ארכיון Arafat - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/arafat/ מתווים Thu, 25 Feb 2021 11:06:03 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון Arafat - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/arafat/ 32 32 The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-solution-to-gaza-is-a-diplomatic-one/ Fri, 06 Mar 2020 15:24:47 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3010 So, what do we do about Gaza? Every new round of violence generates a marathon of media interviews with the usual suspects mouthing the usual platitudes – Israel must rehabilitate its deterrence, occupy Gaza or reach an arrangement with its leaders. Pessimists argue that nothing can be done to stop the violence. Surprisingly, all those interviewed hold similar views despite their different political stripes. However, they are suggesting tactical solutions, rather than strategic and diplomatic goals, which are therefore bound to be short-term in nature. A strategic approach to Gaza must relate to the overall Palestinian issue, not just to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The policy of recent Israeli governments separating the Gaza issue from the West Bank one has convinced Israelis that this split is, indeed, the desired goal. But it is a flawed assumption. Ironically, the Trump plan, which undermines prospects of peace in many respects, pointed to the inevitable solution of linking Gaza and the West Bank. Any solution to the Gaza issue must include the Palestinian Authority (PA). But we have made the PA irrelevant to Gaza and thus achieved a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Israeli government has thwarted all attempts at rapprochement between Gaza and the PA. Such was the case when PA President Mahmoud Abbas sought to hold Palestinian elections, or when he tried to form a government of technocrats that could have enabled Hamas to move forward vis-à-vis Israel without initially abandoning its ideology. We have weakened the PA by refusing to credit and

הפוסט The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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So, what do we do about Gaza? Every new round of violence generates a marathon of media interviews with the usual suspects mouthing the usual platitudes – Israel must rehabilitate its deterrence, occupy Gaza or reach an arrangement with its leaders. Pessimists argue that nothing can be done to stop the violence.

Surprisingly, all those interviewed hold similar views despite their different political stripes. However, they are suggesting tactical solutions, rather than strategic and diplomatic goals, which are therefore bound to be short-term in nature.

A strategic approach to Gaza must relate to the overall Palestinian issue, not just to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The policy of recent Israeli governments separating the Gaza issue from the West Bank one has convinced Israelis that this split is, indeed, the desired goal. But it is a flawed assumption. Ironically, the Trump plan, which undermines prospects of peace in many respects, pointed to the inevitable solution of linking Gaza and the West Bank.

Any solution to the Gaza issue must include the Palestinian Authority (PA). But we have made the PA irrelevant to Gaza and thus achieved a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Israeli government has thwarted all attempts at rapprochement between Gaza and the PA. Such was the case when PA President Mahmoud Abbas sought to hold Palestinian elections, or when he tried to form a government of technocrats that could have enabled Hamas to move forward vis-à-vis Israel without initially abandoning its ideology.

We have weakened the PA by refusing to credit and encourage its non-violent, pro-diplomacy policies. From his first day on the job, Abbas sought agreement, if possible through bilateral negotiations, and if not, by appealing to multinational organizations.

We have turned his attempts at dialogue with Israel into pathetic overtures by continuing to build in the settlements and using negotiations to buy time and create facts on the ground. When the Palestinians tried to achieve their aims by taking multilateral steps, we dubbed their measures “diplomatic terrorism” and exerted pressure on the Americans to block them, even though the same measures – appealing to the UN – gained Israel its own independence.

While Abbas supports a two-state solution and recognition of Israel in its 1967 borders with land swaps, and even accepts the principle of a demilitarized Palestinian state, we insist instead on dealing with Hamas, which rejects our existence. Whereas Abbas continues to instruct his security forces to cooperate with the IDF and Shin Bet in foiling terror attacks, and is therefore accused by many Palestinians of collaboration with Israel, we reward Hamas with benefits and payments from Qatar.

A strategic, long-term solution to the Gaza issue is linked to renewal of the diplomatic process with the PA, and to the encouragement of a technocratic unity government in Gaza with which gradual progress can be made on demilitarization and rehabilitation. A long-term solution must be diplomatic. All our previous attempts to create deterrence have taught us that there is no military solution.

We currently have much better Palestinian partners for peace than we had in the past. The terrorist Arafat has been replaced by Abbas, who reviles terrorism; the three “No’s” (no to peace with Israel, no to recognition of Israel, no to negotiations with Israel) of the 1967 Arab League summit in Khartoum have been replaced by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The key message of that initiative is, “please move ahead with a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian issue so that we can normalize relations with you based on the understanding that Israel could constitute part of the solution to regional problems, rather than the problem itself”.

