ארכיון COVID-19 - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/covid-19/ מתווים Wed, 13 Jul 2022 14:40:22 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון COVID-19 - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/covid-19/ 32 32 Coronavirus: Israel must vaccinate our Palestinian neighbors https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/coronavirus-israel-must-vaccinate-our-palestinian-neighbors/ Wed, 10 Mar 2021 12:27:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6539 Time and again Israel demonstrates its incredible capabilities at the professional level – of civil servants, the private sector and the nonprofit sector, alongside with the failure at the political level. The issue of vaccines is a prominent example. Israel is leading the world in vaccination rate, thanks to our wonderful healthcare system, which the vaccine manufacturers see as a model for testing their products, and due to the HMO’s ability to vaccinate the population at record speed. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did well to leverage these capabilities in favor of vaccinating the country’s residents. The Israeli government, on the other hand, refrains from doing the right thing, namely to help our Palestinian neighbors. Instead, Israel offers vaccines to its favorite dictators. The latest decision to vaccinate 120,000 Palestinians working in Israel is a step in the right direction, but all Palestinians should be our top priority for all the good reasons – moral, medical, as well as strategic. From a moral point of view, there is no doubt that we have a responsibility and there is no point in quibbling about unnecessary legal disputes. According to the Israeli government, we have no responsibility for the Palestinians due to the transfer of responsibility for health to the Palestinian Authority in the Oslo Accords. There is a great deal of irony in the fact that the Israeli right-wing camp is suddenly presenting the Oslo Accords at the forefront of its arguments, after years of defaming the agreement, a defamation that even led to the

הפוסט Coronavirus: Israel must vaccinate our Palestinian neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Time and again Israel demonstrates its incredible capabilities at the professional level – of civil servants, the private sector and the nonprofit sector, alongside with the failure at the political level. The issue of vaccines is a prominent example. Israel is leading the world in vaccination rate, thanks to our wonderful healthcare system, which the vaccine manufacturers see as a model for testing their products, and due to the HMO’s ability to vaccinate the population at record speed. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did well to leverage these capabilities in favor of vaccinating the country’s residents. The Israeli government, on the other hand, refrains from doing the right thing, namely to help our Palestinian neighbors. Instead, Israel offers vaccines to its favorite dictators.

The latest decision to vaccinate 120,000 Palestinians working in Israel is a step in the right direction, but all Palestinians should be our top priority for all the good reasons – moral, medical, as well as strategic.

From a moral point of view, there is no doubt that we have a responsibility and there is no point in quibbling about unnecessary legal disputes. According to the Israeli government, we have no responsibility for the Palestinians due to the transfer of responsibility for health to the Palestinian Authority in the Oslo Accords. There is a great deal of irony in the fact that the Israeli right-wing camp is suddenly presenting the Oslo Accords at the forefront of its arguments, after years of defaming the agreement, a defamation that even led to the assassination of prime minister Rabin. In addition, it is ironic that the argument about the International Criminal Court having no ruling authority on the Palestinian Authority is 180 degrees opposite to the argument on health, where we hold that this is not a legal entity under international law.

It is important to remember that the Oslo Accords were supposed to lead to a five-year process, at the end of which the temporary state of occupation made possible by international law would end. In reality, not only does the occupation continue, the Israeli government’s policy of promoting settlements and putting demographic pressure on the Palestinian population does not lead to an end to the occupation, but rather to its perpetuation. In addition, we have full control over the mobility of the Palestinians, and even over the population register of their residents. At the bottom line, we definitely have a moral responsibility to their health, as long as they do not have full control and independence as we do.

From a medical viewpoint, we and they are not really separate. Netanyahu was right when he said in an interview with Udi Segal (on Israeli TV Channel 13), that in this context, we are not an island state like Cyprus, New Zealand or Taiwan; but at the same time, Netanyahu misled the public by claiming that the Palestinians were the ones who infected us. The data show that the Palestinian morbidity was caused by contact with Israelis, by contacts that occurred due to political decisions regarding illness-laden flights from New York, Dubai and more.

As we know, Palestinians cannot fly abroad or cross into Jordan without our permission. That is, we could be an island state if we treated the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean as one epidemiological unit, to which uncontrolled entrances should be prevented and all Israelis and Palestinians alike should be vaccinated.

Strategically, the use of vaccines as a lever, in order to improve Israel’s reputation is correct, but we could, with the help of vaccine diplomacy, promote relations with the Palestinians who have invaluable importance to our security and to our future far more so than the residents of Honduras, Guatemala, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to whom Israel offered vaccines. We could also coordinate aid to the Palestinians with the World Health Organization, with the new Biden administration, and with key European countries, which are very rightly concerned about the humanitarian situation of the Palestinians, as very prominently having been raised at the recent AHLC meeting.

We could become an example and role model for the strategic use of vaccine diplomacy. But instead, our government is trying its best to use the vaccines as a political gimmick, which does not have a diplomatic effect on anyone in the world, because its cynicism is transparent and clear.

Countries around the globe are adapting to a change in the leadership of the free world following the recent US elections. Even in our region – the Palestinians are working to promote elections. The Saudis, Egyptians, Turks are changing behavior because they understand that there is a new administration in Washington, for which civil rights and democracy matter.

Only the Israeli government mourns about Trump’s departure, and continues to act as if the world is still led by an inhumane narcissist who has irresponsibly left the World Health Organization in the midst of a global epidemic that cries out for global cooperation.

It is still not too late to correct and leverage the advantage we have in the field of vaccines, in order to do the right thing morally, medically and diplomatically, and to benefit ourselves through aid to the Palestinians.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 10 March 2021.

הפוסט Coronavirus: Israel must vaccinate our Palestinian neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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How Biden should handle Israeli-Palestinian Conflict https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/how-biden-should-handle-israeli-palestinian-conflict/ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 12:02:51 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=6535 Joe Biden began his term as US president at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was in a deep and continued stagnation. The Trump administration’s policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only served to create a rift between Washington and Ramallah, compromising the traditional American role as mediator in the conflict. The incoming administration faces a host of challenges, both domestic and global. While the Israeli-Palestinian issue is not expected to figure prominently on the administration’s short-term agenda, Biden’s foreign policy and defense appointees are expected to deal with the issue. The early days of a new administration are an important period of organizing, learning and preparing. Patterns consolidated during this period impact the administration’s future course, and the mechanisms and principles adopted serve as the basis for policy and set the tone for the coming years. Administrations have maximum power and enjoy abundant credit in their early days. That is particularly true for the Biden administration that also enjoys a majority in both houses of Congress, and which could make good use of this period to create a momentum for advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. To that end, a Mitvim Institute task-team recommends the following policy directions: 1. Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been marginalized in recent years on the international agenda, with global actors shifting to domestic concerns and more burning regional issues, and to the Covid-19 crisis. Despite the myriad of challenges it faces, the Biden administration must signal at the outset that it

הפוסט How Biden should handle Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Joe Biden began his term as US president at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was in a deep and continued stagnation. The Trump administration’s policies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only served to create a rift between Washington and Ramallah, compromising the traditional American role as mediator in the conflict. The incoming administration faces a host of challenges, both domestic and global. While the Israeli-Palestinian issue is not expected to figure prominently on the administration’s short-term agenda, Biden’s foreign policy and defense appointees are expected to deal with the issue.

The early days of a new administration are an important period of organizing, learning and preparing. Patterns consolidated during this period impact the administration’s future course, and the mechanisms and principles adopted serve as the basis for policy and set the tone for the coming years.

Administrations have maximum power and enjoy abundant credit in their early days. That is particularly true for the Biden administration that also enjoys a majority in both houses of Congress, and which could make good use of this period to create a momentum for advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. To that end, a Mitvim Institute task-team recommends the following policy directions:

1. Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been marginalized in recent years on the international agenda, with global actors shifting to domestic concerns and more burning regional issues, and to the Covid-19 crisis. Despite the myriad of challenges it faces, the Biden administration must signal at the outset that it attributes importance to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiate declarations and steps attesting to its intention to restore the issue to the international agenda.

2. Renewing ties and building trust with the Palestinian leadership. The incoming administration must announce at an early stage the renewal of US ties with the Palestinian leadership and launch a high-level political dialogue. The renewed ties should walk back Trump-era measures by re-opening the PLO offices in Washington and the US Consulate in east Jerusalem, and resuming USAID assistance to the Palestinians and funding for UNRWA. The administration could also advance confidence-building measures vis-à-vis the Palestinians, such as promoting economic projects in Area C and assisting in alleviating the COVID-19 crisis. Declaring the return of the US to its traditional support of the two-state solution and opposition to settlements would also be of importance.

3. Emphasizing the US commitment to the two-state solution and formulating parameters for a final-status agreement. The Biden administration must declare its commitment to the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and mutually agreed land swaps as its vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a declaration would ratify the US commitment to international norms, the principles of international law and UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the administration should start formulating parameters for a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, to serve as a clear framework for future negotiations and shape the domestic and international discourse. However, the administration should also weigh the challenges in such a move and carefully consider the correct timing and manner of unveiling such parameters.

4. Preserving the feasibility of the two-state solution and drawing red lines. The Biden Administration must ensure that the two-state plan is preserved as a feasible and concrete solution, blocking efforts on the ground designed to make it irrelevant. The administration will have to draw clear red lines against creeping annexation measures, expansion of settlements, legalization of outposts and Israeli construction in the E1 area and Givat Hamatos. At the same time, the administration could demand that Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) ratify their commitment to their previous agreements and maintain security and civilian coordination, while demanding that the Palestinians mount a determined campaign against terrorism, condemn terror attacks and counter incitement.

5. Leading multilateral steps, such as creating a new international mechanism and an incentives package. The Biden administration should lead the formation of an international mechanism for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such a mechanism could be based on the P5+1 model (which negotiated the Iran nuclear deal) or on the Quartet, with the addition of key Arab and European states. This mechanism should put together an international incentives package for peace and outline international parameters for resolution of the conflict. It could also serve as a platform for additional multilateral measures, such as forming regional working groups, harnessing regional organizations of which Israel and the PA are members and convening an international peace conference.

