ארכיון Arab Spring - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/arab-spring/ מתווים Wed, 13 Jul 2022 14:40:25 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון Arab Spring - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/arab-spring/ 32 32 An Alternative Model of Israeli-Arab Encounters https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/an-alternative-model-of-israeli-arab-encounters/ Mon, 20 Jul 2020 06:31:36 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5296 The Arab Spring presents Israel with new opportunities for dialogue with the region. Nevertheless, only little effort has been invested so far in organizing bi-lateral encounters between Israelis and their Arab counterparts. This article outlines a model for such Israeli-Arab meetings. It proposes to hold meetings that are informal and secretive, and that bring together liberal intellectuals from both sides to thoroughly examine issues as democracy, liberalism, identity, minorities, and the Jewish communities in Arab countries. Such non-political meetings can enable the exchange of knowledge between Israeli and Arab scholars, and can even assist parallel political meetings to be more successful. This model has been recently successfully implemented in meetings between Israeli intellectuals and counterparts from a major Arab country.

הפוסט An Alternative Model of Israeli-Arab Encounters הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Arab Spring presents Israel with new opportunities for dialogue with the region. Nevertheless, only little effort has been invested so far in organizing bi-lateral encounters between Israelis and their Arab counterparts. This article outlines a model for such Israeli-Arab meetings. It proposes to hold meetings that are informal and secretive, and that bring together liberal intellectuals from both sides to thoroughly examine issues as democracy, liberalism, identity, minorities, and the Jewish communities in Arab countries. Such non-political meetings can enable the exchange of knowledge between Israeli and Arab scholars, and can even assist parallel political meetings to be more successful. This model has been recently successfully implemented in meetings between Israeli intellectuals and counterparts from a major Arab country.

הפוסט An Alternative Model of Israeli-Arab Encounters הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Coronavirus crisis opens opportunity for shifting Israeli foreign policy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/coronavirus-crisis-opens-opportunity-for-shifting-israeli-foreign-policy/ Thu, 02 Apr 2020 12:47:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3289 At present, there is no end in sight for the novel coronavirus crisis and we do not know its repercussions for the future. Despite this, it is not too soon to start thinking about possible lessons and insights for Israeli foreign policy on the day after. For now, the takeaways are contradictory. On the one hand, states are closing their borders and turning inward, as mandated by health considerations. On the other hand, cooperation between states will clearly be necessary in order to overcome the unprecedented crisis in the health, economic and diplomatic arenas. We are witnessing the rise of more conservative and populist regimes in various states in recent years, and even in some which have adopted racist overtones. The coronavirus outbreak could buttress their argument that unsupervised open borders result not only in uncontrolled immigration, but also in epidemics. An understandably frightened public might support seclusion and isolationist trends. The immediate challenge on the day after will require a balance between what appear to be two polar positions – the version of globalization as we know it versus the veering toward separation and isolationism. Israel is facing that challenge all the more forcefully given the trends of recent years. Its foreign policy has been marked by increased isolationism, an emphasis on threats – whether existential or merely serious attempts to block international diplomatic initiatives and a deep sense that “the world is against us” or that “the world does not fully understand the threats we face.” The coronavirus crisis is

הפוסט Coronavirus crisis opens opportunity for shifting Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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At present, there is no end in sight for the novel coronavirus crisis and we do not know its repercussions for the future. Despite this, it is not too soon to start thinking about possible lessons and insights for Israeli foreign policy on the day after.

For now, the takeaways are contradictory. On the one hand, states are closing their borders and turning inward, as mandated by health considerations. On the other hand, cooperation between states will clearly be necessary in order to overcome the unprecedented crisis in the health, economic and diplomatic arenas.

We are witnessing the rise of more conservative and populist regimes in various states in recent years, and even in some which have adopted racist overtones. The coronavirus outbreak could buttress their argument that unsupervised open borders result not only in uncontrolled immigration, but also in epidemics.

An understandably frightened public might support seclusion and isolationist trends. The immediate challenge on the day after will require a balance between what appear to be two polar positions – the version of globalization as we know it versus the veering toward separation and isolationism.

Israel is facing that challenge all the more forcefully given the trends of recent years. Its foreign policy has been marked by increased isolationism, an emphasis on threats – whether existential or merely serious attempts to block international diplomatic initiatives and a deep sense that “the world is against us” or that “the world does not fully understand the threats we face.”

The coronavirus crisis is a strategic crossroads for renewed solidarity, initiatives and cooperation in the regional and international arena. It therefore constitutes an opportunity for a shift in Israel’s foreign policy, which should be based on several layers.

1. Supporting others – Israel has achieved admirable progress in various fields. It is important to share the unique knowledge we have amassed and developed with neighboring states and with those further away. There is no need to keep boasting of Israel as a “start-up nation.” Instead, Israel should significantly expand its investment in foreign aid.

2. Highlighting opportunities alongside threats – The world appears to have internalized the “threat list” that Israel skillfully presented. Without making light of them, the array of opportunities presented in terms of joint interests with regional states in recent years should also be emphasized. There are numerous options for cooperation between Israel and its neighbors, not only in response to threats but also in taking advantage of opportunities in environmental protection, water, health, immigration and energy, to name a few. The immigration crisis, for example, requires a joint effort to stabilize the situation, but also provides an opportunity for joint plans to address understandable concerns and help create a supportive rather than a threatening and argumentative climate.

3. Regional cooperation – Recent years have presented Israel with increased potential for regional cooperation. Israel took constructive steps to take advantage of this potential, but they must be deepened and extended to the broader region. While the Arab Spring did not generate the hoped-for democratization, it did create a more conducive foundation for cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as well as a sense of a shared fate vis-à-vis a variety of challenges.

4. Conducting an open dialogue with the Palestinians – Current events have underscored the necessity for tighter coordination and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It is very important to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the COVID-19 crisis to return to a format of broader dialogue – empathetic and deep – between the sides. Its outset is in facing the ongoing crisis; its aftermath is in examining ways to break through the impasse in the peace process.

5. Good neighborly relations with Europe – In recent years, Israel has focused on the criticism voiced by Brussels against its policies. The Israeli government took a confrontational approach toward the EU and regarded its weaknesses (prompted by economic, diplomatic and social challenges) as an opportunity. Israel must realize that the geographic, economic and cultural realities linking it to Europe are an asset and not a liability. Moreover, good relations with the EU do not contradict Israel’s strategic relationship with the US, even if they appeared to do so for a short while.

6. A foreign policy based on initiatives and vision – Perhaps most importantly, Israel must replace its defensive and blocking posture with a foreign policy that is proactive and that of an internationalist. Israel should present a vision of its own for regional cooperation and coexistence, based on positive common denominators, rather than being reactive and relying on negatives. By its very nature, the road to realizing a vision is difficult, but a vision-led foreign policy can contribute to a constructive and less threatening atmosphere, resulting in charging the regional climate with positive energies, with or without natural gas.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy and a former ambassador to Cyprus.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Coronavirus crisis opens opportunity for shifting Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-palestinian-foreign-service-at-a-time-of-diplomatic-freeze/ Thu, 05 Dec 2019 12:58:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2819 The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause. One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world. The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/exaggerated-disappointment-on-the-silver-jubilee-of-the-israeli-jordanian-peace-treaty/ Fri, 01 Nov 2019 12:33:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2812 The 26th of October marked the silver jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The media emphasized the fact that no formal celebrations were held on both sides of the Jordan River. Indeed, like the 40th anniversary of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the event passed without fanfare. The absence of formal celebrations was assessed as a true manifestation of the frozen peace between Israel and Jordan. Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible. A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The 26th of October marked the silver jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The media emphasized the fact that no formal celebrations were held on both sides of the Jordan River. Indeed, like the 40th anniversary of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the event passed without fanfare. The absence of formal celebrations was assessed as a true manifestation of the frozen peace between Israel and Jordan.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Expo 2020 Dubai: An Opportunity for Israel-Gulf Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/expo-2020-dubai-an-opportunity-for-israel-gulf-relations/ Sat, 22 Jun 2019 09:33:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2786 While Israel was excited to host the Eurovision competition in May, in the Arab Gulf States, international events are held almost on a daily basis. One of the most prestigious of them is Expo 2020, scheduled for October next year in Dubai to showcase participating countries’ technological achievements. The Expo ranks as the third most important global event after the Olympics and the World Cup (slated for 2022 in neighboring Qatar). While 132 states had signed up for the fair as of August 2018, Dubai’s leadership continued to debate Israel’s participation. On April 25, 2019, Expo organizers issued a festive statement saying all countries “without exception” were welcome to attend. “For more than 170 years, World Expos have been apolitical events focused on furthering humanity for the common good through innovation, cultural exchange, creativity and collaboration. We are proud to continue that tradition,” according to the communique. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the news, writing on his Twitter account, “This is another expression of Israel’s rising status in the world and in the region”. Whether Netanyahu’s insight meets reality or not, Israel’s participation provides Israel an unusual diplomatic opportunity, for which it must prepare wisely in order to fulfill. Among other outcomes, the Arab Spring led to the strengthening of the Gulf States’ standing in the Middle East, given the stability they displayed in the face of events that affected almost every country in the region. Consequently, the Gulf States leveraged the new balance of power to expand their

הפוסט Expo 2020 Dubai: An Opportunity for Israel-Gulf Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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While Israel was excited to host the Eurovision competition in May, in the Arab Gulf States, international events are held almost on a daily basis. One of the most prestigious of them is Expo 2020, scheduled for October next year in Dubai to showcase participating countries’ technological achievements. The Expo ranks as the third most important global event after the Olympics and the World Cup (slated for 2022 in neighboring Qatar). While 132 states had signed up for the fair as of August 2018, Dubai’s leadership continued to debate Israel’s participation. On April 25, 2019, Expo organizers issued a festive statement saying all countries “without exception” were welcome to attend. “For more than 170 years, World Expos have been apolitical events focused on furthering humanity for the common good through innovation, cultural exchange, creativity and collaboration. We are proud to continue that tradition,” according to the communique. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the news, writing on his Twitter account, “This is another expression of Israel’s rising status in the world and in the region”. Whether Netanyahu’s insight meets reality or not, Israel’s participation provides Israel an unusual diplomatic opportunity, for which it must prepare wisely in order to fulfill.

Among other outcomes, the Arab Spring led to the strengthening of the Gulf States’ standing in the Middle East, given the stability they displayed in the face of events that affected almost every country in the region. Consequently, the Gulf States leveraged the new balance of power to expand their international and regional influence, as was evident in Emirati-funded infrastructure in the Horn of Africa, Saudi-led high-level diplomatic moves, Oman’s call for regional mediation, the race for hosting international events in these countries, and many more soft-power displays. Kuwait has been the one exception, remaining virtually isolated. Thus, Israel must acknowledge these new nexuses of power in the Middle East, and draw up a corresponding map of alliances. Its integration into the expanding circle of opportunities emerging around the Gulf countries has the potential to be dually beneficial, since it does not only consist of bilateral or regional cooperation, but also of international opportunities.

The Expo events afford tremendous economic values for the participating countries, as well as the opportunity to shape their national image within the global community. The exposure to millions of visitors and the platform for establishing direct contacts among diplomatic representatives and key figures from around the world, generates a unique hub of diplomacy. Indeed, beyond its importance for Israel’s economy and image, Israel’s participation in this event, hosted by an Arab Muslim country it has no current and past diplomatic relations with, is a significant achievement, which reflects the nature of Israel’s current relations with the UAE.

On the one hand, the UAE, as the host of an international event, is expected by the international community to provide access to all countries, including Israel. As a result, the UAE and other Gulf countries have legitimized in recent years the arrival of Israeli nationals to international conferences and tournaments they hosted. In that sense, the UAE’s decision to invite Israel to Expo 2020 does not reflect a change in the status of ties between the two states, nor does it forecast the beginning of direct and formal relations. On the other hand, meeting this international code points to the UAE’s willingness to compromise on anti-normalization measures towards Israel.

Currently, the UAE government distinguishes between bilateral ties with Israel and international cooperation with it, leaving room to maneuver in the case of the latter. In the international realm, an Israeli representative office has been operating for the past three years in Abu Dhabi, the capital, under the auspices of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Israel and the UAE also conduct Air Force exercises and business cooperation in the fields of diamond trade and cyber technology, under international umbrellas. This demonstrates the warming relations between the countries mainly within multilateral frameworks, and is making headlines in the Israeli media mostly due to its public and symbolic nature. The UAE was a pioneer among the Gulf States in allowing an Israeli sports team to display its national symbols at the October 2018 international judo championship in Abu Dhabi. As part of the latter event, the Emiratis also hosted Israel’s Minister of Culture and Sports Miri Regev according to full ceremonial protocol. Additional sports events in the UAE, such as tennis tournaments, a car race and the Special Olympics have also included growing participation of Israeli delegations in recent years.

Conversely, the UAE strictly limits bilateral relations with Israel, conditioning them on a resolution to the Palestinian issue. Accordingly, the country has been outspoken in its criticism of Israel regarding measures it defines as unjust toward the Palestinian people. Therefore, it does not cooperate with Israel in areas such as culture, research, tourism, industry and media despite mutual interests in doing so. In the diplomatic arena, there are occasional reports of meetings between senior officials of both states, such as the September 2012 meeting between Netanyahu and the UAE Foreign Minister, and the recent January 2019 visit to the UAE by Labor Party leader Avi Gabbay who met with senior ministers. Nonetheless, such meetings are not intended for public knowledge (despite the occasional leaks) and are not considered official breakthroughs in official relations.

At the same time, we are witnessing a new phenomenon in which Gulf citizens express support for Israel on social media, and a growing number of senior Emiratis call for the establishment of direct ties with Israel. For example, Khalaf al-Habtoor, a leading Emirati executive, asked on twitter why the Gulf States are not signing a peace agreement with Israel “same as Egypt, Morocco and Jordan have done before”. Such voices do not regard Israel as an enemy, and view cooperation with it as a vital source of regional stability and development. While not reflecting an official government line, they signal a gradual shift from a formerly taboo subject to an increasingly acceptable opinion. These expressions of interest in bilateral relations create a crack in the traditional demand that has placed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key obstacle to normalization with Israel.

The gap between the official UAE policy toward Israel and the mutual courtship between the two nations demonstrates that Israel is on the cusp of a formative phase in these relations. At this point of time, Israel would do well to leverage the relative openness of the Gulf States towards it by expanding its involvement in the region. Just as Israel sought a formal invitation to Expo 2020, it should continue to identify opportunities, map scheduled international events in the Gulf and ask to participate. Israel should also invite Gulf countries to take part in international events it hosts.

One important issue that arises from increased interactions between Israel and Gulf States is the need to study the culture, values, sensitivities and local laws when preparing Israeli delegations for excursions in the Gulf. Such preparation should be overseen by a government agency, which will formulate a plan for ties with the Gulf States and will be put in charge of these ties through diplomatic, security, economic and civilian channels. By so doing, Israel’s presence in the Gulf could become more acceptable and even be expanded. However, if Israel seeks a more significant opening to the region, it must advance a resolution of the Palestinian issue through a genuine process that would also be of great benefit for its ties with the Gulf States.

Dr. Moran Zaga is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a Research Fellow at the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa. 

