ארכיון China - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/china/ מתווים Wed, 13 Jul 2022 14:40:35 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון China - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/china/ 32 32 The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-interests-of-global-powers-in-the-mediterranean-and-israeli-policies/ Thu, 19 Mar 2020 11:07:41 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3262 This policy paper sets out the various interests and goals of global powers (the US, Russia, China and the EU) in the Mediterranean, and the measures they are undertaking to implement them. The document also describes Israeli policies vis-àvis the powers’ activities in this region, and points to the principles that should guide them. The paper is based on a July 2019 meeting in Jerusalem of the research and policy working group on Israel in the Mediterranean, held at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center.

הפוסט The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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This policy paper sets out the various interests and goals of global powers (the US, Russia, China and the EU) in the Mediterranean, and the measures they are undertaking to implement them. The document also describes Israeli policies vis-àvis the powers’ activities in this region, and points to the principles that should guide them. The paper is based on a July 2019 meeting in Jerusalem of the research and policy working group on Israel in the Mediterranean, held at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center.

הפוסט The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/coronavirus-outbreak-an-important-test-for-globalization/ Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:33:26 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3012 The quick-fire coronavirus spread and the response of different countries to it, not only highlight immediate concerns about public health, but also have a significant impact on the evolving world order and the values that underpin it. While further challenging globalization, the crisis also holds out hope for its resurgence. The epidemic is an additional blow to the vision and practices of the globalization process that is already under strain. The two world powers that led globalization – the US and China – turned to limiting the scope of their cooperation and exchange of goods, people, and even ideas. In early March, the US decreased the number of visas granted to Chinese journalists. In many places, citizens have elected leaders more concerned with domestic values than with a commitment to a global visions and institutions; and the European Union, a crowning achievement of globalization in both practice and values, is creaking and weakening. The coronavirus event provides globalization with additional practical and symbolic challenges. So far, infection has been reported in over 85 countries, and its spread will slow a global economy which is heavily dependent on international production and supply chains. The number of flights between countries, perhaps the most immediate personal experience of globalization, is quickly shrinking, with significant repercussions expected to outlast the epidemic. The outbreak hones the understanding that along with the free passage of people and goods between countries, globalization also can bring with it the spread of disease. Sadly, in the public health context, the limitations to globalization

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The quick-fire coronavirus spread and the response of different countries to it, not only highlight immediate concerns about public health, but also have a significant impact on the evolving world order and the values that underpin it. While further challenging globalization, the crisis also holds out hope for its resurgence.

The epidemic is an additional blow to the vision and practices of the globalization process that is already under strain. The two world powers that led globalization – the US and China – turned to limiting the scope of their cooperation and exchange of goods, people, and even ideas. In early March, the US decreased the number of visas granted to Chinese journalists. In many places, citizens have elected leaders more concerned with domestic values than with a commitment to a global visions and institutions; and the European Union, a crowning achievement of globalization in both practice and values, is creaking and weakening.

The coronavirus event provides globalization with additional practical and symbolic challenges. So far, infection has been reported in over 85 countries, and its spread will slow a global economy which is heavily dependent on international production and supply chains. The number of flights between countries, perhaps the most immediate personal experience of globalization, is quickly shrinking, with significant repercussions expected to outlast the epidemic. The outbreak hones the understanding that along with the free passage of people and goods between countries, globalization also can bring with it the spread of disease. Sadly, in the public health context, the limitations to globalization could be perceived as a positive development. Research examining the effects of the global flu epidemic in the winter of 1957-58 clearly showed Cold War constraints on movement between East and West curtailed the spread of the disease in the West.

The fact that the virus broke out in China is of particular significance. The rising Eastern power plays a critical role in the global economy, inter alia as the production hub of most goods we consume. We hailed this global production chain and the cheap goods it provided. Now that the crisis in China is preventing production and export, many countries will presumably try to bring back home some of their essential production elements. The US under President Donald Trump was trying to do so anyway, albeit for different reasons. Not only that, weakened Chinese economic activity is expected to undermine the global economy and thereby further erode the achievements of globalization.

The second issue highlighted by the epidemic is US-Sino competition. The Trump Administration imposed restrictions on travelers from China on public health grounds. However, China, which has already warned against a global “over reaction” is presumably concerned that some of the restrictions stem from political and perhaps even racist motivations. The crisis is also creating fertile ground for injecting an ideological dimension into US-Chinese tensions. So far, the competition between Washington and Beijing has revolved around material aspects: Global status, economic capacity and military power, but the coronavirus crisis is a test for the regime and society in both China and the US.

On the one hand, the restrictive and hierarchical nature of Chinese society appears to have delayed the identification and treatment of the Covid-19 disease, challenging the legitimacy of China’s Communist Party. It will invariably serve the US in future arguments about the advantages of an open American-style society versus the (partially) closed Chinese one. At the same time, the handling of the disease pits the American model of personal freedom, free market and private and decentralized medicine against the Chinese model that prefers the collective, a partly government controlled economy and medical services shaped according to a public ethos, albeit with some of it privatized nowadays. China’s ability to impose harsh restrictions on its citizens probably helped block the spread of the virus within China, while the ability of the US system to tackle the challenge is unclear as yet.

