They’re only one example of an exceptional level of international involvement in both this year’s Israeli national election campaigns, unprecedented in both scope and style. The posters, their iconography and their message have a significance beyond the intricacies of Israeli politics. They reveal the developing fault lines dividing two competing global camps – liberals and non-liberals – and their growing willingness to support allies and confront foes in a direct, unvarnished manner.

International support for Israeli political candidates engaged in competitive elections is not new. The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit organized by President Clinton to support Shimon Peres’ failed 1996 campaign is a notable example. However, foreign interventions have generally been far more low-key than the explicit pro-Netanyahu lobbying we are now witnessing. Gone are previous campaigns conducted cautiously behind the scenes to back a candidate’s political agenda: these efforts mostly concern the personal rather than the ideological, part of an effort to elevate or to challenge Netanyahu’s image as a global leader.

One of Netanyahu’s main electoral goals is to convince voters that he is indispensable, by branding himself Israel’s only leader with the requisite international magnitude. International feedback is thus a central tool in cementing this play, and in diverting attention from Netanyahu’s pending criminal indictments towards his global prestige. Ahead of the first round of elections in April 2019, Netanyahu’s international allies – leaders of what one could describe as the global non-liberal camp – answered his call by providing both diplomatic gestures and concrete policy steps. The weeks before the election were saturated with international events carefully crafted by the Netanyahu campaign.

Official visits by global allies offered Netanyahu photo-opportunities to land his image as a global leader. Key support was provided by the two competing leaders of the global non-liberal camp: First, Putin, who met with Netanyahu and donated symbolic capital by retrieving Israeli MIA Zachary Baumel’s body. Secondly, and above all else, Trump’s explicit mobilization for Netanyahu’s campaign. Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro were also protagonists in the international re-elect Netanyahu campaign.

Trump’s finest electoral gift was his recognition of the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. This act appealed to a majority of Israelis who see the territory as an integral part of Israel. It also resonated with Netanyahu’s own right-wing base who made the annexation of occupied land a leading topic in the campaign. Trump’s declaration allowed Netanyahu to present a clear sense of achievement in the crucial last stretch, which even his opponents could not dispute. Netanyahu once again situated himself as the only Israeli leader capable of stepping onto the international stage and getting results. This, while the international activity of his main contender, Benny Gantz, was limited to speeches at AIPAC and the Munich Security Conference.

Ahead of the coming re-run elections, we already see Netanyahu attempting similar plays to exploit his interpersonal relations with prominent non-liberal leaders to brand him, as his slogan goes, as a leader “of a different league.”

The growing list of world leaders to meet Netanyahu before the election includes another close peer – India’s Prime Minister Modi. But the main campaign’s effort is focused on arranging a timely visit to Israel by Russia’s Putin, during which a monument to fallen Russian soldiers will be unveiled. This step is possibly devised to influence Russianspeaking voters, who are of special electoral importance for Netanyahu this time around. Trump is also reportedly planning moves that can boost Netanyahu’s chances for reelection, possibly including an announcement of new U.S. security guarantees to Israel.

This global support highlights Netanyahu’s status as a central figure in the global non-liberal camp. His domestic policy corresponds with its values, favoring the majoritarian aspect of democracy over liberal values. However, it also put forward a message that goes well beyond the Israeli context – in times of need, the non-liberal network also functions as a practical political alliance.

The liberal camp lags behind, but it too has shown some willingness to get involved in the Israeli election. In light of the global crisis of liberal democracy, there is a growing understanding that like-minded liberals and progressives – in various countries – should better coordinate and cooperate. Bernie Sanders has even called for an “international progressive front” to confront the “new authoritarian axis.” Civil society organizations were the first to take the lead in this challenge, and the Israeli election may signal the beginning of a spillover into the political field. Stav Shaffir, one of the founders of Israel’s left-wing Democratic Camp, has called on progressives to establish a “united movement.”

In this liberal democratic spirit of pushing back, a few days before Israel’s April 2019 election, U.S. Democratic presidential candidates voiced unprecedented criticism of Netanyahu, accusing him of endorsing racism and of being corrupt. Sanders said openly he hoped Netanyahu loses. This was a continuation of a gradual process, in which mainstream Jewish organizations and figures showed willingness to criticize Netanyahu and his domestic policies. This trend was motivated both by resentment towards Netanyahu, and by his overly-close alliance with Trump. Nevertheless, lacking a clear progressive alternative candidate to Netanyahu, liberals’ critical steps never amounted to a direct endorsement of his opponents.

