Read here

הפוסט Netherlands, France, Sweden flip on EU-Israel ties – Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu’s interview with Globes, May 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

• To sideline Trump’s dangerous proposals for Gaza, stabilise the situation, and generate diplomatic progress, European actors must work with Arab states and others to present viable alternatives that can credibly claim to better fit Trump’s regional goals. In this context European actors should focus on achievable outcomes and play to their strengths. Whereas Europeans have limited capacity when it comes to strongarming Israelis or Palestinians to make difficult
compromises on final status issues, they have a lot to offer in bottom-up Palestinian state building and establishing a regional framework for a two-state process.

Stopping the war and creating a regional framework for diplomacy

• European actors must work with as wide a coalition as possible of Arab states and others to persuade Trump that his interests are aligned with the European
mainstream, moderate Arab states, and moderate Israelis and Palestinians.

• Europeans should work with Arab states and others to promote conditions that are politically helpful for Israeli moderates to make the case domestically for
regional normalization linked to Israeli commitment to a demilitarized Palestinian state.

Stopping annexationist moves in the West Bank

• Changes in the West Bank driven by settler extremists working with ministers are threatening Palestinians and entrenching the settlement project with the intention of making a two-state solution impossible.

• If Netanyahu, with the backing of the Trump administration, continues down this path, European actors will have to consider what costs and incentives they can apply to influence Israeli government steps. In deploying any coercive measures, they must consider how to maximise intended effects whilst minimising the risk of unintended consequences.

• At the same time, there may be untapped potential for European incentives. Floating recognition of Israeli positions on issues like refugees, settlement blocks
and Jerusalem as part of a regional process could deepen the divide between Netanyahu’s coalition and the mainstream.

Bottom-up Palestinian state building

• An indispensable component for progress towards a Palestinian state is a revitalised Palestinian Authority, with the priority being security (for both Israelis and Palestinians) governance and delivery.

• The agenda should include measures to strengthen Israeli confidence, including delivering on announced changes to stop the welfare system rewarding terrorists, removing incitement from the education system, and reassessing the role of UNRWA.

• For the Trump administration, the EU’s role in reforming the PA through newly applied conditionality should be framed as an essential building block for a successful normalisation deal involving Saudi Arabia.

• The Gaza Strip represents an immeasurable logistical challenge. Politically the challenge is to create mechanisms for international actors and the PA to rebuild, whilst marginalizing Hamas.

Bolstering moderates in wider society

• Any hope for a future stable political order depends on a critical mass of public support on both sides for the goal of a two-state solution.

• Europeans should significantly increase long term investments in grass roots peace building.

• They should also confront social media companies about the promotion of extremist content, and work with them to support content orientated towards moderation and coexistence.

• Europeans should partner with Arab and wider Muslim cultural drivers of tolerance and moderation.

הפוסט Stopping annexation and advancing normalization in Trump-world: A framework for European policy makers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Read it here.

הפוסט What does Putin think he’s doing? An expert’s primer on why he invaded, what’s next הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The EU’s differentiation policy seeks to maintain trade and cooperation with the State of Israel within its 1967 borders, in adherence to international law and Europe’s consumer protection laws – unlike the BDS movement that seeks to boycott and sanction the entire State of Israel. Recognizing the value of EU-Israel relationship, the EU’s differentiation policy aims to incentivize Israel to resume negotiations with the Palestinians. The BDS movement, on the other hand, sets goals (such as revoking the right of return and abrogating the Law of Return) that if fully achieved would mean Israel’s end as a Jewish state. The differentiation policy includes an element of normative condemnation but not delegitimization of the State of Israel as a whole, as espoused by the BDS movement. Whereas the differentiation policy implements existing international law, the BDS movement aspires to change the international perception of Israel even within its 1967 borders.

Currently, the economic implications of both the differentiation policy and the BDS movement are negligible. However, in the long term, the threat posed by the BDS activities is greater than that of the differentiation policy, since the BDS is not limited to the settlements. The UN recently issued a list of companies operating in the settlements, which could serve in the future to boycott the settlements and damage major companies that play a significant role in Israel’s economy. The EU does not see any connection between its differentiation policy and the BDS movement, to which some European states oppose.

הפוסט The Differences between the EU’s Differentiation Policy and the BDS Movement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A. What is the “Horizon” Program?
• “Horizon” is the world’s biggest publicly funded research and development program in terms of budget and number of participating states. The seven-year Horizon 2020 program launched in 2014 provided funding of some €80 billion. Grants under the follow-up seven-year “Horizon Europe” program are expected to total over €100 billion.

• Participants include the EU’s 27 member states, the UK and 16 additional states (among them Israel, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Georgia, and Ukraine). In 1996, Israel was the first non-European state to join the program since its 1984 launch.

• To be eligible for program funding, R&D institutes from several countries form consortiums and submit research proposals in accordance with the program’s calls for proposals. Leading specialists in each field evaluate the proposals and grants are allocated in accordance with their professional decisions.

B. Why Is Participation in “Horizon” Important for Israel?
• Government officials and experts have for years described Israel’s participation in the EU’s R&D programs as being of strategic importance for Israel in strengthening and advancing research, development and innovation. It enables cooperation among research, industry, high-tech and academic groups from various states in all major study areas, from the basic research level, through applied research, and all the way to development and product enhancement.

• As of the end of 2019, the acceptance rate of Israeli proposals submitted to the “Horizon” program reached 13.5 percent of all proposals submitted, higher than the 11 percent European average. This reflects, both domestically and externally, the Israeli excellence and leadership in research, development and innovation.

• Participating states are expected to cover their respective part of the “Horizon” program budget. They can reimburse the investment back (and possibly more) through winning research grants. Within the framework of FP7, the predecessor of “Horizon 2020”, Israel contributed €535 million from 2007 to 2013 and received grants at the sum of €875 million. Israel has invested some €1 billion in “Horizon 2020”, receiving to date €1.2 billion in grants (the total is expected to increase by the time the program ends).

• Participation in “Horizon” also benefits Israel in non-quantifiable terms: (1) Opportunities to develop significant international cooperation, strengthen Israeli research capabilities, and build knowledge and advanced technologies; (2) Development of economic ties and a business presence in Europe, Israel’s largest trade partner and natural research partner; (3) EU research grants are a high-level expression of trust in a project and could help attract foreign investment; (4) Formulating research proposals and setting them in motion creates jobs, economic growth and innovation, contributing to Israel’s competitiveness, which, in turn, affects economic performance.

C. What Are the Implications of Curtailing Israel’s Terms of Participation
in the “Horizon” Program?

• Preventing Israeli participation in “Horizon Europe” over the coming seven years does not require a consensus decision by all EU member states. The program can bypass the veto power used by certain EU states to scuttle measures deemed critical of Israel, which require full consensus. That is why measures related to the R&D program are under consideration in response to Israeli West Bank annexation moves.

• Preventing or curtailing Israeli participation in the “Horizon Europe” program would deal a severe blow to Israeli research, industry and academia. It would undermine Israel’s international cooperation and its access to research infrastructure (e.g., specialized labs and facilities) and scientific databases. In a broader context, it would mark a significant setback to Israel’s relationship with the EU.

• In 2013, ahead of the “Horizon 2020” launch, the EU published new guidelines that forbade Israeli entities beyond the 1967 Green Line’s eligibility of benefiting from program grants. The Israeli government opposed these guidelines and considered not joining “Horizon 2020”. This set off a storm among academic and research bodies in Israel that feared being left out of this vital program. The government, realizing the extent of the potential loss and the risk it was taking, relented and joined the program on the EU’s terms.

הפוסט Israel, Annexation, and the EU’s Research and Development Program “Horizon” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Dr. Nimrod Goren, Head of the Mitvim Institute: The EU and almost all its member states have in recent weeks expressed strong opposition to any course of Israeli annexation in the territories. Europe has emphasized that any annexation — large or small — is in violation of international law, will lower the chances of peace and will lead to negative implications with regards to relations with Israel. Europe has so far avoided presenting the practical price an annexation would have on Israel-Europe relations, and is focusing on diplomatic and public  endeavors to prevent it from happening. And yet, Europe has limited influence on decisionmaking processes in Israel, on Israeli public opinion and on the policy of the Trump Administration. If it wishes to do more than simply watch from the sidelines as events unfold in coming weeks, Europe will have to move from declarations to actions, and to present the people and leaders of Israel with the tangible implications that annexation would have regarding Israel-Europe relations.

MK Nitzan Horowitz, Chairperson, Meretz; Member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee: An Israeli annexation in the West Bank will put an end to the two-state solution, to the vision of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and to the peace process. It will make Israel a de facto apartheid state. To date, no preparations have been carried out ahead of annexation, whether militarily, administratively, or judicially. There is still ambiguity and possibility for change, including the scope of an annexation move. Therefore, the opposition is working to prevent annexation from taking place, to mobilize public opinion against annexation, and to generate support to this effort from Israel’s friends abroad and from our neighbors in the region. The goal is not only to stop the annexation from happening, but also to resume the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and promote the two-state solution, which remains the only viable solution to the conflict. If annexation is eventually prevented, but military occupation persists, then not much will be gained.

Dr. Nils Schmid, Spokesperson on Foreign Affairs, SPD Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag: An Israeli  annexation in the West Bank would be a clear breach of international law and lead to an end of any attempt at realizing the two-state solution that has been the general consensus among the international community and among the EU for many years. Any kind of annexation, even a so-called ‘small solution’ such as annexing parts of the settlement blocks close to Jerusalem, will still be regarded as a breach of international law and would be criticized and opposed by Germany. Germany is avoiding discussions of sanctions because no annexation has taken place yet and will not be the one to initiate European discussions about punitive measures to be taken against Israel if it goes through with it. However, a large majority of its political parties are making known that annexation is a bad idea that will not have German or EU support. The Bundestag is about to adopt a resolution calling not to go ahead with annexation as a warning or a stop sign to Israel. It will not debate the issue of consequences, as this is to be debated at the EU level. At the time being we focus on preventing annexation.

Dr. Nathalie Tocci, Director, Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI); Special Adviser to EU HRVP Josep Borrell: Europeans would have liked to imagine a world in which annexation can be prevented, but we also know there is very little we can do to stop it. Therefore, we are in a political process thinking of consequences, also as a signaling effect to Israel that can be dissuasive. European responses could result in three spheres: economic, political and legal. On the economic front, the most obvious consequences would be restrictive measures, and these would depend on what sort of annexation would take place and its immediate repercussions. With Russia, sanctions were adopted after annexation of Crimea – not a preventive but reactive step, which is never effective in reversing a particular course. On  the political front, European states could recognize the State of Palestine, but this would not be a meaningful move. Instead, a more consequential course of action would be to stop financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority should the two-state solution no longer be pursued. On the legal front, a European response could be a revamp of the differentiation agenda, which could include revisiting arrangements such as Horizon Europe and completing different marketing standards to produce originating from Israel and the territories. There is a difference between violation of international law under occupation and illegal annexation, the latter being a more severe breach of international law. This is why the EU’s differentiation policy is expected to be stepped up, and why an Israeli annexation will be treated differently than the cases of Northern Cyprus, West Sahara, Abkhazia. The eventual European response will be determined by a number of factors, including how exactly the annexation will take place and its immediate consequences, the political conditions in EU member states, the political climate in the US and the reactions of other players in the region, mainly the Arab countries.

Martin Konecny, Director, European Middle East Project (EuMEP): Indeed, Europe is not likely to adopt immediate, major sanctions against Israel in response to annexation in the West Bank. Israel enjoys an exceptional status according to which it is taboo to inflict sanctions on it or even on settlements. But in the context of annexation, this taboo is being eroded. Regarding Horizon Europe, the decision is in the hands of the European Commission. It is unlikely that Israel would be cut entirely from the program, but a scale down may be possible. To protect its own legal order, the EU would need to further insulate its relations from what Israel conducts beyond the Green Line, which could have a significant impact on bilateral relations. Friction surrounding the issue of differentiation is likely to come from both sides: not only will the EU double down on differentiation, but Israel will also show greater reluctance to accept any territorial differentiation (as was with Creative Europe Agreement rejected by Minister Miri Regev in 2017), resulting in the straining of ties. The European Court of Justice may also come into play due to increased legal friction. We have seen its rulings in the past years regarding Israeli settlements, Western Sahara and two decades ago with regards to Northern Cyprus. Long-term consequences of annexation on EU-Israel relations could be more significant: it would be harder to update the EU-Israel agreements, while the economic and technological environment keeps on changing.

Dr. Muriel Asseburg, Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP): Germany is a key player. From 1 July it will hold the presidency of both the EU Council and the UN Security Council. The European Commission is also currently presided by a German. What to expect of Germany? As a friend of Israel, and due to the historical lessons it drew from the Holocaust, annexation is a particular challenge for Germany. While Germany has spoken out clearly against annexation, it has also been signaling to Israel through its actions that annexation will come with no price tag as far as Germany is concerned. Not even recognition of a Palestinian state. German Foreign Minister even marked the difference between annexation of Crimea by Russia and the one to be done by Israel. Not having the EU’s “option paper” vis-à-vis Israel ready yet is another failure by the EU to be the geopolitical proactive and forward-looking player the European Commission declared it aspires to be in 2019. EU is divided on the matter. Yet, while sanctions by the EU require unanimity, so do new agreements with Israel. While Europeans will not throw overboard the two-state solution, they will have to open up to other options of conflict resolution.

Hugh Lovatt, Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): As things stand, it seems that the EU’s response to Israeli annexation in the West Bank will fall short of the sanctions that it put in place against Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But there will nonetheless be consequences as such actions will likely burden the relations between the EU and Israel, and create obstacles for future relations. The major vector of any EU response would be enhancing the differentiation policy, which can be done by the EU institutions based on existing legal and policy positions, without having to get further approval from all 27 Member States. While Israel is still largely perceived in Europe as a liberal and democratic state, annexation will contribute to the change of this image. Relations with Israel would become much more problematic and the equation of Israel as an apartheid state will grow in the public and the policy discourse. If it would become apparent that a two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict is no longer possible, the only other alternative that would be acceptable to the Europeans would be equal rights within one state. Meanwhile, Europe should not remain complacent even if formal annexation does not take place given that the Oslo-configured Middle East Peace Process has already collapsed and de-facto annexation will continue to undermine prospects for reaching a two-state solution.

Noa Landau, Diplomatic Correspondent, Haaretz: On the eve of the target day for Israeli annexation in the West Bank, Israeli decision-makers are still not quite sure what annexation means. Similarly, while the Europeans are discussing responses to a full implementation of the annexation plans, it seems they are not prepared for the more likely scenario in which a smaller, more symbolic annexation takes place (such as annexation of Ma’ale Edumim or Gush Etzion). It is worthy to keep in mind that the prevailing argument that Europeans do not have a way to impact Israeli policy is to some extent incorrect: when the European community wanted to prevent the evacuation of the West Bank Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, it was capable of doing so.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Co-President, IASEI; Director of the Program on Israel Europe Relations, Mitvim Institute: In a demonstration of the built-in expectations capabilities gap, the European responses to an Israeli annexation in the West Bank have again proven that the EU is much better at rhetoric and much less capable and influential when it comes to action. The EU has not presented Israel with any heavy economic consequences in case of annexation, and perhaps this is one of the reasons why the EU is not taken so seriously by some in the government. There are not many sticks the EU is willing to use, and not many carrots to give. And yet, to put such measures in a wider perspective, the EU via its linkage policy since 2009 can take its toll by not advancing the relations with Israel further. If there were any hopes to reconvene an EU-Israeli Association Council (high-level political dialogue between the two sides), they are most likely to disappear with annexation. It may be that the “window of opportunity” for annexation is closing down as the polls in the US indicate Trump may not be re-elected. Other considerations are the economic implications of the coronavirus crisis. The EU can play a role in postponing annexation until this window closes.

