For 18+ weeks huge mass grassroots movements demonstrations coupled by civil society are taking place all over the country, outcrying the values of democracy, separation of power, civil, political, and social rights, human rights, and protecting minorities. The result of these demonstrations was halting the judicial “reform” to give time for discussions between the government and the opposition on a broad consensus solution.

If the Israeli liberal democratic camp prevails, this is the best chance for a future solution to the Palestinian problem. When Israelis fear for their own basic democratic rights it is much easier to acknowledge the horrors of occupation under which the Palestinians lack basic rights and even to identify with their suffering. More and more Israelis also understand the dangers of Israel’s creeping annexation of the occupied territories to Israel’s democracy.

Yet the heads of the EU have largely shied away from stressing the importance of preserving Israeli liberal democracy. EU’s low profile can be explained by a reluctance to interfere in the internal debate in Israel and by the convergence of interest between the EU and the current government of Israel when it comes to Ukraine, and the move to Real-politic foreign policy style declared and conducted by HR/VP Joseph Borrell.

When Iranian drones are used by Russia to attack Ukraine, on the border of the EU, Israeli military intelligence of Iran’s weaponry is valuable. Purchases from the Israeli defence industry is desired by some EU member states. Israeli gas is coming through Egypt to the EU or helping the Egyptians to export more of their gas to the EU.

Yet what has the EU received in return for ignoring to speak its values in the Israeli case? The Israeli Prime Minister Secretariat has allocated Itamar Ben Gvir, Minister for National Security, to represent the Israeli government on Europe Day this Tuesday (9 May). Behind creeping annexation and violent settlers are the same forces that have forged Itamar Ben-Gvir’s anti-democratic racist political party “Otzma Yehudit”.

Europe Day is annually celebrated by a reception hosted by the EU Delegation to Israel. A representative of the government always speaks. Last year it was Nitzan Horwitz from Merez, a year beforehand it was Meirav Michaeli from the Labour Party. If the PM Secretariat would have sent another minister, for example from the Likud party, the EU Delegation would probably welcome him/her politely.

This has been the EU’s  informal stance so far: to work with the moderate ministers in the government and ignore the radical right wing “Religious Zionism”. Now the messy conduct of the Israeli government made this stance a formal one.

Israelis do not wish the EU to try and interfere with the internal processes in Israel. Any EU attempt to interfere would also be counter-productive, as many Israelis view the EU as pro-Palestinian and have a negative image of the EU when it comes to political issues. Yet what about Israelis who have been demonstrating in the streets in the past 4 months? Most likely they would appreciate to hear the democratic values the EU stands for pronounced much louder and clearer by heads of the EU. Values do not necessarily contradict real-politic.

Convergence of interests can easily lead to yielding of values. But when yielding of values comes from the EU, is a not only disappointing, it also blows up in the EU’s face to an embarrassing mini-diplomatic crisis it now has to solve.

One needs to remember that it takes two to tango. Peace cannot be reached when the Palestinians are divided. Since 2006, Palestinians are split between two undemocratic regimes. Two million Palestinians are under Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip, and about 3.5 million under the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmud Abbas. Also, Palestinian public opinion is pro-terror and anti-peace.

Still, strengthening the pro-liberal-democratic camp in Israel is one answer to keep a better chance to one day resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. It is also a way to warm up Israelis public opinion on the EU. In the future these Israelis may support Borrell’s initiative to join the Saudi/Arab peace initiative with the EU’s Special Privilege Partnership proposed to Israel and the Palestinians in 2013.

At the time of writing this op-ed the EU had not taken its final situation on how to handle the diplomatic mini-crisis with Israel around the planned reception on Europe Day. Later, the EU Delegation in Israel decided to cancel the reception on Europe Day (but kept the planned public cultural event).

Beforehand, EU spokesperson said that the EU was consulting internally and with its member states. He underlined that the EU does not endorse the political views of Ben-Gvir and his party as they stand in stark contrast to EU’s values and principles. Europe Day has indeed become a chance for the EU to speak its liberal democratic values.

This article is from “The Brussels Times“, from March 8th, 2023.

הפוסט EU cannot receive racist minister Ben Gvir on Europe Day in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The publication prompted belligerent reactions, which appear to be part of an ongoing orchestrated campaign by the right wing and the settlers. National Missions Minister Orit Struck labeled it “a subversive plan to establish a Palestinian state contrary to agreements and against the law.” Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich argued that the EU was helping to establish “an Arab terrorist state in the heart of the Land of Israel, unilaterally.”

Shlomo Ne’eman, head of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization representing communities in Judea and Samaria), said that “the takeover of Area C is the greatest strategic threat in our region.” Right-wing MKs banded together and drafted a letter demanding that the EU “immediately cease illegal construction in Israeli sovereign territory.”

Area C of the West Bank

Area C constitutes 60% of the West Bank’s area. Contrary to right-wing claims, the territory is not under Israeli sovereignty, since Israel never annexed it. According to the Interim Agreement with the PLO (1995), the area, which was occupied in 1967, is under “temporary” Israeli control, and with the exception of the areas left for negotiations on the permanent stage, most of Area C was to be handed over eventually to the Palestinians.

As the parties did not reach a permanent agreement, this ongoing conflict has a negative impact on developments in Area C. The PA, for example, cannot exercise the functional powers it was granted under the Interim Agreement, since Israel controls all movement, planning and infrastructure in the territory.

Along with violence, terrorism and crime, nature and the environment are severely damaged; Israel is torpedoing construction projects necessary for Palestinian living and livelihoods; and Palestinians are sometimes expelled from their homes and require international humanitarian assistance. The lack of coordination along a “zero-sum game” approach prevents construction and development according to a long-term spatial perspective, as the EU suggests.

Reviewing the EU Delegation’s proposal illustrates the extent to which the Israeli claims are unfounded and motivated by a political agenda. The EU’s vision has not changed in any way. Europeans have long supported the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and have been trying for many years to provide humanitarian assistance to the isolated Palestinian population in Area C, which Israel abuses.

The European vision is, in fact, in line with Israel’s long-term interest – to promote the two-state solution in order to ensure its existence as a safe, Jewish and democratic state. This differs deeply from the radical Right’s agenda, which wants to demarcate and isolate Palestinian cities, to annex most of Area C to Israel, and to perpetuate a bloody conflict between the peoples.

Contrary to right-wing claims, the delegation’s document adheres to the Oslo Accords and international law, and even recommends avoiding unilateral measures and implementing a nonconfrontational approach to Israel (“Do No Harm”). This constructive approach falls on the deaf ears of politicians in the right-wing government, who today see the PA and the international community as “enemies of Israel,” motivated by antisemitism to work against it.

The document is also based on a professional approach of spatial planning and environmental sustainability (green energy and green economy). Instead of adopting this approach for coordinating European-funded humanitarian and development construction, Israel is taking unilateral divisive measures, expanding settlements deep within the territory, and demarcating extensive “military zones” at the expense of Palestinian living space, taking over land that is not its own and harming the land and the population.

The extreme Right’s claims of an “illegal” Palestinian takeover of “our” territories, accusing the Palestinians of trying to delineate the borders of their state by stealing and defrauding the State of Israel, are astonishing. Blaming the Palestinians for “settlement-style” activism is like a hunchback who doesn’t see the enormous hump on his back.

The majority of the Palestinian population in the West Bank (approximately three million people) lives in densely populated areas A and B. Without Israeli approval, the PA cannot expand the residential areas. The PA’s requests for building permits in Area C are denied in most cases. Only 0.5% of the applications are approved by the Civil Administration. Thus, Palestinians are unable to cope with natural growth without so-called illegal construction.

Since 1967, more than 460,000 Jews have moved to the occupied territories (not including the Jerusalem area). Settlement expansion at a dizzying pace leads to suffering for the approximately 260,000 Palestinians living in Area C, the destruction of structures and facilities, and the expulsion and confiscation of property, while Israel is the party violating international law.

The international community, including the EU, provides humanitarian and economic assistance for the development of the occupied Palestinian territory, with Israeli approval and in accordance with the agreements. The right-wing is reluctant to incite against other foreign elements (such as UN-Habitat, USAID) that also operate on the ground, under similar principles. Instead, it is treating the EU as a scapegoat.

CONTRARY TO the Right’s accusations, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not yet voted to adopt the document on the development of Area C as an official decision. EU resolutions require unanimous consent by the council, which includes representatives of the 27 member states and the European Foreign Service. Until it is accepted, this is a proposal, not an action plan.

The leak of the document has once again unleashed the far-right demon of anti-EU incitement. Right-wing politicians, especially those from the far Right, are no strangers to spreading vicious anti-EU incitement. However, its volume and speed this time suggest a potential new low in relations between Israel and the EU under the sixth Netanyahu government, after relations had been greatly improved by concerted efforts of the previous government.

The two agreements promoted by the Bennett and Lapid government, Creative Europe and the operational agreement with Europol, have already stalled and are unlikely to be advanced by the current government. The European Commission is also renewing its claim for financial compensation from Israel for the destruction of structures and facilities in Area C, damaging European taxpayer funds.

The excessive powers granted to Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir over maintaining security and managing Palestinian civilian life in the West Bank make clear what we can expect from now on – violent provocations, tacit permission to aggravate attacks on Palestinians, particularly in Area C, and activities to promote the de facto annexation of the territory to Israel.

It is therefore difficult to expect a positive change in the attitude of this most right-wing government. On the other hand, engaging the EU in battle at the present time is liable to harm Israel’s interests, and might result in a broad “counter-coalition” vis-à-vis Israel.

This is even as the EU has demonstrated its interest in increasing its partnership with Israel against the backdrop of the Russo-Ukraine war, and in view of Israel’s energy and security assets.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen have a responsibility to prevent Area C from becoming a new focus of escalation and further damage to the PA’s ability to survive, while at the same time maintaining intact relations with the Europeans. In view of the government’s makeup, they are expected to face a fierce containment battle even in meeting these basic goals.

This article is from “JPost“, from Janurary 16, 2023

הפוסט EU Delegation to the PA propose joint development of Area C הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

EU member states can decide independently whether to recognize a state, and sometimes there are internal disagreements on the subject (for example, on the issue of recognizing Kosovo). However, the EU can also decide on “collective recognition,” for example of states emerging from the collapse of a multinational framework (as was the case with Yugoslavia’s disintegration), or when independence is achieved by agreement (for example, in East Timor and South Sudan). The EU has also adopted collective decisions to withhold recognition, in cases like Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, and Crimea.

Recognition as a diplomatic tool

As far back as the 1980 Venice Declaration, European states have consistently supported the Palestinian right to self-determination and a two-state solution. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Europe assumed that recognition of a Palestinian state would be a component of the final status agreement and an incentive to conclude a peace deal. However, following the collapse of the peace process and the diplomatic freeze that has ensued, the issue of recognition has come up once again, but this time as a possible diplomatic tool that can be used before an agreement is concluded.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched its campaign for international recognition of a Palestinian state in the late 1980s. Addressing a meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algeria on Nov. 15, 1988, PLO leader Yasser Arafat declared the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. That was also the first time the PLO adopted the two-state principle and at the same time accepted UN Resolution 242 based on the 1967 borders. Following the declaration, over 100 states announced recognition of a Palestinian state, and both the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation approved its membership. It should be noted that the states of Eastern Europe (including Poland and Hungary) that are currently members of the EU already recognized the Palestinian state at that stage as part of the Soviet bloc’s support for its independence. Many states subsequently upgraded the level of PLO representation in their countries to the status of an embassy, but beyond such moves, the recognition was mainly symbolic and declarative.

In September 1993, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition. The PLO recognized Israel and its right to exist in peace and security, while Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. However, the Oslo Accords did not include establishment of a Palestinian state, leaving the issue to future negotiations on a permanent agreement. In 2003, the Middle East Quartet — the UN, U.S., EU, and Russia — issued a road map for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which stipulated that an internationally recognized Palestinian state within temporary borders, bearing all the characteristics of sovereignty, would be established during the second phase of the plan, while the third phase would include negotiations between the two states on a permanent agreement. The UN Security Council approved the plan, but while both sides accepted it, the plan was not implemented.

Palestinian push for international recognition

In 2011, following failed attempts to reach a final status agreement in the 2007-08 Annapolis process and in the 2010-11 Mitchell talks, the Palestinians decided to focus their efforts on international recognition of a Palestinian state. In September 2011, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) applied for full UN membership, but the U.S. warned that it would veto such a resolution, blocking the move. In October 2011, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization approved Palestine as a member, and in November 2012 the UN General Assembly upgraded its status to that of a “non-member observer state.” Concurrently, many Latin American states — including Brazil, Argentina, and Chile — announced their recognition of a Palestinian state in 2010 and 2011, and opened embassies in Ramallah.

During U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s mediation efforts in 2013-14, the Palestinians agreed to drop their push for recognition, but following the failure of the negotiations in summer 2014, the effort was renewed and several European parliaments (among them those of the UK, France, and Ireland) called for the recognition of a Palestinian state. The European Parliament, too, adopted a resolution in that spirit. Nonetheless, only one European state — Sweden — officially announced de facto recognition, in October 2014, upgrading the status of the Palestinian representative office to that of an embassy and labeling the hosting of Abbas as a head-of-state visit. However, Sweden did not open an embassy in Ramallah, and Swedish representation remained at the level of a consulate in East Jerusalem. Various EU states have said they would promote recognition at the “appropriate” time and as part of an agreed Israeli-Palestinian settlement. In 2016, France launched a peace initiative and announced that it would recognize a Palestinian state should the plan fail. French officials subsequently withdrew that promise, and when the initiative failed France did not recognize Palestine.

Advocates of recognition — among them some in Israel’s peace camp — argue that such a move would advance the peace process and provide a more equal structure in negotiations between the two sides. They also contend that given the impasse in the peace process, the growing irrelevance of the two-state vision, and concern over escalation into violence, recognition would preserve the two-state principle, bolster Palestinian moderates, and offer the Palestinian public a political horizon. By contrast, critics claim that the tool of recognition should not be used at the wrong time, and that doing so without an agreement between the two sides would reduce the Palestinians’ incentive to progress with negotiations. Discussion of the issue also raises the legal question of whether the PA meets the required conditions for recognition as a state, and whether recognition would include a reference to borders or leave them to be determined in a future agreement (it is worth noting that Israel’s declaration of independence did not determine borders, either).

What next?

In conclusion, while recognition was discussed in the past as part of a future Israeli-Palestinian agreement, these days several European states are considering it as a response to annexation. A decision on recognition would not require consensus, and each EU member could decide for itself. Although recognition would be an expression of protest against annexation, it would not constitute a European sanction against Israel, and would be perceived instead as a balancing measure designed to preserve the feasibility of the two-state vision, and to bolster the PA against the threat of collapse and escalation. On the one hand, PA representatives appeared to advocate recognition in response to annexation. For example, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh has urged EU member states to do so. On the other hand, PA officials have also spoken of a competing option, on the other end of the diplomatic spectrum: declaring the dismantling of the PA’s institutions and “handing the keys” over to Israel in the case of annexation.

Recognition is largely a symbolic measure that does not necessarily augur a de facto change on the ground, as was the case with past recognition declarations that did not result in substantive change. Nonetheless, a broad move by several EU members — especially by key states like Germany and France, as well as the UK, which has exited the EU — could have important diplomatic significance in terms of international legitimization of the Palestinians and affect the international response to Israel’s policy in the West Bank.

The article was published on MEI, August 5, 2020.

הפוסט To recognize or not to recognize: EU recognition of Palestine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the current Israeli government’s stated intention to annex parts of the West Bank illustrates the potential for folly, as historian Barbara Tuchman aptly described in her excellent book The March of Folly. In order to define a decision as unwise, according to Tuchman, it must appear so in real time rather than hindsight. Such is the case of the annexation idea, which not only risks Israel’s interests vis-à-vis the Palestinians, Arab states, the European Union and even the United States, it also risks creating a lamentable and irrevocable situation.

In 1969, shortly after the Six Day War and the PLO’s takeover by the Fatah movement headed by Yasser Arafat, the organization adopted the idea of establishing a democratic, secular state of Muslims, Jews and Christians in Palestine. The Jews perceived the plan, rightly so, as a recipe for Israel’s annihilation, and all the Zionist parties rejected it. Slightly over 50 years later, Israel is moving slowly – and if annexation occurs, swiftly – toward the creation of one state, albeit neither secular nor democratic. In other words, a more radical version of the plan categorically rejected a half century ago is about to be adopted by the government and public without serious discussion. Already in 1986, former Military Intelligence chief and Middle East scholar Yehoshafat Harkabi warned in his book Israel’s Fateful Hour that annexation “would bring about implementation of the PLO’s idea for a democratic Palestinian state.”

SO HOW did we get to this point?

Israel’s political system is based on coalition governments (often with a small majority) that prefer to avoid critical decisions, especially controversial ones, in order to preserve their rule.

Since their capture in 1967, the occupied territories, and especially the West Bank, have been a divisive issue among proponents and opponents of Jewish settlement there. The resulting status quo policy de facto sanctioned the creeping takeover of lands, although no government has ever approved a strategic decision to settle or annex the West Bank. Even the Alon Plan, issued in the days of the Labor Party government, remained unofficial policy. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, there was never a conspiratorial plan to settle the West Bank or annex it. Nonetheless, the absence of a clear governmental policy and the determination of the settlers – encouraged by certain governments or ministers – lulled the international community, as well as most Israeli Jews, who oppose this policy, into complacency.

Division of the Land of Israel (Palestine) has always been the widely accepted solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A series of partition plans has been proposed since 1937, each giving the Palestinians less than the previous one. The 2020 Trump plan goes as far as to deprive the Palestinians of one-third of the land promised to them in the Oslo Accords, which in themselves included less than 22% of the territory of Mandatory Palestine. The Trump plan is largely a mirror image of the 1937 British Peel Commission plan, which provided only 15% of Mandatory Palestine for the establishment of a Jewish state. Both sides, as we know, rejected the plan.

Over 80 years after the partition idea was first broached, Israel is purposely and adamantly working to bury it. Annexation of parts of the West Bank – whether of a few percent of the area (only the settlements), 17% (the Jordan Valley) or the entire 30% allocated under the Trump blueprint – means that Israel is in effect destroying the two-state option.

EVENTUALLY, THE annexation plan may not pan out, for a variety of reasons. First, US insistence on implementation of the Trump plan along with the annexation – i.e., the establishment of a Palestinian state in the remaining parts of the West Bank. Second, the vehement opposition of the EU, including Israel’s friends, and Germany chief among them. During his June 10 visit to Israel, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas expressed his country’s objections and those of other European states. Finally, there is the settlers’ rejection of the price they would have to pay for Israeli sovereignty – i.e., the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Yet Netanyahu, who will not want to violate his annexation pledge, especially as he is immersed in his trial, could push for a mini-annexation, attesting to his determination but also to his responsibility as a leader attentive to criticism. Such a decision could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory, leaving annexation advocates unsatisfied and opponents viewing it as an aggressive and threatening move, requiring response.

However, even if the Israeli government, as Eban remarked, eventually makes a rational decision and avoids annexation, the conclusion will invariably be that Israel does not want a Palestinian state. Pulling back from annexation would not mean that Israel truly wants to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict with the Palestinians, but that circumstances and pressure forced it to do so. In other words, avoiding a small foolish move (annexation) cannot change the larger folly of continued occupation of the West Bank.

Most Israelis are oblivious to what goes on in the territories. In fact, most do not consider the annexation a key issue. According to a poll commissioned by the Two-State Coalition, only 3.5% of respondents believed annexation should be one of the two main issues on the government’s agenda. However, those who favored annexation said they supported it even at the cost of undermining Israel’s peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt (60%) and escalating terrorist attacks against soldiers and civilians (43.5%). These findings should serve as an alarming warning because annexation is not worth such repercussions.

The only good news to come out of the annexation crisis is the renewed discourse about the future of the occupied territories. From now on, the debate should focus on resolution of the Palestinian problem. Most of the experts dealing with these issues in civil society and academic circles keep insisting on the urgency of dealing with the Palestinian problem, so why is no one listening?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Avoiding a small annexation will not prevent the larger occupation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To read the full document, click here

(Originally published in the Palestine-Israel Journal)

הפוסט Beyond the Trump Plan: How Can the International Community Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel is wrong in depicting the EU as hostile to Israel, and the new government would do well to shift direction. The EU is a strategic ally of Israel – in trade and economy, in diplomacy and security, in technology and tourism, in research and culture. The EU’s criticism targets Israel’s policy on the Palestinians and is not inherently anti-Israel as some portray it. The EU opposes the settlements and Israel’s annexation intentions. It also encourages differentiation between the Palestinian territories and Israel, but by no means does it advocate a boycott of Israel.

The growing divisions among EU member states in recent years have undermined European consensus on a variety of foreign policy issues, among them the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu’s European supporters, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has eroded democracy in his own country, are actively engaged in thwarting EU criticism of Israeli policy in the territories. The EU Foreign Affairs Council has not adopted joint resolutions on Israel since mid-2016. Europe’s focus on more urgent challenges, such as refugees, Brexit and now the coronavirus – is also a contributing factor in this regard.

However, Europe is unwilling to ignore Netanyahu’s annexation intentions. The heads of the EU and key member states are finding ways to circumvent internal divisions in order to convey protests, opposition and warnings to Israel: Outspoken remarks by the EU new foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, joint declarations by European members of the UN Security Council, coordinated protests delivered to the Israeli Foreign Ministry by European ambassadors representing states with similar policy views, and cooperation with other international bodies, such as the Arab League, which also oppose annexation.

EU representatives have made use of all these tools in recent weeks. They have expressed unequivocal opposition to annexation, stressed that it would violate international law, recommended that Israel avoid doing so, and some even warned of legal consequences and deterioration of their relations with Israel. Countries like France, Belgium and Luxembourg have been working to place the issue on the agenda of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, calling on the EU to spell out punitive measures against Israeli annexation.

Nevertheless, also due to internal divisions, Europe seems to be waiting to see the nature and extent of Netanyahu’s annexation decision before presenting concrete reactions and a real price tag.

The differences in European approaches are evident in the phrasing of declarations. France, Ireland and Sweden, for example, express themselves in harsher fashion. Borrell, too, is outspoken, but the fact that he does not represent at this stage a unified stance of all member states weakens the significance of his remarks. At the same time, Borrell is seeking to boost EU ties with Jordan, which he identifies as a key state in regards to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Israel has become accustomed to viewing Europe as a weakened entity in the international arena and to dismissing its protests. However, this attitude could turn out to be wrong if Israel decides to take a formal annexation step, which many in Europe would regard as a game changer. Key European leaders might advance measures within EU institutions and elsewhere that would exact a toll on Israel. However, other than a threat of “sticks”, the EU is also offering “carrots” in the event that Israel chooses to progress toward a two-state solution. In 2013, the EU offered a significant upgrade of relations with Israel to that of a Special Privileged Partnership if it makes peace with the Palestinians. It is time to examine this offer, to which Israel has yet to respond, in a positive light.

