Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been running in Turkish national elections for over 20 years, first as founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that challenged the existing political order, subsequently as a prime minister who reshaped the system of government and more recently, as an all-powerful president seeking another term.

Turkish elections have aroused interest in Israel over the years, whether due to Erdogan’s Islamist affiliation that initially prompted speculation about Turkey going the way of Iran or more recently, the impact of his continued hold on power for Israeli-Turkish relations and regional geopolitics.

A new aspect has informed Israeli discourse on Turkey in recent years: concern in Israel’s pro-democracy camp that democratic erosion processes in Turkey are similarly emerging in Israel under Netanyahu’s enduring rule. Seven years ago, the Israeli opposition sounded warnings against “Israel turning into Turkey,” and in 2020, Benny Gantz’s opposition Blue and White party adopted the campaign slogan “It’s Blue and White or Erdogan” (it rhymes in Hebrew).

Since the establishment of the current Netanyahu government and in the face of the legislative processes it is promoting, pro-democracy forces in Israel are increasingly turning to colleagues in Turkey (as well as in Hungary and Poland) to learn about the situation there and to seek tips for safeguarding democracy.

The political renewal that characterized Turkey’s opposition towards the recent election is resonating among Israeli opposition forces, who have an increasing interest in creating fresh, united and renewed political frameworks (see, for example, Labor MK Gilad Kariv’s recent call for unity on the political Left). Relevant insights that can be distilled from the Turkish opposition’s attempt to replace Erdogan touch mainly on issues of alliances and unification, momentum and hope.

Alliances and unifications

In the run-up to the 2023 elections, most Turkish opposition groups joined forces behind a single presidential candidate: the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP, founded by Ataturk), Kemal Kılıcdaroglu. This push to consolidate a united front began ahead of the 2018 presidential elections and bore fruit in the 2019 municipal elections with impressive victories by opposition candidates in major cities.

Ahead of the 2023 presidential elections, six parties from across the political and social spectrum ran a joint campaign, calling for the restoration of democratic order and a return to a parliamentary system of government. Along with Kılıcdaroglu, the heads of the other five parties ran as vice presidential candidates, as did the mayors of Istanbul (Ekrem Imamoglu) and Ankara (Mansur Yavas), who played a key role in the campaign.

The ideologically diverse front performed well during the campaign, although it ultimately failed to live up to expectations. In a sign that may be relevant to Israel’s fragmented politics, the Kurdish ethnic minority in southeastern Turkey provided Kılıcdaroglu with overwhelming support on Election Day, having reached agreements with the opposition front without joining it.

THIS IS an encouraging lesson for the prospects of forging constructive political alliances with Israel’s Arab citizens, even if formal cooperation under one political roof is unlikely.

The joint Turkish presidential campaign conveyed unity and determination and willingness to put differences aside in favor of achieving an overarching national goal. Preliminary agreements among the parties enabled opposition parties to formulate joint political moves vis-a-vis different constituencies in order to maximize their relative advantage on Election Day.

On the other hand, the bloc’s great ideological diversity undermined certainty regarding the policies the opposition would adopt if elected and the identities of political appointments that would follow. This was clearly evident, for example, in the foreign policy field. The opposition bloc included Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s former foreign minister, credited with boosting Turkey’s standing in the Arab and Muslim sphere, as well as Namik Tan, a former Turkish ambassador to Israel and the United States, aligned with pro-Western views.

Which of the two would have set the diplomatic tone had the opposition won? Voters could not know this in advance and the opposition’s attempt to make up for this uncertainty by issuing a comprehensive election platform (unusual in Turkey) only provided a partial response to these concerns.

A seemingly more appropriate model in the Israeli context would be for parties of significantly different ideological stripes to run separately and parties more ideologically aligned to form unions, with a public commitment in advance to form a coalition after the elections.

On the parliamentary front, the bloc’s largest party, CHP, gave up some of its future representation in advance to allow for mergers with several smaller parties. The move was criticized in retrospect when election results indicated that the mergers had failed to increase the CHP’s power and the party was nonetheless forced to transfer seats to ideologically distant parties that had garnered negligible voter support.

When forming political consolidations, one must therefore consider not only how to maximize profits on Election Day, but also how to enable effective parliamentary action throughout a future term. In addition, the opposition’s reliance on key figures (mayors) who were designated for senior positions in the event of victory but not for parliament membership in case of defeat, risked a future weakening of their various factions.

The lesson for Israel is that entry into national politics must be wholeheartedly sincere, including the willingness to give up current positions to make way for opposition parliamentary activity.

