ארכיון Arab Peace Intiative - Mitvim

Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 11 Sep 2024 12:24:49 +0000

The paper aims to shed light on the obstacles and opportunities of Saudi involvement in a future Palestinian-Israeli peace process. It first explains the enigmatic nature of Saudi communication towards Israel and explains why Saudi pragmatism has been misunderstood. The paper also explains the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s willingness to normalize relations with Israel, and that Saudi-Israeli normalization is treated as a gateway to a larger game-changing strategic treaty with the United States, rather than a keenness to cooperate with Israel itself. In addition, the paper argues that while the Saudi ruling elite are willing to play financial and security roles in “reconstructing” Gaza, it is unforeseeable that this will ensue without a credible peace process that can justify these efforts, especially against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s restructuring of its own economy. The paper then explains the ways in which Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab states, and European states can help cooperate in areas such as building a Palestinian economic horizon that can strengthen the Palestinian-Israeli political framework; developing Palestinian-Israeli green cooperation; and developing an Arab-Israeli network of academics, experts, and journalists that can be an intersection of top-down and bottom-up projects that aim to reach a two-state solution.

This publication was written as part of an extensive joint research project with PAX for Peace – Netherlands and SWP Germany titled, “Defining a Role for Europe in Leveraging Israeli-Arab Normalization Towards Israeli-Palestinian Peace”. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Mitvim Institute, SWP and PAX. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.

הפוסט Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel Election Results Give Reason for Israel-Arab Dialogue

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 12 Mar 2020 15:38:46 +0000

The results of the Israeli election did not give a clear majority to any of the sides, but they still yielded a dramatic result. For the first time, a majority in the Knesset – from Lieberman’s right-wing party to the Arab Joint List – share a political goal of ousting Netanyahu, and seem more willing to take coordinated action to make it happen. This is a culmination of a gradual process, which evolved over three election campaigns that took place in Israel during the last year.

Lieberman, initially an ideological and political ally of Netanyahu, shifted his position over time – first preventing from Netanyahu to form a government after the April 2019 election, then insisting on a unity government between Netanyahu’s Likud and Gantz’s Blue and White after the September 2019 election, and currently indicating he wants Gantz to be the one who is called upon by the president to form a government.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Joint List, which increased its share of votes and now holds 15 seats (out of 120), has become a more legitimate political partner for Jewish parties than it has been in the past. Nevertheless, it still not clear whether this changed to the extent that will enable Gantz to form a minority government based on support from outside by Arab legislators.

This process is surprising Netanyahu, who faces a real threat of ending his 11-year consecutive tenure as prime minister, and at a bad timing for him – just as his court case is about to begin. Netanyahu is fighting back, using almost every rhetorical argument and political maneuver possible. While doing so, he is casting doubts about the legitimacy of the electoral process and about the reliability of state institutions. This has negative implications and increases polarization within the Israeli public as well as incitement against Gantz and his supporters.

A change of Israeli leadership may be near, although a fourth election cycle is also a realistic option. Should Gantz become Israel’s prime minister, even if within the context of some sort of unity government, the Israeli political landscape will change dramatically. His persona and leadership style will be different than Netanyahu’s. His goal will be to “heal the society” from divisions and incitement. His tone is a positivist one, including messages of hope, and not only fear. He represents a commitment to good governance and democracy, which eroded in Israel over the last few years.

Gantz is also likely to change course on several foreign policy issues, some of which are relevant to Israel’s relations in the Middle East. While supporting the Trump Plan, he made it clear that he opposes unilateral annexation and that any Israeli move should be coordinated with the international community and regional actors. Even though Gantz does not prioritize an immediate restart of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, he is likely to take more responsible action on the Palestinian issue, and to be more open to engagement with the Palestinian leadership and with those in Europe and the US Democratic Party who are critical of Israel’s current policies.

In terms of relations with the Arab world, Netanyahu repeatedly tried to show that he can promote normalization with Arab countries, without making any progress on the Palestinian issue. However, his efforts met a glass ceiling. Throughout the past year, he tried to get a public meeting with an Arab leader, to boost his election campaigns, but did not succeed.

Gantz is likely to continue working for improved relations with the Arab world, and to maximize new opportunities that emerge – including with countries in the Gulf. But, in contrast to Netanyahu, he may not see this as a route to bypass the Palestinian issue, but rather as something that could be leveraged to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. In such a context, the Arab Peace Initiative – with some modifications due to the changes that took place in regional realities since it was first introduced – could become much more relevant.

The Arab world should regard a leadership change in Israel as an opportunity, reach out to the new prime minister and government, and indicate a willingness to upgrade ties and cooperation should the new prime minister take positive steps. This could be done publicly, or through new dialogue channels that will need to be set up – between new policy actors in Israel and their regional counterparts. Positive messages from the Arab world may help the Israeli leadership to move in a new direction, as Israelis currently view regional cooperation as more possible, desired, and important to Israel’s foreign policy and national security.

The transition process in Israel will not be an easy one, domestically, and could still lead to political instability in the coming months. But things are changing in Israeli politics and a new era may soon begin. If this happens, new opportunities for Israel-Arab relations are likely to appear. This is an issue that pro-peace Israelis are eager to speak with their Arab neighbors about. Let’s start the conversation.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Qposts, arabic)

הפוסט Israel Election Results Give Reason for Israel-Arab Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Arab Peace Initiative at 15 Years

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 21 Jul 2017 07:00:07 +0000

The Arab Peace Initiative (API) offers Israel normalized relations with the Arab world in exchange for reaching a peace agreement. It was first presented to Israel by the Arab League in 2002 and since then has consistently been ratified at the League’s annual summits. Since the original presentation of the API, Israel has chosen to officially not respond. In recent years, the Israeli leadership has attempted to offer an alternative, according to which it is possible to improve relations with the Arab world significantly without progress in the peace process. Arab leaders have publicly rejected this model, yet it has become increasingly prominent within the Israeli public debate.

On 21 March 2017, scholars, diplomats and politicians, together with directors of think tanks and NGOs, gathered at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to discuss the API on the 15th anniversary of its announcement and to examine how it can serve as a more effective incentive for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Speakers from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Turkey, the EU, and the UN participated in the conference, which was initiated by the Mitvim Institute and the Leonard David Institute.

The conference included four sessions: The first session focused on the past – the content of the API, its background and the processes which have taken place since it was first presented. The second session focused on the present day and examined the current status of the API, how changes in the Middle East have affected its viability, and Israel’s recent policies and attitudes towards the API. The third session covered the future of the API and highlighted policy directions via which the API can help advance the peace process. Lastly, in the concluding session, senior diplomats serving in Israel presented their assessments of the API. The conference closed with a lecture by Member of Knesset (MK) Member Tzipi Livni, former Minister of Foreign Affairs. This document summarizes the presentations that were made during the conference. The entire conference can be watched on the Mitvim Institute’s YouTube channel

הפוסט The Arab Peace Initiative at 15 Years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Is Israel’s Regional Opportunity Becoming More Concrete?