That, in turn, requires a change in the new Israeli government’s attitude toward the EU. The new government should regard the EU as a friend and partner, and cease EU bashing. It should support a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and prioritize ties with those European states that are guided by liberal democratic values. The government should seek to renew its high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012. It should also welcome EU involvement in efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, including European support to pro-peace and pro-democracy civil society organizations.

However, recalibrating Israel-EU relations will not be possible while Israel is promoting annexation. These two things do not go together. Israel’s new foreign minister should indeed convey a new message to the Europeans as he takes office – of partnership and friendship, commitment to democratic values, willingness for dialogue and openness to criticism – but at the same time he should seek to block annexation. Not only because of European opposition, but primarily out of concern for Israel’s national interests, democratic character, and quest for peace.

הפוסט Israel, the EU and Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The EU is based on a common market which removes economic and national borders, enabling the free passage of goods, services, capital and people. The Coronavirus crisis has resulted in uncoordinated, unsynchronized closures of national borders, hampering the passage of goods and people and undermining the EU’s integrative vision. Following the debt crisis (2009), immigration crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016), will the Coronavirus pandemic result in spillback or even the dismantling of the European integration project?

The EU was slow to react to the crisis and initially has been blamed for some failures in dealing with it. As usual, it provided a convenient punching bag, especially for those who fail to understand the limitations to its competence. Health policy is made and carried out by member states, not by Brussels. It was unrealistic to aspire or expect that in these times of chaos and pandemic fright the slow-moving, cumbersome organization would successfully coordinate emergency policy for its 27 member states, which can each respond far more quickly and effectively themselves. Brussels’ initial coordination attempts failed, and each member state adopted a different strategy at a different time. Coordination among the states was clearly lacking, as was the initial lack of solidarity, reflected for example in a halt to medical equipment exports to Italy.

When hospitals in Italy were collapsing, urgently needing life-saving protection equipment, Germany, France and additional member states where the epidemic had not yet spread suspended exports of these items. European solidarity was exposed as a hollow slogan, anchored in the Lisbon Treaty but not in European hearts. National instincts predominated. Even if Brussels thought in terms of Europe, EU member states thought of themselves and the competence was, as mentioned, in their hands. It was only several weeks later that manifestations of solidarity emerged, such as transferring Coronavirus patients on respirators from northern Italy to hospitals in Germany. The initial impression, however, was seared in the minds of Italians who desperately needed help and did not get it.

In addition to the absence of solidarity on health-related issues, economic solidarity was also lacking. Italy and other states asked the Eurozone’s finance ministers to approve “Coronavirus bonds”, meaning that the 19 members of the currency bloc would pool some of their debt. The Dutch and German refusal to share in the debt burden of southern European states generated anger, bitterness and disappointment in Italy, Spain and other countries. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen eventually apologized to the Italians on behalf of the other Europeans for failing to render assistance when their state’s health system collapsed. This was an unusual move, but perhaps too little, too late.

In April, the EU was able to cut back some of its losses and even record several achievements. The bloc was quick to regain its composure, quickly shifting to new and creative solutions. Lessons have clearly been learned from previous crises. The European Central Bank was quick to spend 750 billion euros in bond purchase, and the European Commission redirected 37 billion euros from the EU’s budget (which totals some 165 billion euro in 2020) to fighting the pandemic’s repercussions. Aid packages for the 27 member states and their 450 million residents total some 4 billion euros.

The Commission has also launched a joint procurement agreement of medical equipment for the member states and is working on EU-funded construction of joint medical equipment stockpiles. Moreover, the EU has allocated 140 million euros for Coronavirus research, to work on a vaccine and other interim solutions. In addition, the EU’s policy and legislation banning and limiting state-aid has been suspended, and a green light was given to EU member states (under the European Commission’s supervision) to increase their deficits in order to help business and citizens.

The Coronavirus crisis is not only a health crisis. It is a mega-crisis with harsh economic aspects. It is also a crisis of governance and a challenge to democracy. Changes to one’s lifestyle beget changes in perceptions, ideas and identity. The epidemic once again pits the skeptics and critics of the European integration project against its supporters, bolstering the populists and mainly the nationalists.

The Coronavirus crisis has exposed the EU’s weakness in dealing with member states not committed to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban pushed through emergency legislation made possible under the Coronavirus crisis that allows him and his government to take action and pass laws without parliamentary oversight. The legislation, with no stipulated deadline, is akin to suspending democracy in Hungary. Although the crisis entails intrusions of privacy in many countries, no democracy in Europe or elsewhere has adopted such harsh measures. The EU is based on values of democracy, the rule of law and human and civil rights, but Orban’s move generated only a feeble response on the part of the EU and its member states. This type of challenge has hovered over the EU for several years and demands a determined response. Weak actions undermine the EU and testify to its institutional inadequacy and its normative frailty.

The economic crisis will affect the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy, too. China, where the epidemic originated, responded forcefully and blocked it relatively fast and effectively. At the height of the crisis in Italy, when its neighbors refrained from providing it with medical equipment, China sent tens of tons of medical equipment as well as medical teams. This gave China points in Italian public opinion, as the EU was losing ground. China’s economic activity has almost reverted to its pre-Coronavirus level; in Europe, the epidemic hit harder and the economy will take longer to recover. From a broader perspective, Europe, which has been experiencing an economic decline, is losing points to China in the global competition.

And what about Israel? The EU’s voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has faded in any case in recent years. Since 2016, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been mobilizing his opportunistic European friends, who are interested to ram Brussels, in order to block EU resolutions critical of Israel. Instead, the EU has only been reiterating consensual decisions adopted in the past. When the number of Coronavirus fatalities in Europe soars, the foreign policy “guns” fall silent. The Coronavirus-induced crisis, weakening Europe and diverting global attention, may weaken the European response to Israeli annexation measures that will be presented as implementing the Trump plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Europe has been hit the hardest by the Coronavirus. Over 100,000 of the virus’ 180,000 known fatalities are EU citizens. For now, it does not appear the EU will be one of the epidemic’s victims, but public confidence in some of its systems has been substantially undermined and some of its “pre-existing conditions” have erupted and intensified. The EU has been weakened both internally and externally, but it is fighting back and the final word in the European integration project is far from being said.

An efficient, functioning international system is vital to confront surging nationalist sentiment. The cross-border Coronavirus does not distinguish between race and color and fighting it requires internal European cooperation. The EU has displayed resilience in bouncing back from its initial hesitant and uncoordinated response. However, the decisive question in the wake of the crisis is whether European leaders and citizens view the EU as a political or merely an economic functional project. In this context, it is too soon to chart the balance of EU losses and wins in the Coronavirus crisis.

הפוסט The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Germany – and other European countries – could have taken this step seven years ago, when Hezbollah’s military arm was banned by EU in 2013. Perhaps, if it had then banned all Hezbollah’s activities on its soil, both military and “political,” Germany would not have turned into an operational hub for Hezbollah and enabled the network of over 1,000 activists.

Today Berlin had discovered what was well known for quite a while to Israel and the Arab Gulf states – there is no distinction between Hezbollah’s military and “political” wings. There is only one Hezbollah – murderous, poisonous, and dangerous.

Now, it is time for the European Union and other countries around the world to ban Hezbollah in its entirety.

Four years ago, the members of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) classified Hezbollah as terrorist organization, a decision adopted by the Arab League.

GCC Secretary-General Abdullatif al-Zayani then accused Hezbollah of committing “hostile acts” against GCC states, including recruiting young men to carry out “terrorist attacks, smuggling weapons and explosives, stirring up sedition and incitement to chaos and violence.”

Did Europe really think back then that Hezbollah, which had already performed an act of terrorism on its soil by killing innocent Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012, would stop there? Of course, Hezbollah continued its nefarious behavior.

It has been a known fact for quite some time that Hezbollah’s operations in Europe, as well as in Latin America includes drug trafficking, illicit tobacco trade, money laundering, recruitment and fundraising, with the revenues directed to Lebanon to fund terrorist attacks and arms procurement.

Hezbollah – which faithfully fulfills Iran’s orders – has destroyed Lebanon, creating a state within a state, and has sown death and destruction in Syria, acting on behalf of its Iranian master while using foreign countries with lenient policies to promote their goal.

Yet, the world was exceptionally slow to react to this immediate threat and many important players continued to insist on artificial and ridiculous distinction between its military and the “political” wings, even when Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was laughing loudly about this distinction.

“Just as a joke, I propose that our ministers in the next government be from the military wing of Hezbollah,” he said during a televised speech in 2013, following the EU’s designation Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist organization.

Indeed, both political and military wings of this organization are united by the same murderous ideology, created and funded by Iran. There is no disparity between them.

As expected, Iran was not happy with this development. Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council went as far as saying that “ISIS failed to reach Europe because it was defeated by Resistance groups such as Hezbollah.”

Naturally, Iran would want the world to think that “an enemy of an enemy is my friend.” Hopefully, no one will fall for this trap. ISIS is a danger to humanity, but so is Iran that continuously threatens regional security, pushing for more destruction and death through its many tentacles.

Not only Germany, but also countries in Latin America such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil have recently decided to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and change the legislation respectively. These countries have seen for themselves how deep Hezbollah has penetrated, and how dangerous it is. Along with Israel and the Arab states, these countries have a long and painful experience of combating Hezbollah.

Everyone should know, that when Hezbollah traffics drugs, illicit tobacco, weapons or diamonds through Hamburg port or through porous borders in Latin America or East Africa, this dirty money will be later used to send rockets on the civilian population in Israel, kill more Syrians, and perform terror attacks in Europe or Arab states. That’s why the EU and countries around the world should follow the example of Germany and put the entire Hezbollah on its terror list, in an effort to eradicate Hezbollah’s power and global presence.

(originally published in Al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Now is the time for the EU to put all of Hezbollah on its terror list הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For now, the takeaways are contradictory. On the one hand, states are closing their borders and turning inward, as mandated by health considerations. On the other hand, cooperation between states will clearly be necessary in order to overcome the unprecedented crisis in the health, economic and diplomatic arenas.

We are witnessing the rise of more conservative and populist regimes in various states in recent years, and even in some which have adopted racist overtones. The coronavirus outbreak could buttress their argument that unsupervised open borders result not only in uncontrolled immigration, but also in epidemics.

An understandably frightened public might support seclusion and isolationist trends. The immediate challenge on the day after will require a balance between what appear to be two polar positions – the version of globalization as we know it versus the veering toward separation and isolationism.

Israel is facing that challenge all the more forcefully given the trends of recent years. Its foreign policy has been marked by increased isolationism, an emphasis on threats – whether existential or merely serious attempts to block international diplomatic initiatives and a deep sense that “the world is against us” or that “the world does not fully understand the threats we face.”

The coronavirus crisis is a strategic crossroads for renewed solidarity, initiatives and cooperation in the regional and international arena. It therefore constitutes an opportunity for a shift in Israel’s foreign policy, which should be based on several layers.

1. Supporting others – Israel has achieved admirable progress in various fields. It is important to share the unique knowledge we have amassed and developed with neighboring states and with those further away. There is no need to keep boasting of Israel as a “start-up nation.” Instead, Israel should significantly expand its investment in foreign aid.

2. Highlighting opportunities alongside threats – The world appears to have internalized the “threat list” that Israel skillfully presented. Without making light of them, the array of opportunities presented in terms of joint interests with regional states in recent years should also be emphasized. There are numerous options for cooperation between Israel and its neighbors, not only in response to threats but also in taking advantage of opportunities in environmental protection, water, health, immigration and energy, to name a few. The immigration crisis, for example, requires a joint effort to stabilize the situation, but also provides an opportunity for joint plans to address understandable concerns and help create a supportive rather than a threatening and argumentative climate.

3. Regional cooperation – Recent years have presented Israel with increased potential for regional cooperation. Israel took constructive steps to take advantage of this potential, but they must be deepened and extended to the broader region. While the Arab Spring did not generate the hoped-for democratization, it did create a more conducive foundation for cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as well as a sense of a shared fate vis-à-vis a variety of challenges.

4. Conducting an open dialogue with the Palestinians – Current events have underscored the necessity for tighter coordination and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It is very important to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the COVID-19 crisis to return to a format of broader dialogue – empathetic and deep – between the sides. Its outset is in facing the ongoing crisis; its aftermath is in examining ways to break through the impasse in the peace process.

5. Good neighborly relations with Europe – In recent years, Israel has focused on the criticism voiced by Brussels against its policies. The Israeli government took a confrontational approach toward the EU and regarded its weaknesses (prompted by economic, diplomatic and social challenges) as an opportunity. Israel must realize that the geographic, economic and cultural realities linking it to Europe are an asset and not a liability. Moreover, good relations with the EU do not contradict Israel’s strategic relationship with the US, even if they appeared to do so for a short while.

6. A foreign policy based on initiatives and vision – Perhaps most importantly, Israel must replace its defensive and blocking posture with a foreign policy that is proactive and that of an internationalist. Israel should present a vision of its own for regional cooperation and coexistence, based on positive common denominators, rather than being reactive and relying on negatives. By its very nature, the road to realizing a vision is difficult, but a vision-led foreign policy can contribute to a constructive and less threatening atmosphere, resulting in charging the regional climate with positive energies, with or without natural gas.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy and a former ambassador to Cyprus.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Coronavirus crisis opens opportunity for shifting Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in the immediate weeks following the presentation of the plan – these did not happen. The US administration stopped Netanyahu’s efforts for rapid annexation, and by doing so created tensions within Israel’s right-wing bloc. Voting intentions of Israelis remained largely unchanged following the publication of the plan, according to multiple public opinion polls. Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz, who the prime minister tried to trap by dragging him to Washington with him to the introduction of the plan, managed to handle the situation and gain some political benefits from it. And Arab leaders kept refusing to publicly meet Netanyahu, like they did prior to the two Israeli elections in 2019 and despite American pressures.

The Trump plan, however, was greeted with cheer by the Israeli mainstream. It was termed by many as the most pro-Israeli plan ever and was warmly embraced by Gantz’ Blue and White party, the main contender to Netanyahu’s Likud. Voices against the plan came almost only from the Israeli left, whose power is diminishing. But even among the left there was cautious not to aggressively oppose the US president, at times even congratulating him for the efforts his administration undertook to devise the plan.

A two-state solution is still the way forward

International responses were also mild in nature. They reflected the general lack of involvement by the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Trump took office and a reluctance to challenge the US president. Countries in Europe and the Arab world issued statements welcoming the Americans for their efforts and promising to study the content of the plan. Such statements were the ones that the US administration was pushing for. The American goal was to prevent clear and immediate rejection of the plan and this has been largely achieved (there were exceptions like Ireland’s quick response against the plan).

Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place.

In the weeks that followed, multi-national organisations (the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union) made joint non-binding statements opposing the plan. Within the EU, internal divisions continued to prevent joint declarations by all 27 member states, as has been the case since 2016. EU High Representative Borrell thus issued a statement reflecting his own views, while European UN Security Council members reaffirmed the traditional European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The overall nature of these responses reinforced Netanyahu’s narrative that the international community does not care much about the Palestinian issue. His claim is that Arab countries are willing to improve ties with Israel even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and that Europe is no longer a relevant actor, now that some member states are willing to block initiatives in Brussels on Israel’s behalf. Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place. A common thought among Israelis is that if the world does not care that much anymore about the Palestinians, why should we.

The further consolidation of this mindset might become a dangerous consequence of the Trump plan. Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution should be a high-level priority for the next Israeli government. It’s crucial for Israel’s ability to maintain both its Jewish and democratic character, to live in peace, security and prosperity and to truly belong and integrate in its Middle Eastern, European and Mediterranean neighborhood. It’s also the right thing to do in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations.

Challenges and opportunities

However, doing so will not become any easier. The Israeli public is largely indifferent to the issue; the Palestinian public is losing faith in prospects of a real Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank is making the two-state solution more difficult to obtain and implement; and the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza casts a shadow over prospects for future progress towards peace.

These are major challenges that pro-peace Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders should tackle. Prospects for political change in Israel later this year – even if not representing a clear ideological shift – might provide an opportunity to begin doing so. Should a different American administration take office in January 2021, even more opportunities will emerge. Pro-peace actors should already plan towards such scenarios and begin to take action. For the past three years their primary focus was on the release of the Trump plan, what it will include and how to react. Now, after its publication, it’s the time to move on, brush the plan aside and advance steps that can bring peace.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states.

There’s a variety of steps that international actors can take: their primary goal should be to prevent Israeli annexation of territories in the West Bank, through voicing clear opposition. They should also keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue high on their agenda – especially when engaging with Israeli officials – even when they have more pressing priorities and when they do not envision immediate progress. A counter-document to the Trump plan, including alternative principles for a final-status peace agreement, should be published as to not let the Trump plan remain ‘the only game in town’.

What Europeans should do

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states. However, this remains a difficult task and, in any case, European countries should bypass the paralysis caused by divisions among EU member states by acting in smaller coalitions of like-minded actors. Borrell should be supportive of this line of action as well.

Moreover, a new international mechanism to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should be set up – whether officially or unofficially – to enable different international actors (not only European) to coordinate efforts, with participation of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. Such a mechanism should implement the plan agreed upon to introduce Israelis and Palestinians to a coordinated international package of political and economic incentives for peace. Finally, increased international support and recognition should be given to pro-peace civil society groups so they can more effectively build positive interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.

These steps can generate hope, set up new dialogue channels and craft innovative policy proposals – all of which are much-needed components on the path towards peace. They will demonstrate how local and international actors can chart a real vision towards peace and can take action together to advance its implementation. It would be the most suitable response to the Trump plan.

(originally published in IPS Journal)

הפוסט Moving on from Trump’s plan for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the protracted freeze of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and growing tensions generated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation intentions, the Israeli and Palestinian willingness to jointly participate in establishing a new organization is a bright spot not to be taken for granted. The fact that the EMGF includes European and Arab states as full members, as well as the US, EU and other international organizations (such as the World Bank) as observers, further highlights the unique nature of this development.

The underpinning of the new organization is economic, with its members seeking to cooperate in maximizing the energy reserves discovered in the Mediterranean over the past decade. Israel is generally deterred by international groupings, fearing members’ pressure regarding its policy on the Palestinian issue. However, although it initially preferred that the gas forum remain a non-binding body, Israel eventually agreed to its institutional upgrading, probably at Egypt’s behest.

While Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Italy are discussing the construction of a gas pipeline from Israel to Europe – a project whose economic, technical and diplomatic feasibility is highly doubtful – the new organization positions Egypt as a regional energy hub with its gas liquefaction facilities that enable gas exports to Europe without a pipeline.

The make-up of the current forum is unique, but need not be finite. Lebanon and Turkey are two important regional players currently absent from the EMGF due to disputes and confrontations with forum members. However, in order to realize the cooperation potential in the Eastern Mediterranean, the organization should seek to draw them into its ranks in the future. The UN, too, which plays a role in mediation tasks in the Mediterranean region – between Israel and Hamas, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Israel and Lebanon in marking their maritime borders – could also be represented as an observer.

The organization has diplomatic, not just economic, potential, including to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. In recent years, no multinational organizations have been active in this regard. Under the Trump administration, the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) lost whatever limited importance it had beforehand.

French-led efforts to set up an international support group for the peace process were unsuccessful. The absence of an influential multinational body makes it difficult for the international community, for example, to implement its plan to introduce a coordinated package of political and economic incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The EMGF could be an asset for a new Israeli leadership wanting to re-start the peace process and striving to link regional ties to the Palestinian issue. Until such time, and beyond constituting an additional channel to the PA, the new organization could advance Israeli peace ties with Egypt and Jordan.

ISRAELI GAS exports to Egypt and the visits by Israel’s energy minister to Cairo for meetings of the forum are already making a difference in relations. Nonetheless, Israel does not have an ambassador in Cairo, even though the foreign minister approved the appointment of Amira Oron to the post about a year-and-a-half ago. The government has repeatedly avoided approving the appointment and fixing this should be a high priority for the next government.

As for ties with Jordan, cooperation on the gas issue has yet to generate a positive momentum in the relationship. Instead, it has been met with public and political protests in Jordan against the backdrop of the harsh crisis of trust between the two. Jordan’s King Abdullah recently declared that the relationship was at its lowest ebb, and clearly, only a change in Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue as well as prioritizing the rehabilitation of links with Jordan could change that.

Benny Gantz has already issued messages in that direction when he addressed a ceremony in Naharayim marking the 25th anniversary of the peace treaty. The new organization could also help improve Israel’s relations with the EU following several tense years.

The EMGF links Israel and European states in a manner that has won EU approval and that is not viewed in Brussels as a move designed to split and weaken the EU – unlike the alliance Netanyahu forged with the Visegrad Group, especially Hungary. The participation of France in the new organization can also assist – given a new Israeli leadership – to overcome obstacles that prevent the renewal of the high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU (the Association Council).

For Israel to effectively make the most of the opportunity provided by the new organization, it must learn the lessons of its conduct in other regional and international organizations. Budgetary difficulties – coupled with a general skepticism towards such organizations – limited Israel’s ability to take full advantage of similar opportunities in the past.

For example, Israel held the position of deputy general secretary of the Union for the Mediterranean, which it gave up due, also due to its Foreign Ministry’s financial crisis. Israel also has financial debt to the UN, which casts a shadow over its activity there.

Strengthening the Foreign Ministry can help resolve such issues and realize the potential of Israeli membership in the EMGF. It is the Foreign Ministry that should play a leading role when it comes to Israeli participation in international organizations, unlike the current situation with the EMGF in which it is the Energy Ministry that is mostly in charge.

The establishment of the new organization in the Mediterranean is more than just an important economic development. It is also a diplomatic opportunity for Israel. The next Israeli government would do well to leverage the EMGF not only for the economic profit it can generate from the country’s gas reserves, but also for diplomatic gains that advance Israeli-Palestinian peace and broader regional cooperation.

The writer is the founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Gas forum a diplomatic opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Trump Plan: Not the Way to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As such, the “Deal of the Century” endangers Israel’s future in the Middle East rather than improves it. The international community, which stepped aside from the Israeli-Palestinian issue once Trump took office three years ago, must now make itself heard with a resounding “No.” The same goes for Israeli politicians who still seek to advance peace.

Since Trump first coined the term “Deal of the Century” in 2017, the international community has vacated the arena, even when it became apparent that the moves of the US president were encumbering resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International actors failed to adopt any significant initiative of their own, and mostly kept silent.