Momentum and hope

Election Day in Turkey generated much optimism among the camp of change, especially as elections drew nearer. This was no small matter, given the repeated disappointments this camp has suffered in recent years and a sense of helplessness generated by Erdogan’s prolonged rule. This is an important lesson about the relative ease of inspiring hope and leveraging a thirst for change when the public feels that its leaders are acting responsibly and jointly to advance the bloc’s common interest.

THE FORMATION of a collective opposition alliance, the positive campaign it led, the unifying national discourse, the willingness to break social taboos and legitimize ethnic and religious minorities all harnessed the opposition’s supporters and conveyed a sense that change was possible. This, in turn, increased voter turnout and motivated voters to volunteer for polling station supervision – a central pillar of the opposition’s Election Day strategy.

The global dimension introduced by the opposition into the election campaign was also important, stressing that victory would position Turkey as a model for like-minded voters in other countries. The opposition also felt responsible in light of the global attention to its efforts.

The positive momentum and favorable polls ultimately dazzled and generated over-optimism, which may have led to missed electoral trends in the periphery and away from social networks, and to a lack of sufficiently appropriate responses for them in the campaign. This phenomenon has occurred in the past both in Israel and in other Western countries, requiring attention in the future.

The role played by mayors in the campaign indicated the power of the municipal arena. Given repeated losses by the opposition’s national leadership (such as those Kılıcdaroglu himself experienced since being elected head of his party, in 2010), the municipal leadership kept producing stories of success. Imamoglu and Yavas were regarded as winners, having cracked the code for defeating Erdogan’s candidates, in 2019.

Serving as mayors, they were also portrayed as leaders mindful of their residents’ daily needs and their presence in the campaign added a fresh spirit to a somewhat outdated party leadership. Both mayors also played a major role on election night. They appeared in public together every few hours to update on the state of affairs and try to uplift voter morale. This is relevant in the Israeli context ahead of the upcoming municipal elections in October 2023.

The extent to which the pro-democracy camp is successful in creating a compelling narrative of success and victory in these elections and producing young and promising leaders will also be particularly significant ahead of the next Knesset elections, towards which new political frameworks may take shape.

Since the advent of democratic protests in Israel, in January 2023, a growing Israeli openness has developed to international partnerships, to learn from the experiences of like-minded allies in other countries and to share insights from Israel with others. This is a welcome trend generating hope that the voices emerging from Turkey’s recent elections will indeed resonate in Israel and help bring about change.

This article is from “the Jerusalem Post“, May 23th, 2023.

הפוסט What lessons can Israel learn from Turkey’s elections? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An unbearable gap exists between professionals in the civil service, most of whom are prevented from expressing themselves in public, who understand that issues of peace and diplomacy should take center stage in public discourse and the state’s strategic order of preference, and politicians who regard such matters as trivial. The politicians stoke the sense of public fear, which then takes them hostage to public opinion, rather than dealing with the many opportunities on our doorstep.

The anti-Israel boycott movement (BDS) illustrates how we have turned a tactical threat that does not endanger Israel’s security or prosperity into an existential threat. Israel’s aggressive policies vis-à-vis the movement violate freedom of expression, which liberal audiences view as a key human right. This, in turn, plays into the hands of those promoting BDS because it alienates many groups deterred by the government’s anti-liberal policies. The Foreign Ministry is familiar with Israel’s target audiences more than any other government agency and is supposed to present the diplomatic angle at government discussions, but it is often excluded from sessions with decision makers and is not a party to shaping policy.

Israeli politicians are distancing themselves from the values of liberal democracies, which most Diaspora Jewry holds dear, too. With short-term considerations in mind, they prefer alliances with populist leaders who have a record of anti-Semitism. In so doing, they sin against the values defined by the founders of the state in its proclamation of independence as well as against the stated purpose of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

Israel must not regard Diaspora Jewry as simply a cash cow, a political lobby and a pool for immigration. It must engage with those the state views as an integral part of its national project. Diaspora Jews should be invited to voice their views on Israel-related issues, and Israel should appreciate their involvement even when the views are critical. We must create ways for Jews to be critical of government policy and at the same time love and support the State of Israel.

The issue of relations with Diaspora Jewry is intertwined with that of the Arab Israeli minority. For Diaspora Jews, equality for the Arabs in Israel is a fundamental liberal axiom just as is their expectation of the rights they demand for themselves in their countries of residence. There is a measure of hypocrisy in Israeli criticism leveled at Israel’s Arab citizens over their identification with their Palestinian brothers, while expecting US Jews to identify with Israel. Nonetheless, there is room for optimism.

