הפוסט Hydropolitics in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Climate-Political Migration in Israel and Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Adapting the foreign system to the challenge of the climate crisis requires, first and foremost, a profound conceptual change. It calls for a shift from the logic of dealing with the climate issue as a “foster child” of secondary importance to core strategic issues to a new approach of climate diplomacy that sees the climate crisis as a political strategic game changer of prime importance to foreign policy and its implementation. Dealing with the climate crisis as a political issue challenges traditional thinking about the practices shaping foreign relations and about the actors expected to lead these processes. For example, it redefines the importance of non-governmental actors – civil society organizations, the scientific technological community, and the business sector – and positions them as active participants in shaping foreign policy. More broadly, adopting climate diplomacy provides an opportunity to reexamine the relationship between the government and non-governmental sectors in shaping Israel’s foreign relations as a whole.

Based on a review of the structure and activities of Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus on climate issues and case studies from other countries and interstate bodies, the aim of this policy paper is to propose recommendations for conceptual and structural-systemic changes to upgrade Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus handling of climate change challenges. Implementation of conceptual change in the field of climate diplomacy at the national level relies on three main components: a) anchoring and defining the role of Israel’s foreign policy within the framework of Israel’s national effort to confront climate change; b) a structural change in the foreign affairs system itself – defining a strategic integrating actor to deal with the international pillar of Israel’s climate policy; a clear internal division of roles within the system and improvement of inter-ministerial coordination through a permanent government forum; and substantial increase of resources and managerial inputs devoted to the field within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, we see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a national integrator in shaping Israel’s climate diplomacy. c) the creation of new multisectoral systems of cooperation between Israel’s governmental and non-governmental sectors.

הפוסט Upgrading the Capacity of Israel’s Foreign Policy Apparatus to Deal with the Climate Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This trend, together with progress in Israel-Arab relations following the Abraham Accords, creates new opportunities for regional environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. However, these opportunities’ full potential cannot be realized prior to a breakthrough toward Israeli-Palestinian peace. Moreover, the composition and policies of Israel’s current government pose additional challenges to Israel-Arab relations and have led existing cooperation to slow down. Nevertheless, and despite being limited in scope, regional cooperative endeavors are taking place and efforts to sustain them are underway.

The convening of the 27th (2022) and 28th (2023) United Nations Climate Change Conference summits in the Middle East – in Egypt, and in the United Arab Emirates respectively – helps such cooperation evolve. In addition, Israel and several Arab states (such as Morocco and the UAE) have signed bilateral agreements for cooperation on environmental-related issues. Minilateral endeavors, like the Israel-Jordan-UAE water-electricity swap deal and the Israel-Morocco-EU water dialogue, have been launched; and multilateral mechanisms and initiatives – including the Union for the Mediterranean, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and the East Mediterranean & Middle East Climate Change Initiative – enable Israel and its neighbors to jointly engage in tackling climate change.

President Isaac Herzog has called for regional environmental cooperation during visits to neighboring countries and introduced a visionary concept of a “renewable Middle East,” based on inclusive regional frameworks. The international community has a clear interest in enhancing such regional environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors, also with the aim of advancing Israel-Arab normalization and Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. The US and Europe are best positioned to achieve this advancement and can do so via the following pathways:

How can the US and Europe promote Israel-Arab environmental cooperation?

First, by providing third-party support: The US and Europe should further encourage and enable environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. They can be formal partners in cooperative endeavors, provide funding and technological assistance, convene support, assist with training and expertise, and serve as benefactors to ensure success. Third-party involvement is necessary to spark new cooperation and reach agreements, but also to ensure that understandings reached are implemented in a concrete way. Such involvement can increase the motivation of Israel and its neighbors to work together and can assist the countries involved in overcoming political, bureaucratic, and public opinion obstacles.

Second, by focusing on tangible benefits: When seeking to encourage regional environmental cooperation, the US and Europe should focus on initiatives that are likely to bring tangible benefits in the near term. This will make cooperation more likely and legitimate. Selected initiatives should be those that address the concrete needs of the countries involved – and play to their added value – but also have a potential global scale impact, beyond just the region. Relevant issues to engage in could include renewable energy, food security, innovative technologies, sustainable tourism, water desalination and reclamation, public health, and the blue economy.