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Expo 2020 Dubai: An Opportunity for Israel-Gulf Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Egypt: Strategic Partnership, Civil Remoteness? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-egypt-strategic-partnership-civil-remoteness/ Sat, 02 Mar 2019 07:04:31 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3158 This article describes the relationship and cooperation between Israel and Egypt, and discusses the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on them. It focuses on the current political and security cooperation between the two countries regarding the Gaza Strip, the fight against terror, the Palestinian issue, the relations with the US administration, and the regional rivalry between Arab Sunni states and Iran. The article emphasizes that when it comes to civil and economic ties between Israel and Egypt, the potential for cooperation has yet to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, there are a few signs for economic cooperation in the areas of natural gas and industry (with the enlargement of the QIZ system), and to some positive change in the public attitude of the Egyptian government towards relations with Israel. The challenges to bolstering Israel-Egypt relations include bureaucratic, economic and political security (e.g. the nuclear issue) components. Above all, however, stands the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the perception of the Egyptian public that normalization with Israel cannot be reached prior to a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: Strategic Partnership, Civil Remoteness? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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This article describes the relationship and cooperation between Israel and Egypt, and discusses the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on them. It focuses on the current political and security cooperation between the two countries regarding the Gaza Strip, the fight against terror, the Palestinian issue, the relations with the US administration, and the regional rivalry between Arab Sunni states and Iran. The article emphasizes that when it comes to civil and economic ties between Israel and Egypt, the potential for cooperation has yet to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, there are a few signs for economic cooperation in the areas of natural gas and industry (with the enlargement of the QIZ system), and to some positive change in the public attitude of the Egyptian government towards relations with Israel. The challenges to bolstering Israel-Egypt relations include bureaucratic, economic and political security (e.g. the nuclear issue) components. Above all, however, stands the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the perception of the Egyptian public that normalization with Israel cannot be reached prior to a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: Strategic Partnership, Civil Remoteness? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Egypt: A Strategic Axis in the Regional Landscape? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-egypt-a-strategic-axis-in-the-regional-landscape/ Tue, 11 Dec 2018 16:03:48 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2919 The recent violent escalation in Gaza, that led to the resignation of the Israeli minister of defense and to a public uproar against the government’s handling of the Hamas movement, have once more emphasized Egypt’s deep involvement in attempts to mediate and resolve conflicts between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors in the West bank and Gaza. Egypt’s active role is not limited to compliance with the disputants needs, but is an important component in its pro-active policy and its self-perception as a necessary mediator and negotiator that promotes regional stability. The consequences of the “Arab Shaking” have yet to end. Each state that experienced these “winds of change”, withstands the emerging regional and international reality differently, based on the way it defines its current position. Egypt under a-Sisi, and in the post-Mursi era, has re-defined its aims and mode of action. The newly created Egyptian national security outlook prioritized two main objectives: to restore (both domestic and regional) security and to strengthen the Egyptian economy. Regarding the security objective, as soon as Egypt defined “terrorism” (both domestic and international) as its biggest threat, it made sure to label the Muslin Brotherhood movement a terror organization and carried out severe measures against its members. Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities have occasionally accused the Hamas of carrying out terror attacks in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and intermittently with ISIS. No wonder that every now and then news surrounding military cooperation between Egypt and Israel battling ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula appear in

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: A Strategic Axis in the Regional Landscape? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The recent violent escalation in Gaza, that led to the resignation of the Israeli minister of defense and to a public uproar against the government’s handling of the Hamas movement, have once more emphasized Egypt’s deep involvement in attempts to mediate and resolve conflicts between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors in the West bank and Gaza. Egypt’s active role is not limited to compliance with the disputants needs, but is an important component in its pro-active policy and its self-perception as a necessary mediator and negotiator that promotes regional stability.

The consequences of the “Arab Shaking” have yet to end. Each state that experienced these “winds of change”, withstands the emerging regional and international reality differently, based on the way it defines its current position. Egypt under a-Sisi, and in the post-Mursi era, has re-defined its aims and mode of action. The newly created Egyptian national security outlook prioritized two main objectives: to restore (both domestic and regional) security and to strengthen the Egyptian economy.

Regarding the security objective, as soon as Egypt defined “terrorism” (both domestic and international) as its biggest threat, it made sure to label the Muslin Brotherhood movement a terror organization and carried out severe measures against its members. Furthermore, the Egyptian authorities have occasionally accused the Hamas of carrying out terror attacks in cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood and intermittently with ISIS. No wonder that every now and then news surrounding military cooperation between Egypt and Israel battling ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula appear in the media.

In addition to this, the Iranian policy in the Middle East is perceived by Egypt as a threat (and so by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates). Both Turkey and Qatar are considered Egypt’s consistent and uncompromising rivals, due to their support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and based on their membership in the Middle Eastern axis opposing Egypt. A new reality has evolved that we have never seen before, in which the regional interests of Israel and Egypt, as well as those of other Arab states, have intertwined.

The long-standing Egyptian policy that strives to resolve the Palestinian issue relies, even to this day, on its ability to engage in what is happening in the Gaza strip. Egypt wishes to promote steps of reconciliation within the Palestinian wing itself (between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority), and to serve as a mediator between the Palestinians as well as between the Palestinians and Israel. All actors in this equation view Egypt as a trustworthy and influential actor. In this way, Egypt acts as the most significant mediator that negotiates understandings between Israel and Hamas, and that supports Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Egypt is expected to continue playing such a role in the future as well.

The meeting between Israel and Egypt’s leaders that took place during the 2018 UN General Assembly, was not the first meeting between Netanyahu and a-Sisi this past year. Among the issues discussed by the two leaders were the situation in Gaza, the Palestinian issue, security matters, regional developments and bilateral issues. The meeting reflected rather accurately the cooperative relations between the two countries over the past four years.

The second objective put forward by the Egyptian leadership has been to stabilize the economy. A strong sense of security and a steady economy may turn Egypt into a source for regional stability. This leads Egypt to be increasingly interested in promoting economic and trade cooperation with Israel. Egypt hold an important strategic location, on the maritime route from the Indian ocean through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, and toward the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the interest in Egypt’s stabilization is not limited to regional actors alone, but is also eminent for the US, the EU, Russia, India, and China. This generates international interest in supporting Israeli-Egyptian cooperation as a keystone for enhancing regional stability.

Broader cooperation between Israel and Egypt in the security and-political spheres may stimulate their economic relations and therefore work for the benefit of both countries. Nevertheless, there is still a significant gap between the high level of strategic cooperation between Israel and Egypt, and their much lower level of civil cooperation. The number of Israelis touring Egypt is stable but rather low. Trade between the countries is taking place but to a limited extent, and the same is true regarding the field of agriculture, where there is far greater potential for cooperation than what is taking place today (at least in comparison to cooperation in the 1990’s). In addition to that, there is potential for Egypt to utilize technologies such as solar energy and water desalination, areas of which are widely known as Israel’s field of expertise, both as a manufacturer and as an implementer.

The field of energy, and in particular the production and marketing of natural gas, plays a central role in the Israeli-Egyptian economic and trade cooperation. Moreover, both countries can cooperate in traditional industry fields, in unique qualified industrial zones (QIZ, a three-way agreement that allows the export of free trade Egyptian goods to the US, in the condition they hold a certain percent of Israeli components), in agriculture, tourism and more. Such cooperation can promote both Israel’s and Egypt’s economies, and have a positive economic impact on the broader region.

The announcement made by the Israeli company “Delek Drilling” that it will purchase (together with the Noble Energy and East Gas companies) the Egyptian EMG company is a step towards achieving these goals. The natural gas pipeline owned by EMG connects Israel and Egypt, and will deliver natural gas from the “Tamar” and “Leviathan” reservoirs to Egypt. This is considered to be a milestone in transforming Egypt into a regional energy hub, as a major importer and as an exporter based on its liquefying gas facilities. According to Israel’s Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz, the rehabilitation of the Israeli-Egyptian natural gas pipeline, along with the construction of a Jordanian-Israeli pipeline, creates a regional foundation between the “peace countries”. It is rare to have a joint infrastructure project with geo-political significance take shape between Israel and its neighbors.

The positive nature of Israel-Egypt ties in recent years, together with evolving regional developments in the Middle East, Egypt’s role in mediating between Israel and the Palestinians, and the steps taken by Egypt to thaw the “cold” peace with Israel, may all point to the existence of an opportunity for further advancement in ties between two strategic partners in the region – Egypt and Israel.

Dr. Haim Koren, a task-team member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, served as the Israeli Ambassador to Egypt between the years 2014 and 2016. This article is based on a research on Israel-Egypt relations, written as part of Mitvim Institute’s project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Egypt: A Strategic Axis in the Regional Landscape? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-spring-of-israels-relations-with-its-arab-neighbors/ Sun, 09 Dec 2018 15:57:45 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2916 In the past few weeks it seems that Arab and Muslim countries have been competing with each other over Israel. Following news on back-channel intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to a well-publicized visit to Oman. Later, Chad’s president arrived in Israel for a visit, during which Netanyahu revealed that Sudan and Bahrain are about to upgrade their relations with Israel as well. It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states. The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In the past few weeks it seems that Arab and Muslim countries have been competing with each other over Israel. Following news on back-channel intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to a well-publicized visit to Oman. Later, Chad’s president arrived in Israel for a visit, during which Netanyahu revealed that Sudan and Bahrain are about to upgrade their relations with Israel as well.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-jordan-a-looming-crisis-that-should-be-prevented/ Fri, 26 Oct 2018 15:40:53 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2911 Less than 10 months after the resolution of the previous Israeli-Jordanian crisis, a new crisis may be sparked by King Abdullah’s recent decision not to renew the two annexes to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. When the treaty was signed in October 1994, Israel and Jordan decided to establish a “special regime” in two areas, Naharayim (al-Baqoura in Arabic) and Tzofar (al-Ghumar in Arabic), which would remain under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. The “special regime” granted unlimited freedom to the landowners, their employees, and their invitees, without applying any customs or immigration legislation. According to the treaty, this arrangement would be in place for 25 years and renewed automatically unless Israel or Jordan gives one year’s notice in advance of its termination. In such case, discussions between the parties shall begin. From a purely domestic Jordanian perspective, this was a timely and astute decision: The king sought to appease the mounting opposition to the peace treaty with Israel in general and the two annexes in particular coming from parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society at large. Facing growing criticism and periodic waves of demonstrations of citizens protesting against economic and social hardships, the king fired prime minister Hani Mulki in June 2018, but to no avail. Now, in a single stroke, he managed to divert his people’s attention from their daily problems. Jordanian print and social media applauded the king’s bold decision. In addition, it can be speculated that King Abdullah is frustrated by the

הפוסט Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Less than 10 months after the resolution of the previous Israeli-Jordanian crisis, a new crisis may be sparked by King Abdullah’s recent decision not to renew the two annexes to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.

When the treaty was signed in October 1994, Israel and Jordan decided to establish a “special regime” in two areas, Naharayim (al-Baqoura in Arabic) and Tzofar (al-Ghumar in Arabic), which would remain under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. The “special regime” granted unlimited freedom to the landowners, their employees, and their invitees, without applying any customs or immigration legislation.

According to the treaty, this arrangement would be in place for 25 years and renewed automatically unless Israel or Jordan gives one year’s notice in advance of its termination. In such case, discussions between the parties shall begin.

From a purely domestic Jordanian perspective, this was a timely and astute decision: The king sought to appease the mounting opposition to the peace treaty with Israel in general and the two annexes in particular coming from parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society at large. Facing growing criticism and periodic waves of demonstrations of citizens protesting against economic and social hardships, the king fired prime minister Hani Mulki in June 2018, but to no avail.

Now, in a single stroke, he managed to divert his people’s attention from their daily problems. Jordanian print and social media applauded the king’s bold decision. In addition, it can be speculated that King Abdullah is frustrated by the right-wing Netanyahu government, which demonstrates little interest in promoting a dialogue with the Palestinians, and is pushing for international recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thus ignoring Jordan’s special role in the holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem, as stipulated by the peace treaty. In fact, this very issue has been the cause of a series of diplomatic crises between the two countries in recent years.

Admittedly, the decision is difficult to reconcile with the consistently warm Israel-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation. Collaboration between the two countries grew even stronger in the wake of the Arab Spring, as Israel helped the kingdom in various ways to stop the infiltration of radical jihadi elements from Syrian and Iraqi territories under the control of Islamic State. It seems, therefore, that relations between Israel and Jordan move on two parallel tracks simultaneously: the public and the hidden. Yet, a deterioration in the public domain may also affect the hidden.

Israel was not entirely surprised by the king’s decision. If, as all available information suggests, Netanyahu was warned in advance of the coming decision and did nothing to prevent it, then the decision is the result of negligence and miscalculations, and a prime example of how the absence of a foreign minister working in full capacity adversely affects Israel’s decision-making. But it is also yet another demonstration of Israel’s “everything will be OK” (yehiye beseder) syndrome.

The question is what can be done now to prevent the situation from deteriorating into another diplomatic crisis. Unfortunately, as Jordan’s quiet messages went unheeded by Israel, the king tweeted his decision publicly. That makes it difficult for him to backtrack without a blow to his own pride. In addition, by inflaming public opinion, Jordanian media turned the decision into an issue that involves now national honor. Just as the tiny territory of Taba in the Sinai Peninsula became a national issue for Egypt in the 1980s, Naharayim and Tzofar have now became hot issues in Jordan.

How should Israel respond? First, it should be stated what Israel should not do: It should not threaten to cut the water supply to Jordan, which was stipulated in the peace agreement. Water is a highly sensitive issue in Jordan, and Israel has been generous in providing Jordan with more water than stipulated in the agreement, and it should continue doing so.

What Israel should do is make an effort to divert any discussions on this issue from the public to the secret track, removing the sting from the heated public debate in the media on both sides. These secret talks should focus on finding a creative solution based on the peace treaty and the two countries’ shared experience.

Article 7b of the treaty allows the parties to “enter negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area or areas.” A talk with several Israeli experts on the issue emphatically confirmed that a creative solution can be found which will be satisfactory to both sides.

In June 2017, after an Israeli security guard killed two Jordanians after being attacked, it took the Israeli government six months to resolve the crisis with Jordan. It was an unnecessarily long period. Today, Israel should act immediately to contain the looming crisis and propose a reasonable solution to the problem.

The main lesson from this episode is that Israel needs to pay greater attention to diplomacy. But as long as Israel’s foreign policy is subservient to national security considerations, the government will continue to suffer from periodic diplomatic blunders.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-in-an-unchanging-middle-east/ Mon, 27 Aug 2018 15:20:41 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2904 The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time. The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals. No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-new-mideast-in-familiar-clothing/ Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:51:07 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2897 Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed. Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved. First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-saudi-arabia-on-the-way-to-normalization/ Sun, 01 Jul 2018 10:18:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3076 The tectonic changes in the Middle East since 2011 have created the foundation for a significant rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Alongside their strategic security partnership, cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia engenders enormous potential on the political and economic level. Official diplomatic relations between the two countries will reflect on the stability of the region and will also help advance the peace and reconciliation processes with the Palestinians. Economic cooperation including water, technology, energy, and tourism agreements would bring significant benefits to both countries, and certainly to the Israeli economy. These benefits notwithstanding, normalization between the two countries is not expected before the Palestinian demands are met, or at least until there is a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The reasoning behind this is Saudi Arabia’s historical commitment to advancing the solution of the Palestinian problem. As a result, the Saudi regime prefers in the meantime to follow the path of quiet diplomacy in order to advance national-strategic goals, rather than publicizing its relations with Israel.