While Israelis are being exposed often to messages of fear and incitement, polls consistently indicate that a majority favors the two-state for two people solution. Despite it all, many elements that were absent in the past now enable the promotion of this solution. The Arab Peace Initiative accepts the principle of two states within the 1967 borders with certain territorial exchanges as well as Israel’s veto of the number of refugees allowed to return. The Palestinian Authority’s current leadership does not believe violence serves its people and is seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

A change of Israeli leadership, which may be in the offing, could lead Israel and the Palestinians toward a new road that would save the State of Israel’s liberal Zionist dream. When that happens, Israel will no longer have to choose between its character as the nation state of the Jewish people and being a democracy that protects the rights of its minorities.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres. This article is based on his remarks at the 2019 Annual Conference of the Mitvim Institute, held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for Diplomatic Optimism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent years, along with its moves to strengthen ties with Middle Eastern states, Israel has been seeking to expand its links with African states. For example, at a November 2018 meeting with Chad’s President, Netanyahu declared that “Israel is returning to Africa” and hinted at intentions to restore ties with Sudan. The very thought that Netanyahu considered meeting with a man like Omar al-Bashir, who has since been deposed and will soon stand trial for crimes against humanity, generates aversion and concern.

Improved relations between Israel and its neighbors in the Middle East and Africa are undoubtedly a positive development, but does every end justify the means and is every regional leader a worthy Israeli ally? This question has been dogging Israeli foreign policy for decades, but has been underscored in recent years given the changes in Israel’s regional relations and their more public dimension.

What is Israel’s policy regarding the warming relations or rapprochement with countries in the region? Do the government and the Knesset conduct significant debate about the emerging ties between Israel and North African and Middle Eastern states?

Let us start with the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, which is tasked with overseeing the government’s defense and foreign affairs activity. In practice, the Knesset’s most prestigious committee has turned into a unidirectional communications channel for senior defense and foreign affairs officials to the legislature, with those testifying before the panel generally failing to answer lawmakers’ questions or providing only partial answers.

In addition, foreign policy issues are relegated to the sidelines of the committee’s agenda with its perpetual focus on defense issues that always appear more important and pressing. The idea of splitting the panel into two separate committees has come up occasionally, but has been discounted.

The State Security Cabinet also appears to be sidelined often and excluded from the decision making loop. For most of the past four years, the Prime Minister has also served as Foreign Minister. His confidante, attorney Yitzhak Molcho often served as his special envoy to Arab states, but was not required to report to the Knesset or the professional levels of government since he was essentially a private individual. The Prime Minister’s power and authority in defense and foreign policy appeared unlimited.

Israel is proud (justifiably so) of being the only democracy in the Middle East. Human rights values are the pillars of Israel’s existence as a democratic state, and must be one of the most important and weighty considerations in formulating policy. What, then, is their weight in determining Israeli foreign policy?

There is no absolute morality in the conduct of foreign policy. Not only that, there is usually an inherent contradiction between morality and the practice of foreign policy since democratic states must maintain contact with non-democratic ones. They must also deal with the fact that such states will use all means at their disposal to promote their interests.

These days, many fans of “realpolitik” in Israel and the world believe that when a state seeks to promote its foreign policy, it should not be fettered by ethical considerations. Prime Minister Netanyahu undoubtedly subscribes to this school of thought. He forges close ties with authoritarian heads of state, sometimes even appearing to prefer them to his colleagues in democratic states. Just as he is not deterred by close links with such leaders, he is not put off by weapons deals with states such as Burma, where authorities are conducting a genocide, according to UN reports.

The murder of exiled Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi provided one of the most obvious examples of Netanyahu’s belief in “realpolitik”. Although US intelligence flatly accused Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman of ordering the hit, President Trump did not sever ties with Riyadh and urged waiting for the findings of the Saudi investigation. Netanyahu convinced Trump to ease US pressure on Riyadh, arguing that the Saudis are an important strategic regional ally.

Much before Netanyahu, Israel conducted relations with “problematic” states, such as South Africa in the apartheid era. Up until the 1970s, Israel had condemned South Africa for the segregation of its black citizens, voted in favor of international sanctions and recalled its ambassador from Cape Town. In those days, Ben-Gurion rejected out of hand any possibility of closer ties with the South African government and adhered to the criticism of its apartheid regime. Following the Yom Kippur War, when many African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel, Israel’s approach changed. Israel felt weak and isolated, shunned by the family of nations, and decided to tighten relations with pariah states such as South Africa.

