Israel is wrong in depicting the EU as hostile to Israel, and the new government would do well to shift direction. The EU is a strategic ally of Israel – in trade and economy, in diplomacy and security, in technology and tourism, in research and culture. The EU’s criticism targets Israel’s policy on the Palestinians and is not inherently anti-Israel as some portray it. The EU opposes the settlements and Israel’s annexation intentions. It also encourages differentiation between the Palestinian territories and Israel, but by no means does it advocate a boycott of Israel.

The growing divisions among EU member states in recent years have undermined European consensus on a variety of foreign policy issues, among them the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu’s European supporters, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has eroded democracy in his own country, are actively engaged in thwarting EU criticism of Israeli policy in the territories. The EU Foreign Affairs Council has not adopted joint resolutions on Israel since mid-2016. Europe’s focus on more urgent challenges, such as refugees, Brexit and now the coronavirus – is also a contributing factor in this regard.

However, Europe is unwilling to ignore Netanyahu’s annexation intentions. The heads of the EU and key member states are finding ways to circumvent internal divisions in order to convey protests, opposition and warnings to Israel: Outspoken remarks by the EU new foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, joint declarations by European members of the UN Security Council, coordinated protests delivered to the Israeli Foreign Ministry by European ambassadors representing states with similar policy views, and cooperation with other international bodies, such as the Arab League, which also oppose annexation.

EU representatives have made use of all these tools in recent weeks. They have expressed unequivocal opposition to annexation, stressed that it would violate international law, recommended that Israel avoid doing so, and some even warned of legal consequences and deterioration of their relations with Israel. Countries like France, Belgium and Luxembourg have been working to place the issue on the agenda of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, calling on the EU to spell out punitive measures against Israeli annexation.

Nevertheless, also due to internal divisions, Europe seems to be waiting to see the nature and extent of Netanyahu’s annexation decision before presenting concrete reactions and a real price tag.

The differences in European approaches are evident in the phrasing of declarations. France, Ireland and Sweden, for example, express themselves in harsher fashion. Borrell, too, is outspoken, but the fact that he does not represent at this stage a unified stance of all member states weakens the significance of his remarks. At the same time, Borrell is seeking to boost EU ties with Jordan, which he identifies as a key state in regards to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Israel has become accustomed to viewing Europe as a weakened entity in the international arena and to dismissing its protests. However, this attitude could turn out to be wrong if Israel decides to take a formal annexation step, which many in Europe would regard as a game changer. Key European leaders might advance measures within EU institutions and elsewhere that would exact a toll on Israel. However, other than a threat of “sticks”, the EU is also offering “carrots” in the event that Israel chooses to progress toward a two-state solution. In 2013, the EU offered a significant upgrade of relations with Israel to that of a Special Privileged Partnership if it makes peace with the Palestinians. It is time to examine this offer, to which Israel has yet to respond, in a positive light.

That, in turn, requires a change in the new Israeli government’s attitude toward the EU. The new government should regard the EU as a friend and partner, and cease EU bashing. It should support a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and prioritize ties with those European states that are guided by liberal democratic values. The government should seek to renew its high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012. It should also welcome EU involvement in efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, including European support to pro-peace and pro-democracy civil society organizations.

However, recalibrating Israel-EU relations will not be possible while Israel is promoting annexation. These two things do not go together. Israel’s new foreign minister should indeed convey a new message to the Europeans as he takes office – of partnership and friendship, commitment to democratic values, willingness for dialogue and openness to criticism – but at the same time he should seek to block annexation. Not only because of European opposition, but primarily out of concern for Israel’s national interests, democratic character, and quest for peace.

הפוסט Israel, the EU and Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel, Energy, and the Eastern Mediterranean: Shaping a New Regional Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”.

Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979, without including the Palestinians in the agreement, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would not have agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed only after the Oslo Accords, which radically changed Israel’s relations with the Palestinians. Until then, signing a peace agreement was not possible, even after the Jordanian king relinquished his demand for the West Bank at the end of the 1980s, and with seemingly no fundamental disagreement between him and the Israeli leadership, with whom he maintained good informal relations.

However, Netanyahu believes that a new reality has been created, and that even without negotiating with the Palestinians it is possible to normalize relations with the Arab world. It is the “new terror” that makes it possible. The threat of Islamic extremism to the Muslim world encourages the Arab leadership to ally with Israel. In his view, even in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is possible to improve Israel’s relations with other Arab countries.

