We owe it to ourselves to ask the question: Where did we go wrong? Why did we not allow the Biden administration to implement the detailed plan it had prepared for the day after the war in May, which included an alternative to Hamas in Gaza and the normalization of Israel’s relations in the region in a way that would provide security against Iran and its proxies? Why did the Biden administration fail to use the many levers the US has over the Israeli government to save us from the continuation of the catastrophe that has caused so much unnecessary suffering?

What allowed Trump, whose values could not be more contrary to those of the liberal camp in Israel and the United States, to succeed where the principled and Zionist Joe Biden failed?

One of the main reasons for this is the view, which still prevails among too many in our camp and the leadership of most Jewish organizations abroad, that there must be “no daylight” between the positions of the American administration and the Israeli government.

This approach is not only anachronistic but also truly harmful when Israel is led by a government whose main purpose is its own self-preservation. A purpose that often comes at the expense of Israel’s national interests. A purpose that goes against the position of the majority of the Israeli public and that of the liberal majority of American Jews, who have long supported the cessation of hostilities, the release of the hostages, and the defense of our democracy against attempts to destroy it.

Translating pressure

The Prevailing view is not only that it is forbidden to show a gap in positions, but even more so that it is forbidden to translate the gap into pressure on the Israeli government – even one as antagonistic and in need of reigning in as our current one.

A prominent example of this playing out was the criticism from some of the leaders of Israel’s liberal camp regarding the delay in supplying two-ton bombs ahead of the entry into Rafah. It was clear there was no operational need for these bombs, but it was a signal and a message to Israel that it must take the position of the American administration into consideration with regards to the risk of collateral damage.

Another example was the malicious attack in Israel and from many Jewish organizations in the US against the vote of 19 senators – all supporters of Israel and the special US relationship with Israel – who voted to disapprove of unrestricted weapons transfers and send a message to Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that American aid is not a “blank check.”

The position of the senators was unambiguous: The US should not unconditionally support a futile war without a strategic plan to get hostages home or for the day after – and should not do so in violation of US and international law and in a manner that harms both American and Israeli interests.

Biden and his secretary of state Antony Blinken invested monumental efforts in building plans that could have dramatically and positively changed Israel’s situation in the region and brought back the hostages, but they failed to implement them because they feared the political repercussions of pressuring the Israeli government. The Biden administration continued to declare at every opportunity that the prevention of the deal was Hamas’s fault, even though it was as clear as a bell that Netanyahu was the main obstacle to the deal. They removed political pressure that could have gotten hostages home and ended the war sooner, contrary to their own stated goals.

Netanyahu immediately understood the dynamic and Biden’s weakness, openly disregarding American requests.

Hamas is indeed responsible for the atrocities of October 7 and is an openly jihadist, barbaric terrorist organization, but its position over the halting of the fighting to free the hostages has not changed since the first day of the negotiations. After the IDF completed the majority of its military tasks many months ago, there was no reason to prevent the conclusion of the deal other than Netanyahu’s narrow political considerations, primarily the preservation of the coalition.

Jewish organizations in the US supported the release of the hostages, but due to those anachronistic and harmful constraints, they failed to use their influence to actually do something about it. The automatic backing of the Israeli government’s position proved both absurd and dangerous.

This is not the first time that the tendency of many Jewish organizations and leaders in the Israeli liberal camp to align with right-wing governments here has caused strategic damage to Israel. The opposition to the nuclear deal between the P5+1 superpowers and Iran is another example.

They aligned with Netanyahu’s position, leading to the eventual Trump withdrawal from the agreement that had stopped Iran from developing weapons. In hindsight, it is now abundantly clear that the agreement was the best option available, and Trump’s withdrawal from it has resulted in Iran becoming a threshold nuclear state. It also allowed China and Russia to extricate themselves from the international coalition designed to prevent Iran’s nuclearization, and they are now both in a strategic alliance with the ayatollahs’ regime.

Another example was the support of many Jewish organizations and centrist leaders in Israel for Trump’s and Netanyahu’s policies to abandon the Palestinian issue in the framework of the Abraham Accords. This weakened the Palestinian factions that support a settlement and strengthened Hamas. Together with other moves to strengthen Hamas and weaken the Palestinian Authority, this was among the factors that led to October 7.