Israel’s current situation is completely different. Everyone understands that Israel needs good relations with its neighbors in order to ensure its security and sovereignty. That is why policy makers should draw red lines clearly defining what Israel is allowed to do and what it must not do.

Israel must not remain silent in the face of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This constitutes a severe violation of its identity and nature as a Jewish and democratic state. Rigorous judgment must be applied to consideration of arms deals. Clearly, certain states buy weapons not only to defend themselves, but also to kill, and that is why policy makers in the ministries of defense and foreign affairs and in the prime minister’s office must always consider not only financial interests, but also ethical ones. In particularly egregious and troubling cases, when journalists and human right activists are subjected to torture and sent to rot in jail, Israel can use its power and influence to urge the US administration to raise human rights and democracy issues in the region rather than blindly supporting the repressive violence of regimes in the Middle East. The Foreign Ministry has clearly defined red lines to which Israel generally adheres in its relations with radical right European parties. It should formulate similar guidelines regarding Israel’s emerging ties with Middle Eastern and African states, ascribing importance and value to democratic and moral components.

In the legislature, Knesset members must breathe new life into the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and insist on the centrality of Israel’s regional ties for the panel’s agenda. They must demand explanations from senior officials appearing before them and insist on getting answers. The Knesset must also anchor in legislation the Prime Minister’s authority in foreign affairs and defense issues and determine standards to which policy makers must adhere.

Israel is not simply another state in the Middle East. It is the only truly functioning democracy in the region. As a democratic state, Israel cannot shirk the human rights issue. There may not be absolute morality in foreign policy, but conducting a foreign policy devoid of all morality is not an option, either.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Democracy Component in Israel’s Relations with Arab State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Democracy and Foreign Policy in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The three titanic clashes of the 20th century – two world wars and the Cold War – ended with victory for the democratic camp, although often requiring alliances with non-democracies. The democratic advantage in war is not limited to democratic Great Powers. At the end of the 1990s, scholars Allan Stam and Dan Reiter showed that of the 297 wars between states in the years 1816 to 1990, democracies (most of which were not Great Powers, obviously) won almost all the wars they initiated and two-thirds of those imposed on them.

Elections are one explanation for the “democratic dividend” in war. Leaders of democratic states fear voters will depose them due to failed wars and therefore opt for wars they can win. Public trauma in the wake of war can unseat even a strong, established party. Such was the case with Israel’s Mapai/Ma’arach. In 1977, voter fury at the results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War brought about its downfall after 44 years of uninterrupted rule in the pre-state Jewish political entity (The Yeshuv) and later the State of Israel.

A nation’s participation in the choice of its leaders imbues government decisions such as a decision to go to war with an added dimension of legitimacy, generating greater identification among soldiers with the combat goals. It is true that non-democratic states, such as the Soviet Union, were successful in mobilizing public support during difficult times, such as World War II. However, the repressive nature of the Soviet state made it easier for the Germans to recruit to their side over 100,000 Soviet citizens (some of them prisoners of war they had captured). Moreover, in the final historic analysis, both of these political systems that challenged democracy – Nazism and Marxist-Leninism – were defeated.

Another explanation for the advantages democracies enjoy in war pertains to their institutional structure. Democratic leaders have less room to maneuver because constitutions, lawmakers and supreme courts provide checks and balances on their power. This results in tighter oversight over the executive branch of government, and, in turn, greater effectiveness of a decision to go to war, a decision on how to conduct a war and what lessons to learn from it.

Israel beat Egypt in 1967 inter alia because Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser undermined Israeli-Egyptian stability through a series of irresponsible declarations and measures, while his army was engaged elsewhere in a far-off war in Yemen. In a better-balanced regime, such declarations and steps would probably not be possible. The institutional balance is thus very important. As scholars Philip Potter and Matt Baum showed in a 2015 study, even autocracies in which constraints are placed on the ruler enjoy greater success in foreign policy and defense.

Democracies succeed in war because of not only elections and limits on power, but also because they are underpinned by values. A democratic culture that enables domestic and external criticism is a significant force multiplier. For example, writing in a 1982 opinion piece in Haaretz, Major Gershon Hacohen backed the right of a senior officer to resign in order to avoid leading his troops on a mission with which he disagreed. Hacohen’s unusual stand earned him a reprimand and a discharge. He was re-instated several years later, rising to the rank of Major General and contributing greatly to the Israel Defense Forces with his original thinking and outspoken views.

