This is a skewed, false message formulated by those seeking to task Israeli diplomats with whitewashing what is essentially a regime coup championed by an extremist government that is leading Israel to the brink of dictatorship. In other words, the Foreign Ministry is demanding that Israel’s official representatives around the world portray Israel as a “strong democracy” even as the government is removing the checks and balances of the democratic system and severely undermining the independence of the judiciary. This is a genuine Orwellian attempt to portray a campaign to crush the judiciary as “preserving the independence of the courts.”

These messages make it incumbent on all diplomats to ask themselves whether this was the reason they joined the foreign service and whether they really want to describe a coup d’état as a measure to “strengthen democracy.” Our representatives abroad who are anxious about what amounts to a regime coup should refrain from defending a policy that endangers themselves, their families, and their country. This is not a call for their resignation; it is a call for soul-searching and for establishing boundaries.

After all, the diplomats are not being asked to ignore a policy disagreement on a specific issue. They are being told to soft-pedal a fundamental contradiction between the foreign service of a country that purports to be based on democratic values that are articulated in our Declaration of Independence – and the direction in which the government of Yariv Levin, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich, and Benjamin Netanyahu is leading us.

These extremists are aiming to eliminate the separation of powers that is the underpinning of the democratic system, destroy judicial review, promote discrimination and misogyny, divert state budgets to serve ultra-Orthodox and nationalist constituencies and shatter the Zionist ethos on the basis of which the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people was established.

The role of diplomats is to represent their country, including the government and its policies, but also the cultural, economic, and political totality of the society and country they serve, in all its diversity. As long as the government adheres to its basic contract with the public, diplomats can do both, despite the challenges involved. Such is the case in all democratic countries, and the same is true in Israel.

The role of diplomats, like all other civil servants, is not only to broadcast the government’s messages to the world but also to clarify to the government in a professional and courageous manner the implications of the policies it adopts for its interests in the international arena.

Those applying for foreign service training know that they will be called upon at some point in their career to represent policies with which they disagree. Diplomats are civil servants serving democratically elected governments that come and go. Therefore, the ability to serve different governments is a prerequisite for anyone who wishes to represent the State of Israel. Such service involves a willingness to represent and promote the policies of any government, not necessarily the one for which they voted as long as the basis of our democracy is maintained

This challenge faces anyone sent to represent Israel abroad. I myself faced it when I served as Israel’s consul general to the states of New England (at the consulate in Boston). When I disagreed with the Israeli government’s handling of its relations with the US administration, I voiced my criticism behind closed doors in internal forums (although they turned out to be more porous than I thought and my criticism was leaked to the media).

However, I always knew that I would draw the line when I felt that my views were no longer just a policy disagreement, but a fundamental rejection of the messages I was told to convey and of the policies I was required to promote. I did take early retirement from the Foreign Ministry, partly because I felt I could promote my country’s interests better from outside the system. My decision was right for me personally, but may not necessarily be the right choice for all of my many friends at the Foreign Ministry who have achieved wonderful accomplishments for many years from within the system.

Deepening tensions between government policy and civil servants’ personal beliefs can pose a heartbreaking dilemma. They require difficult personal decisions that involve complicated implications for lives and livelihoods, and therefore no one has a right to judge them. Moreover, when a government undermines democratic values, it makes no sense for those who seek to promote such values from within the system to resign, since they will clearly be replaced by officials willing to help the government crush our democracy.

Notwithstanding this argument, civil servants have both the right and the duty to voice their opinions forcefully and describe the implications of government policy on the matters under their purview. Those who can influence from within should do so and make their voices heard.

A large liberal democratic camp has emerged in Israel in recent months under the current government, a citizenry unwilling to sacrifice its future and that of its children and grandchildren for a dictatorship in the making. Right now, the role of democracy lovers is to help preserve the basic values of democracy, if possible, from within the government and if not, from the outside

The current government’s policy cannot and must not be justified or “explained,” not even in diplomatic language.

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on August 8th.

הפוסט Diplomats should represent the country, not the government הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There are the diplomatic costs, such as the tensions with the United States and the lack of an invitation to the White House for Netanyahu as well as the slowing down of Israel-Arab relations. There are the economic costs, including the weakening of the shekel and the decline in foreign investments in the Israeli high-tech sector. There are the security costs, from the rise in terrorist incidents to the firing of rockets from across Israel’s northern and southern borders. And finally, there are the political costs to Netanyahu, with a series of consecutive polls indicating a collapse in support for his coalition, its policies, and his leadership.

Within this context, April had the potential to be particularly challenging for the Israeli prime minister: An Israeli-Palestinian flareup seemed likely, as Passover and Ramadan were about to overlap; Israel’s security establishment was warning of Hezbollah’s, Iran’s, and Hamas’ intentions to act against Israel, perhaps simultaneously; pro-democracy protests were planned to peak around the Day of National Remembrance and Independence Day; and criticism from the administration in Washington of Netanyahu’s policies and conduct was mounting.