While all these positive changes were occurring around us, our leaders continued to explain why Israel has no Palestinian partner and to empower Hamas. That is why Israeli discourse keeps going back to the same tactical suggestions that resolve nothing. These solutions only sound logical absent of a strategic alternative. But such an alternative exists and it requires courageous and sober leadership rather than political slogans and hollow clichés.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-palestinian-foreign-service-at-a-time-of-diplomatic-freeze/ Thu, 05 Dec 2019 12:58:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2819 The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause. One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world. The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The annual commemoration of the UN’s vote on 29 November 1947 for the partition plan provides an opportunity for the Palestinian Foreign Service and the Palestinian President to shine a global spotlight on the current condition of their people and the challenges they face. Unable to realize their national aspirations for statehood, the Palestinians view their presence on international stages as vital to their cause.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/when-israel-smiled-at-the-world-the-world-smiled-back/ Fri, 15 Nov 2019 12:52:38 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2818 “In the last decade of the twentieth century, atlases, history and geography books no longer present an up-to-date picture of the world. Walls of enmity have fallen, borders have disappeared, powers have crumbled and ideologies collapsed, states have been born, states have died and the gates of emigration have been flung open. It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is now – to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and do everything possible to fit into this world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us’. We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation.” With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict. Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly.

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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“In the last decade of the twentieth century, atlases, history and geography books no longer present an up-to-date picture of the world. Walls of enmity have fallen, borders have disappeared, powers have crumbled and ideologies collapsed, states have been born, states have died and the gates of emigration have been flung open. It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is now – to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and do everything possible to fit into this world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us’. We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation.”

With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly. He did so based on solid reasoning and a broad strategic view. He was a pragmatic man who could read the map, identify opportunities and make tough decisions. He understood that the PLO was growing weaker and that unless he sought agreement with that organization, he would face a tougher alternative – Hamas. He also understood Israel’s changing circumstances following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Soviet bloc.

Rabin assessed that this was an opportunity to try to resolve the conflicts with Israel’s immediate neighbors so that when the time came, Israel would be able to face its harshest and most dangerous enemies – Iraq and Iran. He was thoroughly aware of the hurdles he would have to face on the path he had chosen, the crises, the disappointments, but he had decided that he would leave our children and grandchildren a different kind of world, one of hope and normalcy.

I had the privilege of serving the State of Israel and working with him. I had the privilege of serving during the Oslo Accord days, of witnessing the changes Rabin underwent and the tremendous breakthroughs made by Israel’s Foreign Service. From a state that just months previously had clashed with the US government over loan guarantees for immigrant absorption, Israel became a desired ally. Relations with the US were transformed, becoming warm and intimate, with every Israeli diplomatic move coordinated with the US administration and receiving its blessing and support.

I saw and experienced how the world opened up to us, how states which did not even recognized us changed their position. From China and India to Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. Representatives from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all gathered at my home in New York, where I served as Consul General, to meet Rabin. He also managed to make the old dream of peace with Jordan a reality.

The Middle East began opening up to us, and new channels of cooperation were examined at well-attended economic conferences we held in Morocco and Jordan. Europe, too, opened up to us, giving Israel preferential trade status and making it the first non-European partner in its Horizon 2020 research program.

I had the great privilege of being at Rabin’s side when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1996, ten days before his assassination. The hall was packed. Most Heads of State in the audience applauded at length, not only because of what he said but also because they appreciated Rabin and his leadership. They stood in line for long moments to shake his hand. The sympathy of the world enveloped us, constituting the best proof that when we open up to the world, it opens up to us.

Rabin the soldier fought tenaciously against terrorism. I saw him angry and pained when he was informed of a terror attack, I saw him uncompromising when he had to make decisions and I also heard him shouting at Yasser Arafat when he had to. But he also bequeathed us new concepts, redefining the term “security” to include not just tanks, planes and missile boats, but also education, housing and well-being. Security, for Rabin, lay mostly in human hope.

Yitzhak Rabin was a modest man, often introverted, but also sure of himself; a man who did not like small talk and had no patience for fools and liars, for sycophants and fear-mongers. The red-headed Prime Minister spoke his mind, sometimes bluntly. In this sense, he was not blessed with diplomatic skills. But it was his direct style, his deep voice and shy mien that won the hearts of many.

In these days of determined attempts to undermine the State’s gatekeepers and institutions, it is important to remember Rabin’s respect for democracy and the rule of law, even when it concerned his personal life. Let us remember his desire to place the citizens at the top of the government’s priorities, his actions in support of civil equality, his attitude toward the Arab citizens in whom he saw partners, and the real actions he took to rectify past injustices.

Rabin, the man with the analytic mind, had well-defined, firm views, but he knew how to adapt himself when necessity dictated. Rabin knew how to dream and how to make his dreams come true. For him, the essence of Zionism was to establish a safe haven for the Jewish people.

For me, Rabin’s legacy is of integrity and modesty, courageous leadership, respect for democracy and civil rights, the vision of peace, and, above all, a life of hope.

Colette Avital is a former Member of Knesset and Ambassador, and is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/who-remembers-the-palestinian-issue/ Thu, 28 Feb 2019 07:22:44 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2769 Public attention in the upcoming Israeli elections is focusing on domestic political and economic issues, such as Netanyahu’s legal situation and the cost of living – and on security-related political issues, such as Iran, Gaza, Syria and Hezbollah. However, the question of relations between Israel and the Palestinians has been marginalized and has almost disappeared from the political agenda. With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections. The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role. Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy.

