rather than seeking to undermine them. The new foreign minister will have to pull back from Israel’s rapprochement with far-right elements in Europe, some of them tainted by antisemitism. Instead of lashing out at the EU and joining forces with European member states seeking to divide and weaken it, Israel must regard the EU as a partner – both in practical terms and from a value-based perspective. Rather than inviting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Jerusalem, after the European Parliament elections in May Israel should invite whoever replaces Federica Mogherini as the EU’s foreign policy chief.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong and well-functioning foreign ministry and recognition of diplomacy as a central instrument in advancing national security. Thus, the fourth move required of the new foreign minister will be to formulate a national foreign policy paradigm, bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the forefront of core foreign policy issues, upgrade the standing of the Foreign Service vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and restore to the MFA responsibilities delegated to other government bodies in recent years. The minister will also have to work with the Knesset to increase its focus on foreign policy issues (first and foremost by its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee), and advance internal structural reforms within the MFA. Last but by no means least, the new foreign minister will have to raise public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the MFA’s role in implementing it.

The upcoming general elections provide an opportunity to change course in Israel’s foreign policy, towards an empowered Foreign Service, better ties with the Middle East and Europe, and progress in the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace. A full plate awaits Israel’s next foreign minister.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the Mitvim Institute and a lecturer at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Should Israel’s Next Foreign Minister Do? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In effect, the government that is now dispersing is the second one Hamdallah has led. He was first appointed prime minister in 2013 and started his second term in 2015 after Abbas picked him to lead the Fatah-Hamas unity government. That government was comprised of technocrats and appointed not only to govern but also to prepare the groundwork for a Palestinian legislative election and to institute reforms that would allow the Palestinian political system to reunite.

The PA is managed as a presidential republic, in which the president holds most of the power and the government is basically an executive body that does what the president wants. Dismissing the government is one of the tools the president can use to send a message to the people, handle criticism from home or coordinate things ahead of actions required to make political change.

Abbas chose to appoint a new government as a way of dealing with political challenges at home and responding to current events in Palestinian society. The race for succession between various Fatah officials is creating considerable tension. One concern all senior officials in the movement share is that Hamdallah is coalescing political and popular power as prime minister and could become a serious rival in the battle to succeed Abbas. Even though Hamdallah, a former president of the al-Najah University in Nablus, is identified with the Fatah, he holds no official role in the movement. So paradoxically, the Fatah leadership took care to portray him as a political player who isn’t really one of them.

The Fatah succession race is playing out alongside the more than decade long struggle between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA’s political system. As head of the unity government, Hamdallah is now having to pay a high political price for the decision by Abbas and the top Fatah echelon to put a cork in efforts to reconcile the two rival Palestinian factions. The main reason Abbas dismissed the government – which will nevertheless still exist and hold ministerial responsibility for forming a new government – is his need to prepare the groundwork for legislative and presidential elections. These elections are slated to be held in the West Bank only, and not in Gaza, and will effectively make the division between Fatah and Hamas into a permanent fact.

Shoving a serving prime minister aside is another signal from Abbas that he is still powerful. Abbas wants to lay down the outline for Palestinian policy in the future and ensure that Fatah stays in power after Gaza was lost on his watch. Despite the concentrated political power he has demonstrated in recent years, which sometimes took the form of limiting free speech, Abbas has decided – along with dismissing the Hamdallah government – to freeze a bill that would establish a Palestinian social security institution. That bill sparked an outcry in many sectors of Palestinian society, as people feared that money would be deducted from their salaries and put into the PA’s accounts.

Until a new PA government is appointed, Abbas and the rest of the Fatah leadership have some time to get a sense of how the public is responding to their political moves. The next PA prime minister will need to deal with less public backing for the Fatah government. The new Palestinian government will also face challenges in building a Palestinian state, given the lack of faith between the PA and the US administration; the lack of a peace plan; and a total freeze in negotiations between the PA and Israel.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in Yisrael Hayom)

הפוסט Where Are Palestinian Politics Headed? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Regional Opportunities to Improve the Situation in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The leaders played a significant role in the process. The president of South Korea, as opposed to his predecessors who supported tough policies and the enforcement of sanctions, adhered to his policy of dialogue with the neighbor to the north. He took advantage of the hosting of the Winter Olympics to invite a delegation from North Korea. Indeed, the participation of Kim’s sister in the opening ceremony was the harbinger of the change in North Korea’s position. On the other hand, North Korea’s president, Kim, has shown that his rigid and threatening image was wrong. Whether the economic sanctions and the fear of an American attack played a role, or whether in Kim’s view the last ballistic experiment has deterred the US, the result has been a change in his position. There are obviously those who fear that this is merely a tactical change designed to maximize profits within the international community, but in any case, the leadership has proven that it is capable of changing positions and initiating a “game-changing” course.

In comparison, the leaders on both sides of our “conflict” – Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas – have not yet proved that they are capable and willing to promote a real solution to the conflict. Netanyahu’s hands are tied by his right-wing coalition that is ideologically committed to the vision of a greater Israel. He is also engaged in internal political struggles and is troubled by his legal issues of corruption. His policies and behavior convey that he has neither motivation nor determination to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, Abbas has so far escaped two rounds of negotiations, one with Olmert in 2008 and the second with Netanyahu in 2014, and it does not seem that he is inclined – now that he is approaching the end of his political career – to sign the deal of his life. Moreover, Abbas does not enjoy Palestinian legitimacy in the PA, while Hamas challenges his authority. There are two conditions that need to be met in order to promote a solution, legitimacy and determination. Both leaders do not meet these conditions, partially or fully.

The second element concerns the role of the mediator. Trump tried to give a feel of neutrality to his mediation, when he was secretly negotiating with North Korea, during which he also sent the head of the CIA, Pompeo (who in the meanwhile had been appointed Secretary of State) for a visit. He also wisely used “sticks” and “carrots”: on the one hand, he increased the economic pressure on North Korea and also threatened to take military action; On the other hand, he proposed to hold a summit with Kim soon, which previous presidents were not willing to do, thereby granting American legitimacy to the isolated president. Unfortunately, with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump has so far made almost every possible mistake, the last of which is the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The decision, which was meant to be part of the “carrots” that Israel would receive in exchange for its concessions in the negotiations, eliminated Trump’s pretense of becoming a neutral mediator. He can still correct this by making a counter-decision “in favor of” the Palestinians, but it does not appear that he intends to do so.

Finally, the outstanding issues in the two conflicts are completely different; The main issue in the Korean conflict is the unification of the two parts of the nation, which was arbitrarily separated during the Cold War: the north is afraid of losing power; while the south fears the economic costs of unifying a strong and progressive economy with the backward economy of the north. The importance of this issue should not be underestimated, but it has already been solved elsewhere, when East and West Germany united even though the conditions were different. More importantly, the Korean conflict does not include some of the explosive components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the question of borders, the question of Palestine’s independence, and notably the status of Jerusalem and the refugee question. The fact that the religious aspect does not play a role in the Korean conflict makes it less complicated and more manageable.

Beyond that, the history of “our” conflict does not work in Trump’s favor; external mediation alone has never been able to solve it. Peace with Egypt was initiated by Sadat; the Oslo Accords were initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil society players; while peace with Jordan was led mainly by Hussein and Rabin. It follows, therefore, that unlike the Korean story, Trump’s chances of breaking the impasse in our conflict are not great. If he wishes to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Korean arena seems more promising.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and teaches Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Dr. Alon Levkowitz is an expert on Korea, teaches at Beit Berl College and is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Korea Is Not a Likely Precedent for Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Changes in Domestic Palestinian Politics and Their Influence on Israel and the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Second, during the negotiations, the parties should refrain from unilateral actions that would hinder the implementation of the agreement, and in particular, Israel should commit to stop expanding the settlements and build new ones. Thirdly, the implementation of the Arab Peace Plan and the signing of a regional agreement after obtaining a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The main points of the agreement will be based on the principle of a two-state solution – Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel within the borders of the June 4th, 1967; consent to a minimal swapping of territories of similar value and size; East Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine; A just and agreed solution to the refugee problem based on Resolution 194, formulated in accordance to the Arab peace initiative.

The timing of the announcement of the Palestinian plan is intended to preempt a possible upheaval that could stir the Palestinians upon the release of an American peace plan. Moreover, it is intended to signal, as the Palestinians have already stated more than once, that the US is no longer seen as a fair mediator in view of its unilateral stance on Jerusalem, the reduction of US aid to UNRWA and the threat of closing the Palestinian representation in Washington. From a Palestinian point of view, the imbalance created by an exclusive American mediation, can be mitigated with the involvement of international partners. In addition, the speech is intended to portray Abbas to his people as a leader who dares to challenge the US, thereby strengthening his unstable legitimacy.

In view of the thicket of corruption affairs in Israeli politics, it is no wonder that the announcement about the disclosure of the plan was accepted in Israel with indifference. The Israeli Pavlovian reaction, as expressed in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s response – “Abbas has not said anything new” – is a reminiscent of countless similar negative reactions by Israeli prime ministers and foreign ministers, including the response to the Arab peace plan in 2002. Not only that, but to ensure that Abbas is not seen as someone who is willing to make concessions, Netanyahu stressed that Abbas continues to pay millions of dollars to terrorists. Danny Danon, Israel’s representative to the UN, echoed him and said that Abbas is not part of the solution, but the problem.

The importance of the Palestinian plan is not in its content; it is anyway very general and does not contain any details, which are planned to be determined during long and exhausting negotiations. Its importance is three-fold: first, it stresses – once again – Abbas’s commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and a possible exchange of territories, thereby refuting the claim that Abbas intends to demand the implementation of the partition boundaries of 1947. The fact that Abbas views the Balfour Declaration as illegitimate does not change the fact that he recognizes and willing to accept the existing reality. The Palestinian narrative that rejects the Balfour Declaration will not change even after a peace agreement is achieved.

Second, Abbas’s insistence on East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital shows, by inference, that Abbas recognizes West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Thirdly, his view of the Palestinian agreement as a milestone to an Israeli-Arab peace agreement and part thereof, as expressed in the Arab peace initiative, signals that the advancement of IsraeliArab reconciliation cannot replace or advance an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

In August 1981, shortly after Saudi Crown Prince Fahd published his first peace initiative (the first Saudi initiative) – which was immediately rejected by Israel – Yoel Marcus, a senior Ha’aretz journalist, wrote that Israel had always been able to respond to Arab bomb-bearing missiles, but not to missiles bearing peace plans. His observation was correct, but not accurate. Israel has learned to intercept both bomb-bearing missiles and peace plans. It does so by simply ignoring, opposing, or announcing that they are a recipe for the destruction of Israel.