Netanyahu faced this month — during which the Israeli parliament was in recess — by trying to calm things down somewhat, avoiding a security escalation, smoothing things over to a certain extent with the U.S., weakening the protest movement, publicly emphasizing that Israel was not in a moment of crisis, as well as showcasing that he was in charge and practicing responsible leadership.

To address public backlash over the ruling coalition’s aggressive legislative agenda, he declared a time out in the judicial overhaul; announced that the judicial reform would not pass in its original form, including the controversial clause that would give the Knesset the power to override the Basic Laws and decisions by the Supreme Court; postponed discussions on proposed laws that grant the ultra-Orthodox community further exemptions from military service and additional benefits; and acknowledged that his coalition over-reached in its first months in office.

To soften domestic and American criticism, Netanyahu began to convey messages about seeking compromises and consensus, highlighting the negotiations that began taking place under the auspices of President Isaac Herzog; painted a rosy picture of the domestic situation in U.S. media interviews; walked back his previous announcement about firing Defense Minister Yoav Gallant; signaled that far-right Likud parliamentarian May Golan will not be appointed consul general in New York after all; practically distanced his son Yair from social media, after the latter repeatedly posted inciteful messages online; and canceled his planned appearance at the General Assembly of the Jewish Federations of North America in Tel Aviv, to avoid protests against him. In addition, several government ministers — especially those who did not serve in the military — abandoned their plans to deliver speeches at Day of National Remembrance ceremonies, because of demands by bereaved families that the events not be politicized.

To prevent an Israeli-Palestinian flare-up during Ramadan, before reversing course in May regarding Gaza, the Israeli government engaged with the Palestinian Authority at two U.S.-led regional security summits; the Israeli police was ordered not to raid the al-Aqsa Mosque again during the final days of Ramadan, and non-Muslims were banned from visiting the compound at this time; Israel reacted mildly to the initial firing of rockets from Gaza so as to prevent a renewed spiral of violence; and the government indicated it would request to delay the eviction of the Bedouin village Khan al-Ahmar.

The days around Israel’s 75th Independence Day presented three additional challenges:

1. A pair of rival mass demonstrations — a pro-democracy protest in Tel Aviv on the eve of Independence Day and a pro-government one in Jerusalem two days later;

2. A speech that far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir insisted on delivering at the military cemetery in Beer Sheva on the Day of National Remembrance, despite widespread criticism, causing a spat with bereaved families; and

3. The traditional Independence Day ceremony, which the government sought to politically dominate, thus turning a consensual event into a polarizing one, which opposition leader Yair Lapid chose to boycott.

Taken together, Netanyahu’s actions during the month of April indicate not a policy change but rather a different tactical approach to achieve similar goals. Understanding the power of the pro-democracy protest movement and acknowledging the government’s failure at quickly advancing the judicial overhaul, he seemingly turned to a more gradual judicial overhaul process, yet one that is still likely to dramatically erode Israeli democracy. This is precisely the scenario Israelis are repeatedly warned against by colleagues in Poland, who have experienced first-hand a process of step-by-step democratic erosion.

All of this resembles Netanyahu’s previous conduct on the Palestinian front. After dramatically declaring his intention to formally annex Palestinian territories, and after facing domestic and international pushback, Netanyahu decided in 2020 to drop his initial plan. But he replaced it with a process of creeping, de facto, annexation, which would eventually lead to the same goal.

The month of May, with the Knesset having returned from recess, also started with Netanyahu advancing a different agenda — securing passage of the budget (as legally required by the end of the month) and launching strikes against Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. While negotiations on the judicial overhaul continued at President Isaac Herzog’s residence, without real progress in sight, Netanyahu was diverting public attention elsewhere, closer to his comfort zone.

However, during the current Knesset session, which will last until the end of July, anti-democratic legislation processes are likely to resume, at one pace or another, and polarizing rhetoric against the pro-democracy protests is once more being voiced from the parliament’s podium. The pro-democracy movement is not losing sight of this. In April, it succeeded in maintaining momentum, keeping people on the streets, and showcasing its impact. In the first week of May, it announced a national day of disturbance and protest, under the slogan of promoting equality in Israel. And even amid the warfare with Gaza, the protest movement has managed to continue its activities, while taking necessary security precautions. Those in the international community — including the U.S. — who were vocal in recent months to help safeguard Israel’s democracy, should keep up their efforts as well. After several weeks of relative domestic quiet, the two rival camps in Israel are once again ready to step up their struggle over the country’s identity and basic values

This article is from “MEI@75“, from May 14th, 2023.

הפוסט Even with all eyes on Gaza, the struggle for Israel’s democracy continues הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Israeli government’s obsessive focus on promoting the judicial overhaul has led to a loss of overall control: failures in preventing security escalation, rockets in the North and South, the cooling of the normalization process, economic uncertainty, fear of credit rating downgrade, and a crisis with the United States. These are just the tip of the iceberg of a series of frustrating, confusing and fearful moves.

Amid all of this, there is only one success worthy of Benjamin Netanyahu’s credit – the tightening of the ranks in Israel’s liberal camp, its expansion. One can just look at the weekly protests to understand that this is a pivotal and historic moment for democracy, liberalism and equality.