There is no doubt that there is an Israeli interest in normalization with Arab countries, but the attempt to achieve this goal while bypassing the Palestinian issue dramatically harms Israel’s security interests. Here too, the voice of many Jewish organizations was not to be heard.

The time has come for the majority in the Jewish community in the US and the centrist politicians in Israel who claim to lead the liberal camp to realize that the “no daylight” approach in Israel-US interaction only serves the agenda of the messianic Right and the survival of governments that harm Israel’s vital national security interests. It is high time for collaboration between the opponents of the far Right, on both sides of the ocean, to enable an American foreign policy that supports the values we believe in instead of the survival of Netanyahu and his supporters.

The article was published on February 2nd 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Biden’s Failure and Trump’s Success הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Biden expressed his hope that such a moment will someday be reached. This statement reflects Biden’s approach to the Palestinian issue as expressed during his visit to the region: on the one hand, empathy and the outline of a long-term political vision, on the other hand, skepticism about progress in the short term and avoidance of discussing a tangible peace plan.

What can we learn from Biden’s visit about the administration’s policy on the Palestinian issue? Israeli commentators explained that the Palestinian issue had disappeared, while senior figures on the Palestinian side expressed disappointment with the visit. But the Palestinian angle of the visit requires a more complex analysis.

A discussion of the issue is, of course, influenced by the point of reference, whether we compare Biden’s policy to those of Trump or Obama or to the expectations of Israel and the Palestinians. A distinction must also be made between the declarative level of the visit and the measures discussed.

An analysis of Biden’s rhetoric shows that the administration reaffirms support for the two state solution and the importance of maintaining a political horizon. Biden emphasized, in his remarks in Bethlehem, that the solution should be based on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps. In other words, he reiterated American policy that preceded Trump, which was supported by Presidents Bill Clinton, George Bush and Barak Obama. Biden expressed solidarity with the suffering of the Palestinians (referring, among other things, to restrictions on movement), and stressed that both sides deserve equal measure of freedom and dignity.

On the other hand, Biden’s statements made it clear that the US does not believe prospects for political negotiations have matured at this time, and in remarks he delivered upon landing in Israel, he said that while he advocated the two state solution, he was aware it would not materialize anytime soon. The lack of urgency of the issue was also reflected in the ambiguous wording of the Jerusalem Declaration, signed by Biden and Prime Minister Yair Lapid (with a commitment to “discuss challenges and opportunities in Israeli-Palestinian relations”). The Palestinians were discouraged by Biden’s failure to address the settlements and the occupation.

On the question of Jerusalem, Biden took a cautious stance and spoke of a city for all its people, central to both sides’ national visions. He noted that the US recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, but added that the division of sovereignty over the city would be determined by negotiations.

His visit to a Palestinian hospital in east Jerusalem, unaccompanied by any Israeli official, was unusual (he was preceded by a Blinken visit to America House in east Jerusalem), but Biden was careful to present it as a private humanitarian visit, and he did not repeat his promise to open the US consulate in Jerusalem, which served as the liaison with the Palestinians but was closed during the Trump era.

Therefore, given that the Biden administration clearly does not intend to advance any peacemaking effort in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in the near term, where is it going? Biden’s statements and actions suggest several policy directions. First, since taking office, Biden has renewed ties between Washington and Ramallah (after a rift created during the Trump era) and restored the economic aid that had been discontinued. In this context, on his visit Biden announced an aid package for hospitals in east Jerusalem, for UNRWA, and for food security.

These measures are part of an American policy aimed at improving Palestinians’ daily lives. Support for initiatives to strengthen the Palestinian economy are also mentioned in the Jerusalem Declaration, which is in keeping with the shrinking-the-conflict approach supported by senior Israeli government officials.

New economic and civil measures

IN THIS context, Biden took advantage of the visit to announce a number of economic and civil measures, with Israeli consent, including upgrading the cellular phone network in the West Bank and Gaza to 4G technology, opening the Allenby Crossing (between the Occupied Territories and Jordan) 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and reviving the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Committee (JEC). These and other measures were discussed in the past, but did not materialize.