A true democratic culture empowers individuals, encourages their initiative and commitment, and makes them more militarily effective. On the other hand, nondemocratic states repress personal initiative, especially by military personnel, to prevent them directing it against the regime. In a comprehensive study in the 1990s, scholar Kenneth Pollack showed that lack of initiative on the part of military commanders in Arab armies was one of the main reasons for their persistent failures in wars against Israel. Similarly, non-democratic regimes divert significant intelligence resources to repressing their population at the expense of developing an effective an intelligence apparatus directed at the enemy. In this respect, too, Israel enjoys an advantage over its non-democratic neighbors.

Finally, open and democratic societies have been more successful in mining creative talents in high-tech, entrepreneurship and innovation, making the democratic West more prosperous and technologically and scientifically advanced, in terms of military effectiveness, too. True, non-democratic states such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were able to reach some scientific achievements. However, only democracies managed to preserve their scientific and technological advantages in the long term. A technological edge is particularly important for Israel’s security. After all, it is this edge in technology that allows it to compensate for its limited human and material resources, when compared to its foes.

A strong democracy is therefore vital for Israel’s security. Fair elections and regime change, checks and balances with an emphasis on restraining the power of the executive branch, an open and democratic culture of criticism, and the ability to attract and retain the creative classes are the pillars of an effective Israeli national security. Undermining them means not only a different political order, but also a real threat to the security of the state.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and an Associate Professor in international relations at Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Democracy is Essential to Israel’s National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Alternative Directions for Israeli Foreign Policy on the Eve of an Election Year הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent years, the EU has found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Internal divisions and differences of opinions among member states – especially between those in western and northern Europe and those in central and eastern Europe – have prevented meaningful decisions on the topic in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council since 2016. The split within the EU has become evident even in UN votes, such as the vote regarding the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to deepen these divisions and to leverage them to his benefit. He recently stated this in public, on his way to a visit in Lithuania. Israel under his leadership is trying to limit the EU’s ability to reach the consensus needed to make decisions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is doing so by fostering alliances with various groupings of European countries – the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Hellenic states (Cyprus and Greece), and next in line may be the Balkan states. This is done in parallel to growing criticism of the EU by top Israeli ministers, often including insults and portrayals of the EU – Israel’s largest trade partner – as a rival rather than a friend and partner.

The EU has not yet found effective policy solutions to these developments. It also does not see a sense of urgency to do so, particularly at a time when no Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are in sight and while the EU is preoccupied with more pressing internal and regional challenges. Nevertheless, the EU is not giving up on voicing its opinions and searching for paths for taking action, even if the potential impact is limited. In addition to condemnations, voicing concern, and conveying messages via traditional diplomatic channels, the EU is also working to maintain, foster, and deepen its ties with those in Israeli society who support peace, democracy, and human rights. This is evident in the support given to Israeli pro-peace civil society organizations and hosting relevant Israeli politicians in Brussels.

This month was not the first time Arab members of Knesset visited Brussels. Most recently, a delegation from the Joint List visited the European Parliament in November 2017. Their latest meeting with Mogherini is a step forward in their efforts to internationalize their quest for equality within Israel and to protest Netanyahu’s policies. This activism in the international arena draws criticism in Israel but it is very much in line with how modern diplomacy actually works in the 21st century. Citizens, organizations, businesses, and politicians can now take a larger role than ever in shaping foreign relations, which is no longer the exclusive domain of ministries of foreign affairs.

The increased involvement of Arab members of Knesset in foreign affairs holds potential that goes well beyond their current protest against the Jewish Nation-State Law. It can lead to an important and constructive role in future peace negotiations, and in efforts to improve ties between Israel and Arab (and Muslim) countries. To date, their involvement in these issues has been low, but the potential is significant.

The EU, from its perspective, sees meeting Israel’s Arab legislators as another opportunity to convey to the Israeli government its deep concern over the direction in which Israel is heading, and to declare its partnership with those in Israel – Arabs and Jews alike – who are working to change Israel’s course. This support, which takes various forms, is welcomed by a large number of pro-peace and progressive Israelis, and should continue.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel.

Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.

This gap between Israel’s official policy and the actions of right-wing politicians must be narrowed. Far right-wing parties are gaining influence in certain countries in Europe. In Austria, such a party has recently even joined the coalition and some of its members are now appointed senior officials. It is possible that in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the representatives of such parties will also become significant in EU institutions. In light of this, the MFA should formulate criteria and guidelines to instruct Israeli right-wing parties on how to conduct themselves vis-à-vis the far right in Europe. A recommendation to refrain from any interaction with the ministers of the Freedom Party was already formulated and accepted by the Prime Minister.

