ארכיון Abu Dhabi - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/abu-dhabi/ מתווים Sun, 22 Aug 2021 19:12:38 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון Abu Dhabi - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/abu-dhabi/ 32 32 No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/no-preelection-gifts-from-arab-leaders-to-benjamin-netanyahu/ Thu, 27 Feb 2020 15:19:40 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3008 At the annual Munich Security Conference in mid-February, the most important event of its kind – to which Israel did not bother send a single senior representative this year, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan put an end to rumors of a possible meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “There will be no such meeting,” bin Farhan said, explaining that the Saudi position on the Palestinian issue remained unchanged. One can argue about the extent to which the Palestinian issue is important to the Arab Sunni states. A quick glance at the evening news on the pan-Arab television channels, such as Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya, or local channels from Morocco to Bahrain clearly shows that news from Gaza and the West Bank barely make it into the lineup. Nonetheless, there is not a shadow of a doubt that absent progress on resolving this issue there will not be any significant progress on normalizing ties between Israel and Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or other Arab capitals. During the three election campaigns of the past year, the most bizarre in Israeli history, Netanyahu sought time after time to set up a meeting or summit with Arab leaders. Feelers were put out to the king of Morocco, requests were sent to the king of Jordan, pleas were conveyed to the president of Egypt, demands were made of the king of Bahrain and insistent appeals were directed to the Saudi crown prince. All to no avail. In the case of the Jordanian

הפוסט No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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At the annual Munich Security Conference in mid-February, the most important event of its kind – to which Israel did not bother send a single senior representative this year, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan put an end to rumors of a possible meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “There will be no such meeting,” bin Farhan said, explaining that the Saudi position on the Palestinian issue remained unchanged.

One can argue about the extent to which the Palestinian issue is important to the Arab Sunni states. A quick glance at the evening news on the pan-Arab television channels, such as Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya, or local channels from Morocco to Bahrain clearly shows that news from Gaza and the West Bank barely make it into the lineup. Nonetheless, there is not a shadow of a doubt that absent progress on resolving this issue there will not be any significant progress on normalizing ties between Israel and Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or other Arab capitals.

During the three election campaigns of the past year, the most bizarre in Israeli history, Netanyahu sought time after time to set up a meeting or summit with Arab leaders. Feelers were put out to the king of Morocco, requests were sent to the king of Jordan, pleas were conveyed to the president of Egypt, demands were made of the king of Bahrain and insistent appeals were directed to the Saudi crown prince. All to no avail. In the case of the Jordanian monarch, a meeting with Netanyahu as he floats ideas of annexation would not be conceivable in any case. Other states, even those that persistently signal to Israel their willingness for warmer ties, were not wild about the idea, either.

Arab leaders are well aware that Netanyahu is the only real beneficiary of such meetings. For them, a meeting not conditioned on renewed negotiations with the Palestinians or a sign talks are in the offing, would be worthless at best and a wonderful gift for their domestic opposition in the worst-case scenario.

Several months ago, when Netanyahu made a surprise appearance at a conference marking the 25th anniversary of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty – organized by MK Merav Michaeli – he explained how his visit to Oman in late 2018 was different than the one conducted there by late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in the 1990s. “Rabin was forced to pay with Oslo, but I am not paying with concessions,” he explained to the guests, among them Middle East scholar Prof. Itamar Rabinovich and the former director-general of Rabin’s office, Shimon Sheves.

Netanyahu seems to truly believe the Arab world has despaired of the Palestinians, gotten on with its business and all obstacles to cooperation with Israel have now been lifted. After all, our sportsmen and women are allowed to participate in international tournaments in Dubai and Doha, our ministers travel to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in Cairo and to international meetings in Abu Dhabi and a significant security dialogue is being conducted behind the scenes between Israel and Arab states, chief among them the Gulf States.

On the face of it, he is right. The Iranian threat brings Israel closer to the states in the region that have despaired of the Palestinians and realized that Israel is not their enemy. Nonetheless, absent resolution of the Palestinian issue, Israel will remain a “mistress” to these states but never “a legally wed wife.”

Arab leaders reiterate this caveat time and again, so there was nothing new in what the Saudi foreign minister said in Munich. There may be other goodies ahead Israel could present as a “breakthrough” in relations, but nothing more. The Palestinian issue is akin to a glass ceiling that limits the development of relations between Israel and the Arab world, and, as Netanyahu found out personally, it cannot be breached without paying the price.

Relations with the countries of the Middle East are very important for Israel. The importance of proper ties with Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other states cannot be overstated. At the same time, Israel clearly must strive for resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians, first and foremost for its own sake. Advancing ties with Arab states and Israel’s integration in the region are a highly significant bonus. Those dreaming of shortcuts that will allow them to reach Riyadh without stopping in Ramallah should think again.