הפוסט European Responses to an Israeli Annexation in the West Bank: From Statements to Actions? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Role of Economy in US Efforts to Promote Israeli-Arab Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(Originally published in ECONFO)

הפוסט Forget the East-Med Pipeline: Advantages of Alternative Options to Transport the Easter Mediterranean Gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For now, the takeaways are contradictory. On the one hand, states are closing their borders and turning inward, as mandated by health considerations. On the other hand, cooperation between states will clearly be necessary in order to overcome the unprecedented crisis in the health, economic and diplomatic arenas.

We are witnessing the rise of more conservative and populist regimes in various states in recent years, and even in some which have adopted racist overtones. The coronavirus outbreak could buttress their argument that unsupervised open borders result not only in uncontrolled immigration, but also in epidemics.

An understandably frightened public might support seclusion and isolationist trends. The immediate challenge on the day after will require a balance between what appear to be two polar positions – the version of globalization as we know it versus the veering toward separation and isolationism.

Israel is facing that challenge all the more forcefully given the trends of recent years. Its foreign policy has been marked by increased isolationism, an emphasis on threats – whether existential or merely serious attempts to block international diplomatic initiatives and a deep sense that “the world is against us” or that “the world does not fully understand the threats we face.”

The coronavirus crisis is a strategic crossroads for renewed solidarity, initiatives and cooperation in the regional and international arena. It therefore constitutes an opportunity for a shift in Israel’s foreign policy, which should be based on several layers.

1. Supporting others – Israel has achieved admirable progress in various fields. It is important to share the unique knowledge we have amassed and developed with neighboring states and with those further away. There is no need to keep boasting of Israel as a “start-up nation.” Instead, Israel should significantly expand its investment in foreign aid.

2. Highlighting opportunities alongside threats – The world appears to have internalized the “threat list” that Israel skillfully presented. Without making light of them, the array of opportunities presented in terms of joint interests with regional states in recent years should also be emphasized. There are numerous options for cooperation between Israel and its neighbors, not only in response to threats but also in taking advantage of opportunities in environmental protection, water, health, immigration and energy, to name a few. The immigration crisis, for example, requires a joint effort to stabilize the situation, but also provides an opportunity for joint plans to address understandable concerns and help create a supportive rather than a threatening and argumentative climate.

3. Regional cooperation – Recent years have presented Israel with increased potential for regional cooperation. Israel took constructive steps to take advantage of this potential, but they must be deepened and extended to the broader region. While the Arab Spring did not generate the hoped-for democratization, it did create a more conducive foundation for cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as well as a sense of a shared fate vis-à-vis a variety of challenges.

4. Conducting an open dialogue with the Palestinians – Current events have underscored the necessity for tighter coordination and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It is very important to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the COVID-19 crisis to return to a format of broader dialogue – empathetic and deep – between the sides. Its outset is in facing the ongoing crisis; its aftermath is in examining ways to break through the impasse in the peace process.

5. Good neighborly relations with Europe – In recent years, Israel has focused on the criticism voiced by Brussels against its policies. The Israeli government took a confrontational approach toward the EU and regarded its weaknesses (prompted by economic, diplomatic and social challenges) as an opportunity. Israel must realize that the geographic, economic and cultural realities linking it to Europe are an asset and not a liability. Moreover, good relations with the EU do not contradict Israel’s strategic relationship with the US, even if they appeared to do so for a short while.

6. A foreign policy based on initiatives and vision – Perhaps most importantly, Israel must replace its defensive and blocking posture with a foreign policy that is proactive and that of an internationalist. Israel should present a vision of its own for regional cooperation and coexistence, based on positive common denominators, rather than being reactive and relying on negatives. By its very nature, the road to realizing a vision is difficult, but a vision-led foreign policy can contribute to a constructive and less threatening atmosphere, resulting in charging the regional climate with positive energies, with or without natural gas.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy and a former ambassador to Cyprus.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Coronavirus crisis opens opportunity for shifting Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in the immediate weeks following the presentation of the plan – these did not happen. The US administration stopped Netanyahu’s efforts for rapid annexation, and by doing so created tensions within Israel’s right-wing bloc. Voting intentions of Israelis remained largely unchanged following the publication of the plan, according to multiple public opinion polls. Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz, who the prime minister tried to trap by dragging him to Washington with him to the introduction of the plan, managed to handle the situation and gain some political benefits from it. And Arab leaders kept refusing to publicly meet Netanyahu, like they did prior to the two Israeli elections in 2019 and despite American pressures.

The Trump plan, however, was greeted with cheer by the Israeli mainstream. It was termed by many as the most pro-Israeli plan ever and was warmly embraced by Gantz’ Blue and White party, the main contender to Netanyahu’s Likud. Voices against the plan came almost only from the Israeli left, whose power is diminishing. But even among the left there was cautious not to aggressively oppose the US president, at times even congratulating him for the efforts his administration undertook to devise the plan.

A two-state solution is still the way forward

International responses were also mild in nature. They reflected the general lack of involvement by the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Trump took office and a reluctance to challenge the US president. Countries in Europe and the Arab world issued statements welcoming the Americans for their efforts and promising to study the content of the plan. Such statements were the ones that the US administration was pushing for. The American goal was to prevent clear and immediate rejection of the plan and this has been largely achieved (there were exceptions like Ireland’s quick response against the plan).

Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place.

In the weeks that followed, multi-national organisations (the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union) made joint non-binding statements opposing the plan. Within the EU, internal divisions continued to prevent joint declarations by all 27 member states, as has been the case since 2016. EU High Representative Borrell thus issued a statement reflecting his own views, while European UN Security Council members reaffirmed the traditional European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The overall nature of these responses reinforced Netanyahu’s narrative that the international community does not care much about the Palestinian issue. His claim is that Arab countries are willing to improve ties with Israel even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and that Europe is no longer a relevant actor, now that some member states are willing to block initiatives in Brussels on Israel’s behalf. Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place. A common thought among Israelis is that if the world does not care that much anymore about the Palestinians, why should we.

The further consolidation of this mindset might become a dangerous consequence of the Trump plan. Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution should be a high-level priority for the next Israeli government. It’s crucial for Israel’s ability to maintain both its Jewish and democratic character, to live in peace, security and prosperity and to truly belong and integrate in its Middle Eastern, European and Mediterranean neighborhood. It’s also the right thing to do in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations.

Challenges and opportunities

However, doing so will not become any easier. The Israeli public is largely indifferent to the issue; the Palestinian public is losing faith in prospects of a real Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank is making the two-state solution more difficult to obtain and implement; and the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza casts a shadow over prospects for future progress towards peace.

These are major challenges that pro-peace Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders should tackle. Prospects for political change in Israel later this year – even if not representing a clear ideological shift – might provide an opportunity to begin doing so. Should a different American administration take office in January 2021, even more opportunities will emerge. Pro-peace actors should already plan towards such scenarios and begin to take action. For the past three years their primary focus was on the release of the Trump plan, what it will include and how to react. Now, after its publication, it’s the time to move on, brush the plan aside and advance steps that can bring peace.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states.

There’s a variety of steps that international actors can take: their primary goal should be to prevent Israeli annexation of territories in the West Bank, through voicing clear opposition. They should also keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue high on their agenda – especially when engaging with Israeli officials – even when they have more pressing priorities and when they do not envision immediate progress. A counter-document to the Trump plan, including alternative principles for a final-status peace agreement, should be published as to not let the Trump plan remain ‘the only game in town’.

What Europeans should do

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states. However, this remains a difficult task and, in any case, European countries should bypass the paralysis caused by divisions among EU member states by acting in smaller coalitions of like-minded actors. Borrell should be supportive of this line of action as well.

Moreover, a new international mechanism to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should be set up – whether officially or unofficially – to enable different international actors (not only European) to coordinate efforts, with participation of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. Such a mechanism should implement the plan agreed upon to introduce Israelis and Palestinians to a coordinated international package of political and economic incentives for peace. Finally, increased international support and recognition should be given to pro-peace civil society groups so they can more effectively build positive interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.

These steps can generate hope, set up new dialogue channels and craft innovative policy proposals – all of which are much-needed components on the path towards peace. They will demonstrate how local and international actors can chart a real vision towards peace and can take action together to advance its implementation. It would be the most suitable response to the Trump plan.

(originally published in IPS Journal)

הפוסט Moving on from Trump’s plan for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

So, I was hiding in the heap of dead bodies because in the last week the crematoria did not function at all. The bodies were just building up higher and higher. So there I was at night time; in the daytime, I was roaming in the camp, and this is how I survived. On January 27, 1945, I was one of the very first; Birkenau was one of the very first camps being liberated.”

— Bert Stern, a Survivor

Seventy-five years ago today, the Red Army stood at the gates of Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Soviet soldiers could not believe the harrowing sights unfolding before their eyes: the 7,000 remaining prisoners—human skeletons, just skin and bones, some of them dying These were the sad remnants of 1.3 million people—women, men and children—who had been deported by the Nazis to the largest concentration camp ever constructed, a facility that combined a killing center and slave labor. It is estimated that between 1940 and 1945, at least 1.1 million people died there, some of them gassed; others tortured and shot by the Nazi guards; others succumbing to hunger, cold, disease, and exhaustion.

Auschwitz-Birkenau, one of the many concentration camps established by the Nazis, was the culmination of the Nazi plan to dominate a Europe populated by a pure Aryan race. The term “Holocaust” has been used to describe the mass-murder of six million Jews, killed simply because they were Jews. It is true that not only Jews were deported and murdered in Auschwitz: other targeted groups included the Roma, the homosexuals, and the physically and mentally handicapped. All these people were considered threats to racial purity, but for the Jews, the plan was different; it was total and final. Even seventy-five years later it is difficult to understand the frenzy and determination of the Nazis and their collaborators in their effort to wipe from the face of the earth a whole people, to perform what became known as “the final solution”, to eradicate any remnant of their culture and civilization. And perhaps most difficult to understand is that as the Nazi mass-murder machine took its daily toll, the world stood silent.

It would be a dangerous error to think that the Holocaust was simply the result of the insanity of a group of criminal Nazis. On the contrary, the Holocaust was the culmination of centuries of hatred and discrimination targeting the Jews. The hatred propagated by the
Roman Catholic Church, the persecutions and expulsions, the auto-da-fé of the Holy Inquisition, and the pogroms in Eastern Europe—all these were the fate of the European Jews for two millennia, since the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple and deportation of the Jews from their homeland.

Even in the case of the Holocaust, the Nazis did not move immediately to trying to exterminate Jews; they moved step-by-step to dehumanize Jews, so that when the “final” step came it was accepted by the masses. Throughout the 1930s, after the Nazis took power in Germany, they began with laws that required the Jewish people to be gradually removed from the rest of the population, stripping them of their citizenship and their human rights. Jews were barred from the professions, their shops looted and confiscated, their synagogues destroyed and their books burned. Then Jews were forced into squalid ghettos or confined to camps where they were used as slave labor. And all of this was accompanied by systematic incitement and racial indoctrination that portrayed Jews as sub-human, no more than cockroaches, who polluted the pristine German society.

Albert Speer was one of Hitler’s closest confidants, the Minister of the Armaments and War Production in the Third Reich. He was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment at the Nuremberg Trials. In an affidavit, sworn and signed at Munich in 15 June 1977, Speer wrote:

“The hatred of the Jews was Hitler’s driving force and central point, perhaps even the only element that moved him. The German people, German greatness, the Reich, all that meant nothing to him in the final analysis. Thus, the closing sentence of his Testament sought to commit us Germans to a merciless hatred of the Jews even after the apocalyptic downfall.”

Hatred and prejudice were not confined to Germany, however. Such conditions were prevalent in many European nations; had this not been so, the Holocaust would not have been possible. In many conquered states, the Nazis found enthusiastic collaborators in their scheme to rid Europe of Jews. There were also courageous, heroic citizens who endangered their own lives and those of their families to save Jews. We call them the Righteous Gentiles.

For us, citizens of the Free World today, it is difficult to understand the enormity of Auschwitz, and the depth of the cruelty; it is difficult to understand or accept what human beings are capable of doing to each other when motivated by blind prejudice and hatred. After the Holocaust, the world seemed eager to find a more cooperative path. The founding of the United Nations was one expression of that moment. For a while, we thought that hatred of Jews had finally been eradicated. But slowly the demonization of Jews started to come back.

Antisemitism is on the rise again all over Europe and the United States, and anti-Semitic incidents are multiplying. Irrationality and intolerance are back. Jews are being targeted as Jews again in Europe. Jews are being attacked on the streets, in supermarkets, in schools. Synagogues and Jewish businesses are attacked. There are mass-demonstrations, with thousands of people shouting death threats to the State of Israel and to Jews. There is even a revival of Holocaust revisionism, spanning those who minimize the atrocity to those who rewrite history so as to honor the disgraced officials of those dark days.

We are concerned because we know where hatred can lead.

Antisemitism and racism should have no place in the 21rst century. Houses of worship should be places of love, understanding, and healing. Nations should not tell their people to kill in the name of God

Jewish History and consciousness will be dominated for many generations by the traumatic memories of the Holocaust. No people in history has undergone an experience of such violence and depth. For us, to remember is not only a commandment, it is the moral commitment to the sanctity of human life, a commitment to pass on to the next generations the very basic values of acceptance of the Other, of tolerance and understanding.

We remember the Holocaust, because memory is an integral part of our culture. Because memory shapes us. We remember the victims because of the command “Zachor” (Remember).

Remembrance is not an isolated act; it has a moral dimension. The rescuers taught us that even in the hell known as Holocaust, the individual had the choice and the capacity to behave humanely if they cared—and had the courage. We remember because we do not want our past to be our children’s future.

(originally published in European Eye on Radicalization)

הפוסט Remembering the Holocaust: 75 Years After the Liberation of the Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 4 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

But the summit will do little to resolve the maritime disputes that are increasingly overshadowing hopes for regional cooperation. If Israel is to unlock the potential of its offshore riches, then it must commit to reviewing its entire Eastern Mediterranean foreign and energy policies.

Foreign policy is an essential lens through which one can assess the risks and rewards of offshore energy development, and this subject deserves more serious discussion by both Israeli policy-makers and the Israeli public. Advocates of the Netanyahu government’s export plan emphasize the strategic benefits of energy cooperation with Israel’s regional neighbors, while opponents to the government plan often sidestep the foreign policy argument in favor of a discussion about the plan’s domestic consequences, particularly the marginal impact on the cost of electricity, continued monopolization of the energy market by a handful of companies, and the environmental implications of offshore drilling. Neither camp directly confronts the argumentation of its rival, thus ensuring that public debate on Israel’s export strategy remains stuck on repeat.

Yes, Israel has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a new regional architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, but that should not come at the expense of domestic needs and interests. Energy cooperation requires long-term planning; a commitment to building and expanding bilateral relationships with neighbors in the years to come.

This means developing a strategy that expands beyond the limited scope of gas pipelines. In order to chart an optimal course forward, Israelis must first engage in an honest conversation about the prospects of transformative change at the regional level.

Energy cooperation does not always transform into something more meaningful at the bilateral level. Look no further than Israel’s current energy ties with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. In all three cases, the parties benefited from a local and affordable energy stream. However, resource management and jurisdiction remain sensitive issues for Palestinians, who are seeking to reduce their dependence on Israel.