The aim of such a measure would be to prevent right-wing MKs from granting legitimacy to far right-wing ideology in Europe, contrary to the position of the MFA. Furthermore, it would also prevent the legitimizing of anti-Semitic elements in Europe by Israeli officials, regardless of the fact that such elements may currently focus on hating Muslims rather than Jews. The formulation of such criteria and guidelines should be led by the MFA, but should also involve other partners, including the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset Speaker, the Jewish Agency, the Union of Local Authorities, and MKs who head parliamentary friendship associations with relevant countries (such as the Israel-Austria Friendship Association headed by MK Amir Peretz). Additionally, it is vitally important that the recommendations formulated become public, in order to identify those who do not comply with the guidelines, and to ignite a public debate on the issue.

However, the purpose of diplomacy – both formal and parliamentary – is not to impose boycotts, but rather to promote interests through dialogue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to formulate a list of demands and conditions for far right-wing parties in Europe as a condition for policy change toward them. Such a list will also have to take into account the needs of the Jewish communities in Europe, and can be consolidated in cooperation with other groups in Europe who oppose far right-wing parties. It does not need to focus on one country or another, but must address the growing phenomenon throughout the continent, while including lessons from change processes that parties and institutions underwent in the past.

European far right-wing parties sometimes pretend to be pro-Israeli in order to develop ties with right-wing groups in Israel and receive a certificate of integrity from them. This was the case, for example, with the interactions between the head of the Austrian Freedom Party and members of Likud. The leaders of these parties sometime carry soft messages and talk of change, but do not back up this discourse with actions. Presenting a list of clear Israeli requirements and conditions – including, for example, ousting those who are infecting the party with anti-Semitism, changing ideological frameworks and documents, and demonstrating commitment to legislation and policy denouncing anti-Semitism – will produce concrete measures to examine the actual conduct of these parties and avoid a façade of moderation.

The rise of the far right-wing and populist elements is taking place simultaneously, albeit at different levels, in a number of EU member states – especially in the central and eastern Europe. In the EU, there are now countries led by governments that move away from liberal values and democratic norms. The Israeli government is sometimes tempted to see the governments of these countries – such as Hungary – as allies and friends. This is due to block EU initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and their readiness to stand by Israel in international forums. However, viewing these countries as friends is a mistake.

Israel’s foreign policy should indeed be distanced from far right-wing elements in Europe, but this is not enough. It must also emphasize the importance of democracy and show commitment and preference for establishing alliances with countries with a strong democratic regime, even if they disagree with the current policies of the Israeli government. Israel must belong to the family of democratic nations, and should not sacrifice this position for the sake of promoting ad-hoc interests.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Forward)

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The global rise of the right-wing poses a grave threat to liberal values, and in some cases, could even lead to the collapse of democratic regimes. The process can be traced to the early 2000s, when, according to political scientist Larry Diamond, 27 democratic governments collapsed. Freedom House shows that in 2000, 63 percent of the world’s population lived under democratic regimes, but by 2013, this percentage dropped to 40 percent. Scholars and journalists quickly labeled this “the end of liberalism” or “the collapse of the global liberal order.”

The reasons for this phenomenon are diverse: globalization, which made it possible for corporations to accumulate tremendous wealth at the expense of ordinary citizens, and led to loss of jobs due to factory relocations of cheap labor countries; the influx of millions of refugees into first-world countries, as a result of civil wars, unemployment, and famine, has threatened traditional demographic divisions; and widespread violent and brutal terror has re-awakened deep-rooted fears and prompted isolationism.

These changes have had two main outcomes: First, hopes for “strong” regimes and charismatic leaders who can bring order and counter such threats. Second, a strengthening of local identities, whether through narrow-minded intolerant nationalism bordering on fascism in countries that enjoy territorial legitimacy (in the West), or through religious fundamentalism in others (in parts of Africa and the Middle East).

In retrospect, the outcome is not entirely unexpected. Samuel Huntington, who analyzed the third wave of democracy in global history — which began in the mid-1970s in Portugal and peaked with the collapse of the Soviet Union — argued that each of the two previous waves of democratization was followed by a counter-wave: Between 1820 and 1922, 29 democracies were established. The counter wave was initiated in 1922 with the rise to power of Benito Mussolini in Italy, and continued in 1933 with the Nazi regime in Germany.