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 22 May 2017 11:58:37 +0000

As President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia drew near, the Wall Street Journal reported a new initiative originating from the Gulf states vis-a-vis Israel: Should Israel take steps to promote peace with the Palestinians, including a settlement freeze, the Gulf states will be willing to take some steps towards normalization of relations between the two sides.

This report appears merely two months after the Arab League reaffirmed the Arab Peace Initiative (API) at its annual summit in Amman. Fifteen years have passed since the Arab League offered Israel to establish normal relations in return for a peace deal between Israel and its neighbors. All these years, Israel has refrained from issuing any formal response. Nevertheless, the Arab League continues to reaffirm the API – despite both regional turmoil and stagnation in the peace process – and to emphasize its relevance.

The API is also a regular component in international statements and initiatives regarding the peace process. The API, however, only relates to the benefits Israel will gain once it signs a final status agreement with the Palestinians. It does not deal with the path to peace. As such, it is similar to other end-game peace incentives offered to Israel – the EU’s offer to grant Israel (and the future state of Palestine) a Special Privileged Partnership status after peace is achieved, and the security plan devised by the Obama administration to ensure Israelis that a two-state solution will enhance – not jeopardize – Israel’s security. These incentives can make peace more attractive to Israelis. Through them, the international community offers Israel additional peace dividends that the Palestinians are unable of delivering on their own.

But an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal is still in the distant future, and this lessens the perceived relevance of the API. The end-game incentives should be coupled with process oriented ones, and the Gulf states’ offer – assuming such an offer actually exists – is exactly such an incentive. It reflects a shift from the previous Arab thinking that focused on the final status agreement, to thinking also about the path leading to such an agreement. The offer puts forth benefits that Israel can gain merely from moving towards peace, and not only from reaching peace. It also helps in turning the somewhat-vague concept of normal relations between Israel and the Arab world into something more concrete. In Israel, there is no serious debate about the type of relations Israel eventually wants to have with the Arab world. Normalization has not been defined, and this is also the case within the Arab world.

The Gulf states’ offer reportedly includes practical and specific steps, which could introduce Israelis with concrete and immediate dividends as a result of progress towards peace – among them are new business opportunities and shorter flight durations to east Asia. Such an offer can help address Israeli skepticism regarding the ability of Arab countries – in the post-Arab Spring era – to actually implement what they promised to Israel in the API. The offer also reflects a distinction between Arab countries as it is offered only by the Gulf states, and not by the entire Arab world (like the API). It highlights those Arab countries that have the political capabilities to develop ties with Israel and that actually have something concrete to offer Israel. Such countries can also be found in North Africa (i.e. Morocco and Tunisia), and not only in the Gulf.

So, can such a Gulf states offer be a game-changer?

Cooperation between Israel and some Arab countries is already taking place, although in a limited manner, mostly behind the scenes, and with a focus on joint security interests. This has led Israeli ministers to often brag about these relations and exaggerate their scope. The Israeli public, on the other hand, has very little actual knowledge about what is really going on between Israel and its neighbors.

It is worth remembering that Arab willingness to improve ties with Israel in return for significant progress in the Israeli-Palestinian process – and not in return to the actual end of conflict – is not new. Following the signing of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, a variety of regional doors were opened up for Israel. At the time, some Arab countries even established formal diplomatic missions in Israel. This did not require a peace agreement. Mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO was enough. The next time Israeli and Palestinian leaders reach a breakthrough in the peace process, Israel can expect Arab countries to upgrade their ties with it, even if such an offer is not publicly made in advance.

A public offer can help in empowering pro-peace actors within Israel, and in creating a more favorable domestic atmosphere for a leader interested in promoting peace. Former Secretary of State, John Kerry, tried to generate such an offer, similar in concept to the one reportedly offered by the Gulf states. During the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, he tried to convince Arab countries to operationalize the API: to spell out a gradual and concrete road-map for its implementation, including normalization steps in return for progress towards peace. However, his efforts did not bear fruit. The Arab League was not willing to go there.

Therefore, the key question regarding the Gulf states offer is whether it will become a formal and public diplomatic plan or remain as an unconfirmed media report. Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia indicates that the latter may be the case. The offer, as well as the API, was not mentioned even once in public statements made during the visit.

Over the last three years, Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly tries to introduce a different sequence than offered in the API. He claims that significant cooperation with the Arab world can be achieved prior to an Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough. Arab leaders, however, reject this notion time and again. Kerry also rejected it in his last policy speech on the issue. They all emphasize that progress with the Palestinians is a prerequisite to any serious upgrade in Israel-Arab ties.

The report about the Gulf states’ offer highlights the linkage that exists between the peace process and regional cooperation. It reflects that at least some Arab countries have the will and interest to develop better ties with Israel and the ability to offer Israel specific and attractive tangibles. The offer clearly indicates that Israel must change its policies towards the Palestinian issue and the peace process in order to make the most of the unique regional opportunity placed before it.

הפוסט Is Israel’s Regional Opportunity Becoming More Concrete? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel needs good relations with Europe

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 03 May 2017 08:22:34 +0000

The European Union EU is facing great turmoil. Russia’s aggression in the east, the political change in the US and Brexit are all major obstacles on its way forward.

These dramatic developments significantly accelerate a series of processes, which have already been underway in Europe for the last few years, and which cast a cloud over the future of the European project. The upcoming elections in the two most important countries in the EU – France and Germany – intensify these tensions.

In this context, European pressure on Israel to promote the peace process with the Palestinians – if such was ever actually really applied – is decreasing. Europe is now looking inward and is dealing with other conflicts and domestic challenges. It is not seeking to expand its role in the Middle East peace process.

According to a senior European diplomat serving in Washington, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a low-intensity conflict, especially when compared to other conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, the region has more acute fault-lines, including the Sunni-Shi’a and the Arab-Iranian ones.

“Given the internal problems of the EU and the changing international environment due to Trump and Putin, we currently do not have much interest in the Israeli issue”.

“It is currently only number 10 on our priority list,” said a diplomat from a major European country, who is based in Tel Aviv.

Europe does not expect the Netanyahu government to move forward on the peace process, and assumes that Netanyahu seeks to maintain the status quo and continue managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Based on these assumptions, the EU is unlikely to take new initiatives and steps regarding the peace process over the coming period. The Israeli government is happy about this, and views EU disengagement from the peace process as a success of Israel’s policy. This is a narrow and distorted view.