THE 2014 DEAL signed between the Tamar field partners and Jordanian-owned Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine has been met with popular resistance in Amman. Jordanian parliamentarians frequently demand that the government renege on the deal. And even the most optimistic voices wouldn’t claim that a gas pipeline will impact Egyptian public attitudes towards Israel. Israelis must also be concerned about a long-term partnership with an authoritarian regime having an uncertain future. That shouldn’t discourage diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with regional actors, but the Israeli public needs to be realistic about the limitations of normalization, so long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. The floor for cooperation has risen, but the ceiling remains high.

The same dose of realism must also be applied to other potential energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It was only in 2016 that Israeli and Turkish officials cited the prospect of energy cooperation as a primary reason for patching up their bilateral differences. Though the downgrading of ties in 2010 was born out of the Gaza flotilla affair, optimism that reconciliation would lay the groundwork for future natural gas contracts appeared to be one of the primary motivations on both sides. Today, it seems implausible that Israel and Turkey would consider such a partnership – but this demonstrates the Eastern Mediterranean’s unpredictable geopolitical winds, as regional actors vie for influence over the direction of its energy flow.

One of the byproducts of strained Israeli-Turkish relations over the last decade has been the strengthening of bonds between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. After the 2010 fallout, Jerusalem’s hope was to play diplomatic “moneyball” and recreate Ankara’s strategic value in the aggregate by replacing it with other regional partners.

The tripartite relationship, or “Energy Triangle,” exemplifies one of the crowning achievements in contemporary Israeli diplomacy. Still, some in Nicosia and Athens worry about the day that Ankara decides to extend an olive branch to Israel. Will efforts to advance relations with Jerusalem over the last decade come up short if Turkey makes an offer that Israel can’t refuse? How would Israel balance a desire to rebuild ties with Turkey with its existing commitments to its Hellenic partners?

Worryingly, the signature project that Israel, Greece and Cyprus champion – the EastMed pipeline – currently lacks technical and commercial feasibility. While the European Commission is currently reviewing aspects of the pipeline’s feasibility, the decline of global energy prices and availability of cheaper options for the European market cast serious question marks on this endeavor. Based on current numbers, it is doubtful that Israeli natural gas would be competitive on the European market by the time it arrived in Italy or elsewhere in the EU. Despite the political support for the project, many in the energy industry remain skeptical.

WHICH MAKES the developments of recent months all the more concerning for Israeli policymakers. As Israel and other regional actors translated their shared energy interests into developing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – a body tasked with coordinating regional interests into the formation of cooperative energy policies and a regional gas market – Turkey has desperately sought ways of forcing itself back into the regional conversation.

Over the summer, Ankara placed drill ships at strategic positions in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to stake out its territorial claims over maritime space around Cyprus. On November 29, Turkey announces that it had reached a delineation agreement with Libya’s UN-supported government over their maritime boundaries, driving an imaginary wedge through the Eastern Mediterranean that challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime claims and could potentially threaten the region’s maritime security.

For years, Israeli officials reiterated that regional energy cooperation was not designed to exclude any other state. But as Turkey’s actions have crossed more Greek and Cypriot red lines, so has Israel joined Egypt, the European Union and the United States in criticizing Ankara. It remains to be seen whether this collection of actors is committed enough to formulating a strategy that either includes or excludes Turkey. If Netanyahu’s participation in this week’s summit is any indication, this current cycle of regional tension is far from over.

Is Israel executing an energy policy that achieves its foreign policy goals, or vice versa? Should future governments adjust these policies in the hopes of either maximizing the potential of regional energy cooperation, or out of concerns that domestic interests have been overlooked? Israelis need to ask whether their government should continue investing in these multilateral processes for the sake of national security, even if they won’t positively impact their cost of living in the immediate future (or ever), and if there is no guarantee that they will deliver additional strategic benefits.

Considering the ongoing investigations connecting the country’s political and national security elite with secondary aspects of the energy and defense industry, Israelis have just cause to remain skeptical about the motivations of their public servants and to demand greater transparency. Healthy democracies should execute foreign policies with the intention of fulfilling public interests. An open discussion that considers both the domestic and foreign policy implications of Israel’s energy policy would be a valuable first step.

הפוסט Israel’s foreign policy mustn’t be sidelined by energy interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As a member of the Israeli peace camp and as an organizer and participant in numerous meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, I attend these meetings with mixed feelings of excitement and hope alongside skepticism and cynicism. Each time, I am happy for the opportunity to meet and talk to young people on “the other side,” and am sad to discover that our expectations from the encounters are diminished from year to year. Peace? A word too big. Political agreement? No leader has the courage. A diplomatic process? Neither side feels it has a partner. Confidence-building measures? The reality on the ground is different.

In the past, in the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli-Palestinian encounters were much more common. While these were two difficult, painful and blood-soaked decades of the conflict, it was precisely when hope overcame despair. We had the feeling that change was possible, that there was still a possibility for a solution, and that our leaders were able and willing to advance and implement it. In recent years, I have felt that the hope is replaced by despair, stemming both from reality on the ground and from the fact that our politicians are mainly focused on preserving the illusion of a status quo.

In recent years, I am under the impression that Europe and the international community care more about settling our conflict than we do. Peace initiatives, positive incentives, condemnations and controversial decisions are all examples of measures taken by Europe and the international community showing they have an interest in the region and in Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. We can argue about the essence, the motives and the degree of influence of such measures, but there is no doubt that they indicate interest. On my last visit to Brussels, however, I noticed a change of attitude. Europe has many troubles of its own, both at home and abroad, and its focus in the Middle East is no longer necessarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

During the meetings in Brussels last year, the main message of the European Parliament members present was that Europe definitely wants to see advancement toward a two-state solution and believes it is possible, but without the will of the parties and their leaders the chances for it to happen are slim. During the last visit, however, the main message from our hosts was their impression that there is no solution on the horizon, but that we must try to keep our hopes up, and wait for the right timing, or for a change that allows us to move forward.

In this atmosphere of relatively comfortable despair (for some of us), discussions took place between us Israelis, our Palestinian partners and our European hosts. The atmosphere stayed relatively calm, unlike the heated atmosphere I experienced in previous encounters. Even the tensions over democracy and human rights remained within the bounds of a critical and legitimate discourse of people with different worldviews, living in the “same neighborhood,” but in very different realities. Bystanders were positively impressed – young Israelis and Palestinians can sit in one room and talk to each other. Occasionally they argue, but nevertheless they succeed in finding common ground and reaching understandings and agreements.

On the second day of the program we held a simulation of negotiations over Jerusalem. The discussions within each of the two national groups were no less difficult, and perhaps even more so, than the discussions between the two sides. Although most members of the Israeli delegation had progressive and centrist political views, the attempt to reach agreement was challenging. In the end, all sides recognized the need for clear borders, mutual recognition and international involvement in the Holy Basin, the area in Jerusalem that includes the Old City and its adjacent territories. For the organizers of the simulation, the European mediators, this was evidence that with a little effort and foreign support, the sides are still able to reach understandings, even on the conflict’s most difficult issues. For me, it was actually a reminder that unlike us, the participants, the political echelons on both sides are moving away from the ability to reach and implement agreements.

Despite the difficulties and challenges, each meeting reminds me that there is no substitute for personal contact and sharpens my understanding that dialogue encounters between individuals on both sides must continue. Such meetings are often the only opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians to meet each other not on the battlefield and not behind screens, where both sides are often portrayed as a sworn enemy. Meetings between people are a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the Israelis and Palestinians to recognize, know and understand each other. On days when the political horizon seems so far away, it is important to know and remember that on the other side there are quite a few people who aspire to create a better future and yearn for peace.
I can only hope that the next visit of the prime minister to Brussels will be a joint visit with a Palestinian leader. I also hope that for a change, it will be a visit that focuses on dialogue, seeking agreements and building trust – as we tried to do at the meeting of the young leaders – and not another visit of public relations and wrangling.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israelis and Palestinians Meet at the European Parliament הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly. He did so based on solid reasoning and a broad strategic view. He was a pragmatic man who could read the map, identify opportunities and make tough decisions. He understood that the PLO was growing weaker and that unless he sought agreement with that organization, he would face a tougher alternative – Hamas. He also understood Israel’s changing circumstances following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Soviet bloc.

Rabin assessed that this was an opportunity to try to resolve the conflicts with Israel’s immediate neighbors so that when the time came, Israel would be able to face its harshest and most dangerous enemies – Iraq and Iran. He was thoroughly aware of the hurdles he would have to face on the path he had chosen, the crises, the disappointments, but he had decided that he would leave our children and grandchildren a different kind of world, one of hope and normalcy.

I had the privilege of serving the State of Israel and working with him. I had the privilege of serving during the Oslo Accord days, of witnessing the changes Rabin underwent and the tremendous breakthroughs made by Israel’s Foreign Service. From a state that just months previously had clashed with the US government over loan guarantees for immigrant absorption, Israel became a desired ally. Relations with the US were transformed, becoming warm and intimate, with every Israeli diplomatic move coordinated with the US administration and receiving its blessing and support.

I saw and experienced how the world opened up to us, how states which did not even recognized us changed their position. From China and India to Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. Representatives from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all gathered at my home in New York, where I served as Consul General, to meet Rabin. He also managed to make the old dream of peace with Jordan a reality.

The Middle East began opening up to us, and new channels of cooperation were examined at well-attended economic conferences we held in Morocco and Jordan. Europe, too, opened up to us, giving Israel preferential trade status and making it the first non-European partner in its Horizon 2020 research program.

I had the great privilege of being at Rabin’s side when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1996, ten days before his assassination. The hall was packed. Most Heads of State in the audience applauded at length, not only because of what he said but also because they appreciated Rabin and his leadership. They stood in line for long moments to shake his hand. The sympathy of the world enveloped us, constituting the best proof that when we open up to the world, it opens up to us.

Rabin the soldier fought tenaciously against terrorism. I saw him angry and pained when he was informed of a terror attack, I saw him uncompromising when he had to make decisions and I also heard him shouting at Yasser Arafat when he had to. But he also bequeathed us new concepts, redefining the term “security” to include not just tanks, planes and missile boats, but also education, housing and well-being. Security, for Rabin, lay mostly in human hope.

Yitzhak Rabin was a modest man, often introverted, but also sure of himself; a man who did not like small talk and had no patience for fools and liars, for sycophants and fear-mongers. The red-headed Prime Minister spoke his mind, sometimes bluntly. In this sense, he was not blessed with diplomatic skills. But it was his direct style, his deep voice and shy mien that won the hearts of many.

In these days of determined attempts to undermine the State’s gatekeepers and institutions, it is important to remember Rabin’s respect for democracy and the rule of law, even when it concerned his personal life. Let us remember his desire to place the citizens at the top of the government’s priorities, his actions in support of civil equality, his attitude toward the Arab citizens in whom he saw partners, and the real actions he took to rectify past injustices.

Rabin, the man with the analytic mind, had well-defined, firm views, but he knew how to adapt himself when necessity dictated. Rabin knew how to dream and how to make his dreams come true. For him, the essence of Zionism was to establish a safe haven for the Jewish people.

For me, Rabin’s legacy is of integrity and modesty, courageous leadership, respect for democracy and civil rights, the vision of peace, and, above all, a life of hope.

Colette Avital is a former Member of Knesset and Ambassador, and is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Democracy and Foreign Policy in Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

They’re only one example of an exceptional level of international involvement in both this year’s Israeli national election campaigns, unprecedented in both scope and style. The posters, their iconography and their message have a significance beyond the intricacies of Israeli politics. They reveal the developing fault lines dividing two competing global camps – liberals and non-liberals – and their growing willingness to support allies and confront foes in a direct, unvarnished manner.

International support for Israeli political candidates engaged in competitive elections is not new. The Sharm el-Sheikh Summit organized by President Clinton to support Shimon Peres’ failed 1996 campaign is a notable example. However, foreign interventions have generally been far more low-key than the explicit pro-Netanyahu lobbying we are now witnessing. Gone are previous campaigns conducted cautiously behind the scenes to back a candidate’s political agenda: these efforts mostly concern the personal rather than the ideological, part of an effort to elevate or to challenge Netanyahu’s image as a global leader.

One of Netanyahu’s main electoral goals is to convince voters that he is indispensable, by branding himself Israel’s only leader with the requisite international magnitude. International feedback is thus a central tool in cementing this play, and in diverting attention from Netanyahu’s pending criminal indictments towards his global prestige. Ahead of the first round of elections in April 2019, Netanyahu’s international allies – leaders of what one could describe as the global non-liberal camp – answered his call by providing both diplomatic gestures and concrete policy steps. The weeks before the election were saturated with international events carefully crafted by the Netanyahu campaign.

Official visits by global allies offered Netanyahu photo-opportunities to land his image as a global leader. Key support was provided by the two competing leaders of the global non-liberal camp: First, Putin, who met with Netanyahu and donated symbolic capital by retrieving Israeli MIA Zachary Baumel’s body. Secondly, and above all else, Trump’s explicit mobilization for Netanyahu’s campaign. Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro were also protagonists in the international re-elect Netanyahu campaign.

Trump’s finest electoral gift was his recognition of the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. This act appealed to a majority of Israelis who see the territory as an integral part of Israel. It also resonated with Netanyahu’s own right-wing base who made the annexation of occupied land a leading topic in the campaign. Trump’s declaration allowed Netanyahu to present a clear sense of achievement in the crucial last stretch, which even his opponents could not dispute. Netanyahu once again situated himself as the only Israeli leader capable of stepping onto the international stage and getting results. This, while the international activity of his main contender, Benny Gantz, was limited to speeches at AIPAC and the Munich Security Conference.

Ahead of the coming re-run elections, we already see Netanyahu attempting similar plays to exploit his interpersonal relations with prominent non-liberal leaders to brand him, as his slogan goes, as a leader “of a different league.”

The growing list of world leaders to meet Netanyahu before the election includes another close peer – India’s Prime Minister Modi. But the main campaign’s effort is focused on arranging a timely visit to Israel by Russia’s Putin, during which a monument to fallen Russian soldiers will be unveiled. This step is possibly devised to influence Russianspeaking voters, who are of special electoral importance for Netanyahu this time around. Trump is also reportedly planning moves that can boost Netanyahu’s chances for reelection, possibly including an announcement of new U.S. security guarantees to Israel.

This global support highlights Netanyahu’s status as a central figure in the global non-liberal camp. His domestic policy corresponds with its values, favoring the majoritarian aspect of democracy over liberal values. However, it also put forward a message that goes well beyond the Israeli context – in times of need, the non-liberal network also functions as a practical political alliance.

The liberal camp lags behind, but it too has shown some willingness to get involved in the Israeli election. In light of the global crisis of liberal democracy, there is a growing understanding that like-minded liberals and progressives – in various countries – should better coordinate and cooperate. Bernie Sanders has even called for an “international progressive front” to confront the “new authoritarian axis.” Civil society organizations were the first to take the lead in this challenge, and the Israeli election may signal the beginning of a spillover into the political field. Stav Shaffir, one of the founders of Israel’s left-wing Democratic Camp, has called on progressives to establish a “united movement.”

In this liberal democratic spirit of pushing back, a few days before Israel’s April 2019 election, U.S. Democratic presidential candidates voiced unprecedented criticism of Netanyahu, accusing him of endorsing racism and of being corrupt. Sanders said openly he hoped Netanyahu loses. This was a continuation of a gradual process, in which mainstream Jewish organizations and figures showed willingness to criticize Netanyahu and his domestic policies. This trend was motivated both by resentment towards Netanyahu, and by his overly-close alliance with Trump. Nevertheless, lacking a clear progressive alternative candidate to Netanyahu, liberals’ critical steps never amounted to a direct endorsement of his opponents.