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Public attention in the upcoming Israeli elections is focusing on domestic political and economic issues, such as Netanyahu’s legal situation and the cost of living – and on security-related political issues, such as Iran, Gaza, Syria and Hezbollah. However, the question of relations between Israel and the Palestinians has been marginalized and has almost disappeared from the political agenda.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/mahmoud-abbas-interest-is-to-topple-hamas/ Sun, 11 Nov 2018 15:44:10 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2912 It is impossible to isolate the recent escalation of tension between Israel and the Gaza Strip from the stalemate in the internal Palestinian reconciliation process. From the current perspective, Hamas’ political capital is at an all-time low. All Hamas’ attempts to reach a regional agreement that will improve the economic situation in Gaza and enable it to maintain its strategic military abilities have failed. The reconciliation process is a barometer for regional stability. As long as the dialogue between the sides continues, igniting a spark of hope for change, the level of violence between the Gaza Strip and Israel declines. Thus, the failure of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas is another factor which encourages the escalation of violence in the region. Over the past year, and since publishing its updated political document in March 2017, the Hamas movement admitted wholeheartedly that its political endeavor has not succeeded: its attempt to govern the Gaza Strip failed. After more than a year of division, Hamas is willing to unconditionally pass civil control of the Gaza Strip to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. However, Abbas refuses to accept only civil authority over the Strip and in fact declared an uncompromising, all-out war on Hamas. In order to understand the intensity of Abbas’ battle against Hamas, we must go back to the years 2006-2007, to the moment at which Abbas lost the Gaza Strip, first at the ballot box and later at the end of the barrel of a

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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It is impossible to isolate the recent escalation of tension between Israel and the Gaza Strip from the stalemate in the internal Palestinian reconciliation process. From the current perspective, Hamas’ political capital is at an all-time low. All Hamas’ attempts to reach a regional agreement that will improve the economic situation in Gaza and enable it to maintain its strategic military abilities have failed. The reconciliation process is a barometer for regional stability. As long as the dialogue between the sides continues, igniting a spark of hope for change, the level of violence between the Gaza Strip and Israel declines. Thus, the failure of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas is another factor which encourages the escalation of violence in the region.

Over the past year, and since publishing its updated political document in March 2017, the Hamas movement admitted wholeheartedly that its political endeavor has not succeeded: its attempt to govern the Gaza Strip failed. After more than a year of division, Hamas is willing to unconditionally pass civil control of the Gaza Strip to Mahmoud Abbas and the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. However, Abbas refuses to accept only civil authority over the Strip and in fact declared an uncompromising, all-out war on Hamas.

In order to understand the intensity of Abbas’ battle against Hamas, we must go back to the years 2006-2007, to the moment at which Abbas lost the Gaza Strip, first at the ballot box and later at the end of the barrel of a gun. In fact, since he was elected as the President of the Palestinian Authority in 2005, Abbas has not set foot in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, losing control of it is part of his legacy.

In contrast to Yasser Arafat, who had roots in Gaza and spoke like one of the people, Abbas was born in Tzfat, from where his family fled to Syria, and has no special emotional connection to the Strip. Throughout his period in office, he has focused on the project of building the Palestinian State in the West Bank and the diplomatic battle against the State of Israel, neglecting the Gaza Strip. He abandoned the people of Gaza to the hands of Hamas and the economic mercies of the international community and Gulf states, trusting them to add patch after patch to cover the desolation and wretchedness of the Gaza Strip.

After three rounds of warfare, with the Gaza Strip tired and beaten, Abbas has still not changed his strategic approach towards it. Since 2014, not only has the leadership of the Palestinian Authority failed to stretch out its hand to support the people of the Strip economically but, moreover, has imposed a long series of economic sanctions which affect the civilians. These include failure to pay for fuel sent to the Strip, thus increasing civilian pressure on Hamas and proving to the residents of the Strip that the Islamist movement cannot provide for their most basic needs.

Following Abbas’ clear political failure to advance the vision of a Palestinian state, the political struggle against Hamas has become more significant. Hamas of 2018 is looking to the future, and its leadership deems itself the proper heir to the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Abbas, who lost the Gaza Strip, is not interested in losing the political leadership and the historical status of the Fatah movement within the PLO.

The bloody battles since summer 2007 are etched into the memories of Fatah members; the decade-long isolation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank has increased the estrangement between the sides; Abbas’ despair at the political process, alongside the suspicion and ideological and political disgust he feels towards Hamas, has led him to radicalize his position, making it difficult to reconcile the dialogue between the two sides.

Abbas’ main demand from Hamas to enable an advance towards reconciliation is that the movement dismantle its military wing. Hamas without Jihad, Hamas without arms, will lose not only its ideological identity but also its political bargaining chips. Understanding that Hamas will not relinquish its weapons, Abbas’ only option is to continue putting economic pressure on the movement’s rule in the Gaza Strip. He hopes that these steps will lead to mass protests against Hamas, enabling him to return to the Strip as victor.