Palestinians have been critical of Biden’s focus on the economic context, without promoting a structural change in the current situation. A Palestinian nurse who attended the president’s speech at Augusta Victoria thanked him for supporting the hospital, but added, “We need more justice, more dignity.”

In his remarks in Bethlehem, Biden tried to link these steps to a political vision, portraying them as measures that could feed the flame of hope, but they appear to be disconnected from a political context. This is compounded by Palestinian anger at the administration for failing to re-open the consulate in Jerusalem and the PLO’s offices in Washington.

Second, Biden pointed to an additional interim goal of steps to bring Israelis and Palestinians closer together. That includes measures to promote dialogue at the leadership level (such as between Lapid and Abu Mazen) and to encourage people-to-people ties. During his visit, Biden announced two additional grants within the framework of the MEPPA (Middle East Partnership for Peace Act) initiative for joint civil society projects in healthcare and technology.

Third, Biden presented another policy direction of using the normalization process in the region as a tool to renew the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This was reflected in part by Morocco’s involvement in the contacts between Israel, the US and the Palestinians on expanding the Allenby Crossing hours of operation and in reported American efforts to integrate the Palestinians into regional forums being created in the wake of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Summit.

On the other hand, Mahmoud Abbas stressed to Biden that the process had to be reversed, starting with an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and then moving on to a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative (2002). Senior Saudi officials backed this position, despite the aviation normalization measures, and declared during Biden’s visit that normalization would be possible only after the two state solution was implemented. In doing so, Saudi Arabia reiterated its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative and made clear that its relations with Israel are limited by a glass ceiling.

At the same time, the administration has been drawing red lines regarding Israeli policy on the ground. While Biden did not refer publicly to the settlements, he made it clear behind closed doors to his colleagues in Jerusalem that he expects zero surprises on the Palestinian issue, including measures in east Jerusalem and the expansion of West Bank settlements.

This stance continues the Biden administration’s involvement in issues such as foiling the plan to build a neighborhood in Atarot or preventing the evacuation of Palestinian families in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. The current administration is clearly acting quietly on these matters, avoiding public statements, apparently as a lesson from the Obama era. What is more, Biden does not want to politically hurt the current government and; therefore, prefers to deal with these issues behind closed doors.

In conclusion, the Biden administration has signaled from the start that the Palestinian issue is not a high priority on its agenda and while it boasts of reversing various moves made by Trump, in other areas it has not undone the changes he made. The administration has taken a two-pronged approach, promoting measured civil-economic steps and actions to prevent escalation, and offering a distant political vision of two states, and an equal measure of freedom and dignity.

With the visit over, the administration must work to connect the two components and formulate a strategy that connects the near-term steps to the long-range vision. Although we are under a transitional government and in the midst of another election campaign, the administration should take advantage of this stage to translate the declarations on a political horizon into an action plan for the day when hope and history rhyme.

This article was posted in “JPost” on July 26th, 2022

הפוסט Biden’s Israel visit reiterates his views on the two state solution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The early days of a new administration are an important period of organizing, learning and preparing. Patterns consolidated during this period impact the administration’s future course, and the mechanisms and principles adopted serve as the basis for policy and set the tone for the coming years.

Administrations have maximum power and enjoy abundant credit in their early days. That is particularly true for the Biden administration that also enjoys a majority in both houses of Congress, and which could make good use of this period to create a momentum for advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. To that end, a Mitvim Institute task-team recommends the following policy directions:

1. Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been marginalized in recent years on the international agenda, with global actors shifting to domestic concerns and more burning regional issues, and to the Covid-19 crisis. Despite the myriad of challenges it faces, the Biden administration must signal at the outset that it attributes importance to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiate declarations and steps attesting to its intention to restore the issue to the international agenda.

2. Renewing ties and building trust with the Palestinian leadership. The incoming administration must announce at an early stage the renewal of US ties with the Palestinian leadership and launch a high-level political dialogue. The renewed ties should walk back Trump-era measures by re-opening the PLO offices in Washington and the US Consulate in east Jerusalem, and resuming USAID assistance to the Palestinians and funding for UNRWA. The administration could also advance confidence-building measures vis-à-vis the Palestinians, such as promoting economic projects in Area C and assisting in alleviating the COVID-19 crisis. Declaring the return of the US to its traditional support of the two-state solution and opposition to settlements would also be of importance.