While the protests have successfully led to the suspension of the government’s oppressive actions, the road to achieving their goals is still long. Against this backdrop, the Mitvim Institute has launched “The Liberal Partnership” initiative, with the aim of promoting learning processes and mutual influence between liberal civil society organizations in Israel and around the world.

As part of this, Mitvim and IIR conducted an experts panel, focused on the determined and successful campaign of Czech civil society against democratic backsliding. The analysis of the Czech case highlights a number of lessons that every liberal camp should take into account.

Democratic roots: Prior to the notorious billionaire Andrej Babis’s rise as prime minister in December 2017, the Czech Republic enjoyed a stable and inspiring democratic tradition for a country that until the early 1990s was part of the Communist bloc. Unlike its neighbors in Eastern Europe, the democratic tradition is an inseparable part of the Czech identity historically, due to the creation of a wide secular and working middle class.

According to Karel Kouba, an associate professor of political science at Hradec Kralove University, this tradition prevented the Czech Republic from a fate similar to that of Poland and Hungary. In fact, since 1993, there has not been a significant political camp in the Czech Republic based on nationalist and religious forces.

However, in 2017 the winds changed, and Andrej Babis was elected after leading a divisive populist, anti-establishment campaign. He began to promote his economic interests while attempting to weaken the guardians of democracy and faced widespread opposition.

Civil society and the media even encouraged a criminal investigation against him on suspicion of embezzling European Union funds. His attempts to suppress democracy were hesitant in relation to the activism shown by his opponents, and after just one term, his government was replaced.

From protest to political power

Petra Guasti, an associate professor of democratic theory at Charles University, argues that the liberal camp must not disconnect the center from the periphery, and that there is crucial importance to the presence of the struggle outside of major cities. To that end, the consensus for democracy needs to be as broad as possible.

However, protests on their own are not enough. Guasti argues that they must be translated into political power through the creation of a broad coalition of different parties that agree on one singular goal: to defend liberal democracy at any cost. Ultimately, the success of the struggle must be reflected in changes to voting patterns in the ballot boxes.

Unified and focused messaging: According to Gusti, the most effective way to defeat populism is to put aside disagreements on other issues, unite around a unified message, and sharpen it. Without liberal democracy, the government cannot create effective policies on various issues for the benefit of its citizens.

Since populism feeds on the division between “us” and “them,” it is up to liberal forces to create the widest possible political tent, even at the cost of difficult compromises. Many forget that compromises are part of the democratic game, and when we reject them, there is a chance of pushing different communities toward a populist leader.

The ability of the liberal camp to accommodate a wide range of opinions and political positions, while being willing to come together under a joint effort to preserve liberal democracy, is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for success in the struggle.

Moral power: the successes of Czech civil society did not stem from nothing. Another significant ingredient was the establishment of connections and influence with partners in other countries, notably Hungary and Poland. Through these relationships, the mistakes and difficulties in the struggles of Hungary and Poland were shared and understood. Alongside the construction of an international liberal-civil alliance, every liberal camp should look inward and examine the essence of its actions.

Jaromír Mazák, a sociologist and research director at the STEM Institute for Czech Society Research, believes that another significant component of success is understanding the moral power of civil society. For example, the Czech public was able to distinguish between honoring their court’s ruling to acquit Babis, and the moral arguments surrounding his conduct and the reason for his prosecution. Despite his acquittal, Babis continued to be perceived as unethical, which ultimately led to the end of his rule.

Local victories: The Million Moments for Democracy movement managed to create protest infrastructures in central cities and in peripheral regions, translating them into political power through close collaboration with opposition parties. These parties were divided into two coalitions – one more conservative and the other progressive – but their goal was the same: to establish liberal democracy. This collaboration gave hope that the two sides could jointly form a government that would ensure the protection of liberal democracy.

The challenge in Israel is greater

If we learn lessons from the Czech case, it becomes clear that Israeli civil society must emphasize the righteousness of its cause beyond the borders of Tel Aviv, and assertively create a meaningful political force that can compete with the oppressive strength of populism and nationalism.

To do so, Israeli civil society must learn to build a broad political coalition that regards liberal democracy as its guiding principle. Compromises are part of the democratic game, and if one wants to win the ballot box, one must take them into account.

Despite Israel’s rich democratic tradition, the current state of affairs for the liberal camp is darker than that in the Czech Republic. The issues of occupation and Jewish supremacy impede the wheels of the legal revolution. Kouba notes that the mere fact that the Netanyahu government has begun to reduce democratic space indicates deeper steps toward authoritarian rule than those taken by Babis. In addition, Israeli society’s heterogeneity is rife with other important issues and topics that could lead to divisions.

In the face of Netanyahu’s government’s divisiveness, a positive and unifying campaign must be launched around the importance of liberal democracy for all citizens of the country. In addition to domestic political activity, Israeli civil society must strive to establish relationships of influence, support and shared knowledge with its counterparts around the world. Democratic regression is not unique to Israel alone, and there is much to learn from our global partners.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from March 8th, 2023.