Third, by including the Palestinians: Israelis and Palestinians share similar environmental challenges but do not formally cooperate on most of them, due to the political circumstances. The US and Europe should advance the inclusion of the Palestinians in Israel-Arab cooperative endeavors, with a political horizon of advancing the two-state solution.

Messages underscoring the US and European interest in seeing this happen should be conveyed to relevant countries in the region, to make it clear that they do not see the advancement of Israel-Arab cooperation as a way to sideline the Palestinian issue. This could also assist in fostering some mutual trust between Israelis and Palestinians and in creating joint interest in stability and de-escalation. Efforts should be made to ensure that existing regional projects (such as the Israel-Jordan-UAE water-electricity swap deal) also benefit the Palestinians (including those in Gaza) and to include Palestinian interests and needs in new projects that may be developed via mechanisms such as the Negev Forum. An effort should be made to leverage the joint and equal participation of Israel and Palestine in the EMGF and the UfM as well as to increase their cooperation – under a multilateral umbrella – on environmental issues.

Fourth, by encouraging multilateralism and inclusivity: Multilateral initiatives dealing with climate change have already proven their ability to bring rival parties to the same table. This is likely to continue, given the forecasts about the increasing negative implications of climate change for the region. The US and Europe need to empower regional and multilateral frameworks, making them more effective, ensuring coordination between them to avoid duplication of efforts, enhancing their inclusivity by bringing in additional countries (such as enabling Turkish and Lebanese involvement in the EMGF), fostering interregional connectivity (by providing observer status to relevant countries from other sub-regions), and enhancing engagement without recognition between rivals (as was the case with the Israel-Lebanon maritime border deal).

The US and Europe can also work to ensure that existing regional mechanisms – such as the EMGF and the Negev Forum – develop a specific focus on climate and the environment, and encourage the participation of civil society actors, not just officials.

Fifth, by investing in civil society: Parallel to efforts toward enhancing cooperation between governments and officials, the US and Europe should also acknowledge the important role that civil society organizations can play in fostering regional environmental cooperation between Israel and its neighbors. Examples of this are already mounting and having a concrete impact, in terms of content and of fostering constructive societal engagement. The US and Europe should therefore increase their investment in supporting such cooperation. They can do so by linking environmental activists and professionals from regional countries, providing them with opportunities for joint learning, training, strategizing, and sharing best practices and lessons learned, as well as developing cross-border or regional projects.

The US and the EU can ensure that existing funding schemes related to civil society cooperation in the region also include beneficiaries working on climate change, or seeking to enter the field. Finally, they should elevate environmental cooperation between regional NGOs and think tanks to also advance peace, security, stability, and prosperity.

COP28 in the UAE is already around the corner (November 30-December 12). Israel plans to be represented there by both its president and prime minister and is already involved in planning and preparation. However, the far-right composition of its current government and its policies on the Palestinian issue are taking a toll on Israel’s regional foreign policy and causing the development of Israel-Arab relations to significantly slow down.

Even this year’s Negev Forum ministerial meeting, originally slated to take place in Morocco in March, is being repeatedly postponed due to Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Climate change is presenting Israel with numerous opportunities for enhanced regional cooperation and the international community can help in realizing them.

But, should the Netanyahu government continue its current policies toward the Palestinian issue – the potential will not be realized, and missed opportunities will mount. In that case, as regional countries enhance their cooperation on environmental issues, Israel might be left out.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on July 17th.

הפוסט 5 ways the US, Europe can push for Israel-Arab environmental cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This paper was born out of collaboration between Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and Israel Policy Forum.

הפוסט The Prospects for a Regional Climate Forum in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article proposes four fundamental sustainability principles as the basis of policy making based both on the political and climatic spheres: future orientation, equality, environment and diversity. It highlights the symbiosis between environmental change, economic and social change, and emphasizes that the indicators serving us to assess the desired good must also be redefined. A framework of sustainability-oriented policy provides a variety of tools and strategies for future-oriented decisions extrapolated from the current reality, inter-sectoral work processes, reliance on scientific methods, and stronger local resource management, among other benefits.