Netanyahu’s belief in the transformation of the Arab world has led him to change his attitude toward the Arab League initiative. Netanyahu, who once claimed that “in its current format [it is] dangerous to the State of Israel”, claimed in 2016, “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab peace initiative”. The new Netanyahu ignores the central component of the Arab League initiative: the need for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement prior to normalizing relations with Israel. When the “Palestinian component” is left out of the equation, Netanyahu can indeed welcome the initiative. He also believes that strengthening Israel’s relations with the Arab states can lead to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. However, the Arab League still believes in the reversed process whereby the Israeli-Palestinian agreement precedes improving the relations with the Arab world. Likewise, the reports about the recent declarations of the Saudi Prince mentioned that he once again stated that “there needs to be significant progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians before it will be possible to advance negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Arab world and Israel.”

Netanyahu’s discourse is captivating and raises very few objections in Israel. Since 2000, most of the Israeli public believes like there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. If there is no Palestinian partner and if relations with the Arab world can be strengthened even without negotiations with the Palestinians, there is no reason to oppose Netanyahu’s assertion. His coalition partners from the Israeli political right are happy to promote peace with the Arab world without having to pay any price. Netanyahu’s political rivals on the political left show no objection either: some share the view that there is no Palestinian partner, and even those who believe that there is a partner for an agreement find it difficult to oppose the opportunity to strengthen ties with other Arab countries.

But even Netanyahu admitted in the past that a genuine and formal relationship between Israel and the Arab world cannot be expected without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. According to himself, “in order to fully achieve this broad peace agreement, the Palestinians must be part of it”. Indeed, there is no evidence that the hope for substantial and meaningful relations between Israel and the Arab world can occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. It is no surprise, therefore, that in February of this year, when Netanyahu mentioned again the strengthening of relations with the Arab world at the defense conference in Munich, it was reported that the Secretary-General of the Arab League tweeted in response, “there will be no peace with the Arab world before achieving peace with the Palestinians.”

Dr. Yuval Benziman teaches conflict resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a task-team member at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper written as part of the Mitvim Institute’s project on “Israel’s relations with Arab states: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

China supports the two-state solution, which includes a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It consistently votes in favor of UN resolutions along these lines. However, the Chinese Foreign Minister and other senior officials made it clear at the Beijing meeting that China does not take sides in the conflict. Rather, it claims that it is interested in promoting a solution that gives Palestinians their rights and ensures Israel’s security, recognizes the importance of Jerusalem for all religions and ethnic groups, and promotes regional stability. China declared that it intends to do so by mostly using positive economic leverages, instead of exerting political pressures. The Beijing meeting resulted in a joint Israeli-Palestinian paper that included guiding principles and policy steps towards the two-state solution. The meeting helped Chinese officials better understand the interests and sensitivities of the Israelis and Palestinians, and the points of agreement and disagreement between supporters of peace on both sides.

Is this a new and meaningful Chinese move, or is it merely a continuation of China’s low-key and symbolic involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? After all, many countries announce their aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace and show interest in the matter. Nevertheless, most of them do not give it high priority, do not believe that progress is possible under the current political conditions, nor do they invest great efforts and resources in advancing it. In a period of stagnation in the peace process and in light of recent American steps that make it even more difficult to renew negotiations, every country that is willing to help and contribute to peacemaking is important. China has the potential to play a useful role: It is an ambitious power with a growing global influence, which has good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, has unique economic capabilities, and promotes large-scale international infrastructure projects, including in Israel and the Middle East (as part of its far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative).

Chinese officials stressed at the Beijing meeting that China does not see itself as an alternative mediator to the US, but rather wants to be part of a multilateral effort to promote peace. This Chinese willingness to promote peace in coordination with other players in the international community is important and positive. Previous initiatives by other countries that were competing with each other, led mainly to failures. China’s position on the final status agreement is similar to that of the EU and the Arab League, therefore the establishment of a Sino-European dialogue channel on the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be a good starting point for Chinese involvement. In the future, it is worthwhile adding Arab officials and institutions to the initiative – led by Egypt, with whom China has a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Currently, there is no more consensus within the international community regarding the desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The American position has shifted under Trump, and within the EU there are countries (in Central and Eastern Europe) that adopt different positions to that of Brussels and which are rather supportive of Netanyahu’s policies. This makes it difficult to formulate the required international parameters for a twostate solution, but it should not interfere with other international actions that are currently on the diplomatic agenda, i.e. the formulation of a global set of economic and political incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. The idea of introducing to Israelis and Palestinians an incentive package that will increase public support in peace was adopted during the French Peace Initiative and by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council. It was also included in the final document of the Beijing meeting.