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The tectonic changes in the Middle East since 2011 have created the foundation for a significant rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Alongside their strategic security partnership, cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia engenders enormous potential on the political and economic level. Official diplomatic relations between the two countries will reflect on the stability of the region and will also help advance the peace and reconciliation processes with the Palestinians. Economic cooperation including water, technology, energy, and tourism agreements would bring significant benefits to both countries, and certainly to the Israeli economy. These benefits notwithstanding, normalization between the two countries is not expected before the Palestinian demands are met, or at least until there is a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The reasoning behind this is Saudi Arabia’s historical commitment to advancing the solution of the Palestinian problem. As a result, the Saudi regime prefers in the meantime to follow the path of quiet diplomacy in order to advance national-strategic goals, rather than publicizing its relations with Israel.

הפוסט Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Gulf States’ Foreign Policies: Summary of a briefing with Dr. Karen E. Young https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-gulf-states-foreign-policies-summary-of-a-briefing-with-dr-karen-e-youn/ Sun, 01 Jan 2017 10:46:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3327 On December 29th , 2016 the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hosted Dr. Karen E. Young of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington for a briefing titled “The Interventionist Turn in Gulf Foreign Policies and the Economic Drivers of Change.” The briefing focused on local, regional and international causes for the changing dynamics of Gulf states’ foreign policies. Specific attention was paid to the use of economic statecraft and willingness to use military force by the Gulf states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, and to the changing relations between the different Gulf states. The participants in the briefing also discussed the budding ties between the Gulf states and Israel, and the opportunities presented through the current geo-political situation in the Middle East. This document presents some of the key points discussed in the briefing.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Foreign Policies: Summary of a briefing with Dr. Karen E. Young הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On December 29th , 2016 the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hosted Dr. Karen E. Young of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington for a briefing titled “The Interventionist Turn in Gulf Foreign Policies and the Economic Drivers of Change.” The briefing focused on local, regional and international causes for the changing dynamics of Gulf states’ foreign policies. Specific attention was paid to the use of economic statecraft and willingness to use military force by the Gulf states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, and to the changing relations between the different Gulf states. The participants in the briefing also discussed the budding ties between the Gulf states and Israel, and the opportunities presented through the current geo-political situation in the Middle East. This document presents some of the key points discussed in the briefing.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Foreign Policies: Summary of a briefing with Dr. Karen E. Young הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-changing-discourse-on-israel-in-the-arab-world/ Fri, 28 Aug 2015 07:42:09 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4686 Dr. Abdullah Swalha, Director of the Center for Israel Studies in Jordan, was the keynote speaker at a symposium held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies on 13 August 2015. The symposium focused on the changing discourse on Israel in the Arab world as well as on opportunities for regional cooperation. It also featured MK Ksenia Svetlova (Zionist Union), Kamal Hassan (Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute).

הפוסט A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dr. Abdullah Swalha, Director of the Center for Israel Studies in Jordan, was the keynote speaker at a symposium held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies on 13 August 2015. The symposium focused on the changing discourse on Israel in the Arab world as well as on opportunities for regional cooperation. It also featured MK Ksenia Svetlova (Zionist Union), Kamal Hassan (Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute).

הפוסט A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/is-turkeys-war-on-terror-a-consequence-of-the-iran-deal/ Tue, 25 Aug 2015 08:47:04 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4334 The deal negotiated by the P5+1 with Iran on its nuclear program has been heralded by supporters as a historic agreement and regional game-changer. Much of the international criticism thus far has centered on Israeli and Gulf Arab skepticism about the deal. Overlooked in these discussions, however, is the significant impact the Iran deal is already having on other regional disputes, including Iran’s relationship with its traditional competitor, Turkey. Operating with a caretaker government since its June 7 national elections and now heading to early elections on November 1, Turkey has opened a two-front war against the so-called Islamic State and its traditional foe, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Most analysts have pointed to the July 20 terror attack in Suruc and the subsequent killings of two Turkish police officers as the spark that triggered Ankara’s strategic shift. However, the fact that these events transpired immediately following the end of negotiations with Iran was not an accident. The broader trend of increased Iranian–Turkish competition is playing out regionally as Tehran’s support for the Kurds further antagonizes Ankara. The improvement of Iran’s international standing under President Hassan Rouhani has coincided with a decline in Turkey’s global image. As Rouhani abandoned the hostile rhetoric ubiquitous to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s brash and aggressive handling of various domestic and foreign crises tarnished his hard-earned reputation as the West’s most reliable Muslim partner. More importantly, as Iran pragmatically began to “de-conflict” with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State while still supporting the Syrian regime of

הפוסט Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The deal negotiated by the P5+1 with Iran on its nuclear program has been heralded by supporters as a historic agreement and regional game-changer. Much of the international criticism thus far has centered on Israeli and Gulf Arab skepticism about the deal. Overlooked in these discussions, however, is the significant impact the Iran deal is already having on other regional disputes, including Iran’s relationship with its traditional competitor, Turkey.

Operating with a caretaker government since its June 7 national elections and now heading to early elections on November 1, Turkey has opened a two-front war against the so-called Islamic State and its traditional foe, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Most analysts have pointed to the July 20 terror attack in Suruc and the subsequent killings of two Turkish police officers as the spark that triggered Ankara’s strategic shift. However, the fact that these events transpired immediately following the end of negotiations with Iran was not an accident. The broader trend of increased Iranian–Turkish competition is playing out regionally as Tehran’s support for the Kurds further antagonizes Ankara.

The improvement of Iran’s international standing under President Hassan Rouhani has coincided with a decline in Turkey’s global image. As Rouhani abandoned the hostile rhetoric ubiquitous to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s brash and aggressive handling of various domestic and foreign crises tarnished his hard-earned reputation as the West’s most reliable Muslim partner. More importantly, as Iran pragmatically began to “de-conflict” with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State while still supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey’s anger with Assad and comparative ambivalence to the jihadist threat prompted many in the West to question this NATO ally’s commitment and value to regional security.

Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Iran in recent years has undergone a major shift, as has its broader Middle East neighborhood policy. Ankara’s soft-power charm offensive throughout the region ran up against the so-called “Arab Spring” and hard power realities, falling short of its ambitions for a neo-Ottoman role in the region. Meanwhile, Tehran has been eagerly anticipating a final nuclear settlement that would once again open Iran up to international markets. During the days of Ahmadinejad, Turkey was Iran’s largest trading partner and a key international advocate. Ankara repeatedly called for lifting international sanctions, as they inhibited the economic growth of its own eastern provinces, many of which engaged in black market trading with their Iranian neighbors just across the border. The pinnacle of this relationship was the infamous Tehran Declaration that Brazil and Turkey proudly announced with Iran in 2010. Despite being quietly killed by Washington because of “miscommunications,” the deal in many ways set the parameters and precedent for subsequent negotiations and the final Iran deal.

So why aren’t more Turkish officials applauding the signing of the Iran deal and the ending of the sanctions regime? First of all, experts disagree on the extent that Turkey will benefit from Iran’s return to the global economy or how investment that once was destined for Turkey may begin to find its way to Iran as the hot new regional destination. But more importantly, the JCPOA threatens Turkey’s regional position, given both Iran’s use of proxies across the region and, specifically, Tehran’s tacit support of the PKK in recent months.

Look no further than Syria, where Turkey and Iran are visibly working at cross-purposes. Much to Ankara’s chagrin, developments in Syria appear to be working in Iran’s favor just as they did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The shifting realities on the ground are precipitating the establishment of yet another Kurdish entity along Turkey’s border, stoking fears in Ankara that the Kurds could attain their long desired state.

Turkey established a healthy working relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Yet, the close association between the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the PKK kept Ankara from developing a similar relationship with Syria’s Kurds. And although Erdoğan was in the midst of peace talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, he believed that bridging this divide would damage his reputation amongst nationalist voters. Direct cooperation with the PYD was a domestic political risk Turkey’s president was unwilling to take given that he has lost his once reliable Kurdish votes and now must appeal to his more traditional Turkish nationalist base. Instead, Ankara collaborated with those in the Syrian opposition who would pursue regime change in Damascus while respecting Turkish sovereignty.

The flaws of this policy were exposed during the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish-majority town of Kobane last autumn. As the United States frantically launched airstrikes to repel the jihadist advance, Turkish tanks overlooking the battlefield stood idle. Little surprise that Turkish Kurds, feeling betrayed by the man who once depicted himself as a champion of the Kurdish peace process and Kurdish rights, cast their ballots against Erdoğan in June’s elections.

In response, Erdoğan has transformed himself into a wartime president.

Legitimized by the Suruc bombing, Turkey’s two-front military campaign against the Islamic State and the PKK reminded many in the West of its irreplaceable geostrategic value and was initially received with great fanfare. But American observers of the region largely ignored the intense media battle this operation has sparked between Ankara and Tehran. Iranian state media repeatedly accused Turkey of supporting the Islamic State, even going as far as to assert that Erdoğan’s daughter Sümeyye visited wounded jihadists in Syria, while in Turkey the pro-AKP media blamed Iran for instigating regional violence through its multifarious proxies, particularly the PKK. One pro-government Daily Sabah column went as far as claiming that the Iran deal emboldened Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations like the PKK while employing rhetoric similar to the Iran deal’s opponents in Washington. And on August 24 images circulated in the Turkish press of Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli visiting the Qandil Mountains where the PKK operates.

This isn’t mere propaganda. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif cancelled his scheduled visit to Ankara amidst speculation that Erdoğan refused him an official face-to-face meeting.

The revival of the Turkish–Persian balance of power — a narrative that dominated the Middle East for centuries — is just the first ripple caused by the Iran deal, and should deeply concern U.S. officials. By minimally satisfying American needs for the sake of their own, competing regional goals, both states are undermining U.S. strategy. Can Washington turn the dispute between Ankara and Tehran into an opportunity to develop a coherent Syria strategy? The odds are slim. But now more than ever the United States must be aware of these cross-purposes and factor them into its broader regional calculations.

(originally published in War on the Rocks)

הפוסט Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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With Sissi, Egypt Sees a Return of the Pharaohs https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/with-sissi-egypt-sees-a-return-of-the-pharaohs/ Mon, 17 Aug 2015 08:55:26 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4338 On August 6, the new Suez Canal was inaugurated with great pomp and circumstance. In honor of the historic event, there were two ceremonies, attended by both Egyptian and foreign dignitaries, that recalled the festive dedication of the original canal in 1869. Numerous media reports discussed the political and economic aspects of this event, but they missed the aspect that was simultaneously most interesting and most surprising: Islamic and Arab identity are both out, while pharaonic culture is returning in a big way. One could say the most salient trend at both ceremonies was their presentation of the new Egypt as marching forward while also connecting to its pharaonic past. As President Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi put it in his speech, “Egypt is a great country and has a civilization of 7,000 years.” Read the full article at Haaretz

הפוסט With Sissi, Egypt Sees a Return of the Pharaohs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On August 6, the new Suez Canal was inaugurated with great pomp and circumstance. In honor of the historic event, there were two ceremonies, attended by both Egyptian and foreign dignitaries, that recalled the festive dedication of the original canal in 1869.

Numerous media reports discussed the political and economic aspects of this event, but they missed the aspect that was simultaneously most interesting and most surprising: Islamic and Arab identity are both out, while pharaonic culture is returning in a big way. One could say the most salient trend at both ceremonies was their presentation of the new Egypt as marching forward while also connecting to its pharaonic past. As President Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi put it in his speech, “Egypt is a great country and has a civilization of 7,000 years.”

הפוסט With Sissi, Egypt Sees a Return of the Pharaohs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/analysis-in-post-nuclear-agreement-middle-east-its-syria-stupid/ Mon, 27 Jul 2015 09:12:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4346 Informed commentaries have stressed, somewhat justifiably, Iran’s benefits from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 powers. Yet the agreement is, in many ways, formal confirmation of regional developments that have occurred since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring. These changes have not only transformed Iran into a legitimate player in the regional system, but also into a potential partner in the international campaign against Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra and others. Also, concerns over the emergence of a Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East extending from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Shi’ites in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria, are not new: King Abdullah of Jordan voiced such concerns as early as 2004. The issue of Iranian influence involves two elements, one unknown and one hidden. The real extent of Iran’s influence on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a is not known. We can only speculate that intelligence circles have much more credible information than do social networks or the media. What is important to remember is that many players on both sides of this field are invested in portraying an image of Iran’s role in the region that accords with their own interests. Israel and Saudi Arabia have strategic, geographic and ideological interests in magnifying the threat of a nuclear Iran, while the United States (undoubtedly joined in this by Russia and China, and possibly by the Gulf States bordering on Iran, such as Oman)

הפוסט Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Informed commentaries have stressed, somewhat justifiably, Iran’s benefits from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 powers. Yet the agreement is, in many ways, formal confirmation of regional developments that have occurred since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring. These changes have not only transformed Iran into a legitimate player in the regional system, but also into a potential partner in the international campaign against Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra and others. Also, concerns over the emergence of a Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East extending from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Shi’ites in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria, are not new: King Abdullah of Jordan voiced such concerns as early as 2004.

The issue of Iranian influence involves two elements, one unknown and one hidden. The real extent of Iran’s influence on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a is not known. We can only speculate that intelligence circles have much more credible information than do social networks or the media. What is important to remember is that many players on both sides of this field are invested in portraying an image of Iran’s role in the region that accords with their own interests. Israel and Saudi Arabia have strategic, geographic and ideological interests in magnifying the threat of a nuclear Iran, while the United States (undoubtedly joined in this by Russia and China, and possibly by the Gulf States bordering on Iran, such as Oman) has the opposite interest of downplaying this threat.

History is familiar with the analogy of the 1938 Munich Agreement, in which Chamberlain and the West capitulated to Hitler but failed to prevent World War II. Yet history is also familiar with efforts to demonize the enemy that were subsequently understood to be exaggerated, if not outright baseless. For example, Israel and the West turned Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s into the Hitler of the Arab world, and according to Israeli intelligence and media sources of the period, the influence of Egypt and Nasser’s pan-Arabism pervaded the entire Arab world, including Iraq, Syria and distant Yemen. Subsequent historiography of the period shows that Nasser’s capabilities were much more limited than the grandiose powers ascribed to him. An assessment of Iran’s true power and regional influence must surely be sober rather than demagogic.

The latent dimension of Iran’s regional influence involves the future of Syria. The keystone of Iran’s strategy in the Arab Middle East is its capacity to support Bashar Assad’s regime. The Iranian-Syrian alliance, which has been in place for over three decades (with a brief interruption during the Gulf War), has become a major axis of regional politics. This is not a “natural” alliance in the respect that it is based on Iran’s cooperation with an Alawite minority regime rather than a broad Shi’ite social foundation. Syria’s significance stems from its geo-strategic location in the heart of the regional system, rather than from any economic resources that it offers. “Whoever would lead the Middle East must control Syria,” wrote esteemed journalist and historian Patrick Seale in the 1960s.

