A research paper that was written on the subject in 2018, in the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab states, outlined how the UAE and Israel cooperate in four central areas: diplomacy, security, economy, and civilian affairs. The paper concluded that, at the date of its publication, there was a large and diverse array of partnerships in the economic sector. The paper also pointed to the fact that most of these partnerships are founded on ad hoc interests and temporary opportunities, and therefore the relationship between the countries cannot be described as consistent or deep. The majority of these collaborations are characterized by secrecy, due to the lack of formal relations or normalization between the UAE and Israel. At the same time, collaborations that take place in international platforms benefit from a higher level of legitimacy and exposure. Examples of this include the joint air force exercises of the two countries together with Greece, Italy, and the US; Israeli athletes’ participation in sporting events that take place in the UAE; and the gatherings of statespersons in various international fora that take place in the UAE. Most of these collaborations stem from the UAE’s desire to expand its role in the international community, and its wish to serve as a hub for international events and conferences. Within this framework, relations between the UAE and Israel have been tested a number of times in recent years, and were eventually strengthened, following the gradual removal of obstacles by the Emiratis.

In 2019, a series of events sharpened the UAE’s focus and priorities: the withdrawal of its forces from Yemen and its efforts to stabilize Yemen’s political system; its involvement in multiple regions, such as Libya and the Horn of Africa; the rising tensions around violent events in the Gulf and the diplomatic measures that the UAE took to pacify Iran; the ongoing crisis with Qatar; and the UAE’s focus on domestic issues, such as the Federal National Council’s elections and efforts to expand local workforce in the labor market. These changes of focus led, inter alia, to the marginalization of the Palestinian issue in the UAE’s foreign affairs during the last year. The UAE’s involvement in the Palestinian arena was, in the last year, rather distant and symbolic, with continued humanitarian aid via UNRWA and the support of Mohammad Dahlan (believed to be a protege of Mohammed bin Zayed and the UAE’s main channel to the Palestinians). Additionally, the enduring participation of the Palestinian Nusseibeh family in senior positions in the UAE (Zaki Nusseibeh as a government minister, and his daughter Lana Nusseibeh as Permanent Representative to the UN) serves as another manifestation of the UAE’s solidarity with the Palestinians, though in their own territory.

The rather marginalization of the Palestinian issue was also manifested in a significant decline in statements of support for the Palestinian cause, and in decreased concrete involvement (or involvement attempts) in this arena by the UAE. The extent of the UAE’s support and commitment to the national struggle of the Palestinians is in dispute between researchers and policymakers. Though the decline in the UAE’s active involvement in the Palestinian issue does not necessarily attest to a decline in its commitment to the Palestinians. It may be attributed to its inability to exert influence in the Palestinian arena or to the increasing rapprochement between the UAE and Israel. The first aspect can be linked to the important role of Qatar and Egypt in the Gaza Strip, which restricts Dahlan and the UAE’s ability to exert influence in this arena except in unique cases, such as the months following the Qatar crisis in June 2017.

Turning to the second aspect, simultaneously and in contrast with moving away from the Palestinian arena, the UAE has shown greater openness to Israel and Israeli and Jewish audiences this past year. 2019 was characterized by improved informal relations between the countries, and these collaborations increased and became more diverse. The UAE’s decision to allow Israel to participate in Expo 2020 starting October of this year has become the driving force in shaping direct relations between the countries, and continues to shape them in various areas.

This paper examines existing cooperation between Israel and the UAE, and the changes that have taken place in the relations throughout 2019. The paper assesses these changes in four main areas: diplomacy, security, economy and civilian affairs, and briefly describes the main developments in each area in order to point to common denominators and indicate key trends.