Democracy’s second wave began after World War II, and reached its peak in 1962. During that period, the number of democracies increased to 36. This, too, was followed by a counter-wave, between 1962 and 1975, reducing the number of democracies to 30 (while not a significant decline in absolute terms, this still was a 20 percent decline in the number of democracies at the time).

In democracy’s third wave, which began in Portugal in 1974 and ended in 1990, 30 more countries became democracies. According to Huntington’s analysis, the counter-wave to each wave of democracy was the result of anti-liberal and anti-democratic political, cultural, and societal forces.

On the one hand, this approach offers some optimism, as the waves are related and a positive wave is expected to follow every negative wave. This approach is, however, beleaguered by two problems: First, based on the past, the transition from one wave to another occurs only after a devastating war (World War II) or revolution (the collapse of the Soviet Union). Should democracy’s fourth wave actually take place, it may likely begin only after a major catastrophe of as yet unforeseeable proportions. Second, there is no way to predict the duration of the current wave. In the past, counter-waves never lasted longer than two decades, but we are not even sure if the current anti-democratic wave, if it indeed commenced in the early 2000s, has even reached its peak. In any case, this counter-wave seems to be here to stay for the coming years.

These developments should rally all liberal forces from all parts of the political spectrum into action. It would first be wise to recognize the enormity of the threat to liberal values, which until recently were considered universal values. Actions to confront these threats should be taken at the national level, but transnational coalitions are also necessary to defend a joint liberal, democratic vision. Liberal and democratic voices are everywhere, including Israel, and its high time that they start acting in concert. After all, even in the United States, more than half of the votes in the recent election were cast for a candidate who represented an alternative worldview and not the worldview that won the elections. This, if you will, is an alternative fact, although in this case it is true. Being aware of these global trends is the first step toward mobilizing all the liberal forces in Israel, and the world at large, in order to ensure that the third counter-wave will become a transitional phenomenon.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Third Counter-Wave to Democracy and Liberalism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The criticism in the U.S. highlighted something important: the disturbing implications of this visit for domestic governing policies and trends in both countries. In a recent paper comparing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the 25-year old Azerbaijan/Armenia conflict, I observed that both sides of each conflict are facing either a severe democracy deficit or significant erosion, to varying levels. Conflict and damage to democratic society appear closely linked.

Cozying up to Azerbaijan means embracing a country with one of the worst human rights records in the world. Azerbaijan has hurtled down a deeply anti-democratic, semi-authoritarian path since independence in 1991. Its Freedom House ratings are now among the lowest possible: “Not Free,” or 16 on a scale from 0-100, deteriorating even compared to the previous year. Human rights workers, political opposition figures and journalists are regularly arrested, jailed, and face physical violence. The country is run through a corrupt, dynastic leadership, by the son of an earlier corrupt, semi-authoritarian leader.

Israel’s embrace of unsavory allies is nothing new. In earlier decades, during the Arab boycott, the Cold War and its own wars, Israel cultivated willing friends regardless of regime type; realpolitik trumped idealism, in international relations parlance. Thus Israel was close with Nicolae Ceaucescu’s Romania and Idi Amin’s Uganda, and counted apartheid South Africa as an ally too. Nor does Israel lack less-than-democratic allies today, cultivating strategic relations with Turkey and Russia, who display appalling contempt for democratic norms. Moreover, Netanyahu is on a search for new friends in response to creeping political pressure from traditional allies in Europe, to show that Israel doesn’t depend solely on their markets. He has nurtured African states and BRIC countries, and clearly views Central Asia as logical strategic addition.

But what makes Azerbaijan notable is how the protracted ethno-territorial conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh contributes to such a severely restricted political environment at home, justifying and perhaps perpetuating these practices.

Karabakh is a small pocket of territory inside Azerbaijan’s sovereign borders. As the Soviet Union fell apart, its majority Armenian population sought to break away from Azerbaijan, preferring to attach themselves to adjacent Armenia, as the republics became independent.

Azerbaijan was enraged at what it experienced as an attempt to dismember its territory. A vicious war broke out from 1991-1994, killing over 20,000 people, creating roughly 1 million refugees (the majority of them Azerbaijani). The resulting stalemate left the political status of Karabakh unresolved to this day. The population there is now almost exclusively Armenian after the flight of the Azeri minority; Armenians there are effectively self-governing, often considered a state-like entity but unrecognized by any other country. Yet Azerbaijan still seethes at the de facto loss of a part of its sovereign, national land.

Immediately after the war, newly-independent Azerbaijan began investing heavily in military armament, flush with oil money from its Caspian Sea fields. This build-up contributed to a mentality of conflict escalation, and there are regular skirmishes along what is called the “Line of Contact” with Karabakh.

