Prior to the law’s passing, Arabic was considered Israel’s second official language, a fact that improved Israel’s image in the world due to its recognition of the Arab minority’s culture and identity. This helped Israel present itself as a democratic state, while acting as a bridge between the country and the Arab-speaking region. It also recognized the culture and identity of Jews from Arab countries, for whom Arabic is an inseparable part of their heritage. The fact that Arabic was an official language gave Arab speakers in Israel a sense of both hope and belonging, which is why a change in its status may exact a high price both internally as well as externally.

At the western most tip of Africa sits Morocco, a country that can serve as a fascinating case study on the development of national and cultural identity. Although Morocco is not the most economically advanced country in the world, and has quite a way to go in terms of human rights and democracy, it has, over the years, succeeded in formulating a model of an inclusive national identity, with the understanding and belief that difference and diversity should be encouraged and emphasized.

This wasn’t always the situation. When Morocco declared independence in 1956, it had to formulate a clear national identity after years of colonial influence. Morocco chose an Arab national identity, and through an intensive “melting pot” process, it molded its state symbols and institutions according to this homogenous identity. For example, Morocco joined the Arab League, Arabic was defined as the official language of the state, and some of the streets in the kingdom were given Arabic names.

In the wake of the decision, Morocco underwent an accelerated process of Westernization, which came at the expense of other identities in the kingdom, specifically that of the Amazighs, which make up half the population. The Amazighs, also known as Berbers, are considered the original residents of Morocco and North Africa. They are a separate ethnic group and speak Amazigh languages. The exclusion of Amazigh identity was manifested in banning the group’s languages in schools, on state television and radio broadcasts, and forbidding parents from giving their children Amazigh names on their ID cards. Instead, Amazigh citizens are given Arabic names, which they use at school and vis-à-vis state institutions, as well as an Amazigh name, which they use with family and friends.

This led to numerous Amazigh protests over the years, especially during the reign of King Hassan II. The protesters called to increase Amazigh representation in the Moroccan narrative, bridge socioeconomic gaps, make public services available, and promote employment and equitable distribution of resources. All this drastically changed with King Mohammed VI, who took power in July 1999, and who vowed to connect every home to electricity and water and laid down basic infrastructure in the Amazigh villages. Under the king, Morocco established the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture, which works to revive Amazigh languages and to integrate the Amazigh heritage into the national curriculum and encourage research on the topic.

While the situation and representation of the Amazigh improved, the protests did not cease. In February 2011, the winds of the Arab Spring blew through the streets of the country, and hundreds of thousands of Moroccans protested across the kingdom. The king, who feared the protests could destabilize the country, took steps to placate the demonstrators, including by changing the constitution. In July 2011, the kingdom passed an amendment to the constitution by referendum, which redefined Morocco’s national identity as a Muslim state. This time, however, the amendment emphasized the country’s commitment to the rich and diverse heritage of all its residents:

“A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [Amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [Saharo-Hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world.”

The amendment also brought about a change in the status of the Tamazight language, which for the first time became an official language of the state, as per Article 5 of the Constitution:

Arabic is the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/Amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception.

The wording of the amendment was able to emphasize the commonalities between Arabs and Amazighs without undermining the status of Arabic or Morocco’s Arab identity. And while the wording does not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground, it does shape perceptions and reality, cultivating one of the central values of Moroccan nationalism, according to which difference and diversity are a source of strength.

The Moroccan case is not identical to that of Israel. And yet, the development of a national hegemonic Arab identity in Morocco to a heterogenous and multicultural one could serve as a lesson for the Jewish state.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute, and a member of the institute’s task-team, which explores Israel’s relations with key Arab countries. This article is based on a study of Israel-Morocco relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential”.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט What Israel can learn from Morocco’s multiculturalism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since then, the number of Iraqis making contact with Israelis has grown tremendously, mainly through social networks. Among other things, Iraqi surfers recently set up a Facebook page called “The Virtual Embassy of Iraq in Israel”. The Israeli Foreign Ministry reports that about one-third of the Ministry’s Arabic site’s followers (ca. half a million) are Iraqis, and their attitude toward Israel is generally positive and friendly. In their honor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently inaugurated a unique Facebook page called “Israel in the Iraqi Discourse”, which received very positive comments and raised much interest in Iraq. In addition, other interested Israelis (for the sake of full disclosure, the author of this article is among them) maintain daily contact with many friends throughout Iraq.