In Europe, liberals have been even more cautious. They tend to refrain from intervening in domestic Israeli politics, partly because they too did not see an appealing alternative to Netanyahu they could wholeheartedly endorse. French President Macron was the exception. Four days prior to the previous election, he hosted Yair Lapid for a meeting, a move which the Blue and White party hoped would boost their international image. Macron’s step could be seen as a personal favor, grounded in pre-existing links with Lapid, but which also stemmed from his position as a central leader within the global liberal camp and as an alternative to Trump.

Despite their limited nature, these tentative steps by liberals indicate that a change may be underway to challenge the loud illiberal support for Netanyahu. But their insufficient nature can be seen by the fact that no further steps have been taken towards the September 2019 elections, and Israel’s center-left politicians have not yet acted to encourage their international allies to take action. That seems even more short-sighted, bearing in mind how global liberals will have no option but to get involved in Israeli affairs should the next Israeli government fulfil Netanyahu’s promise to annex settlements, and as the U.S. presidential election draw near.

Placing the Israeli election as one in a series of global events allows us to obtain a broader perspective of the ongoing realignment of the international system. It demonstrates the willingness of key liberal and non-liberal actors to adopt a more proactive approach in influencing what was until now considered diplomatically as sacred ground – national elections in friendly countries.

It may signal that the gloves are coming off in the global conflict between liberals and nonliberals. However, it also demonstrates the power asymmetry between the camps. The world’s liberals still have much work to do, before they can collectively succeed to turn the tide.

Dr. Gil Murciano is a foreign policy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Israeli Elections and the Global Competition between the Liberal and Non-Liberal Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Negotiations succeed or fail not only because of the mediator’s skills and personality. Various reasons may explain why Israeli-Palestinian talks have failed over the years. However, history shows that a broker whom both sides regarded as just and honest was an asset in reaching agreements. Such was the case when Henry Kissinger mediated between Israel and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel and Syria, on the other, reaching the 1974-75 disengagement agreements. The Arab side never regarded Kissinger’s Jewish faith as detrimental to his mediation capabilities. US president Jimmy Carter, too, successfully maneuvered between prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David ahead of the 1979 peace treaty. Personally, Carter appeared closer to Sadat than to Begin, but this did not prevent him from conducting negotiations in an impartial manner. In his mediation between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria, president Bill Clinton also convinced the sides of his impartiality although he was personally closer to the Israeli leaders and almost all his advisers were Jewish.

The US stance under the President Donald Trump is so blatantly pro-Israel that the question arises whether it can mediate between the sides at all. Several examples point to asymmetry or inequality in its conduct. Firstly, since assuming office, Trump has met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the US and Israel seven times; he only met with PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Washington and Ramallah twice.

Secondly, the Trump administration has made several historic decisions in total contradiction with previous US policy, all of them supportive of Israel and/or damaging to the Palestinians. The list is long. Closure of the PLO office in Washington in September 2018; US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and the transfer of the US embassy there; and US funding cuts to UNRWA in September 2018. One can also add Trump’s 2019 declaration recognizing Israel sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which while unrelated to the Palestinians, certainly buttresses the image of the US as a one-sided Israel backer.

Thirdly, the US consulted over its peace plan almost exclusively with the Israeli side only. The ultimate move was the participation of Greenblatt and US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman in a recent ceremony inaugurating a tunnel in Silwan, an archaeological project funded by Elad, an NGO dedicated to strengthening the Jewish link to Jerusalem with government help. Moreover, the US position toward the Jewish settlements stands in sharp contrast to all previous administrations, which the saw the settlements as an obstacle to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This was the context of the Palestinian refusal to take part in the recent Bahrain economic “workshop.” The Palestinian objection to the conference stemmed not only from concern that the economic component of the peace plan would serve as an alternative to the real thing. It was also an expression of anger, frustration and helplessness over what the Palestinians perceive as humiliating US behavior that ignores them. Thus, the Palestinians – and part of the Arab world – view the Trump administration as a dishonest, unreliable broker and therefore untrustworthy even before his peace plan has been unveiled.

PUTTING TOGETHER a peace plan is a complex undertaking consisting of several phases. First, studying past proposals to understand what they included, what worked and what failed. The Americans seem to assume that everything that had been tried in the past had failed, requiring new “out of the box” thinking. This may perhaps be logical, but nevertheless mistaken, because “the box” evidently contains some good ideas.

The second stage is preparing public opinion around the world and in the region ahead of the new plan’s presentation, while stressing that this is a historic opportunity for its implementation. So far, it seems that the Americans put a lot of work into this stage.

The third stage – and the most important one – is preparing the various sides to the conflict for the compromises (or rather sacrifices) they will have to make. A lot of work went into this vis-à-vis the “moderate” Arab states, but the Israeli and Palestinian arenas were totally ignored.