In Europe, liberals have been even more cautious. They tend to refrain from intervening in domestic Israeli politics, partly because they too did not see an appealing alternative to Netanyahu they could wholeheartedly endorse. French President Macron was the exception. Four days prior to the previous election, he hosted Yair Lapid for a meeting, a move which the Blue and White party hoped would boost their international image. Macron’s step could be seen as a personal favor, grounded in pre-existing links with Lapid, but which also stemmed from his position as a central leader within the global liberal camp and as an alternative to Trump.

Despite their limited nature, these tentative steps by liberals indicate that a change may be underway to challenge the loud illiberal support for Netanyahu. But their insufficient nature can be seen by the fact that no further steps have been taken towards the September 2019 elections, and Israel’s center-left politicians have not yet acted to encourage their international allies to take action. That seems even more short-sighted, bearing in mind how global liberals will have no option but to get involved in Israeli affairs should the next Israeli government fulfil Netanyahu’s promise to annex settlements, and as the U.S. presidential election draw near.

Placing the Israeli election as one in a series of global events allows us to obtain a broader perspective of the ongoing realignment of the international system. It demonstrates the willingness of key liberal and non-liberal actors to adopt a more proactive approach in influencing what was until now considered diplomatically as sacred ground – national elections in friendly countries.

It may signal that the gloves are coming off in the global conflict between liberals and nonliberals. However, it also demonstrates the power asymmetry between the camps. The world’s liberals still have much work to do, before they can collectively succeed to turn the tide.

Dr. Gil Murciano is a foreign policy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Israeli Elections and the Global Competition between the Liberal and Non-Liberal Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Voters in the world’s largest supranational elections picked 751 representatives from 28 states. Fear of the far-right generated a record turnout, with voters shaking off their usual complacency and heading to the ballot boxes. Some 51 percent of 425 million eligible voters exercised their democratic right, setting a 20-year record.

Twenty-one radical right movements operate in the EU’s 28 member states, enjoying an absolute or relative majority in some. Most favored an EU pullout in the past, but are currently working in tandem across the continent to change the union from within.

Deputy Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, whose Lega party rose from 6 percent of the vote in 2014 to 34 percent, claims Europe is changing. Salvini, expected to be among the leaders of the far-right and Eurosceptic bloc in the EU Parliament, represents a nationalist, xenophobic and centralistic line. He makes no bones about his admiration for Benito Mussolini and often uses expressions similar to ones favored by the fascist World War II leader. On Mussolini’s birthday, Salvini tweeted: “So many enemies, so much honor”, a variation on “Il Duce”’s famous saying. On a recent visit to Mussolini’s hometown Forli, he addressed the crowds from the balcony that Mussolini used.

Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party won 52 percent of the Hungarian vote; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally garnered some 23 percent of the French vote (compared with 25 percent in 2014); the neo-Nazis of Alternative for Germany received 11 percent of the German vote (compared with 7 percent in 2014). Slovakia’s neo-Nazis recorded the most significant victory of the elections, with Our Slovakia, which includes various Holocaust deniers and anti-Semites, winning 120,000 votes (12 percent) compared with only 9,000 in 2014.

The common goal of Europe’s far-right is to introduce a Trojan horse into the heart of the continent in order to spread a message of fear, erase current European borders and redraw them. They want a white, Christian, nationalist Europe without immigrants and foreigners. The 2008 financial crisis, combined with the crisis of Middle Eastern and African refugees dreaming to reach Europe, intensified the debate about the very need for a union of 520 million Europeans and the threat looming over “Christian Europe”. The ghosts of World War II Europe have re-emerged and could be strengthened if a financial crisis erupts again. The populist rebellion of the 21st century is not necessarily of the poor; it is a protest of the conservative middle class that feels cheated of its rights, jobs and national pride. They are the major losers of globalization who feel nostalgic for past glories, with some dreaming to be part of an empire once again.

Steve Bannon, President Trump’s former adviser, spent a long time in Europe prior to the elections in a bid to establish and organize a nationalist right-wing bloc that would dictate Europe’s future – both through the European Parliament and in member states. After winning national elections in Italy, France appears to be the next target of the radical right. France and Italy, who were among the founders of the European community after two world wars and tens of millions of deaths, are now seeing antiEuropean groups placing high in the European Parliament elections. French President Emmanuel Macron dubbed the far-right led by Salvini, Le Pen and Orban “a spreading leprosy”.

Ironically, the European far-right that awakens all the ghosts of the past is seeking a seal of approval from the State of Israel in order to increase its popularity on the continent. Salvini condemns anti-Semitism at every opportunity and even troubled himself recently to Jerusalem and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial. While Jean Marie Le Pen, the former leader of the extreme right in France, claimed the annihilation of European Jews was merely “a detail” of World War II, his daughter Marine tries to distance anti-Semitism from her party and mobilizes French Jews to clear her name. In the 2017 French presidential elections, 11 million French, more than one-third of the electorate, voted for her. Le Pen demands France for the French and aspires to her country’s presidency.

Israel has a significant interest in developments on its neighboring continent, which provides it with significant economic, security, social, and cultural backing. Ties between Israel and Europe are deep, good and ongoing despite political disagreements and the EU’s frequent criticism of Israel’s Palestinian policy. Recent Israeli governments have tried to drive a wedge between European states critical of Israel and populist, nationalist European governments who toe Israel’s line. The bloc headed by Salvini and Le Pen will try to sway European legislation and policy in order to limit anti-Israel criticism.

However, most European Jews do not fall into this trap. They understand that beyond the pleasing rhetoric, some far-right leaders are seeking to downplay their anti-Semitism and xenophobia in a superficial makeover that will generate political profits for them. Jewish leaders and rabbis in Europe are closely monitoring the election results and expressing concern over the creation of a far-right bloc in the heart of Europe, at the center of its parliamentary decision-making.

Quite a few Israelis shuddered when Salvini laid a wreath at Yad Vashem a few months ago. President Reuven Rivlin has persistently rejected all attempts at a relationship of any kind with the European nationalist right. In an unusual step, he expressed support for Macron over Le Pen in the French national elections. No one is saying Israel should cut off ties with states in which the far-right comes to power. However, it should relate to them with a mixture of respect and suspicion rather than expressing undying friendship for them. President Rivlin knows this is a masked ball by the far-right. The foreign ministry does too and urges Israel to avoid ties with such elements as Alternative for Germany and Austria’s Freedom Party.

Israel must continue to strengthen its scientific, defense, economic, cultural and technological ties with Europe. It must aspire to positive relations with Europe even when it is critical of Israel over the Palestinian issue, and prefer democratic allies even when it disagrees with them. Israel must also display sensitivity toward the fears of European Jewish communities over the rise of the right and their concerns over the repercussions of decisions made in Jerusalem.

Despite its growing power and entrenchment, the European far-right was not as successful in the European Parliament elections as it hoped. Most European citizens still chose parties loyal to European integration and liberal-democratic values. However, the struggle against the far-right continues, and Israel has a role to play. It must place itself on the right side of the values scale and help block the European “leprosy”.

Henrique Cymerman is a television journalist and recipient of numerous human rights and journalism, awards. He covers the rise of the European right and lectures at the School of Government of the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Europe’s Far-Right Is Blocked, for Now; Israel Should Help This Continue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections Results: Possible Significance for Europe and Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016.

Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies.

While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to help Israel’s long-term interest of trust and friendship with the EU. Up until a few years ago, Israel could boast of having the highest level of achievements and ties with the EU among non-European states. That was only fitting given that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a worldleading innovator with a developed market economy. However, Israel’s economic agreements with its main trading partner are virtually obsolete – an “Association Agreement” from 1995 and an “Action Plan” from 2004 that was meant as a temporary, four-year agreement. In 2008, Israel was about to sign an upgraded plan but the EU created a linkage: absent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, no progress can be achieved with the EU.

The upgrade has been suspended for over a decade. Were it not for the linkage, we could have enjoyed even more prosperous relationship. On the other hand, in 2013 the EU offered Israel the status of a “Special Privileged Relationship” as an incentive – maturation of the peace process would yield significantly upgraded ties. The Israeli government did not even consider the idea. Since 2012, the Israel-EU Association Council, an annual ministerial-level political dialogue, has not convened. Relations are handled by civil servants. Meanwhile, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have upgraded their “Partnership Priorities” agreements with the EU in recent years.

Relations between Israel and the EU have fluctuated over the years. A significant high was recorded in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The most recent “honeymoon” occurred between 2005 and 2008 following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and up until Operation “Cast Lead” and Netanyahu’s rise to power. For over a decade now, political relations with the world’s largest trading bloc have been at a low that is even starting to affect trade relations along with economic and research cooperation.

Netanyahu and his ministers have been inciting Israelis against the EU for several years. Israelis have grown accustomed to seeing the EU as a hostile entity rather than a friendly critic. However, even if there is disagreement with the EU over the peace process, settlement construction, Iran and more recently over Jerusalem, the EU remains Israel’s second most important strategic partner after the US. This is not a partnership born of mutual interests dictated by regional or global circumstances. Strategic partnerships are forged with those who share our world view and values, primarily with liberal democracies in which the rule of law is a substantive component that includes respect for and protection of human and minority rights.

The relationship with the EU is complex, largely because the EU itself is complex. As a union of 28 states (possibly 27 soon due to Brexit), efforts are always under way to ensure that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. While the EU has achieved this goal to a significant degree in the economic arena, it has had a hard time doing so in foreign policy aspects.

Brussels has often played the bad cop, such as the 2013 guidelines adding a territorial clause to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation agreement. Under that resolution, Israeli research institutions can only benefit from the agreement if they operate within the Green Line. The Netanyahu government had no choice but to go along with the EU’s territorial, legal and economic differentiation between institutions on each side of the Green Line. The backlash followed a few years later. Netanyahu has exploited the crises affecting the EU in recent years over debts, migration and Brexit, accompanied by the rise of populist parties. He took advantage of internal EU rifts to mobilize “rogue” states against anti-Israel decisions.

The new Israeli government should stop boasting of its “divide and rule” tactic and inciting public opinion against the EU and try instead to sever the EU’s linkage that is damaging to the relationship. The sad state of relations is not only the Netanyahu government’s fault. The EU did its share, adopting resolutions such as the linkage condition, the territorial clause and the labeling of settlement goods. Only a government that will advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process will be able to fundamentally change this trend and stem the troubling deterioration in relations with Israel’s biggest partner in terms of values, trade and scientific research.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu is co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, a lecturer at Hebrew University’s Europe Forum and a member of a Mitvim Institute task team.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

US President Donald Trump is closely aligned with Netanyahu and is expected to give him leeway over such policies. The EU today is less united against Netanyahu’s policies than in the past. So it may need a Democratic US administration in 2020 to present and enforce some red lines, in part because Netanyahu will face no significant domestic opposition on foreign policy or national security issues.

The two major pro-peace parties (Labor and Meretz) together have less than ten percent of the Knesset. While Blue and White’s 35 seats is a major achievement for a first-time political run, it does not endorse a two-state solution, and includes some right-wing hard-liners on the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu has portrayed himself as a master-statesman and highlighted his relations with (mostly) populist and anti-liberal world leaders. This trend is set to continue, further eroding the democratic component of Israel’s foreign relations.

Despite its weakness, Israel’s opposition must present an alternative vision based on advancing peace, increasing regional belonging in Europe and the Middle East, and anchoring Israel to the club of liberal democracies. This will not be easy, but Israel’s friends around the world need to know that there is more to Israel and its foreign relations than Netanyahu.

(originally published in the Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Trump Gives Israel’s ‘Master Statesman’ License to Carry On הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s warm relationship with the US administration, the enhanced alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, and burgeoning relations with Gulf States could bolster these claims. However, missing from this rosy picture are the stagnated peace process with the Palestinians, the inability to resolve the festering conflict with Hamas in Gaza, tensions with the EU, crises with Russia and Turkey, difficulties with key Jewish communities, troubling embraces of illiberal leaders from Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, and more.

It will be up to the next Israeli government to reevaluate and provide alternatives to Israel’s current foreign policy, to the values guiding it, and to the status of those government agencies tasked with implementing it. Should the next foreign minister – assuming a fulltime minister will be appointed, unlike after the 2015 elections – will have interest in promoting a pro-peace, multi-regional, internationalist, modern and inclusive Israeli foreign policy, he or she should take the following steps during the first 100 days in office:

First on the agenda is launching a process to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) based on previous agreements and international resolutions, in accordance with the accepted parameters of a two-state solution. Such a move could be launched with a public statement of intent regarding the final goal of the negotiations as proof of seriousness, a meeting with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the creation of a bilateral channel for talks (with an initial clandestine component). Israel should also support the establishment of an updated multilateral mechanism to support the peace process, as an improvement to the existing Quartet, in which specific European and Middle Eastern countries will also take part. While advancing such an initiative, the next Israeli government must recognize the need for a renewed political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as the current split poses a major obstacle on the way to a two-state solution.

The second step to follow the first should be leveraging the move vis-à-vis the Palestinians to realize the unfulfilled regional potential. Israel has been presented with unique opportunities in recent years to significantly upgrade its standing in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe, most of which remain unrealized due to the freeze in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Progress with the Palestinians would enable the next government to take relations with Arab countries to the next level, making them more public and diverse, rather than focusing mostly on behind-the-scenes security coordination. It would also revive regional incentives for peace that previous Israeli governments wrongly ignored – the Arab Peace Initiative and the EU’s proposal of a Special Privileged Partnership, and enable the leveraging of economic cooperation in the Mediterranean to affect change in the diplomatic, civil and security spheres. Finally, it would remove significant obstacles to upgrading Israel’s relationship with the EU.

The third measure is strengthening the democratic component in Israel’s foreign relations. In recent years, the Israeli government eroded basic principles of Israeli democracy. Along with the repercussions of these actions on Israeli society, they have also had an impact on the state’s foreign relations. The next foreign minister will have to prioritize relations and alliances with democratic states, even those critical of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians. As a rule, Israel must recognize the legitimacy of criticism and conduct dialogue with those voicing it rather than seeking to undermine them. The new foreign minister will have to pull back from Israel’s rapprochement with far-right elements in Europe, some of them tainted by antisemitism. Instead of lashing out at the EU and joining forces with European member states seeking to divide and weaken it, Israel must regard the EU as a partner – both in practical terms and from a value-based perspective. Rather than inviting Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Jerusalem, after the European Parliament elections in May Israel should invite whoever replaces Federica Mogherini as the EU’s foreign policy chief.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong and well-functioning foreign ministry and recognition of diplomacy as a central instrument in advancing national security. Thus, the fourth move required of the new foreign minister will be to formulate a national foreign policy paradigm, bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to the forefront of core foreign policy issues, upgrade the standing of the Foreign Service vis-à-vis the defense establishment, and restore to the MFA responsibilities delegated to other government bodies in recent years. The minister will also have to work with the Knesset to increase its focus on foreign policy issues (first and foremost by its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee), and advance internal structural reforms within the MFA. Last but by no means least, the new foreign minister will have to raise public awareness of the importance of diplomacy and of the MFA’s role in implementing it.