Such a European policy is actually a major setback for Israeli interests:

Israel is missing an opportunity to significantly upgrade its ties with Europe, which is still a close ally and Israel’s largest trade partner. Israel should aspire to deepen ties with Europe, as offered by the EU in return for Israeli-Palestinian peace;
Without significant European involvement, it will be much more difficult to promote and operationalise the Arab Peace Initiative, which holds much potential for Israel’s future;
A possible EU decision to cut aid to the Palestinians, due to disengagement from the conflict, might worsen the situation on the ground and will increase the burden on Israel;
A European disengagement, coupled with American isolationism, will enable aggressive and less democratic actors (like Russia) to play a much larger regional role. Israel’s interests are not a priority for such actors.

In Israel, Europe is often portrayed – in the media and by politicians from the right – as hostile to Israel. This is not true.

Israel’s relations with European countries and with EU institutions are deep and multi-layered. They serve the needs of all sides involved.

The Israeli-European alliance is not merely an interest-based economic one. It is a deep strategic alliance, based on shared values and on a long and troubled history. Europe has always been an exceptional asset for Israel’s development and security.

Israel has a genuine interest in a strong EU. Instability in Europe, the weakening of EU institutions, and the rise of anti-democratic forces in Europe, all have negative consequences for Israel.

The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that in light of the challenges faced by Europe, a plurality of Israelis thinks that Israel will benefit more from a stronger Europe than from a weaker one.

Israel’s increased ties with Russia, China and other non-democratic countries cannot and should not be a substitute for relations with Europe. Israel’s belonging to the democratic camp, with Europe at its centre, promoted Israel’s international standing along the years and directly contributed to Israel’s prosperity.

In order to maintain the Zionist vision of a Jewish and democratic state, Israel needs to maintain good ties with democratic Europe. It should also work to promote the two state solution, in order to prevent a change in Israel’s national character will change, mounting tensions with Europe, and an intensified pivot towards non-democratic international actors.

Israel is a regional superpower. As such, it can play a leading role, alongside Europe, in promoting regional stability and prosperity. Israel’s existential need is to dismantle regional threats and to establish good relations with its neighbouring countries and peoples.

These goals are also shared by Europe, and Israel has no better partner than Europe to promote them with. The path towards peace and development in the Middle East is long and requires much commitment.

Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is an essential step in that direction. There is no way to bypass this path – which Israel currently chooses to avoid, and on which Europe is dragging its feet.

(originally published in EurActiv)

הפוסט Israel needs good relations with Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Arab Peace Initiative is the Greatest Missed Opportunity in Israel’s History

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 25 Apr 2017 08:19:23 +0000

The anniversary of the most important peace initiative ever put forth in Israel is marked by no celebration.

Not even a small family gathering. For 15 years it has been set on the table, clear, inviting, with boundless potential. But at this point, it is a contender for the biggest missed opportunity for peace since the State of Israel was established. Except for a short time during the Ehud Olmert-Tzipi Livni era, Israeli leadership has not dealt with it seriously. Most Israelis do not even know about it.

The Regional Peace Initiative, or the Arab Peace Initiative, was adopted by the Arab League in 2002. It is an initiative for ending the Israeli- Arab conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) adopted the initiative, which means dozens of Muslim countries, including powerhouses like Pakistan and Indonesia. Only a single country – Iran – is opposed to the initiative, and this points to the depth of shared interests between Israel and many Arab and Muslim states.

The condition for normal relations with all these countries is the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. It should be noted that the original phrasing of the initiative also relates to the refugee issue and to Israeli withdrawal from all disputed territories, including the Golan Heights.

These issues raise opposition among most Israeli political actors. However, the Arab League already announced some eight years ago that the initiative does not include the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Regarding the Golan Heights, it has been off the agenda for several years due to the civil war in Syria.

So, there is really only one issue left on the table: the Palestinians.

It is hard to find even one Knesset member who speaks up against the notion of “regional peace.” Even the most hardline Likud or Bayit Yehudi MKs invoke the immense security and economic advantages that Israel would gain from having the whole Middle East and Muslim world open up to it. But they regard the regional initiative as a means to bypass the Palestinian issue. Instead of negotiating with the Palestinians over territories and settlements, they aspire for “economic peace” with the Arab states. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is playing a leading role in promoting this approach. There is just one small problem: no Arab actor has ever agreed to it.

Netanyahu’s approach to the regional issue is a false one: he plays the regional card as an attempt to dissolve any prospect for progress with the Palestinians, and to ensure his own political survival.

To this end he tempted and deluded Labor MK Isaac Herzog, who was willing to join his government to advance a big regional move. Netanyahu has succeeded in putting the peace process into deep freeze. Unfortunately, the regional initiative, and all its potential benefits for Israel, froze along with it.

Nevertheless, even today this initiative is the most relevant of all those discussed.

It is not dead. On the contrary.

Due to the major developments in the Middle East, the prospects for its realization have even become better.

The “price” that Israel has to pay has not changed: A Palestinian state in the territories beyond the Green Line.

This is the core aspect of the conflict, and there is nothing that Netanyahu and Education Minister Naftali Bennett can do to change that.

However, unlike in the past, there is now an Arab willingness to move forward with implementing the regional initiative in parallel to Israeli- Palestinian negotiations, and not only after their successful completion. This is a major change which was revealed in March 2017 at a conference held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. All that is currently needed to significantly improve Israel’s ties with its Arab neighbors is the renewal of a genuine peace process with the Palestinians.

At the height of Netanyahu’s fourth term in office, it is clear that as far as he is concerned, there will never be any progress with the Palestinians.

But perhaps it is not only up to him. US President Donald Trump’s sudden motivation to promote peace, his desire to broker a deal between Israelis and Palestinians, and the heavy boot Russian President Vladimir Putin has put on the ground in Syria – in the heart of the Middle East – may drag Netanyahu to the regional negotiating table in spite of himself.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Arab Peace Initiative is the Greatest Missed Opportunity in Israel’s History הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 02 Mar 2017 11:33:54 +0000

Given ongoing stagnation in the peace process and the new American administration, the Mitvim Institute convened a policy-planning roundtable to discuss which steps the international community can take in order to promote Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and which mechanisms are required in order to carry out such steps. The roundtable was attended by experts from various pro-peace Israeli organizations. This document summarizes the discussion that took place. It does not necessarily reflect consensus among participants.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

No Shortcuts to a Regional Breakthrough

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 21 Feb 2017 08:04:57 +0000

Prime Minister Netanyahu succeeded in injecting his regional approach into the policy vacuum that characterizes President Trump’s first weeks in office. Since 2014, Netanyahu has declared at home and abroad that a breakthrough in ties between Israel and neighboring Arab states is possible, even without progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. In Summer 2016, for example, he said that “we used to say that as soon as peace breaks out with the Palestinians, we can achieve peace with the entire Arab world […] but I am increasingly convinced that the process can work in the other direction too”.

