One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Negotiations succeed or fail not only because of the mediator’s skills and personality. Various reasons may explain why Israeli-Palestinian talks have failed over the years. However, history shows that a broker whom both sides regarded as just and honest was an asset in reaching agreements. Such was the case when Henry Kissinger mediated between Israel and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel and Syria, on the other, reaching the 1974-75 disengagement agreements. The Arab side never regarded Kissinger’s Jewish faith as detrimental to his mediation capabilities. US president Jimmy Carter, too, successfully maneuvered between prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David ahead of the 1979 peace treaty. Personally, Carter appeared closer to Sadat than to Begin, but this did not prevent him from conducting negotiations in an impartial manner. In his mediation between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria, president Bill Clinton also convinced the sides of his impartiality although he was personally closer to the Israeli leaders and almost all his advisers were Jewish.

The US stance under the President Donald Trump is so blatantly pro-Israel that the question arises whether it can mediate between the sides at all. Several examples point to asymmetry or inequality in its conduct. Firstly, since assuming office, Trump has met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the US and Israel seven times; he only met with PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Washington and Ramallah twice.

Secondly, the Trump administration has made several historic decisions in total contradiction with previous US policy, all of them supportive of Israel and/or damaging to the Palestinians. The list is long. Closure of the PLO office in Washington in September 2018; US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and the transfer of the US embassy there; and US funding cuts to UNRWA in September 2018. One can also add Trump’s 2019 declaration recognizing Israel sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which while unrelated to the Palestinians, certainly buttresses the image of the US as a one-sided Israel backer.

Thirdly, the US consulted over its peace plan almost exclusively with the Israeli side only. The ultimate move was the participation of Greenblatt and US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman in a recent ceremony inaugurating a tunnel in Silwan, an archaeological project funded by Elad, an NGO dedicated to strengthening the Jewish link to Jerusalem with government help. Moreover, the US position toward the Jewish settlements stands in sharp contrast to all previous administrations, which the saw the settlements as an obstacle to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This was the context of the Palestinian refusal to take part in the recent Bahrain economic “workshop.” The Palestinian objection to the conference stemmed not only from concern that the economic component of the peace plan would serve as an alternative to the real thing. It was also an expression of anger, frustration and helplessness over what the Palestinians perceive as humiliating US behavior that ignores them. Thus, the Palestinians – and part of the Arab world – view the Trump administration as a dishonest, unreliable broker and therefore untrustworthy even before his peace plan has been unveiled.

PUTTING TOGETHER a peace plan is a complex undertaking consisting of several phases. First, studying past proposals to understand what they included, what worked and what failed. The Americans seem to assume that everything that had been tried in the past had failed, requiring new “out of the box” thinking. This may perhaps be logical, but nevertheless mistaken, because “the box” evidently contains some good ideas.

The second stage is preparing public opinion around the world and in the region ahead of the new plan’s presentation, while stressing that this is a historic opportunity for its implementation. So far, it seems that the Americans put a lot of work into this stage.

The third stage – and the most important one – is preparing the various sides to the conflict for the compromises (or rather sacrifices) they will have to make. A lot of work went into this vis-à-vis the “moderate” Arab states, but the Israeli and Palestinian arenas were totally ignored.

The only way the Trump administration can regain Palestinian trust is by submitting a plan that offers some solutions to the central issues – namely, the question of borders (including the settlements), Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Media reports so far do not suggest this is where the Americans are going. Moreover, when Greenblatt tells Makor Rishon that he never uses the term “two-state solution,” he is already mapping out the direction of a “stateless state” that the Palestinians are bound to reject (as will the Arab world to a large degree). On the other hand, a plan that provides a response, even a partial one, to Palestinian aspirations, would meet with harsh criticism in Israel, which has become used to free lunches in the Trump era.

If the Trump administration succeeds in pulling off a deal, it will certainly be the “Deal of the Century,” if not “of the millennium,” given all the mistakes made on the way. However, a sober analysis of the process so far leads to the assessment that the plan is destined for failure and the blame should be placed squarely at the door of the dishonest broker.