The continued economic decline and the intensification of the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip heighten the tension between Hamas and Israel. Hamas must direct its anger and frustration outside, away from itself. Military conflict between Hamas and Israel can result in the dismantlement of Hamas’ weapons following an Israeli military campaign. In the past, the Palestinian Authority ruled out this option, but it seems that now, from Abbas’ perspective, any path that can eventually lead to a unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under his control is deemed suitable. Indeed, a unified control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will increase the Palestinian Authority’s prestige and allow it to exert greater pressure on the State of Israel in the future, should the peace process between the two sides resume.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

הפוסט Mahmoud Abbas’ Interest is to Topple Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-oslo-agreement-was-assassinated-with-rabin/ Mon, 17 Sep 2018 15:29:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2906 Surprisingly for what is considered a failed peace treaty, the 25th anniversary of the Oslo Agreement received significant media coverage. Most of it, as can be expected, was onesided, emphasizing the Palestinian mistakes without attempting to see the wider, balanced picture of the reasons that led to its failure, including the Israeli responsibility. At the outset, it is important to highlight the fact that the Oslo Agreement is not all about failure. It has one major, significant success: the mutual recognition of both sides. In fact, the Palestinians had already recognized Israel indirectly in November 1988, when they accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 and condemned the use of terrorism. The Shamir government was unwilling to recognize the change in the Palestinian position, and the law that prohibited meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, promulgated in 1985, remained in force until late 1992. This mutual recognition enabled the warring parties to humanize the other and commence negotiations. Moreover, the agreement enabled the establishment of an embryonic Palestinian entity (the Palestinian Authority), which was supposed to develop within five years – though it was not stated officially – into a sovereign state. Ironically, the basic logic of the Oslo process – its gradualism, which was meant to build trust between the parties – was also its major flaw: it allowed the opposition forces on both sides to sabotage the agreement. In our historical perspective, the Oslo Agreement looks like a failure. The reasons for that failure lie on both sides. The Israeli

הפוסט The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Surprisingly for what is considered a failed peace treaty, the 25th anniversary of the Oslo Agreement received significant media coverage. Most of it, as can be expected, was onesided, emphasizing the Palestinian mistakes without attempting to see the wider, balanced picture of the reasons that led to its failure, including the Israeli responsibility.

At the outset, it is important to highlight the fact that the Oslo Agreement is not all about failure. It has one major, significant success: the mutual recognition of both sides. In fact, the Palestinians had already recognized Israel indirectly in November 1988, when they accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 and condemned the use of terrorism. The Shamir government was unwilling to recognize the change in the Palestinian position, and the law that prohibited meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, promulgated in 1985, remained in force until late 1992. This mutual recognition enabled the warring parties to humanize the other and commence negotiations. Moreover, the agreement enabled the establishment of an embryonic Palestinian entity (the Palestinian Authority), which was supposed to develop within five years – though it was not stated officially – into a sovereign state. Ironically, the basic logic of the Oslo process – its gradualism, which was meant to build trust between the parties – was also its major flaw: it allowed the opposition forces on both sides to sabotage the agreement.

In our historical perspective, the Oslo Agreement looks like a failure. The reasons for that failure lie on both sides.

The Israeli party is to be blamed for three failures: (1) For not stopping the building of new settlements in the occupied territories. On the eve of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, there were fewer than 120,000 settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; by the end of 2016, the number had risen to 400,000 (not including East Jerusalem). This shows – in the Palestinian view – that Israel has never been sincere about implementing the agreement; (2) Israel has never indicated the end result, which is the building of an independent Palestinian state; (3) Israel – in spite of its military strength – has never been generous toward the Palestinians during the negotiations. Instead of treating the Palestinians with respect and honor, it continued humiliating and insulting them. After all, Israel received what it mostly desired – recognition – upfront, while the Palestinians’ most wanted demands – a state with recognized boundaries, control of East Jerusalem and resolution of the refugee problem – remained all unfulfilled.

The Palestinians, for their part, failed as well, on at least three fronts: (1) By not curbing the attacks of Hamas terrorists. It is debatable whether Arafat was capable of confronting Hamas militarily, but it is clear that he did not do his utmost to prevent these suicide attacks; (2) The Palestinian media, including the educational system, continued to delegitimize the Israeli side. This negative media campaign solidified the negative image of Israelis in Palestinian eyes and convinced Israelis that the Palestinians have not really changed their position toward them; (3) The Palestinians have never internalized that in spite of Israel’s military superiority, its psychological psyche needs continued assurance. Acknowledgment of Israel as a Jewish state would not be harmful to the Palestinians; in many ways it only reaffirms what had been already declared in the UN 1947 partition plan.

In spite of all these failures, the Oslo Agreement could have worked had Prime Minister Rabin not been assassinated in November 1995. History cannot tell us what could have occurred if Rabin had not been shot, yet in my research on missed opportunities in the ArabIsraeli conflict I reached the conclusion that Rabin – with his military background and political acumen – could have made the difference. It is important also to note that Rabin simultaneously negotiated with the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; signing an agreement with him would have laid enormous pressure on Arafat to proceed as well.