הפוסט 5 lessons for Israel from the Czech struggle for democracy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט Launching the Liberal Partnership: how To Successfully Stand Up Against Democratic Backsliding – Lessons From Czech Civil Society הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the coalition members’ plans to harden legal sanctions on Arab Israelis to the point of stripping them of their citizenship and expel them from Israel, and given the projects to extend the settlers’ presence in the occupied territories, the proposed plans are bound to raise tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel. This could set off actions of solidarity among Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Arab countries.

Meanwhile, the new coalition’s plans to expand the settlements and give them a better legal cover by exerting control over the High Court – through legislative override or change in the judges nomination process – is also bound to raise Israeli-Palestinian tensions in the West Bank.

One could rightly argue that the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and the harsh treatment of its population has gotten for a half-century did not wait for new rules to be enacted by a rightist government.

Tensions are bound to rise

But if the proposed legislation succeeds, particularly the override rule and the change in the judicial nomination process, any move would become possible as Prime Minister Netanyahu and his allies crave for total control of the West Bank. With Finance Minister and Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich in charge of civil affairs in the West Bank and with part of the powers of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, tensions are bound to raise.

These tensions may be contained for a while but for how long given Smotrich’s political aims in the West Bank, his political alliance with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, and the fact that these two men and their allies in the Knesset exert true control on the fate of Netanyahu’s government?

Then, yes, the message from the Israeli government would become clear: there is no Palestinian Authority and there will be no Palestinian state, even a demilitarized state as Palestinian leaders have agreed to as a condition for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace since the 1990s.

Given their possible consequences on the ground, on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and in the West Bank, the proposed rules are bound to provoke a deterioration of the relations between Israel and the Arab countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations – no fewer than six.

STOPPING THE projects of the annexation of the West Bank by the previous Netanyahu government was already a condition that made the Abraham Accords possible. The plans of the present Israeli coalition to expand settlements won’t benefit Israeli-Arab relations when progress is expected in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

This point is not only a diplomatic issue, it touches the very fabric of Arab public opinion. Normalization won’t be fully accepted if there is no progress and there is indeed a deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The moment is for building on the assets that the Abraham Accords represent for regional cooperation and peace. The present Israeli government needs to show political and diplomatic maturity. The Middle East has changed positively since the Camp David, Oslo and Abraham Accords, except for a majority of the Palestinian people.

It is time an Israeli and Arab leadership emerges that understands these issues and breaks with the politics of conflict and arrogance. The business communities are here and the civil societies, too, and the potential for shared initiatives and prosperity is real.

It may be that today the unlocking of this situation sits on the shoulders of one man: Netanyahu. The possibility that he does not go to court and avoids prison is completely linked to the fate that his governing coalition is preparing for the Israeli High Court. But by changing the legal rules and particularly by putting the override rule into law, Netanyahu might sacrifice the stability of this country and its relations with its neighbors for his singular benefit.

No one knows better than Netanyahu and the members of Knesset what is better for peace and their country, and their regional and international standing. If the United States and the United Kingdom have already expressed strong reservations about dealing with the present Israeli government and certainly with some of its members, what could be the position of Cairo, Amman, Abu Dhabi, Manama or Rabat?

The present legal issues before the Knesset and Israeli public opinion may be a matter of domestic politics but the way they are handled through votes in the Knesset, civil disobedience, the resignation of opposition MKs or an amnesty law will deeply affect the fate of Israeli-Palestinian relations, which are already at a very low point, and the status of Israeli Arabs, which, in fact, has been improving amid firm and continuous efforts after decades of stagnation.

Jamal Amiar is a Moroccan journalist and writer and a guest contributor to Mitvim Institute for Regional Policies.

The article was published in The Jerusalem Post on March 16.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian relations are deeply affected הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A psychological evaluation may be required these days specifically to explain why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose France as the destination of his first foreign travel since taking office in late December. In the midst of an intensifying domestic storm over the country’s essential nature and democratic values, borne on the fumes of an intoxicated coalition that reduces the concept of democracy to the tyranny of the elected majority, Netanyahu chose to travel to Paris, with inexplicable urgency.

France is the birthplace of human rights and prides itself – not always justifiably so – as a role model and custodian of democratic values in the most expansive sense of the term, including minority rights, separation of powers, separation of church and state, freedom of expression and creativity, and other liberal values considered an unnecessary evil by Netanyahu and his partners.

Before entering the courtyard of the Elysee Palace where rows of sword-bearing Republican Guard soldiers were lined up to honor him, Netanyahu’s office sought to ensure that his host would not embarrass him on this painful issue of the regime reform taking place under his watchful eye. President Emmanuel Macron was circumspect in his public statements and his spokesperson made do with a boilerplate statement about the need to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and the importance of maintaining regional stability.

But Netanyahu paid a price. Contrary to accepted practice, the sides did not issue a joint statement at the end of the visit, nor did they hold a joint news conference. Macron may be willing to preserve the dignity of his guests, but he is not willing to lie for them in public.