Nonetheless, the crisis is also an opportunity to revive globalization. First, the crisis is a reminder of our underlining unity as humans. Beyond divisions, wars and hatred, the crisis shows that different people share rather similar anxieties. Second, international cooperation is crucial. A coordinated, cross-border international effort to monitor and treat the disease, and to speedily develop and disseminate a vaccine across national borders will end the epidemic. This is an important lesson in light of other global challenges, especially climate change. In both cases – climate and public health – mobilization to tackle them should overcome national boundaries. Specifically, the epidemic also highlights the importance of international organizations. Those who are critical of such organizations should be reminded that accepted international mechanisms (such as those being promoted by the World Health Organization) are critical for dealing with the challenges to public health such as the Coronavirus epidemic. Without them, things would be much tougher.

We – leaders, opinion setters, educators and citizens – hold the key to addressing the epidemic and later shaping its legacy: international isolation and competition or shared humanity and cooperation mechanisms. Two 20th century novels – Camus’ “The Plague” and Saramago’s “Blindness” – include horrific depictions of human behavior in the face of epidemics. However, they also highlight heroes who act with compassion and humaneness towards their fellow wo.men. Let us hope that we follow their example of cooperation and humanity rather than alienation and disregard towards others.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Limited European Leverage over Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-limited-european-leverage-over-israel/ Thu, 12 Dec 2019 13:07:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2820 Israel and the EU maintain exceedingly close relations with each other. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and has extensive cultural and political ties to the country. Despite this, Israeli public discourse often portrays the EU as an opponent – not least due to their differences over the Middle East Peace Process and Israel’s settlement policy, as well as the EU’s continued defence of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power. Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the EU maintain exceedingly close relations with each other. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and has extensive cultural and political ties to the country. Despite this, Israeli public discourse often portrays the EU as an opponent – not least due to their differences over the Middle East Peace Process and Israel’s settlement policy, as well as the EU’s continued defence of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/when-israel-smiled-at-the-world-the-world-smiled-back/ Fri, 15 Nov 2019 12:52:38 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2818 “In the last decade of the twentieth century, atlases, history and geography books no longer present an up-to-date picture of the world. Walls of enmity have fallen, borders have disappeared, powers have crumbled and ideologies collapsed, states have been born, states have died and the gates of emigration have been flung open. It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is now – to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and do everything possible to fit into this world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us’. We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation.” With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict. Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly.

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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“In the last decade of the twentieth century, atlases, history and geography books no longer present an up-to-date picture of the world. Walls of enmity have fallen, borders have disappeared, powers have crumbled and ideologies collapsed, states have been born, states have died and the gates of emigration have been flung open. It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is now – to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and do everything possible to fit into this world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us’. We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation.”

With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly. He did so based on solid reasoning and a broad strategic view. He was a pragmatic man who could read the map, identify opportunities and make tough decisions. He understood that the PLO was growing weaker and that unless he sought agreement with that organization, he would face a tougher alternative – Hamas. He also understood Israel’s changing circumstances following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Soviet bloc.

Rabin assessed that this was an opportunity to try to resolve the conflicts with Israel’s immediate neighbors so that when the time came, Israel would be able to face its harshest and most dangerous enemies – Iraq and Iran. He was thoroughly aware of the hurdles he would have to face on the path he had chosen, the crises, the disappointments, but he had decided that he would leave our children and grandchildren a different kind of world, one of hope and normalcy.

I had the privilege of serving the State of Israel and working with him. I had the privilege of serving during the Oslo Accord days, of witnessing the changes Rabin underwent and the tremendous breakthroughs made by Israel’s Foreign Service. From a state that just months previously had clashed with the US government over loan guarantees for immigrant absorption, Israel became a desired ally. Relations with the US were transformed, becoming warm and intimate, with every Israeli diplomatic move coordinated with the US administration and receiving its blessing and support.

I saw and experienced how the world opened up to us, how states which did not even recognized us changed their position. From China and India to Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. Representatives from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all gathered at my home in New York, where I served as Consul General, to meet Rabin. He also managed to make the old dream of peace with Jordan a reality.

The Middle East began opening up to us, and new channels of cooperation were examined at well-attended economic conferences we held in Morocco and Jordan. Europe, too, opened up to us, giving Israel preferential trade status and making it the first non-European partner in its Horizon 2020 research program.

I had the great privilege of being at Rabin’s side when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1996, ten days before his assassination. The hall was packed. Most Heads of State in the audience applauded at length, not only because of what he said but also because they appreciated Rabin and his leadership. They stood in line for long moments to shake his hand. The sympathy of the world enveloped us, constituting the best proof that when we open up to the world, it opens up to us.

Rabin the soldier fought tenaciously against terrorism. I saw him angry and pained when he was informed of a terror attack, I saw him uncompromising when he had to make decisions and I also heard him shouting at Yasser Arafat when he had to. But he also bequeathed us new concepts, redefining the term “security” to include not just tanks, planes and missile boats, but also education, housing and well-being. Security, for Rabin, lay mostly in human hope.

Yitzhak Rabin was a modest man, often introverted, but also sure of himself; a man who did not like small talk and had no patience for fools and liars, for sycophants and fear-mongers. The red-headed Prime Minister spoke his mind, sometimes bluntly. In this sense, he was not blessed with diplomatic skills. But it was his direct style, his deep voice and shy mien that won the hearts of many.