We will never know whether Rabin could have succeeded, but his assassination removed from the field a major player who could have made a difference. This act was tantamount to the assassination of the Oslo track. The episode demonstrates that in spite of the importance of historical processes, the role of leaders in history is still paramount. This only accentuates the regretful conclusion that lack of leadership – on both sides of the conflict – is a major reason for the conflict’s endurance.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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What Abbas Should Be Concerned About? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/what-abbas-should-be-concerned-about/ Sun, 23 Jul 2017 12:14:32 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4133 On July 2, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas delivered a speech at the African Union Heads of State Summit in Addis Ababa. The speech attracted little attention from Israeli or global media, for in many ways it was similar to Abbas’s many speeches focusing on the Israeli occupation and its consequences. It did, however, include an interesting section in which the Palestinian president called on the African leaders (many of whom are Muslim or Arab) to stipulate that any upgrade of their ties with Israel would be conditional on Israel ending the occupation. Given that most experts concur that Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, will not take unnecessary diplomatic risks or normalize ties with Israel before the resolution of the Palestinian issue, we should ask ourselves what Abbas is concerned about. First, Abbas, who has been heavily involved in shaping Palestinian history, knows that at critical moments, the Arab countries have followed their own separate interests. In 1979, it was Egypt under Sadat that turned its back on the Palestinians and signed a peace agreement with Israel. In 1982, during the First Lebanon War, there were no Arab efforts to save the PLO from Israel. The organization suffered defeat and was forced to relocate its headquarters to Tunisia. In 1988, Jordan unilaterally disengaged from the West Bank, following the first intifada. Later, Yasser Arafat abandoned king Hussein by signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite the latter’s political umbrella during the 1991 Madrid conference. King Hussein felt betrayed, but decided to

הפוסט What Abbas Should Be Concerned About? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On July 2, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas delivered a speech at the African Union Heads of State Summit in Addis Ababa.

The speech attracted little attention from Israeli or global media, for in many ways it was similar to Abbas’s many speeches focusing on the Israeli occupation and its consequences. It did, however, include an interesting section in which the Palestinian president called on the African leaders (many of whom are Muslim or Arab) to stipulate that any upgrade of their ties with Israel would be conditional on Israel ending the occupation.

Given that most experts concur that Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, will not take unnecessary diplomatic risks or normalize ties with Israel before the resolution of the Palestinian issue, we should ask ourselves what Abbas is concerned about.

First, Abbas, who has been heavily involved in shaping Palestinian history, knows that at critical moments, the Arab countries have followed their own separate interests. In 1979, it was Egypt under Sadat that turned its back on the Palestinians and signed a peace agreement with Israel. In 1982, during the First Lebanon War, there were no Arab efforts to save the PLO from Israel. The organization suffered defeat and was forced to relocate its headquarters to Tunisia. In 1988, Jordan unilaterally disengaged from the West Bank, following the first intifada.

Later, Yasser Arafat abandoned king Hussein by signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite the latter’s political umbrella during the 1991 Madrid conference.

King Hussein felt betrayed, but decided to make use of the positive regional momentum to sign a peace treaty with Yitzhak Rabin in 1994, without stipulating that the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement or the establishment of a Palestinian state were conditions of the agreement.

Abbas’ second concern is the absence of natural, consistently reliable allies, which is especially disconcerting in view of the PA’s inherent weakness and limited economic resources, and its resulting dependence on regional actors (including Israel). In the past, the PLO could automatically count on the support of the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Today, all these actors have become irrelevant for the PA and its current strategy of relying on moderate states that support the peace process. Such states, however, are not always aligned with the interests of the PA. In 2017, for example, Egypt attempted to amend the Arab Peace Initiative (an attempt blocked by Palestinian objection) and is currently promoting a deal with Hamas to grant Mohammad Dahlan powers in Gaza, contrary to the wishes and at the expense of the interests of the PA.

Finally, Abbas is concerned by recent changes in Israel’s favor in the overall Arab position. In 2013, the Arab Quartet agreed to modify the Arab Peace Initiative and accept the notion of Israeli-Palestinian land swaps without demanding any concession from Israel in return. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has made a series of gestures to Israel over the past two years, including visits, meetings, and allusions to secret security cooperation against common enemies. In May 2017, The Wall Street Journal even reported that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states offered to take some normalization steps toward Israel in return for a limited settlements freeze and an Israeli decision to ease restrictions over trade with Gaza.

Over the years, various Arab countries have conducted behind-the-scenes relations with Israel. The Arab countries were afraid of being caught in public as supporting their Israeli “mistress” rather than their Palestinian “wife.” This “mistress syndrome” is still evident, but recent developments indicate that the interests of these countries, and specifically their desire to deter Iran and its allies, are served by publicizing their diplomatic or security ties with Israel. Making their relations with Israel more public also lays the groundwork for a future upgrade of ties with Israel, once the Israeli-Palestinian peace process moves forward.