The upcoming general elections provide an opportunity to change course in Israel’s foreign policy, towards an empowered Foreign Service, better ties with the Middle East and Europe, and progress in the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace. A full plate awaits Israel’s next foreign minister.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the Mitvim Institute and a lecturer at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט What Should Israel’s Next Foreign Minister Do? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Whether or not the Holocaust will be introduced into the Moroccan curriculum, Morocco has a unique story as a Muslim state willing to acknowledge the Holocaust. Most Muslim states oscillate between avoiding taking a stance on the matter and Holocaust denial, because acknowledging the Holocaust is perceived as harmful to Palestinian interests. So how can it be that Morocco acknowledges the Holocaust? The answer to this, as in many other matters, is the king, in this case Mohammed V. According to the Moroccan narrative, which many Moroccans are familiar with, when the Vichy regime ruled Morocco at the beginning of the 1940s, King Mohammed V was asked to hand over the Jews of his country to the Nazis. The Moroccans relate with pride that the king refused to concede to this demand, arguing fervently that there were only Moroccans in his country. Of course, in reality the story was more complex, restrictive decrees against the Jews were imposed at the instruction of the Vichy regime and freedom of employment, movement etc. were limited. Until today, the issue remains a source of dispute, and despite the important role Mohammed V had played, he was not yet awarded the title Righteous Among the Nations. However, Mohammed V was and remains a hero who saved the Jews. Here lays the real meaning of the story and whether accurate or exaggerated, it allowed the Morocco to develop a positive national identity with regard to the events that took place during the Second World War and the horrors of that period. While in Europe the Jews were annihilated, the Muslims in Morocco helped save them.

But what has happened since Mohammed V’s gesture to the Jews of his land and how does Morocco relate to the Holocaust today? Until 2009, Morocco made almost no public statements regarding the Holocaust. Morocco did not officially acknowledge or deny it. Among the general public a range of opinions existed, but on the national level silence reigned. In 2009, UNESCO inaugurated the Aladdin Project, designed to serve as a platform for activities and educational and cultural initiatives that will bring closer Jews and Muslims in the Middle East and beyond. It was initially established by France, Jordan, and Germany; later on, other states such as Indonesia, Mauritania, Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt also joined. One of its endeavors involves the translation of literature and films about the Holocaust into the official languages of the UN, especially Arabic. The project even enables free digital download of the books, thus making quality content on the topic available. Morocco apparently liked the initiative and Mohammed VI, acknowledged the Holocaust in an official message to the initiators of the Aladdin Project. This was a rare official declaration by a leader of a Muslim country.

When the king speaks, his message begins to trickle downwards, even though obstacles are met along the way. In April 2010, André Azoulay, the advisor to the king, declared that the Moroccan Ministry of Education needs to introduce the Holocaust into educational programs in schools. This initiative elicited protest from pro-Palestinian groups: they called for him to pack up his belongings and leave the country. In response to the protest, an opposing campaign, supporting Azoulay and the message he sought to impart, ensued. Despite the opposition, various elements in Moroccan civil society have adopted Azoulay’s message with pride and organized lectures and conferences in higher education institutions, including testimonies by Holocaust survivors who came to Morocco to tell their stories. In September 2011, the Mimouna association, organized one of the first conferences in the Arab world under the title “Mohammed V: Righteous Among the Nations”. In addition, there are other initiatives in Morocco that seek to change and adapt the educational program, in order to increase the representation of all shades of Moroccan heritage, including Jews and Amazigh (Berbers), which at present are almost completely absent from the history books.

At the bottom line, although Holocaust studies have not yet been officially included in the Moroccan curriculum, it is possible that we will see this happen soon in light of the country’s special history. Morocco’s recognition and sensitive approach to the Holocaust is an additional sign of the special relationship between Jews and Muslims in Morocco and the way this relationship is being included as part of the broader Moroccan heritage.

Einat Levi is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and a strategic consultant specializes in Morocco.

(originally published in the Morocco World News)

הפוסט Holocaust Studies in Morocco? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have demonstrated an enduring interest in collaborating on an ambitious undersea pipeline that would deliver Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe. Since 2011, heads of state from these three East Mediterranean states have met on a regular basis and signed MOUs pledging future energy cooperation (in addition to other areas), if and when the climate is right. Italy’s deepening participation in these dialogues only adds to the general sense of enthusiasm surrounding the appropriately named “EastMed pipeline”. Neither consensus between multiple governments nor the European Union’s commitment of $100 million in a feasibility study – a number that sounds significant, but in comparison to the estimated $7 billion pipeline costs, is a drop in the ocean – promises that this vision will become reality. After all, the average Israeli family invests a larger percentage as a down payment for an apartment.

Commercial viability lies at the center of the EastMed pipeline debate. At present, companies like Noble Energy and Delek Group have found more success in smaller, regional deals. The decision to export Israeli gas to Egypt, for example, demonstrates the compelling logic of limited scale projects where there is pre-existing infrastructure. By contrast, the EastMed pipeline – which would be the world’s largest undersea pipeline – requires not only investment and partnership between multiple corporations, but also the patience to endure a longer, more ambitious, and riskier route. Eni, the Italian oil and gas supermajor developing many of Egypt’s reserves and also investing in Cyprus’ waters, might be the perfect partner for such an endeavor, however there is little indication at present that developers are in agreement about the EastMed pipeline’s feasibility and estimated timeline.

If a consortium of corporations did decide to invest in the EastMed pipeline, its members would need to be resolute in the face of the proposed pipeline route’s many anticipated engineering challenges, shifts in the global energy market that may temporarily nullify the economic value of the pipeline, as well as the predictable delays that would accompany an enterprise of this scale. It took four years to connect Tamar field – a modest, 90 kilometer pipeline – to Israel’s coastline, so it is ambitious to imagine that a 2,200 kilometer pipeline would be constructed in similar timetable. So long as shorter, cheaper options are available, it is unclear that the EastMed pipeline will reach the minimal financial investment required to get off the ground.

That doesn’t mean Steinitz is barking up the wrong tree. After all, Israel has signed impactful export agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. In an increasingly diverse and competitive energy market, one must generate headlines in order to attract investment (on November 5, Israel extended its bid round for offshore exploration licenses), and Steinitz has proven to be a talented frontman for the Netanyahu government’s energy ambitions.

Still, Steinitz’s statement to Israeli TV on November 24 was oddly tone deaf. “For decades, we have complained about the Arab influence in Europe due to oil and gas,” he told Hadashot news, “The export of gas to Europe will moderate this influence to a certain extent and be a counterweight to Arab power.” While historically oil-producing Arab states have wielded outsized international influence because of their central role in the global energy market (and specifically in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict), many of these states are in the midst of a budding security relationship with the Jewish state. Steinitz seemingly ignores the fact that the selling point of the EastMed pipeline from a European perspective is the opportunity to diversify supply and reduce Russian influence, not necessarily Arab influence. Most importantly, the minister’s claim was based on state-level analysis of energy’s impact, sidestepping the bigger question that Israelis should be asking themselves: how will the EastMed pipeline impact my bottom line?

A major infrastructure project that delivers Israeli gas to Europe would be a historic achievement, strengthening a diplomatic and economic partnership that is essential to Israel’s success. But that doesn’t mean the average consumer is going to feel the difference when they receive their monthly electricity bill, and Israel’s government must make a more concerted effort to explain how it remains in the public interest to support projects like the EastMed pipeline. Failure to do so may result in a wave of protests similar to those that responded to the original natural gas framework. Given that the EU feasibility test is expected to offer its conclusions in 2019, there is no better time for the government to start answering the big questions associated with Israel’s energy policy.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in Globes)

הפוסט EastMed Gas Pipeline Must Overcome Major Obstacles הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, it seems that the glorious days of the ministry, if they ever truly existed, have long passed. Ever since the current government was formed in 2015, there has been no full-time foreign minister. The ministry, which – despite its prestige – has always struggled for a leading role in the decision-making process, is generally excluded from significant aspects of Israel’s foreign and defense policy. Salaries of the ministry’s officials are low, especially when considering the strict screening process and the job requirements. Moreover, some of the responsibilities it used to have in the past were transferred to other ministries such as the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs.

The crisis in the ministry is also radiating outwards, and in recent years there has been a sharp drop in the number of candidates for the competitive cadet course. In 2012, there were 2,773 candidates whereas in 2017 only 1,374 candidates started the screening process. In an attempt to change the situation, employees at the ministry decided to take measures and in 2014 they even shut down the headquarters and embassies for the first time in Israel’s history. In late August 2018, the support staff in the ministry (which accounts to some 60% of personal abroad), staged another strike, with little notice.

The crisis in our ‘diplomatic kingdom’ is not unique to Israel. Technology, especially the digital media, allows governments to interact directory, with foreign officials and publics, making diplomatic interventions almost redundant. The decline of the nation-state and the rise of other important non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, international aid organizations, and even global cities, have weakened the need for conventional diplomacy.

But despite this state of affairs, Israel should not neglect its foreign service. In fact, it is needed today more than ever before. First and foremost, in order to prepare for global power transformations. The first change that requires strong foreign service is the rise of important new global players, such as China, but also India and in our region, Russia. We are transitioning from a world of American dominance to a world of multiple powers, that are likely to intervene in regional politics, such as ours. In such circumstances, small countries like Israel, will be required to refined diplomatic skills in order to navigate safely among the various foci of power. In recent decades Israel was in a convenient position: the US was the dominant player in the global system, and we were its closest allies. A vibrant Jewish community in the US has helped us and has been part of an effective pro-Israel lobby. It was often sufficient to appeal to Washington in order to achieve political goals in international forums such as the UN security council. However, in the new world, whereby Israel is required to maintain good relations with both the US and China (in spite of the tension between them), a more sophisticated approach will be required. Israel needs a corpus of skilled diplomats that will be able to cut the right alliances and lead Israel safely among nations.

The second change that requires a strong ministry of foreign affairs is the identity of the emerging powers. After five centuries of European and then American dominance, the 21st century is expected to be the Asian century. China has already overtaken or matched the US on a number of indicators, such as high-speed trains and supercomputers. This will require a significant shift in our mindset. The Euro-American scene is familiar to us, and to a certain extent we are part of it. For example, some of our prime ministers attended elite institutions in the US. The current prime minister (as well as the education minister) were even had American citizenship in the past. Our familiarity with the Euro-Atlantic powers is a result of demography. In the past few centuries, most of the Jewish people have lived in Europe, North America and the Middle East. As a result, we share – in spite of some extremely difficult episodes such as the holocaust – common cultural, religious and historical roots with the European world and its extension in the new world.

This is not the case in Asia. Despite the hectic backpackers’ travels and vipassana workshops that Israelis attend, Asian culture, values and history – are foreign to most Israelis. In order to conduct ourselves effectively in a world where Far-East countries are so important, a professional corpus of skilled and specialized diplomats is required. The foreign service is the natural place to build such a cadre of experts that will make it easier for Israel to face the rising powers. This will require the ministry to invest even more in training and in developing area specializations.

Finally, dispersing the authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between various institutions and ministries leads to duplication, inefficiency and the absence of a clear and sharp message. Logically, there should be a concentration of powers in one ministry with a broad outlook and an accurate reflection of the positions of international players with whom the ministry is in continuous contact. One example is the current effort against BDS. Instead of the traditional leadership of the ministry on the matter, aspects of it were securitized. Recent reports indicated that the Israeli security Agency (Shabak) is guiding the security personal in Israel’s airports with an eye towards limiting criticism of Israel’s control over the territories. This lead to some counterproductive outcomes such as an aggressive questioning at the airport this summer of a leading Jewish philanthropist, Meyer Koplow, and a leading Jewish American journalist, Peter Beinart.

In the past, the Zionist movement coped well with global power transitions and was effective in dealing with the fall the fall of the Ottoman Empire, through the Balfour Declaration and all the way to the alliance with the US in recent decades. We are facing a similar moment now, and the Foreign Ministry is perhaps the most important player to help Israel cope with the change. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, is very much needed.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Why Israel Needs a Strong Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In recent years, the EU has found it increasingly difficult to have an impact on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Internal divisions and differences of opinions among member states – especially between those in western and northern Europe and those in central and eastern Europe – have prevented meaningful decisions on the topic in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council since 2016. The split within the EU has become evident even in UN votes, such as the vote regarding the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is working to deepen these divisions and to leverage them to his benefit. He recently stated this in public, on his way to a visit in Lithuania. Israel under his leadership is trying to limit the EU’s ability to reach the consensus needed to make decisions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is doing so by fostering alliances with various groupings of European countries – the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Hellenic states (Cyprus and Greece), and next in line may be the Balkan states. This is done in parallel to growing criticism of the EU by top Israeli ministers, often including insults and portrayals of the EU – Israel’s largest trade partner – as a rival rather than a friend and partner.

The EU has not yet found effective policy solutions to these developments. It also does not see a sense of urgency to do so, particularly at a time when no Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are in sight and while the EU is preoccupied with more pressing internal and regional challenges. Nevertheless, the EU is not giving up on voicing its opinions and searching for paths for taking action, even if the potential impact is limited. In addition to condemnations, voicing concern, and conveying messages via traditional diplomatic channels, the EU is also working to maintain, foster, and deepen its ties with those in Israeli society who support peace, democracy, and human rights. This is evident in the support given to Israeli pro-peace civil society organizations and hosting relevant Israeli politicians in Brussels.

This month was not the first time Arab members of Knesset visited Brussels. Most recently, a delegation from the Joint List visited the European Parliament in November 2017. Their latest meeting with Mogherini is a step forward in their efforts to internationalize their quest for equality within Israel and to protest Netanyahu’s policies. This activism in the international arena draws criticism in Israel but it is very much in line with how modern diplomacy actually works in the 21st century. Citizens, organizations, businesses, and politicians can now take a larger role than ever in shaping foreign relations, which is no longer the exclusive domain of ministries of foreign affairs.

The increased involvement of Arab members of Knesset in foreign affairs holds potential that goes well beyond their current protest against the Jewish Nation-State Law. It can lead to an important and constructive role in future peace negotiations, and in efforts to improve ties between Israel and Arab (and Muslim) countries. To date, their involvement in these issues has been low, but the potential is significant.

The EU, from its perspective, sees meeting Israel’s Arab legislators as another opportunity to convey to the Israeli government its deep concern over the direction in which Israel is heading, and to declare its partnership with those in Israel – Arabs and Jews alike – who are working to change Israel’s course. This support, which takes various forms, is welcomed by a large number of pro-peace and progressive Israelis, and should continue.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Mogherini’s Meeting with Arab Legislators from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The current standing of American diplomacy shows the flaws of Trump’s approach. The U.S. is publicly at odds with Canada over trade, and with European allies over climate, defense spending, and Iran. Transatlantic unity has been frayed by unpredictability and withdrawal from international agreements. As Trump met Kim, many supporters of a substantive deal on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula considered a new hurdle: that counterparts will no longer see the U.S. as credible or capable of implementing a nuclear agreement. Denuclearization is a lofty goal in ideal times, and the current climate makes it even less probable for a nuclear state to voluntarily surrender its capabilities.

In this context, it is unsurprising that the Trump-Kim meeting did not result in a tangible ‘win’ for nonproliferation. North Korea made no new commitments. Kim gained positive publicity surrounding the meeting and a new U.S. commitment to suspend a large-scale military exercise with South Korea. It is unclear what comes next, and the potential for disagreement is high. While disputes with Canada lead to angry tweets, disputes with angry nuclear weapons states have far greater risks.

Trump’s talks with Kim are juxtaposed with his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and lack of a viable strategy. Direct and implicit threats are insufficient to meet long-term challenges, and they exacerbate tensions by empowering Iranian hardliners. Secretary Pompeo’s recent speech on Iran was not a strategy, but a demand for full submission that unilateral U.S. sanctions are unlikely to achieve, especially as European partners advance financial blocking regulations and exemptions from reimposed nuclear sanctions.

In the immediate term, U.S. threats coupled with European efforts may prevent Iranian nuclear escalation. But while the deal’s opponents feared regulations that would ‘sunset’ in the mid-2020’s, we are now in a shakier environment in which those provisions may collapse well before 2020. As a result of JCPOA withdrawal, the international community is less prepared to address a potential collapse, or an ambiguous action by Iran. Prior to the JCPOA, Iran’s strategy was based on developing its nuclear program in the grey area between technical compliance and clear violation. If Iran again began to operate in the margins, without committing a clear violation, how would the world respond?