So far, incentives have been offered by the Arab League (the Arab Peace Initiative), the EU (the proposal to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state) and the US (security guarantees for the two-state solution formulated during the previous administration). China may add its own large-scale economic incentive, which will present a reality of prosperity and development that both Israelis and Palestinians will benefit from after reaching peace. For example, a senior Chinese official mentioned during the Beijing meeting that China has the potential to play a central role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. China can also be involved in the process of developing a new international mechanism to advance the peace process, which will be more inclusive and effective than the current Quartet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has chosen to invite to Beijing delegations that mostly included Israeli and Palestinian civil society activists, thus conveying the importance it attaches to informal activities to promote peace. Indeed, in their speeches, the Chinese officials emphasized how much hope they derive from the positive spirit of the discussions at the meeting, the agreements reached during it, and the fact that many citizens and organizations on both sides are committed to the two-state solution and to achieving it through peaceful means. As demonstrated in Beijing, the contribution of civil society to the peace process is not limited to grassroots dialogue and activism. Civil society can also have policy impact, by making genuine contributions to international diplomatic processes and by assisting politicians from both sides in reaching agreements and understandings. Although China’s added value is not in expertise regarding civil society, it can still provide significant infrastructural-economic support to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations, thereby increasing their visibility and impact, and assisting them to fulfill their potential. The meeting in Beijing did not lead to a breakthrough towards peace, nor was it its goal. It laid the foundation for greater Chinese involvement in the advancement of peace, highlighting China’s unique advantages and capabilities.

The meeting also showed Israelis and Palestinians that despite the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and increased tensions on the ground, they can still reach understandings and draw a common path forward. Promoting peace requires diverse and effective international involvement, but first and foremost, it requires local political will for peace. Achieving this requires further work, with and without China’s involvement.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. He participated in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium, held in Beijing on 21-22 December 2017. A shorter version of this article was published by Globes on 31 January 2018.

הפוסט Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The speech attracted little attention from Israeli or global media, for in many ways it was similar to Abbas’s many speeches focusing on the Israeli occupation and its consequences. It did, however, include an interesting section in which the Palestinian president called on the African leaders (many of whom are Muslim or Arab) to stipulate that any upgrade of their ties with Israel would be conditional on Israel ending the occupation.

Given that most experts concur that Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, will not take unnecessary diplomatic risks or normalize ties with Israel before the resolution of the Palestinian issue, we should ask ourselves what Abbas is concerned about.

First, Abbas, who has been heavily involved in shaping Palestinian history, knows that at critical moments, the Arab countries have followed their own separate interests. In 1979, it was Egypt under Sadat that turned its back on the Palestinians and signed a peace agreement with Israel. In 1982, during the First Lebanon War, there were no Arab efforts to save the PLO from Israel. The organization suffered defeat and was forced to relocate its headquarters to Tunisia. In 1988, Jordan unilaterally disengaged from the West Bank, following the first intifada.

Later, Yasser Arafat abandoned king Hussein by signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite the latter’s political umbrella during the 1991 Madrid conference.

King Hussein felt betrayed, but decided to make use of the positive regional momentum to sign a peace treaty with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994, without stipulating that the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement or the establishment of a Palestinian state were conditions of the agreement.

Abbas’ second concern is the absence of natural, consistently reliable allies, which is especially disconcerting in view of the PA’s inherent weakness and limited economic resources, and its resulting dependence on regional actors (including Israel). In the past, the PLO could automatically count on the support of the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Today, all these actors have become irrelevant for the PA and its current strategy of relying on moderate states that support the peace process. Such states, however, are not always aligned with the interests of the PA. In 2017, for example, Egypt attempted to amend the Arab Peace Initiative (an attempt blocked by Palestinian objection) and is currently promoting a deal with Hamas to grant Mohammad Dahlan powers in Gaza, contrary to the wishes and at the expense of the interests of the PA.

Finally, Abbas is concerned by recent changes in Israel’s favor in the overall Arab position. In 2013, the Arab Quartet agreed to modify the Arab Peace Initiative and accept the notion of Israeli-Palestinian land swaps without demanding any concession from Israel in return. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has made a series of gestures to Israel over the past two years, including visits, meetings, and allusions to secret security cooperation against common enemies. In May 2017, The Wall Street Journal even reported that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states offered to take some normalization steps toward Israel in return for a limited settlements freeze and an Israeli decision to ease restrictions over trade with Gaza.

Over the years, various Arab countries have conducted behind-the-scenes relations with Israel. The Arab countries were afraid of being caught in public as supporting their Israeli “mistress” rather than their Palestinian “wife.” This “mistress syndrome” is still evident, but recent developments indicate that the interests of these countries, and specifically their desire to deter Iran and its allies, are served by publicizing their diplomatic or security ties with Israel. Making their relations with Israel more public also lays the groundwork for a future upgrade of ties with Israel, once the Israeli-Palestinian peace process moves forward.