Abbas’s peace plan will probably enter the endless collection of peace plans proposed throughout the years of the conflict, which were faded into oblivion. The composition of the current government and the timing of the publication will not give it a chance. Historians will certainly wonder in the future whether a peace plan was ever proposed by an Israeli government. I will give them a hint: not even once.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Matzav Review)

הפוסט Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Opportunities for Israel’s Foreign Relations towards 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The internal Palestinian split, manifested in the creation of two geographically and culturally distinct political entities – in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank – has continued for a decade. Throughout this period, the difficulty in bridging the gaps between Fatah and Hamas stemmed from disagreements in the political and social worldview regarding the character of the future Palestinian society and state. It was also a result of the violent circumstances in which the split emerged in 2007 – killings and violent struggle between the two movements in the Gaza Strip.

The cautious optimism among Palestinians following the signing of the Fatah-Hamas agreement is a product of the changing circumstances; first and foremost, the increasing Egyptian involvement in the reconciliation process. It was Egypt, which through a persistent struggle succeeded in creating the current path for the Palestinian dialogue. This has been accomplished after Egypt emphasized its crucial role to both sides and created a system of dependencies.

הפוסט A Look at the Palestinian Reconciliation Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It’s hard to be optimistic. Israeli leaders have become too comfortable for too long doing nothing, while the Palestinian leadership seems intent on cannibalizing itself, with the help of the occupation. But future leaders may want to take a look at South Africa, as I did on a recent trip, for some comparative insights about why inaction is a terrible idea.

The first obvious comparison between the two regions made famous in 2006 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s book, Peace, not Apartheid, was important at the time. The shock value (for some) helped place Israel’s occupation on a similar level of severity as the infamous regime. However, over a decade later, the debate over whether occupation should be considered apartheid has grown stale. The word has become a team insignia rather than a signifier, and the toxic argument obscures other valuable insights from South Africa about how a conflict can wane, end, and eventually  transform.

In South Africa today, one implicit question seems to run like a river beneath most conversations: is it working? Did ending apartheid bring a better life for the oppressed, while protecting the erstwhile oppressors and their descendants?

Apartheid’s bitter residue still stains the country. Although the policy ended over two decades ago, Peter Sullivan, former chief editor of The Star, South Africa’s premier daily newspaper, stated pointedly to me, “When did it really end?”

Apartheid’s legacy crops up in conversation about nearly all social issues. Young people live with post-conflict experiments designed to equalize educational and professional opportunities. Art exhibits address contemporary struggles of racial identity. The country seems to hover between the vibrancy of a new society building itself – similar to the spirit that drew me to Israel in my 20s – and a descent into grave ills of corruption and crime.

Thus the second main comparison is less about Israel-Palestine, but relates to other post-conflict societies where I have worked: when conflict ends, it can take decades for society to change. Setbacks abound. Democracy didn’t solve apartheid’s problems – it sparked a process of addressing them that could not start beforehand.

By refusing to advance a political agreement now, Israelis and Palestinians postpone the long exorcism of conflict legacy, which can only begin after the structures of conflict fall.

The third main comparison involves the reasons why leaders postpone this process – and the consequences of waiting.

In Israel one often hears that the two parties are too hostile and cannot trust each other. Israelis are terrified that a Palestinian state might become a terrorist theocracy, while a one-state scenario (or a two-state confederation) could mean that that each side floods the other and destroys their respective national character. “It will take time,” is a commonly heard refrain.

South Africa’s leaders too thought the indeterminate future was a good time for progress. In 1966, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd said: “What about the future? I have…little doubt about the solution of our racial problems, if given the time. If meddlesome people keep their hands off us, we shall… provide all our races with happiness and prosperity.” He was assassinated a short time later. As the end of apartheid neared, its stalwart supporters remained terrified that black South Africans could not govern or coexist with whites. They will destroy us, people had said. “’One person, one vote will happen only once,’” Sullivan recalled critics of democracy saying.

Fears may be legitimate – but they are also eternal. Waiting for them to subside before resolving a conflict probably means never resolving it.

As to the substance of those fears – that an agreement will bring doomsday scenarios – Albie Sachs wrote in his 2016 book We the People: Insights of an Activist Judge: “From a moral point of view, it seems most dubious to refrain from dealing with an actual and manifest evil because of anxiety that its elimination might lead to the appearance of another evil…” Sachs served as a judge on the first Constitutional Court in the newly democratic South Africa; he also lost his right arm and an eye to a bomb for his opposition to apartheid. In the book, he continues: “The best time for fighting for freedom is always now.”

Between the two regions, the consequences of chronically postponing the end of the conflict are starting to resemble each other. South Africa’s apartheid policy long outlived its legitimacy, inspiring a painful international economic and cultural boycott. Various forms of boycott or global censure that may be used against Israel need not be identical, to hurt.

As a last resort (and a last comparison), those who resist resolution in Israel and Palestine will insist that there is simply no answer at present. The two-state solution may no longer be possible, while one state is largely undesired. A two-state confederation is too new to have widespread legitimacy.

But ending apartheid took many forms; the old adage says that peace is a process, not an event. Apartheid laws were repealed in 1991, an interim constitution passed in 1993 and a final one in 1996, the first full-suffrage elections were held in 1994. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission followed, and aggressive affirmative action policies have been implemented to nurture equality. The laborious dismantling of institutions, habits, and behaviors associated with white rule continues today.

The problems cannot be papered over. South Africa is racked by economic inequality; lavish wealth sits atop indigent sprawl, and the gaps are heavily (though not totally) race-bound. Party patronage and hints of tribal politics threaten democratic governance. Crime is so bad that walls and wire barricade private homes; signs threaten thieves with electrocution, armed response, and poison. On August 8, the National Assembly held a vote of no-confidence against President Jacob Zuma, widely seen as corrupt, but failed to win a majority.

And yet, there are clear signs of people taking their destiny into their hands. Civil society makes vigorous efforts to engage citizens and deepen democracy. The no-confidence vote was a secret ballot; Baleka Mbete, Speaker of the National Assembly, announced the rules thoroughly and deliberately, with a hint of pride at this procedural integrity. In Durban, a multi-racial stream of joggers stop at hipster cafés in the morning, indicating growing diversity of the middle (and upper) classes.

When I asked Albie Sachs broadly how South Africa is doing now, he said “First of all, we have a country, and nobody predicted we could get a country. People predicted a racial bloodbath…that’s a huge achievement.”

South Africa should remind the ailing leaders of this region, or their successors, that the road to transformation is long and imperfect – and it must start now. Maybe the bar is low now, but first of all, we can do better.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Lessons, Warnings and Hope from South Africa for Israel and Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From a historical perspective, this is one of the worst moments in the history of the Palestinian national movement. The political-geographical split is making it difficult for the PLO leadership to navigate through the diplomatic route toward the two-states-for-two-people solution, as it committed to in the Oslo Agreements. The alternative Hamas tried to present in the form of jihad collapsed too, leading to a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The crisis the two leaderships – the PA and the Hamas – are experiencing obligates them to find solutions that could give the young generation a sense of hope. Naturally, the weakness of the national system and party affiliation makes it possible to create political alliances based on alternative identities. So far, it seems the key for creating change in Palestinian society can be found in the creation of communal alliances around strengthening the regional-geographical connection while bolstering the national connection as well.

That’s the background for the recent Egyptian-brokered unnatural affair between Mohammad Dahlan, who was expelled from Fatah in 2011 but sees himself as Mahmoud Abbas’s future successor, and Hamas’s newly elected leader, Yahya Sanwar. Dahlan, the former head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Force, was described by the Hamas leadership on the eve of the military takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007 as a corrupt person damaging the values of Islam.

The parties have surprisingly moved closer not just thanks to a political meeting of interests, but due to traditional cultural identity components, led by the interpersonal connection and the local identity. Sanwar and Dahlan grew up together in the Khan Younis refugee camp, share the refugee mindset and the same background. In addition, there is no history of bad blood between them. Dahlan and Sanwar’s ways parted in the beginning of the first intifada.

Since then, until their recent meeting in Cairo, there has been no animosity between the two, but perhaps yearning.

The personal acquaintance and the local identity shared by Dahlan and Sanwar is seen as an asset by Egypt too, which is interested in severing the ties between Hamas’s military wing and Islamist organizations in the Sinai Peninsula.

The creation of an economic-political dependence system, which passes through Dahlan and is backed by Sanwar, will make it possible for Egypt to achieve these goals. Thus, the local Gazan identity, which receives a lot of legitimization from Egypt, allows Hamas to find a formula that would make its political survival possible.

For Dahlan, the local identity could serve as a renewed stepping stone to a national leadership position. The purpose of the alliance between Dahlan and Hamas is to lead joint moves that would create a better day-to-day life for the strip’s residents, who are suffering from a shortage of electricity, water and basic civilian infrastructure. Dahlan and the donation money from the Gulf are supposed to fill the void left behind by Abbas. The Palestinian president chose to withdraw funds to harm the Gaza Strip’s bureaucratic systems and civilian infrastructure in an attempt to subdue Hamas, following Sanwar’s efforts to create an alternative government that would neutralize the influence of the Palestinian Authority’s government offices in the Gaza Strip.

Beyond the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas, the internal Fatah battle between Abbas and Dahlan is personal and filled with bad blood. In the past, Abbas rejected Egyptian attempts to reconcile between the parties, and he is determined to block Dahlan’s way back into Fatah and prevent him from reaching an influential position in the future.

As part of his attempts to try to thwart Dahlan’s return to a political position of power, Abbas initiated last week a meeting with the Hamas leadership in the West Bank, led by Nasser alDin al-Shaer. The meeting between the Fatah and Hamas leaderships in the West Bank focused on the efforts to reach an intra-Palestinian reconciliation and a solution to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Abbas, like Dahlan and Sanwar, is using communalregional politics to advance issues of national importance and shape a political agenda.

From the West Bank, the message reached the Gaza Strip. One of the Hamas leaders, Salah al-Bardawil, in response called for a return to the reconciliation path. He said Hamas was willing to cancel the alternative government workers’ council in exchange for setting a general election date and implementing a reform in the PLO’s structure.

Fatah, Hamas and Dahlan are using the local identity to make some gains in the Palestinian national political arena. Local, clan and tribal identity components are usually seen as an obstacle to the national pattern of action. In the Palestinian case, the communal-regional politics is being painted in national and Islamic colors and serving as a future engine of growth, which will have a future key role in the inheritance battles in the post-Abbas era.

