הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren Discusses the Trump-Netanyahu Meeting | BBC | February 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren Breaks Down the Ceasefire: Israel, Hamas, and Gaza’s Future, The New Arab, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The normalization of the relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was close before October 7, 2023 but was shelved after the attack by Hamas. Indeed, one of the goals of the attack was to torpedo it.

The end of the Israel-Hamas War and the agreement for the release of the hostages present a new opportunity to bring this initiative to fruition. We are witnessing an ideal moment, combining two essential elements required for success: first, a significant change; second, the presence of an appealing idea or plan ready to be implemented.

The major change is marked by two significant events. First, the end of the war. History shows that wars often create opportunities for large-scale change due to their tectonic impact. This war has caused significant damage to Iran and its proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas – and has led to Syria’s removal from the Axis of Resistance.

However, such post-war opportunities are not always seized, often due to a lack of leadership or due to short-sightedness, stubbornness, or folly on the part of a country’s leaders.

The second major change is the new US administration, with Trump driven by personal ambition to leave a lasting legacy, possibly by securing a Nobel Peace Prize.

At the same time, there is an attractive proposal on the table: normalization with Saudi Arabia. For Israel, the appeal of this prospect lies in the fact that Saudi Arabia is a key player in the Gulf, the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as the international stage.

An agreement with Saudi Arabia would strengthen the regional coalition against Iran. Moreover, given that all previous peace and normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states have withstood the test of war, such an agreement would further solidify Israel’s integration into the region.

Riyadh’s influence

Saudi Arabia’s influence is evident in three main arenas. Diplomatically, it plays a leading role in both regional and international processes. For instance, in 2002, Saudi Arabia introduced the peace initiative that evolved into the Arab Peace Initiative. It is still ratified annually by the Arab League summit, though it has never received an official response from Israel.

Similarly, during the recent Israel-Hamas War, Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, hosted the 2023 Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit, bringing together in a joint meeting both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation for the first time.

In addition, Saudi Arabia, in partnership with the European Union, founded the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, an international coalition of approximately 90 member states.

Most recently, on January 12, 2025, Riyadh hosted the foreign ministers of the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, along with representatives from 11 Arab states, to discuss the situation in Syria. This indicates that Saudi Arabia is not willing to cede the Syrian arena to Turkey, Qatar, or extremist Islamic groups.

Economically, Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Middle East, even surpassing Turkey. It holds the world’s largest oil reserves and has the capacity to increase production. This gives Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, the ability to swiftly compensate for any disruptions in the international oil supply – whether due to boycotts of countries like Iran or Russia, or natural disasters, such as those that have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico.

By doing so, Saudi Arabia can prevent a dramatic rise in oil prices, which otherwise would trigger shock waves throughout the global economy.

Saudi Arabia also serves as a crucial economic anchor for Egypt and Jordan. The tens of billions of dollars these countries have received over the past decade have been instrumental in maintaining the stability of their regimes.

This economic leverage is expected to play a significant role in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to exert influence in Syria following the formation of a new governing regime, as well as in Lebanon after the election of a new president not aligned with Hezbollah.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia holds considerable media influence in the Arab world, with its Al Arabiya network surpassing the popularity of the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera.

Finally, Saudi Arabia enjoys a unique status in Islam, as it is home to the two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, which host the annual Hajj pilgrimage attended by over two million Muslims annually.

For these reasons, normalization with Saudi Arabia opens the door for Israel to the large Saudi market and perhaps also to other Muslim countries, such as Indonesia.

The main challenge, however, lies in resolving the Palestinian issue. Prior to the war, it seemed that Saudi Arabia might settle for a symbolic concession on Palestine as a condition for normalization. However, statements made by senior Saudi officials during the war indicate that the price of normalization has risen significantly and now includes the establishment of a Palestinian state.

On the other hand, former US secretary of state Antony Blinken stated that normalization “is ready to go,” but two conditions must be met: the end of the war in Gaza and a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood.

Assuming that the war will indeed end, the main bone of contention is the Palestinian issue, especially given that the war has brought about a decline in the willingness of the Jewish public in Israel to agree to a Palestinian state.

However, a survey conducted in early January 2025 found that more than 70% of the Jewish public supports the return of the hostages and the end of the war, normalization with Saudi Arabia, a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians, and the formation of a regional security coalition against Iran.