His ministers followed suit, and have been spreading optimism about regional developments in the making. In June 2016, then-Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation Ayoob Kara declared that within weeks or months Israelis “will hear more good news about ties with several countries in the region”. Eight months have passed, without major breakthroughs, but the optimism is still there. On February 19th, Minister Israel Katz said that Israel’s relations with the Gulf states “can be upgraded, and are going to be upgraded significantly”. Government members frequently tell the Israeli public that Israel’s current state of affairs with the Arab world is better than ever before, even though they usually refuse to provide details, citing a need for secrecy.

Does this reflect a regional reality, or a virtual regional reality? History shows us that progress on the Palestinian issue was a prerequisite for any major breakthrough that ever took place between Israel and the Arab world. The signing of the peace treaty with Egypt was dependent on Israeli-Egyptian agreement over the autonomy plan for the Palestinians. The peace treaty with Jordan was reached only after Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Accords. The Arab Peace Initiative, first published 15 years ago, emphasizes this fact in clear terms. It offers Israel normal relations with the entire Arab world, but only after an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty is reached.

Whenever peace negotiations took place, the Arab world was willing to pitch in, even if its contribution was not a game-changer. Arab leaders participated in the Madrid Summit in 1991, tried to assist Israeli-Palestinian peace summits throughout the 1990s and till the 2000 Camp David summit, and attended the 2007 Annapolis Conference that kicked-off yet another round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It was all in the context of the peace process. And when progress in that process was evident, like in the early 1990s, the fruits of regional cooperation became visible and tangible – diplomatic representations opened up, regional business summits were convened, and high-level visits took place.

The regional approach that Prime Minister Netanyahu is advancing challenges this reality, and attempts at flipping the sequence – calling for improved Israeli-Arab ties first, and progress with the Palestinians later. It is true that Israel currently enjoys better ties with some Arab countries. There is increased security coordination, the relations that do exist are becoming more visible to the public, and new channels for dialogue and cooperation have been put in place. These are positive developments, which derive from the changes occurring in the Middle East in recent years and from the emergence of joint strategic interests. They emphasize the existence of a historic regional opportunity for Israel to reshape its relations in the Middle East.

Some Arab countries are motivated to increase even further their cooperation with Israel, and to expand them to civilian – and not only security – issues. However, the transition from Israeli-Arab relations, which mostly take place behind the scenes and focus on security coordination, to actual normal and visible relations has not yet happened, and is unlikely to happen without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. The Arab publics are not willing to accept that, and the Arab leaders are not willing to go there.

Arab leaders emphasize this in private meetings as well as in public statements. They see the Netanyahu approach as one that contradicts the Arab Peace Initiative, which they are committed to. Former Saudi official Prince Turki al-Faisal asked in September 2015 to “tell Mr. Netanyahu not to propagate false information. As long as Palestine is occupied by Israel, there’s not going to be cooperation between Saudi Arabia or Sunni states with Israel.” In their speeches at the 2016 UN General Assembly, Egypt’s President al-Sisi and Jordan’s King Abdullah also emphasized the need to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as a condition for a genuine regional breakthrough.

John Kerry tried to convince Arab leaders to take some steps towards normalization with Israel even before an Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough, but was rejected. Kerry shared insights from such efforts in his final speech before leaving office, saying in December 2016 that “the Arab countries have made clear that they will not make peace with Israel without resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – that’s not where their loyalties or their politics are.” In his speech, Kerry added that many Arab leaders with whom he has engaged have shown a willingness to support serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to take steps on the path to normalization of relations – including public meetings — providing there is meaningful progress towards a two state solution.”

The steps that Trump is likely to take in order to strengthen US relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia may lead to increased security coordination between these states and Israel. But in order to fulfill the opportunity for a new era in Israeli-Arab relations, progress towards a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is required. This is what the Arab world requests in return. It is also an Israeli interest, even if it is not on Trump’s priority list. Should the Israeli government maintain its rejectionist policy towards the peace process, the regional opportunity is likely to be missed.

The progress that is currently taking place between Israel and the region is a seedling at best. It is certainly not a full-grown plant. This progress signals just how much potential there is for Israel in the region. It can be a source of hope for the many Israelis who find it difficult to even imagine a future of peace. It is a sign that Israel can truly achieve the regional belonging, which it very much deserves and needs.

Israelis should not settle for regional relations that are mostly secret and limited to security issues, and that do not enjoy public legitimacy in the Arab world. The 15th anniversary of the Arab Peace Initiative, in March 2017, is a reminder that regional cooperation is linked to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and that progress on the peace process can totally alter Israel’s regional standing. There are no shortcuts to a regional breakthrough. The road passes through Ramallah.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט No Shortcuts to a Regional Breakthrough הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Kerry’s parameters force Israel to take a hard look in the mirror

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 31 Dec 2016 17:35:13 +0000

Throughout 2016, analysts were wondering what – if at all – will be President Obama’s final move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The options discussed included a presidential speech (like the Cairo speech in 2009), updating the Clinton parameters of 2000, and the advancement of a resolution at the UN Security Council. Eventually, all answers were somewhat right: UN Security Council Resolution 2334 was not initiated by the U.S., but it was definitely encouraged by the American administration. Obama himself did not deliver a speech, but his Secretary of State, John Kerry, did, conveying the frustration and disappointment of the administration from both sides, and especially from Israel’s settlement policy.

The Kerry speech introduced parameters for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They did not differ much from the Clinton Parameters, and were more ambiguous and concise. Still, it was a much-needed move in light of the regional changes that took place since 2000, and of issues which gained traction since (such as Israel’s request that Palestinians recognize it as a ‘Jewish state’). The updated parameters provide Israelis – public and politicians alike – more clarity regarding the two-state solution and the steps needed in order to get there. They also generate new momentum by enabling the discussion on an end-game agreement to be based on a recent document, which is part of a set of international moves to advance conflict resolution, and not on a plan devised sixteen years ago.

The Trump effect

A key difference between the Kerry parameters and those of Clinton is the reference made by Kerry to the Arab Peace Initiative (which was not yet published in 2000) and to regional ramifications of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Kerry highlighted the unique opportunity that Israel is currently facing – an opportunity to establish normal ties with Arab countries, and to even launch a joint security framework. Kerry stressed that the fulfillment of this opportunity is clearly linked to progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace, contrasting recent claims by Netanyahu that normalization between Israel and Arab countries can precede Israeli-Palestinian peace. In his speech, Kerry tried to convince Israelis that peace will bring them concrete regional benefits. He focused on relations with the Arab world and on chances for enhanced security, but he could also have mentioned the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state, as another incentive for peace.