(originally published in Ynet)

הפוסט Sanwar and Dahlan: An Egyptian-Brokered Alliance against Abbas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The speech attracted little attention from Israeli or global media, for in many ways it was similar to Abbas’s many speeches focusing on the Israeli occupation and its consequences. It did, however, include an interesting section in which the Palestinian president called on the African leaders (many of whom are Muslim or Arab) to stipulate that any upgrade of their ties with Israel would be conditional on Israel ending the occupation.

Given that most experts concur that Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, will not take unnecessary diplomatic risks or normalize ties with Israel before the resolution of the Palestinian issue, we should ask ourselves what Abbas is concerned about.

First, Abbas, who has been heavily involved in shaping Palestinian history, knows that at critical moments, the Arab countries have followed their own separate interests. In 1979, it was Egypt under Sadat that turned its back on the Palestinians and signed a peace agreement with Israel. In 1982, during the First Lebanon War, there were no Arab efforts to save the PLO from Israel. The organization suffered defeat and was forced to relocate its headquarters to Tunisia. In 1988, Jordan unilaterally disengaged from the West Bank, following the first intifada.

Later, Yasser Arafat abandoned king Hussein by signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite the latter’s political umbrella during the 1991 Madrid conference.

King Hussein felt betrayed, but decided to make use of the positive regional momentum to sign a peace treaty with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994, without stipulating that the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement or the establishment of a Palestinian state were conditions of the agreement.

Abbas’ second concern is the absence of natural, consistently reliable allies, which is especially disconcerting in view of the PA’s inherent weakness and limited economic resources, and its resulting dependence on regional actors (including Israel). In the past, the PLO could automatically count on the support of the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Today, all these actors have become irrelevant for the PA and its current strategy of relying on moderate states that support the peace process. Such states, however, are not always aligned with the interests of the PA. In 2017, for example, Egypt attempted to amend the Arab Peace Initiative (an attempt blocked by Palestinian objection) and is currently promoting a deal with Hamas to grant Mohammad Dahlan powers in Gaza, contrary to the wishes and at the expense of the interests of the PA.

Finally, Abbas is concerned by recent changes in Israel’s favor in the overall Arab position. In 2013, the Arab Quartet agreed to modify the Arab Peace Initiative and accept the notion of Israeli-Palestinian land swaps without demanding any concession from Israel in return. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has made a series of gestures to Israel over the past two years, including visits, meetings, and allusions to secret security cooperation against common enemies. In May 2017, The Wall Street Journal even reported that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states offered to take some normalization steps toward Israel in return for a limited settlements freeze and an Israeli decision to ease restrictions over trade with Gaza.

Over the years, various Arab countries have conducted behind-the-scenes relations with Israel. The Arab countries were afraid of being caught in public as supporting their Israeli “mistress” rather than their Palestinian “wife.” This “mistress syndrome” is still evident, but recent developments indicate that the interests of these countries, and specifically their desire to deter Iran and its allies, are served by publicizing their diplomatic or security ties with Israel. Making their relations with Israel more public also lays the groundwork for a future upgrade of ties with Israel, once the Israeli-Palestinian peace process moves forward.

Like other experts, I also believed (and continue to believe) that Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and other Arab countries will not take major steps toward normalization with Israel before significant progress is made toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, an uncompromising Palestinian position, and the continued split between the PA and Hamas, might lead Arab leaders to prefer their national interests over their commitment to the Palestinian cause. Sadat and king Hussein made such decisions in the past, and others may follow. This is a definite cause of concern for Abbas.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Abbas Should Be Concerned About? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While meeting Trump in the US, PA President Mahmoud Abbas reportedly presented the maps from the negotiations he conducted with prime minister Ehud Olmert a decade ago, proposing that the US president use them as a starting point for renewed peace talks. The Palestinian team told Trump that the differences between Israeli and Palestinian positions during that round of negotiations had not been so significant, and that Israel’s position on the borders issue at that time is “a good starting point for negotiations.” If this is in fact the position Abbas expressed to Trump, it sheds new light on the Abbas-Olmert talks and shows that the Palestinians’ rejection of Olmert’s offer was a mistake.

The Olmert-Abbas talks were conducted as part of the Annapolis process, which was launched at an international conference attended by almost 50 countries in Annapolis, Maryland in November 2007. No fewer than 12 committees were established to discuss core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the main negotiations took place between Olmert and Abbas, and between foreign minister Tzipi Livni and former Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qurei. The most significant progress in those talks was achieved on the borders issue: Olmert proposed that Israel would annex 6.5% of the West Bank (including Gush Etzion, Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Ariel and the Jewish neighborhoods in east Jerusalem), and in return would give the Palestinians Israeli territory equivalent to 5.8% of the West Bank. The remaining 0.7% would be designated to create a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which would be sovereign Israeli territory but under Palestinian control.

The Palestinians demanded full control over all the 1967-occupied areas, but were willing to agree to land swaps for up to 1.9% of the West Bank, which would not include most of the above-mentioned settlements (except for Gush Etzion). Olmert also proposed a compromise in the Old City of Jerusalem: the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter would remain under Israeli sovereignty, while the Holy Basin (including al-Haram al-Sharif) would be subject to international control, similar to the status of the Vatican. No progress was made on the refugee issue in these talks, as Olmert and Livni presented a tough position.

The Olmert-Abbas talks were interesting not only for their content – a revolutionary Israeli offer in terms of the concessions it included – but also for how they ended. Olmert’s far-reaching offer, supplemented by detailed maps, was made in September 2008, after he had been forced to resign, and when US president George Bush had only a few months left in office. Abbas never replied to Olmert’s final offer. According to the Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat, president Bush made a last-ditch effort to salvage the negotiations by suggesting that Israel and the Palestinians deposit their positions as reached during the talks, so that these would serve as the starting point for future negotiations under the following US administration and Israeli government. Abbas was scheduled to meet Bush and discuss this in January 2009, but the meeting never took place due to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza.

Several factors were behind Abbas’ hesitance about Olmert’s offer. First, Abbas was concerned that the Israeli government, in its final days, would not be capable of ratifying any agreement; second, Livni had hinted to him that he might be able to improve his position in negotiations with the next Israeli government – possibly with Livni as prime minister. third, the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas made it difficult for Abbas to adopt a position that might be perceived as excessively conciliatory and met with harsh criticism. Finally, Abbas lacked the courage to make such a dramatic decision.

Abbas clearly missed this opportunity to consolidate his understandings with Olmert. The Obama administration would have easily supported them, and would have likely made them the foundation of official American policy, which future administrations would find it hard to reverse. Although the Netanyahu government, which succeeded Olmert’s, presumably would have rejected Olmert’s position as a legitimate end-game (let alone starting point) for negotiations, in that case international diplomatic pressure would have mobilized against Israel, not the Palestinians. Today, almost 10 years after the Olmert-Abbas talks, Abbas is now reportedly reverting to Olmert’s proposal, but this time the circumstances – and the president in the White House – are very different.

Abbas’s missed opportunity can be seen retrospectively as part of a pattern of Palestinian behavior. Their greatest mistake was Haj Amin al-Husseini’s rejection of the 1947 partition plan. Behind closed doors, Palestinian negotiators admitted to this grave historical error. Yasser Arafat also carries some responsibility, for rejecting the Clinton Parameters, which were presented to him in December 2000, days before president Bill Clinton left office. The Israeli government, headed by Ehud Barak, accepted the parameters with reservations, but Arafat rejected them altogether, despite Arab and international pressure. Perhaps the historical lesson of these episodes is that the Palestinian leadership should think long and hard before rejecting offers.

Trump’s visit to the region has triggered new expectations for progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, Netanyahu and Abbas do not share mutual trust or intimacy, the gap between their positions is deep and both face domestic challenges from extremists at home. A sober analysis would lead to the conclusion that the chances for progress in the peace process are low. But, as Winston Churchill once said: “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity; the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.” Let us remain optimistic.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinians also know how to miss opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As part of the lessons learned from the Arafat era, in which violence was encouraged and used as a political tool, Abbas wants to change the way Palestinians are viewed by Western eyes. Instead of Palestinians being viewed as peace rejectionists who adopt violence as what they think is a legitimate tool, Abbas wants them to be viewed as a nation searching for a diplomatic solution for its national tribulations, while receiving support from the global community.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena.

The new American administration does not bode well for the Palestinians. During the election campaign, Trump issued statements that he would give Israel a green light to expand settlements and that he would relocate the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He also appointed a right-wing ambassador to Israel (David Friedman) who supports the settlement enterprise. All these actions aroused deep suspicion among the Palestinians. Even if Trump does not carry through on the embassy relocation, due to the sensitivity of the subject and concern over the great anger it would arouse in the Arab world – the very fact that the president supports such an idea teaches the Palestinians that they do not have a friend in the White House.

One of the paths taken by the PA to protest the emerging American policy was to accept a Russian invitation to attend a summit with all the Palestinian factions in Moscow in January 2017. The close ties between the PLO and Russia are natural, as they are based on a positive historic relationship. The socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO enjoy an ideological-historical affinity with the Russians. These groups include: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP; communists). Abbas himself was closely aligned with the Russian regime for many years. It was in Moscow that Abbas wrote his controversial doctorate. Also, Abbas served as chairman of the Russia-PLO Friendship Association for many years.

The goal of the discussions held between the Palestinian factions under the Russian umbrella was to try to promote an internal Palestinian reconciliation, and an actual timetable for its implementation. Following the summit in Moscow, Fatah and Hamas reached a new agreement about conducting municipal elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in mid-May 2017. The discussions regarding the elections dates were held simultaneously with laborious talks between the various factions that attempted to create a formula for reforming the PLO’s political structure and integrating Islamic elements in PLO institutions.

But the growing Palestinian rapprochement with Russia does not only focus on attempts to achieve internal Palestinian reconciliation. It also serves to exert pressure on Israel and diminish US prestige in the region. Thus, the PA is sending out two messages, one to Russia and one to the US. They are telling Russia that the Palestinians are willing to give Russia a role in their internal reconciliation process, and they are sending a message to the US regarding the way the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should be conducted in the future. Abbas declares at every international forum that he accepts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invitation to an Abbas-Netanyahu summit in Moscow. He reiterates that he is waiting for an answer from the Israeli government, to jump-start the peace process.

The fact that the Palestinians do not view the US as an “honest broker” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only heightens Abbas’ achievement in convincing the Obama administration to refrain from using its veto power to block UN Resolution 2334.