In these days of determined attempts to undermine the State’s gatekeepers and institutions, it is important to remember Rabin’s respect for democracy and the rule of law, even when it concerned his personal life. Let us remember his desire to place the citizens at the top of the government’s priorities, his actions in support of civil equality, his attitude toward the Arab citizens in whom he saw partners, and the real actions he took to rectify past injustices.

Rabin, the man with the analytic mind, had well-defined, firm views, but he knew how to adapt himself when necessity dictated. Rabin knew how to dream and how to make his dreams come true. For him, the essence of Zionism was to establish a safe haven for the Jewish people.

For me, Rabin’s legacy is of integrity and modesty, courageous leadership, respect for democracy and civil rights, the vision of peace, and, above all, a life of hope.

Colette Avital is a former Member of Knesset and Ambassador, and is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-perils-of-netanyahus-monarchic-diplomacy/ Thu, 23 May 2019 08:57:53 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2780 Prime Minister Netanyahu used foreign policy as major theme in the 2019 election campaign. Giant billboards depicted him standing alongside President Trump. His aides pointed to his diplomatic achievements, including US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the close ties he had forged with major world leaders. Once the voting was over, Netanyahu posed for a photo-op with close Likud party associates under a giant picture showing him meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jin Ping. Ahead of the elections, the Prime Minister also scheduled a series of visits and events to highlight his position as an arch-diplomat. These included inauguration of a Hungarian trade office in Jerusalem, the supportive statement by Romania’s prime minister for moving its embassy to Jerusalem, Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and a visit by the newly elected President of Brazil. Capping his activity was a meeting with Russian President Putin in Moscow prior to the return of the remains of Zachary Baumel, an Israeli soldier killed in the 1982 Lebanon war. Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Prime Minister Netanyahu used foreign policy as major theme in the 2019 election campaign. Giant billboards depicted him standing alongside President Trump. His aides pointed to his diplomatic achievements, including US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the close ties he had forged with major world leaders. Once the voting was over, Netanyahu posed for a photo-op with close Likud party associates under a giant picture showing him meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jin Ping. Ahead of the elections, the Prime Minister also scheduled a series of visits and events to highlight his position as an arch-diplomat. These included inauguration of a Hungarian trade office in Jerusalem, the supportive statement by Romania’s prime minister for moving its embassy to Jerusalem, Trump’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and a visit by the newly elected President of Brazil. Capping his activity was a meeting with Russian President Putin in Moscow prior to the return of the remains of Zachary Baumel, an Israeli soldier killed in the 1982 Lebanon war.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trump’s Policies on Iran and North Korea Are Weakening U.S. Diplomatic Power https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trumps-policies-on-iran-and-north-korea-are-weakening-u-s-diplomatic-power/ Wed, 20 Jun 2018 14:25:22 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2890 President Trump’s meeting with Kim Jong Un took place at a perilous time for American diplomacy. The meeting came on the heels of a surprising dispute with Canada, Germany, and France at the G7 summit, culminating in Trump’s refusal to support the summit communique and twitter spat with Canada’s Prime Minister. In Singapore with Kim Jong Un, Trump pivoted, and made surprising concessions to the rogue nuclear state. Trump has championed the ideas of unpredictability and brinkmanship, and both are on display. But unpredictability is not a successful foreign policy outlook. The U.S. needs a new approach to restore diplomatic credibility, strengthen partnerships, and meet the nuclear challenges posed by both Iran and North Korea. The current standing of American diplomacy shows the flaws of Trump’s approach. The U.S. is publicly at odds with Canada over trade, and with European allies over climate, defense spending, and Iran. Transatlantic unity has been frayed by unpredictability and withdrawal from international agreements. As Trump met Kim, many supporters of a substantive deal on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula considered a new hurdle: that counterparts will no longer see the U.S. as credible or capable of implementing a nuclear agreement. Denuclearization is a lofty goal in ideal times, and the current climate makes it even less probable for a nuclear state to voluntarily surrender its capabilities. In this context, it is unsurprising that the Trump-Kim meeting did not result in a tangible ‘win’ for nonproliferation. North Korea made no new commitments. Kim gained positive publicity

הפוסט Trump’s Policies on Iran and North Korea Are Weakening U.S. Diplomatic Power הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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President Trump’s meeting with Kim Jong Un took place at a perilous time for American diplomacy. The meeting came on the heels of a surprising dispute with Canada, Germany, and France at the G7 summit, culminating in Trump’s refusal to support the summit communique and twitter spat with Canada’s Prime Minister. In Singapore with Kim Jong Un, Trump pivoted, and made surprising concessions to the rogue nuclear state. Trump has championed the ideas of unpredictability and brinkmanship, and both are on display. But unpredictability is not a successful foreign policy outlook. The U.S. needs a new approach to restore diplomatic credibility, strengthen partnerships, and meet the nuclear challenges posed by both Iran and North Korea.

The current standing of American diplomacy shows the flaws of Trump’s approach. The U.S. is publicly at odds with Canada over trade, and with European allies over climate, defense spending, and Iran. Transatlantic unity has been frayed by unpredictability and withdrawal from international agreements. As Trump met Kim, many supporters of a substantive deal on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula considered a new hurdle: that counterparts will no longer see the U.S. as credible or capable of implementing a nuclear agreement. Denuclearization is a lofty goal in ideal times, and the current climate makes it even less probable for a nuclear state to voluntarily surrender its capabilities.