Kerry refrained from addressing a major change that took place since the Clinton parameters were issued – the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover of Gaza. The Palestinian divide is a major obstacle on the road for a two-state solution, and is one that the international community tends to avoid due to the sensitivity of dealing with Hamas. It is worth remembering that because of this obstacle, the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2007-8 were aimed to reach a “shelf-agreement” only; one that will be implementable only after the restoration of Palestinian unity. While the Quartet report of July 2016 focused on this thorny issue, Kerry decided to skip it altogether.

Paradoxically, it was Trump’s victory and his positions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that may have increased Obama’s motivation to make a final move. The UN Security Council resolution and the Kerry speech leave a legacy for Trump to deal with, but they also provide clear guidelines for future American administrations and for other countries that want to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. These steps demonstrated the continuity in American policy since 1967 regarding the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Despite efforts along the years to mask and downplay differences between Israel and the U.S. on these issues, the American position – of Republican and Democratic administrations alike – has remained remarkably the same. A different policy by the Trump administration, if such will actually be taken, will be the exception. One can only wonder why hasn’t the Obama administration introduced its clear-cut positions earlier, during a time that still allowed the international community to act on them.

Looking in the mirror

The Kerry speech put a mirror in front of the Israeli government and society. Kerry clearly and rationally explained why the continuation of the status quo will not enable Israel to maintain its Jewish and democratic character in the long run. The ongoing occupation and the expansion of settlements makes the two-state solution gradually less feasible, and may lead to an irreversible situation. Those in the Israeli Right, who are ideologically committed to the settlements, do not have a reasonable answer to this dilemma, except for their wishful thinking that the Palestinians will somehow disappear or move to Jordan. The renowned Palestinian scholar Edward Said defined the role of intellectuals as “speaking truth to power.” In our case, it was the opposite. The power Kerry spoke explained the unsolvable contradiction between the occupation and Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature.

Netanyahu and his government responded to the American move with unprecedented bashing of an acting American administration. Netanyahu is looking forward to Trump’s inauguration, expecting a much more sympathetic approach by the next president. However, while American positions may change, the international consensus regarding the Palestinian issue is not likely to erode. This was demonstrated at the UN Security Council, and will be demonstrated again at the upcoming international conference in Paris. The Israeli government’s enthusiasm of Trump’s victory, should be replaced with genuine concern for Israel’s global standing, and for a change of policy that will help Israel regain the international legitimacy it is currently losing.

While American and international actions are important, they alone will not change facts on the ground and resolve the conflict. Eventually, Israelis and Palestinians themselves will have to take the lead. For this to happen, a courageous and pro-peace leadership is needed, as well as a strong civil society that challenges policies that jeopardize the two-state solution and lead Israel to increased isolation.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Kerry’s parameters force Israel to take a hard look in the mirror הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

“No” as a Policy

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 16 Aug 2016 16:07:16 +0000

Netanyahu’s recent statement that Israel “will never accept the Arab Peace Initiative as a basis for negotiations,” joins a long list of negative statements made by Israel regarding attempts by the international community and regional actors to advance negotiations with the Palestinians. Just two weeks after Avigdor Lieberman was sworn in as the Minister of Defense, a seemingly conciliatory statement, the Prime Minister poured cold water on the Arab Peace Initiative (API), while patronizingly commenting that “if the Arab states understand that they need to update the peace initiative according to the modifications that Israel demands, then there will be something to discuss.” In contrast to Israel’s language, the original Arab Peace Initiative “calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative”.

Since the API was first presented at the Arab League summit in March 2002, Israel has never officially responded to the Initiative; moreover, for a long period of time, Israel chose to ignore the Initiative, or simply oppose it. Lieberman went even further in 2009, when he called the API nothing less than a “recipe for Israel’s destruction.” Olmert was the only one to try and promote the Initiative at the end of his term, but it was too little and too late. Occasionally, various politicians expressed positive statements regarding the Initiative, yet the great majority focused on the API’s alleged drawbacks. In any case, no critical mass of supporters has ever been able to bring a change in the Israeli approach towards the Initiative.

Israeli public opinion has also remained in the dark about the Initiative. Opinion polls have shown that the majority of the public is not aware of the API nor its content. Attempts of various civil society organizations to raise public awareness have failed so far to make a genuine change. This is despite the increasing recognition of the advantages of involving the Arab countries in the peace process, and of the benefits that would ensue from improved relations with these countries, in parallel to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As disturbing as the Israeli government’s response to the API is, it is not as disturbing as the typical “Pavlovian” Israeli reaction to any external efforts to advance the peace process. The word “no” has become the hallmark of Israel’s foreign policy regarding the conflict. Here are some typical examples.

First, over the past two years, Israel has opposed four French initiatives: the idea of adopting a Security Council resolution promoting the recognition of Palestinian statehood; an initiative for an international observer presence on the Temple Mount; the establishment of an International Support Group for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; and lastly, an international peace summit, the first stage of which took place in Paris in early June 2016.

Second, the Prime Minister refused to cooperate with the Quartet in the preparation of the report on the stagnation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, as the Israeli government came to realize that the report was critical of Israel, they tried to work through the United States (US) to soften the tone of the report. The Netanyahu government acted similarly in 2012 with the Palestinian United Nations bid for statehood. The government initially refused to take part in any negotiations regarding the text of the resolution, and only when the text was finalized did the government try to work with the US to change the text.

Third, Israel ignored, and even ridiculed, the European Union’s (EU) December 2013 initiative to upgrade Israeli and Palestinian relations with the EU to the status of a “special privileged partnership” upon the signing a peace agreement. European criticism of Israeli policy has usually met an aggressive Israeli response, yet when Europe tries to provide positive incentives to solving the conflict, they encounter silence and rejection. This reaction is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the EU is one of Israel’s major trading partners.

Fourth, Israel expressed its opposition to the American security plan, formulated by General John Allen during the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. Moreover, in January 2014, Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s former Minister of Defense, said that the plan was not even worth the paper that it was written upon.

Fifth, in February 2016, Netanyahu expressed his concern about the possibility that prior to leaving office, Barack Obama may release his own “parameters” for peace, thus updating the framework presented by Bill Clinton at the end of his term in December 2000. It is important to note that Ehud Barak’s government at the time responded with a “reserved yes” to the Clinton parameters.

Israel’s “no” policy does not only apply to initiatives for the resolution of the conflict. It is also reflected in other areas, such as the government’s steadfast and forthright opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, and even to Germany’s proposal that Israel be indirectly involved in the nuclear talks. Additionally, Israel often chooses to boycott commissions of inquiry or international forums that it believes are too critical of the country.

The Israeli government’s adverse reactions to international initiatives are not only disturbing in content, but also the manner in which the reactions are conveyed. In general, they are harsh and often insulting and condescending. This is in despite of the fact that the majority of the initiatives originate from countries that are friendly to Israel, and whom are genuinely interested in dialogue regarding their content.