Resolution 2334 is one of the salient Palestinian diplomatic achievements in the Obama era. This resolution was warmly received by the PLO. More surprising was that it also drew positive reactions from Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, despite the fact that the resolution supports the two-state solution, calls for continued security coordination between Israel and the PA and is vague regarding if and how pressure will actually be placed on Israel.

The tightening relationship between the PA and Russia against the background of the change of government in the US shows that the Palestinians are trying to tell the Trump administration that there are additional power brokers in the global arena. And, according to the Palestinians, these other entities can counterbalance what they believe will be Trump’s pro-Israel policy.

Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is growing and is expressed by the active fighting of Russian forces alongside Assad’s regime in Syria against the rebels, and also by Russian provision of advanced weapons to Syria and Iran. This involvement, together with the Palestinian-Russian alliance, creates a sense of Middle East deja-vu. Are we returning to the diplomatic principles of the Cold War?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The future of Palestinian diplomacy in the Trump era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Mahmoud Abbas espouses the diplomatic struggle and the recruiting of international support for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders. His consistent stance is that institutionalized violent struggle harms Palestinian interests. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2334, which was adopted at the end of 2016 and states that the settlements are illegal, encourages the PA to continue this policy and continue to view the diplomatic path as the central element of its comprehensive strategy.

However, this strategy now faces a number of challenges following the rise of the Trump administration and the new winds blowing in the White House, as well as several regional changes: the growing Russian involvement in the Middle East, and Russia’s signals to the PA and Islamic factions that it is ready to take a more active role in the intra-Palestinian arena. This article describes and analyzes these challenges, and points to the possible courses of action open to the PA.

הפוסט The Future of Palestinian Diplomatic Activism in the Trump Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Paris conference will clearly not be a game-changer on the way to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, such international conferences don’t happen often. Therefore, we should assess what opportunities the Paris peace conference does entail, and how – if acted upon – they could bring longer-term benefits to peacemaking efforts.

Make the international community actually follow through

Over the last couple of years, in light of the stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a variety of ideas and initiatives regarding it have been floated by various international actors. The vast majority of them never went past the theoretical stage.

This damages the credibility of the international community, and enables Israelis and Palestinians to easily dismiss and reject such initiatives, most of which weren’t even coordinated with each other (when they weren’t competing with each other). Why should the sides to the conflict take an initiative seriously, if they anticipate that even the party offering the initiative wouldn’t follow through on it?

Therefore, the French decision to convene the conference in Paris as planned, despite the broad skepticism regarding it and despite factors that could have justified a change of plans (i.e. the Trump victory and Israeli rejectionism) is an important signal not only to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, on the official level, but also to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace civil society groups seeking constructive international steps to advance Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution.

The Israeli opposition: Challenge Netanyahu’s rejectionism

The negative response by the Israeli government to the French peace initiative from its onset is part of a broader rejectionist trend towards international initiatives to advance the peace process. The Israeli government’s rejection of France’s invitation for a summit with Mahmoud Abbas immediately after the ministerial conference, in contrast to a Palestinian decision to accept the invitation, provides an opportunity for the Israeli opposition.

The Israeli center-left leadership, which refrained until now from challenging Netanyahu on key foreign policy and national security issues, can and should start doing it now. It should emphasize the importance of Israeli engagement with the international community on issues vital for Israel’s future, and it should show appreciation to those in the international community that have not yet given up on the idea of peace, and are willing to invest efforts and political capital in attempts to promote it, despite the political hardships involved.

The Israeli opposition should clearly demand from the government to lift its veto over participation in the Paris meeting.

Advance an international incentive package for peace

The previous Paris peace conference, in June 2016, identified the need to provide Israelis and Palestinians with meaningful incentives to make peace. That very same month, the EU Foreign Affairs Council also acknowledged this, calling for a “global set of incentives” to advance the peace process. However, no significant progress has been made since.

The focus was on economic incentives. But these aren’t the ones that are likely to have much impact. An effective international incentive package should be end-game-oriented (i.e. delivered in return for a final-status agreement, and not for small steps along the way) and should address the collective needs of Israeli and Palestinian societies, rather than only economic and practical needs. It could be based on incentives already presented by international actors (albeit at different time periods and in an uncoordinated manner) – such as in the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s Special Privileged Partnership, and US security guarantees for the two-state solution.

The incentives should be updated or improved wherever necessary, packaged together, and introduced as a mega-incentive that enhances the effectiveness of each and every incentive, and make them seem more attractive, feasible, and linked to conflict resolution, in the eyes of Israelis and Palestinians alike. The Paris conference can and should re-emphasize and clarify the very real benefits of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for both societies.

How to make regional and international involvement effective

In recent years, there’s been a growing understanding that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process requires broader regional and international involvement. However, this has not yet been translated into a concrete new international architecture.

The Quartet was not expanded to include Arab countries. An International Support Group has not been set up. Efforts to bring together a variety of international actors for joint discussions on the peace process did not prove effective.

The Paris conference is a chance to make progress on this, especially in light of the fact that key international actors are not likely to act on their own on the Israeli-Palestinian issue in the coming year. The incoming US administration is likely to have other priorities and preferences, and key European countries – namely Germany, France, and the UK – will be busy in 2017 with elections and/or other domestic affairs.

In order to ensure some continuity in international engagement on the peace process, especially after the UN Security Council resolution and the Kerry speech, the Paris conference should relate to the Kerry parameters, call for the establishment of a new international mechanism and assign it a concrete first task. Such a mechanism could include the US, the EU and the Arab League. Its first assignment could be to submit, within the next few months, a proposal for a genuinely enticing international incentive package for IsraeliPalestinian peace.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Opportunities of the Paris Peace Conference הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The split between Fatah and Hamas, the stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the violence in Palestinian society (both inwards and against the IDF and Israeli civilian targets) cannot overshadow the fact that the crisis between Fatah and Hamas will not be concluded until the two movements undergo internal processes of comprehensive reforms.

הפוסט The Postponement of the Palestinian Local Elections and its Ramifications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Who Will Inherit Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The adoption of this discourse should not be taken for granted; it is the result of intellectual and media activity undertaken by various civil society organizations that identified a historic opportunity – the result of changes taking place in the region – to cooperate with the “moderate” Arab states who share common interests with Israel, such as halting the political and ideological expansion of Iran and the Shi’ite axis (including Syria and Hezbollah), and a joint struggle against Sunni Jihadist Islamic non-state actors.

The original purpose of the regional concept was not to disregard, escape or divert attention from the Palestinian problem, but rather to harness the Arab states as an umbrella of support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As bilateral negotiations are at a standstill, the regional framework was supposed to steer the parties away from the impasse.

According to this logic, the Arab states can help in several ways: Egypt has leverage over Hamas because of their common border; Jordan has an interest in reaching a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem as well as a desire to play a role in the Jerusalem issue; and Saudi Arabia can provide religious legitimacy to any political compromise. All these countries have leverage over the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas.

However, the main problem is that the public consciousness has shifted in line with the positions of the right-wing politicians. In other words, those who promote the regional discourse do not do so in order to make progress on the Palestinian issue, but rather to reap the benefits of the changes in the region without having to pay its price in the Palestinian sphere. In such a way, the right-wing government also enhances its supposedly moderate image.

Indeed, Egypt’s ambassador’s return to Israel, the visit of its foreign minister (after nine years), intelligence and military cooperation with Egypt, Jordan and possibly the Gulf – all indicate that regional cooperation is alive and kicking, while the Palestinian track has been abandoned.

The public, according to a Mitvim Institute’s public opinion poll (July 2016), graciously accept it; they are mostly interested in cooperation with Egypt, while the PA is lagging behind in fourth place out of five options. In other words, the public welcomes regional cooperation according to the right-wing vision.

This regional approach is misguided and will not ultimately succeed as one may have hoped. Certain achievements may indeed be reached, but they will be limited and kept under wraps. Israel has a history of contacts with countries, organizations and prominent figures in the Arab world. As these connections were viewed in the Arab world as illegitimate, they were kept behind the scenes. Some Arab leaders also paid with their lives for this (such as Jordan’s king Abdullah, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and others). As a result, Israel has suffered over the years from what I call the “mistress syndrome.” The only time it enjoyed an extensive and open relationship with the Arab world was in the ‘90s, after the signing of the Oslo Accords. All of the achievements in the field of diplomatic relations, the economic conferences and projects evaporated at the onset of the al-Aksa intifada in 2000. In other words, real, open and meaningful cooperation will not exist without a solution, or at least significant progress, on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Any attempt to promote regional cooperation without tackling the Palestinian issue is throwing dust in one’s eyes.

And, as we know, there is plenty of dust in our region.

In view of the fact that the discourse of “opportunities” and the “regional initiative” have been adopted by the government and the public at large, focus should now be placed on introducing another discourse, one of missed opportunities. The Israeli public likes to quote the legendary foreign minister Abba Eban’s saying that “the Arabs/Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Yet, a recent study that I completed shows that not only have the Palestinians missed opportunities, but Israel has as well. Therefore, emphasis should not only be placed on identifying a historic opportunity – which indeed exists – but emphasis should be placed on ensuring that it will not be missed.

As things stand now, the Israeli government shows no motivation to seize this historic opportunity to advance a regional initiative that includes a two-state solution, in accordance with the recommendations of the recent Quartet Report. In August 1952, David Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that “I do not want to be the man that our grandchildren… blame for having had the chance to try and achieve Jewish-Arab peace – and to have missed it.”

I believe that Netanyahu should hang this quote over his desk.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט From opportunities to missed opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Revolt of the Young Palestinian Generation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first truth is that despite obvious differences between Obama and Netanyahu, the bond between the United States and Israel remains strong. This should not be taken for granted; even in the days leading up to Biden’s visit a developing story about an alleged scheduling miscommunication between the two heads of state began to overshadow his tour.

Still, reducing the nuances of the U.S.-Israel relationship to the dynamics between their leaders is limiting. Obama and Netanyahu aren’t the first American president and Israeli prime minister to endure a difficult partnership, and they won’t be the last. In the end, regardless of the intense disputes that may poison personal relationships, the success of U.S.-Israel ties depends on shared values and common interests.

This was unexpectedly and tragically demonstrated in the aftermath of Taylor Force’s murder at the hands of a Palestinian terrorist in Jaffa on March 8. Force, a former US army officer and Vanderbilt graduate student, died just a few hundred yards away from Biden’s family, who were spending their evening on the Tel Aviv promenade (the terror attack in Jaffa was one of three that took place that day, leaving another 14 wounded).