Inside the room, around the dinner table, as leaked to the newspaper Le Monde, Macron was quite clear in suggesting that if the legal reform passes as is, Paris will have to conclude that Israel is moving away from the concept of democracy shared until now by both countries.

With the leak of Macron’s position clouding the smiling photographs, Netanyahu’s people were quick to explain in a somewhat dismissive tone that Macron was “not well versed in the details of the reform.” French presidents have at their disposal a kind of private in-house foreign ministry called “la cellule diplomatique,” comprising skilled diplomats carefully selected according to their geographic specialization.

France also has a large and highly professional embassy in Tel Aviv, which presumably knew how to prepare the president for the meeting with Netanyahu, including on the subject of the legal reform. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that if Macron had known even more details of the planned upheaval, his reaction would have been harsher.

Perhaps a psychologist can determine whether Netanyahu’s appearance alongside the president of France in hopes of obtaining a seal of approval in the cradle of human rights was the result of a sober calculation or of his subconscious playing tricks on him.

A similar question can be asked about the slightly pathetic attempt to arrange a meeting for him with representatives of the business community of the world’s seventh largest economy, in a transparent attempt to contradict the forecasts of JPMorgan and the best Israeli economists regarding the danger to our economy due from the legal reform.

Even if the business leadership in France wanted to stand up and declare loyalty to the start-up nation, the hasty and amateurish way in which this meeting was organized made it a hopeless attempt. According to participants, no more than 10 mid-level businessmen were present in the room, while the rest were representatives of the French Jewish small-business world.

In other words, this attempt to gain legitimacy also backfired, forcing the Prime Minister’s Office to conceal the list of those present and settle instead for throwing about baseless numbers about the foreign investment of billions pouring into Israel.

The nature of Israel’s regime will be a new permanent talking point

Be that as it may, not only did Netanyahu come out empty-handed, but after United States Secretary of State Blinken’s visit and the puzzling trip to France, it is already quite clear that the usual agenda items for discussion between the prime minister and his counterparts, the heads of liberal democratic countries, will now include a new, permanent and particularly burdensome topic: the nature of Israel’s regime.

Macron’s efforts to promote the establishment of a “European Political Community” to examine the EU’s partnership with its neighbors, based inter alia on their commitment to liberal-democratic values is a good example, albeit sometimes inconsistent, of this new parameter. Israel, it must be said, has always been under the watchful eye of the world, one might even say disproportionately so.

But members of the club of world democracies focused on controversial Israeli actions, never on its essence. The community of liberal-democratic countries is even more watchful and critical given the global polarization between liberals and anti-liberals exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.

My former colleagues, Israel’s ambassadors around the world throughout the ages understood that membership in the club of liberal democracies is a valuable asset, not only in terms of Israel’s image, but also of its strategic interests. It is a small club, with only 30+ countries of almost 200 members of the UN but its economic, political and military clout is enormous.

EVEN IN the eyes of many non-members, the club holds the status of a moral compass and serves as a role model. Israel has managed to shelter in the shadow of this exclusive club thanks to its birth as a democracy as anchored in its Declaration of Independence and its preservation of these features despite wars, occupation, terrorism and more. Israel is certainly not a typical member of this club, but the others have accepted it nonetheless.

However, if real damage is caused to the foundations of Israeli democracy and Israel adopts the Hungarian model of democracy according to Orbán, there will likely be a price to pay. Hungary and Poland have been relegated to the sidelines of the club precisely because of the same type of reforms planned in Israel and it is experiencing heavy pressure from other EU members.

If it were not for the EU’s cumbersome structure and the need for consensus on almost every decision, Hungary would have already found itself under heavy sanctions or even suspension of its membership.

Israel is not a member of the EU but it enjoys many of its perks. It would be wise to avoid being sanguine about its prospects. In many ways, we are much more vulnerable than Hungary and Poland because we are a small country in a state of ongoing conflict and in dire need of strategic partners, a diplomatic umbrella and economic partners. This umbrella is provided in large part by the democratic camp.

In his previous term, Netanyahu often preferred the company of illiberal populist leaders who did not make demands and confuse him with talk about human rights and the two-state solution. However, Vladimir Putin is no longer someone to be seen within decent society, Jair Bolsonaro has fled to Florida after losing the election, and the future of another Florida resident, Donald Trump, is shrouded in a thicker fog than before.

Yariv Levin and Simcha Rothman need to understand that the legal reform they are concocting will have implications far beyond the status of the High Court of Justice or the political future of Arye Deri. At stake is Israel’s place in the community of nations and it would behoove those who espouse the biblical promise about “a people that shall dwell alone and shall not be reckoned among the nations” to be careful about what they wish for. The line between membership in the most prestigious club of nations and the status of a pariah among them is much thinner than one thinks.

The prime minister himself needs to understand that the carte blanche he has given them will make Israel’s international integration much more difficult than it has been in the past and that dinner with Macron was just a non-appetizing first course.

This article is from “JPost“, from February 16, 2023.