6. Leveraging Israeli-Arab normalization to advance the peace process. The administration should harness progress in relations between Israel and Arab states for the benefit of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. In doing so, it could integrate the states that have normalized relations with Israel into joint forums with Israel and the Palestinians, and into economic and energy projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In attempting to promote normalization agreements with additional Arab states, especially with Saudi Arabia, the administration could create a linkage to the Palestinian issue, inter alia by conditioning normalization on a halt of settlements’ construction and creeping annexation.

7. Improving the situation in Gaza and ending the internal Palestinian divide. The Gaza Strip is facing a harsh humanitarian crisis, beset by explosive tensions that could escalate into violent clashes at any moment. The US has consistently distanced itself from the issue, but the new administration must stop avoiding it and help advance a solution. The administration should advance plans and projects with international partners to improve the well-being of Gaza’s residents, on issues such as energy, border crossings and vaccines. The administration would also do well to increase its involvement in efforts to avoid clashes between Israel and Hamas, help the UN envoy’s efforts on this front, and seek to advance a long-term solution to the Gaza issue under the aegis of the PA.

8. Empowering pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian actors, including in the civil society. The Biden administration should advance dialogue and cooperation between citizens on both sides of the conflict. The administration should provide backing for pro-peace civil society organizations in Israel and the PA, including regular meetings of administration representatives with them, and seek effective implementation of recent legislation that aids organizations engaged in Palestinian-Israeli cooperation (Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act). At the same time, the administration should appeal directly to various elements within Israel society in order to strengthen support for the two-state solution and promote a discourse on this issue, while working on the Palestinian side to stem the anti-normalization trend undermining joint Israeli-Palestinian activity.

9. Setting a constructive tone to relations with the Israeli leadership and public. The administration should shape relations with Israel in a manner conducive to the advancement of peace and creation of mutual trust. It should learn lessons from the Obama years regarding the relationship with Israel’s government and society, and pay attention to the tone and style of the discourse even when expressing criticism. The Biden administration could initiate public goodwill gestures toward Israelis, and display public expressions of sympathy for Israel, and at the same time present the government with clear demands on the Palestinian issue and set red lines.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 1 March 2021.

הפוסט How Biden should handle Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Lior Lehrs quoted in the Media Line on Israel, Palestinians, and COVID-19, June 2020 https://mitvim.org.il/en/media/lior-lehrs-quoted-in-the-media-line-on-israel-palestinians-and-covid-19-june-2020/ Mon, 22 Jun 2020 17:13:18 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=media&p=5000 הפוסט Lior Lehrs quoted in the Media Line on Israel, Palestinians, and COVID-19, June 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Lior Lehrs quoted in the Media Line on Israel, Palestinians, and COVID-19, June 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/covid-19-put-the-eastern-mediterraneans-hydrocarbon-dreams-on-hold/ Mon, 15 Jun 2020 15:23:04 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3938 On Tuesday, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis will do something pretty unusual in the age of COVID-19 — travel overseas. Mitsotakis will meet with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel to discuss the resumption of commercial flights between their countries, as well as regional energy politics — two things which have been dramatically disrupted by the pandemic. Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades is also expected to visit Israel later this month. The discovery of offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean over a decade ago has sparked intense diplomatic activity. Hoping to maximize the sea’s riches, many of the region’s governments have proposed ambitious projects that would transport the natural gas to Europe via undersea pipelines. Encouraged by U.S. administrations that saw energy development as a vehicle for strengthening ties between its allies, the rough edges of a new regional framework for cooperation slowly took form in January 2019, when the governments of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a multinational body tasked with developing a regional gas market and mechanism for resource development. COVID-19 has scuttled this momentum. The pandemic’s impact on the global energy market has damaged the conditions for Eastern Mediterranean states to profitably export their gas, and has caused a massive rethink amongst policymakers about how to make the most out of the circumstances. Although regional actors may no longer be bound to building pipelines, energy still has the potential to propel greater regional cooperation in the coming decade. American diplomatic support

הפוסט COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On Tuesday, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis will do something pretty unusual in the age of COVID-19 — travel overseas. Mitsotakis will meet with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel to discuss the resumption of commercial flights between their countries, as well as regional energy politics — two things which have been dramatically disrupted by the pandemic. Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades is also expected to visit Israel later this month.

The discovery of offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean over a decade ago has sparked intense diplomatic activity. Hoping to maximize the sea’s riches, many of the region’s governments have proposed ambitious projects that would transport the natural gas to Europe via undersea pipelines. Encouraged by U.S. administrations that saw energy development as a vehicle for strengthening ties between its allies, the rough edges of a new regional framework for cooperation slowly took form in January 2019, when the governments of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a multinational body tasked with developing a regional gas market and mechanism for resource development.

COVID-19 has scuttled this momentum. The pandemic’s impact on the global energy market has damaged the conditions for Eastern Mediterranean states to profitably export their gas, and has caused a massive rethink amongst policymakers about how to make the most out of the circumstances. Although regional actors may no longer be bound to building pipelines, energy still has the potential to propel greater regional cooperation in the coming decade. American diplomatic support and engagement would go a long way to turning this opportunity into a reality.

Israel’s Stake in the Eastern Mediterranean

This is a bitter pill for all of the region’s actors to swallow, but perhaps none more so than Israel. Historically bereft of fossil fuels, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields (in 2009 and 2010, respectively) were seen as a potential game-changer for the Jewish State. The Netanyahu government committed to the concept of gas exports as a strategic boon to Israel, and aggressively pursued a regional policy that embraced partnerships with Greece and Cyprus, as well as export deals with Jordan and Egypt. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz spent most of the last five years promoting the “East Med pipeline” — a 1,900-kilometer undersea pipeline that would link Israel to Italy via Greece and Cyprus.

However, the East Med pipeline — which upon completion would be the longest undersea pipeline in the world — was always more of a political project than a serious commercial endeavor. Not only did the path of the proposed pipeline run through disputed waters between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, but also active geological fault lines and deep trenches. These geopolitical and technical challenges could theoretically be overcome, yet industry experts argue that the biggest obstacle to the East Med pipeline is its commercial feasibility. With an estimated $7 billion price tag, there are doubts that Israeli and Cypriot gas would remain competitive by the time it arrived in Europe. For several years the European Commission has been exploring the possibility of committing to the pipeline, but at this stage is unlikely to back it financially.

The collapse of global energy prices brought on by the combination of an oversupplied market, warmer-than-average winter, and the coronavirus pandemic, has buried the East Med pipeline and put Israel in a serious quandary. Committed to a contract with Tamar and Leviathan’s developers that no longer meshes with the current economic circumstances, Israel is paying three times the global average for its own gas. The price discrepancy is so sharp that the Israel Electric Corporation is buying imported liquid natural gas at half the price of domestic supply. It is no wonder, then, that Steinitz began his second term in office with declarations that Israel would accelerate its construction of solar energy infrastructure.

The Position of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

Israel is not alone in this predicament. Almost the entire Eastern Mediterranean is wrestling with similar questions.

The vanishing prospects for the East Med pipeline are as disconcerting for Greece and Cyprus as they are for Israel. Both countries are essential partners in the project. In January 2020, leaders from the three states met in a public demonstration of their commitment to the pipeline (they reportedly signed an agreement but this document has not been made public). Cyprus hoped to link its modest offshore discoveries to the East Med pipeline, and Greece was eager to function as a conduit to Europe. The important difference is that Cyprus’ natural gas fields are not yet operational. In early May, Italy’s ENI, France’s Total, and ExxonMobil announced a year-long suspension of drilling activities in Cyprus’ waters. There are no guarantees that the developers will return with the same interest as they once did, and the remaining export options are costly.

Even operational energy partnerships are facing tough choices. For example, Jordan’s energy arrangement with Israel (45 billion cubic meters over 15 years at an estimated $10 billion) is deeply unpopular because it normalizes ties with a country seen by most Jordanians as a belligerent. With a global energy market that is driving liquid natural gas prices to historic lows, the monarchy is under mounting pressure to find cheaper alternatives. If Israel continues with its plans to partially annex the West Bank, Amman may sacrifice the deal as a symbolic gesture of disapproval even if the underlying causes are economic. Jordan might hope that it could fall back on the United States, as a guarantor in the deal, to cover its debts.

Egypt hoped that offshore discoveries would transform it into a regional energy hub, converting Israeli and Cypriot gas at its liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta and then shipping them off to Europe. Today, Egypt is struggling to find buyers, has frozen activity at one of its liquid natural gas sites, and cut production at Zohr field. While the Egyptian domestic market is diverse enough to absorb some Israeli imports, this isn’t the long-term arrangement the two parties envisioned some 16 months ago.

No matter where you turn, the Eastern Mediterranean energy picture is bleak. Debt-ridden Lebanon was dismayed by news in late April that initial explorations failed to uncover a meaningful gas field. Politicians in Beirut dreamed that offshore discoveries would deliver an instant economic windfall. But with energy companies announcing a suspension of activities in Cyprus’s waters just a week later — the same companies exploring Lebanese waters — the Lebanese government will have to search elsewhere for a financial bailout.

Meanwhile, Turkey appears to be taking advantage of the regional turmoil by continuing to send exploratory and drilling vessels into Eastern Mediterranean waters. However, these vessels’ purpose is more political than commercial. Spurned by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and with no resolution to the Cyprus conflict in sight, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned his military — on land and at sea — to protect Turkish claims to the continental shelf and break what is perceived as strategic containment of Turkey by the region’s actors. Turkish intervention in the Libyan civil war is at least partially driven by Ankara’s desire to break the will of its neighbors and force them into direct negotiations. Not only has this strategy put Turkey at loggerheads with longtime rivals Greece and Cyprus — with whom Turkey shares a long history of maritime boundary disputes — but other actors as well, including the United States.

In the long run, low liquid natural gas prices could become the norm. Some forecast that the present gas glut may continue for nearly a decade as other projects come onto the market. International projects that require costly infrastructure are going to find it difficult to compete with existing liquid natural gas providers and a growing renewable energy industry. Although COVID-19 appears to have undone significant progress in the Eastern Mediterranean, it ironically may have rescued Eastern Mediterranean states from shortsighted investments. Policymakers have benefited from a rare mulligan and can now reassess their regional prospects.

Post-Pandemic Energy Strategy

The first, and most obvious, post-coronavirus strategy, is to keep the gas local. Rather than prioritizing export markets in Europe, the challenge for Eastern Mediterranean states is to diversify their domestic infrastructure and economies to be more gas friendly. This is especially relevant for Egypt, whose domestic demand is only going to increase as its population grows. Emphasizing the regional market will require intense discussions between the main developers and governments to find the appropriate contractual language that suits the involved parties.