Indeed, harking back to 1950s when Syria became the focus of global and Arab Cold War struggles, at least five powers have competed for control over Syria since the outbreak of the civil war there in 2011: Iran and Russia (through the Alawite regime), the West (through the Free Syria Army), and two jihadi Sunni organizations – IS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

In view of the highly unreliable information from the field, it is difficult to predict what will happen in Syria, or whether it will maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Clearly, Iran’s success in preserving Syria’s Alawite government would be a significant accomplishment and reinforcement of the radical Shi’ite alliance in the region. Assad’s fall, on the other hand, would be a fatal blow to Iran’s regional influence by creating a vacuum in the Shi’ite Crescent, and would also weaken Hezbollah as well as Iran’s influence in Iraq. We can borrow from then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s famous 1992 phrase “It’s the economy, stupid,” and state with equal gusto that in post-nuclear-agreement Middle East, “It’s Syria, stupid!”

Since the Western alternative in Syria now appears to be less probable, the West, including Israel, faces a dilemma regarding whether to support Syria – backed by the demonized Iran – or to bet on an alternative regime, with the risk of chaos, anarchy and even territorial changes. Turkey and Saudi Arabia would prefer to get rid of Assad at all costs, while Egypt has decided to prop up the Assad regime. Indeed, one may wonder whether the potential rise of IS or another radical Islamic entity in Syria might be an even more destructive scenario than the Iranian “threat.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Turkey: The almost mediator state https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/turkey-the-almost-mediator-state-2/ Sat, 18 Jul 2015 08:45:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4333 Most analysts today consider Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, its failure must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the U.S. and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline. The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades. However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone. For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Most analysts today consider Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, its failure must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the U.S. and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades.

However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone.

For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan went on the offensive. Sitting on a panel with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdoğan excoriated Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Regardless of its dispute with Israel, Turkey remained a key player in the eyes of the Obama administration. Washington was convinced – perhaps because of Erdoğan’s previous offers – that Ankara could assist in containing Iran’s nuclear program, the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In October 2009, the Obama administration encouraged Erdoğan and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to separately and discreetly engage in talks with Iran, as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) proceeded to deliver a new sanctions resolution.

Instead of proving Turkey’s quality as a mediator, the resulting Tehran Declaration positioned Ankara and Washington at loggerheads. On June 9, 2010, the UNSC voted in favor of a sanctions regime. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries to oppose the measure. Some American analysts argued that the Obama administration should never have given such responsibility to a country so dependent on Iranian trade and energy: sanctions on Iran would negatively impact Turkey’s economy, and therefore it could not function as an impartial actor. Many characterized the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as simply naïve, while others even claimed that this was yet another example of Turkey trying to distance itself from the West.

There are two lessons than can be derived from these unsuccessful mediation efforts. First, the “zero problems” policy should have only been applied to Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, not the relationships between Turkey’s neighbors or relations between various actors in neighboring states. Turkey possesses neither the carrots nor the sticks to be a suitable mediator in those scenarios. More importantly, the affairs of countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood have too critical an impact on Turkey’s own fortunes for it to be considered an unbiased third party. This overextension of Turkish diplomacy came at a serious price. Second, while conceptually the notion of Turkish exceptionalism has found a place in Western political hyperbole, in reality Turkey is ill suited to function as a mediator between Western and Middle Eastern interests. If Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are committed to reframing Turkey’s foreign policy, then settling their own country’s numerous international disputes must be prioritized over the dream of functioning as an arbitrator in global affairs.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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An opportunity that would not be seized https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/an-opportunity-that-would-not-be-seized/ Sun, 17 May 2015 09:18:55 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4349 The post-Arab Spring period, which witnessed the collapse of dictatorial regimes, the eruption of civil wars and the possible disappearance of several sovereign Arab states, created opportunities that might be seized for progress in different directions. One possible direction involves Israel and its relations with the Palestinians and the moderate Arab countries. Israel has never been in a more opportune position to advance its aims in the region. In the recent election campaign, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expediently emphasized the threats looming from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State (IS), al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. A more realistic analysis would, however, reveal that Iran is a remote threat in any case; Hamas – squeezed between Israel and Egypt – is preoccupied with its own domestic problems in Gaza; Hezbollah is heavily committed to the Syrian front; and IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and other splinter groups do not consider Israel their immediate enemy. Moreover, Israel’s longstanding threat from what was once called the Arab Steadfastness and Rejection Front – the main Arab coalition rejecting peace with Israel – is no longer viable: Iraq, Syria and Libya are bogged down in civil strife and their very survival is in jeopardy; many of the PLO groups are no longer relevant (such as George Habbash’s PFLP and Ahmed Jibril’s PDFLP), and Fatah has largely transformed itself into the Palestinian Authority after the Oslo Accords. In short, Israel does not face an existential threat from any of its immediate or remote Arab neighbors. It is time for

הפוסט An opportunity that would not be seized הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The post-Arab Spring period, which witnessed the collapse of dictatorial regimes, the eruption of civil wars and the possible disappearance of several sovereign Arab states, created opportunities that might be seized for progress in different directions. One possible direction involves Israel and its relations with the Palestinians and the moderate Arab countries.

Israel has never been in a more opportune position to advance its aims in the region. In the recent election campaign, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expediently emphasized the threats looming from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State (IS), al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. A more realistic analysis would, however, reveal that Iran is a remote threat in any case; Hamas – squeezed between Israel and Egypt – is preoccupied with its own domestic problems in Gaza; Hezbollah is heavily committed to the Syrian front; and IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and other splinter groups do not consider Israel their immediate enemy. Moreover, Israel’s longstanding threat from what was once called the Arab Steadfastness and Rejection Front – the main Arab coalition rejecting peace with Israel – is no longer viable: Iraq, Syria and Libya are bogged down in civil strife and their very survival is in jeopardy; many of the PLO groups are no longer relevant (such as George Habbash’s PFLP and Ahmed Jibril’s PDFLP), and Fatah has largely transformed itself into the Palestinian Authority after the Oslo Accords. In short, Israel does not face an existential threat from any of its immediate or remote Arab neighbors.

It is time for Israel to seize the opportunities that have presented themselves in the post-Arab Spring period. Recognizing that an opportunity exists is, of course, not enough: the parties to the conflict must seize it by extending an attractive offer to the other side. The new Israeli government would be well advised to move forward in two possible directions: one, advance Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations for the establishment of a Palestinian state along 1967 borders, with mutually agreed territorial swaps; two, advancing multilateral Israeli-Arab negotiations, under the umbrella of the Arab Peace Initiative (API), with the same aim. Though the “Arab World” as we have known it no longer exists, the “dormant” and “dysfunctional” Arab League has, for example, recently sent forces to the Yemen civil war. Thus, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States – the so-called moderate Arab countries – not only share with Israel mutual interests, but can also play an active role, as evident in the Yemeni case, in resolving the Palestinian problem.

Unfortunately, Israel’s new government has no intention of seizing this opportunity. The main aim of Netanyahu and his previous and current right-wing coalitions has been to “perpetuate the status-quo,” which is a euphemism for consolidating Israel’s hold on Judea and Samaria – the occupied territories.

This goal is pursued despite realistic assessments that indicate that such a course of action will slowly but surely cause Israel’s political, economic and even cultural ostracization by the international community, becoming a pariah state. A third Palestinian intifada may currently seem an unlikely possibility, but it cannot be ruled out, in view of the despair and frustration emanating from “no hope on the horizon.”

It is possible that under US, EU and other international pressure, Netanyahu will re-confirm his support, or even commitment, to the two-state solution, as proclaimed in his 2009 Bar-Ilan speech. But declarations of this kind would be mere fig leafs for a policy that is effectively strengthening Israel’s control over the occupied territories. Such a declaration would be no different from the so-called peace plan that prime minister Yitzhak Shamir devised in 1989 in response to the first Palestinian intifada and the PLO’s recognition of UN Resolution 242 – a media public spin designed to placate the international community.

Future historians will surely lament the fact that the previous and current Netanyahu governments have completely ignored regional developments and the consequent opportunity to resolve the Palestinian issue, surely Israel’s thorniest foreign policy issue.

Israeli prime ministers have always bragged that they have “left no stone unturned” in their pursuit of peace. Regardless of the accuracy of these assessments, it does not seem likely that anyone is going to turn over the current stone in the near future.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An opportunity that would not be seized הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Turkey: The Almost Mediator State https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/turkey-the-almost-mediator-state/ Sun, 26 Apr 2015 08:42:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4330 Most analysts consider Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to religious conservative movements like the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, the failures of the last few years must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey has insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the United States and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Most analysts consider Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to religious conservative movements like the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, the failures of the last few years must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey has insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the United States and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Arab Citizens and Foreign Policy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-arab-citizens-and-foreign-policy/ Tue, 28 Jan 2014 10:05:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4385 A workshop entitled “Israel’s Arab citizens and foreign policy” was held at the Nazareth Academic Institute on January 28th, 2014. The workshop was a joint initiative of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Abraham Fund Initiatives, and the Nazareth Academic Institute (NAI). The workshop was attended by over 20 Jewish and Arab experts. Discussions focused on the following questions: Has the Arab Spring created new opportunities for increased involvement of Israel’s Arab-Palestinian minority in regional politics and diplomacy? What are the challenges of, and the obstacles to involvement of Arab citizens in Israeli foreign policy? Following opening remarks by Prof. George Kanazi, President of NAI; Kamal Hassan, Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute; and Amnon Be’eri Sultzeanu, Co-Executive Director of The Abraham Fund Initiatives, attendees participated in a discussion facilitated by Mitvim Chairman Dr. Nimrod Goren. This paper summarizes the main issues and positions discussed in the workshop

הפוסט Israel’s Arab Citizens and Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A workshop entitled “Israel’s Arab citizens and foreign policy” was held at the Nazareth Academic Institute on January 28th, 2014. The workshop was a joint initiative of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, The Abraham Fund Initiatives, and the Nazareth Academic Institute (NAI). The workshop was attended by over 20 Jewish and Arab experts.

Discussions focused on the following questions: Has the Arab Spring created new opportunities for increased involvement of Israel’s Arab-Palestinian minority in regional politics and diplomacy? What are the challenges of, and the obstacles to involvement of Arab citizens in Israeli foreign policy?

Following opening remarks by Prof. George Kanazi, President of NAI; Kamal Hassan, Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute; and Amnon Be’eri Sultzeanu, Co-Executive Director of The Abraham Fund Initiatives, attendees participated in a discussion facilitated by Mitvim Chairman Dr. Nimrod Goren. This paper summarizes the main issues and positions discussed in the workshop

הפוסט Israel’s Arab Citizens and Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Egyptian revolution is stuck https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-egyptian-revolution-is-stuck/ Wed, 08 Jan 2014 08:52:48 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4337 Almost three years after the Arab Spring, the Egyptian revolution seems to have become stuck, and may even have devolved to its starting point. This observation first emerged after the events of June 30, 2013, in which the masses that captured the city’s streets were once again assisted by the military establishment, which led a de facto coup against the regime of Mohamed Morsi, the president chosen by the Muslim Brotherhood. It currently appears that many of the revolutionary goals have not been achieved. It is difficult to define the revolution’s goals precisely because it fused social elements with a different, and possibly contradictory, agenda. In general, the revolutionaries’ main goals were to topple Hosni Mubarak; remove the authoritarian regime and replace it with a pluralistic political system; and improve economic conditions, especially employment. Mubarak was indeed overthrown, but his regime – based on the state’s “deep-seated” institutions (such as the military, the civil courts, bureaucracy, and al-Azhar University) and political elites – remained in place. The new political system failed to maintain stability or entrench itself after the dissolution of the parliament elected in January 2012. The economic situation in Egypt grew worse as political instability discouraged investors and led to the collapse of the tourist industry, which made it more difficult for the new regime to take action to improve the national economy. The elements involved in the second “revolution” on June 30, 2013, emphatically claimed that they were redirecting the revolution to its original course, from which

הפוסט The Egyptian revolution is stuck הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Almost three years after the Arab Spring, the Egyptian revolution seems to have become stuck, and may even have devolved to its starting point.

This observation first emerged after the events of June 30, 2013, in which the masses that captured the city’s streets were once again assisted by the military establishment, which led a de facto coup against the regime of Mohamed Morsi, the president chosen by the Muslim Brotherhood.

It currently appears that many of the revolutionary goals have not been achieved.

It is difficult to define the revolution’s goals precisely because it fused social elements with a different, and possibly contradictory, agenda. In general, the revolutionaries’ main goals were to topple Hosni Mubarak; remove the authoritarian regime and replace it with a pluralistic political system; and improve economic conditions, especially employment.

Mubarak was indeed overthrown, but his regime – based on the state’s “deep-seated” institutions (such as the military, the civil courts, bureaucracy, and al-Azhar University) and political elites – remained in place.

The new political system failed to maintain stability or entrench itself after the dissolution of the parliament elected in January 2012. The economic situation in Egypt grew worse as political instability discouraged investors and led to the collapse of the tourist industry, which made it more difficult for the new regime to take action to improve the national economy.

The elements involved in the second “revolution” on June 30, 2013, emphatically claimed that they were redirecting the revolution to its original course, from which it had been deviated during Morsi’s term. However, events since have fanned widespread concerns that the revolutionary train is not yet back on track, for several reasons.

First, the military, which functioned as of the “guardian of the revolution,” has now become a party in the political struggle, with an unmistakable interest in maintaining the status quo. Second, Brotherhood activities were outlawed and its leaders thrown into prison. Third, human rights activists and media professionals who “crossed the line” by criticizing the ruler (whether Morsi or the army’s Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi) were thrown in jail or had their programs canceled. Fourth, Mubarak was acquitted and public funds probably smuggled out of the country were not recovered.

All these developments indicate that while Mubarak may have been deposed, Mubarakism is alive and well.

Disconcerting signs of the future of the Egyptian revolution are also expressed in its new constitution, to be ratified in a referendum in January. A 50-member council of experts (which markedly failed to include representatives of the Brotherhood) submitted a draft constitution to the provisional president, Adly Mansour. The new draft is more liberal and social than previous constitutions, but can hardly be called “revolutionary.”

It does protect the rights of children and of Jews and Christians (but not members of non-monotheistic religions), prohibits torture and discrimination against women, and assumes state responsibility for citizens’ health and education.

However, the constitution also reinforces and institutionalizes the autonomous status of the military establishment and the civil judiciary. For example, the military budget is determined according to the military’s needs, as defined by the National Defense Council, and is not subject to parliamentary review. The National Defense Council is also in charge of appointing the defense minister (for the next two presidential terms, at least). Moreover, the constitution permits military trials of civilians prosecuted for offenses in “military areas,” while the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court (which examines the constitutionality of all proposed legislation) will now be elected by the court rather than an external body.

The constitution remains vague in many places, leaving the final decision open to legislation, and dependent on the composition of the to-be elected parliament. In other words, as Nathan Brown and Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have stated, the new constitution appears to be a victory for the country’s “deep-seated” institutions.