Like other experts, I also believed (and continue to believe) that Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and other Arab countries will not take major steps toward normalization with Israel before significant progress is made toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, an uncompromising Palestinian position, and the continued split between the PA and Hamas, might lead Arab leaders to prefer their national interests over their commitment to the Palestinian cause. Sadat and king Hussein made such decisions in the past, and others may follow. This is a definite cause of concern for Abbas.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Abbas Should Be Concerned About? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Who Will Inherit Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/who-will-inherit-palestinian-president-mahmoud-abbas/ Fri, 23 Sep 2016 18:23:52 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4246 The Fatah movement and the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Movement) leadership are experiencing a deep internal crisis. In 1969, Fatah leader Yassir Arafat took control of PLO institutions and imposed a political containment policy, combined with a heavy hand, against his opponents. Since then, the Palestinian national liberation movement has been characterized by a highly centralized authority structure. Mahmoud Abbas, an absolute ruler, inherited three ‘hats’ from his predecessor Arafat: In addition to serving as Chairman of the PLO’s Executive Committee and President of the Palestinian Authority, Abbas also serves as Chairman of the Fatah movement. Fatah is the ruling party in PLO institutions, and constitutes the political backbone of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian justification for the establishment of such centralized rule was the complexity of the negotiations that were held with Israel in the 1990s.

הפוסט Who Will Inherit Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Fatah movement and the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Movement) leadership are experiencing a deep internal crisis. In 1969, Fatah leader Yassir Arafat took control of PLO institutions and imposed a political containment policy, combined with a heavy hand, against his opponents. Since then, the Palestinian national liberation movement has been characterized by a highly centralized authority structure. Mahmoud Abbas, an absolute ruler, inherited three ‘hats’ from his predecessor Arafat: In addition to serving as Chairman of the PLO’s Executive Committee and President of the Palestinian Authority, Abbas also serves as Chairman of the Fatah movement. Fatah is the ruling party in PLO institutions, and constitutes the political backbone of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian justification for the establishment of such centralized rule was the complexity of the negotiations that were held with Israel in the 1990s.

הפוסט Who Will Inherit Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Palestine’s Self-Inflicted Wounds https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/palestines-self-inflicted-wounds/ Fri, 08 Nov 2013 19:22:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4302 About six months ago, I sat in a coffee shop in al-Tireh, a suburb of Ramallah, and interviewed a senior official within Fatah. The official, wanting to talk about the internal dynamics within the Palestinian leadership, wished to remain anonymous. In between flowery anecdotes about his meetings with Dick Cheney (“He always asked about my family”) the official began to shed some light on the Palestinian UN bid of 2011 and 2012. True to perception, various fault lines and rifts began to emerge between his description of how the UN campaign was formed and how other senior officials had described the process. Was Abbas pressured into the UN? Did close advisors convince him? Did he always have it in the back of his mind? If there was one thing the collective Palestinian narrative could agree on, it was that everyone was convinced their explanation was the only explanation for what would become the largest unilateral policy decision in the post-Oslo years. In his new book, State of Failure: Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Unmaking of the Palestinian State, Jonathan Schanzer attempts to unravel these narratives and provide insight into how the Palestinian leadership navigates the rough seas of pseudostatehood. It’s a daunting task—as Schanzer acknowledges early on, the field is crowded with literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, much of that literature is written in a comparative light; it’s usually the Palestinians in relation to Israel, or in relation to the peace process, or the Arab League, and etc. In

הפוסט Palestine’s Self-Inflicted Wounds הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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About six months ago, I sat in a coffee shop in al-Tireh, a suburb of Ramallah, and interviewed a senior official within Fatah. The official, wanting to talk about the internal dynamics within the Palestinian leadership, wished to remain anonymous. In between flowery anecdotes about his meetings with Dick Cheney (“He always asked about my family”) the official began to shed some light on the Palestinian UN bid of 2011 and 2012. True to perception, various fault lines and rifts began to emerge between his description of how the UN campaign was formed and how other senior officials had described the process. Was Abbas pressured into the UN? Did close advisors convince him? Did he always have it in the back of his mind? If there was one thing the collective Palestinian narrative could agree on, it was that everyone was convinced their explanation was the only explanation for what would become the largest unilateral policy decision in the post-Oslo years.

In his new book, State of Failure: Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the Unmaking of the Palestinian State, Jonathan Schanzer attempts to unravel these narratives and provide insight into how the Palestinian leadership navigates the rough seas of pseudostatehood. It’s a daunting task—as Schanzer acknowledges early on, the field is crowded with literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, much of that literature is written in a comparative light; it’s usually the Palestinians in relation to Israel, or in relation to the peace process, or the Arab League, and etc. In putting the internal dynamics of the Palestinian leadership as the focal point, “State of Failure” reveals some truly unsettling facets of how the Palestinians craft and implement their policies. In covering the recent tremors in the political structure, the book focuses on former prime minister Salam Fayyad and his rather inglorious fall from grace in the leadership. The internal disputes, the well-documented rifts and disagreements between Fayyad and the Fatah leadership, all are laid out cogently in the book.