Diplomats and politicians from around the world, including those who in the past expressed commitment to peace, explained their inaction using various excuses: There is no alternative to US leadership on this issue, they said. We are trying behind the scenes to influence the contents of the US plan, they claimed. We will not judge the plan before we see it, they insisted. Once the plan is revealed, we will look at the half full glass and try to move forward, they promised.

They subsequently argued that there was no point in picking a fight with Trump over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as it was irrelevant or because the US plan might not even be published. And that is how we arrived at the point that over 40 world leaders convened in Israel for the World Holocaust Forum while ignoring the heated Israeli discourse on annexing parts of the West Bank that was taking place the very same time.

Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not have asked for better conditions to unveil the plan. From their perspective, their hard work of recent years had paid off.

The Netanyahu government was successful in distancing the international community from the Palestinian issue. It attacked international (and Israeli) players critical of its policy, portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian issue as no longer of interest to the world, and took steps to distance the feasibility of a Palestinian state. The Israeli opposition did not challenge the government effectively on this.

The ideological opposition (left-wing parties) gradually diminished, choosing to focus on social-economic issues rather than on foreign policy and national security ones; the non-ideological opposition (centrist parties) refrained from significantly diverging from Netanyahu’s policies, in a bid to appeal to right-wing voters. Israeli public opinion has been affected accordingly – according to the Mitvim Institute’s recent poll, support for the two-state solution is declining, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is not perceived as a partner for negotiations, and promoting peace is ranked low in the public’s priorities.

THE TRUMP administration worked toward similar goals, not only by formulating the plan behind the scenes and deliberately obfuscating its publication date. The administration adopted a series of measures that affected the situation on the ground and, in fact, promoted the principles of the plan even before its publication.

Trump refrained from acknowledging previous US commitments to the two-state solution; changed the traditional US stand on Jerusalem and claimed the city’s fate was no longer on the negotiating table; was harshly critical of the Palestinian leadership and tried to delegitimize it; cut funds for Palestinian institutions, peace organizations and international bodies; gave the nod to Israel’s settlement enterprise; convened discussions and summits from which the Palestinian Authority was excluded; and neutralized the Quartet (comprised of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN).

The US lost touch with the Palestinian side and in so doing forfeited its role as an honest broker.

Other international players found it hard to counter these trends, or deliberately avoided doing so. The EU’s internal divisions made it hard for Brussels to act on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and implement decisions already adopted (such as labeling products made in the settlements). EU member states chose to invest in more burning issues such as Brexit, refugees, etc.

Key Arab states engaged in advancing their relations with Israel, albeit under the limitations imposed by the freeze in the peace process, but in a manner that signaled willingness to cooperate with Trump’s moves and generated tensions with the PA. Russia and China, to which the PA appealed to join the mediation efforts, were not keen to agree. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov became the most significant non-American player in the arena.

He voiced clear opposition to Israeli annexation as well as firm views about the principles of a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the implications of developments on the ground. He also effectively mediated to avert war with Gaza. Abbas and the Palestinian leadership, which adopted a strategic decision several years ago to conduct their national struggle in the diplomatic arena rather than on the military battleground, were left without significant allies in the world and devoid of achievements.

Under these circumstances, Trump and Netanyahu were able to concoct the plan they wanted. However, its unveiling must effectuate change. International supporters of peace can no longer hide behind the smoke screen of an impending, effective US plan. They must clearly voice their stand against the unilateral plan, present alternative parameters that could truly advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, coordinate among states and bodies committed to peace and willing to invest in its advancement, and join those in Israel and the PA who refuse to accept Trump’s dictates.

The next US president, perhaps a new one, will be sworn in one year from now. Until that time, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the annexation ideas included in the Trump plan do not become reality.

The writer is founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The international community should say no to the Trump plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

So, I was hiding in the heap of dead bodies because in the last week the crematoria did not function at all. The bodies were just building up higher and higher. So there I was at night time; in the daytime, I was roaming in the camp, and this is how I survived. On January 27, 1945, I was one of the very first; Birkenau was one of the very first camps being liberated.”

— Bert Stern, a Survivor

Seventy-five years ago today, the Red Army stood at the gates of Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Soviet soldiers could not believe the harrowing sights unfolding before their eyes: the 7,000 remaining prisoners—human skeletons, just skin and bones, some of them dying These were the sad remnants of 1.3 million people—women, men and children—who had been deported by the Nazis to the largest concentration camp ever constructed, a facility that combined a killing center and slave labor. It is estimated that between 1940 and 1945, at least 1.1 million people died there, some of them gassed; others tortured and shot by the Nazi guards; others succumbing to hunger, cold, disease, and exhaustion.

Auschwitz-Birkenau, one of the many concentration camps established by the Nazis, was the culmination of the Nazi plan to dominate a Europe populated by a pure Aryan race. The term “Holocaust” has been used to describe the mass-murder of six million Jews, killed simply because they were Jews. It is true that not only Jews were deported and murdered in Auschwitz: other targeted groups included the Roma, the homosexuals, and the physically and mentally handicapped. All these people were considered threats to racial purity, but for the Jews, the plan was different; it was total and final. Even seventy-five years later it is difficult to understand the frenzy and determination of the Nazis and their collaborators in their effort to wipe from the face of the earth a whole people, to perform what became known as “the final solution”, to eradicate any remnant of their culture and civilization. And perhaps most difficult to understand is that as the Nazi mass-murder machine took its daily toll, the world stood silent.

It would be a dangerous error to think that the Holocaust was simply the result of the insanity of a group of criminal Nazis. On the contrary, the Holocaust was the culmination of centuries of hatred and discrimination targeting the Jews. The hatred propagated by the
Roman Catholic Church, the persecutions and expulsions, the auto-da-fé of the Holy Inquisition, and the pogroms in Eastern Europe—all these were the fate of the European Jews for two millennia, since the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple and deportation of the Jews from their homeland.

Even in the case of the Holocaust, the Nazis did not move immediately to trying to exterminate Jews; they moved step-by-step to dehumanize Jews, so that when the “final” step came it was accepted by the masses. Throughout the 1930s, after the Nazis took power in Germany, they began with laws that required the Jewish people to be gradually removed from the rest of the population, stripping them of their citizenship and their human rights. Jews were barred from the professions, their shops looted and confiscated, their synagogues destroyed and their books burned. Then Jews were forced into squalid ghettos or confined to camps where they were used as slave labor. And all of this was accompanied by systematic incitement and racial indoctrination that portrayed Jews as sub-human, no more than cockroaches, who polluted the pristine German society.

Albert Speer was one of Hitler’s closest confidants, the Minister of the Armaments and War Production in the Third Reich. He was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment at the Nuremberg Trials. In an affidavit, sworn and signed at Munich in 15 June 1977, Speer wrote:

“The hatred of the Jews was Hitler’s driving force and central point, perhaps even the only element that moved him. The German people, German greatness, the Reich, all that meant nothing to him in the final analysis. Thus, the closing sentence of his Testament sought to commit us Germans to a merciless hatred of the Jews even after the apocalyptic downfall.”

Hatred and prejudice were not confined to Germany, however. Such conditions were prevalent in many European nations; had this not been so, the Holocaust would not have been possible. In many conquered states, the Nazis found enthusiastic collaborators in their scheme to rid Europe of Jews. There were also courageous, heroic citizens who endangered their own lives and those of their families to save Jews. We call them the Righteous Gentiles.

For us, citizens of the Free World today, it is difficult to understand the enormity of Auschwitz, and the depth of the cruelty; it is difficult to understand or accept what human beings are capable of doing to each other when motivated by blind prejudice and hatred. After the Holocaust, the world seemed eager to find a more cooperative path. The founding of the United Nations was one expression of that moment. For a while, we thought that hatred of Jews had finally been eradicated. But slowly the demonization of Jews started to come back.

Antisemitism is on the rise again all over Europe and the United States, and anti-Semitic incidents are multiplying. Irrationality and intolerance are back. Jews are being targeted as Jews again in Europe. Jews are being attacked on the streets, in supermarkets, in schools. Synagogues and Jewish businesses are attacked. There are mass-demonstrations, with thousands of people shouting death threats to the State of Israel and to Jews. There is even a revival of Holocaust revisionism, spanning those who minimize the atrocity to those who rewrite history so as to honor the disgraced officials of those dark days.

We are concerned because we know where hatred can lead.

Antisemitism and racism should have no place in the 21rst century. Houses of worship should be places of love, understanding, and healing. Nations should not tell their people to kill in the name of God

Jewish History and consciousness will be dominated for many generations by the traumatic memories of the Holocaust. No people in history has undergone an experience of such violence and depth. For us, to remember is not only a commandment, it is the moral commitment to the sanctity of human life, a commitment to pass on to the next generations the very basic values of acceptance of the Other, of tolerance and understanding.

We remember the Holocaust, because memory is an integral part of our culture. Because memory shapes us. We remember the victims because of the command “Zachor” (Remember).

Remembrance is not an isolated act; it has a moral dimension. The rescuers taught us that even in the hell known as Holocaust, the individual had the choice and the capacity to behave humanely if they cared—and had the courage. We remember because we do not want our past to be our children’s future.

(originally published in European Eye on Radicalization)

הפוסט Remembering the Holocaust: 75 Years After the Liberation of the Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

3) Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning activists entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4) Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdullah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer. President Reuven Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5) Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf states and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf states, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations toward its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Israel Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf states, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf states, which was not met with a significant American response.

6) Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7) Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement while Israel dials down its Visegrád Group links – The European Union continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner, and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrád Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8) Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9) Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes canceled) international visits and meetings in a bid to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10) Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointment was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, at the expense of diplomats.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, of which Dr. Nimrod Goren is the founder and head.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As a member of the Israeli peace camp and as an organizer and participant in numerous meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, I attend these meetings with mixed feelings of excitement and hope alongside skepticism and cynicism. Each time, I am happy for the opportunity to meet and talk to young people on “the other side,” and am sad to discover that our expectations from the encounters are diminished from year to year. Peace? A word too big. Political agreement? No leader has the courage. A diplomatic process? Neither side feels it has a partner. Confidence-building measures? The reality on the ground is different.

In the past, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli-Palestinian encounters were much more common. While these were two difficult, painful and blood-soaked decades of the conflict, it was precisely when hope overcame despair. We had the feeling that change was possible, that there was still a possibility for a solution, and that our leaders were able and willing to advance and implement it. In recent years, I have felt that the hope is replaced by despair, stemming both from reality on the ground and from the fact that our politicians are mainly focused on preserving the illusion of a status quo.

In recent years, I am under the impression that Europe and the international community care more about settling our conflict than we do. Peace initiatives, positive incentives, condemnations and controversial decisions are all examples of measures taken by Europe and the international community showing they have an interest in the region and in Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. We can argue about the essence, the motives and the degree of influence of such measures, but there is no doubt that they indicate interest. On my last visit to Brussels, however, I noticed a change of attitude. Europe has many troubles of its own, both at home and abroad, and its focus in the Middle East is no longer necessarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

During the meetings in Brussels last year, the main message of the European Parliament members present was that Europe definitely wants to see advancement toward a two-state solution and believes it is possible, but without the will of the parties and their leaders the chances for it to happen are slim. During the last visit, however, the main message from our hosts was their impression that there is no solution on the horizon, but that we must try to keep our hopes up, and wait for the right timing, or for a change that allows us to move forward.

In this atmosphere of relatively comfortable despair (for some of us), discussions took place between us Israelis, our Palestinian partners and our European hosts. The atmosphere stayed relatively calm, unlike the heated atmosphere I experienced in previous encounters. Even the tensions over democracy and human rights remained within the bounds of a critical and legitimate discourse of people with different worldviews, living in the “same neighborhood,” but in very different realities. Bystanders were positively impressed – young Israelis and Palestinians can sit in one room and talk to each other. Occasionally they argue, but nevertheless they succeed in finding common ground and reaching understandings and agreements.

On the second day of the program we held a simulation of negotiations over Jerusalem. The discussions within each of the two national groups were no less difficult, and perhaps even more so, than the discussions between the two sides. Although most members of the Israeli delegation had progressive and centrist political views, the attempt to reach agreement was challenging. In the end, all sides recognized the need for clear borders, mutual recognition and international involvement in the Holy Basin, the area in Jerusalem that includes the Old City and its adjacent territories. For the organizers of the simulation, the European mediators, this was evidence that with a little effort and foreign support, the sides are still able to reach understandings, even on the conflict’s most difficult issues. For me, it was actually a reminder that unlike us, the participants, the political echelons on both sides are moving away from the ability to reach and implement agreements.

Despite the difficulties and challenges, each meeting reminds me that there is no substitute for personal contact and sharpens my understanding that dialogue encounters between individuals on both sides must continue. Such meetings are often the only opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians to meet each other not on the battlefield and not behind screens, where both sides are often portrayed as a sworn enemy. Meetings between people are a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the Israelis and Palestinians to recognize, know and understand each other. On days when the political horizon seems so far away, it is important to know and remember that on the other side there are quite a few people who aspire to create a better future and yearn for peace.
I can only hope that the next visit of the prime minister to Brussels will be a joint visit with a Palestinian leader. I also hope that for a change, it will be a visit that focuses on dialogue, seeking agreements and building trust – as we tried to do at the meeting of the young leaders – and not another visit of public relations and wrangling.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israelis and Palestinians Meet at the European Parliament הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The European Union is not hostile to Israel. Along with its member states, the EU is Israel’s largest trading partner. Europe accounts for almost 50% of Israeli imports, and more than 35%-40% of its exports. Anyone ignoring this Israeli dependence on Europe lacks a basic understanding of reality.

However, ties with Europe are not limited to trade. They encompass many spheres.

Although the EU-Israel Association Council, which is the official framework for high-level dialogue between the sides, has not convened since 2012, Israel and the EU maintain multifaceted ties in accordance with a detailed plan they drew up and a series of agreements on a broad range of issues.

For example, Israel greatly benefits from the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and development program, in which it participates. Brexit is expected to affect the Horizon 2020 follow-up program, making it somewhat less beneficial for Israeli researchers, but an amazing network of ties has been forged in recent years, thanks to this program, between Israel’s economic and academic establishment and European institutions and agencies.

Israelis take part in dozens of EU public administration and governance training programs. European experts are placed for periods of over a year in Israeli government agencies to advance implementation of European-standard programs.

Europe’s Open Skies program has created unprecedented links between Israel and the continent, increasing the flow of tourism in both directions.

All these developments have not generated much of an echo nor media exposure, and that is lamentable because many of those polled for Mitvim’s annual poll said that providing the public with additional information about Israeli-EU cooperation could improve Israelis’ perception of the organization.

Tensions between Israel and the EU are mainly political in nature, stemming from differences over the occupation, the settlements and the absence of a peace process with the Palestinians.

Israel blames Brussels and the EU institutions for criticizing its policies and creating tensions, devoting its efforts instead to developing direct ties with EU member states rather than with the EU in its entirety. Other European states act in similar fashion on a variety of issues.

The decision to portray the EU in a negative light is a political one, and Israeli decision-makers must realize how wrong it is, given the extent of Europe’s significance and importance for Israel.

EUROPE IS experiencing an internal crisis, which confronts Israel with a dilemma of principles and practice in its conduct vis-à-vis the EU.

The European crisis is multifaceted, and largely reflected in non-liberal, populist trends. Brexit is a central expression of this process, as are developments in the Visegrad states, mostly Poland and Hungary, and in other states where populist, right-wing forces are on the rise.

This challenge notwithstanding, one must not lose sight of the fact that the EU has been a successful project in realizing its raison d’etre – preventing a pan-European war, such as World War II.

Despite the difficulties, the EU is still robust and still led by liberal, democratic forces.

In economic terms, the EU still serves as a role model, with which Israel should strive for strong ties. A strong EU is good for Israel, first and foremost from an economic point of view, given that any crisis in Europe has an immediate impact on the Israeli economy. Israel is a small state highly dependent on foreign trade. It needs the open markets so characteristic of Europe and not the exclusionary, anti-globalist trends gaining traction in the US and Russia.

Along with diplomatic and economic cooperation, a dialogue on defense and security issues is feasible and advisable, in light of the steps Europe is taking to establish a joint European security agency. Israel is well placed to integrate into this enterprise, to contribute its experience and cooperate with the EU.

It is important to remember that politics is not only about interests; its essence is also in promoting values. The State of Israel, as the state of the Jewish people, cannot ignore its role in this respect. The State of Israel must not link up with dark forces within Europe out of short-term, purely opportunistic expediency. It must not embrace populist leaders or stand by vis-à-vis developments in Hungary, for example, where anti-democratic liberalism is being entrenched in a manner highly reminiscent of pre-World War II Europe. Israel must not ignore abuse or violations of human rights.

The State of Israel is a powerful, sovereign player which can and must make its views heard on such issues; it must hold a moral compass and enhance liberal democratic values. We want not only to live; there is a reason for living – it is called “values,” which should also be brought into the diplomatic discourse.

The same goes for Israeli politics, where rotten apples have emerged to join forces with like-minded people in other countries. One cannot accuse the whole world of racism and antisemitism without looking in the mirror and examining our own behavior.

The new world order creates many joint interests and challenges for Israel and Europe – for example, regarding China’s role. Israel and the EU can deal with this together as two entities with shared values.

A new European Commission elected to lead the EU is taking office these days. There is tremendous potential in promoting cooperation between Israel and the EU, and leadership changes create an opportunity for a new, more positive dialogue. The next government must turn over a new leaf with Europe.

Dan Catarivas is the chairman of the EU-Israel Chamber of Commerce. This article is based on his remarks at the 3rd annual conference of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, held in November 2019 in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel-EU relations: An annual assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2019 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When he flew to London to meet Johnson, the British Prime Minister publicly stressed his support for the two-state solution, which Netanyahu opposes; when Netanyahu flew to Sochi to meet Putin, he was left by the Russian President in the waiting for three hours and did not return to Israel with policy achievements; even Trump refrained from giving Netanyahu a pre-election “gift” as he did last time, and only indicated vague willingness to discuss an Israel-US defense treaty after the elections; and King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly rejected Netanyahu’s request for a meeting, much like other Arab leaders did earlier in the year. Moreover, the crisis facing Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, deepened further in the lead up to the elections.

Following the elections results, the responsibility for managing Israel’s foreign relations will likely change hands, with Yair Lapid being a major candidate to serve as foreign minister. The next government will need to lead a fix in Israel’s foreign policy. It should advance peace with the Palestinians; highlight Israel’s commitment to liberal-democratic values; engage with – rather than delegitimize – international critics; restore bipartisan support for Israel in the US; stop EU-bashing and improve ties with Brussels; fulfill opportunities to reshape ties with Arab countries; mend the crisis with world Jewry; legitimize the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, and the list goes on.

The Israeli elections did not produce an ideological shift from right to left, and this will limit the extent of foreign policy change we can expect, but they did open up a path for leadership change, block far-right parties, and empower Palestinian citizens of Israel. Given Israel’s difficult political reality, these are important first steps towards change.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises hope, despite the current crisis Ethiopia is facing following the coup attempt. Just a year ago, people in the Horn of Africa felt desperate, just as we sometimes feel, about the long hopeless years of bloody conflict, past agreements that were not implemented, torn societies in ethnic and territorial conflicts, and hope for change that is out of sight. However, in an amazingly fast process, the parties in the Horn of Africa succeeded in changing their reality and get on the path to peace. In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed rose to power in Ethiopia, and within a few months the parties signed a peace agreement brokered by the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the UN. As a result, other peace processes started in the Horn of Africa, and hostile relations were replaced by negotiations and new connections.

How did the Ethiopians and the Eritreans succeed in moving within a few months from a state of protracted conflict to a hopeful peace process? It looks like several factors, that can serve as points of reference for Israelis and Palestinians, have helped the parties:

Bold political leadership: A reality-changing leadership is needed in order to change the course of the long-standing conflict. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki made a move which was contrary to popular positions, national mood and narratives that the parties have cultivated over the years, and reached out for peace. The leaders changed the public discourse rather than being led by it. They proved that the leadership must not submit to prevailing patterns and identity perceptions that have taken root over the years, but legitimize reality-changing actions.

External incentives: External incentives are another force that drives leaders and citizens to move toward reconciliation. Leaders can effectively use incentives to mobilize political and economic support in their quest for peace. In the EthiopianEritrean case, apart from achieving peaceful life, landlocked Ethiopia gained an outlet to the sea, renewed its commercial flights to Somalia, and attracted foreign investors who increased their investments in the country. Eritrea, which was in a difficult economic situation, gained economic, media and transportation cooperation with Ethiopia, and the international sanctions that made it one of the poorest countries in the world, were lifted. As a result, the international isolation that was imposed on the country ended.

International support of the peace process: Advancing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea serves the interests of many international and regional players that are involved in the Horn of Africa and are interested in promoting stability in the volatile region. The US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the UN have mobilized to mediate, support and guarantee the peace process. The fact that the main intermediaries in the process – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – sided by the weaker Eritrean side, teaches us a lesson when choosing the mediators in our conflict. The Ethiopian diaspora in the US, which politically and economically supported the peace process, made a significant contribution too.

Adapting the peace process to the political reality: The design of the process should necessarily be adapted to the complex and changing political reality, while referring to the structure of negotiations, the pace of the process and its implementation, the coordination of symbolic trust building measures, etc. The parties in the Horn of Africa were able to properly adjust the negotiations structure to the existing political reality in order to reduce risks. For example, the relatively fast pace of the process prevented the formation of an organized and strong opposition, as well as extreme activities that might have harmed the process. Other factors that helped move the process forward were symbolic steps, meetings that are covered by the media, rapid changes on the ground, and leadership that is mobilized to communicate with civil society of the other side.

Promoting internal reconciliation processes, enforcing solidarity and establishing the political system: The transition from a protracted conflict to a peace process is a significant change that disrupts well-established perceptions in society and brings to the surface the internal tensions and disagreements. In order to support change, leaders should build on the resilience of society and the stability of the political system. The parties in the Horn of Africa realized that the in-country situation affected the prospects of reaching a peace agreement between countries. Abiy Ahmed has led extensive reconciliation processes in Ethiopia, including the disarmament of opposition groups and making them a legitimate political party, the establishment of a new and inclusive government that includes a Ministry of Peace that is entrusted with the internal process, and the consolidation of a new ethos for Ethiopia.