הפוסט Israel-UAE Cooperation in 2019: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From a historical perspective, this is one of the worst moments in the history of the Palestinian national movement. The political-geographical split is making it difficult for the PLO leadership to navigate through the diplomatic route toward the two-states-for-two-people solution, as it committed to in the Oslo Agreements. The alternative Hamas tried to present in the form of jihad collapsed too, leading to a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The crisis the two leaderships – the PA and the Hamas – are experiencing obligates them to find solutions that could give the young generation a sense of hope. Naturally, the weakness of the national system and party affiliation makes it possible to create political alliances based on alternative identities. So far, it seems the key for creating change in Palestinian society can be found in the creation of communal alliances around strengthening the regional-geographical connection while bolstering the national connection as well.

That’s the background for the recent Egyptian-brokered unnatural affair between Mohammad Dahlan, who was expelled from Fatah in 2011 but sees himself as Mahmoud Abbas’s future successor, and Hamas’s newly elected leader, Yahya Sanwar. Dahlan, the former head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Force, was described by the Hamas leadership on the eve of the military takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007 as a corrupt person damaging the values of Islam.

The parties have surprisingly moved closer not just thanks to a political meeting of interests, but due to traditional cultural identity components, led by the interpersonal connection and the local identity. Sanwar and Dahlan grew up together in the Khan Younis refugee camp, share the refugee mindset and the same background. In addition, there is no history of bad blood between them. Dahlan and Sanwar’s ways parted in the beginning of the first intifada.

Since then, until their recent meeting in Cairo, there has been no animosity between the two, but perhaps yearning.

The personal acquaintance and the local identity shared by Dahlan and Sanwar is seen as an asset by Egypt too, which is interested in severing the ties between Hamas’s military wing and Islamist organizations in the Sinai Peninsula.

The creation of an economic-political dependence system, which passes through Dahlan and is backed by Sanwar, will make it possible for Egypt to achieve these goals. Thus, the local Gazan identity, which receives a lot of legitimization from Egypt, allows Hamas to find a formula that would make its political survival possible.

For Dahlan, the local identity could serve as a renewed stepping stone to a national leadership position. The purpose of the alliance between Dahlan and Hamas is to lead joint moves that would create a better day-to-day life for the strip’s residents, who are suffering from a shortage of electricity, water and basic civilian infrastructure. Dahlan and the donation money from the Gulf are supposed to fill the void left behind by Abbas. The Palestinian president chose to withdraw funds to harm the Gaza Strip’s bureaucratic systems and civilian infrastructure in an attempt to subdue Hamas, following Sanwar’s efforts to create an alternative government that would neutralize the influence of the Palestinian Authority’s government offices in the Gaza Strip.

Beyond the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas, the internal Fatah battle between Abbas and Dahlan is personal and filled with bad blood. In the past, Abbas rejected Egyptian attempts to reconcile between the parties, and he is determined to block Dahlan’s way back into Fatah and prevent him from reaching an influential position in the future.

As part of his attempts to try to thwart Dahlan’s return to a political position of power, Abbas initiated last week a meeting with the Hamas leadership in the West Bank, led by Nasser alDin al-Shaer. The meeting between the Fatah and Hamas leaderships in the West Bank focused on the efforts to reach an intra-Palestinian reconciliation and a solution to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Abbas, like Dahlan and Sanwar, is using communalregional politics to advance issues of national importance and shape a political agenda.

From the West Bank, the message reached the Gaza Strip. One of the Hamas leaders, Salah al-Bardawil, in response called for a return to the reconciliation path. He said Hamas was willing to cancel the alternative government workers’ council in exchange for setting a general election date and implementing a reform in the PLO’s structure.

Fatah, Hamas and Dahlan are using the local identity to make some gains in the Palestinian national political arena. Local, clan and tribal identity components are usually seen as an obstacle to the national pattern of action. In the Palestinian case, the communal-regional politics is being painted in national and Islamic colors and serving as a future engine of growth, which will have a future key role in the inheritance battles in the post-Abbas era.

(originally published in Ynet)

הפוסט Sanwar and Dahlan: An Egyptian-Brokered Alliance against Abbas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Abu Mazen: A Man in Search of a Legacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.