הפוסט Ashkenazi revitalized the IDF, now he can do the same to Foreign Ministry הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite its undeniable standing as a sustainable regional power, Israel continues to conduct itself like a state battling for survival. While the state’s key challenges lie in the field of diplomacy and soft power, its politicians present them through a military prism even as security experts caution that military might cannot solve Israel’s fundamental problems.

Israel has been the strongest power in the region and one of the strongest in the world for years. You and your colleagues in the defense establishment are responsible for that remarkable achievement that turned the burning embers of the Holocaust into a Jewish regional power in a relatively short time in historical perspective.

Nonetheless, as the Americans found out in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, even the strongest military in the world lacks solutions to modern challenges. The IDF, which enjoys its strongest advantage ever over our enemies, cannot achieve a decisive victory because that term no longer applies in the modern battlefield.

Whether in terms of relations with our enemies or the ability to translate our military might into a better life for our people, the solutions all lie in the diplomatic arena. Diplomacy also plays a decisive role for Israel’s export-oriented economy that owes its international standing to its innovative capacity. With most challenges becoming increasingly global – pandemics, climate change, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the response can only be found in the diplomatic arena, not in military arsenals.

Nonetheless, from its infancy, successive Israeli prime ministers have weakened the Foreign Ministry for various reasons, some political (from the days of Ben Gurion’s clashes with Sharett and up to the present), others stemming from our survival complex. We have always opted to look for answers in the wrong place. In recent years, the situation has deteriorated. The Foreign Ministry has sustained deep budget cuts, with many of its tasks outsourced to other ministries and its unique expertise in the international arena excluded from the decision-making process on core issues of diplomacy.

While cabinet meetings always include presentations and assessments by military officers, who often also propose solutions, the Foreign Ministry is largely absent, and its professional opinions are not heard. The explanation for this phenomenon is also to be found in the Foreign Ministry itself, which has grown accustomed to staying out of issues that touch on politics, although every core issue obviously has a political bearing, and often vice versa. Foreign Ministry staff have come to believe that their role is limited to conveying to the world decisions made by other people in other ministries. Rather than having significant impact on decision making, the Foreign Ministry has positioned itself as an agency dedicated to public diplomacy and logistics abroad.

You served as chief-of-staff when the IDF adopted a courageous professional stance against an Israeli attack on Iran, which had a decisive effect on the Prime Minister’s decision. On the other hand, it is hard to think of a position taken by the Foreign Ministry that differed from that of decision makers, simply because the Ministry preferred to wait for diplomatic instructions rather than contribute to shaping them.

Diplomats, like military officers, are obviously bound by the decisions of the elected echelon, but their job is also to represent their professional stand with determination and to ensure that their familiarity with the global arena is taken into consideration.

As for substance, following are the issues of the highest priority.

The Foreign Ministry’s most important role is to advance the peace agreements with our neighbors, and in that context, the most urgent priority is to ensure that in the window of time between July and November, no unilateral moves are made that irrevocably exclude a future arrangement based on the two-state principle. The twostate solution is essential to Israel’s preservation as the democratic nation state of the Jewish people, as well as to our strategic relations with Jordan, Egypt and the pro-Western, anti-jihadist axis in the Middle East. Unilateral moves would also undermine the lifesaving security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the PA’s ability to administer the lives of millions of Palestinians, whose lives we have no interest in running. It is also vital that we maintain the potential for bilateral and regional channels to an accommodation with the Palestinians rather than having these issues dealt with by the International Criminal Court and various BDS arenas.

Bipartisanship has constituted the basis for Israel’s special standing with successive US administrations, Congress and public opinion. In recent years, Israel is being perceived as affiliated with the Republican Party, dealing a fatal blow to the special relationship with the world’s leading power. The loss of bipartisan support also severely undermines our ties with US Jewry, our most important Diaspora community, the majority of which backs the Democrats and steers clear of Israel.