The only way the Trump administration can regain Palestinian trust is by submitting a plan that offers some solutions to the central issues – namely, the question of borders (including the settlements), Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Media reports so far do not suggest this is where the Americans are going. Moreover, when Greenblatt tells Makor Rishon that he never uses the term “two-state solution,” he is already mapping out the direction of a “stateless state” that the Palestinians are bound to reject (as will the Arab world to a large degree). On the other hand, a plan that provides a response, even a partial one, to Palestinian aspirations, would meet with harsh criticism in Israel, which has become used to free lunches in the Trump era.

If the Trump administration succeeds in pulling off a deal, it will certainly be the “Deal of the Century,” if not “of the millennium,” given all the mistakes made on the way. However, a sober analysis of the process so far leads to the assessment that the plan is destined for failure and the blame should be placed squarely at the door of the dishonest broker.

הפוסט The US became a Dishonest Broker between Israel and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Rabin was not the only Israeli politician who chose to publicly pledge allegiance to the notion of a “united Jerusalem”, while understanding that a compromise in the city is required for peace. Current Israeli politicians and party leaders behave similarly, at times clearly contradicting themselves – for example, by rejecting any compromise in Jerusalem, while voicing support for the Clinton parameters (from 2000), which call for Palestinian control of Arab areas of Jerusalem.

The Israeli peace camp is criticizing Trump, and rightly so, for not making a distinction in his statement between East and West Jerusalem and for not mentioning the Palestinian aspirations for a capital in East Jerusalem. His decision not to do so places additional obstacles on the path towards peace. Despite Trump’s repeated statements about his interest in peace, his Jerusalem statement was done due to domestic political considerations, and not due to sophisticated diplomatic calculations. Previous American statements regarding the embassy relocation were also often carried out because of such motives. That was the case in 1972, when the call to relocate the embassy to Jerusalem first appeared in the platform of an American political party (at the time it was the Democratic Party); that was the case in 1995, when Congress passed the legislation requiring the embassy’s relocation; and that was the case in 2000, when George W. Bush stated prior to the elections that he will “begin the process” of relocating the embassy. The wish to gain domestic support, and not genuine concern for the fate of Israelis and Palestinians, dictated these moves.

The Clinton administration acted differently. It identified the significant damage that American steps regarding the status of Jerusalem might cause to the peace process, which the administration was deeply invested in promoting. It is not by chance that President Clinton made efforts to block the 1995 legislation attempt. Administration officials heavily criticized the proposed legislation, held briefings against its initiators, contested its legal legitimacy, and threatened that the president will veto the bill or refuse to sign it. Dennis Ross, who was leading President Clinton’s peace efforts, said at the time that if the bill will pass “my wife will be very happy. I will be able to spend much time at home with the kids. If I go to the Middle East, I will have to wear a bulletproof jacket”. Eventually, a compromise was reached, in the form of the presidential waiver signed by consecutive presidents (including Trump) every six months, postponing the relocation of the embassy due to national security considerations.

The future of Jerusalem will not be determined by politically-motivated statements of one American president or another. Such statements should not be underestimated, as they do impact developments on the ground and may shift positions among the international community. But eventually, Israelis and Palestinians will be the ones making the calls and defining their own political reality.

In recent years, there has been a flux of international peace initiatives – American, European, Arab, and even Chinese – and a striking absence of much-needed peace initiatives proposed and advanced by the local leaderships in Jerusalem and Ramallah.

The international community should contribute to peacemaking and has an important role to play on the path to peace. It can specify parameters for a two state solution, offer incentives that will make peace seem more attractive, and spell out the prices to be paid should the sides take steps that further peace. Nevertheless, the peace process itself should originate from the region and not from the outside. This has already happened in past breakthrough between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and it can happen again. In the absence of a propeace government, the Israeli opposition should take the initiative, as it did in 2003 when the Geneva Initiative was developed and published as a pro-peace alternative to the Sharon government’s policies. The Jerusalem issue can be a good starting point, especially due to the wide gap between the current reality in Jerusalem and the one that can be expected in the city after peace is achieved. Israeli and Palestinian experts drafted an initial shared vision for the city, just over a decade ago, and the effort can now continue.

Pro-peace Israeli politicians should not compete with the right-wing government over who is more enthusiastic about Trump’s statement and who is more committed to “united Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital”. Instead, they should engage in dialogue with Israel’s Palestinian and Arab neighbors, and introduce a vision of peace for the city of Jerusalem. It should be a vision based on compromise and respect, which seeks to fulfill the needs of both sides. Only this will enable the transformation of Jerusalem from a poor and conflict ridden city into the flourishing and prosperous city it should become.