But would organizing a regional market assume that all actors can benefit? Over the last decade, offshore hydrocarbons were as much as cause for confrontation between Eastern Mediterranean states as they were an incentive for cooperation. Now that it is clear the gas bonanza won’t arrive as quickly as anticipated, perhaps the region’s actors will consider a recommitment to regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. From the ongoing Libyan civil war to the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey, there is no shortage of opportunities for those willing to decouple their energy aspirations from their interest in creating a functional regional space.

This is where the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum comes into play. Whereas the forum’s original purpose was to deal with matters pertaining to natural gas, post-COVID it could serve as a platform for discussion on a host of issues, from tourism to environmental protection to pandemic support to alternative energy cooperation and security. If a global pandemic instructs states about anything, it is that neighbors remain neighbors regardless of the boundaries placed between them. In short, it behooves Eastern Mediterranean states to support one another.

America’s Role in the Region

The United States should play a central role in this process. Not only is Washington the preferred mediator for many of the region’s conflicts, but American support for the development of offshore hydrocarbons and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus during both the Obama and Trump administrations, who saw the region’s gas as way to strengthen the position of its Eastern Mediterranean allies while also reducing European dependency on Russian gas. Continued engagement with Eastern Mediterranean actors will allow the United States to guide its partners towards a more cooperative future, help develop deconfliction mechanisms, and discourage interference from outside actors like Russia, Iran, and China.

This should happen in a number of different ways. First, the United States should reengage Eastern Mediterranean states in the process of maritime boundary delimitation. This issue a priority for all of the region’s actors, including European heavyweights France and Italy. In particular, Turkey’s signing of a maritime boundary agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in November 2019 sparked considerable protest throughout the region and entangled the ongoing civil war in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy politics. While the Libyan civil war isn’t the source of all of the region’s tensions, American mediation between the aggrieved parties — notably NATO member states Turkey and Greece — on the issue of maritime boundaries would start rolling back tensions and create a more constructive environment for future negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus. The signing of a maritime boundary agreement between Italy and Greece on June 9 was widely seen as a maneuver to check Turkey’s advance. U.S. diplomats should also encourage Israel and Lebanon to resolve their outstanding maritime issues, which would allow foreign companies to feel more comfortable exploring in Lebanese waters whenever they decide to resume activities. A semi-enclosed maritime space like the Eastern Mediterranean requires delimitation agreements in order to avoid conflict. Ideally, the United States would bring all region’s actors to the negotiating table simultaneously. However, the present conditions necessitate a flexible, hands-on approach to certain disputes.

Additionally, the United States can empower the nascent Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum by investing more diplomatic resources in the organization, and incentivizing collaboration between members states. One way of doing this is by expanding the language of the 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (also known as the Menendez-Rubio Bill) in a manner that offers potential avenues for participation by Eastern Mediterranean actors not mentioned in this legislative package, specifically Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Turkey. The United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center described in the Menendez-Rubio Bill could be a conduit for multinational research and development in the myriad topics that are directly and indirectly impacted by offshore hydrocarbon exploration. This could open channels of communication between American and Eastern Mediterranean industries, strengthening both economic, cultural, and strategic interests.

Going Forward

For the better part of the last decade, it was expected that energy would transform the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the pandemic’s aftershocks have disrupted the prospects for regional cooperation. A collective pivot — with American support — away from the uncertain promises of energy could be a blessing in disguise. It provides regional states the opportunity to embrace a shared future that emphasizes energy diversification, multinational cooperation, and conflict resolution.

Although the United States appears committed to reducing its presence on the global stage, it should preserve and expand energy-centric multilateral diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean that enjoys bipartisan support. The region is rich with American partners — a lasting foreign policy legacy would be finding a formula that would allow them to settle their own disputes and find new ways to cooperate.

(originally published in “War on the Rocks”)

הפוסט COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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War and Peace in the Age of Coronavirus https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/war-and-peace-in-the-age-of-coronavirus/ Thu, 11 Jun 2020 15:13:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3936 Against the backdrop of the Coronavirus crisis, Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin spoke with the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, saying the crisis “does not distinguish between people” and adding that the recent cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on this matter testifies to their ability to cooperate in the future, too. Rivlin’s comments prompt the question of whether the Coronavirus can advance peace and how it might affect conflict areas around the world. The current crisis, and past events, indicate that disasters and epidemics can provide opportunities for parties to a conflict to focus on what they have in common and re-examine their rivalry, but they can also intensify tensions and hostility. Thus, for example, at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, the spread of the disease spawned racism and xenophobia directed at Chinese people the world over. This was also reflected in the intensification of ethnic tensions in states with a Chinese minority. Unprecedented violence was recorded against the Chinese-Muslim Dungan minority in Kazakhstan, and representatives of the Chinese minority in the Philippines complained of incidents of discrimination and racism. Fear of the virus has also led to isolation and border closings, a sensitive issue in conflict areas that can raise tensions even further. For example, the border between the two parts of Cyprus, first opened in 2003, was closed at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, prompting protests. Studies point to a link between the spread of disease and civil conflicts. A 2017 study found that exposure

הפוסט War and Peace in the Age of Coronavirus הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Against the backdrop of the Coronavirus crisis, Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin spoke with the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, saying the crisis “does not distinguish between people” and adding that the recent cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on this matter testifies to their ability to cooperate in the future, too. Rivlin’s comments prompt the question of whether the Coronavirus can advance peace and how it might affect conflict areas around the world. The current crisis, and past events, indicate that disasters and epidemics can provide opportunities for parties to a conflict to focus on what they have in common and re-examine their rivalry, but they can also intensify tensions and hostility.

Thus, for example, at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, the spread of the disease spawned racism and xenophobia directed at Chinese people the world over. This was also reflected in the intensification of ethnic tensions in states with a Chinese minority. Unprecedented violence was recorded against the Chinese-Muslim Dungan minority in Kazakhstan, and representatives of the Chinese minority in the Philippines complained of incidents of discrimination and racism. Fear of the virus has also led to isolation and border closings, a sensitive issue in conflict areas that can raise tensions even further. For example, the border between the two parts of Cyprus, first opened in 2003, was closed at the start of the Coronavirus crisis, prompting protests.

Studies point to a link between the spread of disease and civil conflicts. A 2017 study found that exposure to contagious disease increased the risk of a violent civil conflict. An additional study, focused on the Ebola epidemic in western Africa in 2014-2015, pointed to a similar correlation. It should be noted that following the Ebola epidemic in western Africa, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to define the outbreak in this region as a threat to international security and peace. The study determined that in conflict areas, or countries recovering from internal wars, unusual government measures to deal with epidemics can serve as fertile ground for increased tensions and hostility resulting in unrest and violence. In areas where tension and mistrust prevail between various groups or regions and the central regime, such situations can be perceived as an excuse for the government to exercise its power, generating resistance and counter-reaction. In various central Asian states, among them Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, the Corona crisis prompted protests by residents against government measures.

The Corona crisis is monopolizing the attention of all the countries in the world, including the superpowers, making it difficult for the international community to deal with other issues and divert resources to other causes. The restrictions on movement also undermine such efforts. A report by the International Crisis Group argues that the Covid-19 pandemic undermines the ability of international institutions to deliver humanitarian aid, advance diplomatic initiatives and operate peacekeeping forces. It should be emphasized that areas of war and conflict are particularly vulnerable, raising deep concerns about the spread of the epidemic in such countries as Libya, Syria and Afghanistan. This is well illustrated in the difficulties experienced by international organizations in eradicating Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo due to fighting that prevented access to infected regions and also resulted in injury to medical personnel.

However, along with the risks and negative repercussions, disasters and epidemics can also demonstrate to rivals that they are facing a common enemy and must join forces to confront it, as President Rivlin argued. Agreement on such cooperation could spill over into other issues and serve as a confidence building measures and an eventual turning point in the relationship between sides to a conflict. Such events underscore similarities between rival parties and the immediate need for humanitarian aid, unrelated to politics, and the crisis can turn into an opportunity. Such situations have given rise to what is known as “disaster diplomacy” in which rival parties help each other in a time of crisis as a goodwill gesture. The United Arab Emirates, for example, recently transferred humanitarian relief to Iran, hard hit by Covid-19, despite the tension between these two states.

Such crises can also lead to ceasefires. That was the case, for example, when the “Guinea Worm” disease started spreading in Sudan in 1995, prompting six-month ceasefire between the north and south to tackle the deep crisis afflicting numerous villages. In the current crisis, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued a call for a global ceasefire in order to combat the Coronavirus, and warring sides in various conflict areas, such as Yemen, Libya and the Philippines expressed support for the initiative.

The massive 2005 earthquake that hit India and Pakistan, including the disputed territory of Kashmir, provides another example of rivals helping each other. India transferred huge amounts of aid to Pakistan, whose President publicly acknowledged the assistance and offered his thanks. Shortly thereafter, the sides advanced initiatives on linking the two parts of Kashmir – initially, through phone lines connecting the two sides and then free passage in order to provide disaster relief. These moves generated hope, but violence eventually resumed and the “disaster diplomacy” failed to yield a breakthrough.

However, in some cases disasters did result in real, long-term change. A special case in point was the effect of the December 2004 Indian Ocean quake and tsunami on the conflict between Indonesia and the Aceh Province, which was an epicenter of the disaster that killed over 200,000 people. Following the quake, the President of Indonesia lifted the state of emergency imposed on Aceh, and the Free Aceh Movement declared a ceasefire. In early 2005, Indonesia called for negotiations, which were held in Finland and culminated in a peace agreement in August of that year. It cannot be argued that the disaster led to peace, and the breakthrough was the result of many other weighty elements (among them a political change in Indonesia and successful mediation efforts of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari), but the heavy disaster and the global attention it drew, affected the sides, pushed them to compromise and served as an opportunity for constructive diplomacy.

Turning back to our region, initial indications at the outset of the crisis pointed to encouraging cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. The sides established a special mechanism for close, ongoing coordination, Israel’s Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon met with his Palestinian counterpart Shukri Bishara to discuss economic aspects of the crisis, and Israel transferred aid and equipment to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov praised the cooperation between the sides. However, at the same time, the Palestinians complained on continued operations of the Israel Defense Forces in Palestinian cities and villages, and Israel complained about Palestinian declarations claiming Israel was working to spread the virus. In addition, Hamas leaders threatened that the spread of the disease in Gaza would lead to an escalation with Israel.