3. Emphasizing the US commitment to the two-state solution and formulating parameters for a final-status agreement. The Biden administration must declare its commitment to the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and mutually agreed land swaps as its vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a declaration would ratify the US commitment to international norms, the principles of international law and UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the administration should start formulating parameters for a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, to serve as a clear framework for future negotiations and shape the domestic and international discourse. However, the administration should also weigh the challenges in such a move and carefully consider the correct timing and manner of unveiling such parameters.

4. Preserving the feasibility of the two-state solution and drawing red lines. The Biden Administration must ensure that the two-state plan is preserved as a feasible and concrete solution, blocking efforts on the ground designed to make it irrelevant. The administration will have to draw clear red lines against creeping annexation measures, expansion of settlements, legalization of outposts and Israeli construction in the E1 area and Givat Hamatos. At the same time, the administration could demand that Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) ratify their commitment to their previous agreements and maintain security and civilian coordination, while demanding that the Palestinians mount a determined campaign against terrorism, condemn terror attacks and counter incitement.

5. Leading multilateral steps, such as creating a new international mechanism and an incentives package. The Biden administration should lead the formation of an international mechanism for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such a mechanism could be based on the P5+1 model (which negotiated the Iran nuclear deal) or on the Quartet, with the addition of key Arab and European states. This mechanism should put together an international incentives package for peace and outline international parameters for resolution of the conflict. It could also serve as a platform for additional multilateral measures, such as forming regional working groups, harnessing regional organizations of which Israel and the PA are members and convening an international peace conference.

6. Leveraging Israeli-Arab normalization to advance the peace process. The administration should harness progress in relations between Israel and Arab states for the benefit of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. In doing so, it could integrate the states that have normalized relations with Israel into joint forums with Israel and the Palestinians, and into economic and energy projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In attempting to promote normalization agreements with additional Arab states, especially with Saudi Arabia, the administration could create a linkage to the Palestinian issue, inter alia by conditioning normalization on a halt of settlements’ construction and creeping annexation.

7. Improving the situation in Gaza and ending the internal Palestinian divide. The Gaza Strip is facing a harsh humanitarian crisis, beset by explosive tensions that could escalate into violent clashes at any moment. The US has consistently distanced itself from the issue, but the new administration must stop avoiding it and help advance a solution. The administration should advance plans and projects with international partners to improve the well-being of Gaza’s residents, on issues such as energy, border crossings and vaccines. The administration would also do well to increase its involvement in efforts to avoid clashes between Israel and Hamas, help the UN envoy’s efforts on this front, and seek to advance a long-term solution to the Gaza issue under the aegis of the PA.

8. Empowering pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian actors, including in the civil society. The Biden administration should advance dialogue and cooperation between citizens on both sides of the conflict. The administration should provide backing for pro-peace civil society organizations in Israel and the PA, including regular meetings of administration representatives with them, and seek effective implementation of recent legislation that aids organizations engaged in Palestinian-Israeli cooperation (Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act). At the same time, the administration should appeal directly to various elements within Israel society in order to strengthen support for the two-state solution and promote a discourse on this issue, while working on the Palestinian side to stem the anti-normalization trend undermining joint Israeli-Palestinian activity.

9. Setting a constructive tone to relations with the Israeli leadership and public. The administration should shape relations with Israel in a manner conducive to the advancement of peace and creation of mutual trust. It should learn lessons from the Obama years regarding the relationship with Israel’s government and society, and pay attention to the tone and style of the discourse even when expressing criticism. The Biden administration could initiate public goodwill gestures toward Israelis, and display public expressions of sympathy for Israel, and at the same time present the government with clear demands on the Palestinian issue and set red lines.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 1 March 2021.

הפוסט How Biden should handle Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For anyone for whom Zionism and humanism are important, especially those who remember the trauma of the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, it is hard to think of a more disturbing connection than the one we witnessed that night.

It was a historic event in many ways which harked back to images of the United States during the Civil War. It highlighted a phenomenon that should have been recognized before – Trump’s presidency tried to transform the US from a leader of the free world into a third-world country. Had he won another term, he would likely have succeeded in doing so, due to his shocking disregard for science on the issues of the corona and climate change, his relentless attack on the media and anyone who thinks differently from him, and finally, his unprecedented incitement against the US democratic process.