“The kind of violence we saw yesterday, the failure to condemn it, the rhetoric that incites that violence, the retribution that it generates has to stop,” Biden told reporters during his press conference with Netanyahu. Although he would later add that terror couldn’t be thwarted by “physical force” alone, Biden’s comments were reassuring to an Israeli public concerned that a chasm has grown between them and the United States.

“You never need to doubt,” Biden reiterated, “the United States of America has Israel’s back.”

The second truth is that the Obama administration will not be leading future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Many speculated Biden would push for a renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority during his trip, which included a brief stopover in Ramallah. According to reports, Biden floated a number of proposals during his meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, notably a future Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and Israeli settlement freezes in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and abandoning the demand for a Palestinian right of return.

However, how serious were Biden’s overtures? Considering that prior to his arrival in Ramallah, Biden critiqued Abbas for failing to condemn the Jaffa terror attack, it is fair to ask how sincere these efforts were, and to what degree the vice president was given a mandate to bring both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiation table. In the end, Biden’s meeting with Abbas was unproductive.

To Abbas’ credit, acknowledging Biden’s proposals would have only further stained his public image. And though his current political situation is tenuous at best, Abbas (and Netanyahu, for that matter) knows that come January 2017 there will be a new administration in the White House hoping to make its own mark resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, Biden’s visit confirmed what we already knew: that any Obama-led peace initiative would, at best, lay the groundwork for serious negotiations under the next administration, but is unlikely to produce meaningful results.

Finally, Biden’s trip served as a reminder to both sides that Iran will continue to test the mettle of their alliance for years to come. It was no coincidence that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ testing of ballistic missiles marked with the phrase “Israel must be eliminated” coincided with Biden’s visit. And while it did manage to prompt a direct reassurance from the Vice President that the United States stood behind its Middle Eastern ally, the incident also dredged up their bitter dispute over how to counter the Islamic Republic’s threat to regional stability just as officials in Washington and Jerusalem negotiate the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding that will determine American military aid to Israel in the coming years.

In light of the fact that Biden is a longtime supporter of Israel, and nearing the end of his political career, perhaps the impact of the vice president’s visit shouldn’t be overstated (even though the U.S. Embassy in Israel entitled its video summary of Biden’s visit, “Friends Forever”). Nevertheless, he succeeded in reminding Israelis that although tensions exist within the U.S.-Israel relationship, a deterioration of ties is preventable so long as there remains an open channel for honest dialogue. Regardless of what occurs during the remainder of the Obama presidency, Biden’s message needs to be internalized by American and Israeli politicians going forward in order to ensure that the U.S.-Israel alliance weathers inevitable future storms.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט Biden in Israel: A reset in diplomatic ties? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2015 UN General Assembly and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Abu Mazen: A Man in Search of a Legacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

By voting to reduce aid to the PA, Congressional representatives jeopardize Abbas’ legitimacy, Israeli security and future prospects for peace.

The bill in question calls for the US to withhold funds “equivalent” to those the PA provides families of Palestinian terrorists, and to prevent dollars to any Palestinian government formed as a result of “an agreement with Hamas.”

Altogether, these restrictions would deny the PA some $70 million of the $400 million it receives annually—a figure less than a quarter of what it was in 2008. Unsurprisingly, the bill was chiefly backed by Republicans, and stands in marked contrast to the Obama administration’s support for continued aid to the “technocratic” government. The bill, however, also reflects a sentiment shared by many Democrats, AIPAC, and 88 of the Senate’s 100 members. The Senate Appropriations Committee is expected to approve a sister bill, after which the two chambers will put them to a general vote.

On the surface, the bill appears well grounded, especially in light of Netanyahu’s protestations and Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s charges that Americans are financing PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ stipends to Palestinian terrorists in prison. In practice, it would weaken an already beleaguered PA, undermining the legitimacy it has recently garnered for the first time in years. In so doing it threatens to collapse the very institution that was created for advancing the peace process and that is demonstrating its willingness against unbearable domestic pressure to cooperate with Israel for its security and against extremism in the region.

For starters, as Sec. Kerry’s spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, already pointed out, the Israeli government itself has maintained its security cooperation with the PA and in fact had transferred aid to the PA on the same day as the government was announced—a tacit admission that the lack of any actual Hamas leaders in the technocratic government permits continued relations with the PA.

Vindicating this latter point is the PA’s condemnation of the recent kidnapping and its active participation in the search for Israel’s “lost boys,” despite Israel’s mass arrests of Palestinians not connected in the affair, as well as Hamas and Israel’s own controversial MK Haneen Zoabi’s censure of the PA’s efforts as betrayal and a crime.

On a deeper level, the PA represents a moderate force among Palestinians, is often receptive to Western demands, and most of all is key to strengthening the Palestinian economy and infrastructure—ingredients widely accepted as conducive to Israel’s security. Even a partial reduction in aid, as Congress is proposing, would hamper the PA’s ability to pay for projects and employee salaries—a move that would further stall the economy and the Gaza Strip’s long road to recovery. These benefits far outweigh the PA’s less palatable practices, such as the stipends to the families of Palestinian prisoners.

Indeed, it is for these reasons that in a similar congressional climate in 2011, Brigadier General Nitzan Alon—at the time in charge of Israeli security in the West Bank—was prompted to write an article in the New York Times appealing to Congress not to cut funding to the PA. When Congress ultimately froze $200 million in annual funds, then U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta—who has been known to criticize Obama for not taking military action in Syria—also voiced that that it was a “mistake.” That aid, which largely paid for the 22% of the Palestinian work force that the PA employs, was not reinstated until 2013.

Congress as whole should learn from this fruitless episode and forego plans to dwindle the PA’s budget. If anything, it should be praising the PA for having managed to maintain a government of national consensus all the while fighting Hamas and combatting the glorification of terrorism. It should be offering moral support to Abbas in the face of domestic and Israeli critics.

If Congress were to do this, it would strategically position the U.S. to leverage the PA’s cooperative efforts and governing legitimacy, a legitimacy that Israel has long demanded, and to restart negotiations on a credible and durable path to peace.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Congress Shouldn’t Cut Aid to the Palestinian Authority הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In a clear and loud voice, Mahmoud Abbas renounced the disgraceful crime of kidnapping three teens in Gush Etzion, and said in front of representatives of states which have no diplomatic relations with Israel that he was determined to continue the security coordination with it.

Abbas declared that the PA would do everything in its power to make sure that the kidnapped teens are located and returned safely to their families. He asserted that this was a Palestinian interest.

Abbas chose to face the populist atmosphere on the Palestinian street courageously. The criminal abduction was accepted by many groups there as a legitimate act. Campaigns celebrating the capture of “three new Gilad Shalits” began popping up on the social media. Not only in the Gaza Strip, but also at Birzeit University, the incident was marked by handing out candy to passersby.

Despicably, under false pretense, the Palestinian terror organizations even began claiming that “three Israeli soldiers” had been taken captive.

הפוסט By condemning abduction, Abbas proved he’s a statesman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Abbas Is on His Way to the UN Again הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israeli foreign policy experts: Palestinian reconciliation can be good for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But is it?

Certainly, the move to apply to a raft of international organizations looks confrontational, to say the least. At first glance, it’s a major move outside the Oslo parameters and is liable to sabotage the progress Kerry has made over the past year. What’s the Palestinian endgame? A vote for upgraded status at the U.N. Security Council? Many have speculated that the Palestinians will take Israel to the International Criminal Court, charging the country for war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.

But we’re not there yet.

Read the full article in Foreign Policy

הפוסט Suicide by Statehood הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Resumption of the Palestinian UN Campaign? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

If talks break down, observers including the New York Times’ Tom Friedman suggest that Israel will come under massive international pressure for its continued building of settlements. But what Friedman and others don’t understand is that the Palestinians will lead the way. They have a plan ready and waiting.

Palestinian politics are rarely covered in the United States. Nor, for that matter, are they given a great deal of thought in the Middle Eastern press. But Palestinian insiders are now indicating that there is mounting pressure on Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian leadership to produce something, anything, to alter the status quo. Even now, while negotiations are in full swing, Abbas increasingly appears to be ‘the little Dutch boy’—
as one Israeli reporter put it—struggling to rein in the demands coming from within his own party, Fatah. In light of these increasing demands and pressures, Abbas, who has led the Palestinian Authority well past his legal mandate (his term ended in 2009), is almost certainly set to renew the international campaign for recognition of Palestinian statehood. It’s a campaign known in Ramallah as the “Palestine 194” campaign.

This initiative had been in the works, with fits and starts, since 2005. That year, Abbas reportedly traveled to Brazil for a summit of South American and Arab states, and met privately with Brazil’s leftist president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. There, da Silva supposedly told Abbas that when he neared the end of his second term (which expired on January 1, 2011), he would help build a Latin American consensus for a unilateral Palestinian statehood declaration at the UN.

Between 2009 and 2011, Abbas and Lula made good on their plan, recruiting scores of Latin American and other non-aligned states to recognize the State of Palestine. The campaign also included European states such as France, Spain, Portugal and Norway. In 2010, at an Arab League meeting in Sirte, Abbas made one of his first references to the “Palestine 194” campaign. The name said it all: there are currently 193 member-states in the United Nations, and the Palestinians were unambiguous about their desire to become the 194th.

The international community was similarly unambiguous about its support for the campaign. By the end of 2010, almost one hundred countries had already recognized an independent Palestine. The effort to garner widespread international support was, to say the least, a new and evolved one. The Israelis tried to dissuade some friendly states from supporting the campaign, but the Palestinians clearly had the upper hand.

“Ladies and Gentlemen,” Mahmoud Abbas told the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2011, “…I submitted, in my capacity as the President of the State of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, an application for the admission of Palestine on the basis of the 4 June 1967 borders, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif [Jerusalem] as its capital, as a full member of the United Nations.”

With that, Abbas made history. And while it can be argued that Arafat had already declared a Palestinian state in 1988, the Palestine 194 campaign felt distinctly different. The Palestinians had conceived, formulized, and implemented a concerted international policy, and it was, at least to this point, a diplomatic victory.

The only hitch, however, was that the U.S. was poised to veto their efforts at the Security Council.

Undeterred, Abbas brought the campaign home to overwhelming positive reception. As Al Jazeera reported, “A welcome party was planned at the Muqata, the presidential headquarters [in Ramallah], and a stage was set up next to the grave of the former president, Yasser Arafat.” The Palestinian government and schools closed early. Palestinians across the West Bank received text messages advertising “the official mass reception.” Palestine TV devoted its broadcast to Abbas, broadcasting photographs of the leader throughout the years as well as footage of him meeting ordinary Palestinians and international figures. For the Palestinians’ second president who has always been viewed as a rather bland and uncharismatic afterthought to Yasser Arafat, the reception was gratifying.