In this context, it is unsurprising that the Trump-Kim meeting did not result in a tangible ‘win’ for nonproliferation. North Korea made no new commitments. Kim gained positive publicity surrounding the meeting and a new U.S. commitment to suspend a large-scale military exercise with South Korea. It is unclear what comes next, and the potential for disagreement is high. While disputes with Canada lead to angry tweets, disputes with angry nuclear weapons states have far greater risks.

Trump’s talks with Kim are juxtaposed with his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and lack of a viable strategy. Direct and implicit threats are insufficient to meet long-term challenges, and they exacerbate tensions by empowering Iranian hardliners. Secretary Pompeo’s recent speech on Iran was not a strategy, but a demand for full submission that unilateral U.S. sanctions are unlikely to achieve, especially as European partners advance financial blocking regulations and exemptions from reimposed nuclear sanctions.

In the immediate term, U.S. threats coupled with European efforts may prevent Iranian nuclear escalation. But while the deal’s opponents feared regulations that would ‘sunset’ in the mid-2020’s, we are now in a shakier environment in which those provisions may collapse well before 2020. As a result of JCPOA withdrawal, the international community is less prepared to address a potential collapse, or an ambiguous action by Iran. Prior to the JCPOA, Iran’s strategy was based on developing its nuclear program in the grey area between technical compliance and clear violation. If Iran again began to operate in the margins, without committing a clear violation, how would the world respond?

A viable strategy should emphasize diplomacy wherever possible. It should consider that all other JCPOA parties, including China and Russia, remain committed to the deal. It should deploy threats of force sparingly and wisely, and promote smart diplomatic processes towards both North Korea and Iran when the chances of success appear realistic. Otherwise, the Trump administration risks placing the U.S. in a more isolated position, with less insight into Iran’s nuclear activities, and a diminished ability to leverage the powers of alliances and diplomatic credibility when engaging with rogue regimes. These are important tools that the administration should not turn away from.

Rebecca Bornstein is Director for External Relations and Researcher at the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump’s Policies on Iran and North Korea Are Weakening U.S. Diplomatic Power הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-art-of-the-israeli-russian-deal/ Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:46:18 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2882 On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions. On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/can-china-contribute-to-israeli-palestinian-peacemaking/ Thu, 11 Jan 2018 09:56:08 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2823 In December 2017, while the UN General Assembly voted against the American decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and while Palestinian leaders were seeking an alternative mediator to Trump, Israelis and Palestinians met in Beijing to discuss how to advance peace. Invited by the Chinese Foreign Minister, they traveled to China in order to understand whether China’s increasing interest in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be translated into a real contribution to the advancement of peace. China has a four-point peace plan, that is consistent with the internationally accepted positions regarding the two-state solution. Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the plan in 2013, and began promoting it again last summer. China also has a special envoy to the Middle East, who is promoting the Chinese plan and has tried in the past to assist reaching ceasefires in Gaza. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has previously initiated two IsraeliPalestinian meetings, one in China (2006) and the other in Jerusalem (2013), and announced last summer that it intends to convene Israeli and Palestinian peace activists in Beijing by the end of 2017. The meeting has indeed happened, in cooperation with the Geneva Initiative and Member of Knesset Hilik Bar (Zionist Union). China supports the two-state solution, which includes a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It consistently votes in favor of UN resolutions along these lines. However, the Chinese Foreign Minister and other senior officials made it clear at the Beijing meeting

הפוסט Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In December 2017, while the UN General Assembly voted against the American decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and while Palestinian leaders were seeking an alternative mediator to Trump, Israelis and Palestinians met in Beijing to discuss how to advance peace. Invited by the Chinese Foreign Minister, they traveled to China in order to understand whether China’s increasing interest in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be translated into a real contribution to the advancement of peace. China has a four-point peace plan, that is consistent with the internationally accepted positions regarding the two-state solution. Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the plan in 2013, and began promoting it again last summer. China also has a special envoy to the Middle East, who is promoting the Chinese plan and has tried in the past to assist reaching ceasefires in Gaza. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has previously initiated two IsraeliPalestinian meetings, one in China (2006) and the other in Jerusalem (2013), and announced last summer that it intends to convene Israeli and Palestinian peace activists in Beijing by the end of 2017. The meeting has indeed happened, in cooperation with the Geneva Initiative and Member of Knesset Hilik Bar (Zionist Union).

China supports the two-state solution, which includes a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It consistently votes in favor of UN resolutions along these lines. However, the Chinese Foreign Minister and other senior officials made it clear at the Beijing meeting that China does not take sides in the conflict. Rather, it claims that it is interested in promoting a solution that gives Palestinians their rights and ensures Israel’s security, recognizes the importance of Jerusalem for all religions and ethnic groups, and promotes regional stability. China declared that it intends to do so by mostly using positive economic leverages, instead of exerting political pressures. The Beijing meeting resulted in a joint Israeli-Palestinian paper that included guiding principles and policy steps towards the two-state solution. The meeting helped Chinese officials better understand the interests and sensitivities of the Israelis and Palestinians, and the points of agreement and disagreement between supporters of peace on both sides.

