Why? What can the failure mean for the future of negotiations, public participation, peacemaking? These are troubling questions. But the breathless developments in Colombia also yield valuable lessons for Israelis and Palestinians, and other protracted conflicts in the world.

The referendum failed in part because it became a proxy vote on Colombia’s unpopular President Juan Manuel Santos. The danger of weak leadership in a peace process isn’t limited to plebiscites. In Israel, Ehud Barak’s plummeting support and hobbled coalition on the eve of the Camp David negotiations in 2000 weakened his bargaining position at the table. In 2008, Palestinians worried that Ehud Olmert, corruption charges swirling around him, would not have the authority to uphold a deal, and the process floundered.

What can be done? It’s not too useful to advise leaders to collect great poll numbers before setting off to forge highly sensitive peace agreements. But we can conclude the converse: that leaders who enjoy greater public legitimacy have extra responsibility to advance conflict resolution. This logic is an indictment of four-time elected Benjamin Netanyahu, for failing to leverage his long shadow in Israel to advance peace.

Another reason for Colombia’s rejection was weak “yes” campaigning due to wrong assumptions. Professor Shlomo Ben Ami, former Israeli foreign minister and peace negotiator under Ehud Barak, advised the Colombia negotiations. In a phone interview, he observed that the Colombian government was sure the agreement would win a majority, and barely invested in the campaign. The political opposition went populist, insisting that the agreement was unjust and a better deal was possible. Much of the Western press cited only optimistic polling despite some clearly ominous numbers, as I noted when the agreement was announced.

This a cautionary tale for the Israeli left, since Israel has a constitutional-level referendum law concerning certain future land concessions. The right wing already knows the lesson: a plebiscite could fail despite the common wisdom that Israelis support two states and yearn for peace. If a deal ever reaches a vote, supporters absolutely cannot be complacent, no matter what surveys say. Public rejection is a gigantic setback. Colombia may yet toil ahead on negotiations, but look at divided Cyprus: 12 years after a failed reunification referendum, and despite some recent negotiation progress, there is still no breakthrough for peace.

Colombia – along with Brexit – is raising deep concerns about whether the conflicted public should vote directly on these issues at all. Global referendum expert Matt Qvortrup advised leaders in a Foreign Policy piece to “think twice” before holding them. Analysts in The New York Times took a dim view, observing among other reasons that such votes are vulnerable to arbitrary elements like the hurricane that hit pro-agreement areas of Colombia. Ben Ami feels they are more suitable to dictatorships than democracies. Israel’s legislation will be hard to change – other countries seeking an end to their conflicts may want to choose a different route.

But it’s not just the mechanism. Colombians rejected the agreement itself, largely based on the painful “transitional justice” aspect of leniency for the FARC in exchange for disarmament and peace. Transitional justice is an approach that seeks forgiveness for the future rather than vengeance for the past. One model is the “pacto del olvido” – the “pact of forgetting” that helped Spain leave Franco behind, Ben Ami noted, and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation commission is another.

Over half of Colombians could not tolerate that FARC fighters who had terrorized them for decades would be re-integrated into society and their party given 10 seats in parliament; legitimized or even rewarded, they felt, rather than punished. For those voters forgiving or forgetting was unjust; they clung to their understanding of justice over peace.

Israelis commonly accuse Palestinians of preferring justice for the past to peace in the future, because Palestinians demand recognition of their suffering since 1948. Israelis feel the obsession with historic justice is proof that Palestinians choose pride over life. Now we know this is neither accurate nor unique. Colombia’s vote indicates that for peace in this region, Israelis will have to accept the Palestinian need for perceived justice; while the latter cannot advance peace by forgetting Israeli insecurities, so deeply rooted in modern Jewish experience. Ben Ami called emotional factors a “human given,” and said that neglecting them undermines peacemaking.

The Colombia experience raises still more questions with no clear answers. Why did many areas least affected by the conflict vote against the deal? Why didn’t a FARC cease-fire from a year earlier calm nerves sufficiently to generate enough good will? The answers will be considered in years to come. For now, peace remains elusive in both regions. If Colombia’s misfortune can contribute to a better process in Israel-Palestine, or anywhere else, the failure won’t have been entirely in vain.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Colombia’s Omen for Israel: When the People Don’t Give Peace a Chance הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Can Israel and Palestine learn from Colombia? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The conflict has dragged on for over 50 years.