Abbas did not savor his victory for long, however. As expected, Palestine 194 was not well received in Washington. Led by efforts in the U.S. Congress, Washington withheld $200 million in financial assistance as a warning to the Palestinians not to return to the UN.

However, the Palestinians were not prepared to accept defeat. With more than one hundred countries in support of the “State of Palestine,” the Palestinians had leverage. Abbas and his advisers immediately made a play for membership at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

But this, too, came with consequences. According to a little-known American law passed during the Clinton administration in the 1990s, the U.S. is prohibited from giving funds to any part of the U.N. system that grants the PLO the same standing as member states. So, as the Palestinians pushed for full membership, they were effectively pushing for a $70 million per year (America’s 22 percent) slashing of the UNESCO budget, which operated on a $325 million per annum budget.

The vote took place in October 2011, with 107 of 173 countries voting in favor, 14 opposing, and 52 abstaining. Immediately thereafter, U.S. funds were slashed. The UNESCO victory was a pyrrhic one, at best. Meanwhile, the request for statehood had not led to a vote at the Security Council. Indeed, the bid had stalled when it became clear the US would not hesitate to use its veto.

Despite these setbacks, by early 2012, the PLO signaled that it was poised for another run at the UN. To be sure, not all Palestinians leaders were on board. Some were unconvinced of the benefits it would yield the Palestinians. Indeed, some believed that it was a campaign guided by pride rather than strategic interests. Among the most outspoken opponents was then-prime minister, Salam Fayyad.

Washington undoubtedly played a role in curbing Palestinian enthusiasm. In a June interview with the Saudi Okaz newspaper, Saeb Erekat said the U.S. threatened to suspend aid and close down the PLO mission in Washington if the Palestinians returned to the UN. In an apparent move to placate President Barack Obama, Al-Hayat reported that Abbas would postpone the UN bid until after U.S. elections in early November.

Over the course of the next few months, the Palestinians settled on November 29 as their target. Only this time, they planned to go directly to the General Assembly, where they had the numbers advantage, and Washington could not veto. The strategy proved successful. 138 countries voted in favor of the initiative. Only 9 voted against—eight, not including Israel.

In short, the Palestinians demonstrated that their campaign could not be deterred. Not even the United States could prevent their bid for recognition. And the leadership made it clear that it would not cease seeking recognition so long as Palestinian independence was not achieved.

This, in part, explains the urgency of the Obama Administration’s new peace process, launched in the spring of 2013. Led by Secretary of State John Kerry and managed by veteran diplomat Martin Indyk, Washington has labored to restart the peace process. And while the administration has placed significant pressure on Israel to make concessions on borders, Jerusalem and settlements, one of the major demands on the Palestinians has been to halt the international bid for recognition.

Skeptical of the entire process after decades of fruitless negotiations, the Palestinians have nevertheless abided by this demand. But they have also made it clear that they continue to study steps to join UN treaties and bodies. Even amidst the peace talks, the Palestinians have used the 194 campaign as leverage. In early November, for example, the Palestinian Monetary Authority announced that it had obtained full membership in the International Association of Deposit Insurers. Senior Palestinian official Nabil Shaath also warned that the Palestinians could use the “weapon” of taking claims against Israel in the International Criminal Court. Shaath added, “There are organizations that await our application, and ask us when are we applying.”

Abbas himself has threatened, “If we don’t obtain our rights through negotiations, we have the right to go to international institutions.” Palestinian official Hanan Ashrawi also warned that the Palestinian leadership was ready to join sixteen agencies beginning in April 2014. “Everything is in place and will be set in motion,” Ashrawi claimed. By late December, Saeb Erekat told Maan News Agency that there were no less than sixty-three member agencies of the UN that the PLO sought to join.

And while the exact strategy has not been released, on January 25, Maan News Agency reported that a PLO committee had reached an internal agreement on how to “take the Palestinian plight to the UN and its various bodies.” This included “signing international conventions and joining UN agencies and different bodies.” Among the most important of these bodies was said to be the International Criminal Court (ICC), “because that will enable the PA to sue the Israeli occupation over war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

Israeli officials quietly admit that the ICC is only one agency on a short list of international bodies that they view as red lines. They include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and INTERPOL. The concern for Israel is not that, not only would the Palestinians gain acceptance as a state through these agencies (and do so outside of the bilateral peace process), but that the Palestinians would also try to isolate Israel from these agencies, which are crucial to Israeli commerce, security and/or diplomacy.

Other Palestinian memberships would simply be insulting. For example, Palestinians seek to join FIFA and then disqualify Israel from the international soccer association. Indeed, Israel is growing increasingly concerned that the Palestine 194 campaign is about to become part of the larger strategy of Boycott, Divest and Sanctions (BDS). The campaign has scored some small successes in academia, with a handful of European businesses joining, too. But should the majority of UN member states embrace the strategy of shunning Israel from multiple international organizations, BDS could evolve into a real threat to Israel’s legitimacy.

The Palestinians, for their part, know that if they take new steps in this direction, it will open up a whole new front in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This explains, in part, why Palestinian officials have kept a lid on their strategy. However, Palestinian officials in the past have been quick to point out that they do not view the Palestine 194 campaign as antithetical to bilateral negotiations with Israel. Indeed, they see it as a means to enhance their negotiating position. But now that talks are ongoing, Palestinian officials will not discuss how this dual-track strategy works, particularly in light of U.S. opposition to the 194 track. Instead, Palestinian officials articulate their full-throated support of the Kerry initiative. At least most of the time.

For Washington, there is more at stake here than a Nobel Prize for Obama, Kerry and Indyk. Washington maintains its laws prohibiting the funding of UN agencies when the PLO gains membership. That law did not change following the UNESCO debacle. This, of course, means that the US could be forced to choose between the State of Palestine and sixty-three different UN agencies.

Some may not seem like a loss—such as the International Olive Council. However, others, such as the World Health Organization or the International Court of Justice, could be bruising.

Worryingly, despite the clear signs that such a campaign may be renewed with the collapse of the U.S-led peace talks Washington has given little thought to what happens next. State Department officials working on the peace track acknowledge that Palestinian plans may be in the making, but few will cede that a peace-process breakdown is even possible, let alone imminent. Other officials at Foggy Bottom note the potential threat of the 194 campaign to U.S. interests, in light of the fact that it could prompt Washington to break off from multiple international organizations. They insist that there is regular communication with the Palestinians and the relevant agencies on this issue, but it is unclear whether the U.S. government is in any way prepared for the moment the campaign gets underway. For example, Congress rebuffed the president when he sought waivers during the UNESCO battle, and it has since turned away the executive on multiple occasions when other waivers have been requested.

What this means for Washington is not yet clear. But it is clear that the Palestinians have a ready-made policy to pursue should the current talks break down. Unlike in 2000, when the collapse in diplomacy prompted a violent intifada, this failure will yield a diplomatic intifada, whereby the Palestinians pressure Israel using their leverage with the international community. It’s nonviolent, but its war by other means. And it’s likely that Washington will be caught in the crossfire.

(originally published in the National Interest)

הפוסט Palestine’s Plan for when Peace Talks Fail הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In his new book, State of Failure: Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Unmaking of the Palestinian State, Jonathan Schanzer attempts to unravel these narratives and provide insight into how the Palestinian leadership navigates the rough seas of pseudostatehood. It’s a daunting task—as Schanzer acknowledges early on, the field is crowded with literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, much of that literature is written in a comparative light; it’s usually the Palestinians in relation to Israel, or in relation to the peace process, or the Arab League, and etc. In putting the internal dynamics of the Palestinian leadership as the focal point, “State of Failure” reveals some truly unsettling facets of how the Palestinians craft and implement their policies. In covering the recent tremors in the political structure, the book focuses on former prime minister Salam Fayyad and his rather inglorious fall from grace in the leadership. The internal disputes, the well-documented rifts and disagreements between Fayyad and the Fatah leadership, all are laid out cogently in the book.

The book isn’t likely to be on the PLO’s reading list anytime soon. And most certainly, if there’s one specific area of the book where Schanzer is likely to reach an impasse with the Palestinian leadership, it’s the description of the UN campaign. In the book, Schanzer takes a contemporary approach, detailing the roots of the campaign in 2005, when Palestinian diplomats began working in earnest with Latin American nations, developing a diplomatic strategy that would eventually lead to 2011. This diplomatic strategy was at times viewed as almost antagonistic to negotiations by some within the leadership, but by 2008 and 2009, when Tzipi Livni had failed to form a negotiation-centric government and Benjamin Netanyahu had ascended instead, the idea of this comprehensive and unilateral diplomatic campaign began to take hold. By 2010, with talks breaking down over settlement moratoriums and varying preconditions, the campaign became the predominant driving force of Palestinian policy. This is where things get murky.

If his approach is a pragmatic analysis of a clear-cut policy evolution, the history being touted by the Palestinian leadership is a little more holistic, a bit more nationalistic, and certainly much more paradigm-driven. In other words, Schanzer’s approach neglects a pre-Oslo history the Palestinian officials are incredibly defensive of. In a report I released this past summer, I interviewed nearly twenty Palestinian officials in search of some clarity on the campaign. Of the myriad narratives that emerged, one thing was clear: the UN campaign was not a recent phenomenon. In the historical waxing and waning of the methods of preference in Palestinian policy, internationalization at the UN has a history that precedes negotiations.

Indeed, Palestinian officials described a process that had roots as far back as the 1970s. One official has even written that the Palestinians first considered the UN track in 1969, at the suggestion of President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. By 1974, this track’s foundations were laid in the PLO’s Ten-Point Program, a political manifesto that, among other things, called for Palestinian autonomy of lands “liberated,” and didn’t explicitly rule out other forms of resistance. For a resistance-based liberation movement, the acknowledgment of partial territorial control in Palestine and alternative means of resistance was precedent-setting.

Here, too, is where a historical background would have benefited the book. For even in its brief respite from the fore of Palestinian policy, the UN campaign was never far. Indeed, in 1999, as the end of the 5-year interim Oslo period neared, Yasser Arafat dispatched two deputies, Nabil Sha’ath and Saeb Erekat, to Europe in order to begin gauging support for a unilateral declaration of statehood at the UN. The US promptly countered this campaign, and pressured the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. At the time, President Clinton had managed to dissuade Arafat through several key areas: first, leveraging the well-known fact that a Palestinian unilateral action outside of the Oslo framework would threaten the peace camp in the upcoming Israeli elections, and second, that the US would be willing to host further negotiations if Arafat held off. After a frenetic diplomatic campaign, the US was able to stave off the Palestinian action and set the stage for the Camp David negotiations.