After the June 30 revolution, the liberal-secular forces unexpectedly found themselves in an impossible situation: After joining forces with the military to oust the Brotherhood, they now see that the military has retained its authority in the political system and has reduced the potential for instituting changes in alignment with the original goals of the revolution.

Despite their deep ideological differences, the secularists and the Brotherhood now paradoxically have a common interest in reducing the military’s involvement in politics. Their collaboration recalls the early days of the revolution, when ideologically diverse groups came together to topple Mubarak, with a significant difference: Then, the military stood on the sidelines and did not intervene, but now the military is a major player with an unmistakable agenda of its own.

Three years after the January 25 revolution, the passions that characterized its protagonists appear to have been replaced by despair and frustration resulting from the understanding that a significant change in the foundations of the political system is difficult, if not impossible. In view of the strong desire to restore stability and safety on public streets, the recent personality cult surrounding Sisi is not surprising. This cult recalls the rituals surrounding mythological president Abdel Nasser.

Where, then, is Egypt headed? Is the January 25-June 30 Revolution, the continuation of the historical revolutionary process that began on January 25, or do the events of June 30 mark the beginning of the end of the revolutionary cycle? From the limited historical perspective available to us, it is difficult to decide with certainty, but the Egyptian revolution does appear to be “stuck.”

Armed with the lessons of their recent past, the masses may take to the streets once again to protest against military involvement in politics, but no civil alternative is visible on the horizon.

Under the current circumstances, the revolution will only proceed from the top down, and will be dependent on the goodwill of the military elite.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Egyptian revolution is stuck הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Obama dials down in the Middle East – but is it the right move? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/obama-dials-down-in-the-middle-east-but-is-it-the-right-move/ Sun, 10 Nov 2013 08:59:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4340 ‘There’s a whole word out there, and we’ve got interests and opportunities in that whole world.” In one sentence, Susan Rice, the National Security Adviser, succinctly summed up the Obama administration’s latest efforts in shifting the focus outside of the Middle East. Pundits, citizens, and policymakers alike are all familiar with the “Asia pivot” – the administration’s headline-friendly byword for reallocating resources and efforts that came about a few years ago. Now, in the midst of Egyptian despondency and Syrian dystopia, Obama appears geared toward dialing down, yet again, in the Middle East. It used to be you could place America’s core interests in the Middle East in three categories: 1) democratization, or the spread of democracy; 2) the pursuit of the global war on terror; and 3) the unimpeded exchange of commerce (read: oil) out of the region. To varying degrees depending on the presidency, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict floated in and out of these objectives. This was especially true with George W. Bush, who pursued both 1 and 3 in Iraq, 2 in Afghanistan, and in his second term the peace process. So it was when Obama ascended to the presidency in 2008, and many assumed these core interests would remain. Certainly, Obama’s 2009 speech in Cairo resonated with the democratization interest, and his increased drone campaign coincided with the war on terror. Yet as events unfolded in the Middle East, Obama let these goals get away from him. Indeed, as the Arab Spring unfolded, American interests increasingly became

הפוסט Obama dials down in the Middle East – but is it the right move? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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‘There’s a whole word out there, and we’ve got interests and opportunities in that whole world.” In one sentence, Susan Rice, the National Security Adviser, succinctly summed up the Obama administration’s latest efforts in shifting the focus outside of the Middle East.

Pundits, citizens, and policymakers alike are all familiar with the “Asia pivot” – the administration’s headline-friendly byword for reallocating resources and efforts that came about a few years ago. Now, in the midst of Egyptian despondency and Syrian dystopia, Obama appears geared toward dialing down, yet again, in the Middle East.

It used to be you could place America’s core interests in the Middle East in three categories: 1) democratization, or the spread of democracy; 2) the pursuit of the global war on terror; and 3) the unimpeded exchange of commerce (read: oil) out of the region.

To varying degrees depending on the presidency, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict floated in and out of these objectives. This was especially true with George W. Bush, who pursued both 1 and 3 in Iraq, 2 in Afghanistan, and in his second term the peace process.

So it was when Obama ascended to the presidency in 2008, and many assumed these core interests would remain. Certainly, Obama’s 2009 speech in Cairo resonated with the democratization interest, and his increased drone campaign coincided with the war on terror.

Yet as events unfolded in the Middle East, Obama let these goals get away from him.

Indeed, as the Arab Spring unfolded, American interests increasingly became subverted by outside interests.

Nothing highlighted that more than the contrast in how the US approached Libya and Syria.

With Gaddafi, international pressure and opinion was overwhelmingly in support of a US-led no-fly zone, essentially handicapping the regime and boosting the rebels. In Syria, with global opinion less cohesive, the US was simply upended by Russia.

Intervening on behalf of the rebels in Syria coincided directly with the spread of democracy and the fight on terror that so dominated the political calculus for Bush; the contrast with Obama’s approach was sharp.

Even Israel’s hawkish stance on Iran, long a talking point in DC circles, has become a prominent fixture in Obama’s recent policy evaluation.

According to the same New York Times article quoted above, Rice has made it clear that the core interests for the remaining years of Obama’s tenure will be supporting the ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, limiting the Syrian violence, and resolving the Iranian issue. According to the article: “everything else will take a back seat.”

The focus, then, will be on the diplomatic front, with support mobilizing for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and for resolutions with Syria and Iran. But is this the right move for the US? In downgrading the US’s role in the region, does it leave a gap for another foreign entity to fill? Is it a high-risk, low-reward scenario? Or is it the right move for a nation with little to no domestic interest in intervening in the Middle East? Depending on who you ask, it’s a little bit of both. As Marc Lynch wrote, the US doesn’t really have to worry about any other foreign power getting involved in the Middle East. And for all of Russia’s diplomatic rhetoric, the Middle East is essentially the Miley Cyrus of the geopolitical arena: you don’t want anything to do with it but you can’t stop watching.

And so long as intervening in the Middle East is polling lower than Congress in the US, it is still going to be the safe bet, politically, to avoid any further involvement in the troubled region.

But on the strategic front, you don’t have to go far to find those who disagree with Obama’s shift.

Most notably, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who – when not visiting Egypt or sneaking into Syria – are adamant critics of Obama’s shift toward Asia.

In an op-ed written in The Washington Post, they criticize Obama for abandoning US interests in the region, including, among other things, a lack of support for the Free Syrian Army.

Clearly, it’s an issue that transcends politics in the US. For Obama, it’s almost a lose-lose scenario. Allocate resources and redouble efforts in the Middle East and suffer domestic reprisals, abandon the region and potentially risk adverse side effects that would be detrimental to any combination of US interests.

Perhaps if given a breakthrough on one of the main issues – Israel/ Palestine, Syria, Iran – Obama and Rice will feel comfortable refocusing their efforts on issues such as Egypt, or Libya, or the growing refugee crisis in Jordan. Or perhaps not.

As the past couple years have shown us, Obama has little tolerance for the Middle East, and why add to the grey hairs in the last years of his tenure?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Obama dials down in the Middle East – but is it the right move? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Reaching Out to the Arab Spring: Lessons from an American Experience https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/reaching-out-to-the-arab-spring-lessons-from-an-american-experience/ Thu, 26 Sep 2013 09:54:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4368 For Americans, reaching out to the Arab Spring is much easier than for Israelis. Therefore, Israeli institutions seeking dialogue with the region can benefit from insights collected and lessons learned by those in the US that are constantly engaging with emerging elites in the Arab world. The US-based Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) is a leading institution in this field. In an extensive interview with Mitvim, POMED’s Executive Director, Stephen McInerney, speaks about progress towards Arab democratization, the rising significance of Arab think tanks, the importance of building a network with Arab partners, the characteristics of current US-Arab dialogues, and the prospects for broader Israeli-Arab ties.

הפוסט Reaching Out to the Arab Spring: Lessons from an American Experience הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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For Americans, reaching out to the Arab Spring is much easier than for Israelis. Therefore, Israeli institutions seeking dialogue with the region can benefit from insights collected and lessons learned by those in the US that are constantly engaging with emerging elites in the Arab world. The US-based Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) is a leading institution in this field. In an extensive interview with Mitvim, POMED’s Executive Director, Stephen McInerney, speaks about progress towards Arab democratization, the rising significance of Arab think tanks, the importance of building a network with Arab partners, the characteristics of current US-Arab dialogues, and the prospects for broader Israeli-Arab ties.

הפוסט Reaching Out to the Arab Spring: Lessons from an American Experience הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Arab Spring and the Palestinians of Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-arab-spring-and-the-palestinians-of-israel/ Fri, 20 Sep 2013 07:34:31 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5307 The conversation among the Palestinians of Israel about the Arab Spring raises a number of key moral, political and social dilemmas. In light of the regional turmoil, they debate the impact of regional events on their societal structure, the next phases of their public struggle for equality, and the nature of their future relations with the Arab word. The Palestinian media in Israel is a key arena in which these dilemmas are being addressed. There is no unified voice regarding the Arab Spring, but there is an evident concern that the revolution would destroy the revolutionaries and subject them to the interests of the West.

הפוסט The Arab Spring and the Palestinians of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The conversation among the Palestinians of Israel about the Arab Spring raises a number of key moral, political and social dilemmas. In light of the regional turmoil, they debate the impact of regional events on their societal structure, the next phases of their public struggle for equality, and the nature of their future relations with the Arab word. The Palestinian media in Israel is a key arena in which these dilemmas are being addressed. There is no unified voice regarding the Arab Spring, but there is an evident concern that the revolution would destroy the revolutionaries and subject them to the interests of the West.

הפוסט The Arab Spring and the Palestinians of Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The New Kingdom of Forces: Middle Eastern Research Institutes https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-new-kingdom-of-forces-middle-eastern-research-institutes/ Mon, 01 Jul 2013 07:40:00 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=5312 The Arab Spring substantially strengthened the research institutes in the Arab world. New institutions are being established, while ones that existed prior to this revolutionary period attempt to tailor themselves to the new era, and are now more present in mainstream conferences and in the media. Arab research institutes originally developed in a Middle East of authoritarian regimes, which used them as a tool to gain legitimacy. Today, however, they are rapidly becoming a focal point for developing knowledge regarding democratic and civic values. Their researchers are engaged in explaining, analyzing and tracing the changes in the Middle East, and show increasing curiosity regarding different aspects of Israeli society and politics. This trend should be leveraged in order to develop channels for policy and societal dialogues between Israeli and Arab research institutes.    

הפוסט The New Kingdom of Forces: Middle Eastern Research Institutes הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Arab Spring substantially strengthened the research institutes in the Arab world. New institutions are being established, while ones that existed prior to this revolutionary period attempt to tailor themselves to the new era, and are now more present in mainstream conferences and in the media. Arab research institutes originally developed in a Middle East of authoritarian regimes, which used them as a tool to gain legitimacy. Today, however, they are rapidly becoming a focal point for developing knowledge regarding democratic and civic values. Their researchers are engaged in explaining, analyzing and tracing the changes in the Middle East, and show increasing curiosity regarding different aspects of Israeli society and politics. This trend should be leveraged in order to develop channels for policy and societal dialogues between Israeli and Arab research institutes.

 

 

הפוסט The New Kingdom of Forces: Middle Eastern Research Institutes הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/5-arab-spring-opportunities-for-israel/ Thu, 20 Jun 2013 18:50:54 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4289 The Arab Spring was initially embraced with much enthusiasm and hope in the West. In Israel, however, it has been generally perceived as a threat to national security. Israel’s official policies towards the Arab Spring reflect these concerns. But recent regional developments should not be seen only through a negative lens. They also offer important opportunities for Israel’s foreign policy and for its regional standing, which Israeli decision makers should act upon. 1. Engaging with Political Islam: In contrast to alarming predictions, the new Islamic regimes have thus far been moderate or pragmatic in their policies, including their attitudes to Israel. This opens opportunities for Israel to engage with these new regimes. Egypt, the most important regional country for Israel, has upheld the peace treaty under Muslim Brotherhood leadership; President Mohamed Morsi appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres, expressed his interest in assisting Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas, and in his efforts to fight terrorist elements in the Sinai Peninsula. Interestingly, under an Islamic regime, Egypt has more leverage than did the previous Hosni Mubarak regime, to exert on Hamas in its dealings with Israel. No less important is the fact that a treaty honored by the Brotherhood sends a message across the Muslim world that peace with Israel is not anathema. Though Israeli-Egyptian formal relations will probably remain cold, behind-the-scenes contacts (particularly between the security establishments) will likely continue to flourish. 2. Benefitting from the crisis in Syria: The Syrian enigma

הפוסט 5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Arab Spring was initially embraced with much enthusiasm and hope in the West. In Israel, however, it has been generally perceived as a threat to national security. Israel’s official policies towards the Arab Spring reflect these concerns. But recent regional developments should not be seen only through a negative lens. They also offer important opportunities for Israel’s foreign policy and for its regional standing, which Israeli decision makers should act upon.

1. Engaging with Political IslamIn contrast to alarming predictions, the new Islamic regimes have thus far been moderate or pragmatic in their policies, including their attitudes to Israel. This opens opportunities for Israel to engage with these new regimes. Egypt, the most important regional country for Israel, has upheld the peace treaty under Muslim Brotherhood leadership; President Mohamed Morsi appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres, expressed his interest in assisting Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas, and in his efforts to fight terrorist elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

Interestingly, under an Islamic regime, Egypt has more leverage than did the previous Hosni Mubarak regime, to exert on Hamas in its dealings with Israel. No less important is the fact that a treaty honored by the Brotherhood sends a message across the Muslim world that peace with Israel is not anathema. Though Israeli-Egyptian formal relations will probably remain cold, behind-the-scenes contacts (particularly between the security establishments) will likely continue to flourish.

2. Benefitting from the crisis in Syria: The Syrian enigma can, in the long run, bring to power a Sunni legitimate regime that may be more amenable to peaceful relations to Israel. In the more immediate future, it signals the weakening of the anti-Israeli axis, led by Iran and Syria. Iran’s ability to project power on Israel’s immediate environment has undoubtedly declined. The Syrian crisis also offered Israel opportunities to improve ties with Jordan and Turkey. These opportunities have already been partially exploited over the past months. Israel and Jordan are tacitly coordinating their policy vis-à-vis the Syrian front, while Israel and Turkey are in the midst of mending their relations.

3. A New Sunni Coalition: The Arab Spring has changed the balance of power between the Sunna and Shi’a. The Iranian role in the Middle East has received a blow. Consequently, a new Sunni coalition seems to be emerging in the region, with Turkey and Egypt being central players, backed by the moderate monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. This Sunni axis and Israel have several common interests in the region: diminishing the Iranian nuclear challenge; containing the looming threats from Syria; and ending the stalemate on the Palestinian front, which might deteriorate into a third Intifada.

4. Engaging with the Arab Street: In the past, Israel has dealt mainly with Arab elites. Yet, the Arab Spring accentuated the role of the masses. Reaching out to them—be they secular or Islamic—is difficult for Israel. Yet, because of their growing importance, Israel should attempt—publicly or behind the scenes—to do just so. The Arab Spring empowered the common people and created an opportunity for self-expression of groups and communities. In this “new” Arab world, there is growing curiosity and readiness to challenge the conventions of the old regimes. These circumstances might just enable a new discourse on Israel and with Israelis. Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track is a key to making best use of this opportunity.