Switching back to the Middle East, the absence of a courageous political leadership entails a heavy exasperating toll. When examining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict against the backdrop of the peace process in the Horn of Africa, there is a reason to be hopeful: in the case of the Israelis and the Palestinians, the Arab Peace Initiative and the promise of a Special Privileged Partnership with the EU, serve as incentives, alongside the security guarantees that the US may offer. Regional and global players who have a vested interest in achieving stability in the Middle East offer themselves as potential mediators and help the sides avoid violence. They can help us garner international support for the peace process. Israeli and Palestinian societies face many challenges related to the rule of law, democracy, human and civil rights, social cohesion, the reduction of violence, and the legitimacy of the leadership. Such challenges should be addressed with no delay in order to enforce solidarity, economic resilience, and trust in government institutions. Civil society and the Diaspora can also play a role since they can promote pro-peace cooperation even in the absence of political will to advance peaceful relations. Similarly, the business community, researchers and government agencies can take advantage of the deadlock in negotiations to examine opportunities and adjust the peace process to the changing political context. Above all, we must continue to believe that a solution is possible.

The case of the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not theoretical. Having a success story, in which leaders, civil society and the international community join forces to advance a peace process to solve a protracted conflict that seems hopeless, is politically powerful. It undermines the defeatist argument that “there is nothing that can be done”, and that we are condemned to “live by the sword”. Peace processes can be “contagious”, and the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a good example. Their peace agreement led to a series of peace talks and arrangements across the Horn of Africa. Being infected by the “peace virus” would certainly be beneficial for Israel and the Palestinians as well.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper he wrote on the subject, with the assistance of Dr. Moshe Terdiman.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Lessons from the Peace Process between Ethiopia and Eritrea הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Most previous US administrations also failed in efforts to advance peace, but they were clearly seeking a solution acceptable to both sides and responsive to their interests. Along with the traditional US bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game goals of their initiatives. Such is not the case with the Trump Administration that seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s plan has yet to be made public, and we are supposedly in waiting mode for its launch, US declarations and actions illustrate that we are already in the midst of actual implementation of new US policies, and this includes several courses of action. Vagueness on content: The Americans are busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only a handful. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using various excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be dealing with the trailer for a significant peace move, but with an avoidance of publishing the political plan while fostering incessant international discourse about it (thereby preventing other states from intensifying their involvement as they await the US plan).

Incentivizing peace ineffectively: The economic part of the Trump plan lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians, and as such is supposed to highlight benefits and convince the Palestinians to engage with the American plan. However, if the Trump Administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to do so. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society to which the incentive is offered. This was done in the cases of previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama Administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the American proposition, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is viewed by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe offer, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of dollars. This might create further alienation rather than promote engagement.

Convening events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has been busy planning and producing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions and a workshop, all focused on economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of ways to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it is bringing together various states in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, the Americans also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss defense in the Middle East (mostly focused on the Iran issue). The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially the Gulf States and Jordan and Egypt, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to US pressure. The Bahrain workshop will be the first without official Israeli representation, despite Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. US attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences in order to promote a breakthrough in IsraeliArab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: President Trump and his emissaries now and again announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for the two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as Jerusalem and the refugees) be taken off the table. US officials expressed criticism of the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, and recently even expressed support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys tweeted remarks intended to refute rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. In their entirety, these all paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump Administration is moving, even without publication of its plan.

Game changing actions: Alongside the verbal front, the administration is engaged in actions. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, closure of the PLO office in Washington, transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and closing the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded Israeli-Palestinian projects and in budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These moves also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding American policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. They are perceived in the world as a deviation from international law, generate anger toward the US and undermine its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening the Palestinian leadership and bolstering Netanyahu – The US administration invests great efforts in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority leaders. Whether by pressure on the Palestinians to engage on the Trump plan or attempts to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, this conduct has failed thus far. The American emissaries have been accusing the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism and harming their people’s interests. They pen opinion pieces against them, clash with them repeatedly on Twitter, and even withheld a US entry visa from Hanan Ashrawi. The Palestinian Authority was not even invited to Bahrain. This all contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, ongoing coordination with him and his people (chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington), mobilizing in favor of his reelection and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Seen in their entirety, US declarations and actions over the past two years indicate that the Bahrain economic worship is not the real thing. It is only the tip of the iceberg. The policy adopted by the Trump Administration distances Israeli-Palestinian peace. It goes against the components of a future peace arrangement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years; it weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to the path of negotiations and opposed to terrorism; it places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace; it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians and makes it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while providing a tailwind for proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees a great friend in Trump, the moves his administration is leading on the Israeli-Palestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in striving for peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace must take a stand against these moves despite the difficulty in confronting Israel’s best friend in the world, certainly during an election campaign. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party know how to criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so elements in Israel’s opposition should criticize the conduct of the American president and point out its negative repercussions when he distances prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump Distances Peace, and Bahrain is Just the Tip of the Iceber הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in recent years, the Israeli government has been leading a negative campaign against the EU. It has been criticizing the EU for being anti-Israel, while making efforts to increase divisions between EU Member States in order to limit the EU’s capacity to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Toward the formation of a new Israeli government in late 2019, this article presents ten guiding principles for an improved Israeli foreign policy toward the EU, based on the work of a Mitvim Institute task team.

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the EU הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Voters in the world’s largest supranational elections picked 751 representatives from 28 states. Fear of the far-right generated a record turnout, with voters shaking off their usual complacency and heading to the ballot boxes. Some 51 percent of 425 million eligible voters exercised their democratic right, setting a 20-year record.

Twenty-one radical right movements operate in the EU’s 28 member states, enjoying an absolute or relative majority in some. Most favored an EU pullout in the past, but are currently working in tandem across the continent to change the union from within.

Deputy Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, whose Lega party rose from 6 percent of the vote in 2014 to 34 percent, claims Europe is changing. Salvini, expected to be among the leaders of the far-right and Eurosceptic bloc in the EU Parliament, represents a nationalist, xenophobic and centralistic line. He makes no bones about his admiration for Benito Mussolini and often uses expressions similar to ones favored by the fascist World War II leader. On Mussolini’s birthday, Salvini tweeted: “So many enemies, so much honor”, a variation on “Il Duce”’s famous saying. On a recent visit to Mussolini’s hometown Forli, he addressed the crowds from the balcony that Mussolini used.

Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won 52 percent of the Hungarian vote; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally garnered some 23 percent of the French vote (compared with 25 percent in 2014); the neo-Nazis of Alternative for Germany received 11 percent of the German vote (compared with 7 percent in 2014). Slovakia’s neo-Nazis recorded the most significant victory of the elections, with Our Slovakia, which includes various Holocaust deniers and anti-Semites, winning 120,000 votes (12 percent) compared with only 9,000 in 2014.

The common goal of Europe’s far-right is to introduce a Trojan horse into the heart of the continent in order to spread a message of fear, erase current European borders and redraw them. They want a white, Christian, nationalist Europe without immigrants and foreigners. The 2008 financial crisis, combined with the crisis of Middle Eastern and African refugees dreaming to reach Europe, intensified the debate about the very need for a union of 520 million Europeans and the threat looming over “Christian Europe”. The ghosts of World War II Europe have re-emerged and could be strengthened if a financial crisis erupts again. The populist rebellion of the 21st century is not necessarily of the poor; it is a protest of the conservative middle class that feels cheated of its rights, jobs and national pride. They are the major losers of globalization who feel nostalgic for past glories, with some dreaming to be part of an empire once again.

Steve Bannon, President Trump’s former adviser, spent a long time in Europe prior to the elections in a bid to establish and organize a nationalist right-wing bloc that would dictate Europe’s future – both through the European Parliament and in member states. After winning national elections in Italy, France appears to be the next target of the radical right. France and Italy, who were among the founders of the European community after two world wars and tens of millions of deaths, are now seeing antiEuropean groups placing high in the European Parliament elections. French President Emmanuel Macron dubbed the far-right led by Salvini, Le Pen and Orban “a spreading leprosy”.

Ironically, the European far-right that awakens all the ghosts of the past is seeking a seal of approval from the State of Israel in order to increase its popularity on the continent. Salvini condemns anti-Semitism at every opportunity and even troubled himself recently to Jerusalem and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial. While Jean Marie Le Pen, the former leader of the extreme right in France, claimed the annihilation of European Jews was merely “a detail” of World War II, his daughter Marine tries to distance anti-Semitism from her party and mobilizes French Jews to clear her name. In the 2017 French presidential elections, 11 million French, more than one-third of the electorate, voted for her. Le Pen demands France for the French and aspires to her country’s presidency.

Israel has a significant interest in developments on its neighboring continent, which provides it with significant economic, security, social, and cultural backing. Ties between Israel and Europe are deep, good and ongoing despite political disagreements and the EU’s frequent criticism of Israel’s Palestinian policy. Recent Israeli governments have tried to drive a wedge between European states critical of Israel and populist, nationalist European governments who toe Israel’s line. The bloc headed by Salvini and Le Pen will try to sway European legislation and policy in order to limit anti-Israel criticism.

However, most European Jews do not fall into this trap. They understand that beyond the pleasing rhetoric, some far-right leaders are seeking to downplay their anti-Semitism and xenophobia in a superficial makeover that will generate political profits for them. Jewish leaders and rabbis in Europe are closely monitoring the election results and expressing concern over the creation of a far-right bloc in the heart of Europe, at the center of its parliamentary decision-making.

Quite a few Israelis shuddered when Salvini laid a wreath at Yad Vashem a few months ago. President Reuven Rivlin has persistently rejected all attempts at a relationship of any kind with the European nationalist right. In an unusual step, he expressed support for Macron over Le Pen in the French national elections. No one is saying Israel should cut off ties with states in which the far-right comes to power. However, it should relate to them with a mixture of respect and suspicion rather than expressing undying friendship for them. President Rivlin knows this is a masked ball by the far-right. The foreign ministry does too and urges Israel to avoid ties with such elements as Alternative for Germany and Austria’s Freedom Party.

Israel must continue to strengthen its scientific, defense, economic, cultural and technological ties with Europe. It must aspire to positive relations with Europe even when it is critical of Israel over the Palestinian issue, and prefer democratic allies even when it disagrees with them. Israel must also display sensitivity toward the fears of European Jewish communities over the rise of the right and their concerns over the repercussions of decisions made in Jerusalem.

Despite its growing power and entrenchment, the European far-right was not as successful in the European Parliament elections as it hoped. Most European citizens still chose parties loyal to European integration and liberal-democratic values. However, the struggle against the far-right continues, and Israel has a role to play. It must place itself on the right side of the values scale and help block the European “leprosy”.

Henrique Cymerman is a television journalist and recipient of numerous human rights and journalism, awards. He covers the rise of the European right and lectures at the School of Government of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Europe’s Far-Right Is Blocked, for Now; Israel Should Help This Continue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, formerly his country’s energy minister, noted that negotiations would be launched on May 7, at which point both sides will try to map out their points of agreement and disagreement in order to complete the talks by September. At the same time, a tripartite Lebanese-Cypriot-Greek summit is scheduled to take place in June. The Cypriot foreign minister added that a unitization agreement would send an important and calming message to international energy companies seeking to invest in the region.

The Lebanese side is clearly interested in speedy progress on the issue, realizing that their country is lagging behind in developing its energy potential, compared to Israel and Cyprus. Moreover, according to the Lebanese minister, Lebanon is planning to carry out an exploratory drill next year along or adjacent to its maritime border with Cyprus.

This significant development is the latest element in the diplomatic and energy-related shifts taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean in recent years, and several points should be pointed out in this regard.

A. Lebanon, it appears, understands the need to accelerate progress in the energy context if it wants to fulfill its economic potential, and the various actors in Lebanon that are involved in this are willing to overcome their differences to that end.

B. Cyprus is once again proving its vitality and centrality in the region. A CypriotLebanese agreement, as mentioned, would reassure energy companies and promote discussion of possible regional cooperation, which could enhance Cyprus’ position as a regional export center. After all, Lebanese-Cypriot cooperation is devoid of complex diplomatic issues for Lebanon.

C. If the trilateral summit does, in fact, take place in June, it would once again underscore the attractiveness of the tripartite alliance model taking root in the region in recent years (as attested to by the Israel-Cypriot-Greek alliance and the Egyptian-Cypriot-Greek one). In certain regards, we are witnessing a type of competition among additional elements in the region (such as Jordan and the Palestinians) seeking to join this accelerating “triangular game”, which is generating growing interest.

This is good news for Israel. A constructive Lebanese approach designed to achieve progress on the energy front is healthy. The more Lebanon moves forward with plans and agreements with neighboring states in the region, including joining the “triangular game”, the more it will have to adopt a pragmatic line toward Israel.

The regional gas forum launched in January 2019 in Cairo, which Lebanon has been invited to join but has yet to do so, could provide a framework to encourage regional cooperation, albeit not necessarily direct and bilateral. This may not lead to a speedy, formal resolution of the disagreements between Israel and Lebanon over their maritime border, but presumably, it would result in indirect and discreet understandings, for which such a framework would be particularly suited. Possible mediation by Greece and Cyprus between Israel and Lebanon, together with the UN and US, was recently reported.

Finally, the intention to achieve agreement on joint development of Lebanese and Cypriot gas reserves should encourage Israel to accelerate and complete its slow negotiations with Cyprus over a similar agreement. The first (and so far only) Cypriot gas field – Aphrodite – straddles Israel’s maritime border with Cyprus and is thus a joint field. Lack of a unitization agreement, the likes of which are common and routine in other parts of the world, conveys a negative message to the relevant international energy giants and Israeli energy firms.

The plans to export gas from this field to Egypt also require a speedy agreement. After all, it will be very difficult and unacceptable in the international business arena to promote such an export agreement without properly anchoring the issue between the two relevant states (Israel and Cyprus). This can be achieved through a specific agreement on the Aphrodite gas field or an acceptable framework agreement paving the way for relevant firms on both sides of the maritime border to calculate the percentage of each side’s ownership of the gas reservoir. Either way, Israel’s next government must act quickly to regulate this issue and fulfill the new opportunities and regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Amb. (Ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and the former Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus (2010-2015). He has held senior positions in the Foreign Ministry’s planning and research departments, and is currently a lecturer of political science at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Do Closer Lebanon-Cyprus Energy Ties Mean for Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections Results: Possible Significance for Europe and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016.

Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies.

While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to help Israel’s long-term interest of trust and friendship with the EU. Up until a few years ago, Israel could boast of having the highest level of achievements and ties with the EU among non-European states. That was only fitting given that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a worldleading innovator with a developed market economy. However, Israel’s economic agreements with its main trading partner are virtually obsolete – an “Association Agreement” from 1995 and an “Action Plan” from 2004 that was meant as a temporary, four-year agreement. In 2008, Israel was about to sign an upgraded plan but the EU created a linkage: absent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, no progress can be achieved with the EU.

The upgrade has been suspended for over a decade. Were it not for the linkage, we could have enjoyed even more prosperous relationship. On the other hand, in 2013 the EU offered Israel the status of a “Special Privileged Relationship” as an incentive – maturation of the peace process would yield significantly upgraded ties. The Israeli government did not even consider the idea. Since 2012, the Israel-EU Association Council, an annual ministerial-level political dialogue, has not convened. Relations are handled by civil servants. Meanwhile, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have upgraded their “Partnership Priorities” agreements with the EU in recent years.

Relations between Israel and the EU have fluctuated over the years. A significant high was recorded in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The most recent “honeymoon” occurred between 2005 and 2008 following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and up until Operation “Cast Lead” and Netanyahu’s rise to power. For over a decade now, political relations with the world’s largest trading bloc have been at a low that is even starting to affect trade relations along with economic and research cooperation.

Netanyahu and his ministers have been inciting Israelis against the EU for several years. Israelis have grown accustomed to seeing the EU as a hostile entity rather than a friendly critic. However, even if there is disagreement with the EU over the peace process, settlement construction, Iran and more recently over Jerusalem, the EU remains Israel’s second most important strategic partner after the US. This is not a partnership born of mutual interests dictated by regional or global circumstances. Strategic partnerships are forged with those who share our world view and values, primarily with liberal democracies in which the rule of law is a substantive component that includes respect for and protection of human and minority rights.

The relationship with the EU is complex, largely because the EU itself is complex. As a union of 28 states (possibly 27 soon due to Brexit), efforts are always under way to ensure that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. While the EU has achieved this goal to a significant degree in the economic arena, it has had a hard time doing so in foreign policy aspects.

Brussels has often played the bad cop, such as the 2013 guidelines adding a territorial clause to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation agreement. Under that resolution, Israeli research institutions can only benefit from the agreement if they operate within the Green Line. The Netanyahu government had no choice but to go along with the EU’s territorial, legal and economic differentiation between institutions on each side of the Green Line. The backlash followed a few years later. Netanyahu has exploited the crises affecting the EU in recent years over debts, migration and Brexit, accompanied by the rise of populist parties. He took advantage of internal EU rifts to mobilize “rogue” states against anti-Israel decisions.

The new Israeli government should stop boasting of its “divide and rule” tactic and inciting public opinion against the EU and try instead to sever the EU’s linkage that is damaging to the relationship. The sad state of relations is not only the Netanyahu government’s fault. The EU did its share, adopting resolutions such as the linkage condition, the territorial clause and the labeling of settlement goods. Only a government that will advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process will be able to fundamentally change this trend and stem the troubling deterioration in relations with Israel’s biggest partner in terms of values, trade and scientific research.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu is co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, a lecturer at Hebrew University’s Europe Forum and a member of a Mitvim Institute task team.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Israeli Election Results and Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US President Donald Trump is closely aligned with Netanyahu and is expected to give him leeway over such policies. The EU today is less united against Netanyahu’s policies than in the past. So it may need a Democratic US administration in 2020 to present and enforce some red lines, in part because Netanyahu will face no significant domestic opposition on foreign policy or national security issues.

The two major pro-peace parties (Labor and Meretz) together have less than ten percent of the Knesset. While Blue and White’s 35 seats is a major achievement for a first-time political run, it does not endorse a two-state solution, and includes some right-wing hard-liners on the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu has portrayed himself as a master-statesman and highlighted his relations with (mostly) populist and anti-liberal world leaders. This trend is set to continue, further eroding the democratic component of Israel’s foreign relations.

Despite its weakness, Israel’s opposition must present an alternative vision based on advancing peace, increasing regional belonging in Europe and the Middle East, and anchoring Israel to the club of liberal democracies. This will not be easy, but Israel’s friends around the world need to know that there is more to Israel and its foreign relations than Netanyahu.

(originally published in the Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Trump Gives Israel’s ‘Master Statesman’ License to Carry On הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s warm relationship with the US administration, the enhanced alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, and burgeoning relations with Gulf States could bolster these claims. However, missing from this rosy picture are the stagnated peace process with the Palestinians, the inability to resolve the festering conflict with Hamas in Gaza, tensions with the EU, crises with Russia and Turkey, difficulties with key Jewish communities, troubling embraces of illiberal leaders from Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, and more.

It will be up to the next Israeli government to reevaluate and provide alternatives to Israel’s current foreign policy, to the values guiding it, and to the status of those government agencies tasked with implementing it. Should the next foreign minister – assuming a fulltime minister will be appointed, unlike after the 2015 elections – will have interest in promoting a pro-peace, multi-regional, internationalist, modern and inclusive Israeli foreign policy, he or she should take the following steps during the first 100 days in office:

First on the agenda is launching a process to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on previous agreements and international resolutions, in accordance with the accepted parameters of a two-state solution. Such a move could be launched with a public statement of intent regarding the final goal of the negotiations as proof of seriousness, a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the creation of a bilateral channel for talks (with an initial clandestine component). Israel should also support the establishment of an updated multilateral mechanism to support the peace process, as an improvement to the existing Quartet, in which specific European and Middle Eastern countries will also take part. While advancing such an initiative, the next Israeli government must recognize the need for a renewed political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the current split poses a major obstacle on the way to a two-state solution.

The second step to follow the first should be leveraging the move vis-à-vis the Palestinians to realize the unfulfilled regional potential. Israel has been presented with unique opportunities in recent years to significantly upgrade its standing in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe, most of which remain unrealized due to the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Progress with the Palestinians would enable the next government to take relations with Arab countries to the next level, making them more public and diverse, rather than focusing mostly on behind-the-scenes security coordination. It would also revive regional incentives for peace that previous Israeli governments wrongly ignored – the Arab Peace Initiative and the EU’s proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership, and enable the leveraging of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean to affect change in the diplomatic, civil and security spheres. Finally, it would remove significant obstacles to upgrading Israel’s relationship with the EU.

The third measure is strengthening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. In recent years, the Israeli government eroded basic principles of Israeli democracy. Along with the repercussions of these actions on Israeli society, they have also had an impact on the state’s foreign relations. The next foreign minister will have to prioritize relations and alliances with democratic states, even those critical of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. As a rule, Israel must recognize the legitimacy of criticism and conduct dialogue with those voicing it rather than seeking to undermine them. The new foreign minister will have to pull back from Israel’s rapprochement with far-right elements in Europe, some of them tainted by antisemitism. Instead of lashing out at the EU and joining forces with European member states seeking to divide and weaken it, Israel must regard the EU as a partner – both in practical terms and from a value-based perspective. Rather than inviting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Jerusalem, after the European Parliament elections in May Israel should invite whoever replaces Federica Mogherini as the EU’s foreign policy chief.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong and well-functioning foreign ministry and recognition of diplomacy as a central instrument in advancing national security. Thus, the fourth move required of the new foreign minister will be to formulate a national foreign policy paradigm, bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the forefront of core foreign policy issues, upgrade the standing of the Foreign Service vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and restore to the MFA responsibilities delegated to other government bodies in recent years. The minister will also have to work with the Knesset to increase its focus on foreign policy issues (first and foremost by its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee), and advance internal structural reforms within the MFA. Last but by no means least, the new foreign minister will have to raise public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the MFA’s role in implementing it.

The upcoming general elections provide an opportunity to change course in Israel’s foreign policy, towards an empowered Foreign Service, better ties with the Middle East and Europe, and progress in the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace. A full plate awaits Israel’s next foreign minister.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the Mitvim Institute and a lecturer at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Should Israel’s Next Foreign Minister Do? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Netanyahu and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the convenient metaphor, Gaza is not a pressure cooker from which excess pressure can be released through a valve or lifting a lid. The explosive situation in Gaza cannot be resolved only by opening and closing the Erez border crossing, or by occasional Israeli decisions to expand Gaza’s fishing area to nine nautical miles. Perhaps many would like to see Gaza disappear, sinking into the depths of oblivion. Nobody seems to like Gaza, no one wants Gaza. Netanyahu himself recently said that if Gaza could be handed over to anyone, he might have supported its reoccupation. Rumor has it, that Gazans claim that even God does not like Gaza. However, Gaza is here to stay. And as much as it is being isolated and placed behind high fences and thick walls of repression, Gaza finds itself yet again in the heart of regional politics. Gaza is a regional issue and since any clash in Gaza might ignite the whole region, many regional players find themselves involved in Gaza, each having its own interests and considerations, not out of love for Gaza, but out of concern for itself.