The vast majority of world Jewry, and especially in North America, is gradually distancing itself from Israel, put off by the state’s growing tendency toward segregation, extremism, and its reluctance to accept the different streams of Judaism, their needs, views and concerns. Israel’s political establishment tends to prefer ties with Christian evangelists and Orthodox Jews and to treat liberal Jewish communities that make up the vast majority of US Jewry, as irrelevant at best and as non-Jews in the worst-case scenario. This poses an immediate and present danger to the cohesion of the Jewish people, its links with the State of Israel and to a large extent the security of the state, which also relies on the solidarity of Diaspora Jewry with Israel.

Government policy of recent years distances the State of Israel from the Zionist vision of a model, egalitarian society that protects the rights of minorities and empowers the disadvantaged. These values are the foundation on which Israel’s innate alliance with liberal democratic states rests. However, the erosion of this foundation is generating growing aloofness on the part of democratic, liberal nations toward Israel. The government clearly prefers alliances with states led by dictators, nationalists and racists, among them some with anti-Semitic past and/or current anti-Semitic leanings. This process directly endangers the Jewish communities in those countries, where minority rights are crucial for the Jews, both morally and strategically.

In summing up, I urge you to treat the Foreign Minister’s role as an unusual opportunity to influence Israel’s future significantly, to make a difference as a politician and to make your mark on history. Your success is our success, and the sooner you achieve it, the better.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Letter to Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Covid-19 pandemic has placed Israeli diplomats on the nation’s frontlines, particularly in helping obtain medical equipment and bringing home Israelis stranded abroad. Although the Foreign Ministry has had to withstand the erosion of its authority and budget, efforts to undermine it and the deterioration of its staff’s working conditions in recent years, Israeli diplomats have been operating relentlessly to accomplish their assigned tasks, with some even contracting the disease.

The pandemic has challenged the core of the diplomatic profession. Diplomatic activity entails forging and developing ties with key economic, social and political figures in foreign states; the professional-personal relationships with those key figures is a crucial element in achieving the tasks assigned by Jerusalem. For instance, such relationships made it possible to fly an experimental drug from Japan to treat Covid-19 patients in Israel, helped bring home Israeli travelers stranded in Peru, and freed a shipment of facemasks held up at an airport in Turkey.

The social distancing induced by the pandemic hampers Israeli diplomats’ ability to conduct the face-to-face meetings traditionally used to develop connections with foreign representatives. Within a very short period, all interpersonal communications have shifted to technology-mediated interaction. Whereas digital platforms served as a supplementary and targeted means in the diplomats’ toolbox in the pre-coronavirus era, at least in the short term, a sharp shift to digital-virtual diplomacy has been necessary. At present, diplomacy is only possible through technologically enabled means of communications. Reliance on digital-virtual platforms should not be perceived as a problem, but rather as an opportunity. The Foreign Ministry should take advantage of the Israeli spirit of entrepreneurship and Israeli technological pre-eminence to invent and lead new diplomatic communications, firstly for Israel’s Foreign Service and subsequently as an example to other diplomats around the world. Efficient implementation of this new form of diplomacy involves three key aspects.

First, planning communications with representatives in a foreign country must include all forms of communications: e-mail, social media platforms and video conferencing. Each suits a different part of the job and different type of relationship-building. For example, to initiate contact and send out feelers regarding shared values and interests, e-mail is preferable as it allows open-ended questions and ambivalent formulation (to the extent necessary). In order to conduct a conversation on sensitive or controversial issues, chat over a digital platform is preferable, because it makes saying “no” easier and the delayed response provides time to consult or find arguments and references to buttress the answer. The World Health Organization (WHO) provided an excellent example of why discussion of sensitive issues should be avoided on video conference when its representative simply hung up on a journalist who asked him about the role of Taiwan in confronting the pandemic. Video calls are best for strengthening personal ties, signaling empathy and reaching agreements, making them a unique form of communication in terms of content and significance. They have in fact become the “physical” meetings between diplomats in the coronavirus era.