In the context of Israeli foreign policy, sustainability-oriented approaches propose: (1) the formation of regional partnerships to strengthen regional resilience, (2) the linking of Israel’s integration into the Middle East to the promotion of Israeli-Palestinian peace, (3) the redefinition of who makes foreign policy, and (4) the analysis of geographic spaces even when disconnected from political borders. Adopting the conceptual framework of sustainable climate policy requires an examination of every action through two parameters – asking whether it is politically viable and climatically sustainable. The article offers several directions for examining these questions by using clear, simple metrics.

הפוסט Political-Climate Sustainability: The Core of Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming of relations is expected to boost existing fields of cooperation (e.g. trade and tourism) and de-freeze fields that were put on hold during years of tensions (e.g. the strategic dialogue on regional affairs). At the same time, it also creates an opportunity to launch new fields of cooperation on issues that are relevant to current realities.

Climate change is the leading field. It is an issue of growing centrality in both Turkey and Israel, in which there is untapped potential for joint endeavors. For example, Israel’s charge d’affaires in Ankara, Irit Lillian, recently told Turkish media that cooperation in the field of sustainability could improve economic and trade ties.

Climate change is already taking a toll in Turkey, with fires, droughts, flooding and pollution in the Marmara Sea. More extreme climate events are expected in the coming decades alongside the intensification of current trends. Until recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not convey a sense of urgency regarding climate change. However, in his 2021 speech to the UN General Assembly, Erdogan spoke much about climate change, calling for international action and emphasizing Turkey’s commitment.

In October 2021, Turkey ratified the Paris Convention, becoming the last G-20 country to do so. Turkey plans to reduce emissions by 21 percent by 2030 and reach zero emissions by 2053. With the support of the EU, a network of municipalities is operating in Turkey to deal with climate change. In late 2021, Turkey adopted a program called the “Green Development Revolution,” and in February 2022, a climate council was established in Turkey, with government support and participation of representatives from all over the country.

Climate change is likely to assume a more central role in Turkey’s political discourse, as the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections draw near. In January 2022, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu addressed a letter to young Turkish citizens, pledging that the political bloc he heads would lead to real climate change and “work to save the ecological future of Turkey and the world.”

At the same time, Erdogan is trying to rebrand himself from a leader criticized for ignoring the climate issue, into a leader of innovative national environmental programs who urges the international community to take better action. The approaching elections are likely to heighten his interest in developing climate-oriented cooperation with other countries, including Israel.

President Herzog’s vision of inclusive regional cooperation to tackle climate change raised interest in Turkey. This is partly because Turkey is not a member of the current Mediterranean frameworks in which Israel participates, e.g. the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the Cypriot governmental initiative to coordinate climate change activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Turkey feels that these initiatives isolate it in the region and that they do not have a real interest in its inclusion. A new Cypriot proposal to establish a regional framework to deal with summer wildfires has also been recently presented to Greece and Israel, but not to Turkey.

Israel’s climate developments

IN ISRAEL, there has been a recent discussion of turning the EMGF into a forum dealing with renewable energies, or energy in general, and not only natural gas. This is a result of difficulties in profitable cooperation in the natural gas field and the increased importance of renewable energies. Each EMGF member has veto power over adding new members or observers. For example, the Palestinian Authority has torpedoed the UAE’s request to be accepted as an observer in the forum.

Turkey does not believe Greece and Cyprus would accept its membership. To a lesser extent, there is a similar Turkish perception about Egypt. Even if the Hellenic states were willing to include Turkey, Turkey would likely demand representation for Turkish Cypriots as well, a condition that Cyprus and Greece are not expected to accept.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of upgrading the EMGF into an inclusive regional framework also dedicated to environmental issues does not seem feasible at this stage. The establishment of a new forum, built from its onset as a partnership among all countries of the region, stands a better chance of success since it would not be perceived as directed against any regional actor.

This could enable Turkey, Cyprus and Greece a measure of political flexibility, as has been the case with other regional frameworks that they joined upon establishment, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

Such a move could be jump-started with an Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian meeting on environmental and climate issues. This would have been considered impossible until recently, but it now appears more feasible given the cautious attempts by Egypt and Turkey to improve their relations. Israel can play a role in promoting such a meeting, albeit initially on an informal level, with a focus on promoting regional dialogue ahead of COP27 scheduled for late 2022 in Egypt.