הפוסט The US became a Dishonest Broker between Israel and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Most previous US administrations also failed in efforts to advance peace, but they were clearly seeking a solution acceptable to both sides and responsive to their interests. Along with the traditional US bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game goals of their initiatives. Such is not the case with the Trump Administration that seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s plan has yet to be made public, and we are supposedly in waiting mode for its launch, US declarations and actions illustrate that we are already in the midst of actual implementation of new US policies, and this includes several courses of action. Vagueness on content: The Americans are busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only a handful. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using various excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be dealing with the trailer for a significant peace move, but with an avoidance of publishing the political plan while fostering incessant international discourse about it (thereby preventing other states from intensifying their involvement as they await the US plan).

Incentivizing peace ineffectively: The economic part of the Trump plan lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians, and as such is supposed to highlight benefits and convince the Palestinians to engage with the American plan. However, if the Trump Administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to do so. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society to which the incentive is offered. This was done in the cases of previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama Administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the American proposition, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is viewed by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe offer, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of dollars. This might create further alienation rather than promote engagement.

Convening events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has been busy planning and producing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions and a workshop, all focused on economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of ways to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it is bringing together various states in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, the Americans also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss defense in the Middle East (mostly focused on the Iran issue). The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially the Gulf States and Jordan and Egypt, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to US pressure. The Bahrain workshop will be the first without official Israeli representation, despite Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. US attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences in order to promote a breakthrough in IsraeliArab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: President Trump and his emissaries now and again announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for the two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as Jerusalem and the refugees) be taken off the table. US officials expressed criticism of the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, and recently even expressed support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys tweeted remarks intended to refute rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. In their entirety, these all paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump Administration is moving, even without publication of its plan.

Game changing actions: Alongside the verbal front, the administration is engaged in actions. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, closure of the PLO office in Washington, transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and closing the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded Israeli-Palestinian projects and in budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These moves also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding American policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. They are perceived in the world as a deviation from international law, generate anger toward the US and undermine its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening the Palestinian leadership and bolstering Netanyahu – The US administration invests great efforts in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority leaders. Whether by pressure on the Palestinians to engage on the Trump plan or attempts to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, this conduct has failed thus far. The American emissaries have been accusing the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism and harming their people’s interests. They pen opinion pieces against them, clash with them repeatedly on Twitter, and even withheld a US entry visa from Hanan Ashrawi. The Palestinian Authority was not even invited to Bahrain. This all contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, ongoing coordination with him and his people (chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington), mobilizing in favor of his reelection and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Seen in their entirety, US declarations and actions over the past two years indicate that the Bahrain economic worship is not the real thing. It is only the tip of the iceberg. The policy adopted by the Trump Administration distances Israeli-Palestinian peace. It goes against the components of a future peace arrangement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years; it weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to the path of negotiations and opposed to terrorism; it places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace; it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians and makes it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while providing a tailwind for proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees a great friend in Trump, the moves his administration is leading on the Israeli-Palestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in striving for peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace must take a stand against these moves despite the difficulty in confronting Israel’s best friend in the world, certainly during an election campaign. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party know how to criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so elements in Israel’s opposition should criticize the conduct of the American president and point out its negative repercussions when he distances prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump Distances Peace, and Bahrain is Just the Tip of the Iceber הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This situation changed dramatically in 1980, following the Israeli decision to annex East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council condemned Israel and – with the US abstaining – passed Resolution 478 that called upon “states that established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City”. As a result, foreign embassies began leaving the city and relocating to Tel Aviv and the surrounding area. Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries to maintain embassies in Jerusalem, after leaving the city in 1980 and re-opening their embassies there in 1982 and 1984 respectfully. Eventually, they too decided to relocate their embassies in 2006, following Arab pressure.