Is this a new and meaningful Chinese move, or is it merely a continuation of China’s low-key and symbolic involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? After all, many countries announce their aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace and show interest in the matter. Nevertheless, most of them do not give it high priority, do not believe that progress is possible under the current political conditions, nor do they invest great efforts and resources in advancing it. In a period of stagnation in the peace process and in light of recent American steps that make it even more difficult to renew negotiations, every country that is willing to help and contribute to peacemaking is important. China has the potential to play a useful role: It is an ambitious power with a growing global influence, which has good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, has unique economic capabilities, and promotes large-scale international infrastructure projects, including in Israel and the Middle East (as part of its far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative).

Chinese officials stressed at the Beijing meeting that China does not see itself as an alternative mediator to the US, but rather wants to be part of a multilateral effort to promote peace. This Chinese willingness to promote peace in coordination with other players in the international community is important and positive. Previous initiatives by other countries that were competing with each other, led mainly to failures. China’s position on the final status agreement is similar to that of the EU and the Arab League, therefore the establishment of a Sino-European dialogue channel on the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be a good starting point for Chinese involvement. In the future, it is worthwhile adding Arab officials and institutions to the initiative – led by Egypt, with whom China has a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Currently, there is no more consensus within the international community regarding the desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The American position has shifted under Trump, and within the EU there are countries (in Central and Eastern Europe) that adopt different positions to that of Brussels and which are rather supportive of Netanyahu’s policies. This makes it difficult to formulate the required international parameters for a twostate solution, but it should not interfere with other international actions that are currently on the diplomatic agenda, i.e. the formulation of a global set of economic and political incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. The idea of introducing to Israelis and Palestinians an incentive package that will increase public support in peace was adopted during the French Peace Initiative and by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council. It was also included in the final document of the Beijing meeting.

So far, incentives have been offered by the Arab League (the Arab Peace Initiative), the EU (the proposal to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state) and the US (security guarantees for the two-state solution formulated during the previous administration). China may add its own large-scale economic incentive, which will present a reality of prosperity and development that both Israelis and Palestinians will benefit from after reaching peace. For example, a senior Chinese official mentioned during the Beijing meeting that China has the potential to play a central role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. China can also be involved in the process of developing a new international mechanism to advance the peace process, which will be more inclusive and effective than the current Quartet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has chosen to invite to Beijing delegations that mostly included Israeli and Palestinian civil society activists, thus conveying the importance it attaches to informal activities to promote peace. Indeed, in their speeches, the Chinese officials emphasized how much hope they derive from the positive spirit of the discussions at the meeting, the agreements reached during it, and the fact that many citizens and organizations on both sides are committed to the two-state solution and to achieving it through peaceful means. As demonstrated in Beijing, the contribution of civil society to the peace process is not limited to grassroots dialogue and activism. Civil society can also have policy impact, by making genuine contributions to international diplomatic processes and by assisting politicians from both sides in reaching agreements and understandings. Although China’s added value is not in expertise regarding civil society, it can still provide significant infrastructural-economic support to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations, thereby increasing their visibility and impact, and assisting them to fulfill their potential. The meeting in Beijing did not lead to a breakthrough towards peace, nor was it its goal. It laid the foundation for greater Chinese involvement in the advancement of peace, highlighting China’s unique advantages and capabilities.

The meeting also showed Israelis and Palestinians that despite the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and increased tensions on the ground, they can still reach understandings and draw a common path forward. Promoting peace requires diverse and effective international involvement, but first and foremost, it requires local political will for peace. Achieving this requires further work, with and without China’s involvement.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. He participated in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium, held in Beijing on 21-22 December 2017. A shorter version of this article was published by Globes on 31 January 2018.

הפוסט Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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An Outward-Looking Israeli Foreign Policy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/an-outward-looking-israeli-foreign-policy/ Sun, 26 Nov 2017 11:30:10 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3347 Israeli foreign policy should shift from contrarianism to integration, and work toward a more committed role in international institutions and increased share in foreign and humanitarian aid. The special relationship between Israel and the US is the most important strategic asset for Israel in the global arena. Israel should become a strategic asset for the US by promoting peace and cooperation. It should re-establish its position in the bi-partisan US consensus and foster relations with new audiences within the US, including minority communities. Additionally, Israel’s foreign policy must adapt to changes in the global balance of power, and increase its presence in Asia and its cooperation with China, while protecting its relationship with the US. Finally, Israel must take into account the world Jewry when weighing the impact of its actions; it should strive to enable genuine Jewish pluralism, and identify new common ground on which to build Israel-Diaspora relations. This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט An Outward-Looking Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israeli foreign policy should shift from contrarianism to integration, and work toward a more committed role in international institutions and increased share in foreign and humanitarian aid. The special relationship between Israel and the US is the most important strategic asset for Israel in the global arena. Israel should become a strategic asset for the US by promoting peace and cooperation. It should re-establish its position in the bi-partisan US consensus and foster relations with new audiences within the US, including minority communities. Additionally, Israel’s foreign policy must adapt to changes in the global balance of power, and increase its presence in Asia and its cooperation with China, while protecting its relationship with the US. Finally, Israel must take into account the world Jewry when weighing the impact of its actions; it should strive to enable genuine Jewish pluralism, and identify new common ground on which to build Israel-Diaspora relations.