Like other experts, I also believed (and continue to believe) that Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and other Arab countries will not take major steps toward normalization with Israel before significant progress is made toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, an uncompromising Palestinian position, and the continued split between the PA and Hamas, might lead Arab leaders to prefer their national interests over their commitment to the Palestinian cause. Sadat and king Hussein made such decisions in the past, and others may follow. This is a definite cause of concern for Abbas.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Abbas Should Be Concerned About? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Foreign Policies: Summary of a briefing with Dr. Karen E. Young הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since the API was first presented at the Arab League summit in March 2002, Israel has never officially responded to the Initiative; moreover, for a long period of time, Israel chose to ignore the Initiative, or simply oppose it. Lieberman went even further in 2009, when he called the API nothing less than a “recipe for Israel’s destruction.” Olmert was the only one to try and promote the Initiative at the end of his term, but it was too little and too late. Occasionally, various politicians expressed positive statements regarding the Initiative, yet the great majority focused on the API’s alleged drawbacks. In any case, no critical mass of supporters has ever been able to bring a change in the Israeli approach towards the Initiative.

Israeli public opinion has also remained in the dark about the Initiative. Opinion polls have shown that the majority of the public is not aware of the API nor its content. Attempts of various civil society organizations to raise public awareness have failed so far to make a genuine change. This is despite the increasing recognition of the advantages of involving the Arab countries in the peace process, and of the benefits that would ensue from improved relations with these countries, in parallel to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As disturbing as the Israeli government’s response to the API is, it is not as disturbing as the typical “Pavlovian” Israeli reaction to any external efforts to advance the peace process. The word “no” has become the hallmark of Israel’s foreign policy regarding the conflict. Here are some typical examples.

First, over the past two years, Israel has opposed four French initiatives: the idea of adopting a Security Council resolution promoting the recognition of Palestinian statehood; an initiative for an international observer presence on the Temple Mount; the establishment of an International Support Group for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; and lastly, an international peace summit, the first stage of which took place in Paris in early June 2016.

Second, the Prime Minister refused to cooperate with the Quartet in the preparation of the report on the stagnation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, as the Israeli government came to realize that the report was critical of Israel, they tried to work through the United States (US) to soften the tone of the report. The Netanyahu government acted similarly in 2012 with the Palestinian United Nations bid for statehood. The government initially refused to take part in any negotiations regarding the text of the resolution, and only when the text was finalized did the government try to work with the US to change the text.

Third, Israel ignored, and even ridiculed, the European Union’s (EU) December 2013 initiative to upgrade Israeli and Palestinian relations with the EU to the status of a “special privileged partnership” upon the signing a peace agreement. European criticism of Israeli policy has usually met an aggressive Israeli response, yet when Europe tries to provide positive incentives to solving the conflict, they encounter silence and rejection. This reaction is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the EU is one of Israel’s major trading partners.

Fourth, Israel expressed its opposition to the American security plan, formulated by General John Allen during the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. Moreover, in January 2014, Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s former Minister of Defense, said that the plan was not even worth the paper that it was written upon.

Fifth, in February 2016, Netanyahu expressed his concern about the possibility that prior to leaving office, Barack Obama may release his own “parameters” for peace, thus updating the framework presented by Bill Clinton at the end of his term in December 2000. It is important to note that Ehud Barak’s government at the time responded with a “reserved yes” to the Clinton parameters.

Israel’s “no” policy does not only apply to initiatives for the resolution of the conflict. It is also reflected in other areas, such as the government’s steadfast and forthright opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, and even to Germany’s proposal that Israel be indirectly involved in the nuclear talks. Additionally, Israel often chooses to boycott commissions of inquiry or international forums that it believes are too critical of the country.

The Israeli government’s adverse reactions to international initiatives are not only disturbing in content, but also the manner in which the reactions are conveyed. In general, they are harsh and often insulting and condescending. This is in despite of the fact that the majority of the initiatives originate from countries that are friendly to Israel, and whom are genuinely interested in dialogue regarding their content.

If “no” becomes a regular pattern in Israeli foreign policy, then it ceases to be an expression of rational thought, rather an expression of emotional and/or ideological behavior. Israel’s pattern of negative reactions is a manifestation of its current leaders’ fear and anxiety regarding any change in the status quo. The outside world – whether it is ISIS or the EU, and to some extent even the US – is perceived as a threat, and any concession is viewed as an existential threat.

“No” is not a policy prescription that will lead to a better future. This behavior moves us further away from peace, harms relations with friendly countries, and damages our interests. Israel needs to change direction. The next time Israel is presented with an international initiative, Jerusalem should respond with a “yes”, qualified as it may be, rather than a flat “no”.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט “No” as a Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט How to Make the Arab Peace Initiative a More Effective Incentive for Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.