It is too soon to say at this stage how the Coronavirus crisis will play out and how it will impact conflict areas. Examples from around the world illustrate that the link between a humanitarian or health disaster and political tensions could be dangerous. Therefore, the Israel-Palestinian cooperation should be welcomed and the parties should make every effort to avert a deterioration into a harsh health or economic crisis that might increase the threat of escalation. Leaders in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority could learn from efforts made in the past by other rival parties to exploit such crises to advance conciliatory moves and a diplomatic breakthrough.

הפוסט War and Peace in the Age of Coronavirus הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-uns-call-for-a-global-ceasefire-can-it-help-advance-israeli-palestinian-peace/ Tue, 19 May 2020 13:47:03 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3892 In March 2020, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued an appeal for a global ceasefire. “There should be one fight in our world today, our shared battle against COVID-19,” he said. In the weeks that followed, leaders, organizations and citizens from different countries have voiced their support for a global ceasefire. In some conflicts around the world, there were signs of reduced escalation and increased humanitarian cooperation. Israelis and Palestinians have also stepped up their cooperation these days, as both sides work to confront the health crisis and its domestic implications. However, the current political climate poses obstacles for additional progress. Statements about an upcoming Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories raise the likelihood of escalation over the coming months. In light of this background, the conference introduced the UN’s call for a global ceasefire, explored the impact it has made so far on international conflicts, assessed its relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and discussed ways to increase Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and to advance peace. This document sums up the main points presented by H.E. Nickolay Mladenov, Richard Gowan, Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Yael Berda, Huda Abuarquob, Prof. Dan Midownik and Dr. Nimrod Goren. The recording of the conference can be watched here. 

הפוסט The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In March 2020, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued an appeal for a global ceasefire. “There should be one fight in our world today, our shared battle against COVID-19,” he said. In the weeks that followed, leaders, organizations and citizens from different countries have voiced their support for a global ceasefire. In some conflicts around the world, there were signs of reduced escalation and increased humanitarian cooperation. Israelis and Palestinians have also stepped up their cooperation these days, as both sides work to confront the health crisis and its domestic implications. However, the current political climate poses obstacles for additional progress. Statements about an upcoming Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories raise the likelihood of escalation over the coming months. In light of this background, the conference introduced the UN’s call for a global ceasefire, explored the impact it has made so far on international conflicts, assessed its relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and discussed ways to increase Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and to advance peace. This document sums up the main points presented by H.E. Nickolay Mladenov, Richard Gowan, Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Yael Berda, Huda Abuarquob, Prof. Dan Midownik and Dr. Nimrod Goren.

The recording of the conference can be watched here. 

הפוסט The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-new-israeli-government-preliminary-implications-and-long-term-effects/ Tue, 19 May 2020 13:43:45 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3889 A new Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to take office on 17 May 2020 following the March elections, the third vote in eleven months. Initially, it seemed these had ended inconclusively, mirroring the results of the two earlier rounds in April 2019 and September 2020. By the end of March, however, Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party and the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history, orchestrated yet another political miracle. (originally published by IAI)

הפוסט The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A new Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to take office on 17 May 2020 following the March elections, the third vote in eleven months. Initially, it seemed these had ended inconclusively, mirroring the results of the two earlier rounds in April 2019 and September 2020. By the end of March, however, Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party and the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history, orchestrated yet another political miracle.

(originally published by IAI)

הפוסט The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dr. Nimrod Goren quoted in Xinhua on Pompeo’s visit, May 2020  https://mitvim.org.il/en/media/dr-nimrod-goren-quoted-in-xinhua-on-pompeos-visit-may-2020/ Thu, 14 May 2020 17:00:39 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=media&p=4989 הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren quoted in Xinhua on Pompeo’s visit, May 2020  הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Dr. Nimrod Goren quoted in Xinhua on Pompeo’s visit, May 2020  הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Political Situation in Iraq: An Opportunity for Israel? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-political-situation-in-iraq-an-opportunity-for-israel/ Mon, 11 May 2020 14:33:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3922 On April 9, Mustafa al-Kadhimi was tasked with forming a new Iraqi government after two other candidates, Mohammed Tawfik Allawi and more recently Adnan al-Zurfi, failed to win enough parliamentary support for their bids. Al-Kadhimi, who has served successfully since 2016 as head of Iraq’s Mukhabarat (domestic security service), is an independent candidate. He enjoys good relations with top US administration officials. He is an intellectual and a friend of intellectuals and of liberal civil society activists. He was close in the past to Ahmed al-Chalabi and Kanan Makiya, two architects of the US occupation of Iraq. He lived for years in the West (the UK) and upon his return to Iraq wrote for liberal media outlets, such as AlMonitor. He could be said to be the complete opposite of a typical Mukhabarat chief in the Arab world. During his term, at his initiative, the service was cleansed of political interference. Al-Kadhimi was appointed against the backdrop of Iraq’s political crisis, which is also turning into an economic crisis with the global drop in oil prices. Widespread demonstrations were held in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities between October 2019 and February 2020 protesting political developments and Iran’s hegemony. For now, the protest has subsided due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Even before the crisis, the protesters had failed to impose an alternative on the existing political system. They failed to take advantage of the US support they received and of the assassinations of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis to achieve

הפוסט The Political Situation in Iraq: An Opportunity for Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On April 9, Mustafa al-Kadhimi was tasked with forming a new Iraqi government after two other candidates, Mohammed Tawfik Allawi and more recently Adnan al-Zurfi, failed to win enough parliamentary support for their bids. Al-Kadhimi, who has served successfully since 2016 as head of Iraq’s Mukhabarat (domestic security service), is an independent candidate. He enjoys good relations with top US administration officials. He is an intellectual and a friend of intellectuals and of liberal civil society activists. He was close in the past to Ahmed al-Chalabi and Kanan Makiya, two architects of the US occupation of Iraq. He lived for years in the West (the UK) and upon his return to Iraq wrote for liberal media outlets, such as AlMonitor. He could be said to be the complete opposite of a typical Mukhabarat chief in the Arab world. During his term, at his initiative, the service was cleansed of political interference.

Al-Kadhimi was appointed against the backdrop of Iraq’s political crisis, which is also turning into an economic crisis with the global drop in oil prices. Widespread demonstrations were held in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities between October 2019 and February 2020 protesting political developments and Iran’s hegemony. For now, the protest has subsided due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Even before the crisis, the protesters had failed to impose an alternative on the existing political system. They failed to take advantage of the US support they received and of the assassinations of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis to achieve their political goals.

Iraq is run behind the scenes by political blocs led by unelected figures, who divide the state’s resources among themselves and employ politicians to preserve the system. Since 2018, the main godfathers of the system have been Hadi al-Amiri (who heads the Fatah bloc of parties and commands the Badr militia) and Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Iran is the sponsor and patron of this alliance between al-Amiri, al-Sadr and the others. At the same time, the escalation continued between the Shiite militias and US military forces deployed in Iraq, prompted by attempts to avenge the killing of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, mostly on the part of the Hezbollah movement in Iraq that al-Muhandis led. The escalation perpetuated the “spin” started by Soleimani in order to divert public attention from the protests toward a “patriotic” goal of achieving US withdrawal from Iraq. That, in turn, dragged Iraq into a regional Iranian-American conflict that only few want.

In fact, until March 2020, Iran was satisfied with the status quo that prevailed in Iraq. The protest had died down and the state was being ruled by a weak acting prime minister, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who resigned in December 2019. At that point, a new candidate entered the arena, posing a threat to the militias and Iran. Adnan al-Zurfi obtained the support of the Shiite religious establishment (the Marja’iya) and of the US (he is an American citizen). Iraq’s Kurdish President Barham Salih was quick to enthusiastically approve the appointment. AlZurfi had previously served as governor of Najaf Province. During his term, he led a determined campaign against the parties and militias that have previously ruled the province. Many in Iraq regarded him as an ideal candidate and hoped he would manage to form a government. Had he run in elections, there is little doubt he would have been elected. At the time, he laid out his guiding principles, pledging to place all weapons in the hand of the state, put on trial those responsible for killing protesters, put in place an “Iraq first” policy and keep Iraq out of regional conflicts. His candidacy was of great concern to the pillars of the existing political system in Iraq, and they were quick to act.

Initially, many in this political system supported al-Zurfi, probably due to a combination of an illusion that they could continue to rule through him and a desire to weaken rivals within the system. When they realized that al-Zurfi was no puppet, they were quick to shift course. Initially, senior Iranian officials visited Iraq and then a meeting was held of representatives of all the Shiite parties, at which a decision was made to withdraw support for al-Zurfi and hand it to al-Kadhimi, with Iran’s blessing, of course. The Sunnis and Kurds were quick to follow, also transferring support to al-Kadhimi. On April 9, al-Zurfi announced he was withdrawing, attributing his decision to “internal and external elements”.

Implications for Israel

Iraq is the largest and most populous Arab state east of Israel. Many Iraqis want links with Israel, for various reasons: Renewed interest in the now defunct Iraqi Jewish community, and admiration for Israel as a democracy with impressive scientific achievements as well as an enemy of Iran (and as such, a potential ally for the many Iraqis hostile to Iran).

Official Israel discovered this new Iraqi climate recently and started to communicate with the Iraqi public mostly via social media. Over the past year, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has joined the effort to encourage contacts and discourse. In 2019, several Iraqi delegations visited Israel as did Iraqi members of other delegations. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis follow the Foreign Ministry’s Arab-language social media pages, and most of them express positive views. One of these pages, “Israel in Iraqi dialect” is designed especially for IsraeliIraqi dialogue. In November 2019, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned the massacre of Iraqi protesters by pro-Iran forces. Before him, Foreign Minister Israel Katz expressed support for the protesters and their demands. Israel thus became the only state in the region to express solidarity with the Iraqi protesters.