This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט An Outward-Looking Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Netanyahu Goes to China: Three Questions https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/netanyahu-goes-to-china-three-questions/ Tue, 28 Mar 2017 08:16:33 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4067 Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu’s March visit to China seemed to revolve around economic issues. The Israeli media reported that the main goal of the visit was to advance IsraeliChinese economic relations. A large group of Israeli business people accompanied the Prime Minister, and he met leaders of major Chinese corporations. Israel wants to export more to China, get more Israeli companies to operate there, and to attract more Chinese investments. Indeed, during the visit, numerous cooperation agreements were signed. At least in part, the Chinese are interested in expanding economic cooperation with Israel, as it is geographically situated near the route of Beijing’s maritime Silk Road, a vision for old-new trade lane going from China to Europe via the Middle East. More broadly, the visit is part of the Israeli “pivot”, of sorts, to Asia. This is the Prime Minister’s second visit to China in three years. Only in February, he visited Singapore and Australia. Israeli President, Reuven Rivlin, traveled to India in November 2016 and to Vietnam in March 2017. The institutional framework that supports the “pivot” is also being expanded. In February, the Prime Minister (who is also the Foreign Minister) announced that the units responsible for China and India in Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be upgraded. However, this is not only a story about economic cooperation. The broader, global context of the “pivot” is the transformation in great power politics. Asia’s economic and technological rise is bound to lead Asian nations to expand their military and

הפוסט Netanyahu Goes to China: Three Questions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu’s March visit to China seemed to revolve around economic issues. The Israeli media reported that the main goal of the visit was to advance IsraeliChinese economic relations. A large group of Israeli business people accompanied the Prime Minister, and he met leaders of major Chinese corporations. Israel wants to export more to China, get more Israeli companies to operate there, and to attract more Chinese investments. Indeed, during the visit, numerous cooperation agreements were signed. At least in part, the Chinese are interested in expanding economic cooperation with Israel, as it is geographically situated near the route of Beijing’s maritime Silk Road, a vision for old-new trade lane going from China to Europe via the Middle East.

More broadly, the visit is part of the Israeli “pivot”, of sorts, to Asia. This is the Prime Minister’s second visit to China in three years. Only in February, he visited Singapore and Australia. Israeli President, Reuven Rivlin, traveled to India in November 2016 and to Vietnam in March 2017. The institutional framework that supports the “pivot” is also being expanded. In February, the Prime Minister (who is also the Foreign Minister) announced that the units responsible for China and India in Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be upgraded.

However, this is not only a story about economic cooperation. The broader, global context of the “pivot” is the transformation in great power politics. Asia’s economic and technological rise is bound to lead Asian nations to expand their military and political power. China’s economic prowess already equals the US’ (according to some measures); while the West’s centuries-long hegemony is being shaken in the last decade as both Western Europe and the US faced a number of major political and economic crises, some of which are still unfolding. Israel, and the Zionist movement before, had always sought a great power ally. The “pivot” to Asia, is simply an adaptation of the old policy to new global realities.

However, three question are in order

First, can Israel get close to China without risking its “special relationship” with the United States? China’s rise to great power status and the specific challenges it poses to American hegemony – both in terms of power and in terms of norms – have already strained AmericanChinese relations. The Trump administration seems to further exacerbate the tension, mostly over trade issues. Steven Bannon, the President’s chief strategist, predicted (before the elections) that within a decade Washington and Beijing would go to war with each other. The Falcon deal incident, in which Israel canceled under American pressure (in 2000) an agreement to sell advanced surveillance aircraft to China, is a reminder of the difficulties of the balancing act required from Israel. For this reason, it is convenient for Israel to stress the economic dimension of its relationship with China, rather than a strategic agenda.

Second, will Israel ever be able to develop relations with China that are as close as its relations with the United States? Some of the fundamental building blocks of the IsraeliAmerican “special relationship”– a large Jewish community, an effective pro-Israel lobby – are simply not there. Israel and China further lack the deeper common Judeo-Christian tradition that oils aspects of Israeli-American affinity. Hence the Israeli effort to stress, when talking to Chinese, the similarities of modern states that reflect ancient traditions that both presumably share.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly: how would a close Chinese-Israeli relationship affect Israel’s own democracy, already under strain lately. After all, a state’s internal makings are also affected by the global structures of power, and the state’s alliance in the international arena. It seems that the Chinese stress power and historical rights as a source for legitimate action in the international arena, rather than universal norms. Those in Israel who prefer such an approach might use the example set by the new global power as a justification for a similar approach in Israeli foreign and security policy. Moreover, China traditionally prefers not to intervene in other states’ internal affairs, and is unlikely to comment on the quality of internal Israeli democracy and human rights the way Washington and Western European countries do. A growing role for China in the international community, and a closer alliance with China, are expected to diminish, therefore, the pressure Israel is facing – especially from civil society circles in the West – as it continues to control the Palestinians, and as its democracy is weakening.