The main protagonists in this drama are Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, who have different and at times conflicting interests in Gaza. Such a situation poses difficulties in dealing with the humanitarian crisis and achieving stability and security. Ostensibly, there is not much to expect from other foreign actors involved in Gaza. Any such foreign actor – Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the UN, the EU, and the US – uses Gaza to advance domestic and regional interests. Erdoğan uses the situation in Gaza to provoke Israel and make political gains at home while positioning himself as an important leader in the Muslim world. Qatar is using its support of Gaza to gain advantage in the Gulf and position itself in the region. For the part of the EU and UN agencies, the situation in Gaza may really matter, but they do not have the political power to change reality (luckily and most recently, the UN was able to act as an effective mediator alongside Egypt and help prevent another round of violence). This is also the case regarding other actors.

However, even if they do not really care about Gaza, the fact that Gaza has become a usable political-public currency, is perhaps its greatest source of political power. The vested interests that foreign players have in Gaza, can be a good starting point for a change in reality. The main challenge, therefore, is to mobilize such actors to advance their interest in Gaza while improving the quality of life for Gazans. One important steps to be taken to this effect is to shift from a donor model to an investment model. The donor model, such as the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) that meets every year since 1993, or ad-hoc conferences that gather to discuss the rehabilitation of Gaza following yet another round of fighting, provides Gaza with only so much money, while donors have almost no responsibility for the effective use of their money. On the other hand, designing an investment mechanism requires investors to be involved in managing their funds. The investment model leads to increased involvement and increased interest in stability, and creates favorable conditions to support each investment. It is not a magic solution, just another tool, but an important one. The more players invest in Gaza, the greater the chances that Gaza will not sink.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט A Better Way for the International Community to Benefit the People of Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Alternative Directions for Israeli Foreign Policy on the Eve of an Election Year הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In 1965, British journalist Patrick Seale published a book called The Struggle for Syria, in which he described the international conflicts between the USSR and the US and between Egypt and Iraq over Syria since the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. More than 50 years later, the struggle over Syria is ongoing in full force, but it now seems to have been decided. Unlike the past, when the US struggled to maintain its influence in the Middle East, it has now decided to abandon the region.

The civil war in Syria, since 2011, has witnessed unprecedented involvement of internal and external players – more than any other conflict in the region. Upon the beginning of the civil war, the US, Jordan and Saudi Arabia helped the Free Syrian Army – the most significant opposition group – when the goal of the pro-Western coalition was to topple President Bashar Assad’s regime. This coalition was joined by Turkey, which not only attempted at toppling the regime, but also ensured that neither the Kurds nor Islamic State would establish territorial outposts in Syria.

Despite the ideological differences, the establishment of a Kurdish and/or Islamic state on the Turkish border was perceived as a serious threat, while Iran and Hezbollah rushed to assist Assad, followed by Russia who only joined in 2015. The involvement of so many players in the campaign confirmed Seale’s perception that whoever controls Syria also controls the Middle East. This perception results from Syria’s geostrategic role as a link between the Gulf region and the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, in the absence of other Arab allies, Syria has become an important anchor of Russia’s and Iran’s policies in the region.

The withdrawal of the US is not substantial militarily. A 2,000-soldier force, however efficient it may be, cannot significantly alter the balance of power. In fact, the fight over Syria was decided already in 2015, when it became clear that Russia showed relentless resolve to attain its objectives in Syria, in contrast to the hesitancy that the Obama administration demonstrated.

The talks in Astana and Sochi in recent years in an attempt to find a political settlement between the countries involved and the factions in Syria did not include the US. Therefore, Washington has long lost a central role in shaping the new political order in Syria. Yet, the withdrawal of American forces from Syria still holds a symbolic and moral significance that will adversely affect not only the US position in the region in general, but also its allies.

It symbolizes the failure of the US in Syria and the Middle East in general, and emphasizes the absence of a clear strategy and its lack of commitment to recognized allies. Paradoxically, Trump’s policy continues the policy of his predecessor president Barack Obama: first, by gradually withdrawing from the Middle East, and second by betraying his allies.

What does the recent American move mean for Israel? The implications for Israel are not significant, since even prior to this withdrawal, the US no longer played a major role in the Syrian playground. Unlike the Cold War, Israel’s situation today is better because it maintains a dialogue with Russia.

In addition, the fact that Russia and Iran do not necessarily share common interests in Syria may allow Israel to receive Russia’s help in preventing Iran from being even more influential in a Russian-controlled territory. If during the civil war Russia and Iran had a shared objective to secure the Assad regime, then after reaching this goal it is quite possible that competition over the rebuilding of Syria in the aftermath of the civil war may increase the rivalry between the two countries.

In any event, after seven years of bloody civil war that led to the destruction of the country, the death of half a million people and the creation of millions of refugees, Syria poses no threat to Israel. Moreover, based on past experience, the Syrian regime has kept the situation at the Syrian-Israeli border quiet and stable.

The bad news is that the victory of the “axis of resistance” in Syria has given a tailwind to those who are active on the northern front against the West and Israel. The fight over Syria is over for now, but the final word has not yet been said.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The End of the Struggle Over Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have demonstrated an enduring interest in collaborating on an ambitious undersea pipeline that would deliver Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe. Since 2011, heads of state from these three East Mediterranean states have met on a regular basis and signed MOUs pledging future energy cooperation (in addition to other areas), if and when the climate is right. Italy’s deepening participation in these dialogues only adds to the general sense of enthusiasm surrounding the appropriately named “EastMed pipeline”. Neither consensus between multiple governments nor the European Union’s commitment of $100 million in a feasibility study – a number that sounds significant, but in comparison to the estimated $7 billion pipeline costs, is a drop in the ocean – promises that this vision will become reality. After all, the average Israeli family invests a larger percentage as a down payment for an apartment.

Commercial viability lies at the center of the EastMed pipeline debate. At present, companies like Noble Energy and Delek Group have found more success in smaller, regional deals. The decision to export Israeli gas to Egypt, for example, demonstrates the compelling logic of limited scale projects where there is pre-existing infrastructure. By contrast, the EastMed pipeline – which would be the world’s largest undersea pipeline – requires not only investment and partnership between multiple corporations, but also the patience to endure a longer, more ambitious, and riskier route. Eni, the Italian oil and gas supermajor developing many of Egypt’s reserves and also investing in Cyprus’ waters, might be the perfect partner for such an endeavor, however there is little indication at present that developers are in agreement about the EastMed pipeline’s feasibility and estimated timeline.

If a consortium of corporations did decide to invest in the EastMed pipeline, its members would need to be resolute in the face of the proposed pipeline route’s many anticipated engineering challenges, shifts in the global energy market that may temporarily nullify the economic value of the pipeline, as well as the predictable delays that would accompany an enterprise of this scale. It took four years to connect Tamar field – a modest, 90 kilometer pipeline – to Israel’s coastline, so it is ambitious to imagine that a 2,200 kilometer pipeline would be constructed in similar timetable. So long as shorter, cheaper options are available, it is unclear that the EastMed pipeline will reach the minimal financial investment required to get off the ground.

That doesn’t mean Steinitz is barking up the wrong tree. After all, Israel has signed impactful export agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. In an increasingly diverse and competitive energy market, one must generate headlines in order to attract investment (on November 5, Israel extended its bid round for offshore exploration licenses), and Steinitz has proven to be a talented frontman for the Netanyahu government’s energy ambitions.

Still, Steinitz’s statement to Israeli TV on November 24 was oddly tone deaf. “For decades, we have complained about the Arab influence in Europe due to oil and gas,” he told Hadashot news, “The export of gas to Europe will moderate this influence to a certain extent and be a counterweight to Arab power.” While historically oil-producing Arab states have wielded outsized international influence because of their central role in the global energy market (and specifically in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict), many of these states are in the midst of a budding security relationship with the Jewish state. Steinitz seemingly ignores the fact that the selling point of the EastMed pipeline from a European perspective is the opportunity to diversify supply and reduce Russian influence, not necessarily Arab influence. Most importantly, the minister’s claim was based on state-level analysis of energy’s impact, sidestepping the bigger question that Israelis should be asking themselves: how will the EastMed pipeline impact my bottom line?

A major infrastructure project that delivers Israeli gas to Europe would be a historic achievement, strengthening a diplomatic and economic partnership that is essential to Israel’s success. But that doesn’t mean the average consumer is going to feel the difference when they receive their monthly electricity bill, and Israel’s government must make a more concerted effort to explain how it remains in the public interest to support projects like the EastMed pipeline. Failure to do so may result in a wave of protests similar to those that responded to the original natural gas framework. Given that the EU feasibility test is expected to offer its conclusions in 2019, there is no better time for the government to start answering the big questions associated with Israel’s energy policy.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in Globes)

הפוסט EastMed Gas Pipeline Must Overcome Major Obstacles הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well.

Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman supported the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and after the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of the three Arab countries (alongside Sudan and Morocco) who did not sever their diplomatic relations with Egypt. This fact is noteworthy especially in view of the resulting delicate position that was imposed on Oman vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, which have boycotted Egypt. Moreover, the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 tainted the relations between Oman and Iran, which was under the rule of the Shah, an ally of Qaboos. This independent behavior became a feature of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy.

Beginning in 1980, Mossad agent Nachik Navot used to meet regularly with Qaboos. The talks dealt with the common interests of the two countries, which included concern about the spread of Soviet influence and armaments in the Middle East, the Iran revolution, and the advancement of the peace process.

After the Madrid Conference, the signing of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan, there was a turning point in Israeli-Omani relations. In February 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin held a secret meeting with a senior Omani official to discuss relations between the two countries, which led to Oman’s decision to host in Muscat in April 1994 the fifth meeting of the working group on water in the context of the multilateral talks of the Oslo process. The involvement and participation of Oman in the working group on water and environment was not a secret. However, the secret contacts between Beilin and Yusuf bin Alawi, the foreign minister of Oman, prepared the ground for the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Sultan Qaboos, on 27 December 1994, two months after the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. This was the first official meeting between an Israeli leader and an Arab ruler in the Gulf.

This visit exposed Oman to criticism from within the Arab world. As a result, most interactions continued behind the scenes. Yet, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his counterpart, Alawi, met in public in Washington in June 1995. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, and the presence of Alawi, who represented the sultanate, in the funeral, led to more overt relations: in January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement to open trade missions. In April 1996 Peres visited Oman (and Qatar). The visit took place at the summer palace of the Sultan in Salalah. He was accompanied by Dan Gillerman, Chairman of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of businessmen in order to promote economic ties. Peres’s advisor Avi Gil insisted that Peres be accepted by a military parade that included the Israeli anthem. In September 1999, Foreign Minister David Levy met with Alawi during the UN General Assembly. However, a year later, Oman closed the Israeli mission as a result of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada. It was only in 2008 that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Alawi when she participated in the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The most important project carried out by Israel and Oman was the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), inaugurated in 1997. The project was the outcome of the talks in the multilateral working group on water and environment. The center was financed by the United States, the European Union, Japan, Oman and Israel. Oman, an arid country in need of desalinated water, was interested in establishing the center in its territory and using Israeli technology. Within the umbrella of technology cooperation, Oman and Israel could continue to hold covert meetings. Israeli officials could also meet with Arab officials from the Gulf whose countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Oman took advantage of having the center in its territory to develop desalination projects and to train local experts. The center continued to be active throughout the Intifada.

Netanyahu’s visit to Oman symbolizes the renewal of an old “romance.” At the same time, Oman’s willingness to reveal the meeting is indicative of boldness and self-confidence, especially against the backdrop of the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. In the local press, Qaboos is portrayed as a “man of peace”. In light of his fatal illness, perhaps this is the legacy he wants to leave behind. Yet, more concretely, two reasons may explain the visit’s aims: One, an attempt to offer an Omani mediation to the dormant IsraeliPalestinian peace process. The fact that Mahmoud Abbas visited the Sultanate a few days earlier and that Alawi was sent to Ramallah after the Netanyahu visit may support this thesis. Second, Israel wanted to use the good offices of Oman, which enjoy good relations with Iran and/or Syria. Beyond achieving prestige vis-à-vis the Saudi and Qatari neighbors, Oman can use Israel to reach out to the United States and the West in general. In any event, the visit substantiates once more again that Israel is recognized as an important player in the Arab Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently working on a study dealing with Israel’s secret relations with the countries in the Middle East.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Welcome to the New Normal: Israel and Turkey’s Turbulent Relations in the Post-Reconciliation Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The lack of open and direct dialogue between Israel and Hamas necessitates international mediation. While neither Israel nor Hamas are interested in a violent confrontation, such a confrontation can occur at any given moment. The continued hostility between them, alongside a severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and the inability of Hamas to deliver the economic and political conditions required to end this crisis, maintain prospects for violent outbreaks. The use of violence as a political tool helps Hamas raise the humanitarian crisis in Gaza on the regional agenda, as a means of preserving its status as the ruling entity in the Gaza Strip.

Given that the current state of affairs continues, international mediation initiatives towards a ceasefire in Gaza are doomed to fail. Without an agreement between Israel and Hamas, and without the backing and active involvement of the Palestinian Authority, there is no real prospect to improve living conditions in the Gaza Strip.

In light of Israel’s decision to refrain from an all-out military attack to defeat Hamas, both sides are looking for interim solutions to the challenges posed by Gaza. The Palestinian Authority, which sees itself as the legitimate sovereign of the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which fears a spillover of violence that will undermine stability along the Sinai-Gaza border, are also parties to this charged relationship.

Due to Palestinian Authority’s historical semi-state status and to the PLO’s role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Egypt cannot abrogate Mahmoud Abbas’ demands and ignore the Palestinian Authority’s needs while searching for a solution to Gaza. Abbas sees the recent indirect dialogue between Israel and Hamas as undermining the status of the PLO. The international mediation, led by the UN envoy and some Arab states, grants Hamas with increased political legitimacy, and Abbas, who has already lost control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, cannot afford a situation whereby the PLO’s political status is further undermined.

Attempts by Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire agreement that does not involve the Palestinian Authority raise concerns among the PLO and Fatah leaderships. The PLO is therefore making efforts to thwart any initiative that does not give it a central role in the reconstruction of Gaza. This was said quite overtly during the recent PLO Central Council meeting in Ramallah (15-17 August 2018). It has also become a major source of contention in the intra-Palestinian reconciliation attempts.

The inability of Hamas and Fatah to unify the Palestinian political system also makes it difficult to reach a regional arrangement in Gaza. The disputes among the Palestinian movements obstruct efforts by the donor countries to extend assistance, since there is no agreed upon mechanism for transferring and managing the funds.

A ceasefire arrangement could serve as a temporary solution, but one that will continue to inflame the tensions between Fatah and Hamas, and between Israel and Hamas. Since Israel’s Cast Lead operation in Gaza in the summer of 2014, there have been cycles of violent confrontations between Israel and Hamas, that did not evolve to a comprehensive military conflict. The current year has seen another escalation, which was triggered by the Gazans’ “Return Campaign”, which included marches towards the border fence as well as arson attempts via kites.

These actions and the casualties involved were supposed to generate support of Hamas’ objectives in the Arab world and beyond. This campaign, however, failed. The marches led to escalation and to an increase in Palestinian fatalities, but did not generate the media response and political pressure on Israel that Hamas hoped for, not even on the part of Arab countries. The lack of political achievements of such a popular struggle strengthened Hamas’ military wing, at the expense of the movement’s political wing.

Efforts to reach a ceasefire are intended to produce a glimmer of hope for the residents of Gaza, but the political obstacles, primarily the split between Hamas and Fatah, reduce the chances of success. Moreover, Israel currently sees the developments in Syria (especially the Iranian presence there) as a more urgent challenge to deal with than that of Gaza. But leaving Gaza behind only raises the bar of violence there. It leads to renewed escalation and riots with the IDF along the border, with Hamas closely monitoring their intensity.

As long as the Fatah-Hamas rift remains unresolved, international mediation regarding Gaza can produce only temporary solutions. The socio-economic problems of the Gaza Strip and the division of power within Palestinian society will continue to create difficulties and to challenge the status quo. To counter this, permanent solutions are needed, and these can only be achieved under international auspices and with US support.

However, the current lack of trust between the PLO and the US administration prevents this. Trump’s decision to cut funding to UNRWA reflected once again that Gaza is not just an internal Palestinian issue. It is turning from a regional problem to a complex international one, in which there is a clash between American interests and those of other major countries.

While US President Trump aspires – unsuccessfully for the time being – to lead peace efforts under his own terms, the EU and other donor countries are looking for alternative short-term solutions that will significantly ease living conditions in Gaza. Such solutions, despite their importance, are not likely to solve the intra-Palestinian divide nor to produce a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.

The road to an effective solution must include constructive US involvement that backs both sides to the conflict, and not just Israel. This is necessary for Israelis to feel that their security interests are taken care of, for the Palestinians to restore trust in the US, and for the US to once again be able to play the role of an accepted mediator.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Quest for a Long-Term Ceasefire in the Gaza Strip הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent years, the EU has found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Internal divisions and differences of opinions among member states – especially between those in western and northern Europe and those in central and eastern Europe – have prevented meaningful decisions on the topic in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council since 2016. The split within the EU has become evident even in UN votes, such as the vote regarding the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to deepen these divisions and to leverage them to his benefit. He recently stated this in public, on his way to a visit in Lithuania. Israel under his leadership is trying to limit the EU’s ability to reach the consensus needed to make decisions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is doing so by fostering alliances with various groupings of European countries – the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Hellenic states (Cyprus and Greece), and next in line may be the Balkan states. This is done in parallel to growing criticism of the EU by top Israeli ministers, often including insults and portrayals of the EU – Israel’s largest trade partner – as a rival rather than a friend and partner.

The EU has not yet found effective policy solutions to these developments. It also does not see a sense of urgency to do so, particularly at a time when no Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are in sight and while the EU is preoccupied with more pressing internal and regional challenges. Nevertheless, the EU is not giving up on voicing its opinions and searching for paths for taking action, even if the potential impact is limited. In addition to condemnations, voicing concern, and conveying messages via traditional diplomatic channels, the EU is also working to maintain, foster, and deepen its ties with those in Israeli society who support peace, democracy, and human rights. This is evident in the support given to Israeli pro-peace civil society organizations and hosting relevant Israeli politicians in Brussels.

This month was not the first time Arab members of Knesset visited Brussels. Most recently, a delegation from the Joint List visited the European Parliament in November 2017. Their latest meeting with Mogherini is a step forward in their efforts to internationalize their quest for equality within Israel and to protest Netanyahu’s policies. This activism in the international arena draws criticism in Israel but it is very much in line with how modern diplomacy actually works in the 21st century. Citizens, organizations, businesses, and politicians can now take a larger role than ever in shaping foreign relations, which is no longer the exclusive domain of ministries of foreign affairs.

The increased involvement of Arab members of Knesset in foreign affairs holds potential that goes well beyond their current protest against the Jewish Nation-State Law. It can lead to an important and constructive role in future peace negotiations, and in efforts to improve ties between Israel and Arab (and Muslim) countries. To date, their involvement in these issues has been low, but the potential is significant.

The EU, from its perspective, sees meeting Israel’s Arab legislators as another opportunity to convey to the Israeli government its deep concern over the direction in which Israel is heading, and to declare its partnership with those in Israel – Arabs and Jews alike – who are working to change Israel’s course. This support, which takes various forms, is welcomed by a large number of pro-peace and progressive Israelis, and should continue.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the atmosphere on the Gaza border has been heating up in recent weeks, the humanitarian crisis requires an urgent response. This is a clear Israeli interest, since the situation in Gaza encourages violence that affects life in Israel proper, leads to international criticism of Israel and stands in contrast to Jewish and human values.

There are several plans that outline ways to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, including the construction of a port in the El Arish area of Egypt, the construction of infrastructure facilities on an artificial island off the coast of Gaza, the development of the gas field opposite the Gaza Strip in favor of vital electricity generation and desalination projects, and the construction of a marine port in Cyprus.

The Cyprus option was discussed again recently at the initiative of Defense Minister Lieberman during the tripartite meeting between the defense ministers of Israel, Greece and Cyprus on June 22 in Nicosia. The proposed outline includes the construction of a seaport in Cyprus (or, in effect, the allocation of a number of docks in an existing port), which will serve as a conduit for the transfer of aid to the Gaza Strip under Israeli security supervision. The idea is not new, and the Cypriot response is generally cautious, although mostly positive. In the past, they tried to mobilize the EU in order to provide a sponsorship (mainly political) for the initiative and presumably this is what they will try to do now.

Nicosia, on one hand, attaches great importance to the close relationship with Israel, and hence the need for serious consideration of the Israeli request, which puts Cyprus in a power position as a significant regional player. On the other hand, the Cypriots understand that the Palestinian Authority is not enthusiastic about the idea, as generally they are fearful, and rightly so, to meddle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially in view of the split between Hamas and Palestinian Authority.

In Cyprus, as well as in the EU, there is great understanding of Israel’s security concerns and presumably of Israel’s future demand for tight and efficient control of the goods to be transferred from a Cypriot port to the Gaza Strip. The idea of the Cyprus port, which can be part of a successful Israeli policy in the eastern Mediterranean, has several requirements: 1) serious Israeli-Cypriot (and perhaps Greek) dialogue; 2) discussion and arrangement with Egypt; 3) an international political umbrella with the participation of the EU, the US, and possibly relevant Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia); 4) an internal Israeli campaign to mobilize public support for such a move, including the support of the defense administration, which frequently warns against a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.

The construction of a seaport for the Gaza Strip in Cyprus should be dissociated from the broader political process with the Palestinians; currently negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority do not seem feasible, therefore it should not be a precondition for advancing the initiative. However, there is a need to coordinate it with the Palestinian Authority, in order to neutralize any objection for such a move that could be seen as one that strengthens Hamas. There will also be a need for indirect coordination with Hamas (through the Egyptians) in order to ensure that conditions for a successful deal are in place.

The Israeli interest is to prevent a serious humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. The return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip is not in sight, and therefore the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip is still the lesser of two evils in Israel’s view and certainly preferable to the takeover of a more radical Islamist groups.