The concept of a “pathway to separation” from the Palestinians may be constructively ambiguous, but it raises several important questions: Will it satisfy the Saudis? Will there be a Palestinian partner? Can a diplomatic and security arrangement be reached in Gaza, potentially in partnership with moderate Arab states, that satisfies both sides?

While the answers to these questions are complex and uncertain, one thing seems clear: An opportunity exists for realizing the normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Will it be seized? As Winston Churchill once said, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity; the optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.”

The article published in January 23rd 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Normalizing Relations with Saudi Arabia Provides New Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli public has been waiting for this for months, with consecutive public opinion polls indicating that a large majority supported ending the war in Gaza in return for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

As months went by, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing governing coalition worked to avoid such a deal — Hamas was doing the same. And the U.S. administration, although heavily invested in mediation efforts, simply didn’t apply effective pressure to make either party change course.

At the same time, the number of living Israeli hostages gradually decreased; casualties among Israeli soldiers increased; and the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population continued.

Today, Israelis are supportive of the cease-fire deal, but they also can’t help but ask why it wasn’t reached six, seven or eight months ago. The terms that were discussed and rejected at the time were nearly identical to the ones agreed upon now. Why was it necessary for additional hostages, soldiers and civilians to die before leaders finally took action?

Still, the deal brings with it a sigh of relief. We, Israelis, have all come to know and care so much about the hostages. Hope for their release and concern for their fate have become part of our daily lives. Their families have been leading a brave and furious struggle to bring them back home, sometimes in the face of unbearable, ugly attacks by the far right.

Many Israelis showed solidarity and support, feeling a basic Israeli principle had been jeopardized — the state’s responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring its people back home. And it was often claimed in recent months that until the hostages returned, Israeli society couldn’t heal from the trauma of Oct. 7.

Now, things are finally moving forward. The excitement upon the return of the first three hostages was felt in every corner. But we also receive the cease-fire announcement with a heavy heart. Not all of the 33 hostages who are to be gradually released in the deal’s first phase are said to be alive, and no one definitively knows which hostages will return on their feet.

More questions arise too: What will be the health condition of those returning? What will be the fate of the remaining 65 hostages who are to be released in later phases of the deal, which Netanyahu doesn’t seem eager to implement? What will be the future of Gaza after Israel’s withdrawal? And will residents of southern Israel finally be able to return home safely?

There are still many unknowns. But since the cease-fire was announced, they also carry a spark of optimism.

This deal shows that, eventually, diplomacy can work. International mediators can deliver. Sides to a bitter conflict can reach an agreement, and public pressure can make an impact. It shows that suffering can come to an end, that families can reunite and a better future can emerge.

Taking place in the context of many other regional changes, this cease-fire also creates new opportunities. From the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire in Lebanon to the transition in Syria and the weakening of Iran, all these developments improve Israel’s geopolitical situation. If only the country had a government that would seek to leverage this to advance a two-state solution, we could have witnessed a much more dramatic transformation — including normalization in Israeli-Saudi relations.

The window of opportunity for such change will still exist for a while to come, but its realization would require different, more moderate Israeli leadership, as well as curbing and sidelining far-right extremism, reversing anti-democratic trends within Israeli society and politics, and reviving pro-peace attitudes and practices.

The immediate priority, however, is fully implementing all phases of the cease-fire agreement, and setting in motion a constructive “day after” plan in the Gaza Strip — one involving the Palestinian Authority and regional countries, at the expense of Hamas. Israelis and Palestinians will need a continuous international helping hand to do this, especially from the U.S.

It’s time to turn the page on the dark chapter that Oct. 7 brought, and start charting the better, more peaceful future that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. The cease-fire inches us closer to that reality, and the mediators who, however belatedly, made it happen deserve appreciation and thanks, and they should follow the process through till it is fully implemented.

The article published on January 22nd 2025 in Politico.

הפוסט Gaza Cease-Fire: The View From Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren on the Breakthrough Regarding the Ceasefire Negotiations, The Monocle Daily, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas is agreed after 15 months of war, Ksenia Svetlova and Prof. Yossi Mekelberg join Emma Nelson from The Monocle Daily to discuss.