Jerusalem can become a local, regional, and international success story. In an era of peace, Jerusalem will attract flocks of tourists, businesses, and international organizations. And, yes, there will also be embassies relocating to the city, and in masses. This is the story that Israelis and Palestinians should be hearing. Voicing it will be the best response to Trump’s statement.

הפוסט Introducing a Vision of Peace for Jerusalem is the Ultimate Response to Trump’s Statement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Kerry speech introduced parameters for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They did not differ much from the Clinton Parameters, and were more ambiguous and concise. Still, it was a much-needed move in light of the regional changes that took place since 2000, and of issues which gained traction since (such as Israel’s request that Palestinians recognize it as a ‘Jewish state’). The updated parameters provide Israelis – public and politicians alike – more clarity regarding the two-state solution and the steps needed in order to get there. They also generate new momentum by enabling the discussion on an end-game agreement to be based on a recent document, which is part of a set of international moves to advance conflict resolution, and not on a plan devised sixteen years ago.

The Trump effect

A key difference between the Kerry parameters and those of Clinton is the reference made by Kerry to the Arab Peace Initiative (which was not yet published in 2000) and to regional ramifications of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Kerry highlighted the unique opportunity that Israel is currently facing – an opportunity to establish normal ties with Arab countries, and to even launch a joint security framework. Kerry stressed that the fulfillment of this opportunity is clearly linked to progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace, contrasting recent claims by Netanyahu that normalization between Israel and Arab countries can precede Israeli-Palestinian peace. In his speech, Kerry tried to convince Israelis that peace will bring them concrete regional benefits. He focused on relations with the Arab world and on chances for enhanced security, but he could also have mentioned the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state, as another incentive for peace.

Kerry refrained from addressing a major change that took place since the Clinton parameters were issued – the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover of Gaza. The Palestinian divide is a major obstacle on the road for a two-state solution, and is one that the international community tends to avoid due to the sensitivity of dealing with Hamas. It is worth remembering that because of this obstacle, the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2007-8 were aimed to reach a “shelf-agreement” only; one that will be implementable only after the restoration of Palestinian unity. While the Quartet report of July 2016 focused on this thorny issue, Kerry decided to skip it altogether.

Paradoxically, it was Trump’s victory and his positions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that may have increased Obama’s motivation to make a final move. The UN Security Council resolution and the Kerry speech leave a legacy for Trump to deal with, but they also provide clear guidelines for future American administrations and for other countries that want to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. These steps demonstrated the continuity in American policy since 1967 regarding the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Despite efforts along the years to mask and downplay differences between Israel and the U.S. on these issues, the American position – of Republican and Democratic administrations alike – has remained remarkably the same. A different policy by the Trump administration, if such will actually be taken, will be the exception. One can only wonder why hasn’t the Obama administration introduced its clear-cut positions earlier, during a time that still allowed the international community to act on them.

Looking in the mirror

The Kerry speech put a mirror in front of the Israeli government and society. Kerry clearly and rationally explained why the continuation of the status quo will not enable Israel to maintain its Jewish and democratic character in the long run. The ongoing occupation and the expansion of settlements makes the two-state solution gradually less feasible, and may lead to an irreversible situation. Those in the Israeli Right, who are ideologically committed to the settlements, do not have a reasonable answer to this dilemma, except for their wishful thinking that the Palestinians will somehow disappear or move to Jordan. The renowned Palestinian scholar Edward Said defined the role of intellectuals as “speaking truth to power.” In our case, it was the opposite. The power Kerry spoke explained the unsolvable contradiction between the occupation and Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature.

Netanyahu and his government responded to the American move with unprecedented bashing of an acting American administration. Netanyahu is looking forward to Trump’s inauguration, expecting a much more sympathetic approach by the next president. However, while American positions may change, the international consensus regarding the Palestinian issue is not likely to erode. This was demonstrated at the UN Security Council, and will be demonstrated again at the upcoming international conference in Paris. The Israeli government’s enthusiasm of Trump’s victory, should be replaced with genuine concern for Israel’s global standing, and for a change of policy that will help Israel regain the international legitimacy it is currently losing.

While American and international actions are important, they alone will not change facts on the ground and resolve the conflict. Eventually, Israelis and Palestinians themselves will have to take the lead. For this to happen, a courageous and pro-peace leadership is needed, as well as a strong civil society that challenges policies that jeopardize the two-state solution and lead Israel to increased isolation.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Kerry’s parameters force Israel to take a hard look in the mirror הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This issue is still being debated in Washington.