The obsession with its territorial loss also fed an increasingly repressive political climate. By the mid-2000s, observers noted that local politicians competed for the most hard-line positions on the conflict. In the name of the existential cause, authorities cracked down on political protest over perceived electoral misconduct. The regime said that “Azerbaijan’s defeat in the war had been due to domestic turmoil,” in the words of Rasim Musabayov, a former advisor to the Azerbaijani leadership.

Leveraging the conflict to crush freedoms spread to other fields. In 2016, Freedom House reported that at least one journalist was jailed on charges of spying for Armenia; academics and students associated with political opposition have been likewise harassed or fired. In 2012, a nationally celebrated writer, Akram Aylisli, published a novella that included Azeri killings of Armenians during the conflict; politicians went on a rampage of incitement, calling to investigate his DNA (perhaps he was actually part Armenian?) and cut off his ear. He was stripped of his titles, his books burned, family members lost their jobs, and his work removed from educational curriculum. This past March, Azerbaijani authorities detained him on his way to a writer’s festival in Italy – part of a trend, say local sources.

Luckily Israel is nowhere near that level. But what if it’s a difference of degree rather than substance? In recent years, a department at Ben Gurion University was hounded by the state’s Council of Higher Education for its political leanings and novelist Dorit Rabinyan saw calls for her book involving a Jewish-Arab romance to be removed from school curriculum, along with the accompanying public vitriol. Governments Netanyahu has led have passed Israel’s most undemocratic laws to date, almost always involving some aspect of the conflict: the Nakba law, the boycott law and restrictive laws designed to target Arabs in Israel (the admissions committees law for small communities and the muezzin bill currently under debate.)

The infamous NGO law attempts to intimidate independent civil society groups who defend human rights and criticize government policy specifically regarding the conflict, echoing the tendency in Azerbaijan to harass human rights activity (in harsh ways), and snuff out government criticism.

Israel’s democratic culture is more tenuous now than in the past. Netanyahu obsessively portrays the occupation as an existential threat from Palestinians, but he also increasingly fuses Israeli left-wing opposition with the scariest physical threats of our time. His 2015 campaign ad accused the left of bringing ISIS to Jerusalem. When the head of B’tselem spoke recently at United Nations against the occupation, Likud coalition whip David Bitan called to strip him of his citizenship. He then suggested that Arab citizens shouldn’t be allowed to vote because they represent “Palestinian interests.” After Netanyahu’s infamous “Arabs voting in droves” video there’s little question who inspired, or legitimized Bitan.

All these together do not put Israel nearly at the level of Azerbaijan in terms of the democratic deficit. And it’s important to recall that Azerbaijan had little culture of democracy prior to independence; Israel inside the Green Line has certainly does.

But the parallels between the role of the conflicts within each society does not bode well. Both conflicts are viewed as existential threats to the very identity of the country. Both are heavily militarized – Azerbaijan with the help of Israeli arms sales – and have made military acquisition a top national and budget priority, often to the detriment of other social priorities. That in turn must be justified by fear-mongering or warmongering in the national rhetoric. Both experience regular deadly escalations. In April 2016, a mini-war over Nagorno-Karabakh caused hundreds of deaths on both sides; Israel experiences stabbing attacks and regular wars. These serve to keep the trauma fresh, the threat level high, and dissent toxic.

The old adage may be newly, and sadly relevant: “Show me who your friends are and I’ll tell you who you are” – or who in the future, whom you may become.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s Visit to Azerbaijan: Cozying Up to Despots הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The conference featured presentations from the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), Shatil – The New Israel Fund’s Initiative for Social Change, and the Abraham Fund Initiatives. A robust list of speakers included MK Ofer Shelah, MK Yossi Yonah, MK Nachman Shai, former MK Ronen Hoffman, and Dani Dayan, Israel’s recently appointed Consul-General in New York. The conference addressed challenges to democracy and social cohesion in Israel, Germany, and the US, and included a roundtable discussion on recommendations to counter anti-democratic trends and clarify a path for multilateral progressive partnerships. Discussion focused on challenges in the political, legislative, and public spheres. Participants addressed these challenges in the context of global instability, mass immigration, and shifting borders. This paper summarizes the highlights of the presentations, discussions and recommendations of the trialogue. It does not necessarily reflect a consensus of the participants or hosting organizations.

הפוסט Challenges to Democracy and Social Cohesion: Trilateral Strategic Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.