In the U.S. political arena, the issue of relocating the embassy was first raised in the leadup to the 1972 presidential elections. Since, it has become a regular and popular preelections promise, and in every instance, that promise was walked back after the election dust had settled. In the early 1980s, legislative attempts to formalize the embassy move began circulating in Congress. These legislation attempts reached their peak in the 1990s, in the days of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Right-wing Israeli politicians, together with partners in AIPAC, advanced legislation in Congress to move the U.S. embassy.

It was clearly a move to jeopardize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, by highlighting Jerusalem as an issue of controversy. Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who felt obliged to publicly support a move nominally aimed at strengthening Israel’s capital, conveyed behind closed-doors his opposition to the legislation. He regarded it as a politically motivated move to undermine his policies. The legislation eventually passed in Congress in 1995. Since then, until the May 2018 embassy relocation, every six months – in June and in December, the U.S. President, whether Democrat or Republican, has signed a waiver postponing the implementation of the bill on the grounds of U.S. national security considerations. Among the reasons leading to the signing of these waivers was the concern that relocating the embassy would jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to serve as an honest broker and as a credible negotiator between Israel and the Arab world.

הפוסט The History of Embassies in Jerusalem and Past Attempts to Relocate the U.S. Embassy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Improving Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Rabin was not the only Israeli politician who chose to publicly pledge allegiance to the notion of a “united Jerusalem”, while understanding that a compromise in the city is required for peace. Current Israeli politicians and party leaders behave similarly, at times clearly contradicting themselves – for example, by rejecting any compromise in Jerusalem, while voicing support for the Clinton parameters (from 2000), which call for Palestinian control of Arab areas of Jerusalem.

The Israeli peace camp is criticizing Trump, and rightly so, for not making a distinction in his statement between East and West Jerusalem and for not mentioning the Palestinian aspirations for a capital in East Jerusalem. His decision not to do so places additional obstacles on the path towards peace. Despite Trump’s repeated statements about his interest in peace, his Jerusalem statement was done due to domestic political considerations, and not due to sophisticated diplomatic calculations. Previous American statements regarding the embassy relocation were also often carried out because of such motives. That was the case in 1972, when the call to relocate the embassy to Jerusalem first appeared in the platform of an American political party (at the time it was the Democratic Party); that was the case in 1995, when Congress passed the legislation requiring the embassy’s relocation; and that was the case in 2000, when George W. Bush stated prior to the elections that he will “begin the process” of relocating the embassy. The wish to gain domestic support, and not genuine concern for the fate of Israelis and Palestinians, dictated these moves.

The Clinton administration acted differently. It identified the significant damage that American steps regarding the status of Jerusalem might cause to the peace process, which the administration was deeply invested in promoting. It is not by chance that President Clinton made efforts to block the 1995 legislation attempt. Administration officials heavily criticized the proposed legislation, held briefings against its initiators, contested its legal legitimacy, and threatened that the president will veto the bill or refuse to sign it. Dennis Ross, who was leading President Clinton’s peace efforts, said at the time that if the bill will pass “my wife will be very happy. I will be able to spend much time at home with the kids. If I go to the Middle East, I will have to wear a bulletproof jacket”. Eventually, a compromise was reached, in the form of the presidential waiver signed by consecutive presidents (including Trump) every six months, postponing the relocation of the embassy due to national security considerations.

The future of Jerusalem will not be determined by politically-motivated statements of one American president or another. Such statements should not be underestimated, as they do impact developments on the ground and may shift positions among the international community. But eventually, Israelis and Palestinians will be the ones making the calls and defining their own political reality.

In recent years, there has been a flux of international peace initiatives – American, European, Arab, and even Chinese – and a striking absence of much-needed peace initiatives proposed and advanced by the local leaderships in Jerusalem and Ramallah.

The international community should contribute to peacemaking and has an important role to play on the path to peace. It can specify parameters for a two state solution, offer incentives that will make peace seem more attractive, and spell out the prices to be paid should the sides take steps that further peace. Nevertheless, the peace process itself should originate from the region and not from the outside. This has already happened in past breakthrough between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and it can happen again. In the absence of a propeace government, the Israeli opposition should take the initiative, as it did in 2003 when the Geneva Initiative was developed and published as a pro-peace alternative to the Sharon government’s policies. The Jerusalem issue can be a good starting point, especially due to the wide gap between the current reality in Jerusalem and the one that can be expected in the city after peace is achieved. Israeli and Palestinian experts drafted an initial shared vision for the city, just over a decade ago, and the effort can now continue.