The book isn’t likely to be on the PLO’s reading list anytime soon. And most certainly, if there’s one specific area of the book where Schanzer is likely to reach an impasse with the Palestinian leadership, it’s the description of the UN campaign. In the book, Schanzer takes a contemporary approach, detailing the roots of the campaign in 2005, when Palestinian diplomats began working in earnest with Latin American nations, developing a diplomatic strategy that would eventually lead to 2011. This diplomatic strategy was at times viewed as almost antagonistic to negotiations by some within the leadership, but by 2008 and 2009, when Tzipi Livni had failed to form a negotiation-centric government and Benjamin Netanyahu had ascended instead, the idea of this comprehensive and unilateral diplomatic campaign began to take hold. By 2010, with talks breaking down over settlement moratoriums and varying preconditions, the campaign became the predominant driving force of Palestinian policy. This is where things get murky.

If his approach is a pragmatic analysis of a clear-cut policy evolution, the history being touted by the Palestinian leadership is a little more holistic, a bit more nationalistic, and certainly much more paradigm-driven. In other words, Schanzer’s approach neglects a pre-Oslo history the Palestinian officials are incredibly defensive of. In a report I released this past summer, I interviewed nearly twenty Palestinian officials in search of some clarity on the campaign. Of the myriad narratives that emerged, one thing was clear: the UN campaign was not a recent phenomenon. In the historical waxing and waning of the methods of preference in Palestinian policy, internationalization at the UN has a history that precedes negotiations.

Indeed, Palestinian officials described a process that had roots as far back as the 1970s. One official has even written that the Palestinians first considered the UN track in 1969, at the suggestion of President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. By 1974, this track’s foundations were laid in the PLO’s Ten-Point Program, a political manifesto that, among other things, called for Palestinian autonomy of lands “liberated,” and didn’t explicitly rule out other forms of resistance. For a resistance-based liberation movement, the acknowledgment of partial territorial control in Palestine and alternative means of resistance was precedent-setting.

By 1988, the Palestinian position had evolved into two clear schools of thought regarding the UN. On the one hand, elements within the leadership argued against the UN track, insisting that applying for statehood status on the 1967 lines would jeopardize the PLO’s claim of representation over the Palestinian refugee diaspora. This group was led by Farouk Kaddoumi, and was also concerned over the potential hindrance international recognition would place on a resistance group. The second group, championed by Riyad Mansour (and supported by Mahmoud Abbas), argued for full engagement at the UN, claiming that statehood would not delegitimize the PLO’s standing, but rather enhance it. By the time the dust had settled, the former had won, and a hybrid option was implemented, with the Palestinians opting for an upgrade to ‘observer entity’ status. In the coming years, the US and PLO would open the lines of communication, the Madrid talks would commence, and the Oslo period would start shortly thereafter. The UN track, in short, would be sidelined.

Here, too, is where a historical background would have benefited the book. For even in its brief respite from the fore of Palestinian policy, the UN campaign was never far. Indeed, in 1999, as the end of the 5-year interim Oslo period neared, Yasser Arafat dispatched two deputies, Nabil Sha’ath and Saeb Erekat, to Europe in order to begin gauging support for a unilateral declaration of statehood at the UN. The US promptly countered this campaign, and pressured the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. At the time, President Clinton had managed to dissuade Arafat through several key areas: first, leveraging the well-known fact that a Palestinian unilateral action outside of the Oslo framework would threaten the peace camp in the upcoming Israeli elections, and second, that the US would be willing to host further negotiations if Arafat held off. After a frenetic diplomatic campaign, the US was able to stave off the Palestinian action and set the stage for the Camp David negotiations.

Acutely aware of this bit of history was one of its primary actors: Mahmoud Abbas. So when, in 2011, Abbas was faced with a similar moribund peace process and a lack of suitable alternatives, the UN bid was again moved to the fore. Here’s where the discrepancy in motivations arises within the Palestinian narrative. Was Abbas motivated out of a hope for renewed US brokerage of negotiations? Or was he always convinced of the merits of a UN campaign? Perhaps we’ll never know. But President Obama was not able to offer anything similar to Clinton, and Abbas had no choice but to pursue the UN.

Where does that leave the UN bid in the grand scheme of things now? The Palestinians have halted their campaign in lieu of recent negotiations, a compromise they made with John Kerry in order for talks to be restarted. Should the talks break down, however, or fail to yield an interim agreement by March, the Palestinians can be expected to again gear up for engagement at the international body this coming year. Their engagement, and specifically which entities to engage and to what degree, will be known only to the man at the top, Abbas.

Such is the clouded area of tasseography in the Palestinian Territories that State of Failure deftly interprets. Schanzer discards the rhetoric and nationalist storylines in lieu of the pragmatic, describing the recent leadership’s myopic nature in zero-sum terms. His prognosis is clear: the Palestinian leadership is struggling on two fronts: in negotiating a state’s existence and governing a state entity. In order to do the former, it must improve on the latter. It is not likely to win him many friends in the West Bank. But it is, however, a workman’s analysis of how Palestinian officials form policy and govern in one of the longest and most intractable conflicts of the modern era.