Trump and his playbook have become a model for an entire network of nationalists, racists and narcissists, which unfortunately includes not only Orbán in Hungary, Bolsonaro in Brazil and others around the world, but also the Israeli Right. Moreover, the Israeli flag has been appropriated as one of the symbols of the struggle of these authoritarian populists. Most of them hate Jews, just as they hate anyone who is different in skin color, religion or values. But they really like Netanyahu’s Israel, which for them represents anti-Muslim machoism, anti-liberalism and a wonderful symbiosis with their idol, Donald Trump.

Right-wing commentators continue to explain that the Left, which criticizes Israeli policies, is antisemitic – a ridiculous claim for too many reasons to list here. Recently, for example, right-wing media commentators have portrayed those critical that Israel does not take responsibility for vaccinating the population in the Palestinian Authority and Gaza, as a sign of left-wing antisemitism. Particularly ironic is their claim that Israel has no such obligation, even though international law obliges the occupier to take care of the needs of the occupied, due to the transfer of powers to the Palestinians in the Oslo Accords.

For self-serving purposes, these commentators appear to suddenly support the Oslo Accords. Moreover, they appear unbothered by the moral and medical consequences of the fact that the Palestinians and Israel remain intertwined, both because of the number of Palestinians working in Israel and because of the number of settlers and our security forces among them.

As someone who opposes BDS and the attempt to blame Israel before examining the facts, I can testify that at times there is no lack of ignorance, naivety and even malice on the radical Left – but antisemitism?! Not only have there always been many Jews on the radical Left, but for many years, the ultra-Orthodox were anti-Zionists and some still retain this view today – does that make them antisemites?

Many contemporary antisemites are actually lovers of Israel. The classical Catholic antisemitism, which accused us of crucifying Jesus, has disappeared due to both theological changes and developments at the Vatican, especially with Pope Francis, who is a sworn lover of Jews. On the contrary, the new antisemitism hates Jews and loves Israel.

ANTISEMITISM IS a racist phenomenon and racism is a phenomenon that is mainly right-wing, just as we see among Trump supporters who believe in white Christian supremacy. These groups are an inspiration to extreme Right organizations, such as “La Familia” and “Flame” in Israel, who believe in Jewish supremacy and a “pure forever” Beitar Jerusalem.

People may be wondering why we are losing the support of liberals and progressives, a fast-growing demography in the US. People may be afraid that we are losing the support of the world’s most important and largest Jewish community. People may not understand why many in Europe have difficulty supporting Israel in recent years. The Israeli flag raised in the riots on Capitol Hill should provide the answers.

However, as a student of former president Shimon Peres, I am a hopeless optimist, so I will end with a positive scenario. Despite the horrific events on Capitol Hill, on the very same day we also witnessed some hopeful signs of an opposing trend: Republican Party leaders, including Vice President Mike Pence and former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, finally distanced themselves from Trump.

In Georgia, a Black senator and a Jewish senator were elected for the first time in history and the exciting alliance between them reminded us of the friendship between Rev. Martin Luther King and Rabbi Avraham Yehoshua Heschel. With their election, the Democrats won a majority in both houses of Congress, giving a greater opportunity to clear the rubble and repair the damage left behind by Trump.

It is precisely the awful images from Capitol Hill that we saw last Wednesday which will demonstrate the dangers of populism and racism to many in the US and around the world. As such, we can begin to see the pendulum of the historical dialectic return toward the liberal outlook we saw during the Obama administration’s eight years and in Europe since World War II.

Here too in Israel, there are signs that even the Right is beginning to understand that one must move away from the cult of personality and “Bibi-ism,” which has rendered the Likud, a party whose connection to Jabotinsky and Begin’s liberalism, as entirely coincidental.

There is also a new and encouraging trend in our politics of courting Arab candidates among parties that have previously distanced themselves from any contact with the Arab sector.

Perhaps the cliché, “it’s always darkest just before dawn,” will come true and the racist populist camp will lose control of politics, not only in the US but also here – soon in our time.