Second, complete technological mastery in operating these tools and virtual platforms is a must. That includes simple tasks such as positioning cameras at the correct angle during a video call and silencing microphones when needed. Applications must be used correctly and technical mishaps, such as Boris Johnson’s inadvertent exposure of the dial-in code for the British cabinet’s Zoom meeting, must be avoided. Suddenly, diplomats have not only to control the tilt of their head or the perfect way to tie a bowtie. They must speedily learn the correct use of various technological tools.

Third, professionalism must be acquired in the intricacies of digital and virtual language. In this context, diplomats will have to learn how nuances and cross-cultural codes come across on digital media, such as WhatsApp or a video call, as opposed to during a face-to-face encounter. Should diplomats now employ emojis or GIFs in place of a smile and a slap on the back? On a video call, the choice will be between formal attire, replete with the Foreign Ministry logo and Israeli flag as a backdrop, and informal attire with family photos hanging on the walls, to emphasize common denominators and add a personal dimension to the interaction.

One of the major challenges posed by digital-virtual communications is information security, especially when the subject of the conversation is of a sensitive political or diplomatic nature. This challenge must be addressed in two ways: use of advanced technologies and information security tools, and mutual commitment to avoid revealing the contents of the discussion. Success in maintaining secrecy in a digital-virtual environment will likely raise the level of trust and as a result improve cooperation between the sides.

It is important to note that although a significant part of diplomatic communications will be digital-virtual from now on, this will not replace a diplomatic presence on the ground. Even in the current crisis, Israeli diplomats were required to show up physically at airports to ensure they accomplished their tasks, despite the danger involved. Diplomats’ presence at foreign posts will remain highly significant. Physical proximity enables first-hand comprehension of the climate, culture and reality that cannot be easily reflected in online research or big data tools. While digital-virtual communication will assist diplomacy and retain its newfound importance even once the pandemic is controlled, even now it is no alternative to a physical presence.

Just as companies, schools and universities have shifted to managing tasks and telelearning, once the new diplomacy is implemented, we may find that it yields faster, more precise and efficient results. We may even see negotiation processes and mobilization of political support in international institutions yielding better results when significant use is made of digital-virtual tools. Civil society organizations promoting dialogue between parties to a conflict have already achieved success in recent years through the use of new technologies to build trust and understanding. Now it is the turn of the official representatives to learn from them and bridge gaps. The coronavirus crisis is shaking up political and economic systems and its impact will be evident for a long time to come. Diplomacy is challenged by social distancing rules and diplomats are being forced to adapt to the new world, in an era in which foreign ministries are also challenged to adapt their activities to the rules of modern diplomacy. With the growing dominance of politicians as well as non-state actors in foreign relations, foreign ministries the world over are striving to justify their existence, redefine their mission and fight for relevance in decision-making processes. Diplomats must study the advantages and drawbacks of various technological tools and immediately adopt new and varied means of communications so they can continue carrying out their tasks.

For years, Israeli diplomacy marketed Israeli technological innovation and entrepreneurship to bolster Israel’s image abroad. In recent years, Israel has also demonstrated achievements in digital diplomacy, especially in creating new discourse channels with the citizens of Arab states.

The coronavirus pandemic offers Israeli diplomacy an opportunity to take another step forward and show that it can lead deep and significant change in forging innovative processes of communications to help it successfully implement Israeli foreign policy.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Coronavirus Crisis Offers Opportunities for Innovative Israeli Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

3) Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning activists entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4) Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdullah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer. President Reuven Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5) Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf states and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf states, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations toward its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Israel Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf states, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf states, which was not met with a significant American response.

6) Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7) Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement while Israel dials down its Visegrád Group links – The European Union continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner, and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrád Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8) Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9) Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes canceled) international visits and meetings in a bid to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10) Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointment was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, at the expense of diplomats.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, of which Dr. Nimrod Goren is the founder and head.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An unbearable gap exists between professionals in the civil service, most of whom are prevented from expressing themselves in public, who understand that issues of peace and diplomacy should take center stage in public discourse and the state’s strategic order of preference, and politicians who regard such matters as trivial. The politicians stoke the sense of public fear, which then takes them hostage to public opinion, rather than dealing with the many opportunities on our doorstep.