Where does that leave the UN bid in the grand scheme of things now? The Palestinians have halted their campaign in lieu of recent negotiations, a compromise they made with John Kerry in order for talks to be restarted. Should the talks break down, however, or fail to yield an interim agreement by March, the Palestinians can be expected to again gear up for engagement at the international body this coming year. Their engagement, and specifically which entities to engage and to what degree, will be known only to the man at the top, Abbas.

Such is the clouded area of tasseography in the Palestinian Territories that State of Failure deftly interprets. Schanzer discards the rhetoric and nationalist storylines in lieu of the pragmatic, describing the recent leadership’s myopic nature in zero-sum terms. His prognosis is clear: the Palestinian leadership is struggling on two fronts: in negotiating a state’s existence and governing a state entity. In order to do the former, it must improve on the latter. It is not likely to win him many friends in the West Bank. But it is, however, a workman’s analysis of how Palestinian officials form policy and govern in one of the longest and most intractable conflicts of the modern era.

(originally published in the National Interest)

הפוסט Palestine’s Self-Inflicted Wounds הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

So what happens if negotiations actually renew and then break down again? What’s next for the Palestinian agenda?

Kerry has said that progress needs to be made by the fall, presumably to circumvent future Palestinian actions at the UN; it’s clear that one of the conditions for resuming talks was a halt in the Palestinian internationalization campaign while talks are ongoing. The common Israeli prediction is that the Palestinians could build off their 2011-2012 UN campaign and do something as drastic as going to the International Criminal Court to air their grievances. This battle of global public opinion is one of the few areas of Palestinian diplomatic strength, and a severe concern for the Israelis. Yet if that’s the next move in the eyes of the Israelis, the feeling isn’t mutual in Ramallah. Indeed, as one senior Fatah official pointed out to me, the ICC is the last organization on a list of organizations triaged in importance to the Palestinian internationalization campaign. What is more likely, then, is a renewed Palestinian diplomatic campaign at the international level, a campaign that starts with the Palestinians seeking to sign some of the less-threatening international treaties such as the UNICEF Rights of the Child. These treaties and conventions are referred to by Palestinian leaders as the “first clusters”; relatively minor organizations and treaties that escalate as the campaign continues. Becoming signatories to some of these treaties has two main benefits for the Palestinians: first, they show the Palestinian people a palpable engagement on the international level, and second, they do very little to antagonize the United States and Israel.

But where did these “clusters” and contingency plans come from? The shift in the Palestinian leadership was gradual but recent. Faced with a moribund peace process and a status quo that increasingly harmed their interests, the Palestinian leadership scrambled to find alternative tactical tracks to pursue. In 2009, this reached a head when Abbas was faced with roughly three main options: attempt to reconcile the Fatah/Hamas split, essentially condone an intifada, or go international and approach the UN. With less-than-overwhelming enthusiasm for reconciliation, and similar disdain for an intifada, Abbas was left with really only one realistic option: internationalization.

The justification, then, for this choice lay in the history of the Palestinian political movement. In interviews this past year in Ramallah, Palestinian officials were quick to align the recent international campaign with the historical movements of the Palestinians at the UN. This process, in their eyes, started in 1974, with the PLO’s release of the ten-point plan, a document that sought to reconcile the armed resistance, but also left room for political maneuverability. As the Lebanese war raged on, the local PLO leadership began to evolve, forming the institutions of a semi-state. This evolution continued in 1982, when PLO members began openly calling for the acceptance of Resolution 242, the UN resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from “lands occupied in the recent conflict.” Abbas’s own memoirs detail this evolution—as an advocate of accepting 242 in 1974, Abbas noted that by 1982 members of the PLO thought a shift towards the international community could ”break the siege [of Beirut] and preserve the PLO.”

By 1988, this evolution had reached a climax when the Palestinians issued their declaration of independence, a statement that was joined with supporting documents accepting Resolution 242 and the two-state process. Soon after, Arafat was invited to address the UN, the Palestinians’ status was upgraded to observer entity, and a few days later Arafat renounced terrorism in a teleconference. The evolution of Palestinian thought that had culminated in an international campaign was halted subsequently thereafter, as the United States and PLO began to form a tenuous, if not productive, relationship that would lead to Madrid and eventually the Oslo process. Not until this process broke down in the years following Annapolis would the Palestinians look back on their internationalization campaign. As one PA official told me, “it’s as if the stopwatch we started in 1974 and paused in 1988 was resumed in 2009.”

The beauty of the UN campaign was its flexibility. Unlike most options on the table for the Palestinians, the internationalization campaign had tremendous upside. Not only did it play to one of the last, great strengths of the Palestinian leadership, the UN, but it was able to reconcile internal Palestinian political camps, something very few policy agendas can claim in the West Bank and Gaza. For those that advocate the use of force, or at least a more stern approach to dealing with Israel, it had the advantages of appearing to antagonize Israel and the United States. For those that pledge themselves to bilateral negotiations, it had the upside of appearing to leverage the Palestinian hand, the clearest evidence of that being Kerry’s recent attempts to bring both sides to the table.

For Abbas, a man who wants to appear committed to the bilateral process, the UN campaign followed in the footsteps of his predecessor. In May of 1999, Arafat both publicly and privately mused about what to do after the five-year interim Oslo period ended. With his trademark style of pursuing multiple tracks to varying levels of effort at once, Arafat deployed two deputies, Nabil Shaath and Saeb Erekat, to lobby European countries at the UN to recognize a possible Palestinian declaration of statehood. It was a lobbying campaign that Dennis Ross countered with a campaign of his own, as described in his memoirs; Arafat was “coy” about the possible move. However, President Clinton was able to take advantage of his working relationship with Arafat and bring him back from the brink with the promise of renewed negotiations. It was a moment that undoubtedly had an impact on Abbas when he launched his UN campaign in 2011. Palestinian officials describe Abbas as a leader hoping for Obama to intervene with proposed negotiations, to bring both parties back to the table. With Obama either unwilling or unable to do so, Abbas had walked himself into a corner where the only option was to go to the UN.

If Israeli officials describe the UN campaign as unilateral because it breaks with the spirit of Oslo, and the Palestinians describe the campaign as multilateral because it engages the international community, then the truth is somewhere in between. For the Palestinian leadership, there is an emerging group of officials and policymakers calling for an integrated strategy, a usage of tactics such as ”smart resistance,” of lobbying international countries and signing on to the “clusters” of the global community. This group is not opposed to new negotiations with Israel—indeed they support it—but they have been laying the foundation for a backup plan to failed negotiations for years. If Kerry’s proposed talks do indeed break down, or if they are unable to even start, the backup plan for the Israelis is a perpetuation of the status quo. The backup plan for the Palestinians, however, is taking the conflict back to the international arena.

(originally published in the National Interest)

הפוסט Palestine’s Plan B הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There has previously been dramatic news about Palestinian reconciliation that has not amounted to much, and the road toward a unity government may be a long one. But for supporters of the two-state solution, this recent development should be regarded as an opportunity rather than a threat.

The split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is one of the largest obstacles to the two-state solution. Even the Israeli peace camp cannot provide a convincing explanation of how a final-status agreement can be implemented with only the West Bank on board.

This obstacle was evident during the Annapolis peace process in 2007-2008. At the time, the parties acknowledged that given the Palestinian split, the most realistic goal was merely to reach a “shelf agreement” that would not be implemented until a later stage in the process.

The situation looks similar this time around. The current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were launched with the ambitious goal of reaching a two-state solution. Alas, recent statements from Washington are introducing a much more modest goal: either a framework for a final-status agreement or an agreement to be implemented in phases.

At this year’s Saban Forum, U.S. President Barack Obama was asked whether peace is possible when the Palestinian people are not united. His response was that if “we can create a pathway to peace, even if initially it’s restricted to the West Bank,” then the Palestinians in Gaza will also want to enjoy its benefits.

הפוסט Israel Should Support Palestinian Reconciliation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט There Is No Israeli Partner הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the wake of these elections, originally scheduled for 2011 yet postponed due to political infighting, several storylines emerged:

The Hamas-Fatah rift is widening

Hamas — which has run Gaza since it split following the last round of elections in 2006 and 2007 — officially boycotted the elections, shunning candidates from running in the West Bank and barring any polling centers in Gaza. The elections elicited a trading of barbs between the two parties, with the Hamas spokesman, Fawzi Barhoum, asking to “end this disgrace.” Saeb Erekat, the long-entrenched strongman of Fatah, responded that “Hamas cannot have a veto on democracy.”

Fatah and Hamas have long made public overtures for reconciliation, meeting in Cairo in 2011 and then in Doha in April. Yet their plans for hosting these municipal elections together stalled, and the agreement broke down. Indeed, the 2010 elections were cancelled and the 2011 elections postponed due to the rift between the two parties, as the Palestinian Central Elections Committee blamed the political divide as the primary obstacle to holding the elections.

It is unlikely that Saturday’s Fatah-led elections did anything to bridge the divide between the two parties; in fact, the tone from senior officials suggest the rift will only widen. Salam Fayyad, the polarizing Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA), told Ma’an News, “It’s time to get over the split. It was a complicated election but there shouldn’t be any excuses to prevent it going ahead. Hamas will be responsible politically and ethically for preventing people from voting and must be judged for that.”

Fatah’s strength is waning

Despite being the party with the most financial and political resources, Fatah did not claim the sweeping victory it had hoped for on Saturday, winning in just five of the 11 main districts. Showing the political infighting that has plagued the party for years, many cities saw former Fatah party members running independently against the party. After the polls closed, Fatah controlled the seats in cities such as Hebron, Tulkarem and Jericho, yet lost control in Ramallah, Nablus, and Jenin.

Fatah officials had hoped that the elections would show a unified support base in the face of its rival, Hamas, yet what appeared Saturday was a party feeling the repercussions of years of stalled peace process efforts, financial crises, and internal bickering.

High levels of apathy among Palestinians

The elections on Saturday yielded relatively low voter turnout. Despite being the first elections since 2006, where voter turnout was roughly 75 percent, these elections drew out just 54 percent, according to the Central Elections Committee. The drop in participation can be attributed to a couple of factors, most notably the well-documented disillusionment and apathy of the Palestinian voter.