Pro-peace Israeli politicians should not compete with the right-wing government over who is more enthusiastic about Trump’s statement and who is more committed to “united Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital”. Instead, they should engage in dialogue with Israel’s Palestinian and Arab neighbors, and introduce a vision of peace for the city of Jerusalem. It should be a vision based on compromise and respect, which seeks to fulfill the needs of both sides. Only this will enable the transformation of Jerusalem from a poor and conflict ridden city into the flourishing and prosperous city it should become.

Jerusalem can become a local, regional, and international success story. In an era of peace, Jerusalem will attract flocks of tourists, businesses, and international organizations. And, yes, there will also be embassies relocating to the city, and in masses. This is the story that Israelis and Palestinians should be hearing. Voicing it will be the best response to Trump’s statement.

הפוסט Introducing a Vision of Peace for Jerusalem is the Ultimate Response to Trump’s Statement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The multiple reports published by the media in the aftermath of Trump’s declaration focused on two things: first, Trump’s desire to appease the Evangelists and/or Jews in the US; and second, his desire to honor his election campaign promise to declare Jerusalem Israel’s capital. He rationalized the decision by claiming that a new approach was required since all the other avenues were exhausted.

Trump’s decision harms US interests in several ways. One, in contrast to his desire to portray America as an honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump identified himself completely with one side – Israel. Although he qualified his statement by saying that this decision does not define the boundaries of Jerusalem, the content and tone of his speech was clearly one-sided. An even-handed mediator should have presented a corresponding or equivalent concession to the other party. As a result, the Palestinians will be highly suspicious of any new peace plan that the US attempts to present.

Two, the decision will unite Arabs and Muslims against the US. Trump worked very hard to reconcile with the Saudis following president Barack Obama’s foreign policy debacle, and he probably coordinated the declaration with moderate Arab leaders, but popular opposition across the Arab and Islamic worlds could influence the position of friendly Arab regimes. Jerusalem and the Palestinian issue are the lowest common denominators in the Arab world, and are still able to trigger charged public reactions. Although these may subside after a while, the ominous implications of Trump’s decision will last, at least as long as he remains in power.

Three, the decision opened two unnecessary fronts for the US – one in the UN, and the other with the EU, where most countries oppose Israel’s occupation and control of east Jerusalem.

Four, the consequent tension between the US and the moderate Arab countries, on the one hand, and between the US and Europe, on the other, serves the interests of Iran and its Middle East proxies, which can be counted on to exploit the opportunity to inflame their public opinion against the US and Israel. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin will no doubt attempt to use the opportunity to improve their own positions and influence.

Five, the decision will exacerbate the divisions between the various American agencies (particularly between the White House and State Department) and between them and the public, who oppose the move.

And, finally, the possibility of a violent confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere as a result of the decision should not be underestimated.

If Trump’s announcement turns out to be part of a grand plan he is cooking up behind the scenes, Israel will be forced to reciprocate and make a corresponding concession to the Palestinians. So far, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not expressed any intention of moving forward in the peace process. Even if he had, the composition of his government would not allow any significant move.

This is unfortunate, because the post-Arab Spring situation in the Middle East offers an opportunity to strike a deal with the Palestinians, with the support of several moderate Arab countries, based on a modified version of the Arab Peace Initiative. It is still not clear whether the Palestinians are ready, but a generous Israeli offer, backed the US and those Arab countries, might draw them to the negotiating table. At present, after Trump’s declaration the likelihood of a breakthrough in the conflict looks even more remote than ever. The inevitable conclusion is that Trump’s decision recalls both Eban’s euphemism and Barbara Tuchman’s march of folly theory – that governments pursue policies contrary to their own interests.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump’s Jerusalem Statement is his March of Folly הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hopefully this abrupt change in tone is a result of the administration’s post-inauguration meet-up with Middle East realities: that the embassy move has potentially dangerous political consequences both for Israel and for the U.S. itself, and a high potential cost in terms of human lives.