הפוסט Is Israel democratic? The new talking point for Netanyahu abroad הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Benjamin Netanyahu begins his current term as prime minister with a domestic focus, and with a sense of urgency that relates to a personal, not national, issue. Seeking a way out of his corruption trial seems to be his top priority. This dictated which parties became part of the coalition, and which policy directives are advanced first.

In his first months in office, Netanyahu is likely to promote the judicial reforms announced by Justice Minister Yariv Levin. If approved, these reforms will dramatically undermine Israeli democracy, and that is already generating significant pushback and causing deep polarization within Israel.

Domestic escalation is therefore coming first. It seems to be a price Netanyahu is willing to pay to solve his personal legal problems and consolidate power. While doing so, he will be seeking international legitimacy and regional stability, to give him more room to maneuver domestically and to counter claims that the government damages Israel’s global standing. For that reason, Netanyahu may be willing to abide by certain redlines conveyed by the Biden administration (for example, on settlements and Jerusalem).

Things have initially been going Netanyahu’s way on the international front. Arab leaders have shown interest in continuing to cooperate with his government, a White House visit is reportedly in the works, and the European Union has expressed a desire to continue the high-level dialogue it launched with former Prime Minister Yair Lapid. While international actors are raising red flags and voicing genuine concerns, many of them are adopting an almost “business-as-usual” approach, waiting to see whether the new government takes actions on the Palestinian issue that will necessitate a response.

Netanyahu’s intention was seemingly to make sure that should escalation on the Palestinian front happen, it would only come second. The recent security deterioration, however, indicates that such an escalation is already taking place, even if that was unintended, and might quickly spiral. In any case, Netanyahu remains determined to block any prospect of a future Palestinian state and has handed authorities related to the West Bank to far-right politicians. Netanyahu may limit them somewhat at first — for the sake of avoiding international crises or regional troubles — but eventually they are likely to carry out provocations in Jerusalem and work to deepen and broaden Israeli control over the Palestinian territories. Such developments might lead to further escalation, especially during the sensitive overlap (in April) between Passover and Ramadan.

An Israeli-Palestinian flare-up could be a catalyst for the third type of escalation — the regional one. If this were to happen, Arab and Muslim countries would find it difficult to maintain their current level of relations with Israel. Regional countries are likely to respond in different ways, depending on the nature of the conflict that erupts, while trying to hold onto the benefits of increased ties with Israel.

Netanyahu, cherishing his regional achievements and seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, may utilize an Israeli-Palestinian escalation to shake up his coalition. If escalation occurs after his desired legal reform is approved, and if he can blame his far-right coalition partners for the flare-up, he may seek to replace an extremist party in his government with a centrist one. He will frame it as a step to restore security and safeguard Israel-Arab relations — a framing that security-oriented centrists, seeking to “save Israel,” might adhere to.

Considering these potential developments, and in an attempt to shape them for the better, the international community should already put in place de-escalation mechanisms, conceive of preventive and proactive diplomatic steps it can take, and step up its support for those in Israel pushing back against democratic erosion.

The article was published in MEI@75 on Janurary 30.

הפוסט Israel’s new government raises the likelihood of escalation on multiple fronts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet a movement of Israelis who resist the new Netanyahu government is crystallizing and taking initial steps to push back against democratic erosion. It will need to evolve quickly and effectively to make an impact. As this movement seeks to draw lessons from the experiences of others, including Americans who resisted the unprecedented actions of former President Donald Trump and his supporters, it could benefit from some international helping hands along the way.

Realization sets in

In the first two months since the Nov. 1 elections, all eyes were on Netanyahu, as he worked to seal coalition agreements with his far-right and ultra-Orthodox partners. Netanyahu was handing out portfolios, reshuffling ministerial responsibilities, committing to legislation, and allocating budgets. In parallel, his party members and coalition partners were taking a victory lap — granting media interviews and posting celebratory messages on social media about their future policy intentions.

For the nearly 50% of the Israeli population who voted for anti-Netanyahu parties, this was both a reality check and a wake-up call. They began to understand what society would soon face. The month of November was characterized by disappointment, frustration, and soul-searching over the election defeat; but in December, new feelings emerged, based on what Israelis heard their soon-to-be leaders announce in public.

A sense of deep concern for Israel’s social cohesion, democratic nature, security situation, regional relations, and global standing became widespread, amplified by provocative actions like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s visit to the Temple Mount/al-Aqsa Mosque compound and the regional and international reactions it sparked. These sentiments were coupled with disgust at the racist and discriminatory remarks uttered by far-right politicians now in government positions.

Changing the dynamics of opposition

In recent years, the anti-Netanyahu camp had become accustomed to leading a personalized campaign that mostly limited itself to rebuking Netanyahu for his corruption. But now, while the designated prime minister’s trial remains a popular topic on the opposition’s agenda, there are many other issues to speak out against. New messaging and new modalities of action are needed. A large segment of the population in Israel has begun to reflect on what could and should be done in light of this new political reality. But there are no easy answers.