Yet it’s worth noting that the drop in these numbers is comparable with the drop in U.S. voter turnout between a presidential and congressional election. In 2008, U.S. voter turnout was 57 percent, while in 2010 it fell to 38 percent. In short: Are Palestinians disillusioned and apathetic towards the democratic process? Yes. Is it normal to have a drop-off in voter turnout between presidential and municipal elections? Yes. And, coincidentally, does the PA still have a higher voter turnout than the U.S. in its elections? Yes.

In the long run, without an effective central government or any measurable progress in negotiations with the Israeli government, the Palestinian municipal elections may not have a significant impact on the political gridlock. Yet in a region currently witnessing the sometimes-violent emergence of democracies, the Palestinians are quick to note their veteran status. As vocalized by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whose own term expired in 2009 with no new presidential elections in sight: “We hope we will be regarded by our brothers in Gaza and everywhere in the Arab world as the ones who first embarked upon democracy, and we continue on this path and we hope everyone will follow us.”

(originally published in The Atlantic)

הפוסט 3 Key Takeaways From This Week’s Palestinian Elections הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Impressions from Meetings with Palestinian Officials from the West Bank, October 2011 

At the beginning of October, prior to the Gilead Shalit prisoners swap deal, representatives of Mitvim participated in meetings with a series of key Palestinian figures from Ramallah and Nablus. The meetings were conducted in cooperation with Ronnie Shaked, from Yediot Aharonot and the Hebrew University’s Truman Institute, and focused on the implications of the Palestinian UN statehood bid of September 2011. This paper summarizes the main points that were raised in the aforementioned meetings. These points do not represent official positions and should not be attributed to all Palestinians; however, they do provide a glimpse into the current state of mind of Palestinian officials from the West Bank.

Abu Mazen returned victorious from the UN, despite the Israeli perception that the Palestinians had lost at the UN. The request for UN recognition of a Palestinian state, Abu Mazen’s speech, and his willingness to confront the United States, were all perceived at the time as major events within the Palestinian national struggle. They sparked a surge in Abu Mazen’s popularity on the ground. The Palestinian Authority held celebrations in parallel to the UN General Assembly, and Abu Mazen was portrayed as a national hero.

Abu Mazen is aware of his power. Despite the continued and repeated rumors regarding retirement from the political sphere, Abu Mazen has not appointed or trained any successors and has limited the power of the younger generation. He is focused on working towards the creation of his own legacy. Abu Mazen knows that he does not have a replacement at the moment, and that his only replacement could be Hamas, which remains unwanted by the United States, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Therefore, he allows himself to adopt a “take it or I leave” approach. Abu Mazen is aware that there is no desire for Hamas to take his place and therefore, various domestic and international actors will eventually accept the policies that he chooses to pursue.

Abu Mazen creates a new ethos, one that stands for non-violence. Abu Mazen has chosen a non-violent political struggle as his strategy and has taken steps to change the ethos of Arafat’s battle. This new policy emphasizes the Palestinian intentions to end the Occupation and acquire a state within the 1967 borders, without violent confrontation with Israel. The new approach is supported by most of Fateh’s figureheads and members. The level of support it enjoys among the Palestinian people, specifically the young generation, is unclear. The choice to follow the non-violent path contributes to a positive self-image among Palestinians, some of whom have compared themselves to India and Gandhi. This approach is perceived as a step that safeguards the Palestinian national interests and increases international support for the Palestinians and their struggle. It appears that in the meantime this is just a tactic, one which has not yet uprooted the ethos of the violent struggle. If they feel helpless or if they think there is a more beneficial path, it seems that the Palestinians will be ready to change course once again. .

The Palestinians feel that they are ready for and deserve a state. Abu Mazen rehabilitated the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) – the economy, the security, and the institutions. The Palestinians feel better about themselves than they have in the past. They are on the road to progress, taking initiative and promoting actions in the international arena. The Palestinians have achieved support (Turkey provided legal advice to the PNA prior to the UN bid) and highlight their readiness for their own state. Nablus, for example, was previously marked by instability and security chaos, whereas today the situation is totally different. The city has developed immensely: economic progress, stability, and civil order. Unemployment has dropped from 65% to 11%, tourism is beginning to pick up and more tourism plans are being created, there is commercial and real estate development, restaurants are opening up, a stock exchange is operating, and more. There is security cooperation with Israel, which everyone is aware of (also in regards to Joseph’s Tomb, which was refurbished by the PNA), and that has brought to the removal of checkpoints around the city and to increased freedom of movement.

First a state, then a permanent status agreement. It seems that today’s Palestinian discourse is focused on the establishment of a state and not on the achievement of a permanent status agreement, or a peace agreement with Israel. There is a lack of faith in the ability to negotiate with the Netanyahu Government. There is an operative plan for diplomatic progress towards statehood and a belief that it will be better (for Israel as well) to negotiate a permanent status agreement on a state-to-state level. It may then be easier for the Palestinians to make compromises on sensitive issues. At the same time, there is an understanding that the parameters of a future peace agreement, based on the 1967 lines, are already more or less known, that it will be possible to eventually reach an agreement on all core issues, and that should Israel adopt a pro-peace policy that a final status agreement can be achieved also before the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Following the UN General Assembly, the Palestinians are patient and realistic. The Palestinians do not expect that a state will be established tomorrow. They understand that there is a long road ahead, and they declare that they possess a great amount of patience. They point out that several states (including Israel) have turned to the UN multiple times until they were accepted as members, and the Palestinians plan to do the same. If America will use their veto, the Palestinians plan to submit another application, and so on and so forth, until they are accepted. They believe that this is an historical process that cannot be stopped and that September 2011 marked the beginning of a new era in the Palestinian political struggle. The Palestinians believe that momentum is on their side and they are not afraid of a political confrontation with Israel or the United Sates. They plan to maintain their tactic of turning to the international community and conducting a diplomatic struggle in parallel to non-violent protests. They feel that they have nothing to lose.

An international Intifada, not a Palestinian one. The Palestinians paid a heavy toll during the second Intifada and they are not searching for another round of violence. They believe that the UN bid will benefit them far more than another Intifada and that the Israelis are afraid of a third Intifada, regardless of the fact that Palestinian leaders have discounted this possibility. In fact, no significant violent confrontations broke out in September. Instead of Palestinians launching an Intifada against Israel, the World is doing it for them. Israel finds itself increasingly isolated by the international community and is losing support among the countries of the region (Turkey and Egypt) as well as among its allies in the West.

There is no point in negotiating with Netanyahu’s Government. Two years ago, Fateh’s convention concluded that there is no possibility of reaching an agreement with the current Israeli government and that the Palestinian struggle for statehood should thus be conducted in the international arena. The Palestinians do not have any faith in Netanyahu and they view his policy proposals as a right-wing political battle with Lieberman. The Palestinians feel that there is no reason to negotiate just for the sake of negotiations. They are waiting for the Israeli Government to say what it wants and to make clear where it is heading to. It hasn’t happened yet.

There are alternatives, and they are less desirable for Israel. If no progress is made in the Palestinian bid for statehood, and if there is no progress in negotiations, then the two-state solution will become less popular among Palestinians. They have warned that Abu Mazen may decide to dismantle the PNA and promote the call for one-state. If Israel will push the Palestinians into a corner, a violent confrontation is not unlikely. It may start with demonstrations similar to those of the Arab Spring – perhaps with organized marches on Fridays towards the fence. The Palestinians feel that Israel is trying to force them into an alliance with Iran, despite the fact that the Palestinians oppose Iranian and Shi’ite attempts to meddle in the politics of the region. However, some said that if all other doors close, then the Palestinians might even decide to “deal with the devil”.

The problem is Israel, and Israel is at a disadvantage. Israel does not understand the changes that are happening around it. These changes are serving Palestinian interests, and not the Israeli ones. Israel is losing friends in the region and is no longer a central figure in determining regional processes. The question is not how much patience the Palestinians have before they turn to violence, but how much time Israel will wait before promoting a solution to the conflict. The deterioration is within Israel. Israel is changing from a liberal society to a less democratic and zealous society. It finds itself increasingly isolated internationally. Today there is no Palestinian leader that can be labeled an obstacle to peace. There is no Palestinian terror. The problem is Israel. There is terrorism from the settlers, which Israel does not control. The settlers are the ones that will destroy Israel and cause a violent explosion. The Palestinians do not understand how it is possible that Israel has refrained from halting the settler violence. Israel does not need to be afraid of a Palestinian state. It should be concerned from Iran. The solution to the Palestinian problem will first and foremost serve Israel, and will improve its regional and global standing. The establishment of a Palestinian state is in Israel’s interest, and there is a belief that about half of the Israeli public understands it, in contrast to the Israeli government’s policies.

The road to Fateh-Hamas reconciliation is still long. Some believe that the Fateh-Hamas crisis is temporary, that the reconciliation agreement signed in Cairo will soon be implemented, that democratic elections are near, and that the division between the West Bank and Gaza is not really an obstacle to peace (based on claims that Khaled Mashal respects Abu Mazen’s non-violence policy, and declared that he will accept a final status agreement brought forth by Abu Mazen). Nevertheless, there is an understanding that without including Gaza it will not be possible to implement any Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and that the true Fateh-Hamas reconciliation is still far away. The Palestinian people want Palestinian unity and it is possible that they will take to the streets to promote this desire. Abu Mazen is working to maintain Fateh’s power in Gaza, and does so through paying salaries to approximately 60,000 Gaza residents every month without them actually working. A majority of Abu Mazen’s budget is transferred to the Gaza Strip. Fateh believes that it is currently more popular in Gaza than Hamas, and would have gained a majority there should elections take place today. During Abu Mazen’s speech at the UN, Hamas did not allow rallies in support of him. They also threatened to shoot anyone that would demonstrate. Fateh instructed their supporters in Gaza to stay home. They did not want to agitate the situation.

In contrast, Hamas is perceived as being strong in the West Bank. It is allowed to act there as a political organization as long as it operates according to PNA law. Fateh does not directly oppose Hamas (Abu Mazen even met Hamas leaders from Nablus), but it does work to erode Hamas’ power. For example, all of Hamas’ welfare institutions in the West Bank were transferred to the PNA, which currently provides the West Bank residents’ social needs. Fateh has a dilemma in the West Bank, which impacts their ability to gain popularity over Hamas. Fateh veterans that used to be among Israel’s “most wanted” and were responsible for many terror attacks, are now looked at by the younger generation as corrupt officials that drive luxury cars and enjoy VIP permits to enter Israel. The youth are not aware of the militant past of these people, and the Fateh veterans cannot boast about their past because it will not be accepted by the Israelis with whom they cooperate today.

הפוסט Continuing on the Path to Statehood: The Palestinians Following their Septmember 2011 UN Bid הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.