Trump’s pro-move campaign promises were received with joy by top Israeli ministers and right-wing politicians. The Mayor of Jerusalem even launched a public campaign thanking President Trump and encouraging him to follow through on his commitment on the topic.

In contrast, Israel’s neighbors in the Arab world issued harsh warnings about the possible consequences of such a move. Palestinian leaders said it will lead to chaos, harm prospects of peace, and might even lead to withdrawing their recognition of Israel. Strong opposition has also been raised in Jordan.

Relocating its embassy to Jerusalem would mean the U.S. taking a partisan stance on a central and sensitive issue, a source of controversy between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and the international community.

The future status of Jerusalem is among the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to be decided upon in the final-status negotiations. Its national, religious and symbolic meanings have already led to violence erupting due to unilateral steps taken in the city. Along the years, the U.S. has been well aware of this, and has exercised great caution regarding policies on Jerusalem.

It is not by chance that, as of today, not a single country has an embassy in Jerusalem. This was not always the case. From the 1950s onwards, Israel invested much effort in convincing states to open embassies in Jerusalem. Until 1962, the U.S. actively opposed this Israeli policy, advising countries to refrain from opening embassies there.

American involvement on the issue dissipated in the early 1960s in parallel to the development of the Israel-U.S. special relationship. By this time, Israel’s attempts showed signs of success. By 1967, almost 40 percent of the 54 diplomatic missions in Israel were based in Jerusalem. These were largely representatives of African and South American countries, to whom Israel promised aid allocations in return.

This situation changed dramatically in 1980, following the Israeli decision to annex East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council condemned Israel and – with the US abstaining – passed Resolution 478 that called upon “states that established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City”.

As a result, foreign embassies began leaving the city and relocating to Tel Aviv and the surrounding area. Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries to maintain embassies in Jerusalem, after leaving the city in 1980 and re-opening their embassies there in 1982 and 1984 respectfully. Eventually, they too decided to relocate their embassies in 2006, following Arab pressure.

In the U.S. political arena, the issue of relocating the embassy was first raised in the leadup to the 1972 presidential elections. Since, it has become a regular and popular preelections promise, and in every instance, that promise was walked back after the election dust had settled. In the early 1980s, legislative attempts to formalize the embassy move began circulating in Congress.

These legislation attempts reached their peak in the 1990s, in the days of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Right-wing Israeli politicians, together with partners in AIPAC, advanced legislation in Congress to move the U.S. embassy.

It was clearly a move to jeopardize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, by highlighting Jerusalem as an issue of controversy. Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who felt obliged to publicly support a move nominally aimed at strengthening Israel’s capital, conveyed behind closed-doors his opposition to the legislation. He regarded it as a politically motivated move to undermine his policies.

The legislation eventually passed in Congress in 1995. Since then, every six months – in June and in December, the U.S. President, whether Democrat or Republican, has signed a waiver postponing the implementation of the bill on the grounds of U.S. national security considerations. President Obama did so for the last time in early December 2016. Among the reasons leading to the signing of these waivers was the concern that relocating the embassy would jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to serve as an honest broker and as a credible negotiator between Israel and the Arab world.

Any American decision to reverse this long-standing policy and relocate the embassy will certainly backfire. With the stagnation of the peace process and question marks regarding the commitment of the new U.S. administration to the two-state solution, the embassy move could have dire consequences. Not least among those possible consequences: Escalation and violence between Israel and the Palestinians. Damage to the relationships that Israel has managed to gradually develop and deepen with some of its Arab neighbors.

If President Trump really wants to have Israel’s back, as he’s often said he does, he should focus his energy on promoting peace, rather than on taking actions like moving the U.S. embassy that will distance its achievement even further.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem Should Wait הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.