Furthermore, Israel must initiate and even participate (including through a significant economic contribution) in such an extensive and ambitious effort to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip. A sort of “Marshall Plan” is needed for the Gaza Strip, one that will mobilize the Arab states and the international community to fundamentally change the situation in the Gaza Strip. Such a move would benefit everyone, including Israel, both politically and publicly. The latest round of violence in the Gaza Strip and the almost daily incidents illustrate the explosive potential of Israel-Hamas relations. Presumably, the current cease-fire will not last. The Cypriot initiative, however specific, can trigger a process that will help neutralize what appears to be an inevitable confrontation. Israel must seriously advance this initiative – the sooner the better.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Port in Cyprus Can Help Resolve Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Civil Society in Action – Promoting Sub-Regional Cooperation Between CSOS as a Way Forward? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For Zionism, a state was a pre-requisite to safeguarding the Jewish people. Israel exists to provide for the wellbeing of all its citizens, Jews and non-Jews, but it is also an existential point of reference, and if necessary a refuge, for every Jew on earth. Still today, Israel is an exemplar of a functioning democracy amongst authoritarian regimes, a true multicultural society respecting, albeit not perfectly, the rights of minorities. Still today, the majority of Israelis would prefer to live in a country abiding by the high moral tenets that the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and his like, have upheld.

The frequent failure of present-day Israel to be fully accepted in the family of nations and to find favor in world public opinion should not in itself be of particular concern to us, Israelis. The critical importance of safeguarding the country’s borders and its citizens against those still seeking its elimination, justifies even the price of certain seclusion. Nevertheless, straying from the high moral standards upon which Israel was established, and breaching the moral boundaries the state founders have set for us, could become a real threat to the existence and wellbeing of Israel as we know it, and of world Jewry.

The visit to Jerusalem this week by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán [18-20 July] symbolizes such moral failure. The recent agreement reached by the Israeli and Polish governments, exonerating Poland of some of its notorious actions during the World War II, is another example of boundaries that Israelis should not cross.

In her unconventional book on the banality of evil, reporting from the trial of Nazi criminal Eichmann, German Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote, “evil can be banal and redefined as a civil norm.” She added that, “most people will comply but some people will not […] The Final Solution […] ‘could happen’ in most places but it did not happen everywhere.” While Orbán and his like across Europe cannot be compared to Nazi criminal Eichmann, reactions today in parts of Europe to immigration from the east serves as a brutal reminder of how quickly and seamlessly moral standards can deteriorate, also and even presently in Europe.

Hosting illiberal leaders in Jerusalem whose raison d’être is elimination of immigration, and by that legitimizing their policies, is an absurdity and an outcry. The reasons pushing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to try to court Poland, Hungary and others, in an effort to split and weaken the EU toll in the region is understandable. He and his government often face automatic and even perfunctory criticism from the EU conglomerate, so trying to draw a wedge inside Europe is basic realpolitik. The EU has some responsibility, too, when others are more inclined to accept forces wishing to destroy the principles on which it stands.

Nevertheless, short-term political gains from realigning with Europe’s extreme right might prove very costly for Israel. Endorsing Orbán works against the Jewish state’s core values and interests. For Israeli leadership, national interest should go far beyond immediate political gains and their responsibility extends to world Jewry. The implications of their actions and statements ought to be in good faith for the Jewish people and for Zionism-at-large.

The litmus test for Israel’s leaders in that regard should be whether the Jewish community in the discussed country supports the leadership in question. Are the country’s Jews as a minority feeling welcome, safe and protected? In the case of Hungary, the answer is no. Orbán’s anti-Semitic undertones and policies threaten Hungary’s Jews. That should be sufficient to disinvite him and several others who are in a similar position.

Beyond the immediate political gains, the EU and Israel should act more responsibly in order to serve the long term interests and wellbeing of their people. Brussels and Jerusalem must reestablish trust and increase practical exchange within the wide spectrum of center-right and center-left in both entities. They should work together, within the many existing joint frameworks, to create more unity between moderate forces, and together reject radicalism. Israel has valued expertise it can share with the EU in the field of absorbing immigrants and making refugees feel at home. Europe’s greatest challenge today is one Israel has dealt with throughout its existence, being a true immigrant society. In proportional terms, Israel taking in one million Russian immigrants when it had less than six, some three decades ago, can be compared to Germany taking in over ten million immigrants today. Albeit not similar, specifically on the background of religious affinity between Jews which is absent in Europe, many challenges are the same.

Israel will stand to gain from opposing Europe’s extremists and sticking to the noble values upon which it was established. World Jewry will be proud once again to be affiliated with their second homeland, Israel. And Europe will have an ally with unprecedented credibility in fighting xenophobia, a calming element to a most volatile region at its footsteps, to defend the values upon which the European Union was created, on the rubbles of World War II.

Raanan Eliaz founded and led for a decade the European Leadership Network (ELNET) and its Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD), two organizations dedicated to strengthening relations between Europe and Israel. He is a member of the Mitvim Institute’s task-team on Israel-EU relations.

(originally published by EurActiv)

הפוסט Orban in Jerusalem: Challenging Days for Europe-Israel Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quest for an Honest Broker in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The diplomacy of the 21st century is increasingly different in nature than that of past decades. It is no longer the exclusive domain of ambassadors and diplomats but is characterized by the larger involvement of civil society organizations, business entities, private entrepreneurs, ordinary citizens, and members of parliament.

This poses challenges for foreign ministries worldwide, whose share in implementing foreign policy becomes less significant. In order to cope with this phenomenon, some of them are taking steps that will emphasize – to decision-makers and the public alike – that even in the present age there is no substitute for professional diplomacy and the bodies that lead it.

A review of the steps taken on this issue by foreign ministries in various countries points at a common denominator: the use of public appeal and greater public participation. Foreign ministries, who are used to the practice of influencing public positions in foreign countries, also started investing efforts in fostering relations with the public in their home countries.

Recent steps taken by the foreign services of Germany, England, Australia, Sweden and the EU, for example, include: formulating and presenting foreign policy paradigms and guidelines; leading campaigns that emphasize the importance of diplomacy; explaining to the public the work of a diplomat as well as the work of the foreign ministry and its achievements; holding regular media briefings on current political issues; appearing before a variety of local audiences; and carrying out formal consultations with the public.

It is no coincidence that one of the most prominent signs of the weakening of the US State Department under President Trump, was a significant reduction in the scope and number of media briefings. Reduced interaction with the media entails reduced presence of the ministry in the public discourse therefore less exposure of its work and importance to the public.

The Israeli MFA is currently at a significant point of weakness – not only in terms of budget and manpower, but also due to a deliberate move to weaken it by dispersing its authority. Some of the measures needed to empower the ministry require that the government makes decisions and takes action. However, with regard to enhancing its transparency and sharing more information with the public about its work, the ministry can take action right away.

The 2017 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that within the Israeli public there is a desire to know more about the MFA’s activities, and a belief that being more transparent will help in the empowerment of the ministry. Doing so requires a different mindset. Today, the MFA sometimes regards its weakness as a factor that prevents – rather than encourages – more transparency, and this needs to be changed.

The Israeli MFA is on the defensive against an acting Foreign Minister (Prime Minister Netanyahu) who has taken steps in recent years to deliberately weaken the ministry, against a deputy foreign minister (Tzipi Hotovely) who advances an agenda that is further to the right than that of the government, and against other ministries that provide financial means for MFA activities, but in a manner that creates dependence and limitations.

The MFA is recently recognizing the importance of increased transparency. For the first time, its 2018 work plan includes a chapter dealing with improving the ministry’s public positioning and sharing information with the public. While this is a positive development, its implementation still lies in the future. Currently, the MFA does not publish annual reports that summarize its activities and achievements, does not conduct regular media briefings, does not make its annual assessment public (unlike some security bodies), does not provide its representations abroad with clear evaluation criteria for its representations abroad, and excessively tends to seek immunity for the (few) discussions that are held in the Knesset on foreign affairs.

The reasons for this conduct partially lie in the need for a conceptual change within the MFA, as well as in the difficulties facing the ministry in the current political context. In such a reality, the Knesset should play a more important role in encouraging and promoting transparency in the foreign service, and in making diplomacy more central to decision making. The MFA, for its part, must open up to the Israeli public, and continue its adaptation to the modern diplomacy of the 21st century. Doing so will also prepare the ministry for the day when a new Israeli government take shape, hopefully with a full-time foreign minister, who will seek ways to empower the ministry and not further diminish it.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Need for Increased Transparency in the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel’s Policy toward the Far-Right Party in Austria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

China supports the two-state solution, which includes a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It consistently votes in favor of UN resolutions along these lines. However, the Chinese Foreign Minister and other senior officials made it clear at the Beijing meeting that China does not take sides in the conflict. Rather, it claims that it is interested in promoting a solution that gives Palestinians their rights and ensures Israel’s security, recognizes the importance of Jerusalem for all religions and ethnic groups, and promotes regional stability. China declared that it intends to do so by mostly using positive economic leverages, instead of exerting political pressures. The Beijing meeting resulted in a joint Israeli-Palestinian paper that included guiding principles and policy steps towards the two-state solution. The meeting helped Chinese officials better understand the interests and sensitivities of the Israelis and Palestinians, and the points of agreement and disagreement between supporters of peace on both sides.

Is this a new and meaningful Chinese move, or is it merely a continuation of China’s low-key and symbolic involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? After all, many countries announce their aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace and show interest in the matter. Nevertheless, most of them do not give it high priority, do not believe that progress is possible under the current political conditions, nor do they invest great efforts and resources in advancing it. In a period of stagnation in the peace process and in light of recent American steps that make it even more difficult to renew negotiations, every country that is willing to help and contribute to peacemaking is important. China has the potential to play a useful role: It is an ambitious power with a growing global influence, which has good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, has unique economic capabilities, and promotes large-scale international infrastructure projects, including in Israel and the Middle East (as part of its far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative).

Chinese officials stressed at the Beijing meeting that China does not see itself as an alternative mediator to the US, but rather wants to be part of a multilateral effort to promote peace. This Chinese willingness to promote peace in coordination with other players in the international community is important and positive. Previous initiatives by other countries that were competing with each other, led mainly to failures. China’s position on the final status agreement is similar to that of the EU and the Arab League, therefore the establishment of a Sino-European dialogue channel on the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be a good starting point for Chinese involvement. In the future, it is worthwhile adding Arab officials and institutions to the initiative – led by Egypt, with whom China has a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Currently, there is no more consensus within the international community regarding the desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The American position has shifted under Trump, and within the EU there are countries (in Central and Eastern Europe) that adopt different positions to that of Brussels and which are rather supportive of Netanyahu’s policies. This makes it difficult to formulate the required international parameters for a twostate solution, but it should not interfere with other international actions that are currently on the diplomatic agenda, i.e. the formulation of a global set of economic and political incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. The idea of introducing to Israelis and Palestinians an incentive package that will increase public support in peace was adopted during the French Peace Initiative and by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council. It was also included in the final document of the Beijing meeting.

So far, incentives have been offered by the Arab League (the Arab Peace Initiative), the EU (the proposal to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state) and the US (security guarantees for the two-state solution formulated during the previous administration). China may add its own large-scale economic incentive, which will present a reality of prosperity and development that both Israelis and Palestinians will benefit from after reaching peace. For example, a senior Chinese official mentioned during the Beijing meeting that China has the potential to play a central role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. China can also be involved in the process of developing a new international mechanism to advance the peace process, which will be more inclusive and effective than the current Quartet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has chosen to invite to Beijing delegations that mostly included Israeli and Palestinian civil society activists, thus conveying the importance it attaches to informal activities to promote peace. Indeed, in their speeches, the Chinese officials emphasized how much hope they derive from the positive spirit of the discussions at the meeting, the agreements reached during it, and the fact that many citizens and organizations on both sides are committed to the two-state solution and to achieving it through peaceful means. As demonstrated in Beijing, the contribution of civil society to the peace process is not limited to grassroots dialogue and activism. Civil society can also have policy impact, by making genuine contributions to international diplomatic processes and by assisting politicians from both sides in reaching agreements and understandings. Although China’s added value is not in expertise regarding civil society, it can still provide significant infrastructural-economic support to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations, thereby increasing their visibility and impact, and assisting them to fulfill their potential. The meeting in Beijing did not lead to a breakthrough towards peace, nor was it its goal. It laid the foundation for greater Chinese involvement in the advancement of peace, highlighting China’s unique advantages and capabilities.

The meeting also showed Israelis and Palestinians that despite the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and increased tensions on the ground, they can still reach understandings and draw a common path forward. Promoting peace requires diverse and effective international involvement, but first and foremost, it requires local political will for peace. Achieving this requires further work, with and without China’s involvement.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. He participated in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium, held in Beijing on 21-22 December 2017. A shorter version of this article was published by Globes on 31 January 2018.

הפוסט Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The examination was limited in scope and covered only a specific aspect relating to Israel’s global standing. However, it provides a comparative overview of Israel’s current standing in the UN. The findings are not sufficient to draw conclusions about all the votes in all UN institutions or about Israel’s ability to influence votes in other international forums (such as other UN bodies, the EU, the World Trade Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or FIFA). They also do not reflect Israel’s influence on other political and procedural processes that take place behind the scenes and not through voting (such as influencing the wording of draft resolutions and postponing the raising of a particular topic for discussion or voting). Furthermore, the research is not an index to assess Israel’s efforts to strengthen bilateral relations. Rather, it says that if indeed a certain relationship is strengthened, it has yet to yield results in respect of important resolutions voted in UN institutions.

The findings showed that in important UN voting on the Palestinian issue, Israel continues to be isolated, where out of 193 UN member states, it usually enjoys the support of only the US, Canada and a number of small island states. This has been the case for the past eight years. It is evident from the examination that in votes that do not relate to the Palestinian issue, there is a greater number of abstaining countries. This has been manifested throughout the years in the vote on the “Syrian Golan” proposal, which calls for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, with almost 60 abstentions in 2016 and in 2017 (a similar trend was observed in previous years, although in 2015 only eight countries abstained). Another example is the Security Council vote on Resolution 1701 (August 2006), which dealt with the conditions for ending the Second Lebanon War and was unanimously adopted, in accordance with the position advanced by Israel.

A certain change in favor of Israel can be discerned in the series of votes held by the UNESCO Executive Board in April and October 2016 and in May 2017 that condemned Israel over the Jerusalem issue and objected its municipal policy in that regard. The proposal was tabled for voting several times, with minor changes each time, and there was a diminishing trend in the number of countries supporting the proposal (from 33 countries in April 2016 to 22 in May 2017). A number of countries (including France and India) moved from support to abstention, and in May 2017 there was a slight increase in the number of opposing countries, from six countries in October 2016 to ten. The US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Lithuania opposed in all the votes. Estonia opposed both votes in 2016 and abstained in 2017. In May 2017, Greece, Italy, Paraguay, Togo (the only one in Africa that did so) and Ukraine moved from abstention to objection. The voting results are influenced by Israel’s diplomatic moves combined with the Trump government’s efforts (led by US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley) to change UN voting patterns against Israel, and internal election processes that took place within UNESCO for key positions, including that of the Secretary General.

On the other hand, Russia, India, China, African countries, and South and Central American states, consistently vote in the UN assembly in support of the Palestinian position and against Israel (apart from Paraguay, which in recent years has chosen to abstain and Mexico that abstained in a recent vote). This is also the case regarding Israel’s allies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Cyprus (which in fact express greater support for Israel in other forums, including in the EU). The Vishgrad countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – are traditionally closer to the Israeli position. This can be seen, for example, in the way these countries voted in 2009, when they opposed the Goldstone Report, in support of Israel’s position. However, this is not their usual voting pattern, and in many of the votes that have been examined since then, these countries also supported Palestinian positions against Israel.

Voting patterns in the UN are not only a reflection of the bilateral relations between Israel and the other states. They are influenced by many different considerations, including political and economic interests, perceptions of justice and identity, tradition and regional decisions. According to former ambassador, Eviatar Manor, who served until August 2016 as Israel’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva, the decision of a country to vote one way or the other, is also based on regional voting. The EU, for example, sometimes decides to vote as a collective, and member states are expected to vote accordingly. The African continent has a similar mechanism for coordinating regional voting, but it is less binding than the European one, and countries can be persuaded to deviate from such a decision. Therefore, he says, Israel should attempt to influence the voting decision by regional multi-national bodies before it is formed, since after a decision has been made it is difficult to influence the voting in the UN institutions of the member states.

According to Manor, Israel should determine how it relates to UN resolutions based on their practical implications. In cases where a specific resolution contains operative clauses (such as imposing sanctions, setting up investigation commissions and referral to the International Court of Justice), it is important to make political efforts in order to transform the resolution into a declarative one. In general, Manor argues that Israel must also conduct political efforts aimed at reducing the number of anti-Israel resolutions in the UN institutions and increasing the number of countries that oppose or abstain in voting on such decisions. The smaller the majority that resolutions against Israel receive, the more firmly can Israel argue that such resolutions are illegitimate. And if more liberal democratic countries vote with Israel, Israel’s moral argument will be stronger when facing anti-Israeli resolutions.

In conclusion, the voting patterns in the UN institutions vis-à-vis Israel do not represent the complex reality in the global political arena and the complexity of Israel’s foreign relations. Rather, they underscore the challenging relations that Israel has with the international community. Israel’s Prime Minister recently asserted that the change in the attitude towards Israel in international forums may take several more years, but our understanding is that without progress with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process the chances for a real breakthrough in this regard are slim.

Israel’s policy on the Palestinian issue is central to Israel’s foreign relations and has a negative impact on Israel’s standing in the world. Past experience shows that a “diplomatic renaissance” – like the one that Netanyahu recently claimed that Israel is currently enjoying – occurs only when Israel shows a genuine commitment to advancing peace and takes steps in this direction. We experienced this in the 1990s, when the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords led to much more significant achievements than the decision of countries to abstain in a vote on a resolution against Israel at the UN. Progress in the peace process opened many doors for Israel in the region and in the world. Israel’s bilateral relations greatly improved, and the attitude towards Israel in multi-national forums had undergone a real shift. These are the real achievements that Israeli foreign policy should aspire to.

¹ Not all countries included in the research are members of all the international forums whose votes were included in the survey. The full information appears in the [Hebrew] data file accompanying this report. The research was featured in Itamar Eichner, “Despite PM”s foreign trips, Israel remains nearly isolated in UN,” Ynetnews, 27 December 2017.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is Director of Research at the Mitvim Institute; Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute

הפוסט Voting Patterns in UN Institutions Regarding Israel, 2009-2017 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The multiple reports published by the media in the aftermath of Trump’s declaration focused on two things: first, Trump’s desire to appease the Evangelists and/or Jews in the US; and second, his desire to honor his election campaign promise to declare Jerusalem Israel’s capital. He rationalized the decision by claiming that a new approach was required since all the other avenues were exhausted.

Trump’s decision harms US interests in several ways. One, in contrast to his desire to portray America as an honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump identified himself completely with one side – Israel. Although he qualified his statement by saying that this decision does not define the boundaries of Jerusalem, the content and tone of his speech was clearly one-sided. An even-handed mediator should have presented a corresponding or equivalent concession to the other party. As a result, the Palestinians will be highly suspicious of any new peace plan that the US attempts to present.

Two, the decision will unite Arabs and Muslims against the US. Trump worked very hard to reconcile with the Saudis following president Barack Obama’s foreign policy debacle, and he probably coordinated the declaration with moderate Arab leaders, but popular opposition across the Arab and Islamic worlds could influence the position of friendly Arab regimes. Jerusalem and the Palestinian issue are the lowest common denominators in the Arab world, and are still able to trigger charged public reactions. Although these may subside after a while, the ominous implications of Trump’s decision will last, at least as long as he remains in power.

Three, the decision opened two unnecessary fronts for the US – one in the UN, and the other with the EU, where most countries oppose Israel’s occupation and control of east Jerusalem.

Four, the consequent tension between the US and the moderate Arab countries, on the one hand, and between the US and Europe, on the other, serves the interests of Iran and its Middle East proxies, which can be counted on to exploit the opportunity to inflame their public opinion against the US and Israel. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin will no doubt attempt to use the opportunity to improve their own positions and influence.

Five, the decision will exacerbate the divisions between the various American agencies (particularly between the White House and State Department) and between them and the public, who oppose the move.

And, finally, the possibility of a violent confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere as a result of the decision should not be underestimated.

If Trump’s announcement turns out to be part of a grand plan he is cooking up behind the scenes, Israel will be forced to reciprocate and make a corresponding concession to the Palestinians. So far, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not expressed any intention of moving forward in the peace process. Even if he had, the composition of his government would not allow any significant move.

This is unfortunate, because the post-Arab Spring situation in the Middle East offers an opportunity to strike a deal with the Palestinians, with the support of several moderate Arab countries, based on a modified version of the Arab Peace Initiative. It is still not clear whether the Palestinians are ready, but a generous Israeli offer, backed the US and those Arab countries, might draw them to the negotiating table. At present, after Trump’s declaration the likelihood of a breakthrough in the conflict looks even more remote than ever. The inevitable conclusion is that Trump’s decision recalls both Eban’s euphemism and Barbara Tuchman’s march of folly theory – that governments pursue policies contrary to their own interests.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump’s Jerusalem Statement is his March of Folly הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט What do the German Election Results Mean for Israel, Europe, and the Peace Process? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Many states which see themselves as true friends of Israel, find themselves criticizing Israeli policies, especially regarding the continued occupation. Germany criticizes Israel’s treatment of peace organizations; consecutive American administrations, as well as growing circles among American Jewry, criticize Israel’s continued building in the settlements; the EU criticizes Israel’s policy in the occupied territories; as does the UN and many other states. And isn’t that what is expected from friends? To genuinely reflect on how we look and how we behave? After all, true friends are supposed to alert us when we behave in a way which they see as harmful to us.

In reaction to the criticism it faces, Israel chooses to attack the critic, delegitimize it and/or downgrade ties. When Senegal and New Zealand submitted resolution 2334 to the UN Security Council, Israel recalled its ambassadors from those states. Ambassadors of the countries which supported the resolution were called in to be reprimanded. When Germany expressed support of civil society organizations, Netanyahu chose to cancel his planned meeting with the German foreign minister. When Jews in the US criticized Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, elements in Israel acted to stain their right to do so. When the UN passed resolutions which criticized Israel, the Israeli response is often aggressive and includes decisions to cut the budget it is obligated to transfer to the UN. And when individuals who call for a boycott of Israel or the settlements, because of Israel’s actions beyond the Green Line, want to enter the country, their entrance may be barred in advance and then backed by legislation. Anything, just to avoid the need to face and deal with the critic itself.

Such actions do not serve Israel’s interests, and are not the way Israel’s diplomacy should be carried out. True, the role of Israeli diplomats is made harder due to Israel’s policy in the Palestinian territories, which is not accepted in the international community. It is hard for Israel to upgrade its relations with Arab states, while continuing its current treatment of the Palestinians. It is also hard to convince democratic countries that Israel is, after all, a liberal democracy, despite that fact that it is ruling over a population with infringed rights. It does not sit right. Even so, it would be good if Israel chose to continue to strengthen relations with its critics and face the criticism through dialogue and policy reassessment. Instead of slamming the door shut and close off, Israel must put its best face on and turn it to the world.