Meanwhile in Jerusalem, steps are already being taken to jeopardize such a move. The Netanyahu government sees President Obama’s final days in office as a source of concern. Netanyahu is asking the US administration to refrain from any final move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Foreign Ministry is discussing how to confront this new “danger.”

There are, however, benefits to be gained from the presentation of new American parameters for the two-state solution. While they are not expected to bring an immediate breakthrough toward peace, such parameters will convey a clear message regarding the American position on how the Israeli- Palestinian should be resolved, and will highlight the consistency of the American position over the years.

There are also more concrete benefits to be gained, on both the international and domestic Israeli fronts, as identified by the Mitvim Institute: Clarity regarding the final-status agreement – parameters would supply the clarity that is presently lacking regarding the way to resolve the core issues of the conflict. The deeper and more detailed they are, the more clarity they will provide regarding the path to a final-status agreement.

Without clear parameters, the chances for the success of any diplomatic move regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral – are much lower. A presentation of parameters is important with or without the upcoming presidential transition juncture. Even if President Obama avoids such a move, the next president should present clear parameters, preferably in the first year in office.

Renewed momentum for the two-state solution – The stagnation in the peace process leads to skepticism regarding the feasibility of the two-state solution. The “two-state solution” concept becomes empty of meaning when different politicians assign substantively different meanings to it. Parameters will help instill renewed meaning into this concept, and assist in changing the tide against it. There is also a need to update the key international documents connected to the peace process, most of which are over a dozen years old.

Updating the Clinton Parameters can be an important first step in such a process, and can contribute to harnessing an Israeli and Palestinian young public that searches for invigorated new ways to resolve the conflict.

Provide support for future negotiations – Parameters can help bypass additional useless rounds of Israeli- Palestinian negotiations that involve empty words alone, devoid of meaning. Parameters can serve as an “entrance ticket” to future negotiations.

The parties will be required to demonstrate a positive attitude toward them before negotiations even begin, to demonstrate that they have serious intentions. True, this may make it more difficult to begin the negotiations. However, if both parties have the political will to resolve the conflict, then the creation of a framework, a conceptual “anchor” and an objective for the talks will support the negotiations once they begin.

Deepen international involvement in the peace process – The Clinton Parameters remained, in their time, a solely American plan. If President Obama should present his own parameters, it would be an opportunity to create international consensus regarding them which, in turn, would enhance the parameters’ legitimacy.

Over the past two years, various attempts have been made to create a new international architecture to advance the peace process. However, none of these has been followed through or found to be effective.

Parameters could help here – if they go beyond the speech of an American president and are ratified by the United Nations Security Council or a relevant international forum like the Quartet or an international peace conference.

Sharpen the Israeli discourse regarding the two-state solution – The Israeli discourse regarding the two-state solution includes contradictions and knowledge gaps. Positions regarding it in the large parties tend to be fuzzy and unclear, with general, abstract statements lacking clear political content.

Parameters could help change this. They would clarify what the US really means when it talks about a two-state solution. Israeli opposition parties could adopt the parameters as a clear alternative to the current government’s policy; peace organizations could benefit from the fact that the parameters would banish much of the existing public opaqueness regarding the gist of a future peace agreement; and the Israeli public, most of which is interested in being a part of globalization processes, will understand more precisely what the international community requires from Israel in order to enjoy a fresh start among the nations.

Advance the Israeli quest for recognition – Parameters can be an opportunity for Israel to gain recognition for its Jewish character. Even though the essential need for such a recognition is disputable, the majority of Israelis seek it. Senior US administration officials have already responded favorably to Israel’s quest for such recognition, and it can thus be assumed that the parameters will express this as well. In addition, parameters are expected to emphasize the option of international recognition of west Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (and of east Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine) with the attainment of the two-state solution. In this way, the parameters will not only present demands of Israel, but also show Israel’s public some of the advantages embodied in achieving peace.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The benefits of ‘Obama parameters’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since the API was first presented at the Arab League summit in March 2002, Israel has never officially responded to the Initiative; moreover, for a long period of time, Israel chose to ignore the Initiative, or simply oppose it. Lieberman went even further in 2009, when he called the API nothing less than a “recipe for Israel’s destruction.” Olmert was the only one to try and promote the Initiative at the end of his term, but it was too little and too late. Occasionally, various politicians expressed positive statements regarding the Initiative, yet the great majority focused on the API’s alleged drawbacks. In any case, no critical mass of supporters has ever been able to bring a change in the Israeli approach towards the Initiative.