The writer, a former member of Knesset, is director of the Program on Israel-Middle East Relations at the Mitvim Institute. She is a senior research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya and formerly a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

הפוסט No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trouble-in-paradise-cracks-are-forming-in-the-saudi-emirati-relationship/ Wed, 07 Aug 2019 10:37:11 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2797 The relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always been smooth. Even before the latter’s independence in 1971, the affairs between the ruling families, al-Nahyan of Abu-Dhabi and al-Saud of Riyad, were tense due to borders disputes and power struggles. Today, however, it seems that the two countries have never been closer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated, over the last decade, a solid partnership in decision-making processes and see eye to eye on major strategic questions in their region. The strength of their cooperation was expressed in varied interests and arenas, such as the backing the rise of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt (2014), joining forces in their campaign in Yemen (2015), imposing an unprecedented boycott on Qatar (2017) and introducing groundbreaking national laws in both states such as the Value Added Tax law (2018)—all of which are taking place in times of rapid and significant changes within their own territories. The alliance between the two states rests on close personal ties between their leaders—Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de-facto ruler, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Emirati crown prince and de-facto ruler. It’s also based on similar, though not identical, world-views in which political Islam and Iranian influence form two destabilizing forces in the Middle East. Nevertheless, just like in romantic relations, the more they are becoming intense and weighty, the more difficulties they reveal. The recent tension in the Gulf affords a glimpse into one of many disputes between Saudi Arabia

הפוסט Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always been smooth. Even before the latter’s independence in 1971, the affairs between the ruling families, al-Nahyan of Abu-Dhabi and al-Saud of Riyad, were tense due to borders disputes and power struggles. Today, however, it seems that the two countries have never been closer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated, over the last decade, a solid partnership in decision-making processes and see eye to eye on major strategic questions in their region. The strength of their cooperation was expressed in varied interests and arenas, such as the backing the rise of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt (2014), joining forces in their campaign in Yemen (2015), imposing an unprecedented boycott on Qatar (2017) and introducing groundbreaking national laws in both states such as the Value Added Tax law (2018)—all of which are taking place in times of rapid and significant changes within their own territories.

The alliance between the two states rests on close personal ties between their leaders—Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de-facto ruler, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Emirati crown prince and de-facto ruler. It’s also based on similar, though not identical, world-views in which political Islam and Iranian influence form two destabilizing forces in the Middle East. Nevertheless, just like in romantic relations, the more they are becoming intense and weighty, the more difficulties they reveal.

The recent tension in the Gulf affords a glimpse into one of many disputes between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on appropriate responses to common challenges, this time with Iran. While Saudi Arabia took a public stance using confrontational language vis-à-vis Iran, the UAE remained vaguer in its media coverage of events and did not point an unequivocal finger of blame towards Iran. In the first attack against four oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on May 12, the UAE tried to diminish the significance of the attacks, claiming that the damage caused was minor. Some reports even claimed that Saudi Arabia preferred a military response towards Iran, while the UAE sought to smooth over the situation with a diplomatic resolution.

An additional dispute between the two countries relates to the war in Yemen. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have jointly led the campaign in Yemen against the Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebels, who have been garnished with weaponry, advisors and money from Tehran. While the Saudi forces focused on air operations, the UAE army has played a more significant role on the ground, leading to several game-changing outcomes. Even though the Saudis led their allies to the war, it is now the UAE who is steering the wheels by gradually withdrawing from Yemen. In its cautious and sophisticated nature, the UAE had calculated its battles on the expanding fronts and realized that its focus should be granted to more immediate and close challenges. As tension with Iran increased, the UAE took a swift step to tackle the rising threat with greater attention and a reallocation of resources for any possible development.

The increasing international criticism over the humanitarian effects of the Yemen war was another catalyst for the Emirati withdrawal. The UAE’s pulling off from Yemen without a satisfactory arrangement acceptable to Saudi Arabia, is a probable source for a conflict between them and a death blow to the latter’s attempt to reach a victorious image in this arena.

Despite the increasing tension and apparent disagreements between the countries, their relationship is yet far from a crisis, as it is based on deep ideological and strategic partnership. The disagreements at this point mainly revolve around methods of action and degrees of force that each of the sides is interested in applying, whether in regard to military action, diplomatic decisions or social processes. Of the two, the UAE behaves like the “responsible adult” in its tactical choices, while Mohammed bin Salman has been portrayed as more reckless. Despite the open channel of communication between the two leaders, their continued proactive policies are increasing the likely challenges in the relationship between them.

The struggle between Iran and the Sunni Arab states has shaped the way researchers, journalists and intelligence analysts have understood and analyzed regional dynamics for many years. This struggle has geostrategic and ideological impacts on the region which affect many arenas. Alongside this struggle, however, another battle has been taking place for a while now which also has a significant impact on the character of the Middle East and beyond. Without standing out to a comparable degree, the competition between the Arab Gulf states, as we have seen in North Africa, Yemen, the Red Sea and the Palestinian arena, has made its mark on the region. This competition, which is driven by aspirations for influence and prestige in the Arab world, indirectly influences such issues as nuclear proliferation and regional arms races, thus bringing up new challenges for the security of the Middle East.