A viable strategy should emphasize diplomacy wherever possible. It should consider that all other JCPOA parties, including China and Russia, remain committed to the deal. It should deploy threats of force sparingly and wisely, and promote smart diplomatic processes towards both North Korea and Iran when the chances of success appear realistic. Otherwise, the Trump administration risks placing the U.S. in a more isolated position, with less insight into Iran’s nuclear activities, and a diminished ability to leverage the powers of alliances and diplomatic credibility when engaging with rogue regimes. These are important tools that the administration should not turn away from.

Rebecca Bornstein is Director for External Relations and Researcher at the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump’s Policies on Iran and North Korea Are Weakening U.S. Diplomatic Power הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For Zionism, a state was a pre-requisite to safeguarding the Jewish people. Israel exists to provide for the wellbeing of all its citizens, Jews and non-Jews, but it is also an existential point of reference, and if necessary a refuge, for every Jew on earth. Still today, Israel is an exemplar of a functioning democracy amongst authoritarian regimes, a true multicultural society respecting, albeit not perfectly, the rights of minorities. Still today, the majority of Israelis would prefer to live in a country abiding by the high moral tenets that the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and his like, have upheld.

The frequent failure of present-day Israel to be fully accepted in the family of nations and to find favor in world public opinion should not in itself be of particular concern to us, Israelis. The critical importance of safeguarding the country’s borders and its citizens against those still seeking its elimination, justifies even the price of certain seclusion. Nevertheless, straying from the high moral standards upon which Israel was established, and breaching the moral boundaries the state founders have set for us, could become a real threat to the existence and wellbeing of Israel as we know it, and of world Jewry.

The visit to Jerusalem this week by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán [18-20 July] symbolizes such moral failure. The recent agreement reached by the Israeli and Polish governments, exonerating Poland of some of its notorious actions during the World War II, is another example of boundaries that Israelis should not cross.

In her unconventional book on the banality of evil, reporting from the trial of Nazi criminal Eichmann, German Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote, “evil can be banal and redefined as a civil norm.” She added that, “most people will comply but some people will not […] The Final Solution […] ‘could happen’ in most places but it did not happen everywhere.” While Orbán and his like across Europe cannot be compared to Nazi criminal Eichmann, reactions today in parts of Europe to immigration from the east serves as a brutal reminder of how quickly and seamlessly moral standards can deteriorate, also and even presently in Europe.

Hosting illiberal leaders in Jerusalem whose raison d’être is elimination of immigration, and by that legitimizing their policies, is an absurdity and an outcry. The reasons pushing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to try to court Poland, Hungary and others, in an effort to split and weaken the EU toll in the region is understandable. He and his government often face automatic and even perfunctory criticism from the EU conglomerate, so trying to draw a wedge inside Europe is basic realpolitik. The EU has some responsibility, too, when others are more inclined to accept forces wishing to destroy the principles on which it stands.

Nevertheless, short-term political gains from realigning with Europe’s extreme right might prove very costly for Israel. Endorsing Orbán works against the Jewish state’s core values and interests. For Israeli leadership, national interest should go far beyond immediate political gains and their responsibility extends to world Jewry. The implications of their actions and statements ought to be in good faith for the Jewish people and for Zionism-at-large.

The litmus test for Israel’s leaders in that regard should be whether the Jewish community in the discussed country supports the leadership in question. Are the country’s Jews as a minority feeling welcome, safe and protected? In the case of Hungary, the answer is no. Orbán’s anti-Semitic undertones and policies threaten Hungary’s Jews. That should be sufficient to disinvite him and several others who are in a similar position.

Beyond the immediate political gains, the EU and Israel should act more responsibly in order to serve the long term interests and wellbeing of their people. Brussels and Jerusalem must reestablish trust and increase practical exchange within the wide spectrum of center-right and center-left in both entities. They should work together, within the many existing joint frameworks, to create more unity between moderate forces, and together reject radicalism. Israel has valued expertise it can share with the EU in the field of absorbing immigrants and making refugees feel at home. Europe’s greatest challenge today is one Israel has dealt with throughout its existence, being a true immigrant society. In proportional terms, Israel taking in one million Russian immigrants when it had less than six, some three decades ago, can be compared to Germany taking in over ten million immigrants today. Albeit not similar, specifically on the background of religious affinity between Jews which is absent in Europe, many challenges are the same.

Israel will stand to gain from opposing Europe’s extremists and sticking to the noble values upon which it was established. World Jewry will be proud once again to be affiliated with their second homeland, Israel. And Europe will have an ally with unprecedented credibility in fighting xenophobia, a calming element to a most volatile region at its footsteps, to defend the values upon which the European Union was created, on the rubbles of World War II.

Raanan Eliaz founded and led for a decade the European Leadership Network (ELNET) and its Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD), two organizations dedicated to strengthening relations between Europe and Israel. He is a member of the Mitvim Institute’s task-team on Israel-EU relations.

(originally published by EurActiv)

הפוסט Orban in Jerusalem: Challenging Days for Europe-Israel Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Netanyahu has faced trouble, including ministerial resignations and police investigations, since shortly after the 2015 elections. Over the last year, the arguments for his imminent demise gathered steam: In February, police recommended that the attorney general indict him for corruption based on investigations in four different cases. The situation in the Gaza Strip festered; the Temple Mount nearly exploded; and the news warned almost nightly of a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There has been no progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace since negotiations collapsed in 2014. And at home, a wave of rage against economic hardship and massive social inequality erupted in 2011, when Netanyahu was prime minister as well, yet there has been no relief for the exorbitant cost of living in the seven years since.

Why then is Bibi more beloved than ever? In 2016, Netanyahu’s Likud party polled at an average of 25.7 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, lower than the 30 seats it won in 2015 but still ahead of all rivals. Each year, the average has crept upward. When the police recommended indicting Netanyahu, his party’s numbers rose. When U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, polls gave him the highest numbers in a decade, 35 or 36 seats; one survey was even rumored to predict 42.

As with so many things in Israel, Netanyahu’s solid support is based on security. In Israel’s political discourse, the word “security” signifies threats from any form of Palestinian violence, whether Qassam rocket fire, Palestinian demonstrations and attempts to cross the Gaza border, or girls wielding scissors. On Netanyahu’s watch, Israel has fought two wars against Hamas and dealt with a wave of stabbing attacks, along with a crisis on the Temple Mount and now the deadly escalation in Gaza.

When violence rises, Israelis vote right. This was the ultimate lesson of the Second Intifada, which brought a Likud leader back to power in 2001 after a short Labor Party term; the left has never won an election since.

Netanyahu has mastered the use of crises to shore up his support. Periodic escalation reminds nearly half of Israeli voters that they are relieved to keep the right in power. Just one-quarter of Israelis even believe peace is possible, and at present fewer than half of Israeli Jews support the two-state solution. The question in their minds is who knows how to manage a security problem, not who can bring peace. One Israeli voter recently told me she appreciates Netanyahu for knowing when to end military escalations. In other words, not only do many centrists and right-wingers not blame him for wars; they laud him for restraint.

Regional threats such as Iran, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State are also part of the security issue, but they are more theoretical. Israel has never fought a war with Iran. The last war with Hezbollah was 12 years ago, and there is no Islamic State to speak of in Israel. But in the public mind, they loom large, especially when Netanyahu hammers home the existential threat of Iran at all opportunities (or broadcasts a campaign ad saying the Israeli left will bring the Islamic State to Jerusalem). Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal was the jewel in Netanyahu’s crown. Whether the deal survives or whether it hinders or helps Iran’s presumed quest for military nuclear capabilities wasn’t truly the point. Netanyahu spoke, and a few days later the most powerful man in the world listened. That’s power.

It’s also vindication. For eight years, Netanyahu antagonized President Barack Obama. Israelis know the United States is Israel’s best friend; Netanyahu’s defiant attitude was a risky course not only for U.S.-Israeli relations but for Netanyahu’s home-front, too. After the 2015 elections, just one-quarter of Israelis thought U.S.-Israeli relations were good; three quarters rated relations bad or neutral; and Israeli Jews were split on whether Obama or Netanyahu was to blame.

Trump’s electoral victory set the relationship between the leaders back on solid ground; colossal policy victories such as pushing Washington to abandon the Iran deal and moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem conveyed to voters that Netanyahu was right all along. He had the grand plan before anyone believed in it.

There was another side of the foreign-policy scheme. In his fourth term, Netanyahu has made a big show of cultivating other friends beyond the United States or Europe — including India and Azerbaijan — to build economic ties and enhance the country’s regional security interests. The most important, if cryptic, relationship is with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It’s no accident that Netanyahu met Putin last week between the two strikes against Iranian targets in Syria or numerous times over the last two years as Israel has stepped up attacks of the same nature.

It’s too simplistic to say Israelis are distracted by terrorism and escalation away from Netanyahu’s corruption cases. Rather, Netanyahu’s military and diplomatic victories complement and thus burnish his image in domestic politics. Israelis regularly say, sighing, “There’s nobody else.” They mean that on the domestic as well as international scene.

Very few Israeli coalition governments have survived for a full term; most collapse and lead to early elections. Israel has had 34 coalitions in 70 years. By contrast, Netanyahu’s second government from 2009 to 2013 came close to a full term, and there’s no guarantee his current one will fall before 2019 — which would be close to another full term. Combined with his staying power (nearly 13 years combined, the second longest-serving prime minister), Netanyahu has brought a measure of political stability to Israel.

But there is a price. By the start of his fourth term, Netanyahu seemed to have unleashed his true self: a cult of personality in style and an increasingly consolidated strongman form of governance in practice.

For a time in early 2016, he held five ministerial portfolios in addition to prime minister, before slowly parceling them out; he still holds the post of foreign minister. His government shut down Israel’s historic public broadcast authority and has heaped policy and legal hardships on a new, reconstituted state-funded news corporation. Meanwhile, Netanyahu enjoys the stalwart support of the country’s highest-circulating newspaper funded by his patron Sheldon Adelson. His government is on a warpath against the Supreme Court and is currently debating a bill that would allow the Knesset to override the court’s right of judicial review.

When Netanyahu wanted a massive deal for the extraction of natural gas, the director of Israel’s antitrust authority and the economy minister resigned in protest, arguing that the arrangement prevented competition and protected a cartel, citing his direct interference. Netanyahu made himself economy minister, which allowed him to activate a special clause to sidestep antitrust regulations. To do that, he was required to consult with a Knesset committee by law. The committee members voted against the clause; he ignored them.

The result of strongman leadership is that people become much less enthusiastic for the foundations of democracy, favoring splashy personal achievements or controversy instead. And the irony of consolidating power is that it harms democracy but simultaneously generates an environment in which one person gets credit for everything going well, reinforcing support for that same leader.

Such a leader could also be blamed for all bad things. But many Israelis have apparently traded personal economic frustrations for an occasional celebration, be it Israel’s victory in the Eurovision contest or the U.S. Embassy moving to Jerusalem. Voters have lowered their standards on personal integrity in return for domestic tranquility, punctured only by the occasional war that most believe could not have been prevented. And, so the logic goes, it’s better to have Bibi fighting that war — or killing those protesters in Gaza who dare to seek a way out after 11 years of closure — than a despised left-winger.

Sooner or later, Netanyahu will eventually exit the political stage. But given the way that every crisis reinforces his power, and what his years in power have done to Israel, the pendulum doesn’t look likely to swing in the other direction soon.

(originally published in Foreign Policy)

הפוסט Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Like many before him, Arens claims that only the Palestinian refugees have been used “to serve as a festering sore that would prevent peace.” For years, if not decades, Israelis have insisted that “no one else does this.” In other conflicts, writes Arens, war refugees were resettled. He is right about this to some extent, however the refugees were not resettled as he describes.

Arens says that after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, “millions were displaced from their homes by the subsequent fighting in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Most have been resettled.” The basis for this assertion is unclear. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, by 2004, 1,000,473 refugees had returned to Bosnia from abroad – i.e., less than a decade after the war’s end, about half (more than a million out of more than two million refugees) returned to their country and were resettled there.

The Kosovo war in the spring of 1999 made refugees out of a million Kosovars, both inside and outside Kosovo. But by August 1999, about two months after the war ended, the UNHRC reported the return of about 750,000 refugees; at the end of that month, the UNHRC stated that 95 percent of the refugees had returned. Since then, most efforts have focused on integrating minorities, including Serbs, who also returned to their homes in Kosovo and Croatia, despite the difficulty of living alongside one’s enemies after a bloody war in the notat-all-distant past.

The return of refugees to Kosovo is still considered a success story: A recent assessment by the UNHRC found that the refugee situation was handled well, and that the return was especially quick, at the initiative of the refugees themselves and with the support of the international community. And Kosovo is the example that Arens chooses to cite?

One reason the international community moved so quickly to effect the return of refugees to Kosovo was the reluctance of neighboring countries to resettle those people within their borders. These Western countries were wary of absorbing a large number of refugees from the same continent – and yet Arens does not accuse them of political exploitation or manipulation for the purpose of preventing peace. He finds it more convenient to completely forget that Europe not only allowed a massive return of refugees to Yugoslavia: It encouraged it. The UNHRC’s report even says that certain countries feared that the Kosovo refugees would become the “new Palestinians.”

The argument that only in the Palestinian case do countries in which the refugees reside refuse to resettle them, so as to influence a future final status accord, is incorrect as well. In the early 1990s, in the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a million people lost their homes.

Three-quarters were Azeris who fled from the Karabakh province in Azerbaijan and from Armenia; the rest were mainly Armenians who fled Azerbaijan. Until recently, nearly 600,000 Azeris had not been permanently resettled, even while residing in Azerbaijan, because the latter does not recognize the independence of Karabakh but considers it Azeri territory under Armenian occupation. They are “internally displaced people.”

To support this political stance and ensure that in any future agreements the Azeri refugees’ right of return is recognized, the government refuses to permanently resettle these hundreds of thousands. Until not long ago, some lived in genuine refugee camps; many currently live in designated locales that lack infrastructure and are poorly served by welfare services.

The general outlines for a resolution of this conflict are accepted by the international community, and they include the principle of the return of refugees. None of this in any way justifies the poor treatment of refugees. But the notion that the demand for the right of return is exclusive to the Palestinians is patently false.

Adherents of Arens’ approach argue that the Sudeten Germans moved to Germany. Arens and others who make similar arguments should need no reminding that the Palestinians refugees as yet have no Palestinian state to which to return. Many of the Palestinian refugees have been stateless for as long as 70 years now because, unlike refugees in all the other places Arens mentioned, they have no country that they can call home.

It is time to bury the myth that everywhere else in the world, refugees whose situation resembles that of the Palestinians come to grips with their fate and the Palestinians alone refuse to do likewise. Advocates of this fallacy seek to dismiss the Palestinians’ need for solutions, and prefer to keep them as eternal enemies.

Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, researching comparative conflict dynamics. She is also a public opinion expert and an international political consultant.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Who Said Refugees Do Not Return Home? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This will not make newspaper headlines. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement is barely addressed in Israeli public discourse. Many Israelis are unaware of its advantages and importance. On the Jordanian street, the attitude towards the peace agreement with Israel is even worse. It is an attitude of hostility and objection to any form of a relationship with Israel. But these are peace relations which have a huge potential, and only a little of it has been realized.

The peace agreement is based on its strategic importance to both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the peace agreement with Israel is a highly important strategic anchor of stability: It has reinforced the Israeli umbrella of defense, as well as Jordan’s strategic relations with the US. The Israeli-American defense umbrella is crucial for Jordan in light of external threats from the east and from the north, but it also helps with internal security against the subversion of regional and local terror elements.