Israeli public opinion has also remained in the dark about the Initiative. Opinion polls have shown that the majority of the public is not aware of the API nor its content. Attempts of various civil society organizations to raise public awareness have failed so far to make a genuine change. This is despite the increasing recognition of the advantages of involving the Arab countries in the peace process, and of the benefits that would ensue from improved relations with these countries, in parallel to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As disturbing as the Israeli government’s response to the API is, it is not as disturbing as the typical “Pavlovian” Israeli reaction to any external efforts to advance the peace process. The word “no” has become the hallmark of Israel’s foreign policy regarding the conflict. Here are some typical examples.

First, over the past two years, Israel has opposed four French initiatives: the idea of adopting a Security Council resolution promoting the recognition of Palestinian statehood; an initiative for an international observer presence on the Temple Mount; the establishment of an International Support Group for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; and lastly, an international peace summit, the first stage of which took place in Paris in early June 2016.

Second, the Prime Minister refused to cooperate with the Quartet in the preparation of the report on the stagnation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, as the Israeli government came to realize that the report was critical of Israel, they tried to work through the United States (US) to soften the tone of the report. The Netanyahu government acted similarly in 2012 with the Palestinian United Nations bid for statehood. The government initially refused to take part in any negotiations regarding the text of the resolution, and only when the text was finalized did the government try to work with the US to change the text.

Third, Israel ignored, and even ridiculed, the European Union’s (EU) December 2013 initiative to upgrade Israeli and Palestinian relations with the EU to the status of a “special privileged partnership” upon the signing a peace agreement. European criticism of Israeli policy has usually met an aggressive Israeli response, yet when Europe tries to provide positive incentives to solving the conflict, they encounter silence and rejection. This reaction is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the EU is one of Israel’s major trading partners.

Fourth, Israel expressed its opposition to the American security plan, formulated by General John Allen during the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. Moreover, in January 2014, Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s former Minister of Defense, said that the plan was not even worth the paper that it was written upon.

Fifth, in February 2016, Netanyahu expressed his concern about the possibility that prior to leaving office, Barack Obama may release his own “parameters” for peace, thus updating the framework presented by Bill Clinton at the end of his term in December 2000. It is important to note that Ehud Barak’s government at the time responded with a “reserved yes” to the Clinton parameters.

Israel’s “no” policy does not only apply to initiatives for the resolution of the conflict. It is also reflected in other areas, such as the government’s steadfast and forthright opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, and even to Germany’s proposal that Israel be indirectly involved in the nuclear talks. Additionally, Israel often chooses to boycott commissions of inquiry or international forums that it believes are too critical of the country.

The Israeli government’s adverse reactions to international initiatives are not only disturbing in content, but also the manner in which the reactions are conveyed. In general, they are harsh and often insulting and condescending. This is in despite of the fact that the majority of the initiatives originate from countries that are friendly to Israel, and whom are genuinely interested in dialogue regarding their content.

If “no” becomes a regular pattern in Israeli foreign policy, then it ceases to be an expression of rational thought, rather an expression of emotional and/or ideological behavior. Israel’s pattern of negative reactions is a manifestation of its current leaders’ fear and anxiety regarding any change in the status quo. The outside world – whether it is ISIS or the EU, and to some extent even the US – is perceived as a threat, and any concession is viewed as an existential threat.

“No” is not a policy prescription that will lead to a better future. This behavior moves us further away from peace, harms relations with friendly countries, and damages our interests. Israel needs to change direction. The next time Israel is presented with an international initiative, Jerusalem should respond with a “yes”, qualified as it may be, rather than a flat “no”.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט “No” as a Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This assessment is based on three premises. First, the Netanyahu government has no incentive – political, economic or ideological – to advance talks with the Palestinians.

Second, regional instability and Iran’s empowerment after the signing of the nuclear accord, as well as the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, ensure that overall security issues will take priority over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Finally, the U.S. election year guarantees that the permanent patron of peace talks will be looking inward, with Europe lacking the clout to bring the two sides to the table.

While 2016 seems a wasted year in terms of the peace process, 2017 may be the year things flare up. There are several reasons; the first is coincidental. June 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the occupation.

Countries and leaders enjoy marking round anniversaries to glorify the nation or themselves. Decision-makers on the right have been quick to realize the potential.

Education Minister Naftali Bennett has declared that the coming school year will be inspired by the unification of Jerusalem. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely has announced that 2017 will be a festive year stressing the narrative of the whole Land of Israel, along with the line that there’s no occupation. To this list one might add the centennial of the Balfour Declaration, which favored a homeland for the Jewish people.

This linkage – 50 years of the occupation and 100 years after the Balfour Declaration – lends these events an almost cosmic significance.