Small states, such as Israel, do not always have much choice in the global competition between superpowers. Yet, as Israel reshapes its global alliances, we should be aware of the constraints and costs of getting closer to the rising power from the east.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Netanyahu Goes to China: Three Questions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Time for an Israeli Regional Initiative https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/time-for-an-israeli-regional-initiative/ Wed, 23 Nov 2016 18:33:47 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4263 On July 20, 2016, the Knesset Lobby for Regional Cooperation held a conference at the Knesset, in cooperation with the Mitvim Institute, on the need for an Israeli regional initiative that can assist the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds. The conference was attended by politicians, diplomats, and experts on regional affairs. The speakers included: Co-chairs of the Lobby for Regional Cooperation, MK Merav Michaeli, MK Yaakov Peri, and MK Michael Oren; Minister of Tourism MK Yariv Levin; Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation MK Ayoob Kara; MK Ksenia Svetlova, MK Zuheir Bahloul, MK Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin, MK Nachman Shai; Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Walid Obeidat; Ambassador of Bulgaria, Dimitar Mihaylov; Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, Thessalia-Salina Shambos; UNSCO Director of Regional Affairs Unit, Ms. Jody Barrett; Head of Political and Press Section at the Delegation of the European Union, Mr. Mark Gallagher; Political Counselor of the United States Embassy, Keith Mines; Professor Uzi Arad, Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and the head of the National Security Council; Head of Mitvim, Dr. Nimrod Goren; Mitvim Board Member, Professor Elie Podeh; Director of the Israeli Peace Initiative, Koby Huberman; Adv. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Head of the Tamar Regional Council, Mr. Dov Litvinoff; EcoPeace Middle East’s Director of Government Relations, Mr. Uri Ginot. This document presents an edited version of the remarks that were made at

הפוסט Time for an Israeli Regional Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On July 20, 2016, the Knesset Lobby for Regional Cooperation held a conference at the Knesset, in cooperation with the Mitvim Institute, on the need for an Israeli regional initiative that can assist the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as Israel’s relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The conference was attended by politicians, diplomats, and experts on regional affairs. The speakers included: Co-chairs of the Lobby for Regional Cooperation, MK Merav Michaeli, MK Yaakov Peri, and MK Michael Oren; Minister of Tourism MK Yariv Levin; Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation MK Ayoob Kara; MK Ksenia Svetlova, MK Zuheir Bahloul, MK Ayelet Nahmias-Verbin, MK Nachman Shai; Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Walid Obeidat; Ambassador of Bulgaria, Dimitar Mihaylov; Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, Thessalia-Salina Shambos; UNSCO Director of Regional Affairs Unit, Ms. Jody Barrett; Head of Political and Press Section at the Delegation of the European Union, Mr. Mark Gallagher; Political Counselor of the United States Embassy, Keith Mines; Professor Uzi Arad, Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and the head of the National Security Council; Head of Mitvim, Dr. Nimrod Goren; Mitvim Board Member, Professor Elie Podeh; Director of the Israeli Peace Initiative, Koby Huberman; Adv. Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Head of the Tamar Regional Council, Mr. Dov Litvinoff; EcoPeace Middle East’s Director of Government Relations, Mr. Uri Ginot.

This document presents an edited version of the remarks that were made at the conference. The full conference can be viewed on Mitvim’s YouTube channel.

הפוסט Time for an Israeli Regional Initiative הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/eastern-mediterranean-do-not-write-off-states-just-yet/ Fri, 23 Sep 2016 17:15:00 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4187 Do not write off states as power brokers in the Eastern Mediterranean maritime arena just yet. It is easy to do so.  Great powers (past, present and aspiring) as well as non-state actors seem to have eroded the centrality of regional state actors in shaping the region’s maritime security environment in the last few years.  Russia – both a past and an aspiring great power – revived the Soviet era fifth Eskadra (flotilla), which includes a permanent force of 10-15 vessels. Moscow further announced that it would be sending its sole aircraft carrier in the fall for a few months to the region. The deployment supports the Russian mission in Syria. It also allows Moscow to show off its technological prowess. On December 8, 2015, the improved Kilo Class diesel electric submarine Rostov on Don, operating in the Mediterranean, was the first-ever Russian submarine to fire operational Kalibr submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) while submerged, targeting Raqqa, the ISIS de-facto capital in Syria. More broadly, coupled with Russia’s energized relationship with Egypt and Israel and recently with Turkey, the deployment signals Russia’s reemergence as a regional power broker. The United States offered a response of sorts, by deploying for the first time in years, two carrier Strike Groups – Truman and Eisenhower – in the region for several weeks in the summer of 2016. In the meantime, China continues its slow maritime advance in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the routes leading to it. Beijing strengthened its civil and naval presence by buying, building, and operating port facilities

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Do not write off states as power brokers in the Eastern Mediterranean maritime arena just yet. It is easy to do so.  Great powers (past, present and aspiring) as well as non-state actors seem to have eroded the centrality of regional state actors in shaping the region’s maritime security environment in the last few years.  Russia – both a past and an aspiring great power – revived the Soviet era fifth Eskadra (flotilla), which includes a permanent force of 10-15 vessels. Moscow further announced that it would be sending its sole aircraft carrier in the fall for a few months to the region. The deployment supports the Russian mission in Syria. It also allows Moscow to show off its technological prowess. On December 8, 2015, the improved Kilo Class diesel electric submarine Rostov on Don, operating in the Mediterranean, was the first-ever Russian submarine to fire operational Kalibr submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) while submerged, targeting Raqqa, the ISIS de-facto capital in Syria. More broadly, coupled with Russia’s energized relationship with Egypt and Israel and recently with Turkey, the deployment signals Russia’s reemergence as a regional power broker. The United States offered a response of sorts, by deploying for the first time in years, two carrier Strike Groups – Truman and Eisenhower – in the region for several weeks in the summer of 2016.