Another new opportunity for regional cooperation on climate change issues is the parallel warming of relations between Israel and Turkey, and Turkey and the UAE. From an economic point of view, trilateral projects are already reportedly being discussed, and an Israeli-Turkish-Emirati summit on environmental and climate issues can also be advanced. In this case, there is less sensitivity than there is with Egypt – especially in light of Erdogan’s successful visit to the Emirates – and a gathering of officials from the three countries should be possible early on in the process.

Including the Palestinians

IT IS IMPORTANT to include the Palestinian issue in any discussion of regional cooperation on climate and the environment. The Palestinian issue is important to Turkey, and as part of warming relations with Israel, Turkey has an interest in finding new ways to help the Palestinians and advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Cavusoglu clearly stated that during his press conference with Foreign Minister Lapid, and that environmental issues could be part of a positive agenda that serves the interests of all parties.

In addition to the regional aspect, Israel and Turkey should launch bilateral cooperation on climate change, which could include a regular ministerial-level annual meeting – alternating between Israel and Turkey; ongoing contact between relevant professionals in government ministries, exchange of knowledge, coordination and joint work; mutual assistance in the event of exceptional climate events (fires, flooding, etc.) and the launch of a climate hotline; support for civil society organizations from both countries that are interested in environmental projects and joint action; and encouraging academic cooperation in the fields of environment and sustainability, which will include conferences, research as well as faculty and student exchanges.

Climate change is already reshaping the international system, creating common interests and fostering cooperation between countries that used to be at odds. Israel-Turkey relations stand to benefit from this trend. Tackling climate change can become a central pillar in the new chapter in relations, bringing benefits not only to the citizens of both countries, but potentially also to the region as a whole.

The op-ed was published in JPost in June 2022.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey must cooperate on climate change הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

International energy companies comprehended the situation quickly, especially regarding the COVID-19 crisis and the shift in global priorities concerning the fight against the climate crisis. The Biden administration gave it a much higher priority once it entered the White House. The energy companies successfully branded the natural gas as transition energy and promised to divert significant budgets to renewable energy. Their conclusion is that it is imperative to develop alternative and clean energy sources for the benefit of future generations. However, until we reach a stage where we can rely on them to a safe extent, there is no escape from relying on transition energy, which pollutes less than other energy sources, such as oil and coal.

The new government in Israel is trying to embrace this change in global priorities. To the climate summit in Glasgow in early November last year, Israel sent a high-level large-scale delegation, which included Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, the energy and environmental protection ministers and a long line of representatives from the business, political, civil, and academic communities. Israel, whose environmental performance is not outstanding, to say the least, declared through the prime minister that it pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero by 2050 and gradually stop using coal by 2025. As well, Bennett called on the Israeli business community to mobilize its creativity and innovation in favor of innovative technological solutions to tackle the climate crisis.

Energy Minister Karine Elharrar has also adopted these latest highlights. Last month, the minister made it clear that new gas exploration will be frozen over the coming year in favor of investment in renewable energies. Her aim, she explained, is that 2022 would be the year of renewable energies. Truth be told, this does not materially change or harm Israel’s energy security. The existing reservoirs, the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, combined with the Karish and Tanin gas fields that are in development will meet the needs of the local economy for years to come. The change in emphasis in minister Elharrar’s remarks ensures a new, committed, and challenging direction of investing in renewable energy and in her words, “this year we will be centered in renewable energies in order to create the right energy mix.”

In this respect, the criticism leveled at the minister from various directions (energy companies, economic commentators, and so on) is out of place. This is a one-year freeze, designed to help the energy, business, and political attitude adjustment required. Presumably, the minister was exposed to the new regional architecture, and internalized its strategic importance and implications during her meetings with colleagues from the region (Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus). An important achievement should be seen in the tripartite agreement signed between Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, regarding the supply of desalinated water from Israel in exchange for solar energy to be produced in Jordan. Its test will be, of course, in its application.

Is it possible that Elharrar’s message suffered from unsuccessful branding? It is very possible and likely that her previous comment, “we have become accustomed to 100% gas, and that will not be the case now” did not sound positively in some relevant circles and to some degree of justice. Essentially, it is not a question of stopping the searches for new gas, but of promising a change in the dosages to which we have become accustomed. This is required and corresponds with the political-energy reality in the international arena. Time will tell if and how it will be realized. By itself, this is a worthy promise.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 17, 2022

הפוסט Is there room for coexistence between energy and safe environment? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and the Environment in the Mediterranean Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.