Prior to the law’s passing, Arabic was considered Israel’s second official language, a fact that improved Israel’s image in the world due to its recognition of the Arab minority’s culture and identity. This helped Israel present itself as a democratic state, while acting as a bridge between the country and the Arab-speaking region. It also recognized the culture and identity of Jews from Arab countries, for whom Arabic is an inseparable part of their heritage. The fact that Arabic was an official language gave Arab speakers in Israel a sense of both hope and belonging, which is why a change in its status may exact a high price both internally as well as externally.

At the western most tip of Africa sits Morocco, a country that can serve as a fascinating case study on the development of national and cultural identity. Although Morocco is not the most economically advanced country in the world, and has quite a way to go in terms of human rights and democracy, it has, over the years, succeeded in formulating a model of an inclusive national identity, with the understanding and belief that difference and diversity should be encouraged and emphasized.

This wasn’t always the situation. When Morocco declared independence in 1956, it had to formulate a clear national identity after years of colonial influence. Morocco chose an Arab national identity, and through an intensive “melting pot” process, it molded its state symbols and institutions according to this homogenous identity. For example, Morocco joined the Arab League, Arabic was defined as the official language of the state, and some of the streets in the kingdom were given Arabic names.

In the wake of the decision, Morocco underwent an accelerated process of Westernization, which came at the expense of other identities in the kingdom, specifically that of the Amazighs, which make up half the population. The Amazighs, also known as Berbers, are considered the original residents of Morocco and North Africa. They are a separate ethnic group and speak Amazigh languages. The exclusion of Amazigh identity was manifested in banning the group’s languages in schools, on state television and radio broadcasts, and forbidding parents from giving their children Amazigh names on their ID cards. Instead, Amazigh citizens are given Arabic names, which they use at school and vis-à-vis state institutions, as well as an Amazigh name, which they use with family and friends.

This led to numerous Amazigh protests over the years, especially during the reign of King Hassan II. The protesters called to increase Amazigh representation in the Moroccan narrative, bridge socioeconomic gaps, make public services available, and promote employment and equitable distribution of resources. All this drastically changed with King Mohammed VI, who took power in July 1999, and who vowed to connect every home to electricity and water and laid down basic infrastructure in the Amazigh villages. Under the king, Morocco established the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture, which works to revive Amazigh languages and to integrate the Amazigh heritage into the national curriculum and encourage research on the topic.

While the situation and representation of the Amazigh improved, the protests did not cease. In February 2011, the winds of the Arab Spring blew through the streets of the country, and hundreds of thousands of Moroccans protested across the kingdom. The king, who feared the protests could destabilize the country, took steps to placate the demonstrators, including by changing the constitution. In July 2011, the kingdom passed an amendment to the constitution by referendum, which redefined Morocco’s national identity as a Muslim state. This time, however, the amendment emphasized the country’s commitment to the rich and diverse heritage of all its residents:

“A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [Amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [Saharo-Hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world.”

The amendment also brought about a change in the status of the Tamazight language, which for the first time became an official language of the state, as per Article 5 of the Constitution:

Arabic is the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/Amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception.

The wording of the amendment was able to emphasize the commonalities between Arabs and Amazighs without undermining the status of Arabic or Morocco’s Arab identity. And while the wording does not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground, it does shape perceptions and reality, cultivating one of the central values of Moroccan nationalism, according to which difference and diversity are a source of strength.

The Moroccan case is not identical to that of Israel. And yet, the development of a national hegemonic Arab identity in Morocco to a heterogenous and multicultural one could serve as a lesson for the Jewish state.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute, and a member of the institute’s task-team, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries. This article is based on a study of Israel-Morocco relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט What Israel can learn from Morocco’s multiculturalism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The conference was attended by politicians, diplomats, and experts on regional affairs. The speakers included: Co-chairs of the Lobby for Regional Cooperation, MK Merav Michaeli, MK Yaakov Peri, and MK Michael Oren; Minister of Tourism MK Yariv Levin; Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation MK Ayoob Kara; MK Ksenia Svetlova, MK Zuheir Bahloul, MK Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin, MK Nachman Shai; Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Walid Obeidat; Ambassador of Bulgaria, Dimitar Mihaylov; Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, Thessalia-Salina Shambos; UNSCO Director of Regional Affairs Unit, Ms. Jody Barrett; Head of Political and Press Section at the Delegation of the European Union, Mr. Mark Gallagher; Political Counselor of the United States Embassy, Keith Mines; Professor Uzi Arad, Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and the head of the National Security Council; Head of Mitvim, Dr. Nimrod Goren; Mitvim Board Member, Professor Elie Podeh; Director of the Israeli Peace Initiative, Koby Huberman; Adv. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Head of the Tamar Regional Council, Mr. Dov Litvinoff; EcoPeace Middle East’s Director of Government Relations, Mr. Uri Ginot.

