The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises hope, despite the current crisis Ethiopia is facing following the coup attempt. Just a year ago, people in the Horn of Africa felt desperate, just as we sometimes feel, about the long hopeless years of bloody conflict, past agreements that were not implemented, torn societies in ethnic and territorial conflicts, and hope for change that is out of sight. However, in an amazingly fast process, the parties in the Horn of Africa succeeded in changing their reality and get on the path to peace. In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed rose to power in Ethiopia, and within a few months the parties signed a peace agreement brokered by the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UN. As a result, other peace processes started in the Horn of Africa, and hostile relations were replaced by negotiations and new connections.

How did the Ethiopians and the Eritreans succeed in moving within a few months from a state of protracted conflict to a hopeful peace process? It looks like several factors, that can serve as points of reference for Israelis and Palestinians, have helped the parties:

Bold political leadership: A reality-changing leadership is needed in order to change the course of the long-standing conflict. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki made a move which was contrary to popular positions, national mood and narratives that the parties have cultivated over the years, and reached out for peace. The leaders changed the public discourse rather than being led by it. They proved that the leadership must not submit to prevailing patterns and identity perceptions that have taken root over the years, but legitimize reality-changing actions.

External incentives: External incentives are another force that drives leaders and citizens to move toward reconciliation. Leaders can effectively use incentives to mobilize political and economic support in their quest for peace. In the EthiopianEritrean case, apart from achieving peaceful life, landlocked Ethiopia gained an outlet to the sea, renewed its commercial flights to Somalia, and attracted foreign investors who increased their investments in the country. Eritrea, which was in a difficult economic situation, gained economic, media and transportation cooperation with Ethiopia, and the international sanctions that made it one of the poorest countries in the world, were lifted. As a result, the international isolation that was imposed on the country ended.

International support of the peace process: Advancing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea serves the interests of many international and regional players that are involved in the Horn of Africa and are interested in promoting stability in the volatile region. The US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UN have mobilized to mediate, support and guarantee the peace process. The fact that the main intermediaries in the process – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – sided by the weaker Eritrean side, teaches us a lesson when choosing the mediators in our conflict. The Ethiopian diaspora in the US, which politically and economically supported the peace process, made a significant contribution too.

Adapting the peace process to the political reality: The design of the process should necessarily be adapted to the complex and changing political reality, while referring to the structure of negotiations, the pace of the process and its implementation, the coordination of symbolic trust building measures, etc. The parties in the Horn of Africa were able to properly adjust the negotiations structure to the existing political reality in order to reduce risks. For example, the relatively fast pace of the process prevented the formation of an organized and strong opposition, as well as extreme activities that might have harmed the process. Other factors that helped move the process forward were symbolic steps, meetings that are covered by the media, rapid changes on the ground, and leadership that is mobilized to communicate with civil society of the other side.

Promoting internal reconciliation processes, enforcing solidarity and establishing the political system: The transition from a protracted conflict to a peace process is a significant change that disrupts well-established perceptions in society and brings to the surface the internal tensions and disagreements. In order to support change, leaders should build on the resilience of society and the stability of the political system. The parties in the Horn of Africa realized that the in-country situation affected the prospects of reaching a peace agreement between countries. Abiy Ahmed has led extensive reconciliation processes in Ethiopia, including the disarmament of opposition groups and making them a legitimate political party, the establishment of a new and inclusive government that includes a Ministry of Peace that is entrusted with the internal process, and the consolidation of a new ethos for Ethiopia.

Switching back to the Middle East, the absence of a courageous political leadership entails a heavy exasperating toll. When examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict against the backdrop of the peace process in the Horn of Africa, there is a reason to be hopeful: in the case of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the Arab Peace Initiative and the promise of a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU, serve as incentives, alongside the security guarantees that the US may offer. Regional and global players who have a vested interest in achieving stability in the Middle East offer themselves as potential mediators and help the sides avoid violence. They can help us garner international support for the peace process. Israeli and Palestinian societies face many challenges related to the rule of law, democracy, human and civil rights, social cohesion, the reduction of violence, and the legitimacy of the leadership. Such challenges should be addressed with no delay in order to enforce solidarity, economic resilience, and trust in government institutions. Civil society and the Diaspora can also play a role since they can promote pro-peace cooperation even in the absence of political will to advance peaceful relations. Similarly, the business community, researchers and government agencies can take advantage of the deadlock in negotiations to examine opportunities and adjust the peace process to the changing political context. Above all, we must continue to believe that a solution is possible.

The case of the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not theoretical. Having a success story, in which leaders, civil society and the international community join forces to advance a peace process to solve a protracted conflict that seems hopeless, is politically powerful. It undermines the defeatist argument that “there is nothing that can be done”, and that we are condemned to “live by the sword”. Peace processes can be “contagious”, and the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a good example. Their peace agreement led to a series of peace talks and arrangements across the Horn of Africa. Being infected by the “peace virus” would certainly be beneficial for Israel and the Palestinians as well.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper he wrote on the subject, with the assistance of Dr. Moshe Terdiman.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.