On the other side of the political map, the 50-year anniversary is clearly a reason to mourn. The result of the 1967 war – the domination of another people – must be undone. This is a chance to mobilize all peace advocates in Israel and abroad, Jews and non-Jews, people who support a Jewish democratic state within the 1967 borders and see the occupation as a sure recipe for turning Israel into a binational, nondemocratic state.

This is the aim of the group Save Israel, Stop the Occupation, SISO, which has been established to organize events on the injustices of the occupation, culminating in 50th-anniversary events. A clash between the opposing worldviews that will find expression next year are bound to lead to a flare-up.

Another factor will be the new U.S. president. It’s not certain the winner will immediately launch a drive to revive the peace process. But history teaches that even a president with a limited understanding of the Middle East, like Jimmy Carter in 1977, achieved a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within two years.

Bill Clinton, meanwhile, finalized the Oslo process and the treaty with Jordan during his first term. History also teaches that a president who really seeks a solution must start early, as proved by Clinton’s missed opportunities with Hafez Assad and Yasser Arafat at the end of his second term. The arrival of a new president on the 50th anniversary of the occupation could provide a spark.

The perception that a two-state solution is no longer applicable is increasingly taking hold. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman claims that the two-state solution is dead and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be remembered as the father of the one-state solution.

But any deep look at the situation on the ground shows that the two-state ideal is still around and viable. It depends on leaders on both sides making it work.

A public campaign in Israel and overseas that will gather momentum toward June 2017 could jump-start diplomatic ideas already on the agenda. These include a new Security Council resolution to replace or be appended to Resolution 242, incorporating elements of the Arab peace initiative.

The resolution would call for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with agreed-on border adjustments and land swaps, without addressing tougher issues such as Jerusalem and refugees. Another idea is an international conference in June 2017 that would launch talks between Israel, the Palestinians and moderate Arab countries.

I fear that if these ideas aren’t realized, the despair, frustration and disappointment of the younger Palestinian generation – directed at the occupation and Palestinian leaders who can’t deliver the goods – will lead to an intifada. The reasons have long been there, but the spark hasn’t arrived.

And the fuse will be lying about in 2017. Let’s hope Israelis and their leaders will see 2016 as an opportunity for reconciliation, not escalation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט 2017, a 50th Anniversary That Could Spark a Real Intifada הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This assessment is based on three premises.

First, the Netanyahu government has no incentive – political, economic or ideological – to advance talks with the Palestinians.

Second, regional instability and Iran’s empowerment after the signing of the nuclear accord, as well as the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, ensure that overall security issues will take priority over the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Finally, the U.S. election year guarantees that the permanent patron of peace talks will be looking inward, with Europe lacking the clout to bring the two sides to the table.

While 2016 seems a wasted year in terms of the peace process, 2017 may be the year things flare up. There are several reasons; the first is coincidental. June 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the occupation.

Countries and leaders enjoy marking round anniversaries to glorify the nation or themselves. Decision-makers on the right have been quick to realize the potential.

Education Minister Naftali Bennett has declared that the coming school year will be inspired by the unification of Jerusalem. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely has announced that 2017 will be a festive year stressing the narrative of the whole Land of Israel, along with the line that there’s no occupation. To this list one might add the centennial of the Balfour Declaration, which favored a homeland for the Jewish people.

This linkage – 50 years of the occupation and 100 years after the Balfour Declaration – lends these events an almost cosmic significance.

On the other side of the political map, the 50-year anniversary is clearly a reason to mourn. The result of the 1967 war – the domination of another people – must be undone. This is a chance to mobilize all peace advocates in Israel and abroad, Jews and non-Jews, people who support a Jewish democratic state within the 1967 borders and see the occupation as a sure recipe for turning Israel into a binational, nondemocratic state.

This is the aim of the group Save Israel, Stop the Occupation, SISO, which has been established to organize events on the injustices of the occupation, culminating in 50thanniversary events. A clash between the opposing worldviews that will find expression next year are bound to lead to a flare-up.

Another factor will be the new U.S. president. It’s not certain the winner will immediately launch a drive to revive the peace process. But history teaches that even a president with a limited understanding of the Middle East, like Jimmy Carter in 1977, achieved a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within two years.

Bill Clinton, meanwhile, finalized the Oslo process and the treaty with Jordan during his first term. History also teaches that a president who really seeks a solution must start early, as proved by Clinton’s missed opportunities with Hafez Assad and Yasser Arafat at the end of his second term. The arrival of a new president on the 50th anniversary of the occupation could provide a spark.

The perception that a two-state solution is no longer applicable is increasingly taking hold. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman claims that the two-state solution is dead and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be remembered as the father of the one-state solution.