5. Promoting Peace: The Arab Spring has put on hold the possibility of reaching peace with Syria. The Israeli-Palestinian track remains the only possible track for negotiations. In the absence of a bi-lateral breakthrough, Israel should use the Arab Peace Initiative (API) to break the ice. The allegation that changes of regimes following the Arab Spring has rendered the API meaningless is untrue. The 2013 summit of the Arab League clearly re-affirmed the API, and the results of the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Arab League leaders in May 2013 have made this even more evident.

The Arab Spring—in contrast to the prevailing Israeli view—does not only offer threats but provides opportunities as well. Israeli decision makers should take advantage of these developments in order to tap into regional processes and introduce a change in the traditional Israeli policy toward the Middle East, which has thus far been characterized by a policy of “prevention” rather than “initiation.”

(originally published in The Daily Beast)

הפוסט 5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-is-choosing-regional-isolation-not-alliances/ Thu, 18 Apr 2013 18:55:27 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4290 The Arab Spring upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East started in Tunisia at the end of 2010, and subsequently spread into Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, triggering repercussions in a wide arc of Arab countries. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya free democratic elections were held and brought to power Islamic regimes. But contrary to commentators’ alarming predictions, these regimes have been moderate or pragmatic in their domestic and foreign policies, including their attitudes to Israel and Jews. Nevertheless, several opposition groups in these countries are militant Salafists-Islamists and Jihadists, being both anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic. This is also the case in Syria, where various Islamic groups are still fighting against the Baathist rule of Bashar Assad. Egypt – the most populous and influential Arab state (some 88 million people) – is the most significant case to focus in on. It is governed by the ideologically religious Muslim Brotherhood, but its new constitution provides, inter alia, for a pluralist “democratic system” with freedom of expression and media, and equality for all citizens, including Christians and Jews. They will also be granted religious and worship rights according to the values of “tolerance and moderation.” Nevertheless, the new Islamic regime has attempted to control the media and the legislative system, encountering strong opposition. In regional matters it has also reflected moderate pragmatic policies by rejecting the overtures of Shiite Iran toward improving bilateral relations (an exception to this rejection was the agreement to renew bilateral flights, which were soon after halted), while tightening ties with

הפוסט Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Arab Spring upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East started in Tunisia at the end of 2010, and subsequently spread into Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, triggering repercussions in a wide arc of Arab countries.

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya free democratic elections were held and brought to power Islamic regimes. But contrary to commentators’ alarming predictions, these regimes have been moderate or pragmatic in their domestic and foreign policies, including their attitudes to Israel and Jews. Nevertheless, several opposition groups in these countries are militant Salafists-Islamists and Jihadists, being both anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic. This is also the case in Syria, where various Islamic groups are still fighting against the Baathist rule of Bashar Assad.

Egypt – the most populous and influential Arab state (some 88 million people) – is the most significant case to focus in on. It is governed by the ideologically religious Muslim Brotherhood, but its new constitution provides, inter alia, for a pluralist “democratic system” with freedom of expression and media, and equality for all citizens, including Christians and Jews. They will also be granted religious and worship rights according to the values of “tolerance and moderation.”

Nevertheless, the new Islamic regime has attempted to control the media and the legislative system, encountering strong opposition. In regional matters it has also reflected moderate pragmatic policies by rejecting the overtures of Shiite Iran toward improving bilateral relations (an exception to this rejection was the agreement to renew bilateral flights, which were soon after halted), while tightening ties with Turkey, perhaps within a “new democratic axis of power” (the Turkish foreign minister’s phrase). Egypt has also come closer to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states that are deeply concerned (alongside Israel and Turkey) by the Iranian threat, as well as by the survival of the pro-Iranian regime in Syria.

With regard to Israel, despite hostile expressions by Islamic militants, Egypt’s President Morsi has appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas to end the IDF operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

To be sure, President Morsi has a vested interest to settle not only the Hamas-Israel conflict, but also the entire Palestinian-Israeli dispute. According to him, “The Palestinian issue is first priority for Egypt and the rest of the Arab and Muslim States,” as he stated at the Islamic Solidarity Conference held in Mecca in August 2012.

Hashim Kandil, Egypt’s Prime Minister, noted at the Davos conference this January that his country expected that the new Israeli government would renew the peace process with the Palestinians for the sake of its own interests, and the interests of Egypt and the entire region. Like all Arab states and most Muslim nations, Egypt has continued to support, up to the present, the Saudi/Arab League peace initiative of March 2002.

As is well-known, this initiative, which has been recently approved again, offers Israel peace, security and normalized relations with all Arab countries, in exchange for Israel agreeing to the erection of a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as settling the Palestinian refugees’ problem according to U.N. Resolution 194 (of December 1948). Israel has not yet accepted this unprecedented initiative, which has the potential to be a critical breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations.

Indeed, Egypt and other new Islamic regimes in the Arab world have continued to support the Saudi/Arab peace initiative, while the Palestinian issue has gained great interest and solidarity among the Muslim masses, notably amongst militant groups. Simultaneously hatred for Israel and for Jews continues to increase among many Arabs and Muslims, because of the continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel, especially of East Jerusalem with its Muslim holy shrines.

Consequently it is in Israel’s vital interest to neutralize or decrease this negative sentiment while improving its image and position among moderate/pragmatic Muslim groups and governments. These goals can be achieved by accepting the Arab peace initiative and renewing the peace process with the Palestinians. Such crucial steps are likely to facilitate Israel’s potential alliance with Sunni Muslim states, notably Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates, vis-à-vis the common hazard emanating from Iran and its allies – Lebanese Hezbollah and the Alawi government in Syria.

Such an alliance must be coordinated by the U.S. with the tacit, gradual participation of Israel – provided Israel makes substantial progress in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and simultaneously accepts the Arab Peace initiative. Alas, as during his previous government, the Netanyahu’s current cabinet is unlikely to assume such a pragmatic policy.

A significant change may occur only under U.S. pressure and with a reshuffle of the Israeli government, namely replacing Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party with the Labor party (and perhaps also Shas). The chances for this happening are slim; it is far more likely that Israel will continue to aggravate and intensify its regional and international isolation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Blowing Hot and Cold: Israel’s Divided Reaction to the Arab Spring https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/blowing-hot-and-cold-israels-divided-reaction-to-the-arab-spring/ Sun, 03 Feb 2013 18:44:35 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4287 After dramatic events began unfolding across the Arab world starting two years ago, most of the world began using the term “Arab Spring” to describe the popular uprisings and revolutions that swept the region. For Israelis, however, it was harder to accept this naming, largely because of its positive and optimistic connotations. Israelis, in many cases, seemed to refer to what was happening around them as the “Arab Winter” or the “Islamic Winter”, as a way of challenging the original term and painting the events in a negative light. Yet delving more deeply into the Israeli discourse around the Arab Spring reveals a more complex picture, and different voices. I believe that Israeli reactions to the Arab Spring can be categorized into three types. The first type of reaction to the Arab Spring is visibly negative and pessimistic, as demonstrated, first and foremost, by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (It should be noted, though, that other right-wing politicians, like Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon and Danny Ayalon, as well as other players from the security establishment, have also adopted a negative perspective on the Arab Spring.) In his 1993 book “A Place Among the Nations,” Netanyahu argued that the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East is Israel’s lack of democratic neighbors. He asserted further that any party that wished to promote “Western-style” peace in the region must first pressure the Arab regimes to move toward democracy. Yet, as prime minister, Netanyahu’s reaction to the Arab Spring was fundamentally different. Netanyahu’s comments

הפוסט Blowing Hot and Cold: Israel’s Divided Reaction to the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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After dramatic events began unfolding across the Arab world starting two years ago, most of the world began using the term “Arab Spring” to describe the popular uprisings and revolutions that swept the region. For Israelis, however, it was harder to accept this naming, largely because of its positive and optimistic connotations. Israelis, in many cases, seemed to refer to what was happening around them as the “Arab Winter” or the “Islamic Winter”, as a way of challenging the original term and painting the events in a negative light. Yet delving more deeply into the Israeli discourse around the Arab Spring reveals a more complex picture, and different voices.

I believe that Israeli reactions to the Arab Spring can be categorized into three types.

The first type of reaction to the Arab Spring is visibly negative and pessimistic, as demonstrated, first and foremost, by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (It should be noted, though, that other right-wing politicians, like Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon and Danny Ayalon, as well as other players from the security establishment, have also adopted a negative perspective on the Arab Spring.)

In his 1993 book “A Place Among the Nations,” Netanyahu argued that the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East is Israel’s lack of democratic neighbors. He asserted further that any party that wished to promote “Western-style” peace in the region must first pressure the Arab regimes to move toward democracy.

Yet, as prime minister, Netanyahu’s reaction to the Arab Spring was fundamentally different. Netanyahu’s comments to the Israeli public painted a harsh and threatening picture of the very developments he had once longed for. “Despite all of our hopes, chances are that an Islamic wave will wash over the Arab countries, an anti-Western wave, an anti-liberal wave, an anti-Israeli wave and ultimately an anti-democratic wave,” Netanyahu said in November 2011.

Interestingly, Netanyahu’s remarks to the outside world took a different tone and presented a more optimistic approach. In February 2011, for example, he told diplomats: “Israel is a democracy that encourages the promotion of free and democratic values in the Middle East and the promotion of such values will benefit peace.” Almost a year later, in January 2012, Netanyahu answered questions on Facebook from Web surfers across the Arab world and said, “Increasing the freedom within the countries will promote their prosperity, and the increased freedom of information can help the cause of peace.”

The second approach accepted the negative framing of events, but tried to introduce a more complex picture and offer a different reading of consequences and conclusions. For example, Amos Yadlin, former head of Military Intelligence, declared that the wave of protests in the Arab world was “more of an opportunity than a risk.” Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan argued that Israel’s military challenge had disappeared for the three to five years following the Arab Spring. And Yitzhak Levanon, Israel’s ambassador to Egypt until November 2011, presented a similar approach, arguing in an interview that “we must not look only at the empty half of the glass.”

The third outlook challenged the negative take on the Arab Spring and proposed an alternative, optimistic one. Two figures who shared Netanyahu’s “democratic peace” thesis from the 1990s, for example, maintained that position after the Arab Spring. The first was President Shimon Peres who wrote in an April 2011 in The Guardian: “We in Israel welcome the Arab Spring. Israel welcomes the wind of change, and sees a window of opportunity.” The second was Natan Sharansky, chairman of the Jewish Agency, who wrote in an article in the Washington Post in December 2011: “The West should bet on freedom in Egypt.” As in Netanyahu’s case, however, these positive voices were presented more often to the international media than to the Israeli press.

Public opinion polls in Israel also paint an intricate and dynamic picture. Figures from 2011 showed that half of Israelis viewed the Arab Spring events as positive for Israel and its neighbors, while almost half thought that Israel’s status in the region had worsened following these changes. As the turmoil continued in the Arab world, more and more Israelis viewed them as a threat to the country’s national security. Interestingly, after Mohamed Morsi’s victory in Egypt, the Israeli public’s fears abated in terms of the future of Israel-Egypt relations. After Operation Pillar of Defense, this sentiment increased, with two-thirds of Israelis saying they appreciated Morsi’s positive role in negotiating a ceasefire. Overall, though, polls showed that the Arab public in Israel had a more positive outlook than the Jewish public regarding the Arab Spring.

The Israeli public discourse regarding the Arab Spring must be deep and serious, and less one-dimensional and negative than that of the government. Israelis must distance themselves from generalized and simplistic conclusions that fail to recognize the differences between the various Arab countries and societies. They should also avoid the dichotomous view of “Islamists” versus “non-Islamists” and try to become more familiar with the wide array of groups and forces at play.

Let’s not forget that the media tends to provide a distorted and partial picture of societies undergoing transition and regime change, because it tends to highlight extreme events and does not provide equal coverage of complex processes that occur over time. As political Islamic movements become key players on the new Arab stage, it would be wise to adopt a broader and more nuanced approach, which would also consider how to pursue official – or unofficial – dialogue with them.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Blowing Hot and Cold: Israel’s Divided Reaction to the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Two Years After Tahrir Square: The Battle for Egypt’s Identity Is Far From Over https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/4335/ Fri, 25 Jan 2013 08:50:13 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4335 Two years ago, on 25th January 2011, it began with a big dream: Millions of people went into the Cairo streets with the aim of toppling the dictatorial Mubarak regime and establishing a democracy in Egypt. All the groups participating in the demonstrations – whether Islamists, liberals or secularists – shared a vision of a different Egypt. Read the full article at Haaretz

הפוסט Two Years After Tahrir Square: The Battle for Egypt’s Identity Is Far From Over הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Two years ago, on 25th January 2011, it began with a big dream: Millions of people went into the Cairo streets with the aim of toppling the dictatorial Mubarak regime and establishing a democracy in Egypt. All the groups participating in the demonstrations – whether Islamists, liberals or secularists – shared a vision of a different Egypt.

Read the full article at Haaretz

הפוסט Two Years After Tahrir Square: The Battle for Egypt’s Identity Is Far From Over הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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New Paradigms, New Voices in a New Middle East https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/new-paradigms-new-voices-in-a-new-middle-east-2/ Fri, 07 Sep 2012 18:39:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4285 Most Israelis do not really understand the Middle East. This is true for the general public as well as for decision makers. Israelis get their information about regional realities from certain messengers, who highlight certain messages, which are conveyed through certain prisms. It is all about the conflict, and it is all about security. Overall, the Arab world is regarded in Israel as an existential threat. Those countries and developments that seem to most endanger Israel’s security receive substantial media coverage and raise public interest. Regional developments tend to be described in simplistic, black-and-white terms: Are they good or bad for Israel? Usually, such developments including the Arab Spring are overwhelmingly viewed with concern, even fear Negative stereotypes and images of Islam and Arabs are widespread, constituting a significant component of the dominant Israeli ethos of the conflict. The Arab world is often seen as homogeneous. Nuances and complexities, as well as differences between countries, societies and cultures, often go unobserved. For many in Israel, the Middle East is neither a region they wish to belong to, nor one that may ever be willing to welcome them in. They doubt whether the possibility of attaining peace with the Arabs will be worth the concessions that will be required, or whether it will ever be attainable. While such views are, of course, not shared by all Israelis, they are gradually becoming mainstream, as Israel becomes more hawkish and inward-looking, and as relations between it and the Arab world continue to deteriorate.

הפוסט New Paradigms, New Voices in a New Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Most Israelis do not really understand the Middle East. This is true for the general public as well as for decision makers. Israelis get their information about regional realities from certain messengers, who highlight certain messages, which are conveyed through certain prisms. It is all about the conflict, and it is all about security.

Overall, the Arab world is regarded in Israel as an existential threat. Those countries and developments that seem to most endanger Israel’s security receive substantial media coverage and raise public interest. Regional developments tend to be described in simplistic, black-and-white terms: Are they good or bad for Israel? Usually, such developments including the Arab Spring are overwhelmingly viewed with concern, even fear

Negative stereotypes and images of Islam and Arabs are widespread, constituting a significant component of the dominant Israeli ethos of the conflict. The Arab world is often seen as homogeneous. Nuances and complexities, as well as differences between countries, societies and cultures, often go unobserved. For many in Israel, the Middle East is neither a region they wish to belong to, nor one that may ever be willing to welcome them in. They doubt whether the possibility of attaining peace with the Arabs will be worth the concessions that will be required, or whether it will ever be attainable.