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הפוסט Ksenia Svetlova and Prof. Yossi Mekelberg on the Ceasefire Deal, The Monocle Daily, January 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The lack of open and direct dialogue between Israel and Hamas necessitates international mediation. While neither Israel nor Hamas are interested in a violent confrontation, such a confrontation can occur at any given moment. The continued hostility between them, alongside a severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and the inability of Hamas to deliver the economic and political conditions required to end this crisis, maintain prospects for violent outbreaks. The use of violence as a political tool helps Hamas raise the humanitarian crisis in Gaza on the regional agenda, as a means of preserving its status as the ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

Given that the current state of affairs continues, international mediation initiatives towards a ceasefire in Gaza are doomed to fail. Without an agreement between Israel and Hamas, and without the backing and active involvement of the Palestinian Authority, there is no real prospect to improve living conditions in the Gaza Strip.

In light of Israel’s decision to refrain from an all-out military attack to defeat Hamas, both sides are looking for interim solutions to the challenges posed by Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, which sees itself as the legitimate sovereign of the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which fears a spillover of violence that will undermine stability along the Sinai-Gaza border, are also parties to this charged relationship.

Due to Palestinian Authority’s historical semi-state status and to the PLO’s role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt cannot abrogate Mahmoud Abbas’ demands and ignore the Palestinian Authority’s needs while searching for a solution to Gaza. Abbas sees the recent indirect dialogue between Israel and Hamas as undermining the status of the PLO. The international mediation, led by the UN envoy and some Arab states, grants Hamas with increased political legitimacy, and Abbas, who has already lost control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, cannot afford a situation whereby the PLO’s political status is further undermined.

Attempts by Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire agreement that does not involve the Palestinian Authority raise concerns among the PLO and Fatah leaderships. The PLO is therefore making efforts to thwart any initiative that does not give it a central role in the reconstruction of Gaza. This was said quite overtly during the recent PLO Central Council meeting in Ramallah (15-17 August 2018). It has also become a major source of contention in the intra-Palestinian reconciliation attempts.

The inability of Hamas and Fatah to unify the Palestinian political system also makes it difficult to reach a regional arrangement in Gaza. The disputes among the Palestinian movements obstruct efforts by the donor countries to extend assistance, since there is no agreed upon mechanism for transferring and managing the funds.

A ceasefire arrangement could serve as a temporary solution, but one that will continue to inflame the tensions between Fatah and Hamas, and between Israel and Hamas. Since Israel’s Cast Lead operation in Gaza in the summer of 2014, there have been cycles of violent confrontations between Israel and Hamas, that did not evolve to a comprehensive military conflict. The current year has seen another escalation, which was triggered by the Gazans’ “Return Campaign”, which included marches towards the border fence as well as arson attempts via kites.

These actions and the casualties involved were supposed to generate support of Hamas’ objectives in the Arab world and beyond. This campaign, however, failed. The marches led to escalation and to an increase in Palestinian fatalities, but did not generate the media response and political pressure on Israel that Hamas hoped for, not even on the part of Arab countries. The lack of political achievements of such a popular struggle strengthened Hamas’ military wing, at the expense of the movement’s political wing.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire are intended to produce a glimmer of hope for the residents of Gaza, but the political obstacles, primarily the split between Hamas and Fatah, reduce the chances of success. Moreover, Israel currently sees the developments in Syria (especially the Iranian presence there) as a more urgent challenge to deal with than that of Gaza. But leaving Gaza behind only raises the bar of violence there. It leads to renewed escalation and riots with the IDF along the border, with Hamas closely monitoring their intensity.

As long as the Fatah-Hamas rift remains unresolved, international mediation regarding Gaza can produce only temporary solutions. The socio-economic problems of the Gaza Strip and the division of power within Palestinian society will continue to create difficulties and to challenge the status quo. To counter this, permanent solutions are needed, and these can only be achieved under international auspices and with US support.

However, the current lack of trust between the PLO and the US administration prevents this. Trump’s decision to cut funding to UNRWA reflected once again that Gaza is not just an internal Palestinian issue. It is turning from a regional problem to a complex international one, in which there is a clash between American interests and those of other major countries.

While US President Trump aspires – unsuccessfully for the time being – to lead peace efforts under his own terms, the EU and other donor countries are looking for alternative short-term solutions that will significantly ease living conditions in Gaza. Such solutions, despite their importance, are not likely to solve the intra-Palestinian divide nor to produce a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

The road to an effective solution must include constructive US involvement that backs both sides to the conflict, and not just Israel. This is necessary for Israelis to feel that their security interests are taken care of, for the Palestinians to restore trust in the US, and for the US to once again be able to play the role of an accepted mediator.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Quest for a Long-Term Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.