But any deep look at the situation on the ground shows that the two-state ideal is still around and viable. It depends on leaders on both sides making it work.

A public campaign in Israel and overseas that will gather momentum toward June 2017 could jump-start diplomatic ideas already on the agenda. These include a new Security Council resolution to replace or be appended to Resolution 242, incorporating elements of the Arab peace initiative.

The resolution would call for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with agreed-on border adjustments and land swaps, without addressing tougher issues such as Jerusalem and refugees. Another idea is an international conference in June 2017 that would launch talks between Israel, the Palestinians and moderate Arab countries.

I fear that if these ideas aren’t realized, the despair, frustration and disappointment of the younger Palestinian generation – directed at the occupation and Palestinian leaders who can’t deliver the goods – will lead to an intifada. The reasons have long been there, but the spark hasn’t arrived.

And the fuse will be lying about in 2017. Let’s hope Israelis and their leaders will see 2016 as an opportunity for reconciliation, not escalation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט 2017, a 50th anniversary that could spark a real intifada הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite this support domestically, such a move would spell disaster for Israel on the world stage. Far more than upsetting the EU and the UN—a reality Israelis have long come to stomach—a rightist coalition left unchecked to pursue its objectives would almost inevitably undermine Israel’s already strained relationship with its key ally and financial backer, the United States.

For starters, Netanyahu will have a grueling time keeping his relations with U.S. President Obama afloat. Ties between the leaders have still not had time to mend since the fallout from Netanyahu’s Congressional speech, aggravated by years of discord and undermining. Moreover, if an Israeli report back in January is true, that Obama considered Netanyahu “toast,” one can only imagine how the administration will react if Netanyahu implements the extensive settlement expansion those on the hard right and in his own party have demanded.

With two years left to seal his legacy, Obama seemed positioned to get tough as reports previously indicated he is planning one last initiative to advance the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Now, before that process can even begin, Netanyahu is having to backpedal on his pre-election message that if he was reelected he would ensure that no Palestinian state will be created—a statement that likely helped him peel away precious mandates from the far-right Jewish Home party.

Although Obama may eventually need to take a more accommodative approach to Netanyahu to bring any progress toward resolving the conflict—or at least agreed-upon international parameters—comments from his administration in the post-election period so far indicate that he is committed to ramping up pressure. As some have noted, this pressure could come in the form of supporting a Palestinian state at the UN or simply refraining from shielding Israel from international pressure.

Then there are the Iranian nuclear talks. Having shown little if any remorse during the Congressional speech controversy, Netanyahu will doubtless continue to thwart a deal in any way he can. And yet, any more bold actions from him could again jeopardize the US government’s strong support for Israel at the UN, concerning intelligence sharing, and in other foreseeable ways short of withholding foreign aid.

Assuming a stable right-wing Israel government does not collapse within the next two years, Netanyahu will outlast Obama and find himself with a new American presidential counterpart. In either scenario of a Democrat or Republican taking office in 2016, Netanyahu would still find himself at odds with the White House.

If de facto Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton is any measuring stick, her comments during and after her service as Secretary of State reveal that Israel can expect more of the same regarding Obama’s views on Iran, as well as his and her husband Bill’s positions on both the conflict and on Netanyahu personally.

If a Republican is elected as president, history has shown the dynamic between the two nations’ leaders could be even more capricious. Even conservative hardliner George W. Bush—despite the nostalgia in Israel for his presidency—went so far as to counsel Netanyahu’s rival, Tzipi Livni, on how to beat the Likud in the 2009 general election, just as Hillary Clinton had soon afterward. Unconditional and hawkish Republican rhetoric domestically and in Congressional chambers apparently does not translate to the office of the Commander-in-Chief.

Beyond challenges from American presidents down the road, the policy direction that Netanyahu and a hard right-wing coalition would take will likely further erode the American domestic support base for the Israeli government in Congress and among the Jewish community that has long served as a critical component of Israel’s soft power.

The lack of Israeli diplomatic engagement with all sides of the pro-Israel spectrum—including the dovish lobby group, J Street—and staunch disagreements among the U.S. and Israeli governments will transform Israel even more into a divisive issue in the American political arena. Both problems could be significantly mitigated by earnest Israeli efforts to resolve the conflict, yet these would be out of the question for the coalition under discussion.

Netanyahu’s final decision on a coalition may still be weeks away, but if he makes that perilous of decisions to form an all-right-wing government, its probable course of action will risk leaving an indelible stain on ties with the American president, on the bipartisan domestic American support for Israel and on the US-Israel “special relationship” itself.

(originally published in The Hill)

הפוסט A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.