The 50-year club

Like Colombia, Cyprus has been divided since 1974, and locked in an angry, sometimes violent political struggle since 1963. Cyprus is currently engaged in the first negotiation process to generate some expectation of success since the failure to ratify the Annan Plan in 2004. If Cyprus should also see a breakthrough, perhaps a measure of hope could break through another 50-year wall: the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict, dating back to 1967.

No short cuts or catharsis

This week’s cease-fire did not occur ex nihilo.

Negotiations between the government and FARC had dragged on for five years, with rounds of cease-fires, violations, escalations and renewed attempts. The Norwegian think tank NOREF observed that limited goals of ending the war probably helped this round relative to more comprehensive earlier negotiations that failed. But finally, in June 2015, FARC declared a unilateral cease-fire that lasted the year, until the formal agreement was signed in June and completed this week. It is valuable to note then that the sides saw the process through to fruition despite ongoing violence and the backlash this surely generated.

No (good) partner

The FARC has agreed to end its military campaign and join the legal political process, reported CNN. This is a reminder that when it comes to undesirable partners, even brutally violent ones, there are few options.

Either they magically disappear (rare) or they join political mechanisms and state institutions – the more common models seen in both Northern Ireland and in Kosovo, as well as in Palestine (with the PLO) and Israel’s own pre-state fighting forces. With a quarter of a million people dead through the course of the conflict and millions more displaced, accepting FARC into political life will be no small task. The Economist cites a local expression, “swallowing toads,” to describe how this will feel for Colombians.

To offset the resistance to integrating FARC, two mechanisms are to be established: a tribunal and restrictions on their activity; and disarmament. This formulation shows that militant groups can also agree to concessions when the process is ripe.

The public matters

The agreement will now be put to a referendum on October 2. It will be a critical test. The Economist breezily reports that polls predict a two-to-one victory for a “yes” vote, but this optimism seems unwarranted, with significant conflicting data available. The most worrying findings are from particularly credible institute: reports say that IPSOS polling shows 50 percent against the agreement, and just 39% in favor. Worse, this data is a reversal from just months before – showing that trends are unstable and support may be falling. A Washington advocacy group on Latin America gathered several polls showing the precipitous drop in support between June and August, and concluded, “The possibility that a ‘No’ vote could undo the entire peace effort is too great to be dismissed.”

Colombia is about to face a bitter internal political struggle. The incumbent leader who negotiated the deal, Juan Manuel Santos, is facing crisis-level ratings – roughly 25% popularity.

A former president is the incumbent’s main political rival and the primary leader of opposition to the agreement for the referendum vote. His favorability ratings are roughly double those of Santos, according to reports on the IPSOS poll. But as Quintin Oliver, a leader of Northern Ireland’s “Yes” campaign for the Good Friday agreements in 1998 pointed out, the latter will face major lack of social support for his position: “No NGOs, no artists, no celebrities, no sports stars, no obvious business community backing.”

Peaceniks matter

With or without a referendum, public legitimacy is essential for such controversial agreements under such delicate political circumstances. Oliver’s point is that civil society actors can provide an essential boost for an agreement. In Colombia, if available, support from actors outside politics could shore up what the president is lacking. In Cyprus in 2004, civil society in the north helped rally a strong majority vote in favor of the Annan Plan (a valuable lesson despite rejection in the south).

In Israel and Palestine, this key role for civil society is also a reminder that the hardship of pro-peace activity, from daily despair to anti-normalization and outright political attacks, are not in vain. Peace is a long and frustrating game but at the key moment, an infrastructure of support can make a difference. Perhaps even the sophisticated advertising campaign that began a decade ago encouraging de-commissioning of FARC soldiers (described in a remarkable episode of This American Life), contributed slowly to the current process as well. That was government led – a sort of reverse hasbara (public diplomacy).

The bottom line is that the road is twisted and belabored, full of fresh trauma and setbacks. Long-term efforts for peace by the government, peace advocates and other social figures may seem futile for years.

That is, until the moment of potential – when all hands are needed in the push for peace.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Can Israel and Palestine learn from Colombia? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.