In the past, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia demonstrated restraint in conducting their foreign affairs. They stood in the shadow of others and made primary use of their comparative economic advantage. Today, they are the driving force behind many regional changes, and are key players in many arenas. However, with this power comes the weight of responsibility for maintaining regional stability. In this matter, it seems that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are implementing divergent approaches regarding the use of their power.

Yoel Guzansky is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served at Israel’s National Security Council and advised other ministries including the Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry for Strategic Affairs.

Moran Zaga is a research fellow at the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy and a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in The National Interest)

הפוסט Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Pending Opportunities https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-the-united-arab-emirates-pending-opportunities/ Wed, 12 Dec 2018 15:46:00 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3016 Op ed by Dr. Moran Zaga, December 2018

הפוסט Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Pending Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In a sensational statement, Anwar Gargash shed a light on the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) foreign policy of the last decade. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the UAE said this past summer that ” we are ready to take up more of the burden of security in our own neighborhood”. The economic and political status of the UAE provides it with a significant added value in its foreign relations. In recent years, the UAE has expanded its influence in the Middle East and North Africa through a more active diplomacy and an extensive infrastructure of military bases and ports, in various countries in the region. During the last three years, the UAE has also been active in Yemen’s war and in local conflicts in Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. This demonstrates a calculated policy aimed at transforming the UAE into a regional power alongside its ally, Saudi Arabia.

This increasingly activist foreign policy approach also explains the growing interest of the UAE in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In its repeated declarations, the UAE has expressed its support for a two-state solution, but mostly stayed a passive supporter for international peace initiatives. Now, it appears that the UAE is striving to adopt an independent and proactive policy on the issue, with a greater involvement in internal Palestinian politics and in multilateral talks that include Israel.

The UAE is of much importance to Israel. The two countries share common interests and sometimes even similar worldviews, in parallel to the political and ideological gap that separates them. One of the prominent characteristics of the UAE is its moderate Islamic approach and its opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist organizations (Sunnis and Shiites). This worldview is at the center of the UAE’s dispute with Iran and Qatar, and this is where its values and interests converge with those of Israel. The moderate and liberal nature of the two countries, relative to other countries of the region, enables a pragmatic dialogue between them. Furthermore, the UAE enjoys strong political stability, which provides it with obvious economic advantages as well as with unique capabilities to shape long-term processes in the Middle East.

At the international level, the UAE invests considerable efforts and resources in expanding its diplomatic ties and in branding itself as an important global hub. As such, it hosts international institutions, conferences, competitions and events. However, this is a source for dilemma relating to its ties with Israel. On the one hand, the UAE faces domestic and regional criticism for hosting Israelis, and is accused of normalization with Israel. On the other hand, there is international pressure against boycotting Israel at international events, and an understanding in the UAE that such a boycott might lead to a loss of legitimacy. This often forces the UAE to accept Israeli participation in a variety of international events.

It is not far-fetched to imagine direct official contacts between the two countries in the future, but such relations seem unrealistic at this point. The UAE seems to currently prefer to avoid or limit any cooperation with Israel. For example, its official news agencies refrained from reporting on the opening of the Israeli representation to the UN’s International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi in early 2016. However, since there was significant coverage in Israeli and international media outlets about the topic, Maryam al-Falasi, the media officer at the UAE Foreign Ministry, issued an official statement clarifying that IRENA is an independent international agency with its own norms and laws, and that the opening of the Israeli representation does not indicate any change in the UAE’s position towards Israel or in the relations between the two countries.

Business cooperation between the two countries is no longer a secret. Nevertheless, the fact that they have to be covert and the scope of technical obstacles involved in carrying them out, make it difficult for Israel to compete with other countries in entering the desirable UAE markets. The potential for closer business, security, diplomatic and civilian ties is great. An example, is the international EXPO2020 exhibition, which will be held in Dubai in two years, and will be a hub for high level meetings between governments and private sector companies. Israel has not yet received an invitation for this exhibition and might miss out on this great opportunity.

The UAE is a partner in the waiting for Israel. Both Israel and the UAE are essentially pragmatic, and have leverage in the Middle East. The UAE has never participated in any war against Israel and there is no deep hostility between the two countries. The Gulf states, and the UAE among them, regard Israel as a regional player that must be dealt with. They all consider a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a source of regional stability and as a means to confront extremism in their own territories. The UAE Foreign Ministry’s website is full of references calling on Israel and the Palestinians to advance the peace process based on the two-state solution and the Arab peace initiative (2002).

In general, the UAE receives Jews of various nationalities in its territory and does not regard religious differences as the source of its conflict with Israel. Rather, it is Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians. The regional influence that the UAE can exert, and its growing importance in the Middle East, position it as a country that can potentially play a significant role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whenever Israel will want to normalize relations with its neighbours and promote regional peace, it is likely to find a very willing partner in the UAE.

Dr. Moran Zaga researches social and geopolitical processes in the Gulf states. She is a Policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy, and a Research Fellow at the Ezri Center at the University of Haifa and at the Forum for Regional Thinking. This article is based on her study on Israel-UAE relations, which is part of the “Israel-Arab Relations: The Unfulfilled Potential” project of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and the United Arab Emirates: Pending Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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