A segmentation of the Iraqi participants in the discussions conducted on the Foreign Ministry’s Arabic page shows that most of the participants are educated young people between the ages of 18 and 35, an age group that accounts for about 70 percent of Iraq’s population, with about a third of them living in Baghdad. They are not afraid to disclose their real names and photographs, and they represent various Iraqi population groups: Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, and others. These young people are usually politically and socially active and constitute the backbone of Iraq’s educated class. They came to deal with Israel and Israelis out of interest in the Jewish past in Iraq or out of a certain attraction to the democratic and liberal model presented by Israel. Recently, their support for Israel has grown in the face of their hostility to Iran. Their positions on the Israeli issue are distinctly different from those prevailing in the Arab world.

Unlike other Arab countries, the interest in Israel among Iraqis is not confined to politics; it extends to the cultural and religious spheres and the daily aspects of life in Israel. Many Iraqis openly express their desire to visit Israel, but when they try to carry it out they encounter the arbitrariness of the Israeli establishment and are generally refused. The two pages of the Foreign Ministry in Arabic frequently publish non-political articles that shed light on different aspects of the Israeli way of being which raise great interest among Iraqi users. The knowledge of young Iraqis about Israel is sometimes surprising, as demonstrated through the popularity of Sarit Hadad.

It is difficult to determine whether the phenomenon is limited to social networks or whether it will also have political ramifications in future. The educated Iraqi youth in question influence the political and cultural agenda and shape public opinion. Yet in recent elections in Iraq, many of them supported the boycott movement, and others voted mainly for the parties of al-Sadr and al-Abadi, or for smaller parties on the fringe of the Iraqi national and anti-Iranian camp.

For some reason, official Israel has not yet discovered Iraq, the largest Arab state on the East. Iraq is the second largest exporter of oil in the world, after Saudi Arabia, and is a significant potential trading partner. Iraq, which is being rebuilt, is desperate for assistance with infrastructure construction, banking, irrigation, agriculture, communications, and more. It also needs indirect assistance with improving its credit rating and with encouraging foreign investments. Iraq would also welcome the assistance of Intelligence services in its fight against terrorism, in which Iraq has acquired great skill in recent years.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of secondary importance in shaping Iraq’s official position vis-a-vis Israel. The Iraqi public is quite indifferent to Palestinian suffering, and Iraq supports the Arab peace initiative, which calls for Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose capital is East Jerusalem. It does not recognize the Hamas rule in Gaza.

As Iraq enters the period of establishing a coalition that will paralyze the political system for a while, it is worth thinking about how Israel should approach this important country. While the Iraqi political echelon is preoccupied with its own affairs, the educated and the young people discuss the matter openly and boldly. In its attempts to establish relations with the Arab states, Israel tends to focus on forging contacts with the political elite, and sometimes only with one specific leader. This is how peace agreements were reached with Egypt and Jordan, and to a great extent this is also the story of the Oslo process with the Palestinians. The educated middle class in the Arab countries was neglected and as a result became alienated from the process and hostile to Israel. Iraq offers the opportunity for a different process which may begin with the educated class and will prepare the ground within wide and influential circles before the formal diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries begins. This different process will lay a firm foundation for future relationships.

Dr. Ronen Zeidel is a senior researcher of Iraq at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University and a research fellow at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study on Israeli-Iraqi relations which is part of the “Israel-Arab Relations: The Unfulfilled Potential” project.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Laying a Civil Foundation for Cooperation between Israel and Iraq הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.