From the Israeli perspective, the peace agreement with Jordan is one of the pillars of the strategic-political stability, alongside the peace agreement with Egypt. Jordan serves as a friendly buffer state and a strategic partner – in the past, against threats from an Iraqi-led Arab front, and in recent years, against an Iranian-led Shiite coalition and dangers from the direction of Syria.

The extensive security cooperation became possible after the two governments recognized the critical need for this type of cooperation and invested all the required efforts, resources and attention for its development. The other areas – diplomatic, economic and civilian – haven’t enjoyed the same amount of attention and have not been perceived as equally vital, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made it very difficult to advance collaborations in these areas. As a result, the great potential hidden in the peace agreement hasn’t been realized.

In the diplomatic area, Jordan could become a closer partner of Israel in managing the relations with the Palestinians and furthering peace processes. It could be, as it has proved in the past, a good partner in running Jerusalem’s holy sites. In addition, it could serve as a partner in advancing relations with other Arab countries.

In the civilian area, Israel and Jordan share a number of issues and joint challenges that require tighter cooperation. Water is of course a key issue, and the existing agreements – coupled with the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance and water swaps plans – point to the existing potential. Furthermore, collaborations between the countries on issues and projects in the fields of environment, energy, tourism and infrastructure will provide the two countries with dividends that each country would be unable to achieve on its own.

It’s true that without considerable progress towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, the huge potential concealed in the relations between the countries cannot be fully realized. Nevertheless, in light of the existence of a formal peace agreement, real and invaluable progress can also be achieved in the current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinians.

The existing set of agreements between Israel and Jordan – in commerce, transportation, water, gas and other areas – serves as an infrastructure facilitating the quick advancement of plenty of collaborations, if the necessary priority is given.

The economic aspect is a good example. From the Israeli perspective, the economic relations with the small Jordanian economy are of minor importance (even in light of the latest agreement to sell natural gas to Jordan), but Jordan has a very important role as a bridge for Israeli commerce with the large Gulf state markets and other Arab markets.

According to studies conducted in recent years, opening up the Arab markets to Israel will create a new and powerful growth engine that would help increase the Israeli product by a quarter or a third more than expected in today’s conditions, and will make Israel part of the group of the world’s 15 richest countries. The Arab market will become Israel’s most important market alongside the European market.

The existing commerce and transportation agreements between Israel and Jordan could serve as a basis for the development of a new route of commerce between the Gulf states’ large markets and the Mediterranean Sea, through Jordan and Israel. This route is already active today, through the Jordan River border crossing near Beit She’an and the Haifa Port, but the volume of freight passing through it is relatively small. Turning this route into a regional terrestrial bridge will become possible by connecting Israel Railways to the new regional railway network.

This network is already in advanced construction stages in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf coasts. The plan is for Jordan to serve as the main junction of this network. Connecting the Jordanian train to Israel’s valley railroad will make it possible to complete the terrestrial bridge.

Despite some major difficulties, this project is politically feasible, as it is based on an active route and on a system of existing trade and transportation agreements. Any progress in this project could help create a new climate of faith in Israeli-Jordanian peace and gradually change the Jordanian (and Israeli) public’s views.

To strengthen the positive influence of the economic cooperation, it’s important to couple these moves with ongoing public relations efforts among both the Israeli and Jordanian publics, which would stress the benefits of the peace process, change the perception towards the other side and support the establishment of warm peace. The public perception changes, for their part, would help strengthen the collaborations and create other benefits. “Success stories” in the Israeli-Jordanian contexts would help strengthen the two countries’ regional standing as players with a stabilizing – economic and diplomatic – contribution to the regional system in general.

The Israel-Jordan peace agreement is a strategic asset with huge potential for both Israel and Jordan in many aspects. The reopening of the Israeli embassy in Jordan, after it was closed for half a year following the crisis between the countries, is an opportunity to look into ways to fix the missed opportunity and realize at least part of the major potential concealed in the peace agreement.

Yitzhak Gal is a financial and business advisor specializing in the Arab markets, and a researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study of Israel-Jordan relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

While the Arab Middle East is in turmoil and is capturing international attention mostly due to crises and instability, the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is witnessing some positive diplomatic momentum. In recent years, this has included the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey (although tensions between the countries remain); the tripartite summits between the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus and Greece; the coming to power of pro-peace Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; the forming of an alliance between Israel, Cyprus and Greece; and the increased security and economic ties between Israel and Egypt.

However, this positive momentum is challenged by a variety of geo-political factors, including the war in Syria and its consequences; the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus conflicts; the crisis between Turkey and Egypt; the Palestinian split and the situation in Gaza; the growing involvement of Russia in the sub-region; and mounting obstacles to the promotion of democracy, tolerance and human rights.

The numerous actors, factors and developments listed above created a complex ecosystem in the Eastern Mediterranean. Navigating the sub-region towards a win-win, rather than a zero-sum, reality requires relevant stakeholders to gain more knowledge, better understand regional dynamics, identify opportunities for cooperation, overcome conflicts and contradictory interests, and practise skilled and inclusive diplomacy.

This Joint Policy Study on “The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Opportunities for Cooperation”, led by the Mitvim Institute in the framework of the EuroMeSCo project, aims to contribute to these needs, and to conflict resolution and enhanced cooperation in the sub-region. It includes three chapters that were written by leading experts from Greece, Israel and Germany, following consultations with colleagues from additional countries in Europe, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first chapter, by Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas, focuses on promoting collective security schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean. The chapter provides a definition of the Eastern Mediterranean and presents its evolution as a distinct sub-region. It argues that in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to evolve into a successful sub-region, rather than a failed one, a limited security regime should be established there – namely a cooperative and stable security architecture that will centre, at least in the beginning, on two particular issue areas: energy security and Jihadist terrorism. The chapter claims that it is upon these areas that the interests of the various states in the Eastern Mediterranean sub-region are expected to converge.

The second chapter, by Gabriel Mitchell and Dr. Ehud Eiran, focuses on regional effects of the natural gas finds in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reviews specific gas discoveries in the region since the late 1990s, looks at their effect on regional security and on environmental policies, analyses international boundary demarcation in the region, and examines the roles of external actors – the US, EU and Russia. The chapter claims that the discoveries have yet to become a game-changing driving force of regional integration, reconciliation and closer relations with Europe, and that in some cases they even created new regional tensions. Despite this state of affairs, the chapter emphasises those areas that show potential for regional cooperation and the instances where this potential has already materialised.

The third chapter, by Dr. Muriel Asseburg, focuses on the war in Syria and its effect on Eastern Mediterranean dynamics. It analyses the interests of key Eastern Mediterranean actors regarding Syria, and how these interests converge or diverge with those of other involved actors. The chapter claims that Eastern Mediterranean actors developed fundamentally opposing interests, often considered vital, which do not cater for constructive sub-regional dynamics or closer sub-regional collaboration. At the same time, it shows how these interests – and in particular their divergence from other crucial actors’ interests – are detrimental to achieving sustained stabilisation in Syria. The chapter also provides recommendations for the EU on how it can support constructive dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and prevent military spill-over of the war in Syria.

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: New Dynamics and Potential for Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel.

Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.

This gap between Israel’s official policy and the actions of right-wing politicians must be narrowed. Far right-wing parties are gaining influence in certain countries in Europe. In Austria, such a party has recently even joined the coalition and some of its members are now appointed senior officials. It is possible that in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the representatives of such parties will also become significant in EU institutions. In light of this, the MFA should formulate criteria and guidelines to instruct Israeli right-wing parties on how to conduct themselves vis-à-vis the far right in Europe. A recommendation to refrain from any interaction with the ministers of the Freedom Party was already formulated and accepted by the Prime Minister.

The aim of such a measure would be to prevent right-wing MKs from granting legitimacy to far right-wing ideology in Europe, contrary to the position of the MFA. Furthermore, it would also prevent the legitimizing of anti-Semitic elements in Europe by Israeli officials, regardless of the fact that such elements may currently focus on hating Muslims rather than Jews. The formulation of such criteria and guidelines should be led by the MFA, but should also involve other partners, including the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset Speaker, the Jewish Agency, the Union of Local Authorities, and MKs who head parliamentary friendship associations with relevant countries (such as the Israel-Austria Friendship Association headed by MK Amir Peretz). Additionally, it is vitally important that the recommendations formulated become public, in order to identify those who do not comply with the guidelines, and to ignite a public debate on the issue.

However, the purpose of diplomacy – both formal and parliamentary – is not to impose boycotts, but rather to promote interests through dialogue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to formulate a list of demands and conditions for far right-wing parties in Europe as a condition for policy change toward them. Such a list will also have to take into account the needs of the Jewish communities in Europe, and can be consolidated in cooperation with other groups in Europe who oppose far right-wing parties. It does not need to focus on one country or another, but must address the growing phenomenon throughout the continent, while including lessons from change processes that parties and institutions underwent in the past.

European far right-wing parties sometimes pretend to be pro-Israeli in order to develop ties with right-wing groups in Israel and receive a certificate of integrity from them. This was the case, for example, with the interactions between the head of the Austrian Freedom Party and members of Likud. The leaders of these parties sometime carry soft messages and talk of change, but do not back up this discourse with actions. Presenting a list of clear Israeli requirements and conditions – including, for example, ousting those who are infecting the party with anti-Semitism, changing ideological frameworks and documents, and demonstrating commitment to legislation and policy denouncing anti-Semitism – will produce concrete measures to examine the actual conduct of these parties and avoid a façade of moderation.

The rise of the far right-wing and populist elements is taking place simultaneously, albeit at different levels, in a number of EU member states – especially in the central and eastern Europe. In the EU, there are now countries led by governments that move away from liberal values and democratic norms. The Israeli government is sometimes tempted to see the governments of these countries – such as Hungary – as allies and friends. This is due to block EU initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and their readiness to stand by Israel in international forums. However, viewing these countries as friends is a mistake.

Israel’s foreign policy should indeed be distanced from far right-wing elements in Europe, but this is not enough. It must also emphasize the importance of democracy and show commitment and preference for establishing alliances with countries with a strong democratic regime, even if they disagree with the current policies of the Israeli government. Israel must belong to the family of democratic nations, and should not sacrifice this position for the sake of promoting ad-hoc interests.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Forward)

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Although Iran’s move is considered an escalation, it should not come as a surprise. This is a step up in the exchange of messages between the sides, but we can safely assume that Israel anticipated that its actions, according to foreign and/or Syrian sources, would sooner or later provoke a counter-reaction. After all, the Syrian regime has reacted to attacks, presumably carried out by Israel, in a number of cases in the past. In this regard, Iran’s move may be seen as a Syrian-Iranian attempt to draw some red lines, indicating that the military freedom of action in Syria, long enjoyed by Israel, should not be taken for granted.

Either way, the Israeli interests remain unchanged and focus on two main levels.

The first interest relates to preventing Iran from establishing itself in Syria, or at least weakening its hold on the state, especially in the areas adjacent to the border with Israel and Jordan. Therefore, we must focus on a series of diplomatic measures:

First, reaching some understandings with the relevant actors – Iran, and the Assad regime – in Syria. The tightening Iran’s grip on Syria is a reality that will be extremely difficult to uproot, at least in the short-to- medium term. The goal, then, is to limit or to prevent it from establishing itself in a way that is too threatening to the Syrian-Israeli border. This goal may be achieved with the intervention of international actors who enjoy open channels and a sufficient level of trust, vis-a-vis both sides.

Under the current circumstances, the most prominent actor is Moscow. The intensive dialogue between Israel and Russia allows for a sincere and deep dialogue, even if their interests are not aligned. The convergence of the Russian-Iranian interests is firm and tight, and it cannot be dismantled now. At the same time, Russia has a clear interest in preventing an undesirable escalation that will harm the strengthening of the Assad regime. Israel can leverage this situation in its dialogue with Moscow, while refraining from intense and unpredictable actions, in return.

Although the US has positioned itself in a less influential (albeit largely secondary) position in Syria, it is necessary to closely coordinate the Israeli-American positions. In addition, it is important to coordinate positions with Arab countries, with whom Israel has shared interests and close dialog. Jordan fears, just like Israel, the Iranian hold on Syria. Egypt is watching Iran with concern as it is becoming a stronger regional power, and Saudi Arabia adopted a most assertive policy vis-a-vis Iran. The Israeli message should be that this regional dynamic should be curbed in a coordinated regional diplomatic effort against the Syrian-Iranian axis.

Although Europe has ceded its premiership in Syria to Russia, it is still possible to recruit prominent European players to increase pressure on Iran. Germany can be a good candidate for that. The focus of the Israeli message, at this stage, should be the Syrian context, rather than the nuclear issue. Moreover, diplomatic levers should be used to make it difficult for the Iranians to further establish their presence in Syria. It is essential to expose to the international community the Iranian attempts to establish military bases, in a manner that will prove to the world Iran’s destructive conduct in the region, while establishing that an Iranian nuclear activity is prohibited before reaching a nuclear agreement.

Another Israeli interest, no less important, focuses on preventing an escalation in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Such a confrontation is not necessary as the deterrence that was achieved following the Second Lebanon War still stands and is manifested in the organization’s various public statements. Moreover, the organization is working to strengthen its political involvement in Lebanon and is looking forward to the elections for the Lebanese parliament. This trend could induce a more responsible conduct on its part, which could prevent a slide into violent confrontations to the detriment of Lebanon, as Israel repeatedly warns. Another round of violence will end with a renewed status quo, that is no different from the current one.

The strengthening of Assad’s regime in Syria continues vigorously. Currently, it is clear to all that the regime has been strengthened to such an extent that no one expects or desires to reverse the process, that was achieved thanks to the involvement of Russia and Iran (and Hezbollah). Israel must have an interest in strengthening the regime, who will, most probably, be able to deal more effectively with an excessively dominant Iranian influence. It should be emphasized again that this is a long-term process, since it is clear that Assad currently has neither the ability nor the will to challenge the tightening Iranian dominance in his country. At the same time, it is hard to ignore the moral consideration of the Assad regime. This is a murderous regime that committed war crimes against its own people. However, as Israel did not directly intervene during the civil war in Syria, it must now consolidate its interests in the face of the emerging reality.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that Israel’s strategic balance with Syria, continues to be comfortable, even after the recent escalation. Syria is still in the midst of difficult fighting between the various forces, and Assad’s takeover of the entire country is still far from being over. It should also be remembered that the relationships and interests of the Russia-IranTurkey triangle are in no way smooth. In any event, it is imperative to acknowledge that the freedom of Israeli military action is not unlimited in view of the emerging reality, hence the importance of the political-diplomatic effort. This is a challenge that Israel can and must withstand.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Diplomatic Blueprint for Israel vis-à-vis Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Opportunities for Israel’s Foreign Relations towards 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel Should Maintain its Boycott on Far-Right Parties in Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט An Outward-Looking Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A total of 25 participants, including the EuroMeSCo researchers involved in the project, as well as additional experts and scholars attended the workshop, which aimed at presenting and discussing the initial research results of the Joint Policy Study. Participants analyzed various factors that may constitute both opportunities and threats to an increasing cooperation between some Eastern Mediterranean countries, such as newfound energy reserves and the war in Syria.

In the first session, Dr. Thanos Dokos and Prof. Panagiotis Tsakonas from ELIAMEP (Greece) kicked off the discussion on whether the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a separate sub-regional security system and on ways to promote collective security schemes in the region. During the second session, Dr. Ehud Eiran of Mitvim (Israel) analyzed the energy and regional integration in the Eastern Mediterranean while in the third session, Dr. Muriel Asseburg of SWP (Germany) examined the Eastern Mediterranean dynamics and the evolving war in Syria. In the final session, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin of Mitvim (Israel), Walid Salem of CDCD (Palestine) and Prof. Ahmet Sözen of the Eastern Mediterranean University (northern Cyprus) debated over conflict resolution methods and approaches in the Eastern Mediterranean, and over the benefits of conflicts comparisons and mutual conflict resolution support.