Al-Kadhimi is a worthy candidate for prime minister and his appointment could create an unprecedented opportunity for an Israeli link with Iraq’s top political echelons. Al-Kadhimi is essentially pro-Western, a true liberal, articulate in English and his circles offer significant potential for channels to Israel. Iran and its supporters were forced to endorse a candidate for the premiership who as recently as January was accused of having a role in Soleimani’s assassination and was dubbed an “American agent”. Several weeks ago, as head of the security services, he ordered the arrest of commanders in the Iraqi Hezbollah militias. AlKadhimi now has a month to form a government and win parliamentary approval. If he succeeds, he is supposed to govern for about a year until elections are held.

However, one must not lose sight of the fact that al-Kadhimi was not elected; he was appointed by Iran’s supporters in Iraqi politics. He will have to behave himself and avoid risks. Iran’s backers will test him over the next month, for example by engineering confrontations with US forces. He will have to restrain himself. They also have contingency plans in case he turns out not to be weak enough: They will not vote for the government he forms and try to keep Caretaker Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi in power until the elections. If al-Kadhimi succeeds at some point after his official appointment as premier in freeing himself from the binds of his sponsors, Israel will be handed a true opportunity for a new horizon in its ties with Iraq. This will not happen without greater US involvement (perhaps Israeli, too) in Iraqi politics.

הפוסט The Political Situation in Iraq: An Opportunity for Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/3920/ Mon, 11 May 2020 14:30:16 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3920 The Coronavirus crisis and its impact on Europe has re-ignited the argument over the EU’s future prospects. While the Coronavirus crisis is global, each state has adopted its own coping strategy. For the EU, which has aspired for the past seven decades to promote the integration of its member states, this return to isolation within the nation-state unit could have destructive repercussions. The EU is based on a common market which removes economic and national borders, enabling the free passage of goods, services, capital and people. The Coronavirus crisis has resulted in uncoordinated, unsynchronized closures of national borders, hampering the passage of goods and people and undermining the EU’s integrative vision. Following the debt crisis (2009), immigration crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016), will the Coronavirus pandemic result in spillback or even the dismantling of the European integration project? The EU was slow to react to the crisis and initially has been blamed for some failures in dealing with it. As usual, it provided a convenient punching bag, especially for those who fail to understand the limitations to its competence. Health policy is made and carried out by member states, not by Brussels. It was unrealistic to aspire or expect that in these times of chaos and pandemic fright the slow-moving, cumbersome organization would successfully coordinate emergency policy for its 27 member states, which can each respond far more quickly and effectively themselves. Brussels’ initial coordination attempts failed, and each member state adopted a different strategy at a different time. Coordination

הפוסט The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Coronavirus crisis and its impact on Europe has re-ignited the argument over the EU’s future prospects. While the Coronavirus crisis is global, each state has adopted its own coping strategy. For the EU, which has aspired for the past seven decades to promote the integration of its member states, this return to isolation within the nation-state unit could have destructive repercussions.

The EU is based on a common market which removes economic and national borders, enabling the free passage of goods, services, capital and people. The Coronavirus crisis has resulted in uncoordinated, unsynchronized closures of national borders, hampering the passage of goods and people and undermining the EU’s integrative vision. Following the debt crisis (2009), immigration crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016), will the Coronavirus pandemic result in spillback or even the dismantling of the European integration project?

The EU was slow to react to the crisis and initially has been blamed for some failures in dealing with it. As usual, it provided a convenient punching bag, especially for those who fail to understand the limitations to its competence. Health policy is made and carried out by member states, not by Brussels. It was unrealistic to aspire or expect that in these times of chaos and pandemic fright the slow-moving, cumbersome organization would successfully coordinate emergency policy for its 27 member states, which can each respond far more quickly and effectively themselves. Brussels’ initial coordination attempts failed, and each member state adopted a different strategy at a different time. Coordination among the states was clearly lacking, as was the initial lack of solidarity, reflected for example in a halt to medical equipment exports to Italy.

When hospitals in Italy were collapsing, urgently needing life-saving protection equipment, Germany, France and additional member states where the epidemic had not yet spread suspended exports of these items. European solidarity was exposed as a hollow slogan, anchored in the Lisbon Treaty but not in European hearts. National instincts predominated. Even if Brussels thought in terms of Europe, EU member states thought of themselves and the competence was, as mentioned, in their hands. It was only several weeks later that manifestations of solidarity emerged, such as transferring Coronavirus patients on respirators from northern Italy to hospitals in Germany. The initial impression, however, was seared in the minds of Italians who desperately needed help and did not get it.

In addition to the absence of solidarity on health-related issues, economic solidarity was also lacking. Italy and other states asked the Eurozone’s finance ministers to approve “Coronavirus bonds”, meaning that the 19 members of the currency bloc would pool some of their debt. The Dutch and German refusal to share in the debt burden of southern European states generated anger, bitterness and disappointment in Italy, Spain and other countries. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen eventually apologized to the Italians on behalf of the other Europeans for failing to render assistance when their state’s health system collapsed. This was an unusual move, but perhaps too little, too late.

In April, the EU was able to cut back some of its losses and even record several achievements. The bloc was quick to regain its composure, quickly shifting to new and creative solutions. Lessons have clearly been learned from previous crises. The European Central Bank was quick to spend 750 billion euros in bond purchase, and the European Commission redirected 37 billion euros from the EU’s budget (which totals some 165 billion euro in 2020) to fighting the pandemic’s repercussions. Aid packages for the 27 member states and their 450 million residents total some 4 billion euros.

The Commission has also launched a joint procurement agreement of medical equipment for the member states and is working on EU-funded construction of joint medical equipment stockpiles. Moreover, the EU has allocated 140 million euros for Coronavirus research, to work on a vaccine and other interim solutions. In addition, the EU’s policy and legislation banning and limiting state-aid has been suspended, and a green light was given to EU member states (under the European Commission’s supervision) to increase their deficits in order to help business and citizens.

The Coronavirus crisis is not only a health crisis. It is a mega-crisis with harsh economic aspects. It is also a crisis of governance and a challenge to democracy. Changes to one’s lifestyle beget changes in perceptions, ideas and identity. The epidemic once again pits the skeptics and critics of the European integration project against its supporters, bolstering the populists and mainly the nationalists.

The Coronavirus crisis has exposed the EU’s weakness in dealing with member states not committed to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban pushed through emergency legislation made possible under the Coronavirus crisis that allows him and his government to take action and pass laws without parliamentary oversight. The legislation, with no stipulated deadline, is akin to suspending democracy in Hungary. Although the crisis entails intrusions of privacy in many countries, no democracy in Europe or elsewhere has adopted such harsh measures. The EU is based on values of democracy, the rule of law and human and civil rights, but Orban’s move generated only a feeble response on the part of the EU and its member states. This type of challenge has hovered over the EU for several years and demands a determined response. Weak actions undermine the EU and testify to its institutional inadequacy and its normative frailty.

The economic crisis will affect the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy, too. China, where the epidemic originated, responded forcefully and blocked it relatively fast and effectively. At the height of the crisis in Italy, when its neighbors refrained from providing it with medical equipment, China sent tens of tons of medical equipment as well as medical teams. This gave China points in Italian public opinion, as the EU was losing ground. China’s economic activity has almost reverted to its pre-Coronavirus level; in Europe, the epidemic hit harder and the economy will take longer to recover. From a broader perspective, Europe, which has been experiencing an economic decline, is losing points to China in the global competition.

And what about Israel? The EU’s voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has faded in any case in recent years. Since 2016, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been mobilizing his opportunistic European friends, who are interested to ram Brussels, in order to block EU resolutions critical of Israel. Instead, the EU has only been reiterating consensual decisions adopted in the past. When the number of Coronavirus fatalities in Europe soars, the foreign policy “guns” fall silent. The Coronavirus-induced crisis, weakening Europe and diverting global attention, may weaken the European response to Israeli annexation measures that will be presented as implementing the Trump plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Europe has been hit the hardest by the Coronavirus. Over 100,000 of the virus’ 180,000 known fatalities are EU citizens. For now, it does not appear the EU will be one of the epidemic’s victims, but public confidence in some of its systems has been substantially undermined and some of its “pre-existing conditions” have erupted and intensified. The EU has been weakened both internally and externally, but it is fighting back and the final word in the European integration project is far from being said.

An efficient, functioning international system is vital to confront surging nationalist sentiment. The cross-border Coronavirus does not distinguish between race and color and fighting it requires internal European cooperation. The EU has displayed resilience in bouncing back from its initial hesitant and uncoordinated response. However, the decisive question in the wake of the crisis is whether European leaders and citizens view the EU as a political or merely an economic functional project. In this context, it is too soon to chart the balance of EU losses and wins in the Coronavirus crisis.

הפוסט The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Coronavirus Crisis Offers Opportunities for Innovative Israeli Diplomacy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-coronavirus-crisis-offers-opportunities-for-innovative-israeli-diplomacy/ Wed, 29 Apr 2020 14:10:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3915 Like so much else, official diplomacy has shifted to virtual communications since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. This is an opportunity for Israeli diplomacy to lead a new type of diplomatic communication and adapt diplomacy to an era in which relations must be forged without “physical” meetings with representatives of other states. The Covid-19 pandemic has placed Israeli diplomats on the nation’s frontlines, particularly in helping obtain medical equipment and bringing home Israelis stranded abroad. Although the Foreign Ministry has had to withstand the erosion of its authority and budget, efforts to undermine it and the deterioration of its staff’s working conditions in recent years, Israeli diplomats have been operating relentlessly to accomplish their assigned tasks, with some even contracting the disease. The pandemic has challenged the core of the diplomatic profession. Diplomatic activity entails forging and developing ties with key economic, social and political figures in foreign states; the professional-personal relationships with those key figures is a crucial element in achieving the tasks assigned by Jerusalem. For instance, such relationships made it possible to fly an experimental drug from Japan to treat Covid-19 patients in Israel, helped bring home Israeli travelers stranded in Peru, and freed a shipment of facemasks held up at an airport in Turkey. The social distancing induced by the pandemic hampers Israeli diplomats’ ability to conduct the face-to-face meetings traditionally used to develop connections with foreign representatives. Within a very short period, all interpersonal communications have shifted to technology-mediated interaction. Whereas digital platforms served

הפוסט The Coronavirus Crisis Offers Opportunities for Innovative Israeli Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Like so much else, official diplomacy has shifted to virtual communications since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. This is an opportunity for Israeli diplomacy to lead a new type of diplomatic communication and adapt diplomacy to an era in which relations must be forged without “physical” meetings with representatives of other states.