הפוסט New antisemitism hates Jews, loves Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Incoming American presidents tend to adopt policies diametrically opposed to those of their predecessors in order to convey a change in direction. Often, this comes across as forced and unnecessary from a policy perspective. This time, that is not the case. Trump strayed so far from traditional American positions that it will be incumbent on Biden to reverse policy on many issues. In terms of personality and moral compass, the next President is also Trump’s polar opposite. These differences will manifest themselves on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

To renew peace efforts, Biden will have to update U.S. policy quickly. This means pulling back from Trump’s “deal of the century”, expressing renewed commitment to the two-state solution, opposing steps that undermine it and incentivizing those that encourage it. Biden will also have to reverse decisions by Trump that weakened moderate Palestinian leaders. He will have to restore, and even increase, suspended U.S. funding to the Palestinians (including to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations), re-open the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem (and not subordinate it to the U.S. Embassy in Israel), and invite Palestinian representatives back to their Washington mission shut down by Trump. A change in policies and reversal of decisions will enable the Biden administration to build trust with the Palestinian Authority and heal the rupture that Trump has caused. The U.S. will once again have open and effective channels of communication to both sides, allowing it to resume the role of mediator that it had played (not always successfully) for decades.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Israeli-Palestinian issue will not be a priority for the Biden administration. Many in the peace camp are therefore convinced that they should not nurture much hope, especially given the multiple domestic challenges facing the new administration. That might well be the case, but it is not necessarily inevitable. Pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians have a duty to make clear to the Biden administration the paramount importance of this issue. The obstacles to peace are piling up. Severe damage was done in recent years to the prospects for peace, damage that must be repaired. Israel’s right-wing government seeks to make a two-state solution unviable, and domestic trends in Israel and among the Palestinians do not bode well for peace either. Faced with this reality, the White House must make it clear that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is important and urgent, that resolution of the conflict is essential and feasible, and that enhanced dialogue and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians is vital to achieve that end. Such messages, even if not initially accompanied by significant policy moves, would empower Israeli and Palestinian advocates for peace and will help reshape public discourse in Israel.

Yet another accepted view these days is that Biden will advance a multilateral approach to U.S. foreign policy. In adopting such an approach, the Biden administration will restore the Obama administration’s style of foreign policy, respond to the need for joint action in the face of the Covid-19 crisis, and work towards healing the transatlantic rift created by Trump’s defiant attitude toward the EU and NATO. Such a multilateral approach could be advantageous for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, especially if implemented in a more effective manner than Obama did. Although the U.S. is central on the global stage, it cannot resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alone. Previous US administrations recognized this limitation, but were hard pressed to act accordingly. While the U.S. spoke about multilateralism, and took certain steps in that direction, it was unable to change its pattern of independent action and its aspirations for sole leadership.

To implement effective multilateralism that advances peace, the Biden administration should first and foremost promote the formation of a new multilateral mechanism, in essence an updated version of the Quartet (formed in 2002, and including the U.S., Russia, the UN and the EU). Key European and Arab states would be invited to join this mechanism, which would have to engage with pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians who can articulate the needs of both peoples to the international community. Such a mechanism could formulate renewed international understandings on the parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement. This would require adapting previous policy documents initially drafted in the early 2000s (such as the Clinton parameters, the Bush roadmap and the Arab Peace Initiative) to current circumstances. The multilateral mechanism could also lead to the formulation of an international incentive package for peace that would impress upon both Israel and the Palestinians the fruits of peace. Making the benefits of peace tangible and specific from the outset will boost political willingness and public support for achieving it. The international community has expressed support in the past for such a package, but no attempts were made to devise one under the Trump administration.

What did occur during the Trump period was a change in Israel’s relations with states in the Middle East. The Trump administration contributed to a significant strengthening of Israel’s ties with Gulf states, but did so by circumventing the Palestinian issue and weakening the Palestinian Authority. Biden should help Israel manage its emerging ties with the UAE and Bahrain, but in a manner that ensures advantages for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. Israel’s ties with Jordan and Turkey, two countries with a direct bearing on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, deteriorated under the Trump administration. American investment in improving these relations could pave the way for additional opportunities for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation track in the future. And finally, a new regional organization was formed this past year in the Eastern Mediterranean — the Cairo-based gas forum (EMGF), of which both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are members along with several Arab and European states. Biden could leverage US engagement in this forum to advance economic and diplomatic Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.