If “no” becomes a regular pattern in Israeli foreign policy, then it ceases to be an expression of rational thought, rather an expression of emotional and/or ideological behavior. Israel’s pattern of negative reactions is a manifestation of its current leaders’ fear and anxiety regarding any change in the status quo. The outside world – whether it is ISIS or the EU, and to some extent even the US – is perceived as a threat, and any concession is viewed as an existential threat.

“No” is not a policy prescription that will lead to a better future. This behavior moves us further away from peace, harms relations with friendly countries, and damages our interests. Israel needs to change direction. The next time Israel is presented with an international initiative, Jerusalem should respond with a “yes”, qualified as it may be, rather than a flat “no”.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט “No” as a Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

How to Make the Arab Peace Initiative a More Effective Incentive for Peace?

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 11 Feb 2016 17:49:39 +0000

Almost 14 years after it was first unveiled, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) still has the potential to serve as a key incentive in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is true despite the fact that Israel has yet to respond to the initiative. The Arab League has reaffirmed the API time and again, the Quartet often meets with the leaders of Arab states in order to promote it, the US Secretary of State and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs emphasize its importance, and, according to the Mitvim Institute’s most recent polling, the Israeli public sees the prospects of normal relations with the Arab world as the most effective incentive to promoting peace. And yet, since the API was adopted by the Arab League in 2002, significant changes have occurred in the Middle East, which cast doubts about the initiative’s relevancy in today’s regional reality. In light of this reality, 25 experts from across academia and policy gathered to discuss ways in which the API can be made a more effective regional incentive for peace. The discussion revolved around issues relating to public awareness to the API, its attractiveness as an incentive, and its feasibility for implementation. This document summarizes the discussion’s main points. It does not reflect a consensus of the participants or the views of the host organizations.

הפוסט How to Make the Arab Peace Initiative a More Effective Incentive for Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Unknown Incentives for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 13 Dec 2015 08:02:35 +0000

The deep freeze in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians has led the international community to examine new ways of acting to further clarify the character of a future two-state solution, the benefits that Israel and the Palestinians will receive from such a solution, and the price the two sides will pay if it is not reached.

One of the possibilities discussed in this context is the more effective use of incentives to convince Israelis and Palestinians of the value of striving for peace. Incentives are a tool with great potential to advance the processes of conflict resolution, but it is a tool that has yet to play a central role in the IsraeliPalestinian peace process. Israel may have received American aid in the past in return for concessions it made in the peace process, but this aid was in the form of compensation, and did not serve as an incentive presented in advance to create a change in the positions of the public and its leaders.

The need for incentives was also unclear for years. The vision of peace was enough to enlist public and political support. But when the belief in the feasibility of peace and its value faded, a search started in Israel for alternative and concrete benefits that would justify making concessions to its neighbors. The United States, which in any case had already granted Israel almost all it had asked for, did not have much more to offer. The involvement of other countries and institutions was needed.

Security, normalization, upgrade

Precisely at this current juncture, at which the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in a deep freeze, for the first time in the history of this conflict Israel is looking at three separate incentives for making peace, presented by key players in the international community:

The first one is a commitment to American security guarantees. These were present in earlier stages of the process and were updated in a plan formulated by General John Allen during the last round of negotiations. The second is a promise for normalization of relations and an end to the conflict, as presented in the Arab peace initiative from 2002, which has been repeatedly ratified by the Arab League. The third incentive is a promise to upgrade Israel’s relations with the European Union to the highest non-member status possible, a “special preferred status,” which the Union proposed to Israel and the Palestinians in 2013.

However, these incentives have so far failed to melt the diplomatic ice, mainly due to opposition to and total disregard of this proposal by Israel, and also due to the decentralized manner in which these guarantees were presented by international players at different times.

In addition to the specific impediment in each incentive, there is a problem common to all, which hinders their ability to generate a change in Israeli public opinion Israel’s government contributes significantly to this state of affairs. The lack of response to the Arab League proposal since it was proposed over a decade ago; refusal to discuss the upgrading of relations with the European Union due to an opposition to linking relations with the Palestinians to relations with Europe; the disdain shown towards the efforts made by General Allen and the disqualification of elements he proposed as the basis of his plan – all of these helped conceal these initiatives from public awareness, thus harming their effectiveness.

New opportunity

Nevertheless, there is currently an opportunity for a further significant step with regard to these incentives, one which will make it difficult for Israelis to remain indifferent. Inspired by the negotiations conducted with Iran, the international community is now trying to establish a new mechanism that will accompany and promote the peace process. This involves a refreshing of the Quartet (UN, U.S., EU and Russia) and the establishment of an international support group that will also include Arab countries.

Such a new international framework could realize the potential inherent in the use of incentives. To do so, it will have to create and present a coordinated package of incentives, to be presented by the international community. This package will include upgraded versions of the incentives presented so far, while addressing the strengths and weaknesses of each individual one, an updating of previously proposed incentives in accordance with current regional realities, with the addition of components that are important to the two sides of the conflict.

Such a package could serve as a mega-incentive to achieving peace. It will demonstrate to the Israeli and Palestinian publics the attractiveness, feasibility and the tangible advantages of achieving peace. This should be done in a manner that will be endorsed by key players in the international arena, which will evoke a public discourse of hope, which will strengthen politicians who are interested in thawing the diplomatic freeze and promoting peace-pursuing policies. This kind of package will be hard to ignore.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Unknown Incentives for Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The writing is on the wall

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 15 Dec 2014 07:48:14 +0000

Senior Israeli security personnel, Israeli and Palestinian political leaders, rabbis and imams have been warning for years that the Jewish-Muslim conflict over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif could trigger a devastating worldwide religious war.

Few, however, have paid much attention to the underlying processes propelling the parties inexorably toward impending catastrophe: growing Islamic anti-Semitism or Judeophobia in the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the one hand, and accelerated Jewish Islamophobia in Israel and the Diaspora, on the other.

These destructive trends, which feed off each other, have intensified sharply since Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount in June 1967. Israel’s triumphant return to Jerusalem’s religious heartland sparked heady euphoria in the Jewish world and deep trauma among Muslims.

A year after Israel’s occupation began, hundreds of religious leaders from all over the Muslim world convened at the al-Azhar Center in Cairo to craft a response. In addition to the staple anti-Zionist rhetoric, they unleashed a flurry of vitriolic anti-Semitic slurs. Jews, they declared, were treacherous, conniving monsters who deserved to die.

Secular Arab/Muslim leaders made similar public statements and from time to time called for jihad, or holy war, against the Jews and Israel. The same anti-Semitic tropes appeared in Arab school textbooks and in the media, often based on selective texts from the Koran or the Hadith prophetic tradition. Christian anti-Semitic writings, including blood libels, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and classics like the Merchant of Venice were also adduced to buttress the case against the Jews.