הפוסט Israel Should Deal with Criticism Better הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although the Arab world rejected this term as an Israeli attempt to achieve dominance in the region through non-military means, Israeli diplomacy made progress toward this end by scoring substantial achievements in the region.

Today, however, it is not Israel’s contribution that has prompted the formation of the current New Middle East. It is a product of a number of developments, including the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the rise of Iran as a regional power seeking hegemony and nuclear power, and the wave of the Arab Spring revolutions that triggered chaos in several major (Egypt, Syria) and minor (Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Bahrain) countries.

The shattering of the Arab world has forced some of its elements to seek external allies to battle threats from within and without. Together, these developments forged a new architecture of alliances and coalitions based on shared interests.

One of the typical features of the New Middle East is that alliances are not based solely along religious or ethnic lines. For example, several Sunni states, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are concerned by the expansion of Iran and Shi’ite Islam, and its allies, while the Sunni states of Qatar and Turkey maintain good relations with Iran. Furthermore, the Sunni Arab World is not only joining forces against Qatar, because of the latter’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and its pro-Iranian policy, but also against a range of different Sunni organizations that are considered terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, Islamic State, the Muslim Brotherhood, and more.

Another indication of the divisions among Sunnis is the split among the Palestinians, who are divided not only geographically but also ideologically and politically between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. If this were not enough, the Iraqi Kurds (who are Sunni Muslims but not Arabs) announced a referendum on their independence, exerting pressure on the federal government in Baghdad and on neighboring Turkey, which has a large Kurdish minority.

The conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite Islam and the conflicts among the Sunnis themselves are one of the reasons that major players in the Arab world are reaching out to countries outside the Arab system. Since the pragmatic Sunni Arab countries adopt a Western-oriented policy and their armies rely on Western technology, approaching Russia is not considered a real option.

However, the West in general – the US and Europe – and limit its role. Furthermore, external allies are needed to replace Iran and Turkey, which served as local allies on the margins on the Arab system and today have either become an enemy (in the case of Iran) or hesitate to cooperate (Turkey).

Thus, Israel has suddenly found itself by default courted by major countries in the Sunni Arab world. This development offers Israel several achievements: first, recognition as an important player in the Middle Eastern arena. Second, if cooperation in the past focused on the minorities (such as Druse, Kurds, Maronites, etc.) and periphery (Turkey, Iran), now Israel has penetrated the core Sunni Arab world. Third, while Israeli-Arab cooperation occurs mainly behind the scenes, some elements are currently rising to the surface. The new public visibility of cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is intentionally designed to intimidate their common enemy, Iran.

If cooperation with Israel remained secret, Israel would not be able to be used as a deterrent card. For the PA or rather for PA President Mahmoud Abbas, public cooperation with Israel against Hamas is dangerous, although the new political configuration that firmly places Hamas alongside Qatar and Iran on the side of the “bad guys” seems to have mitigated Abbas’ concerns of public indications of collaboration with Israel.

Although today’s New Middle East poses greater security threats than the former New Middle East, it is more amenable for Israel, because the Arab countries do not feel that they are being coerced into cooperation with Israel. Rather, this new constellation represents a conscious decision based on a realistic analysis of interests, and the longstanding logic “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” – a motto that has served Israel well over the years.

Israeli decision-makers identified the emergence of this unique regional opportunity relatively late, although having discovered it, they pounced upon it like a treasure chest. It is, however, too early to celebrate: cooperation between Israel and the Arab states remained limited by an undeniable “glass ceiling” whose height and thickness may be difficult to determine but its central component is clearly the Palestinian issue.

In the 1990s, Israel was permitted to penetrate the Arab world and establish diplomatic and economic ties with countries in the Middle East and North Africa in line with progress on the Palestinian issue, but these ties dissipated with the collapse of the Oslo process and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. The lesson of this period is that a significant breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinian can remove barriers and dramatically increase Israel’s regional integration.

Most Sunni Arab states have abandoned ideology in favor of political realism. It is time for the Israeli government to do so too, and make progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These dramatic developments significantly accelerate a series of processes, which have already been underway in Europe for the last few years, and which cast a cloud over the future of the European project. The upcoming elections in the two most important countries in the EU – France and Germany – intensify these tensions.

In this context, European pressure on Israel to promote the peace process with the Palestinians – if such was ever actually really applied – is decreasing. Europe is now looking inward and is dealing with other conflicts and domestic challenges. It is not seeking to expand its role in the Middle East peace process.

According to a senior European diplomat serving in Washington, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a low-intensity conflict, especially when compared to other conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, the region has more acute fault-lines, including the Sunni-Shi’a and the Arab-Iranian ones.

“Given the internal problems of the EU and the changing international environment due to Trump and Putin, we currently do not have much interest in the Israeli issue”.

“It is currently only number 10 on our priority list,” said a diplomat from a major European country, who is based in Tel Aviv.

Europe does not expect the Netanyahu government to move forward on the peace process, and assumes that Netanyahu seeks to maintain the status quo and continue managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Based on these assumptions, the EU is unlikely to take new initiatives and steps regarding the peace process over the coming period. The Israeli government is happy about this, and views EU disengagement from the peace process as a success of Israel’s policy. This is a narrow and distorted view.

Such a European policy is actually a major setback for Israeli interests:

1. Israel is missing an opportunity to significantly upgrade its ties with Europe, which is still a close ally and Israel’s largest trade partner. Israel should aspire to deepen ties with Europe, as offered by the EU in return for Israeli-Palestinian peace;
2. Without significant European involvement, it will be much more difficult to promote and operationalise the Arab Peace Initiative, which holds much potential for Israel’s future;
3. A possible EU decision to cut aid to the Palestinians, due to disengagement from the conflict, might worsen the situation on the ground and will increase the burden on Israel;
4. A European disengagement, coupled with American isolationism, will enable aggressive and less democratic actors (like Russia) to play a much larger regional role. Israel’s interests are not a priority for such actors.

In Israel, Europe is often portrayed – in the media and by politicians from the right – as hostile to Israel. This is not true.

Israel’s relations with European countries and with EU institutions are deep and multi-layered. They serve the needs of all sides involved.

The Israeli-European alliance is not merely an interest-based economic one. It is a deep strategic alliance, based on shared values and on a long and troubled history. Europe has always been an exceptional asset for Israel’s development and security.

Israel has a genuine interest in a strong EU. Instability in Europe, the weakening of EU institutions, and the rise of anti-democratic forces in Europe, all have negative consequences for Israel.

The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that in light of the challenges faced by Europe, a plurality of Israelis thinks that Israel will benefit more from a stronger Europe than from a weaker one.

Israel’s increased ties with Russia, China and other non-democratic countries cannot and should not be a substitute for relations with Europe. Israel’s belonging to the democratic camp, with Europe at its centre, promoted Israel’s international standing along the years and directly contributed to Israel’s prosperity.

In order to maintain the Zionist vision of a Jewish and democratic state, Israel needs to maintain good ties with democratic Europe. It should also work to promote the two state solution, in order to prevent a change in Israel’s national character will change, mounting tensions with Europe, and an intensified pivot towards non-democratic international actors.

Israel is a regional superpower. As such, it can play a leading role, alongside Europe, in promoting regional stability and prosperity. Israel’s existential need is to dismantle regional threats and to establish good relations with its neighbouring countries and peoples.

These goals are also shared by Europe, and Israel has no better partner than Europe to promote them with. The path towards peace and development in the Middle East is long and requires much commitment.

Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is an essential step in that direction. There is no way to bypass this path – which Israel currently chooses to avoid, and on which Europe is dragging its feet.

(originally published in EurActiv)

הפוסט Israel needs good relations with Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In 1999, NATO led the largest international military intervention in Europe since World War II, to stop Serbia’s actions in Kosovo, then a province of Serbia. The war ended with a long and tense political standoff. After negotiations in the mid-2000s failed, Kosovo declared independence in 2008, in a move vehemently opposed by Serbia.

Then in 2013, the two sides took a major step forward, signing a set of principles intended to advance future normalization of relations. It was not a full-fledged peace agreement but contained two major aspects: neither side would block the access of the other to eventual EU accession, and the small Serb minority living in Kosovo would create a municipal association, while being more integrated into Kosovo’s governing structures. Many thought Serbia was coming to accept the increasing fact of Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo implicitly acknowledged the right of the Serb minority to a measure of autonomy and special protection.

The agreement was viewed as a historic step. The international community was thrilled – cautious but unmistakably optimistic.

Thus the first inquiry of this paper is what can be learned from this relatively recent leap towards conflict resolution that may be relevant for Israelis and Palestinians? What factors – incentives, pressure, international or domestic dynamics – contributed to Belgrade and Pristina’s progress, that Israelis and Palestinians can learn from?

The second inquiry regards the agreement itself. What are the core ideas for a workable arrangement between the two entities struggling between forced marriage and contested separation? How were Kosovo’s claims to total sovereignty reconciled with Serbia’s equally unwavering demand that Kosovo remain Serbian sovereign territory, with only circumscribed autonomy? Here the political and constitutional arrangements will be reviewed to consider applicable ideas or lessons for eventual Israeli-Palestinian final-status arrangements.

The paper will then address a third and perhaps thorniest question: the current status of negotiations. Nearly four years after the flurry of optimism, in 2017, the dialogues have been beset by major problems of both interpretation and implementation. Relations between the two regions have stagnated at best, or soured. This mixed and worrying outcome will be compared to experiences in the past and present of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to consider ways to improve such a process in the future.

The analysis reaches several key insights. One is that intensive detail for implementation of an agreement may not substitute for clarity of the core principles for resolving the conflict, and commitment to those political goals by both parties. The lack of agreement on the final status vision, sensitive as this may be, hampers negotiation and erodes chances for eventual resolution. Other insights touch on the need to include parties directly affected by the conflict in the resolution process, or boost their role in negotiations; the possibility that under certain circumstances, hawkish leaders may be the more likely figures to advance peace; as well as the need for protection of minorities while preserving sovereignty – while minimizing ambiguity of sovereignty over any given area.

The paper first outlines the background of the Serbia-Kosovo conflict, then highlights main areas of comparison to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – beginning with general core issues in common, and moving to a more detailed analysis of the trajectory of negotiations.

הפוסט Lessons from Serbia and Kosovo for Israel and Palestine: All Process, No Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The global rise of the right-wing poses a grave threat to liberal values, and in some cases, could even lead to the collapse of democratic regimes. The process can be traced to the early 2000s, when, according to political scientist Larry Diamond, 27 democratic governments collapsed. Freedom House shows that in 2000, 63 percent of the world’s population lived under democratic regimes, but by 2013, this percentage dropped to 40 percent. Scholars and journalists quickly labeled this “the end of liberalism” or “the collapse of the global liberal order.”

The reasons for this phenomenon are diverse: globalization, which made it possible for corporations to accumulate tremendous wealth at the expense of ordinary citizens, and led to loss of jobs due to factory relocations of cheap labor countries; the influx of millions of refugees into first-world countries, as a result of civil wars, unemployment, and famine, has threatened traditional demographic divisions; and widespread violent and brutal terror has re-awakened deep-rooted fears and prompted isolationism.

These changes have had two main outcomes: First, hopes for “strong” regimes and charismatic leaders who can bring order and counter such threats. Second, a strengthening of local identities, whether through narrow-minded intolerant nationalism bordering on fascism in countries that enjoy territorial legitimacy (in the West), or through religious fundamentalism in others (in parts of Africa and the Middle East).

In retrospect, the outcome is not entirely unexpected. Samuel Huntington, who analyzed the third wave of democracy in global history — which began in the mid-1970s in Portugal and peaked with the collapse of the Soviet Union — argued that each of the two previous waves of democratization was followed by a counter-wave: Between 1820 and 1922, 29 democracies were established. The counter wave was initiated in 1922 with the rise to power of Benito Mussolini in Italy, and continued in 1933 with the Nazi regime in Germany.

Democracy’s second wave began after World War II, and reached its peak in 1962. During that period, the number of democracies increased to 36. This, too, was followed by a counter-wave, between 1962 and 1975, reducing the number of democracies to 30 (while not a significant decline in absolute terms, this still was a 20 percent decline in the number of democracies at the time).

In democracy’s third wave, which began in Portugal in 1974 and ended in 1990, 30 more countries became democracies. According to Huntington’s analysis, the counter-wave to each wave of democracy was the result of anti-liberal and anti-democratic political, cultural, and societal forces.

On the one hand, this approach offers some optimism, as the waves are related and a positive wave is expected to follow every negative wave. This approach is, however, beleaguered by two problems: First, based on the past, the transition from one wave to another occurs only after a devastating war (World War II) or revolution (the collapse of the Soviet Union). Should democracy’s fourth wave actually take place, it may likely begin only after a major catastrophe of as yet unforeseeable proportions. Second, there is no way to predict the duration of the current wave. In the past, counter-waves never lasted longer than two decades, but we are not even sure if the current anti-democratic wave, if it indeed commenced in the early 2000s, has even reached its peak. In any case, this counter-wave seems to be here to stay for the coming years.

These developments should rally all liberal forces from all parts of the political spectrum into action. It would first be wise to recognize the enormity of the threat to liberal values, which until recently were considered universal values. Actions to confront these threats should be taken at the national level, but transnational coalitions are also necessary to defend a joint liberal, democratic vision. Liberal and democratic voices are everywhere, including Israel, and its high time that they start acting in concert. After all, even in the United States, more than half of the votes in the recent election were cast for a candidate who represented an alternative worldview and not the worldview that won the elections. This, if you will, is an alternative fact, although in this case it is true. Being aware of these global trends is the first step toward mobilizing all the liberal forces in Israel, and the world at large, in order to ensure that the third counter-wave will become a transitional phenomenon.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Third Counter-Wave to Democracy and Liberalism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After agreement on the deal was reached, domestic audiences in both Turkey and Israel began focusing almost exclusively on the relative gains and losses. There are, however, more crucial topics requiring further attention such as the underlying reasons for the ruptures during the negotiation process, suggestions that the lingering political deadlock was deliberately cultivated by the leaders and questions as to whether the promises of the deal will succeed in compensating for the political and social damage caused by years of resentment.

Analyzing the causes that precipitated the downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is necessary to provide a beer understanding of the point reached by the pares with the signing of the deal, and helps us create a sound basis upon which to reconstruct bilateral es. In a similar vein, evaluating the domestic and foreign factors that led to the rapprochement will shed light upon the countries’ mutual expectations from the deal and, therefore, shape the future of the partnership.

This paper is part of the Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue Publication Series of Mitvim and GPoT Center, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

הפוסט Turkey-Israel deal: A key to long-term reconciliation? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Kerry speech introduced parameters for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They did not differ much from the Clinton Parameters, and were more ambiguous and concise. Still, it was a much-needed move in light of the regional changes that took place since 2000, and of issues which gained traction since (such as Israel’s request that Palestinians recognize it as a ‘Jewish state’). The updated parameters provide Israelis – public and politicians alike – more clarity regarding the two-state solution and the steps needed in order to get there. They also generate new momentum by enabling the discussion on an end-game agreement to be based on a recent document, which is part of a set of international moves to advance conflict resolution, and not on a plan devised sixteen years ago.

The Trump effect

A key difference between the Kerry parameters and those of Clinton is the reference made by Kerry to the Arab Peace Initiative (which was not yet published in 2000) and to regional ramifications of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Kerry highlighted the unique opportunity that Israel is currently facing – an opportunity to establish normal ties with Arab countries, and to even launch a joint security framework. Kerry stressed that the fulfillment of this opportunity is clearly linked to progress towards Israeli-Palestinian peace, contrasting recent claims by Netanyahu that normalization between Israel and Arab countries can precede Israeli-Palestinian peace. In his speech, Kerry tried to convince Israelis that peace will bring them concrete regional benefits. He focused on relations with the Arab world and on chances for enhanced security, but he could also have mentioned the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state, as another incentive for peace.

Kerry refrained from addressing a major change that took place since the Clinton parameters were issued – the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the Hamas takeover of Gaza. The Palestinian divide is a major obstacle on the road for a two-state solution, and is one that the international community tends to avoid due to the sensitivity of dealing with Hamas. It is worth remembering that because of this obstacle, the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in 2007-8 were aimed to reach a “shelf-agreement” only; one that will be implementable only after the restoration of Palestinian unity. While the Quartet report of July 2016 focused on this thorny issue, Kerry decided to skip it altogether.

Paradoxically, it was Trump’s victory and his positions on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that may have increased Obama’s motivation to make a final move. The UN Security Council resolution and the Kerry speech leave a legacy for Trump to deal with, but they also provide clear guidelines for future American administrations and for other countries that want to contribute to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. These steps demonstrated the continuity in American policy since 1967 regarding the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Despite efforts along the years to mask and downplay differences between Israel and the U.S. on these issues, the American position – of Republican and Democratic administrations alike – has remained remarkably the same. A different policy by the Trump administration, if such will actually be taken, will be the exception. One can only wonder why hasn’t the Obama administration introduced its clear-cut positions earlier, during a time that still allowed the international community to act on them.

Looking in the mirror

The Kerry speech put a mirror in front of the Israeli government and society. Kerry clearly and rationally explained why the continuation of the status quo will not enable Israel to maintain its Jewish and democratic character in the long run. The ongoing occupation and the expansion of settlements makes the two-state solution gradually less feasible, and may lead to an irreversible situation. Those in the Israeli Right, who are ideologically committed to the settlements, do not have a reasonable answer to this dilemma, except for their wishful thinking that the Palestinians will somehow disappear or move to Jordan. The renowned Palestinian scholar Edward Said defined the role of intellectuals as “speaking truth to power.” In our case, it was the opposite. The power Kerry spoke explained the unsolvable contradiction between the occupation and Israel’s Jewish and democratic nature.

Netanyahu and his government responded to the American move with unprecedented bashing of an acting American administration. Netanyahu is looking forward to Trump’s inauguration, expecting a much more sympathetic approach by the next president. However, while American positions may change, the international consensus regarding the Palestinian issue is not likely to erode. This was demonstrated at the UN Security Council, and will be demonstrated again at the upcoming international conference in Paris. The Israeli government’s enthusiasm of Trump’s victory, should be replaced with genuine concern for Israel’s global standing, and for a change of policy that will help Israel regain the international legitimacy it is currently losing.

While American and international actions are important, they alone will not change facts on the ground and resolve the conflict. Eventually, Israelis and Palestinians themselves will have to take the lead. For this to happen, a courageous and pro-peace leadership is needed, as well as a strong civil society that challenges policies that jeopardize the two-state solution and lead Israel to increased isolation.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Kerry’s parameters force Israel to take a hard look in the mirror הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since the API was first presented at the Arab League summit in March 2002, Israel has never officially responded to the Initiative; moreover, for a long period of time, Israel chose to ignore the Initiative, or simply oppose it. Lieberman went even further in 2009, when he called the API nothing less than a “recipe for Israel’s destruction.” Olmert was the only one to try and promote the Initiative at the end of his term, but it was too little and too late. Occasionally, various politicians expressed positive statements regarding the Initiative, yet the great majority focused on the API’s alleged drawbacks. In any case, no critical mass of supporters has ever been able to bring a change in the Israeli approach towards the Initiative.

Israeli public opinion has also remained in the dark about the Initiative. Opinion polls have shown that the majority of the public is not aware of the API nor its content. Attempts of various civil society organizations to raise public awareness have failed so far to make a genuine change. This is despite the increasing recognition of the advantages of involving the Arab countries in the peace process, and of the benefits that would ensue from improved relations with these countries, in parallel to progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As disturbing as the Israeli government’s response to the API is, it is not as disturbing as the typical “Pavlovian” Israeli reaction to any external efforts to advance the peace process. The word “no” has become the hallmark of Israel’s foreign policy regarding the conflict. Here are some typical examples.

First, over the past two years, Israel has opposed four French initiatives: the idea of adopting a Security Council resolution promoting the recognition of Palestinian statehood; an initiative for an international observer presence on the Temple Mount; the establishment of an International Support Group for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; and lastly, an international peace summit, the first stage of which took place in Paris in early June 2016.

Second, the Prime Minister refused to cooperate with the Quartet in the preparation of the report on the stagnation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, as the Israeli government came to realize that the report was critical of Israel, they tried to work through the United States (US) to soften the tone of the report. The Netanyahu government acted similarly in 2012 with the Palestinian United Nations bid for statehood. The government initially refused to take part in any negotiations regarding the text of the resolution, and only when the text was finalized did the government try to work with the US to change the text.

Third, Israel ignored, and even ridiculed, the European Union’s (EU) December 2013 initiative to upgrade Israeli and Palestinian relations with the EU to the status of a “special privileged partnership” upon the signing a peace agreement. European criticism of Israeli policy has usually met an aggressive Israeli response, yet when Europe tries to provide positive incentives to solving the conflict, they encounter silence and rejection. This reaction is particularly surprising in light of the fact that the EU is one of Israel’s major trading partners.

Fourth, Israel expressed its opposition to the American security plan, formulated by General John Allen during the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. Moreover, in January 2014, Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s former Minister of Defense, said that the plan was not even worth the paper that it was written upon.

Fifth, in February 2016, Netanyahu expressed his concern about the possibility that prior to leaving office, Barack Obama may release his own “parameters” for peace, thus updating the framework presented by Bill Clinton at the end of his term in December 2000. It is important to note that Ehud Barak’s government at the time responded with a “reserved yes” to the Clinton parameters.

Israel’s “no” policy does not only apply to initiatives for the resolution of the conflict. It is also reflected in other areas, such as the government’s steadfast and forthright opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, and even to Germany’s proposal that Israel be indirectly involved in the nuclear talks. Additionally, Israel often chooses to boycott commissions of inquiry or international forums that it believes are too critical of the country.

The Israeli government’s adverse reactions to international initiatives are not only disturbing in content, but also the manner in which the reactions are conveyed. In general, they are harsh and often insulting and condescending. This is in despite of the fact that the majority of the initiatives originate from countries that are friendly to Israel, and whom are genuinely interested in dialogue regarding their content.

If “no” becomes a regular pattern in Israeli foreign policy, then it ceases to be an expression of rational thought, rather an expression of emotional and/or ideological behavior. Israel’s pattern of negative reactions is a manifestation of its current leaders’ fear and anxiety regarding any change in the status quo. The outside world – whether it is ISIS or the EU, and to some extent even the US – is perceived as a threat, and any concession is viewed as an existential threat.