While such views are, of course, not shared by all Israelis, they are gradually becoming mainstream, as Israel becomes more hawkish and inward-looking, and as relations between it and the Arab world continue to deteriorate. The long and violent history of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the lack of flow of ideas, goods and people between Israel and the Arab world also strengthen these perceptions. But so do sources from which Israelis acquire knowledge about the region.

Security personnel (active and former), as well as right-wing think tanks, experts and media outlets have an increasingly major role in shaping the Israeli perceptions of the Middle East. The security establishment in Israel is much more influential than the diplomatic one. Its personnel are regarded as having the best understanding of national security interests. They are often sought-after as media commentators and as participants in official decision-making processes. They tend to represent the old guard of Israeli society and have close ties to the state establishment. While they often adhere to moderate approaches, their discourse is usually shaped through the narrow security prism.

Israel is lacking policy institutes committed to advancing peace and regional integration. There are a large number of peace NGOs, but these are mostly focused on the grassroots level, not on policy. There are also quite a few academic research centers dealing with regional affairs, but they tend to distance themselves from divisive political issues and do not engage in advocacy. There is no lack of equivalent institutes on the right, some of which are very well funded. These include think tanks and scholars who provide hawkish analysis on regional developments. Their work is complemented and echoed by conservative-leaning institutions that monitor Arab media, Arab textbooks, and even peace and human rights NGOs, as well as by right-wing grassroots organizations and media outlets (like Israel’s most widely read daily, Israel Hayom).

These are major sources through which Israelis shape their perceptions of the region. A change is needed in order to move forward toward a fresh start for Israel among the nations. New paradigms and new voices should be introduced to the Israeli public and policy elites. A coherent pro-peace foreign policy framework should be developed. While acknowledging existing security threats, it should openly emphasize engagement and cooperation; stress the values of pluralism and tolerance; seek ways to benefit from Israel’s unique multi-regional location; be receptive toward the international community; regard peace and regional belonging as top-priority national projects; and identify diplomatic opportunities for better regional relations and create paths for their realization.

Israelis should hear a new vocabulary and a new set of arguments regarding the region. A discourse centered on big ideas, new national enterprises, hope, visions for the future, post-conflict agendas, and peace. A discourse that expands horizons, based on knowledge of and respect for local and regional histories, traditions, languages and cultures. A discourse that analyzes the complexities of the Middle East, and focuses also on the people of the region and not solely on their leaders. A discourse that creates genuine curiosity to know and understand more about the Arab world and about Islam. A discourse that provides a nuanced, humanized and heterogeneous view of the Middle East.

Bringing about the desired change requires new messengers. The voices of foreign-policy experts, diplomats and civil-society activists should not be undermined by security experts. Emerging and young thinkers, scholars and policy makers should not be overshadowed by the old guard and former state officials. Furthermore, Palestinian citizens of Israel should assume a major role in explaining the region to mainstream Israelis. The variety of voices in the Arab media, including those expressed in blogs and social networks, should be heard by the Israeli public.

The Arab Spring provides a unique context to promote these objectives. It will serve Israel. It will serve the region. It will serve the cause of peace.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט New Paradigms, New Voices in a New Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Turkey During the Arab Spring https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/4354/ Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:33:37 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4354 Winds of change have begun blowing across the Middle East in early 2011. For the first time in decades, Arab citizens in different countries have been going to the streets and demanding freedom and basic human rights. In much of Europe and North America, these developments have been by and large greeted with enthusiasm and hope for democratization in the Middle East. Israel, however, has been viewing things differently. It has been examining the new regional situation with considerable concern, and even fear. The Israeli consensus is that the country is witnessing the start of a long era of instability, with increased threats of regional radicalization and Islamism. The Israeli government, led by Benyamin Netanyahu, stresses that Israel should wait and see how developments in the Middle East progress, and should not take any major diplomatic initiatives until the region is stable once again. But the potential threats form only part of a larger and more complex picture. As acknowledged by Israel’s President Shimon Peres, the Arab Spring also holds opportunities for Israel’s regional foreign policies and for its relations with the Arab/Muslim world. Such opportunities are often neglected in Israel, as they tend to be over-shadowed by the dominant discourse that focuses on potential security concerns. But among the opportunities that the Arab Spring did bring Israel, there seemed to also be an opportunity to mend relations with Turkey — relations that were significantly strained following the May 2010 flotilla incident. While many of the Arab Spring opportunities for

הפוסט Israel and Turkey During the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Winds of change have begun blowing across the Middle East in early 2011. For the first time in decades, Arab citizens in different countries have been going to the streets and demanding freedom and basic human rights. In much of Europe and North America, these developments have been by and large greeted with enthusiasm and hope for democratization in the Middle East. Israel, however, has been viewing things differently. It has been examining the new regional situation with considerable concern, and even fear. The Israeli consensus is that the country is witnessing the start of a long era of instability, with increased threats of regional radicalization and Islamism. The Israeli government, led by Benyamin Netanyahu, stresses that Israel should wait and see how developments in the Middle East progress, and should not take any major diplomatic initiatives until the region is stable once again.

But the potential threats form only part of a larger and more complex picture. As acknowledged by Israel’s President Shimon Peres, the Arab Spring also holds opportunities for Israel’s regional foreign policies and for its relations with the Arab/Muslim world. Such opportunities are often neglected in Israel, as they tend to be over-shadowed by the dominant discourse that focuses on potential security concerns. But among the opportunities that the Arab Spring did bring Israel, there seemed to also be an opportunity to mend relations with Turkey — relations that were significantly strained following the May 2010 flotilla incident. While many of the Arab Spring opportunities for Israel required some progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for their fulfillment, this was not necessarily the case regarding Israel and Turkey. Although the lack of a peace process does negatively impact Israel-Turkey relations, the major crisis between them at the time was a bi-lateral one, and could have been solved through a mutual agreement.

The crisis between Israel and Turkey, however, did not begin with the flotilla incident. It has flared up in light of Israel’s operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which started in late December 2008. Operation Cast Lead was a turning point in Turkey-Israeli relations. It put a halt to Turkey’s intense mediation efforts between Israel and Syria, and led to strong Turkish condemnation of Israel’s policy in Gaza and its consequences. Erdoğan’s clash with Peres in the Davos Summit, in January 2009, and his walking off the Davos stage with anger symbolized the beginning of a new era of crisis. This was further fuelled by the public humiliation of the Turkish Ambassador to Israel by Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, in January 2010, in an attempt to protest an anti-Israeli TV series that was aired in Turkey. It was in this context – of an Israeli siege on Gaza and of a highly visible Israel-Turkey crisis – that the flotilla incident took place.

It is thus clear that the Israel-Turkey crisis is not all about the flotilla. It already began before. However, once the flotilla incident happened, it overshadowed other pending issues between Israel and Turkey. Finding a formula that will enable the two countries to move beyond this incident became a prerequisite for any effort to restore normal bi-lateral ties between them and to move towards reconciliation. Not only at the official governmental level but also at the societal level. Early attempts at resolving the flotilla incident did not bear fruit. Israel’s Industry, Trade and Labor Minister Benyamin Ben-Eliezer met in late June 2010 with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu to discuss ways of resolving the crisis between Israel and Turkey. This meeting, as well as other efforts held in the second half of 2010, did not lead to a breakthrough.

Things seemed to be stuck. But, 2011 brought a new opportunity for Israel and Turkey to mend their bi-lateral relations. The re-election of Erdoğan in the June 2011 Turkish general elections, coupled with the dramatic events of the Arab Spring, provided a new political and regional context in which the relations could be re-evaluated. This context contributed to Turkey and Israel, with US mediation, making progress towards drafting an agreement between them. However, this agreement was eventually rejected by Israel in August 2011 leading to the eruption of a new cycle of escalating tension between the two countries.

The aim of this article is to analyze the Israeli decision-making process and discourse regarding the crisis with Turkey in 2011. It will first examine the changing circumstances of 2011, including the impact of the Arab Spring and the different manners in which Israel and Turkey reacted to it. Afterwards, it will focus on the Israeli decision to reject the draft agreement with Turkey and on the different phases of the Israeli reaction to the new crisis with Turkey that followed. Finally, it will reflect on possible next phases in Israel-Turkey relations, and on conditions that may assist in providing yet another opportunity for making the two former allies less alienated.

An Opportunity for Reconciliation

During the first half of 2011, it was common to hear from Turkish and Israeli pundits that once the June 2011 elections in Turkey are over, Erdoğan may very well move towards mending relations with Israel. Despite the fact that Israel was not a major issue in the election campaign, this assessment was based on the assumption that upon being free from electoral considerations, Erdoğan would have more room and political will to manoeuver towards fixing the Israel-Turkey crisis. Indeed, following the elections and AKP’s landslide victory, there was an effort by both sides to create some better atmosphere between the countries.

A few days after the elections, the Turkish organization IHH announced that it would not take part in another planned flotilla to Gaza. This was apparently decided upon due to pressure from Turkish government officials, and was regarded in Jerusalem (together with Turkey’s assistance to Israel regarding the December 2010 Mt. Carmel fire), as an indication that Turkey was pursuing a more constructive approach towards Israel. Netanyahu responded with a letter to Erdoğan, which congratulated him on his elections victory, and which stressed that the Israeli government “will be happy to work with the new Turkish government on finding a resolution to all outstanding issues between our countries, in the hope of reestablishing our cooperation and renewing the spirit of friendship which has characterized the relations between our peoples for many generations.”

Even Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon took part in the efforts to express renewed warmth between the countries. Ayalon met in Jerusalem with a group of Turkish journalists that decided to visit Israel, and claimed that he actually did not intend on humiliating the Turkish Ambassador in early 2010. Ayalon told the Turkish journalists that “the incident [in which the Ambassador was seated in a low chair] was a joke that was blown out of proportion,” that he has sent a letter of apology to the Turkish Ambassador, and that the cancellation of the second flotilla is a good opportunity for Turkey and Israel to restore their relations. He also posed for a Turkish journalist while sitting in a lower chair than her. Ayalon, though, did not change his hawkish position regarding the flotilla incident. He still hoped that the flotilla incident would be shelved by Turkey. This was unrealistic.

In parallel to these public diplomacy acts, the US had publicly encouraged the governments of Turkey and of Israel to work closely together. Reports began to appear claiming that the US was also mediating secret negotiations between Israeli and Turkish representatives. For the US, having its two major allies in the region at odds with each other was a strategic hardship it was willing to put strenuous efforts to resolve.

It was not only the Turkish elections that enabled this attempt at Turkish-Israeli reconciliation. While the elections did provide a more favorable political context for the sides to get closer together, it was the Arab Spring that provided a more favorable regional context. Turkey’s pro-active decision to side with the protesters in the different Arab countries and its aim at playing a central role in assisting peaceful transformations was of importance in this regard. It led to the collapse of the alliance between Turkey and Assad’s Syria, which was a key factor in Turkey regional foreign policies in recent years and which brought Turkey closer to the region’s radicals, such as Hamas and Iran; it led to a significant improvement in the relations and coordination between Turkey and the US in light of their mutual interests in the changing region; and it enabled Turkey to try and position itself as part of a new regional alliance of moderate (albeit critical of Israel) countries that work to prove that Islam and democracy are compatible. Turkey had to re-evaluate its ties in the region.

Turkey and Israel seemed to have more joint regional interests than before. Both countries aspire for regional stability and security (albeit holding often diverging views on the means to achieve this). The events in Syria brought the regional instability to the borders of Israel and Turkey, with some incidents of cross-border spillover already taking place – the flow of Syrian refugees towards Turkey, and the attempt by Syrian protestors to cross the border into Israel in the Golan Heights. In such a period of change and uncertainty, Israel and Turkey – the democratic and pro-Western countries in the region – could have benefitted from coordination and dialogue mechanisms enabling a joint look at the changing region, much like Turkey-US relations evolved for the better during the Arab Spring.

The improvement in Turkey-US relations, and the increased coordination between their leaders, enabled the US to have more leverage on Turkey to push it towards reconciliation with Israel. Moreover, Turkey’s continued interest to assume a mediator role between Israel and the Palestinians, as expressed by Abdullah Gül, also gave Turkey a reason to improve ties with Israel. In order to be a mediator, Turkey has to have good relations with both sides and open communication channels to them. These were assets that Turkey had in the past, and that previously helped it bring Israelis and Arabs closer together.

For Israel, the Arab Spring brought new reasons for mending relations with Turkey. In light of a region in turmoil, of fear from further isolation and from rising radicalism, of concerns from possible implications of the Palestinian approach to the UN and from the Iranian nuclear project – Israel should have been more interested in having at least normal relations with Turkey. Turkey is a significant regional power, one of the only Muslim countries willing at all to engage with Israel, a source of stability, and a country that can have a moderating effect on some regional actors and can serve as a channel between Israel and the new regimes in the Arab world.

However, the first year of the Arab Spring did not lead Israel to try and get closer to Turkey. Israel and Turkey differed in the way they viewed the changes in the Arab world. In contrast to Turkey’s pro-active and supportive approach to the Arab Spring, Israel adopted a passive approach that was preoccupied with threats and concerns. Israelis looked around them and saw the regional status quo, which they have grown to know and to feel relatively at ease with, collapse. They saw Muslim parties and movements grow stronger. They saw the fall of Hosni Mubarak, a strategic ally of Israel. They also saw demonstrations in front of Israeli embassies in Egypt and Jordan. Israelis began to doubt whether the existing peace agreements would survive the regional changes. They also feared that the Assad regime might initiate an Israeli-Syrian escalation in order to divert attention from the domestic unrest in Syria.

In light of this approach, the Israeli government decided to follow regional developments with a wait-and-see policy. It refrained from issuing statements of support to the Arab protesters and from calling on Arab leaders to step down. The Israeli government believed that until the region stabilizes – and even if this is to take several years – Israel should not initiate major diplomatic initiatives or take bold regional or pro-peace steps. By taking such an approach, Israel – unlike Turkey – gave up on the opportunity to play a role in the re-shaping of the region. It chose to try and dis-engage itself from Middle Eastern affairs and to seek new alliances in its periphery as a compensation for its lost regional alliances, including its relations with Turkey. Thus, Israel turned to develop increased cooperation with Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. Netanyahu’s visit to Cyprus in February 2012, the first-ever visit of an Israeli Prime Minister to the neighboring island, was a clear manifestation of this policy.

These official Israeli attitudes and policies were echoed in Israel’s public opinion. In February 2011, forty-six percent of the Israeli public thought that Egypt’s revolution will have a negative effect on Israel-Egypt relations (while only nine percent thought the opposite); seventy percent thought that the chance for democracy in Egypt in the foreseeable future was low; forty-six percent though that there were high chances for an Iranian-style Islamic regime forming in Egypt; and forty-eight percent thought that Egypt’s revolution will strengthen Hamas (while only thirteen percent thought the opposite). Attitudes did not change for the better as time went by. In November 2011, sixty-eight percent of Israelis believed that their country’s national security situation was worse than it was before the process of change in the Arab world started.