This murky anti-Semitic wave gathered momentum the more Israeli governments and extremist Jewish groups were perceived as undermining the sanctity of the Haram and the status of East Jerusalem. For example – the annexation of East Jerusalem by the government in 1967 and the Knesset in 1980; persistent Jewish settlement in parts of the city across the 1967 Green Line; the opening of the Western Wall tunnel by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996; Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000, which helped to trigger the second intifada.

Parallel to the growing Islamic Judeophobia, radical nationalist and religious messianic trends were developing in Israel, especially among Jews in the national religious movement. The more radical among them advocate the building of the Third Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount on the ruins of the existing mosques. In the meantime they insist on the right to go up onto the mountain and pray, in violation of Israeli government agreements with the Muslim waqf, which administers Muslim holy places, including the Haram.

As it developed, national religious radicalism took on an anti-Muslim and anti-Arab character, partly for ideological reasons, and partly in response to Arab terror and Arab/Muslim anti-Semitism. This created a vicious cycle of mutual religion-based hatred, which came to a head with the abortive attempt by the so-called Jewish Underground, led by Yehuda Etzion, to blow up the Dome of the Rock Mosque on the Temple Mount in 1984.

This type of anti-Muslim radicalism is also the driving force behind more recent attacks on mosques and burning of Korans in the occupied territories and Israel proper by Jewish extremists. Israeli leaders, secular and religious, added fuel to the flames with a string of irresponsible declarations – for example, the late Shas leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef called Islam “an ugly religion” and an Israeli broadcaster referred to it on air as a “virus.”

In 1996, national religious rabbis exacerbated an already explosive situation when they challenged a longstanding rabbinical ruling forbidding Jews from going up onto the mountain and pray ing on its holy ground until the coming of the messiah. Since then thousands of Jews have entered the holy compound and prayed, to the chagrin of the Muslim authorities. In highly publicized acts of deliberate provocation, right-wing Knesset Members have also gone up onto the Temple Mount. In early September, Housing Minister Uri Ariel of the national religious Bayit Yehudi party visited the holy space, declaring that Jews should be allowed to pray there whenever they liked and calling for the building of the Third Temple.

Influenced by radical national religious leaders, dozens of organizations sprang up preparing for the rebuilding of the temple. They produced architectural plans, building materials, priestly vestments and programs for training young priests. According to recent public opinion polls, 30 percent of Jews and 45 percent of religious Jews in Israel support the rebuilding of the temple; 64 percent of Israeli Jews are in favor of Jews being allowed to pray on Temple Mount; and 80 percent support a united Jerusalem under Israel’s sole and eternal sovereignty.

Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital has been the position of most Israeli governments since 1967, which did virtually nothing to counter the growing Islamophobic and anti-Arab trends in Israeli society. Worse, Israeli leaders failed to show corresponding flexibility on Jerusalem after Muslim and Arab governments began to discard anti-Semitic and antiIsrael positions in the late 1970s.

Interestingly in 1978, then prime minister Menachem Begin was leaning toward the establishment of a Muslim “Vatican” on the Temple Mount and in East Jerusalem. But he changed his mind and consolidated the demand for Israeli sovereignty over the entire city.

Nevertheless, on several occasions the Arab side offered Israel a way out of the Jerusalem dilemma based on divided sovereignty and agreed arrangements for the holy sites. For years the kings of Jordan, who have special custodial status on the Haram, have made practical proposals. The Egyptians, too, have called for workable compromise. In November 1977, in his speech to the Knesset, then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat offered Israel peace on condition that it agree to Arab/Muslim sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Haram, excluding the Western Wall. And, in 1979, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Jad al-Haq, published a special fatwa, Muslim religious ruling, in this spirit.

Most importantly, in March 2002, all 22 Arab states backed the Saudi peace initiative offering Israel peace, security and normalization of ties on condition that it agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Shortly afterwards, all 35 remaining non-Arab Muslim states added their support. Saudi Arabia and Jordan also initiated a series of religious dialogues with the participation of Jewish clerics.

However, all Israeli governments, with the tacit exception of the Olmert administration in late 2008, never accepted the Saudi-Arab-Muslim initiative, not even as a basis for negotiation.

Israeli rejection of the Arab initiative has come at a price. It has already contributed to the intensification of Muslim Judeophobia and Jewish Islamophobia, to strains on relations with Jordan and Egypt, to aggravated tension with Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line, to international isolation and to the danger of a Muslim-Jewish religious war.

The writing is on the wall: To prevent escalation of the current wave of religion-motivated terror in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Netanyahu needs to quash false rumors of plans to change the status quo on the Temple Mount. More importantly, on the strategic level, to preempt wider religious conflagration, he needs to move politically to reach an agreement on Jerusalem that takes Muslim sensitivities into account and gives Israel a chance for peace with most of the Muslim world.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Report)

הפוסט The writing is on the wall הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel, Gaza and the Region: Post-Ceasefire Opportunities

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 24 Jul 2014 10:20:24 +0000

In light of the prolonged fighting between Israel and Hamas, forty experts, diplomats and journalists, from Israel and abroad, convened in Jerusalem on July 24, 2014 for a policy planning workshop initiated by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the International Crisis Group. They discussed how to best advance regional stability and Israeli-Palestinian peace following a Gaza ceasefire.

The workshop addressed the changing dynamics in the Middle East, regional and international mechanisms for mediation and ceasefire implementation, the need to move from conflict management to conflict resolution, the difficulties of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, the economic rebuilding of Gaza, the future of the Palestinian unity government and the Arab Peace Initiative.

The workshop aimed to understand the issues that led to the recent flare-up in Gaza and the favorable circumstances that could arise following a truce. This paper summarizes the main points raised in the workshop. It focuses on the analysis of key players and the assessment of future options.

הפוסט Israel, Gaza and the Region: Post-Ceasefire Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 20 Jun 2013 18:50:54 +0000

The Arab Spring was initially embraced with much enthusiasm and hope in the West. In Israel, however, it has been generally perceived as a threat to national security. Israel’s official policies towards the Arab Spring reflect these concerns. But recent regional developments should not be seen only through a negative lens. They also offer important opportunities for Israel’s foreign policy and for its regional standing, which Israeli decision makers should act upon.