“No” is not a policy prescription that will lead to a better future. This behavior moves us further away from peace, harms relations with friendly countries, and damages our interests. Israel needs to change direction. The next time Israel is presented with an international initiative, Jerusalem should respond with a “yes”, qualified as it may be, rather than a flat “no”.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט “No” as a Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Assessing the Quartet Recommendation to Increase Interaction and Cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The way the army legitimizes these moves is deeply rooted in the historical narrative of how the Turkish Republic was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and how the Turkish political culture has taken root over the years. Indeed, in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, the Turkish army succeeded – in different ways – to bring about regime change. However, in the last two decades, Turkey has developed significant immunity against recurrence, and the failed coup attempt of July 15 is an example of this.

The main change in the status of the army took place in the early years of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reign. One of Erdogan’s main objectives, after his party’s first victory in the 2002 elections, was to promote Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. One of the most prominent conditions the EU presented to the Turkish leadership was to strengthen democracy by making the military leadership accountable to the political one. This also served the goals of Erdogan, who feared that the military would attempt to end his rule, as happened in 1997 to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, who also came from the ranks of political Islam.

הפוסט Why the coup in Turkey wasn’t successful הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This European offer, which was reaffirmed by the EU in January 2016, has not yet succeeded in promoting the peace process. The Israeli government has avoided giving a positive response to the offer, and the vast majority of the Israeli public is not even aware of its existence. In addition, there is ambiguity and lack of clarity regarding the concrete content of the offer.

The Mitvim institute sees potential in regional peace incentives – such as the European offer and the Arab Peace Initiative – as a tool for promoting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and works to advance and improve the use of these incentives.

In this framework, the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung conducted in March 2016 a policy-planning workshop that examined the European offer and ways to transform it into a more efficacious peace incentive.

This workshop was part of a series workshops, each focusing on a different incentive. A previous workshop focused on the Arab Peace Initiative. The workshop was attended by Israeli experts on Israeli-European relations, Israeli foreign policy, and the peace process, as well as by Mr. Jan Freigang of the EU Delegation to Israel. This document summarizes the different points and recommendations that were raised during the workshop.

הפוסט A Special Privileged Partnership with the EU as an incentive for Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The curse of stagnation and the need for conflict comparison הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It has been 14 years since a coalition government ruled Turkey, and this is having visible effects. A political culture of compromise and flexibility has given way to an increasingly centralized regime, which is taking aggressive steps against political rivals and is working to silence critical voices in the media and civil society. Erdogan seeks full control over Turkey. He does not at the moment have the ability to change the governing system from parliamentary to presidential because of the absence of a parliamentary majority. But this is in fact already happening. The process led by Erdogan to replace Davutoglu is another step in a general change to the rules of the game that is Turkish politics.

No truly fundamental, ideological, or political disagreement erupted between Erdogan and Davutoglu and led to the prime minister’s stepping down months after leading his party to a clear election victory. Their disagreements, which began to sprout visibly over a year ago, centered on attempts – while very limited – by Davutoglu to give real meaning to his role as prime minister. One example was Davutoglu’s (failed) endeavor in 2015 to make Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, a member of parliament, against Erdogan’s wishes; another was Davutoglu’s recent, overly prominent role in the successful negotiations with the European Union on handling of the Syrian refugee crisis.

All this was not to President Erdogan’s liking, which was seen in the Justice and Development Party’s decision early this month to withdraw from the prime minister the authority to make appointments within the party. This was the signal that symbolized the beginning of the end for Davutoglu’s term. And yet, Davutoglu refrained in his emotional farewell speech from challenging Erdogan. He emphasized their years-long friendship and promised to serve the party as a member of parliament.

Even if he does so in the short term, it’s likely that the tensions between the two will overflow at some point. Davutoglu is not the first of Erdogan’s partners to find himself on the other side of the fence. Other former leaders in the Justice and Development Party, including some who helped found the party, have criticized Erdogan’s centralized behavior and his retreat from the path that characterized the party when it originated. Former president and foreign minister Abdullah Gül, former foreign minister Yaşar Yakış, and former deputy prime minister Bülent Arınç, have all come out at one point or another against moves championed by Erdogan. And yet, despite rumors in the past about the possibility of the creation of a new party out of those religious-conservative circles, not one of them has chosen so far to run against Erdogan in the political arena. It is possible that in the short term, Davutoglu’s resignation will further reinforce this group.

The Turkish plan: zero problems with neighbors

Davutoglu’s resignation also symbolized the end of an era in Turkey’s foreign policy. He joined politics after an academic career as a professor of political science, during which time he wrote extensively on his ideal Turkish foreign policy. His thick volume provided guiding principles and arrangement for Turkey’s desired conduct on the international stage. As foreign minister, Davutoglu worked to implement the paradigm he had developed. He steered Turkey’s foreign policy away from the conservative character that had characterized it for decades and towards a pro-active, ambitious approach.

Davutoglu worked to situate Turkey as a major country on the global stage, one implementing a multi-regional foreign policy. He worked to transform it into a leading actor in the Middle East, based on Ottoman heritage, and to create a reality in which Turkey has “zero problems with the neighbors”.

At the beginning of his term as foreign minister, Turkey indeed succeeded in attaining achievement on the regional and international stages. But later – particularly after the ebbing of power held by political Islam in the Middle East and the ouster of Mohamed Morsi from the Egyptian presidency – Turkey found itself more isolated and uninfluential.

What’s more, the aggressive policy towards Syria championed by Davutoglu, consisting of a commitment to topple Assad, did not yield positive results. Quite the opposite. Not only did Turkey fail to attain its stated goals in Syria, the ramifications of the Syrian war have exacted mounting security, economic, and social costs.

Just at the moment that Turkey’s foreign policy is seen as having failed, Davutoglu managed to supply his final diplomatic achievement, which may have helped hasten his downfall. Davutoglu, seen as of late as a likeable and respected dialogue partner (relative to Erdogan) by Western leaders – especially German Chancellor Angela Merkel – had a central role in arriving at the agreement with the European Union on Syrian refugees.

This agreement included a historic European commitment to Turkey to cancel the visa requirements for Turks traveling to EU nations. It was a commitment that Turkey did not receive even in the days of the great democratic reforms that Erdogan supported during the first half of the prior decade.

The irony is that Davutoglu, who as foreign minister was suspected by the West to be working to distance Turkey from its traditional pro-Western policy, is with his resignation receiving accolades from the West. And yet, the main concern in the West – and among many in Turkey – is not necessarily the change of prime minister. After all, Davutoglu is still seen as obedient to Erdogan, and so his replacement will be. The concern is over the additional erosion of Turkish democracy, which is guided by the nation’s president and is becoming more difficult to bring to a halt.

(originally published by i24)

הפוסט Erdogan keeps changing the rules of the Turkish political game הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט How to Make the Arab Peace Initiative a More Effective Incentive for Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discussions took place as part of the 2015 Annual Conference of the EuroMeSCo Network. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni was the keynote speaker of the conference, which was attended by four Israelis, alongside representatives from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and the Gaza Strip.

In recent years, discussions at such regional conferences focused on assessing the developments in Arab countries in light of the Arab Spring. However, this year the emphasis was on taking stock and critically examining the European policies toward the Mediterranean just weeks before the unveiling of the EU’s review of the European Neighborhood Policy, which pertains to the countries that border the Union.

The Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the internal conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, are impacting Europe and require a reevaluation of EU policy. As one of the speakers observed, today Europe is enveloped by crises but it has not taken a leading role in any of them. The result is a highly unstable Mediterranean and a European policy toward the region that is increasingly shaped by domestic concerns.

הפוסט Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and a possible International Support Group for the Middle East Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent months, representatives of the Quartet – from the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations – held a series of meetings across the Arab world. These occurred in Cairo (June), in Amman (July), and in Riyadh (September). The focus of these meetings was to identify and promote measures that will preserve the viability of a two-state solution, improve the situation on the ground, and will enable the restarting of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in the future. However, these meetings also had another purpose – to increase the involvement of Arab states and the Arab League in efforts to promote the peace process, while emphasizing the Arab Peace Initiative.

The meeting of the Quartet, which took place on September 30th in New York, was supposed to be the highpoint of these efforts and senior representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League were also invited to attend. And yet, the results of the meeting were far from a breakthrough. Issues raised included a need for the Quartet to consult on a regular basis with regional actors and to hear other voices in the international community; a call for both Israel and the Palestinians to implement previously signed agreements in a more complete manner, and to take concrete steps on the ground with the help of the Quartet. Moreover, it was decided that a diplomatic delegation of the Quartet is to be dispatched to both Jerusalem and Ramallah in mid-October in an attempt to create some sort of positive momentum.

The Quartet’s efforts do not occur in a vacuum. In the past year, the international community has devoted extensive energy to answering the question of what are the possible next steps it might take in order to promote a solution to the IsraelPalestinian conflict. While the United States is still in a phase of reassessing its policy, which it announced after the failure of the negotiations led by Secretary of State John Kerry, it has been mainly France that has tried to launch new initiatives. However, these efforts, chiefly among them an attempt to introduce a UN Security Council resolution outlining agreed-upon parameters for a two-state solution, were postponed again and again. This happened first because of the elections in Israel, later because of the negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran about the latter’s nuclear program, and finally because of a lack of American support.

In the absence of progress on the content of an agreement, the international community began in the summer of 2015 to contemplate the possibility of the creation of a new mechanism – an International Support Group for the IsraeliPalestinian Peace Process. At its core, this initiative is an attempt to add a number of European and Arab countries to the Quartet. The French led this effort, it was supported by the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, and the European Union Foreign Affairs Council authorized its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to lead consultations on the matter. The impetus for this initiative was influenced by the success of the model of negotiations conducted by the P5+1 with Iran, which proved to them that an international coalition has the capacity to reach diplomatic achievements.

Unfortunately, it seems as though the meeting of the Quartet that took place on the margins of the UN General Assembly actually impeded the effort. The current members of the informal organization seem to wish to preserve its current standing and composition. However, if the Quartet wishes to create new momentum on the Israeli-Palestinian channel it must show a willingness to renew and reinvigorate itself while accepting additional countries into its fold (and not merely consulting and taking advice from them). The creation of a new international mechanism to advance the prospects of a two-state solution will not likely bring peace, but it is possible that it would assist the international community in executing new coordinated initiatives whose implementation has failed time and time again over the past year.

הפוסט Revitalizing the Middle East Quartet? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Post-Referendum Greece: Between Challenges and Hope הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel has never been in a more opportune position to advance its aims in the region. In the recent election campaign, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expediently emphasized the threats looming from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State (IS), al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. A more realistic analysis would, however, reveal that Iran is a remote threat in any case; Hamas – squeezed between Israel and Egypt – is preoccupied with its own domestic problems in Gaza; Hezbollah is heavily committed to the Syrian front; and IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and other splinter groups do not consider Israel their immediate enemy. Moreover, Israel’s longstanding threat from what was once called the Arab Steadfastness and Rejection Front – the main Arab coalition rejecting peace with Israel – is no longer viable: Iraq, Syria and Libya are bogged down in civil strife and their very survival is in jeopardy; many of the PLO groups are no longer relevant (such as George Habbash’s PFLP and Ahmed Jibril’s PDFLP), and Fatah has largely transformed itself into the Palestinian Authority after the Oslo Accords. In short, Israel does not face an existential threat from any of its immediate or remote Arab neighbors.

It is time for Israel to seize the opportunities that have presented themselves in the post-Arab Spring period. Recognizing that an opportunity exists is, of course, not enough: the parties to the conflict must seize it by extending an attractive offer to the other side. The new Israeli government would be well advised to move forward in two possible directions: one, advance Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations for the establishment of a Palestinian state along 1967 borders, with mutually agreed territorial swaps; two, advancing multilateral Israeli-Arab negotiations, under the umbrella of the Arab Peace Initiative (API), with the same aim. Though the “Arab World” as we have known it no longer exists, the “dormant” and “dysfunctional” Arab League has, for example, recently sent forces to the Yemen civil war. Thus, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States – the so-called moderate Arab countries – not only share with Israel mutual interests, but can also play an active role, as evident in the Yemeni case, in resolving the Palestinian problem.

Unfortunately, Israel’s new government has no intention of seizing this opportunity. The main aim of Netanyahu and his previous and current right-wing coalitions has been to “perpetuate the status-quo,” which is a euphemism for consolidating Israel’s hold on Judea and Samaria – the occupied territories.

This goal is pursued despite realistic assessments that indicate that such a course of action will slowly but surely cause Israel’s political, economic and even cultural ostracization by the international community, becoming a pariah state. A third Palestinian intifada may currently seem an unlikely possibility, but it cannot be ruled out, in view of the despair and frustration emanating from “no hope on the horizon.”

It is possible that under US, EU and other international pressure, Netanyahu will re-confirm his support, or even commitment, to the two-state solution, as proclaimed in his 2009 Bar-Ilan speech. But declarations of this kind would be mere fig leafs for a policy that is effectively strengthening Israel’s control over the occupied territories. Such a declaration would be no different from the so-called peace plan that prime minister Yitzhak Shamir devised in 1989 in response to the first Palestinian intifada and the PLO’s recognition of UN Resolution 242 – a media public spin designed to placate the international community.

Future historians will surely lament the fact that the previous and current Netanyahu governments have completely ignored regional developments and the consequent opportunity to resolve the Palestinian issue, surely Israel’s thorniest foreign policy issue.

Israeli prime ministers have always bragged that they have “left no stone unturned” in their pursuit of peace. Regardless of the accuracy of these assessments, it does not seem likely that anyone is going to turn over the current stone in the near future.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An opportunity that would not be seized הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The essence of this “doctrine” is that a combination of engagement and satisfaction of core strategic needs could serve American interests far better than sanctions and isolation.

America, in Obama’s opinion, with its overwhelming power, should have the confidence to take some calculated risks to create important new opportunities.

He believes that the United States is sufficiently powerful to test new diplomatic propositions without putting itself at risk. Although Obama hopes to see a change in Iran’s position in the forthcoming years, leading it to discontinue or slow its nuclear journey, America will be in a position to use its deterrence capabilities and military force if no such change develops.

According to this argument, a superpower with a defense budget of $600 billion should be able to ward off any threat emanating from a nation with $30b budget.

Time will tell whether the Obama Doctrine with regard to Iran (and pariah states in general) was successful or merely wishful thinking, but no one can deny the logic of this reasoning, even if doubts regarding the sincerity of Iranian intentions persist. Interestingly, the logic underlying this doctrine appears to be even more relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian case.

A self-confident Israel, with a defense budget amounting to NIS 57b., is a superpower in comparison to the approximately $1b. budget of the Palestinian Authority (the figures for Hamas are more problematic although there is obviously a wide gap here as well). According to the Obama Doctrine, such a gap allows Israel to take risks and offer some substantial concessions with regard to the occupied territories. Israel’s consistent argument that it does not have the luxury to test this proposition is disingenuous because its military might could easily undo whatever has been conceded.

Moreover, an agreement with the Palestinians would be supported by security guarantees provided by the United States, the European Community and perhaps other parties in the region, which would help deter Israel’s potential enemies.

Unfortunately, the chances that the newly composed rightwing government will adopt this line of reasoning are slim at best. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political allies, there is no partner on the Palestinian side. While he may be correct with regard to Hamas, placing Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas firmly in the “no partner” square is a mistake. The problem, however, goes far beyond the policy of the current government, as most Israeli governments were reluctant to take initiative in the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel was even reluctant to formally endorse, or even positively respond, to the Arab Peace Initiative, which might have served as an umbrella for advancing an agreement with the Palestinians.

The conclusion must be, therefore, that the chances for an independent Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough initiated by Israel are close to zero. This leaves the Obama administration as the only viable player that can ignite the process by offering a blueprint for a solution.

If Obama applies his doctrine to the Israeli-Palestinian case, we can expect the Obama Doctrine to be followed by the Obama Peace Plan or the Obama Peace Parameters.

In contrast to Clinton, who offered his vision in his final days in office in December 2000, Obama has sufficient time in office to promote his plan if he acts now. While the chances of this eventuality seem remote in view of the failure of the Kerry mission in 2014, coupled by Obama’s reluctance to further antagonize the Israeli government following the controversy over the Iran deal, perhaps Obama might be ready to take the chance of offering his own vision for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

After all, the deal with Iran was similarly driven by the conviction that it was “the right thing to do.” Such a proposal would surely arouse heated political debate in Israel and may lead to internal changes.

But if the Israeli government involves itself in domestic American politics, there is no reason why the United States cannot do the same.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Applying the ‘Obama Doctrine’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite this support domestically, such a move would spell disaster for Israel on the world stage. Far more than upsetting the EU and the UN—a reality Israelis have long come to stomach—a rightist coalition left unchecked to pursue its objectives would almost inevitably undermine Israel’s already strained relationship with its key ally and financial backer, the United States.

For starters, Netanyahu will have a grueling time keeping his relations with U.S. President Obama afloat. Ties between the leaders have still not had time to mend since the fallout from Netanyahu’s Congressional speech, aggravated by years of discord and undermining. Moreover, if an Israeli report back in January is true, that Obama considered Netanyahu “toast,” one can only imagine how the administration will react if Netanyahu implements the extensive settlement expansion those on the hard right and in his own party have demanded.

With two years left to seal his legacy, Obama seemed positioned to get tough as reports previously indicated he is planning one last initiative to advance the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Now, before that process can even begin, Netanyahu is having to backpedal on his pre-election message that if he was reelected he would ensure that no Palestinian state will be created—a statement that likely helped him peel away precious mandates from the far-right Jewish Home party.

Although Obama may eventually need to take a more accommodative approach to Netanyahu to bring any progress toward resolving the conflict—or at least agreed-upon international parameters—comments from his administration in the post-election period so far indicate that he is committed to ramping up pressure. As some have noted, this pressure could come in the form of supporting a Palestinian state at the UN or simply refraining from shielding Israel from international pressure.

Then there are the Iranian nuclear talks. Having shown little if any remorse during the Congressional speech controversy, Netanyahu will doubtless continue to thwart a deal in any way he can. And yet, any more bold actions from him could again jeopardize the US government’s strong support for Israel at the UN, concerning intelligence sharing, and in other foreseeable ways short of withholding foreign aid.

Assuming a stable right-wing Israel government does not collapse within the next two years, Netanyahu will outlast Obama and find himself with a new American presidential counterpart. In either scenario of a Democrat or Republican taking office in 2016, Netanyahu would still find himself at odds with the White House.

If de facto Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton is any measuring stick, her comments during and after her service as Secretary of State reveal that Israel can expect more of the same regarding Obama’s views on Iran, as well as his and her husband Bill’s positions on both the conflict and on Netanyahu personally.

If a Republican is elected as president, history has shown the dynamic between the two nations’ leaders could be even more capricious. Even conservative hardliner George W. Bush—despite the nostalgia in Israel for his presidency—went so far as to counsel Netanyahu’s rival, Tzipi Livni, on how to beat the Likud in the 2009 general election, just as Hillary Clinton had soon afterward. Unconditional and hawkish Republican rhetoric domestically and in Congressional chambers apparently does not translate to the office of the Commander-in-Chief.

Beyond challenges from American presidents down the road, the policy direction that Netanyahu and a hard right-wing coalition would take will likely further erode the American domestic support base for the Israeli government in Congress and among the Jewish community that has long served as a critical component of Israel’s soft power.

The lack of Israeli diplomatic engagement with all sides of the pro-Israel spectrum—including the dovish lobby group, J Street—and staunch disagreements among the U.S. and Israeli governments will transform Israel even more into a divisive issue in the American political arena. Both problems could be significantly mitigated by earnest Israeli efforts to resolve the conflict, yet these would be out of the question for the coalition under discussion.

Netanyahu’s final decision on a coalition may still be weeks away, but if he makes that perilous of decisions to form an all-right-wing government, its probable course of action will risk leaving an indelible stain on ties with the American president, on the bipartisan domestic American support for Israel and on the US-Israel “special relationship” itself.

(originally published in The Hill)

הפוסט A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Syriza chose to form a coalition government with Panos Kammenos’ populist and farright (though often-referred to as centre-right) Independent Greeks (ANEL), that won 13 seats with 4.8% of the votes. Not only that, but Tsipras appointed Kammenos as the new Minister of Defense. Although leftist Nikos Kotzias, Syriza’s new Foreign Minister, is more cool-headed and pragmatist, if assertive, than Kammenos, the Ministry of Defense plays an important role in security issues and Kammenos might adopt a harder line that could challenge Greece’s overall foreign policy with particular respect to relations with Turkey and Israel. Overall, these developments may signal a new approach in Greek foreign policy on issues ranging from the EU, to Russia and the Eastern Mediterranean.

הפוסט Syriza’s Victory and Greek-Israeli Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Kosovo and its Relationship with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The workshop, facilitated by Ms. Mireille Surowicz, featured Mr. Mark Gallagher (Deputy Chief of Mission and Head of the Political Section, the European Union Delegation to Israel), Ms. Avivit Bar-Ilan (Director, Department for European Organizations, Europe Division, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu (The European Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Dr. Werner Puschra (Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Israel), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Chairman, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies).

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections and Israeli-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On 9-10 March 2014, a public opinion poll regarding the EU offer was initiated by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. The poll was conducted by the Rafi Smith Institute, among 500 men and women, as a representative sample of the Israeli adult population (Jewish and Arab sectors).

The main findings of the poll are:

84% of the Israeli public has never heard of the package offered by the EU to Israel in December 2013.

After being read the text of the offer, 19% declared that it increases their support for the peace process; 59% stated that it does not alter their position regarding the peace process; 8% claimed that it decreases their support for the peace process. 14% did not have an opinion.

Percentages of increased support for the peace process were highest among secular and educated respondents, aged 30-49, with voting preferences to the center-left.

Of interest is that a relatively-high 31% of Yesh Atid (Yair Lapid’s party) supporters stated that the EU offer increases their support for the peace process.

Among national-religious and ultra-Orthodox respondents, there were more who stated that the EU offer decreases their support for the peace process, than the other way around (but for most of them – it did not lead to any change of position).

Respondents were also asked what would have happened if the EU incentive package would have included an offer to Israel to become a full EU member once IsraeliPalestinian peace is reached.

In such a case, 27% declared that it increases their support for the peace process; 53% stated that it does not alter their position regarding the peace process; 6% claimed that it decreases their support for the peace process. 14% did not have an opinion.

The upgrading of the offer’s content had a striking impact on those respondents intending to vote for Likud-Beytenu. The original EU offer increased the support for peace of 12% of these respondents. The upgraded offer lifted this number to 29%.

הפוסט 84% of Israelis have never heard of the new EU incentive for Israeli-Palestinian peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.