The Israeli left’s shrunken parliamentary representation after the elections, the infighting among opposition parties, the significant majority that the Netanyahu bloc holds in the Knesset, and the anticipated judiciary reform that will shatter Israel’s system of checks and balances have all raised questions about what the anti-Netanyahu camp can hope to achieve. Whereas examples of other countries that recently experienced their own democratic erosion have sparked further concerns that Israel might be at a game-changing moment from which there will be no easy return. The powerful words of award-winning author David Grossman, published on the front page of Haaretz, echo that sentiment. Grossman warns that Netanyahu is sowing the seeds of anarchic chaos, hatred, and violence, which are leading Israel to a catastrophe and possibly to a point of no return.

It was in this context that the month of December 2022 was so important. While pro-peace and pro-democracy Israelis continued to feel shock — almost on a daily basis — at the statements of incoming ministers and leaked clauses of almost-signed coalition agreements, they also turned to action. An appetite for pushback against the new government became evident and swept through multiple sectors of Israeli society. The first phase of this pushback was mostly declaratory and did not bring many tangible outcomes, but it set the stage for the next phases of opposition and spotlighted the looming threats yet to come from the ruling coalition.

Israelis did not flock to the streets in large numbers in December, although some demonstrations took place, notably in front of the Knesset during the swearing in ceremony of the new government. The sense of urgency for mass protests was not there yet, in part because the government was still establishing itself. Things only began to more sharply intensify and transform into a second phase in January, when mass weekly demonstrations began taking place in Tel Aviv, drawing larger crowds every Saturday night.

The first signs of public pushback

In its earliest phase, at the beginning of December, the pushback was limited to rebuking the statements and intentions of members of the incoming governing coalition, not criticism of any concrete policy measures (as the government was not yet formed). But a series of uncoordinated, grassroots-driven initiatives had started to emerge. These were mostly individual actions taken by professional networks, public figures, and companies — all stepping up to voice their concern, opposition, and commitment to democratic values. It was not yet an organized protest led by the major organizations in the social change camp. Such protest only began to materialize in January.

As often happens in Israeli public life, these initial steps had a domino effect. Sporadic actions taken in early December evolved into a larger trend within a few weeks. Several issues that touch upon Israel’s core values, the divisions among Israelis, and the very structure of Israel’s democratic system came to the forefront.

It began with Netanyahu’s decision to grant Avi Maoz, the leader of the far-right and anti-LGBTQ Noam party (and its sole member in the Knesset), control over extracurricular school programming. As a response, and within a few days, 170 school principals wrote to Netanyahu asking him to reverse his decision; 600 teachers and educators signed an open letter stating they will not cooperate with problematic programs advanced by Maoz; and over 50 municipalities and mayors (including the forum of 14 women mayors) publicly committed to continue and self-fund existing programming that might be opposed by the government.

Next was the government’s declared intention to speedily advance legal reforms designed to weaken the judiciary and enable the Knesset to override Supreme Court rulings under certain conditions. Among those who initially spoke up against this were prominent legal figures, both current and former. Supreme Court President Esther Hayut delivered a public statement against any move that would limit the independence of the judiciary. The head of the Israeli Bar Association and several former chief justices followed suit, going on the record with critical comments of their own.

The messages about judicial reform reinforced a general concern about the fate of Israeli democracy. It led the mayor of Tel Aviv, Ron Huldai, to plaster a gigantic copy of Israel’s Declaration of Independence onto the side of a municipal building; 400 high-tech workers, executives, and investors wrote a letter to Netanyahu warning of devastating consequences to Israel and its economy; and additional open letters — each with a unique slant — were published (some as large ads in the media) by more than 1,000 ex-Air Force officials, dozens of school principals, dozens of retired judges, over 100 retired ambassadors, 650 academics and individuals from the fields of humanities and culture, the Academic Community for Israeli Society (which has some 2,000 members), and more.

A domino effect taking place

The first phase of pushback really began to snowball following subsequent media interviews by two far-right religious members of the Knesset (MKs), Orit Strook and Simcha Rothman, who stated that a doctor could deny treatment to certain patients under certain conditions and that a hotel owner could refuse to serve people on religious grounds. These statements referred to an intended discrimination law, included in the coalition agreements, clearly aimed at Arabs and members of the LGBTQ community. The lawmakers’ remarks sparked outrage, leading to a new, larger wave of public protest.

Discount Bank, one of Israel’s largest banks, was the first private sector Israeli company to act, announcing a board decision to decline credit to any entity practicing discrimination. A series of firms — including from the high-tech, insurance, investment, and tourism sectors — followed suit. While not having immediate consequences, these statements signaled a willingness by businesses, which often shy away from political debates, to step into the ring.

The healthcare sector also responded, reiterating its commitment to provide the best possible treatment to all patients, regardless of their background. Dozens of health officials published an open letter; the Israeli Medical Association released a statement against the politicization of the healthcare sector; the heads of the National Association of Nurses and the Pharmaceutical Society of Israel provided their own statements; and physicians at various hospitals undertook initiatives like posting videos and hanging signs on their office doors.

Municipalities showed leadership here too. The mayor of Herzliya, Moshe Fadlon, announced that his city would not issue business licenses to anyone who discriminates against others; Mayor Huldai of Tel Aviv stated that the new government’s discrimination law resembles actions against African Americans and Jews in the southern United States 90 years ago; and the mayor of Mevasseret, Zion Yoram Shimon, announced a decision not to cooperate with any entity or elected official who advocates discrimination.