The Covid-19 pandemic has placed Israeli diplomats on the nation’s frontlines, particularly in helping obtain medical equipment and bringing home Israelis stranded abroad. Although the Foreign Ministry has had to withstand the erosion of its authority and budget, efforts to undermine it and the deterioration of its staff’s working conditions in recent years, Israeli diplomats have been operating relentlessly to accomplish their assigned tasks, with some even contracting the disease.

The pandemic has challenged the core of the diplomatic profession. Diplomatic activity entails forging and developing ties with key economic, social and political figures in foreign states; the professional-personal relationships with those key figures is a crucial element in achieving the tasks assigned by Jerusalem. For instance, such relationships made it possible to fly an experimental drug from Japan to treat Covid-19 patients in Israel, helped bring home Israeli travelers stranded in Peru, and freed a shipment of facemasks held up at an airport in Turkey.

The social distancing induced by the pandemic hampers Israeli diplomats’ ability to conduct the face-to-face meetings traditionally used to develop connections with foreign representatives. Within a very short period, all interpersonal communications have shifted to technology-mediated interaction. Whereas digital platforms served as a supplementary and targeted means in the diplomats’ toolbox in the pre-coronavirus era, at least in the short term, a sharp shift to digital-virtual diplomacy has been necessary. At present, diplomacy is only possible through technologically enabled means of communications. Reliance on digital-virtual platforms should not be perceived as a problem, but rather as an opportunity. The Foreign Ministry should take advantage of the Israeli spirit of entrepreneurship and Israeli technological pre-eminence to invent and lead new diplomatic communications, firstly for Israel’s Foreign Service and subsequently as an example to other diplomats around the world. Efficient implementation of this new form of diplomacy involves three key aspects.

First, planning communications with representatives in a foreign country must include all forms of communications: e-mail, social media platforms and video conferencing. Each suits a different part of the job and different type of relationship-building. For example, to initiate contact and send out feelers regarding shared values and interests, e-mail is preferable as it allows open-ended questions and ambivalent formulation (to the extent necessary). In order to conduct a conversation on sensitive or controversial issues, chat over a digital platform is preferable, because it makes saying “no” easier and the delayed response provides time to consult or find arguments and references to buttress the answer. The World Health Organization (WHO) provided an excellent example of why discussion of sensitive issues should be avoided on video conference when its representative simply hung up on a journalist who asked him about the role of Taiwan in confronting the pandemic. Video calls are best for strengthening personal ties, signaling empathy and reaching agreements, making them a unique form of communication in terms of content and significance. They have in fact become the “physical” meetings between diplomats in the coronavirus era.

Second, complete technological mastery in operating these tools and virtual platforms is a must. That includes simple tasks such as positioning cameras at the correct angle during a video call and silencing microphones when needed. Applications must be used correctly and technical mishaps, such as Boris Johnson’s inadvertent exposure of the dial-in code for the British cabinet’s Zoom meeting, must be avoided. Suddenly, diplomats have not only to control the tilt of their head or the perfect way to tie a bowtie. They must speedily learn the correct use of various technological tools.

Third, professionalism must be acquired in the intricacies of digital and virtual language. In this context, diplomats will have to learn how nuances and cross-cultural codes come across on digital media, such as WhatsApp or a video call, as opposed to during a face-to-face encounter. Should diplomats now employ emojis or GIFs in place of a smile and a slap on the back? On a video call, the choice will be between formal attire, replete with the Foreign Ministry logo and Israeli flag as a backdrop, and informal attire with family photos hanging on the walls, to emphasize common denominators and add a personal dimension to the interaction.

One of the major challenges posed by digital-virtual communications is information security, especially when the subject of the conversation is of a sensitive political or diplomatic nature. This challenge must be addressed in two ways: use of advanced technologies and information security tools, and mutual commitment to avoid revealing the contents of the discussion. Success in maintaining secrecy in a digital-virtual environment will likely raise the level of trust and as a result improve cooperation between the sides.

It is important to note that although a significant part of diplomatic communications will be digital-virtual from now on, this will not replace a diplomatic presence on the ground. Even in the current crisis, Israeli diplomats were required to show up physically at airports to ensure they accomplished their tasks, despite the danger involved. Diplomats’ presence at foreign posts will remain highly significant. Physical proximity enables first-hand comprehension of the climate, culture and reality that cannot be easily reflected in online research or big data tools. While digital-virtual communication will assist diplomacy and retain its newfound importance even once the pandemic is controlled, even now it is no alternative to a physical presence.

Just as companies, schools and universities have shifted to managing tasks and telelearning, once the new diplomacy is implemented, we may find that it yields faster, more precise and efficient results. We may even see negotiation processes and mobilization of political support in international institutions yielding better results when significant use is made of digital-virtual tools. Civil society organizations promoting dialogue between parties to a conflict have already achieved success in recent years through the use of new technologies to build trust and understanding. Now it is the turn of the official representatives to learn from them and bridge gaps. The coronavirus crisis is shaking up political and economic systems and its impact will be evident for a long time to come. Diplomacy is challenged by social distancing rules and diplomats are being forced to adapt to the new world, in an era in which foreign ministries are also challenged to adapt their activities to the rules of modern diplomacy. With the growing dominance of politicians as well as non-state actors in foreign relations, foreign ministries the world over are striving to justify their existence, redefine their mission and fight for relevance in decision-making processes. Diplomats must study the advantages and drawbacks of various technological tools and immediately adopt new and varied means of communications so they can continue carrying out their tasks.

For years, Israeli diplomacy marketed Israeli technological innovation and entrepreneurship to bolster Israel’s image abroad. In recent years, Israel has also demonstrated achievements in digital diplomacy, especially in creating new discourse channels with the citizens of Arab states.

The coronavirus pandemic offers Israeli diplomacy an opportunity to take another step forward and show that it can lead deep and significant change in forging innovative processes of communications to help it successfully implement Israeli foreign policy.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Coronavirus Crisis Offers Opportunities for Innovative Israeli Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In Israel: Of Corona and Politics https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/in-israel-of-corona-and-politics/ Sun, 26 Apr 2020 14:06:34 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3912 Like everywhere in the world the coronavirus pandemic caught us by surprise. During the last week of February we all heard about it but the Government did not take it seriously. It took another fortnight before the first measures were taken : the Government closed its skies to incoming flights and decreed that anyone returning home from a trip abroad should remain at home in total isolation for two weeks. And before too long, all of us especially the elderly, those who have passed the threshold of 65, were ordered to stay home. The elderly population, being considered as the most vulnerable, has been under strict orders not to meet, see or hug family members, children or grandchildren. So the virus drastically changed our lives. First we were told that the “skies are closed”. Then they closed down the coffee houses, the theaters, the sports facilities. No more get togethers, no more work, no more restaurants, bars, music, dance or cinema. No more trips abroad. Just home sweet home. The world had stopped and it was telling us something – perhaps that we had gone too far, too quickly. And we must take a deep breath. The pandemic did not only catch Israel by surprise, but unprepared. Even though the State Controller had issued a comprehensive report just a few years ago, warning of Israel’s lack of critical medical supplies in the face of a possible unexpected epidemic – the Government did not heed, and continued to allocate its budgets

הפוסט In Israel: Of Corona and Politics הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Like everywhere in the world the coronavirus pandemic caught us by surprise. During the last week of February we all heard about it but the Government did not take it seriously. It took another fortnight before the first measures were taken : the Government closed its skies to incoming flights and decreed that anyone returning home from a trip abroad should remain at home in total isolation for two weeks. And before too long, all of us especially the elderly, those who have passed the threshold of 65, were ordered to stay home. The elderly population, being considered as the most vulnerable, has been under strict orders not to meet, see or hug family members, children or grandchildren.

So the virus drastically changed our lives. First we were told that the “skies are closed”. Then they closed down the coffee houses, the theaters, the sports facilities. No more get togethers, no more work, no more restaurants, bars, music, dance or cinema. No more trips abroad. Just home sweet home. The world had stopped and it was telling us something – perhaps that we had gone too far, too quickly. And we must take a deep breath.

The pandemic did not only catch Israel by surprise, but unprepared. Even though the State Controller had issued a comprehensive report just a few years ago, warning of Israel’s lack of critical medical supplies in the face of a possible unexpected epidemic – the Government did not heed, and continued to allocate its budgets to other “worthy” causes, based on its preferential politics. Thus, when the virus started to spread, there was no plan of action, no strategy, no understanding as to who would be better organized to deal with the crisis on a large scale. There was a real lack of the medical supplies necessary for testing and not enough respiratory machines, not enough medical personnel.

But that was not the only virus Israel was suffering from. For the last year and half, this country has been plunged into a political crisis the kind of which we have not experienced before. Faced with a serious personal problem, acting Prime Minister Netanyahu who has been indicted of bribery, fraud and breach of trust, has done everything in his power to avoid justice and retain power. So he plunged the country into three consecutive rounds of national elections, thus practically and effectively paralyzing both the Parliament and the Executive. Netanyahu mobilized people against the very state institutions he is supposed to defend. In all election cycles he lambasted the judicial system and the police for doing their job; he attacked the media, pilloried the intellectuals, delegitimized the representatives of the Arab citizens and incited against them and depicted the left as traitors. During this whole period of time, Israel has lived with a transitional government while the Prime Minister took decisions without consulting the Parliament, thereby continuing to erode our democracy. Thus he decided, without consulting the Parliament, to apply Emergency Regulations which effectively gave him unlimited powers. This meant, inter alia, the permission to listen into the phone of any Israeli citizen.

That political situation was in fact ideal for him, because he could continue to rule, unbridled, and avoid going to court.

The corona crisis benefitted Netanyahu in so many ways, and he used it extensively. His dramatic nightly appearances on national television, giving the impression that he is the only responsible person mastering the situation amounted to a national campaign. Now that the third round of negotiations had given a slight advantage to his adversary, the leader of the “Blue and White “party, Benny Gantz, and negotiations to form a new Government were underway, Netanyahu needed to transform his image into “the father figure”, the only experienced leader. His nightly appearances sowing fear and panic among the population were effectively turned into a drama of biblical dimensions. But what also became clear was the unpreparedness of the medical establishment, the lack of coordination and disputes among Ministries, the conflicting daily orders. This is when the Ministry of Defense and the army stepped in, helping mainly in the most densely populated areas. The corona crisis here and elsewhere has underscored the importance of a centralized healthcare system and the State’s responsibility for the citizens’ health.