These negative beliefs regarding the Arab Spring were coupled with a belief that Turkey is aspiring for leadership in the changing Middle East and that it is bolstering its popularity in the Arab world through criticism of Israel. This combination had a negative impact on prospects for mending Israel-Turkey ties, and it overshadowed the above-mentioned joint interests that the two countries shared in light of the regional turmoil. Israelis were skeptic as to whether Turkey is at all willing to have better relations with Israel at this point in time.

The opportunity that emerged in 2011 for Israel-Turkey reconciliation was eventually left unfulfilled. The two countries held secret negotiations under US auspice, and senior representatives sent by both governments joined these talks. The aim was to agree on a formula, on an agreement, that would fix relations and that would lead to the shelving of the Palmer report. The Palmer Report was drafted by an UN-appointed committee that was supposed to assist in fixing the Israel-Turkey crisis. The report’s publication was postponed several times, in order to give the negotiators more leeway to try and reach an agreement.

With each delay, it became more apparent that the report – if and when published – would be used by both sides to reinforce a blame game between them. The report was gradually perceived as a verdict as to which side was guilty in the flotilla incident, rather than as a tool to promote a solution to the Israeli-Turkish crisis. Nevertheless, the fact that both sides came to realize that the report did not fully support their views became an incentive for progress in the negotiations. The report was to claim that Israel’s blockade of Gaza was legal – despite Turkey’s claims, while arguing that the IDF used unreasonable and excessive force in the takeover of the flotilla – despite Israel’s claims.

Eventually, the Israel-Turkey negotiations led to a draft agreement, which is said to have included an Israeli apology for operational mistakes that may have occurred during the takeover of the flotilla, Israeli compensation to the victims’ families, a restoration of full diplomatic ties between Israel and Turkey, and a guarantee by the Turkish government not to prosecute Israelis involved in the flotilla incident. Israel, however, decided to reject the agreement. In August 2011, following deliberations in the Israeli cabinet and despite US pressure, Netanyahu notified Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Israel would not apologize to Turkey. Shortly afterwards, the Palmer report was leaked to the press, putting a halt to any attempts for reconciliation and leading to a renewed escalation of tensions between Israel and Turkey.

The draft reconciliation agreement that was rejected by Netanyahu, did in fact address Israel’s major concerns and interests – it included only a low-key and conditional version of an apology, it protected to a significant extent Israeli soldiers from law suits, it did not demand any change of Israeli policy regarding Gaza (as was demanded by Turkey before), and it ensured normal diplomatic ties between the countries. If so, why was such an agreement eventually rejected?

The Israeli Decision

In major Israeli state circles there was support for the reconciliation agreement. Israel’s Attorney General, Yehuda Weinstein, has reportedly advised Netanyahu to reach an understanding with Turkey, even if that meant issuing a general apology for operational mistakes and misuse of force in order to prevent lawsuits against Israeli soldiers. Within the defense establishment there was increased support for resolving the crisis even at the price of an apology to Ankara, as “Israel has a major stake in improving relations with Turkey in light of Turkey’s standing in the region, its past economic relationship with Israel, and the opportunity to renew defense-related export to Turkey.” Also, among Israel’s diplomatic circles there was support for such a move.

However, the voices within the bureaucracy and the establishment that supported an agreement with Turkey were usually not voiced in the public domain, and did not spark a public discourse on the issue. The negotiation process with Turkey was conducted behind closed doors, and the eventual Israeli decision was shaped by only a few political leaders, based on political considerations as well as their personal beliefs and ideology. There was no real public pressure on the issue, although the possible reaction of the public was definitely part of the political considerations that were actually taken into account.

Israelis did not understand the significance of the flotilla event for Turks. While Davutoğlu labeled the flotilla incident as “Turkey’s 9/11,” Israel dismissed the incident as an event used by Erdoğan to humiliate Israel and to improve Turkey’s standing in the Arab and Muslim world. Israelis were offended by the fact that Turkey did not stop the flotilla from sailing. They did not grasp the intensity of public emotions in Turkey regarding the killing of the Turkish citizens (which was seen in Israel as a legitimate act of self-defense) and that the demand for an apology was a consensual issue in Turkey, also shared by Israel’s friends there. Israeli officials wanted to believe that an expression of sorrow, without an apology, would be enough to satisfy Turkey. This was not the case. Moreover, Israelis were not aware of the nuances of the proposed agreement. The public debate focused on whether or not to apologize to Turkey, while there was very little understanding of what the agreement called Israel to actually apologize about, of the broader context in which such an apology will be made, and of what Israel was about to get in return.

The prevailing attitude in Israel was that relations with Turkey are doomed and that further deterioration is inevitable due to Erdoğan’s policies and statements, especially as the crisis between the countries began before the flotilla incident. Thus, an agreement was seen as being of no use, as Turkey would later come up with other demands (such as the lifting of the blockade of Gaza, a demand made already at the onset of the crisis) and with other sorts of criticism. Turkey, in turn, did not do enough to address the Israeli concerns and to help convince the Israeli public that should Israel take the needed actions to repair the relations, then these will actually bear fruit and will lead to the restoration of normal ties between the countries.

Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman framed the debate about a possible Israeli apology around the issue of national pride. He claimed that national pride should be a guiding principle in Israel’s foreign policy making, and that an apology will undermine this pride and will thus weaken Israel’s strategic position in the region. This position was not shared by all members of the Israeli government. Minister Matan Vilani, who took part in the negotiations with Turkey, clearly stated that “whoever refers to the crisis with Turkey in terms of national pride does not understand the strategic reality in the Middle East”. Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor were also supportive of mending ties with Turkey. Netanyahu himself was reported to have already agreed on several instances to apologize to Turkey, before backing off due to domestic political reasons, namely the fear of criticism by major coalition partners or by key members of his government. It was the fierce objection by hard-liners Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon (who represented the government in the negotiations with Turkey) and Lieberman that eventually pushed Netanyahu to oppose the agreement, perhaps as an attempt not to alienate his right-wing constituency, in which Lieberman was enjoying increased popularity.

The Turkish response to the Israeli decision was extremely harsh. It was to serve as proof to those in Israel that opposed the reconciliation agreement that Turkey was in no way ready to once again actually become a friend of Israel. Erdoğan and his government, which promised in advance to sanction Israel should it refuse to take the actions Turkey has expected, embarked on a series of tough anti-Israeli statements and policies, In an interview to Al Jazeera, Erdoğan stated that the flotilla incident could have justified going to war if it was not for Turkey’s restraint. The Turkish Prime Minister announced a series of sanctions against Israel. Israeli diplomats were expelled and diplomatic relations were downgraded to second-secretary level, what has remained of the Israel-Turkey military cooperation was put on halt, official trade between the countries was frozen, Turkey tried to block Israel in multi-national institutions, Turkey announced that it plans to have a military presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea to escort future flotillas and to challenge Israel’s natural gas drillings, that it will support lawsuits against Israeli soldiers, and that it will consider further sanctions. Erdoğan also declared that he is planning to challenge the Israeli blockade on Gaza by visiting the Gaza Strip in adjacent to a scheduled visit to Egypt. In a specific incident that was not included in the sanctions declared by Erdoğan, Israeli tourists were detained in the Istanbul airport, discouraging those Israelis who were still considering Turkey as a tourist destination. In early September 2011, not a day has passed without further escalation in the crisis. Turkey was trying to put a concrete, visible and high price tag on Israel’s decision to reject the reconciliation agreement. There was concern that things might get out of control.

The Israeli Discourse

The Israeli reaction to the crisis that has flared up with Turkey had several phases and aspects to it. The initial public response was one of confusion mixed with concern, even fear. Israelis could not understand Erdoğan’s conduct. The Turkish Prime Minister was portrayed in the Israeli media as an irrational, extremist and radical leader, who does not play according to international diplomatic norms. Erdoğan was occasionally compared to Israel’s worst enemies in the present and in the past, and was depicted as someone who is inherently against Israel and with whom cooperation or reconciliation are impossible. Israelis were amazed at what they saw as a disproportionate over-reaction. Some sought to explain it with frustration by Erdoğan over the legitimacy given by the Palmer Report to the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Questions started to pop up in the Israeli media about whether Turkey plans to carry out actual acts of warfare against Israel.

In light of the Turkish reaction, public opinion polls revealed a striking consensus within the Israeli public against any apology to Turkey. There were also public calls to boycott Turkish products, and to refrain from visiting the country. In the past, Turkey was a country that so many Israelis used to visit and towards which Israelis had such warm feelings. It was the only country in Israel’s neighborhood that embraced Israelis, and accepted them. Now it was seen in Israel as a country that changed course and that sided with Israel’s enemies. Israelis felt deeply betrayed by Turkey, claiming that it is Turkey that needs to apologize for enabling the IHH flotilla to set sail in the first place. While Turkey declared that its measures are directed against the current Israeli government and not against Israel or the Israeli public, this did not lead things to be seen more favorably in Israel. Reconciliation seemed far-fetched, with relations hitting rock-bottom.

In parallel, a different kind of Israeli discourse has begun to emerge. One that was critical of the Israeli government’s handling of the diplomatic crisis with Turkey, questioning Netanyahu’s decision to reject the reconciliation agreement, and stressing the importance of having good ties with Turkey. Traditional supporters of the relations with Turkey spoke up once again, and new voices – that were not heard prior to the Netanyahu’s decision about the agreement – came forth. These included political opposition figures, as Tzipi Livni and Tzachi Hanegbi from the Kadima party, but also public figures as the Governor of the Bank of Israel Stanley Fischer, and former-Minister Prof. Amnon Rubinstein.

This trend, which by-far did not represent the mainstream Israeli discourse, was somewhat empowered by some op-eds in the media, and especially by a column published by Nahum Barnea of Yediot Aharonoth, one of Israel’s most influential journalists. In September 2011, Barnea published an account of the secret negotiations between Israel and Turkey, publishing for the first time the actual content of the draft reconciliation agreement. His column made clear what was on the table and what Israel had missed out on. “Very few in Israel asked what Israel actually has to apologize about,” wrote Barnea, adding that “if you ask the Israeli on the street he will say confidently: Israel is asked to apologize on the IDF operation. This is not true”. According to the draft agreement, Israel had to apologize only for the very same operational mistakes that it already acknowledged through its self-appointment investigation committee.

The official Israeli policy towards Turkey in light of the heightened conflict was one of containment. Israeli government members kept quiet and did not retaliate towards Erdoğan’s statements and policies. The logic was to let Erdoğan play his game on his own, without reacting to his provocations. Israel believed that time will take its toll, and eventually Turkey would move on to other issues. Moreover, there was the expectation that the Barack Obama administration would help Israel in containing Erdoğan and in limiting his anti-Israeli rhetoric and actions. The Egyptian decision not to facilitate Erdoğan’s request to visit Gaza in September 2011 was perceived in the Israeli public as a direct outcome of American pressure.

The Israeli policy of keeping a low profile regarding the Turkish sanctions did not hold for all. It was Lieberman, in an attempt to make political gain among Israel’s right-wing constituency, who was reportedly planning an Israeli diplomatic retaliation against Turkey. Lieberman wanted to prove that it is Turkey who has much to lose from its policy towards Israel, and to portray himself as taking care of Israel’s national pride. It was leaked to the press that he was assessing different ideas on how to embarrass Turkey on the Armenian, Kurdish, and human rights issues.

However, the Netanyahu government opposed this initiative. The official Israeli discourse was trying to devalue the crisis with Turkey, and it was doing so by using two contradictory arguments. One argument held that Israel-Turkey relations had already deteriorated so much in recent years that they could not get much worse. The second was citing the fact that economic relations between the countries surprisingly reached a peak after the flotilla crisis, meaning that political tensions between the governments do not have an impact on the actual conduct of relations between the two societies.

What Can Happen Next?

The last couple of months of 2011 have brought more calm to Israel-Turkey relations. The regional focus has been redirected towards Syria, where Turkey has assumed a leading role against the Assad regime. Erdoğan’s “megaphone diplomacy” against Israel has been put to a relative halt, probably also due to American pressure. Moreover, there have been some renewed positive public diplomacy moves – Israel’s acknowledgement of a supportive Turkish role in the reaching Israel’s prisoners swap deal with Hamas, Israel’s offering of aid following the October 2011 earthquake in Van and Turkey’s willingness to accept it (that made the top news in Israel), and Netanyahu’s conversation with Erdoğan (for the first time in ten months) following the passing away of Erdoğan’s mother. Nevertheless, the January 2012 visit of Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh to Turkey and the manner in which he was embraced by the Turkish leadership — reinforced the negative image that many in Israel currently hold towards Turkey’s policies.

In parallel to these political aspects, Turkey-Israel relations began to draw the attention of civil society organizations, which have been gradually trying to become involved in attempts to mend the relations. A growing number of think tanks, NGOs, and youth movements are seeking ways to bring together Israelis and Turks, something that was not sufficiently done even when the official relations between the countries were strong. In parallel, the US continues to express its support and desire for improving Israel-Turkey relations, with occasional media reports on discrete channels or on new bridging proposals.

These attempts at creating a better atmosphere, at establishing a new modus vivendi between the countries, and at preventing further deterioration are a positive step and should be encouraged. They will not be enough to normalize relations, but can help in defining what Israel-Turkey relations can look like given the current political and regional circumstances and in charting constructive paths to get there. By themselves, these efforts will not be able to dismantle the danger of further deterioration in the official relations. Events of near clashes, that used to take place in the Aegean as part of the Turkey-Greece dispute in the Aegean, might occur in the Mediterranean if things get worse. The reactivation of ties between the Israeli and Turkish air forces in December 2011 was an important step to try and prevent this from happening, especially as almost all official channels between the governments have been cut off. Israel and Turkey seem to be headed towards a period in which they will be engaged in fierce rivalry but within the context of some sort of diplomatic, economic, and social relations.

Normalization between Israel and Turkey can be likely in the event of a policy change in Israel regarding Turkey or of a breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process. These do not seem feasible under the term of the current Israeli government, with Lieberman as Foreign Minister, but may become more plausible after the next Israeli elections, when a new coalition is formed. In the meantime, from the Israeli side, it is essential to educate the public and policy-makers that better ties with Turkey are both feasible and desirable, to maintain the existing level of economic and social ties, and to establish new channels for joint policy-dialogue between Israeli and Turkish scholars, policy analysts, and institutions.

Turkey-Israel relations have a long history of ups and downs. These were mostly linked to developments in Israeli-Arab relations, and not to bi-lateral crises resembling the flotilla incident. People tend to remember the Turkey-Israel “honeymoon” of the 1990s, but to forget the cold relations of the 1980s. As a new reality unfolds in the Middle East, with Turkey playing a central role in the re-shaping of Israel’s neighborhood, Israel and Turkey should strive to mend their bi-lateral relations. The 2011 opportunity for reconciliation was left unfulfilled, but the regional conditions that enabled this opportunity are still out there. It may not be long before another opportunity for reconciliation appears, due to a political change in Israel or to further regional realignments. Should this happen, Israel, Turkey, and their international allies should seize the opportunity and not let it sail past them, once again.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey During the Arab Spring הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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