(originally published in the National Interest)

הפוסט Palestine’s Self-Inflicted Wounds הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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There Is No Israeli Partner https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/there-is-no-israeli-partner/ Tue, 13 Nov 2012 19:13:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4298 The claim that there is no one to talk to on the Palestinian side is a common one in Israeli discourse, seemingly an axiom. The Netanyahu-Barak-Lieberman government has managed to stick the “no-partner” label to the Palestinian leadership and thus has slammed the door on diplomatic negotiations. The credit for this slogan goes to Ehud Barak, who placed full responsibility for the failure of talks with the Syrians on Hafez Assad, and responsibility for the failure of the Camp David summit on Yasser Arafat. However, scrutiny of the history of talks between Israel and its neighbors reveals that the no-partner claim has been a part of the Israeli-Arab conflict from its outset. A study of statements by Israeli leaders David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, by pre-state Revisionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky and many others reveals that the concept of the “iron wall” led their actions. To their mind, there was no partner to talk to on the Palestinian or Arab side. The fact that most of the Arab leaders refused to speak to Israel’s leaders, at least until 1967, lent credence to this idea. But its dominance became counterproductive when leaders began to appear on the other side who did show willingness to talk to Israel under certain conditions. That was the case, for example, when as far back as 1965 the president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, proposed recognition of Israel on the basis of the 1947 UN Partition Plan. That was also the case with Anwar Sadat, who was not

הפוסט There Is No Israeli Partner הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The claim that there is no one to talk to on the Palestinian side is a common one in Israeli discourse, seemingly an axiom. The Netanyahu-Barak-Lieberman government has managed to stick the “no-partner” label to the Palestinian leadership and thus has slammed the door on diplomatic negotiations. The credit for this slogan goes to Ehud Barak, who placed full responsibility for the failure of talks with the Syrians on Hafez Assad, and responsibility for the failure of the Camp David summit on Yasser Arafat. However, scrutiny of the history of talks between Israel and its neighbors reveals that the no-partner claim has been a part of the Israeli-Arab conflict from its outset.

A study of statements by Israeli leaders David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, by pre-state Revisionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky and many others reveals that the concept of the “iron wall” led their actions. To their mind, there was no partner to talk to on the Palestinian or Arab side. The fact that most of the Arab leaders refused to speak to Israel’s leaders, at least until 1967, lent credence to this idea. But its dominance became counterproductive when leaders began to appear on the other side who did show willingness to talk to Israel under certain conditions.

That was the case, for example, when as far back as 1965 the president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, proposed recognition of Israel on the basis of the 1947 UN Partition Plan. That was also the case with Anwar Sadat, who was not perceived as a possible partner although he had proposed a peace plan even before the 1973 Yom Kippur War. So it was with Arafat, although in 1988 he declared his acceptance of Resolution 242 and his abandonment of the road of terror. The same thing happened with regard to the Arab peace initiative of 2002, which proposed a peace treaty with all the Arab countries in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Down through the years, the no-partner claim was criticized by researchers studying the Middle East. In the 1980s, Yehoshafat Harkabi, who had been the chief of Military Intelligence and was a renowned scholar of the Israeli-Arab conflict, said this claim was serving as a pretext for annexing territories conquered in 1967. Criticism has also recently come from Middle East expert Prof. Matti Steinberg, who saw the no-partner claim as a manifestation of Israel’s patronizing attitude that the worthiness of Palestinian partners is a function of their willingness to obey Israeli dictates.

The case of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is particularly interesting. Since he became president in 2005, he has called for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed-on adjustments. In fact, on both of the thorniest issues, Jerusalem and refugees, a moderate Palestinian stand can be seen from the minutes of secret talks in 2007 and 2008 between then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Abbas and between then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and then chief negotiator Ahmed Qureia.

The minutes were leaked to Al-Jazeera. Since the participants had not imagined such a leak, we may assume that the minutes reflect their true positions. The Israeli public, which was not exposed to this information at all, is not aware that the gap between the two sides, including on key issues, had become significantly smaller.

Abbas’ consistency in his position, his reiteration of opposition to a popular struggle against Israel and his emphasis that the establishment of a Palestinian state does not mean a return to the borders of the Partition Plan or 1967, validates his statements. It is interesting that when the Arab-Palestinian side refuses to negotiate (for example the “three nos” of Khartoum in 1967, the Palestinian National Charter, the Hamas charter ), Israel’s leaders treat these declarations seriously and view them as credible reflections of Arab positions. However, when Arabs take a positive position, moderate or conciliatory (Arafat, Assad, the Arab peace initiative ), there is a tendency to belittle the importance of such declarations, which are perceived as an attempt to mollify the West or as worthless rhetoric.

The obvious conclusion is that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s declaration that there is no Palestinian partner does not necessarily stem from the fact that there is no one to talk to, but more from the fact that Netanyahu and Lieberman have nothing to talk about. People who do not want to promote peace talks find it convenient to explain away the continued stagnation by saying that there is no partner, not by Israeli rejectionism.

There is a partner on the Palestinian side, and his name is Mahmoud Abbas. Perhaps after the elections an Israeli partner will emerge.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט There Is No Israeli Partner הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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