While the confinement policy had its positive results -compared to other countries we have had fewer victims of the virus- it took its terrible social and economic toll. Hundreds of thousands of people were fired; thousands of small businesses had to close down, with no prospect to ever reopen. Actors, singers, entertainers, the whole industry has been shut down and this for a very long time to come. Over a million and a half Israelis are unemployed and unable to pay their rent and their most elementary bills. Some cannot even buy food anymore. The Government voted an emergency fund, but so far no one has been compensated. The economic crisis is deep and will certainly last long after the virus is gone.

Under those circumstances the civil society mobilized. The corona has brought out the best in us: people have donated money to buy respiratory machines; tens of NGO’s have delivered food parcels to the old and needy, and thousands of volunteers are helping with errands those who cannot leave their homes; solidarity has been the order of the day; neighbors help each other, cook for each other.

Politically, the struggle for democracy has also been the order of the day. We all felt cheated and disappointed when the leader of the “Blue and White”, whose whole campaign had centered on barring a man indicted under the law with such serious charges from serving as prime minister, decided to join him. A movement called the “Black Flags” was born spontaneously, overnight. It started when 600,000 citizens who participated in a first virtual meeting on the internet, and then demonstrations were organized. We have all been able to overcome the strict orders against public gatherings by keeping a distance from each other, and thousands have turned out in our demonstrations in the past weeks. This struggle will continue.

The coalition agreement signed on the eve of our Holocaust Day is a total shame: in the midst of one of the worst economic crisis the government will number 36 ministers and 16 deputy Ministers (in a country much larger than Israel, Germany, there are only 16 ministers) it gives Netanyahu full immunity against a trial, and is about to amend the existing fundamental laws in order to allow it to function.

With “Blue and White” and the Labor Party having joined this coalition government led by Netanyahu, the Meretz party is the only leftwing Zionist party that has remained true to its values and principles. Together with the United (Arab) List, with whom we cooperate, we will be a determined and fighting opposition.

(originally published by Socialist International)

הפוסט In Israel: Of Corona and Politics הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israeli-annexation-talks-threaten-ties-with-arab-world/ Sun, 19 Apr 2020 13:21:40 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3297 The issue of possible Israeli land annexation in the West Bank has become an endless source of spin for Israeli politicians. The hard-line right-wing Yamina party is accusing the right-wing Likud of not really wanting to push ahead with the annexation and only giving it lip service. The centrist Blue and White party said it was willing to discuss such a move “under certain circumstances,” only to have its No. 2, Gabi Ashkenazi, reportedly dismiss the option out of hand. Two things stand out in this regard. The first is the normalization of the annexation idea. The senior Israeli politicians on the verge of forming a unity government of some sort, whether now or after fourth elections are held in the summer, are addressing the annexation issue in terms of when, not if. Whereas two or three years ago, talk of annexation was the purview of Knesset members from the hard-line HaBayit HaYehudi (now Yamina) party and the most right-wing flank of the Likud, nowadays, the leader of Blue and White Benny Gantz is wrangling with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the manner of its execution and its extent, not over the very question of whether the issue should be considered at all. Meanwhile, members of Gantz’s party, some of them originally Labor party voters, are keeping mum on the issue. The second thing that stands out: There is a clear majority in the current Knesset, and probably in the next one, too, for annexation. The right-wing bloc, joined by the newly minted faction of Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel (Derech

הפוסט Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The issue of possible Israeli land annexation in the West Bank has become an endless source of spin for Israeli politicians. The hard-line right-wing Yamina party is accusing the right-wing Likud of not really wanting to push ahead with the annexation and only giving it lip service. The centrist Blue and White party said it was willing to discuss such a move “under certain circumstances,” only to have its No. 2, Gabi Ashkenazi, reportedly dismiss the option out of hand.

Two things stand out in this regard. The first is the normalization of the annexation idea. The senior Israeli politicians on the verge of forming a unity government of some sort, whether now or after fourth elections are held in the summer, are addressing the annexation issue in terms of when, not if. Whereas two or three years ago, talk of annexation was the purview of Knesset members from the hard-line HaBayit HaYehudi (now Yamina) party and the most right-wing flank of the Likud, nowadays, the leader of Blue and White Benny Gantz is wrangling with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the manner of its execution and its extent, not over the very question of whether the issue should be considered at all. Meanwhile, members of Gantz’s party, some of them originally Labor party voters, are keeping mum on the issue.

The second thing that stands out: There is a clear majority in the current Knesset, and probably in the next one, too, for annexation. The right-wing bloc, joined by the newly minted faction of Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel (Derech Eretz), Knesset member Orly Levy-Abekasis (Gesher faction) and probably Blue and White’s lawmakers, as well as the seven representatives of the Yisrael Beitenu party and perhaps even Yesh Atid, could all vote in favor of annexation. If Netanyahu (assuming he is the next prime minister) moves ahead with annexing the settlement town of Maale Adumim, its surrounding area (known as E1) or the Jordan Valley, he is presumably assured Knesset approval.

The prime minister’s office continues to work on possible annexation maps, but with the coronavirus running amok, all this talk is motivated by politics rather than ideology. The controversial annexation issue serves the various parties involved as a bargaining chip and a tool with which to goad their rivals, whereas actual implementation of this move entails three conditions: formation of a government, a full return to post-corona normal, and White House support. Since a return to normal could take time, and the White House is busy managing the COVID-19 crisis and preparing for the November elections, even if a new Israeli government is sworn in, annexation legislation could be delayed until after the US presidential vote. In other words, it will not happen in the coming days, weeks or months.

The Arab world, however, does not make the distinction between the ideological component of annexation and the political one, and is monitoring the declarations of Israeli politicians with grave concern. On April 13, the Arab League warned of the severe repercussions of annexation, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held an urgent round of phone consultations with Arab leaders. The Palestinian leadership is convinced that Israel and the White House are pushing forward with the “deal of the century” that President Donald Trump unveiled in late January while the world’s attention is diverted by the coronavirus. Ramallah, as well as Amman, Cairo and Riyadh view the much-discussed annexation as an immediate threat, even if only a theoretical one, for now.

The Israeli annexation discourse bolsters radical elements in the Arab world and undermines the moderates. At this stage, with Arab regimes dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak, the issue could fan the flames of regional instability and endanger Israeli security. A recent internal Foreign Ministry assessment reflects Israel’s concerns over a possible collapse of several Arab regimes as a result of the coronavirus, an Iranian breakout toward a nuclear weapon and significant strengthening of radical terror organizations, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. With Israel aware of the regional threats to its security, it would be logical to assume that now is not the time to rock the fragile Middle Eastern boat and to undermine cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States. Even before the pandemic, the Arab regimes and their populations were not enamored by the annexation prospects. Now, with millions in the Arab world unemployed and facing a severe economic crisis, any hasty move could deal a blow to the delicate fabric of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and eventually have a much harsher impact on Israel’s security.

Most former and current defense officials who enjoyed close relations with their senior Arab counterparts for decades are aware of the danger lurking in the annexation policy. Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilad, former director of policy and political-military affairs at the Ministry of Defense, warned Feb. 7, after President Donald Trump unveiled his plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, that imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley would undermine the peace treaty with Jordan. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom expressed a similar view, whereas Commanders for Israel’s Security, a nonprofit representing dozens of former defense officials, has conducted an online campaign designed to influence Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Labor leader Amir Peretz to withhold support for the move.

These harsh warnings of an impending disaster, particularly at such a sensitive time when the battle to defeat the coronavirus should be at the top of Israel’s agenda, appear to be falling on deaf ears. The distinction between army and defense agency veterans who conducted Israel’s ties with Arab regimes for years, and the politicians, most of whom lack any experience in defense or diplomacy, is evident. Even Netanyahu, who in the past avoided annexation moves and sidelined proposed legislation by members of his Likud party to annex Maale Adumim and the Jordan Valley, continues to throw about promises of annexation. This is a man who periodically meets and talks with Arab rulers, and knows their views on annexation and the threat that it poses in destabilizing the Middle East. His actions contradict his favorite and widely expressed thesis that the Arab world does not care about the Palestinians and would be willing to advance ties with Israel, even if it fails to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel has failed to establish formal relations with more Arab states in recent years, and it has not boosted trade or forged closer diplomatic ties. While it enjoys a slight warming of relations with some Arab rulers, and growing public interest in what it has to offer, Israel would pay dearly if it annexed the West Bank, dealing a significant blow to the Palestinians and destabilizing Jordan. The repercussions would put an end to its dreams of cooperation with the region and of a united front against Iran.

(originally published on al-Monitor)

הפוסט Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A Very Israeli Pandemic Response https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-very-israeli-pandemic-response/ Tue, 07 Apr 2020 13:05:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3294 As in other countries, COVID-19 has exposed the weaknesses particular to Israel society and governance. These shortcomings are not revelatory. Instead, the coronavirus’ spread shines a spotlight on familiar, systemic issues consistently neglected over the decades. Israel’s health care system was unprepared to handle COVID-19. Although as of this article’s submission there is a comparatively low death toll – 56 individuals (as for April 6), the majority of whom were senior citizens – the main concern is that Israel’s medical institutions will soon be overrun by coronavirus patients which will indirectly affect the mortality rates of non-coronavirus patients. Israel only possesses some 4,000 ventilators – a critical tool to aid those suffering from the worst conditions. Each day, more health care employees are being sidelined from their tasks due to possible exposure to the virus. Inventive solutions like converting vacant hotels into housing units for patients with mild symptoms may not be enough if government measures cannot flatten the curve. Mass coronavirus testing – one of the most successful policies adopted by countries like South Korea and Taiwan – has yet to take off efficiently in Israel. Many patients who have been tested received incorrect results, further delaying the health system’s ability to provide a vital service in a timely fashion. An absence of essential chemicals has slowed the existing testing process. But befitting its moniker as the “startup nation”, Israel has tried to employ technology in order to curtail COVID-19. One initiative is the Health Ministry’s app that permits citizens who download it to see whether their movement

הפוסט A Very Israeli Pandemic Response הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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As in other countries, COVID-19 has exposed the weaknesses particular to Israel society and governance. These shortcomings are not revelatory. Instead, the coronavirus’ spread shines a spotlight on familiar, systemic issues consistently neglected over the decades.