1. Engaging with Political Islam: In contrast to alarming predictions, the new Islamic regimes have thus far been moderate or pragmatic in their policies, including their attitudes to Israel. This opens opportunities for Israel to engage with these new regimes. Egypt, the most important regional country for Israel, has upheld the peace treaty under Muslim Brotherhood leadership; President Mohamed Morsi appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres, expressed his interest in assisting Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas, and in his efforts to fight terrorist elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

Interestingly, under an Islamic regime, Egypt has more leverage than did the previous Hosni Mubarak regime, to exert on Hamas in its dealings with Israel. No less important is the fact that a treaty honored by the Brotherhood sends a message across the Muslim world that peace with Israel is not anathema. Though Israeli-Egyptian formal relations will probably remain cold, behind-the-scenes contacts (particularly between the security establishments) will likely continue to flourish.

2. Benefitting from the crisis in Syria: The Syrian enigma can, in the long run, bring to power a Sunni legitimate regime that may be more amenable to peaceful relations to Israel. In the more immediate future, it signals the weakening of the anti-Israeli axis, led by Iran and Syria. Iran’s ability to project power on Israel’s immediate environment has undoubtedly declined. The Syrian crisis also offered Israel opportunities to improve ties with Jordan and Turkey. These opportunities have already been partially exploited over the past months. Israel and Jordan are tacitly coordinating their policy vis-à-vis the Syrian front, while Israel and Turkey are in the midst of mending their relations.

3. A New Sunni Coalition: The Arab Spring has changed the balance of power between the Sunna and Shi’a. The Iranian role in the Middle East has received a blow. Consequently, a new Sunni coalition seems to be emerging in the region, with Turkey and Egypt being central players, backed by the moderate monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. This Sunni axis and Israel have several common interests in the region: diminishing the Iranian nuclear challenge; containing the looming threats from Syria; and ending the stalemate on the Palestinian front, which might deteriorate into a third Intifada.

4. Engaging with the Arab Street: In the past, Israel has dealt mainly with Arab elites. Yet, the Arab Spring accentuated the role of the masses. Reaching out to them—be they secular or Islamic—is difficult for Israel. Yet, because of their growing importance, Israel should attempt—publicly or behind the scenes—to do just so. The Arab Spring empowered the common people and created an opportunity for self-expression of groups and communities. In this “new” Arab world, there is growing curiosity and readiness to challenge the conventions of the old regimes. These circumstances might just enable a new discourse on Israel and with Israelis. Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track is a key to making best use of this opportunity.

5. Promoting Peace: The Arab Spring has put on hold the possibility of reaching peace with Syria. The Israeli-Palestinian track remains the only possible track for negotiations. In the absence of a bi-lateral breakthrough, Israel should use the Arab Peace Initiative (API) to break the ice. The allegation that changes of regimes following the Arab Spring has rendered the API meaningless is untrue. The 2013 summit of the Arab League clearly re-affirmed the API, and the results of the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Arab League leaders in May 2013 have made this even more evident.

The Arab Spring—in contrast to the prevailing Israeli view—does not only offer threats but provides opportunities as well. Israeli decision makers should take advantage of these developments in order to tap into regional processes and introduce a change in the traditional Israeli policy toward the Middle East, which has thus far been characterized by a policy of “prevention” rather than “initiation.”

(originally published in The Daily Beast)

הפוסט 5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Ten paradoxes in Israeli foreign policy

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 19 May 2012 18:37:12 +0000

The composition of a broad coalition government presents opportunities to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in several directions, including the possibility of renewed dialogue with the Palestinians. The problem, however, is that this government will have first to address 10 basic paradoxes that lie at the heart of Israel’s foreign policy, which thwart the possible achievement of Israel’s desired goals. Let me briefly enumerate these paradoxes: 1. Israeli leaders often declare – even shout out – their willingness and readiness to invest every effort to advance peace. In reality, however, the Zionist movement and the State of Israel have formally offered only one peace plan to the Arabs in more than 100 years of conflict (the 1989 Shamir plan).

All other plans originated with third parties (mainly the US) or the Arab side. In addition, Israel missed several opportunities for peace (or at least for some serious negotiations). One such missed opportunity was the Arab Peace Initiative (API), presented in March 2002 by the Arab League. Israel has never officially responded to that initiative. The API is still on the table, as indicated by the most recent Arab summit, held in Baghdad in March 2012.

2. Most of the parties in the political system (Likud, Labor, Kadima and more) support the notion of a two-state solution. This was also declared by Netanyahu at his Bar-Ilan speech in 2009. Yet, Israel continues to build and expand the settlements which undermine the very essence and logic of the two-state solution. The expansion of current settlements and new ones stand in contrast to several agreements signed by Israel (the Oslo accords; the Sharm e-Sheikh Memorandum in 1999), which stipulate that nothing should be done to change the status quo.

3. The continuation of the settlement activity undermines another target of Israeli foreign policy: the desire to be a Jewish state – and be recognized as such. This settlement activity – if continued without abatement – will eventually lead to a de facto one-state solution, which is considered a by many Israelis as the end of the Jewish state, taking into account the demographic trend among Jews and Arabs.

4. Israel supports the idea of a unified Jerusalem, which in reality means controlling and absorbing some 300,000 Palestinians in east Jerusalem – a policy that also contradicts the very essence of the desire to establish a Jewish state. In addition, it contradicts the Israeli refusal to admit more than a few thousand Palestinians refugees within a future agreement.

5. Israel recognized the international boundary as a mandatory border with Egypt and Jordan (and negotiated with Syria on its basis), yet it is unwilling to recognize the 1967 Green Line as a mandatory border with the Palestinians.

6. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democracy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring and the possibility that Arab regimes will become democratic because it fears the rise of Islamic regimes.

7. Israel fears the rise of Islamic fundamentalist regimes, but in reality Saudi Arabia – which twice in the past proffered peace plans (the Fahd Plan, 1981- 82; the API, or “Abdallah initiative,” as noted, in February 2002) – is “a fundamentalist Islamic state.”

Therefore, an Islamic state is not necessarily an immediate threat to Israel.

8. Israel claims that there is no Palestinian partner, but in reality PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are perhaps the most moderate Palestinian leaders to date and he is in favor of a solution based on the 1967 borders.

9. Israel is the strongest state in the Middle East militarily, with the possession of nuclear capability (according to foreign reports), yet it views the Palestinians, and certainly Iran, as existential threats.

10. The Jews came to Palestine to establish an independent Jewish state and in such a way to disengage themselves from the ghetto mentality they were subjected to in Europe and the Arab countries.

Yet, several generations later, they have managed – with the help of their neighbors – to establish a new ghetto in the Middle East surrounded by walls and fences.

Obviously, the question is what to do next. Well, the first step is to recognize these paradoxes in Israeli policy. Second, there must be an attempt to address them by initiating a major change in the thinking which guides the policy. The continuation of the more-or-less same policy will lead to the perpetuation of these paradoxes in the Israeli foreign policy. The entrance of the more moderate Kadima Party to the coalition creates an opportunity for addressing these paradoxes.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten paradoxes in Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.