When journalist Nadav Eyal revealed in Yediot Aharonot that the Noam party prepared secret lists of LGBTQ people in Israeli public life, opposition MKs convened a public emergency conference to defend LGBTQ rights; a protest was held on the streets of Tel Aviv; dozens of principals posted signs at the entrances to their schools emphasizing the importance of democracy, freedom, human rights, tolerance, and equality; and additional statements were released by academics, educators, and public figures.

Assessing the first phase of pushback

The first — relatively limited — phase of pushback against the new government involved Israelis from the fields of education, academia, diplomacy, military, business, judiciary, local governance, health and civil society, and these groups are likely to remain involved as the movement progresses and evolves. But notably, it has so far generally lacked Arab participation, other than in actions taken by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working for Jewish-Arab equality and in an initiative to launch a new Jewish-Arab party. Moreover, the pushback movement in December did not yet focus much on issues related to the Israeli policies towards the Palestinians — other than, for example, a public event organized by Peace Now and Haaretz. On the Jewish side, a debate was sparked whether highlighting Jewish-Arab inequalities or expressions of solidarity with the Palestinians is conducive to the opposition movement or not; while among Israel’s Arab population, a prevailing sense was that their struggle for rights is a long-lasting one, preceding the new government and not necessarily highly influenced by it, and should thus be better conducted via other means.

Phase one of the pushback took place while most big NGOs were wrapping up their 2022 activities, strategizing, fundraising, adapting, and reorganizing. Therefore, they did not play a major role, although their voice was heard and their activists participated in and echoed the initiatives that took place. Some of these organizations have since started organizing public conferences and panels that will be held in the months to come, to educate the public, raise awareness, and reflect on what else could be done.

Finally, the initial, December actions against the incoming Netanyahu government occurred during a transition period in terms of political leadership. Without a strong left-wing opposition in the Knesset (Meretz had not passed the electoral threshold, and Labor is weak), and prior to the possible emergence of new grassroots leaders (as happened in the 2011 social protest). As new unofficial networks of civil society and political activists were just starting to form, the influential public voices at this phase were mostly of veteran figures, such as former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, and Tel Aviv Mayor Huldai.

The moment the prospect of democratic erosion became truly real was on Jan. 4, when Israel’s incoming Minister of Justice Yariv Levin appeared on primetime TV to announce the advancement of dramatic legal reforms that would undermine the Israeli judiciary and alter basic pillars of the country’s democracy. This marked a transition from weeks of non-binding declarations of intent by future coalition members to formal governmental policies announced by the new people in power.

At the same time, it catalyzed an even sharper escalation and transformation of the protest movement into its next phase, characterized, in part, by mass street demonstrations against radical and discriminatory policies of the Netanyahu government. A large crowd of 80,000 showed up for the demonstration in Tel Aviv on Jan. 14, while protests were also taking place in front of the President’s House in Jerusalem and in Haifa. As weekly demonstrations continue, the numbers of participants and locations are likely to rise, mobilizing additional sectors and catalyzing new types of pushback actions.

An internationalist way forward

This first phase was a prelude. Now that the government has been established and actual policies are being advanced, the challenge of how to resist is crystallizing in the minds of the opposition. In that regard, as pro-democracy Israelis make significant strides in their public campaigns and concrete actions, they should increasingly see themselves as part of a larger international community facing similar challenges.

Democratic backsliding is a global phenomenon, and there are models and best practices of how to oppose it that can be learned from. The Indivisible movement in the U.S., and the role played by liberal mayors in countries like Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, are relevant examples that Israelis can familiarize themselves with. But, it is not only about learning, it is also about creating more international partnerships, with like-minded leaders, individuals, and organizations, which can enable coordination and joint action, serving both the local and global cause of advancing democracy.

In turn, international actors concerned about the health of Israeli democracy will need to not only monitor and respond to what the Israeli government is doing, but also keep track of how pro-democracy Israelis are working to safeguard their country’s identity and offer them support.

Steps the international community and NGOs can take to back and empower Israelis pursuing liberal-democratic norms and values include:

• Regular meetings of visiting American and European officials with pro-democracy Israelis;
• efforts to highlight their actions and amplify their voices;
• financial and political support, as well as sharing of relevant expertise;
• initiatives to foster cooperation and solidarity with international allies; and
• Regular public statements advocating a values-based approach to bilateral relations.

Dramatic realities are unfolding in Israel. How far they will go is not yet clear. The trajectory will be largely shaped by the effectiveness of domestic actors as they seek to resist democratic erosion; but the situation will also be impacted by how Israel’s friends in the world respond. A “business as usual” or “wait-and-see” approach is not helpful in this case. The new reality necessitates that support for Israel now includes a clear international commitment to help safeguard its democracy.

This article is from “MEI@75“, from Janurary 19, 2023.

הפוסט Israelis’ evolving pushback to democratic erosion under Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.