הפוסט New Euro-Mediterranean Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These dramatic developments significantly accelerate a series of processes, which have already been underway in Europe for the last few years, and which cast a cloud over the future of the European project. The upcoming elections in the two most important countries in the EU – France and Germany – intensify these tensions.

In this context, European pressure on Israel to promote the peace process with the Palestinians – if such was ever actually really applied – is decreasing. Europe is now looking inward and is dealing with other conflicts and domestic challenges. It is not seeking to expand its role in the Middle East peace process.

According to a senior European diplomat serving in Washington, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a low-intensity conflict, especially when compared to other conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, the region has more acute fault-lines, including the Sunni-Shi’a and the Arab-Iranian ones.

“Given the internal problems of the EU and the changing international environment due to Trump and Putin, we currently do not have much interest in the Israeli issue”.

“It is currently only number 10 on our priority list,” said a diplomat from a major European country, who is based in Tel Aviv.

Europe does not expect the Netanyahu government to move forward on the peace process, and assumes that Netanyahu seeks to maintain the status quo and continue managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Based on these assumptions, the EU is unlikely to take new initiatives and steps regarding the peace process over the coming period. The Israeli government is happy about this, and views EU disengagement from the peace process as a success of Israel’s policy. This is a narrow and distorted view.

Such a European policy is actually a major setback for Israeli interests:

1. Israel is missing an opportunity to significantly upgrade its ties with Europe, which is still a close ally and Israel’s largest trade partner. Israel should aspire to deepen ties with Europe, as offered by the EU in return for Israeli-Palestinian peace;
2. Without significant European involvement, it will be much more difficult to promote and operationalise the Arab Peace Initiative, which holds much potential for Israel’s future;
3. A possible EU decision to cut aid to the Palestinians, due to disengagement from the conflict, might worsen the situation on the ground and will increase the burden on Israel;
4. A European disengagement, coupled with American isolationism, will enable aggressive and less democratic actors (like Russia) to play a much larger regional role. Israel’s interests are not a priority for such actors.

In Israel, Europe is often portrayed – in the media and by politicians from the right – as hostile to Israel. This is not true.

Israel’s relations with European countries and with EU institutions are deep and multi-layered. They serve the needs of all sides involved.

The Israeli-European alliance is not merely an interest-based economic one. It is a deep strategic alliance, based on shared values and on a long and troubled history. Europe has always been an exceptional asset for Israel’s development and security.

Israel has a genuine interest in a strong EU. Instability in Europe, the weakening of EU institutions, and the rise of anti-democratic forces in Europe, all have negative consequences for Israel.

The 2016 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that in light of the challenges faced by Europe, a plurality of Israelis thinks that Israel will benefit more from a stronger Europe than from a weaker one.

Israel’s increased ties with Russia, China and other non-democratic countries cannot and should not be a substitute for relations with Europe. Israel’s belonging to the democratic camp, with Europe at its centre, promoted Israel’s international standing along the years and directly contributed to Israel’s prosperity.

In order to maintain the Zionist vision of a Jewish and democratic state, Israel needs to maintain good ties with democratic Europe. It should also work to promote the two state solution, in order to prevent a change in Israel’s national character will change, mounting tensions with Europe, and an intensified pivot towards non-democratic international actors.

Israel is a regional superpower. As such, it can play a leading role, alongside Europe, in promoting regional stability and prosperity. Israel’s existential need is to dismantle regional threats and to establish good relations with its neighbouring countries and peoples.

These goals are also shared by Europe, and Israel has no better partner than Europe to promote them with. The path towards peace and development in the Middle East is long and requires much commitment.

Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is an essential step in that direction. There is no way to bypass this path – which Israel currently chooses to avoid, and on which Europe is dragging its feet.

(originally published in EurActiv)

הפוסט Israel needs good relations with Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It has been a busy month for Benjamin Netanyahu. For the third week in a row, Israel’s prime minister has journeyed outside of the Middle East in order to advance his country’s interests. But after enjoying high-profile meetings with British Prime Minister Theresa May and US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu’s world tour heads eastward, with stops in Singapore and Australia.

There is no denying that Netanyahu is making history. Operating as both prime minister and foreign minister, Netanyahu has expanded his international travel schedule, visiting corners of the globe familiar to Israeli backpackers but alien to most of their politicians. In the last year alone, Netanyahu’s passport has collected stamps from Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. His arrival in Sydney this Wednesday will mark the first ever visit by an Israeli head-of-state.

Netanyahu’s jet-setting is indicative of a shift within Israel’s foreign policy strategy away from the United States and Europe. Israel is cognizant that the geopolitical order is shifting away from a unipolar world and is making preparations that will compensate for America’s withdrawal from the world stage. Frustrated with European ‘interference’ in its relationship with the Palestinians, Israel is casting a wide net in search for international partners who are less interested in the conflict. As the aforementioned list demonstrates, this approach has worked predominantly with non-democratic states.

This is not the case with Australia, which boasts strong democratic values, a robust economy and is both culturally and strategically linked with the West. Membership in the anglosphere is yet another important distinction. As Netanyahu will undoubtedly reiterate during his stay, Australia and Israel are natural partners and there are tremendous opportunities for cooperation on a host of issues—including cyber security, counterterrorism, environmental and agricultural sciences and of course high-tech.

But in fact, it is because of these unique qualities that the Australian government can use the same platform it is providing Netanyahu to articulate its own interests.

If Australia wants to contribute to peace in the Middle East, it should reaffirm its support of the two-state solution. The two-state solution has come under heavy scrutiny of late and it is unclear how committed the current US administration is to ensuring that Israelis and Palestinians reach that goal. Still, it was perplexing how Foreign Minister Julie Bishop could support Trump’s damaging “two-state, one-state” remarks just days after joining the near universal condemnation of a controversial Israeli law that retroactively legalizes all West Bank settler homes constructed on private Palestinian land.

Trump’s comments have emboldened Netanyahu’s rivals. Many believe it is only a matter of time before he is ousted from office—he is currently under investigation in multiple police cases—and challenging his position on the settlements is an easy way to score points. Those close to Netanyahu claim that the prime minister still supports the two-state solution, yet such reports are difficult to believe when he always appears to be in a fight for his political life. So goes the game of thrones that is Israeli domestic politics.

When international actors send mixed messages on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it only strengthens the radical camps in both societies—often bearing deadly results. Rather than limiting its involvement to rhetorical statements, the Australian government should try to incentivize Israeli efforts towards peace, perhaps by offering to facilitate dialogue between Israel and ASEAN’s Muslim-majority member states that have historically been reluctant to normalize relations with the Jewish State.

Alternatively, Australia could lend its support for the kind of US-led regional peace initiative that was pursued by the Obama administration and floated during the Trump-Netanyahu press conference in Washington, DC.

Both countries should be thinking as big when it comes to strengthening bilateral ties. The Israel Trade Commission and the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce provide a strong foundation for commercial ties to grow, and their efforts should be applauded. Still, taking the Australia-Israel relationship to the next level requires investment in new bilateral initiatives—similar to the industrial R&D agreement signed by Israel and the NSW government in April 2016—as well as expanding existing scientific exchange programs, establishing joint energy and water management projects, and creating room for future military exchanges.

The future of Australian-Israeli bilateral relations will ultimately be determined by the tone and content of the dialogue between their respective societies. If the last decade is any indication, there is legitimate reason for optimism. Still, the gravity of official state visits such as these should not be overlooked. With Netanyahu finally ‘Down Under’, Australia’s government has a historic opportunity to clarify its own position on the two-state solution at a time when international support is at an all-time low. Such a demonstration from a trusted ally may pressure Netanyahu to clarify some of his own dubious remarks, but more importantly it would resonate with Israelis who are tired of opportunistic politicians and seek international partners that will ‘talk straight’ when engaged in a face-to-face conversation.

(originally published in the Australian Outlook)

הפוסט Why Australia Needs to be Straight-Talking with Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט A Pro-Peace Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This assessment is based on three premises.

First, the Netanyahu government has no incentive – political, economic or ideological – to advance talks with the Palestinians.

Second, regional instability and Iran’s empowerment after the signing of the nuclear accord, as well as the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, ensure that overall security issues will take priority over the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Finally, the U.S. election year guarantees that the permanent patron of peace talks will be looking inward, with Europe lacking the clout to bring the two sides to the table.

While 2016 seems a wasted year in terms of the peace process, 2017 may be the year things flare up. There are several reasons; the first is coincidental. June 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the occupation.

Countries and leaders enjoy marking round anniversaries to glorify the nation or themselves. Decision-makers on the right have been quick to realize the potential.

Education Minister Naftali Bennett has declared that the coming school year will be inspired by the unification of Jerusalem. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely has announced that 2017 will be a festive year stressing the narrative of the whole Land of Israel, along with the line that there’s no occupation. To this list one might add the centennial of the Balfour Declaration, which favored a homeland for the Jewish people.

This linkage – 50 years of the occupation and 100 years after the Balfour Declaration – lends these events an almost cosmic significance.

On the other side of the political map, the 50-year anniversary is clearly a reason to mourn. The result of the 1967 war – the domination of another people – must be undone. This is a chance to mobilize all peace advocates in Israel and abroad, Jews and non-Jews, people who support a Jewish democratic state within the 1967 borders and see the occupation as a sure recipe for turning Israel into a binational, nondemocratic state.

This is the aim of the group Save Israel, Stop the Occupation, SISO, which has been established to organize events on the injustices of the occupation, culminating in 50thanniversary events. A clash between the opposing worldviews that will find expression next year are bound to lead to a flare-up.

Another factor will be the new U.S. president. It’s not certain the winner will immediately launch a drive to revive the peace process. But history teaches that even a president with a limited understanding of the Middle East, like Jimmy Carter in 1977, achieved a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within two years.

Bill Clinton, meanwhile, finalized the Oslo process and the treaty with Jordan during his first term. History also teaches that a president who really seeks a solution must start early, as proved by Clinton’s missed opportunities with Hafez Assad and Yasser Arafat at the end of his second term. The arrival of a new president on the 50th anniversary of the occupation could provide a spark.

The perception that a two-state solution is no longer applicable is increasingly taking hold. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman claims that the two-state solution is dead and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be remembered as the father of the one-state solution.

But any deep look at the situation on the ground shows that the two-state ideal is still around and viable. It depends on leaders on both sides making it work.

A public campaign in Israel and overseas that will gather momentum toward June 2017 could jump-start diplomatic ideas already on the agenda. These include a new Security Council resolution to replace or be appended to Resolution 242, incorporating elements of the Arab peace initiative.

The resolution would call for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with agreed-on border adjustments and land swaps, without addressing tougher issues such as Jerusalem and refugees. Another idea is an international conference in June 2017 that would launch talks between Israel, the Palestinians and moderate Arab countries.

I fear that if these ideas aren’t realized, the despair, frustration and disappointment of the younger Palestinian generation – directed at the occupation and Palestinian leaders who can’t deliver the goods – will lead to an intifada. The reasons have long been there, but the spark hasn’t arrived.

And the fuse will be lying about in 2017. Let’s hope Israelis and their leaders will see 2016 as an opportunity for reconciliation, not escalation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט 2017, a 50th anniversary that could spark a real intifada הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Straddling the East-West Divide: A Subjective Israeli Perspective on Muslim Immigration to Europe הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Post-Referendum Greece: Between Challenges and Hope הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Syriza chose to form a coalition government with Panos Kammenos’ populist and farright (though often-referred to as centre-right) Independent Greeks (ANEL), that won 13 seats with 4.8% of the votes. Not only that, but Tsipras appointed Kammenos as the new Minister of Defense. Although leftist Nikos Kotzias, Syriza’s new Foreign Minister, is more cool-headed and pragmatist, if assertive, than Kammenos, the Ministry of Defense plays an important role in security issues and Kammenos might adopt a harder line that could challenge Greece’s overall foreign policy with particular respect to relations with Turkey and Israel. Overall, these developments may signal a new approach in Greek foreign policy on issues ranging from the EU, to Russia and the Eastern Mediterranean.

הפוסט Syriza’s Victory and Greek-Israeli Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Kosovo and its Relationship with Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The workshop, facilitated by Ms. Mireille Surowicz, featured Mr. Mark Gallagher (Deputy Chief of Mission and Head of the Political Section, the European Union Delegation to Israel), Ms. Avivit Bar-Ilan (Director, Department for European Organizations, Europe Division, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu (The European Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Dr. Werner Puschra (Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Israel), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Chairman, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies).

הפוסט The European Parliament Elections and Israeli-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Of course, it did not seem that way at first. After all, when Brussels issued last July new guidelines specifying that Israeli entities located beyond the Green Line would no longer be eligible to apply for EU funding under the European research program, Jerusalem reacted as if the nation’s very security was at stake.

Assuming the gravity of a leader whose country was under frontal assault, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu proclaimed that “We shall not accept any external dictates on our borders.”

Some of his fellow cabinet ministers were far less restrained. An act of “economic terrorism,” was how the country’s economy minister termed the guidelines, while another declared that the guidelines were “reminiscent of boycotts against Jews from over 66 years ago.”

Yet if the reigning perception in Jerusalem was that the EU wished to punish Israel for its settlement policy, the political reality in Brussels suggests a radically different story.

First, and as with almost anything having to do with EU policy, the primary motivations were legal and technical in nature. In this case, given that agreements between the EU and Israel have traditionally failed to specify what constitutes the “territory of the State of Israel, the guidelines sought to fill in a lacuna that has bedeviled European policymakers for years.

The issue had taken on legal significance following a European Court of Justice ruling in February 2010 that products originating in the West Bank did not fall within the territorial scope of the EU’s free trade agreement with Israel. Since the ruling placed a legal imprimatur on the Union’s definition of the territory of the State of Israel, the new guidelines sought to ensure that European institutions were not found in contempt of court.

Certainly, the new guidelines aimed at more than just assuaging the legalistic anxieties of Brussels’ Eurocrats. But the irony is that, despite Israeli suspicions, the guidelines did not seek to toughen EU policy toward Israel its settlement policy in the West Bank as much as to uphold the viability and legitimacy of the Union’s existing agreements with Israel.

In order to recognize this point, it is necessary to appreciate the political context for the European move and the economic significance of the guidelines.

The political context is the rising power of the European Parliament relative to the EU institutions in the post-Lisbon Treaty era and the growing influence within Parliament of interest groups calling for boycotting Israel.

Given that the calls to boycott Israel draws justification from Israel’s occupation, the EU move to differentiate between the State of Israel and the occupied territories is tantamount to drawing a cordon sanitaire around Israel.

It is an act designed to uphold and defend the very health of the relationship between the EU and Israel.

As for the economic significance of the guidelines, it is virtually nil. While precise data on the volume of Israeli research financed by the EU in the occupied territories since Israel first joined the Union’s research programs in the mid 1990s is hard to come by, according to the European Commission the total number of EU-funded Israeli projects beyond the Green Line since 2001 may be no more than five.

Moreover, these five projects were all conducted by a single entity – the Ahava cosmetics company – which was awarded about 1.5 million euro, a figure that represents less than one tenth of one percent of all EU research grants awarded to Israeli entities over this same period.

It is perhaps no coincidence that the beneficiary of the European research funding goes by the name of Ahava, which is Hebrew for “love.” For despite the perception in Israel, the guidelines ultimately underscore the degree to which Brussels remains deeply committed to its relationship with the Jewish state – a relationship that it struggles to protect from the collateral damage that Israel’s settlement policy increasingly creates.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The EU and Israel: Much ado about love הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.