Israel’s health care system was unprepared to handle COVID-19. Although as of this article’s submission there is a comparatively low death toll – 56 individuals (as for April 6), the majority of whom were senior citizens – the main concern is that Israel’s medical institutions will soon be overrun by coronavirus patients which will indirectly affect the mortality rates of non-coronavirus patients. Israel only possesses some 4,000 ventilators – a critical tool to aid those suffering from the worst conditions. Each day, more health care employees are being sidelined from their tasks due to possible exposure to the virus. Inventive solutions like converting vacant hotels into housing units for patients with mild symptoms may not be enough if government measures cannot flatten the curve.

Mass coronavirus testing – one of the most successful policies adopted by countries like South Korea and Taiwan – has yet to take off efficiently in Israel. Many patients who have been tested received incorrect results, further delaying the health system’s ability to provide a vital service in a timely fashion. An absence of essential chemicals has slowed the existing testing process.

But befitting its moniker as the “startup nation”, Israel has tried to employ technology in order to curtail COVID-19. One initiative is the Health Ministry’s app that permits citizens who download it to see whether their movement has overlapped with anyone with a confirmed infection. The government has also granted the Shin Bet – Israel’s internal security agency – permission to track the movements of coronavirus patients through use of their phones and credit card data. This controversial decision reportedly identified at least 500 individuals carrying the disease.

Not surprisingly, these efforts have proven both imperfect against the coronavirus. Israel’s national expenditure on healthcare is lower than the OECD average and a 2019 Taub Center report deemed the country’s acute care system insufficient for public demand. Ad hoc solutions rarely solve chronic problems. An increasing number of public figures are asking whether the Health Ministry should be the primary actor in this saga or whether the Defense Ministry should assume the lead.

Enforcing a rigid policy of social distancing and lockdown has also proven challenging. Since March 12, Israeli schoolchildren have been homebound but the Education Ministry has been inconsistent with its execution of nationwide distance learning. Air traffic has all but ceased and public transportation has been significantly reduced, but that hasn’t stopped many from seeing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s almost nightly addresses as merely a polite suggestion. Israel’s police – and, more worryingly, its military – now patrol public spaces (including beaches), fining and arresting those violating the government’s directives.

Since day one, communicating a single, clear message to Israel’s diverse population has been a serious challenge for the Israeli government. No case exemplifies this better than the ultra-Orthodox community. Ultra-Orthodox Jews (around 12% of the general population) observe a rigid set of customs that centers around mass religious education and communal participation in lifecycle events. They often live in distinct neighborhoods and cities, separate from mainstream Israeli society. Whether portions of the ultra-Orthodox community did not receive or were willfully ignorant to the Health Ministry’s directives remains unclear, however images capturing Haredim disregarding government policy seriously damaged the already frayed bonds between this community and mainstream Israeli society. Health Minister Yaakov Litzman, who represents one of the Haredi parties in the Knesset, also violated these public safety restrictions and contracted the coronavirus. Senior government officials, including Netanyahu, are now under quarantine. Haredi leaders are now instructing their devotees not to gather in large numbers, but it has taken longer for these communities to adapt and, unsurprisingly, about half of hospitalized Israelis with COVID-19 are ultra-orthodox. Major Haredi population centers are now under lockdown, cut off from the rest of Israel.

These manifold pressures, in addition to a ballooning unemployment numbers, have manufactured perhaps one, shallow ray of light: the end of Israel’s political deadlock. Publicly, Blue & White leader Benny Gantz claimed that the coronavirus threatened Israel’s future and required that he “put politics aside” after three grueling election cycles. But many see Gantz’s decision as capitulation. And it is difficult to overlook how Netanyahu and Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein strained an already tense political atmosphere to its breaking point by utilizing the coronavirus as legitimate cause for shutting down the legislature and refusing to follow a Supreme Court order to reopen parliament. The cost of establishing a unity government with Netanyahu is high; Gantz’s decision left Israel’s opposition movement in tatters. Firmly back in the driver’s seat, Netanyahu can refocus his attention on his legal battles – and of course coronavirus as well.

As the Passover holiday approaches, most Israelis are trying to look past the egg shortages and the looming economic fallout in order to count their blessings. There is good reason to believe that the national mortality rate will remain low. But similar to many other states affected by the coronavirus, the pandemic’s damage to public trust may require years of rehabilitation.

(originally published in IPSI)

הפוסט A Very Israeli Pandemic Response הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Ehud Eiran quoted in CGTN on the Coronavirus, March 2020 https://mitvim.org.il/en/media/ehud-eiran-quoted-in-cgtn-on-the-coronavirus-march-2020/ Wed, 25 Mar 2020 16:52:15 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=media&p=4985 הפוסט Ehud Eiran quoted in CGTN on the Coronavirus, March 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Ehud Eiran quoted in CGTN on the Coronavirus, March 2020 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/coronavirus-outbreak-an-important-test-for-globalization/ Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:33:26 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3012 The quick-fire coronavirus spread and the response of different countries to it, not only highlight immediate concerns about public health, but also have a significant impact on the evolving world order and the values that underpin it. While further challenging globalization, the crisis also holds out hope for its resurgence. The epidemic is an additional blow to the vision and practices of the globalization process that is already under strain. The two world powers that led globalization – the US and China – turned to limiting the scope of their cooperation and exchange of goods, people, and even ideas. In early March, the US decreased the number of visas granted to Chinese journalists. In many places, citizens have elected leaders more concerned with domestic values than with a commitment to a global visions and institutions; and the European Union, a crowning achievement of globalization in both practice and values, is creaking and weakening. The coronavirus event provides globalization with additional practical and symbolic challenges. So far, infection has been reported in over 85 countries, and its spread will slow a global economy which is heavily dependent on international production and supply chains. The number of flights between countries, perhaps the most immediate personal experience of globalization, is quickly shrinking, with significant repercussions expected to outlast the epidemic. The outbreak hones the understanding that along with the free passage of people and goods between countries, globalization also can bring with it the spread of disease. Sadly, in the public health context, the limitations to globalization

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The quick-fire coronavirus spread and the response of different countries to it, not only highlight immediate concerns about public health, but also have a significant impact on the evolving world order and the values that underpin it. While further challenging globalization, the crisis also holds out hope for its resurgence.

The epidemic is an additional blow to the vision and practices of the globalization process that is already under strain. The two world powers that led globalization – the US and China – turned to limiting the scope of their cooperation and exchange of goods, people, and even ideas. In early March, the US decreased the number of visas granted to Chinese journalists. In many places, citizens have elected leaders more concerned with domestic values than with a commitment to a global visions and institutions; and the European Union, a crowning achievement of globalization in both practice and values, is creaking and weakening.

The coronavirus event provides globalization with additional practical and symbolic challenges. So far, infection has been reported in over 85 countries, and its spread will slow a global economy which is heavily dependent on international production and supply chains. The number of flights between countries, perhaps the most immediate personal experience of globalization, is quickly shrinking, with significant repercussions expected to outlast the epidemic. The outbreak hones the understanding that along with the free passage of people and goods between countries, globalization also can bring with it the spread of disease. Sadly, in the public health context, the limitations to globalization could be perceived as a positive development. Research examining the effects of the global flu epidemic in the winter of 1957-58 clearly showed Cold War constraints on movement between East and West curtailed the spread of the disease in the West.

The fact that the virus broke out in China is of particular significance. The rising Eastern power plays a critical role in the global economy, inter alia as the production hub of most goods we consume. We hailed this global production chain and the cheap goods it provided. Now that the crisis in China is preventing production and export, many countries will presumably try to bring back home some of their essential production elements. The US under President Donald Trump was trying to do so anyway, albeit for different reasons. Not only that, weakened Chinese economic activity is expected to undermine the global economy and thereby further erode the achievements of globalization.

The second issue highlighted by the epidemic is US-Sino competition. The Trump Administration imposed restrictions on travelers from China on public health grounds. However, China, which has already warned against a global “over reaction” is presumably concerned that some of the restrictions stem from political and perhaps even racist motivations. The crisis is also creating fertile ground for injecting an ideological dimension into US-Chinese tensions. So far, the competition between Washington and Beijing has revolved around material aspects: Global status, economic capacity and military power, but the coronavirus crisis is a test for the regime and society in both China and the US.

On the one hand, the restrictive and hierarchical nature of Chinese society appears to have delayed the identification and treatment of the Covid-19 disease, challenging the legitimacy of China’s Communist Party. It will invariably serve the US in future arguments about the advantages of an open American-style society versus the (partially) closed Chinese one. At the same time, the handling of the disease pits the American model of personal freedom, free market and private and decentralized medicine against the Chinese model that prefers the collective, a partly government controlled economy and medical services shaped according to a public ethos, albeit with some of it privatized nowadays. China’s ability to impose harsh restrictions on its citizens probably helped block the spread of the virus within China, while the ability of the US system to tackle the challenge is unclear as yet.

Nonetheless, the crisis is also an opportunity to revive globalization. First, the crisis is a reminder of our underlining unity as humans. Beyond divisions, wars and hatred, the crisis shows that different people share rather similar anxieties. Second, international cooperation is crucial. A coordinated, cross-border international effort to monitor and treat the disease, and to speedily develop and disseminate a vaccine across national borders will end the epidemic. This is an important lesson in light of other global challenges, especially climate change. In both cases – climate and public health – mobilization to tackle them should overcome national boundaries. Specifically, the epidemic also highlights the importance of international organizations. Those who are critical of such organizations should be reminded that accepted international mechanisms (such as those being promoted by the World Health Organization) are critical for dealing with the challenges to public health such as the Coronavirus epidemic. Without them, things would be much tougher.

We – leaders, opinion setters, educators and citizens – hold the key to addressing the epidemic and later shaping its legacy: international isolation and competition or shared humanity and cooperation mechanisms. Two 20th century novels – Camus’ “The Plague” and Saramago’s “Blindness” – include horrific depictions of human behavior in the face of epidemics. However, they also highlight heroes who act with compassion and humaneness towards their fellow wo.men. Let us hope that we follow their example of cooperation and humanity rather than alienation and disregard towards others.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט Coronavirus Outbreak: An Important Test for Globalization הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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