Biden’s move into the White House will generate opportunities and hope for the Israeli-Palestinian context and beyond. Renewed U.S. involvement in advancing the two-state solution should be viewed with optimism. Israel must greet it with open arms, rather than engineering provocations such as an expansion of settlements. The measures that the Biden administration can and is expected to take during its term will not in themselves yield the hoped-for peace, but with tailoring and precision, they could serve as a positive and significant turning point, injecting new energy into efforts to advance it.

**The article was published by the Middle East Institute, 30 November 2020

הפוסט Biden could generate momentum for Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first truth is that despite obvious differences between Obama and Netanyahu, the bond between the United States and Israel remains strong. This should not be taken for granted; even in the days leading up to Biden’s visit a developing story about an alleged scheduling miscommunication between the two heads of state began to overshadow his tour.

Still, reducing the nuances of the U.S.-Israel relationship to the dynamics between their leaders is limiting. Obama and Netanyahu aren’t the first American president and Israeli prime minister to endure a difficult partnership, and they won’t be the last. In the end, regardless of the intense disputes that may poison personal relationships, the success of U.S.-Israel ties depends on shared values and common interests.

This was unexpectedly and tragically demonstrated in the aftermath of Taylor Force’s murder at the hands of a Palestinian terrorist in Jaffa on March 8. Force, a former US army officer and Vanderbilt graduate student, died just a few hundred yards away from Biden’s family, who were spending their evening on the Tel Aviv promenade (the terror attack in Jaffa was one of three that took place that day, leaving another 14 wounded).

“The kind of violence we saw yesterday, the failure to condemn it, the rhetoric that incites that violence, the retribution that it generates has to stop,” Biden told reporters during his press conference with Netanyahu. Although he would later add that terror couldn’t be thwarted by “physical force” alone, Biden’s comments were reassuring to an Israeli public concerned that a chasm has grown between them and the United States.

“You never need to doubt,” Biden reiterated, “the United States of America has Israel’s back.”

The second truth is that the Obama administration will not be leading future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Many speculated Biden would push for a renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority during his trip, which included a brief stopover in Ramallah. According to reports, Biden floated a number of proposals during his meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, notably a future Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and Israeli settlement freezes in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and abandoning the demand for a Palestinian right of return.

However, how serious were Biden’s overtures? Considering that prior to his arrival in Ramallah, Biden critiqued Abbas for failing to condemn the Jaffa terror attack, it is fair to ask how sincere these efforts were, and to what degree the vice president was given a mandate to bring both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiation table. In the end, Biden’s meeting with Abbas was unproductive.

To Abbas’ credit, acknowledging Biden’s proposals would have only further stained his public image. And though his current political situation is tenuous at best, Abbas (and Netanyahu, for that matter) knows that come January 2017 there will be a new administration in the White House hoping to make its own mark resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, Biden’s visit confirmed what we already knew: that any Obama-led peace initiative would, at best, lay the groundwork for serious negotiations under the next administration, but is unlikely to produce meaningful results.

Finally, Biden’s trip served as a reminder to both sides that Iran will continue to test the mettle of their alliance for years to come. It was no coincidence that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ testing of ballistic missiles marked with the phrase “Israel must be eliminated” coincided with Biden’s visit. And while it did manage to prompt a direct reassurance from the Vice President that the United States stood behind its Middle Eastern ally, the incident also dredged up their bitter dispute over how to counter the Islamic Republic’s threat to regional stability just as officials in Washington and Jerusalem negotiate the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding that will determine American military aid to Israel in the coming years.

In light of the fact that Biden is a longtime supporter of Israel, and nearing the end of his political career, perhaps the impact of the vice president’s visit shouldn’t be overstated (even though the U.S. Embassy in Israel entitled its video summary of Biden’s visit, “Friends Forever”). Nevertheless, he succeeded in reminding Israelis that although tensions exist within the U.S.-Israel relationship, a deterioration of ties is preventable so long as there remains an open channel for honest dialogue. Regardless of what occurs during the remainder of the Obama presidency, Biden’s message needs to be internalized by American and Israeli politicians going forward in order to ensure that the U.S.-Israel alliance weathers inevitable future storms.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט Biden in Israel: A reset in diplomatic ties? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.