This document presents an edited version of the remarks that were made at the conference. The full conference can be viewed on Mitvim’s YouTube channel.

הפוסט Time for an Israeli Regional Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It was also the first visit by an incumbent prime minister since Yitzhak Shamir’s visit to Liberia, Ivory Coast, Togo and Cameroon in 1987.

The State of Israel is also conducting extensive secret diplomatic activity in a bid to resume or establish diplomatic ties with Muslim states in Africa which it has no diplomatic relations with. As part of this activity, on July 20, 2016, the State of Israel signed an agreement to resume diplomatic relations with the Republic of Guinea, the first state in Africa to sever its ties with the State of Israel in 1967 following the Six-Day War.

After the agreement was signed, Foreign Ministry Director-General Dore Gold visited Guinea on August 21 and met with the country’s president, Professor Alpha Condé, and with 10 of his ministers. They discussed cooperation in different fields and agreed to complete the ambassadors’ appointment process.

At the end of his visit to Guinea, Gold paid a rare visit on August 22 to a Muslim African state with which Israel has no diplomatic relations and met with senior officials there. Before this, on July 14, he visited Chad and discussed the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel with its president, Idriss Déby. So far, the relations have not been restored.

The main goals of the extensive Israeli diplomatic activity in Africa are: An attempt to change the African states’ voting patterns at the UN, the African Union, and other international forums, as so far most African states continue to vote in favor of pro-Arab resolutions despite the fact that they have good bilateral relations with Israel; an attempt to win observer’s status or, at least, the status of an invited guest at the African Union; to expand trade relations between the State of Israel and African states; to aid African states in areas in which Israel has experience, such as agriculture, development, security and counterterrorism; and to curb the Iranian influence in Africa. At the moment, the State of Israel appears to be partially successful in reaching its objectives in Africa.

Are Sudan and Somalia also wooing Israel?

Israel has been successful in expanding its trade relations with African states which are experiencing fast economic growth, and is helping many African states in the aforementioned areas. In addition, the State of Israel has been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with Muslim African states who severed ties or had no ties with Israel in the past. In this regard, the agreement with the Republic of Guinea appears to be just the beginning.

Moreover, against the backdrop of the battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which reached its peak when relations between the two states were cut on January 3, 2016, and when relations between Saudi Arabia’s allies in Eastern Africa – Somalia, Djibouti. Sudan and the Comoros Islands – and Iran were severed several days later, and with of the improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel as a result of the Iranian nuclear threat and the war on terror, Sudan and Somalia have reportedly begun wooing Israel. Israel has thereby practically succeeded in partially curbing the Iranian influence in the continent.

  For now, the Iranian influence has been curbed in some states in the Horn of Africa and in Eastern Africa, and the route of Iranian arms shipments to Hamas – which passes through the Red Sea and Sudan to Egypt and from there to the Gaza Strip – has been blocked.

As a result of this activity, it is quite possible that other African states will change their voting patterns at the UN by abstaining in votes on pro-Arab resolutions on Middle Eastern issues, or distance themselves from them – as Nigeria did at the Security Council vote on December 31, 2014, when it moved from supporting a Palestinian proposal to abstaining.

An observer status at the African Union?

Nonetheless, the main challenge facing the State of Israel is its repeated attempts to gain observer status at the African Union. During Netanyahu’s visit to Africa, it was reported that Algeria and Sudan had worked to thwart his visit to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, although he had no plans to visit the place. South African objected to it too.

This is the result of attempts made by the Palestinians and Arab states to curb Israel’s activity in Africa, including its attempts to gain observer status at the European Union. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) received observer status at the African Union in 1974, when African states turned the Palestinian problem into an African problem. So after Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Agreements in September 1993, African states – including Muslim ones – restored their ties with Israel. But some of those states, such as Niger and Mauritania, cut their ties with Israel again following the deterioration in Israel’s relations with the Palestinians.

In the past, Egypt also played an important role in the attempt to limit Israel’s steps in Africa, but today, in light of its budding relationship with Israel, which has warmed up in the three years of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rule, and in light of the many internal challenging faced by Egypt, it seems to prefer to keep a low profile and not disrupt Israel’s reentry into the continent.

Due to the centrality of the Palestinian problem in African states, it’s very likely that in the event of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian process, Israel would also be able to gain an observer status at the African Union alongside the PLO and almost fully implement the targets of its reentrance into the continent.

(originally published in YNet)

הפוסט The Israeli return to Africa הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.