In the meantime, China continues its slow maritime advance in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the routes leading to it. Beijing strengthened its civil and naval presence by buying, building, and operating port facilities in Greece, Israel, and Egypt, in the last few years. China is also building its first overseas naval station in Djibouti. These moves are part of Beijing’s ambitious new Silk Road vision, and will allow it to further secure its crucial sea line of communications to Europe. China’s maritime actions in the region signal that it accepts the responsibilities of a rising world power. In the spring of 2015, its naval forces evacuated not only hundreds of Chinese citizens, but also hundreds of other nationals from war-torn Yemen. There are also early signs of a more direct Chinese military and naval involvement in the region. In August 2016, a Chinese admiral visited Syria, and a month earlier China completed the delivery of a third corvette to the Algerian Navy. The Chinese also conducted a joint drill with the Russians in the Mediterranean in May 2015.

Global superpowers like China and Russia are not the only ones to pose a challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean. Several sub-state armed groups share the stage. Back in 2006, the Lebanese Hezbollah damaged an Israeli naval vessel, killing four sailors, when it effectively fired a land-sea c-802 missile at the Israeli flagship Saar 5 Class corvette INS Hanit. In recent years, Islamist groups have attacked a merchant ship in the Suez Canal and Egyptian navy vessels on the Mediterranean coast. A senior NATO official expressed concern earlier this year that an even graver threat will evolve in the central Mediterranean, following the expansion of ISIS in Libya.

Yet, states are still important in the maritime regional security architecture. American engagement in the region has waxed and waned since their navy operated against the Barbary pirates in the early 19th century. In the latest chapter of American naval power projection in the region, the 6th Fleet presence declined dramatically. At least for the US and China, and to a lesser extent even Russia, the eastern Mediterranean is a peripheral region, far from their core interests. Unlike great powers, local actors will remain engaged in the region due to the dictates of geography. For the regional actors, defending their shores and their sea lines of communications is a core interest: Not only because they are here to stay, but the discovery of offshore gas beginning in the 1990s raises the stakes for Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Turkey and possibly other regional actors. Indeed, regional actors have been building their naval capabilities, including power projection abilities in the last few years. In 2016, Israel received its fifth (out of six) German-built diesel submarines. A year earlier it signed a deal with the same German shipyard to purchase four multitask corvettes.  In June, Egypt took delivery of the French-built Mistral class landing helicopter dock, and is expected to receive a second one by the fall. This year Egypt also began the local construction of the first of four French-designed Gowind Corvettes, purchased marine helicopters from Russia, commissioned a missile corvette donated by Russia, and a FREMM class French-Italian frigate. Talks of a possible deal for two more French corvettes commenced in 2015. Egypt also took delivery of two American fast missile boats during the summer of 2015, completing an order for four. Cairo also purchased from the United States submerged Harpoon missiles for its submarine fleet.

Similarly, the Turkish Navy, a nine-century-old institution – continued the expansion of its power projection capabilities. In April 2016, Ankara opened an overseas military base in Qatar, which will include naval units. A Turkish shipyard began in May the construction of a landing helicopter dock (LHD) to be completed by 2021. President Erdoğan hinted that his country would move to construct a fully-fledged carrier in the next decade.

Robust regional navies suggest both risks and opportunities. On the risk side, growing naval prowess enhances the chances that an escalating regional conflict can turn violent. Turkish self-confidence on the seas, for example, can lead Ankara to take an even more assertive position over Cyprus’ gas prospecting. In turn, this can affect great powers by forcing them into conflicts they would rather avoid. A possible Hezbollah-Israel clash, for example, might expose the American forces operating in the region to allegations that they support the Israeli effort by virtue of the American-Israeli alliance. Strong regional actors could also humiliate, and even constrain, great power activity. Back in 1968, The Israeli Airforce shot down Soviet jets over Egypt, and more recently it was Turkey that downed a Russian jet. Both events embarrassed Moscow, and in effect, presented a constraint of sorts on its freedom of action.

Effective regional navies also create opportunities. They can serve as allies. After all, three strong regional navies – Egypt, Turkey, and Israel – have solid (though at times, strained) relations with the United States. As such, they can offer a compensation of sorts to the limited presence of the US Navy in the region. Even if not fully-fledged allies of the United States on the waters, some of the regional powers, notably Israel and Turkey, surely share America’s concern over the anti-access/area denial “bubble” the Russians created on Syria’s shores. This is fertile ground for cooperation.

Therefore, although external powers are yet again active in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and despite being challenged by non-state actors from below, regional states still matter in shaping the maritime security environment. The increased capabilities, and expanded reach of the Egyptian, Turkish, and Israeli navies coupled with the Russian and American presence in the region, as well as Chinese ambitions there, all create a more complex environment. In a final analysis, this complexity presents opportunities for the United States, as most of the strong regional actors are closer to Washington than to Moscow. This remains the case, even with the current glitches between the United States and its traditional allies Turkey, Egypt and Israel. If Washington plays this new iteration of a maritime regional “great game” well, it has much to benefit. However, in order to exploit the potential benefits of the relationship with regional states, Washington needs to re-build trust with these regional actors. A clear signal from Washington that the East Mediterranean remains a high priority for the United States, would be a good start.

(originally published by the Hoover Institution)

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean: Do Not Write Off States Just Yet הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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