The anti-Israel boycott movement (BDS) illustrates how we have turned a tactical threat that does not endanger Israel’s security or prosperity into an existential threat. Israel’s aggressive policies vis-à-vis the movement violate freedom of expression, which liberal audiences view as a key human right. This, in turn, plays into the hands of those promoting BDS because it alienates many groups deterred by the government’s anti-liberal policies. The Foreign Ministry is familiar with Israel’s target audiences more than any other government agency and is supposed to present the diplomatic angle at government discussions, but it is often excluded from sessions with decision makers and is not a party to shaping policy.

Israeli politicians are distancing themselves from the values of liberal democracies, which most Diaspora Jewry holds dear, too. With short-term considerations in mind, they prefer alliances with populist leaders who have a record of anti-Semitism. In so doing, they sin against the values defined by the founders of the state in its proclamation of independence as well as against the stated purpose of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.

Israel must not regard Diaspora Jewry as simply a cash cow, a political lobby and a pool for immigration. It must engage with those the state views as an integral part of its national project. Diaspora Jews should be invited to voice their views on Israel-related issues, and Israel should appreciate their involvement even when the views are critical. We must create ways for Jews to be critical of government policy and at the same time love and support the State of Israel.

The issue of relations with Diaspora Jewry is intertwined with that of the Arab Israeli minority. For Diaspora Jews, equality for the Arabs in Israel is a fundamental liberal axiom just as is their expectation of the rights they demand for themselves in their countries of residence. There is a measure of hypocrisy in Israeli criticism leveled at Israel’s Arab citizens over their identification with their Palestinian brothers, while expecting US Jews to identify with Israel. Nonetheless, there is room for optimism.

While Israelis are being exposed often to messages of fear and incitement, polls consistently indicate that a majority favors the two-state for two people solution. Despite it all, many elements that were absent in the past now enable the promotion of this solution. The Arab Peace Initiative accepts the principle of two states within the 1967 borders with certain territorial exchanges as well as Israel’s veto of the number of refugees allowed to return. The Palestinian Authority’s current leadership does not believe violence serves its people and is seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

A change of Israeli leadership, which may be in the offing, could lead Israel and the Palestinians toward a new road that would save the State of Israel’s liberal Zionist dream. When that happens, Israel will no longer have to choose between its character as the nation state of the Jewish people and being a democracy that protects the rights of its minorities.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres. This article is based on his remarks at the 2019 Annual Conference of the Mitvim Institute, held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for Diplomatic Optimism הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Knesset does not excel in dealing with foreign affairs, and it does not carry out effective parliamentary supervision on such matters. The plenum debates hardly deal with international developments; there is no separate committee on foreign affairs; foreign issues are not perceived by most MKs as generating electoral profit; and visits of MKs abroad – even when justified – are viewed by the public as self-serving. The opening conditions do not seem promising, but there is still much that MKs can do to advance Israel’s foreign relations, each according to his/her ideological position.

Members of parliament around the world are increasingly engaged in promoting foreign relations, together with civil society organizations, the business sector, and individual entrepreneurs. This reflects the nature of modern diplomacy, which no longer relies solely on ambassadors and foreign ministers. Members of parliament participate and represent their countries in international forums, host foreign delegations, raise global issues on the agenda and contribute to their solution, and generally play a role in supervising their government’s activities on these issues. MKs can also do so, and they have a number of tools available to them.

First and foremost, they must push the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to increase its involvement in foreign issues. The committee is supposed to perform “supervision and control of the country’s foreign policy,” but out of hundreds of debates by the outgoing committee, the vast majority dealt with security and only a few with international affairs. To solve this, the Knesset can establish a separate committee on foreign affairs, as is customary in other countries. In the meantime, a quota for committee discussions on foreign issues should be set, Foreign Ministry officials should be invited to appear before the committee, and the committee’s discussions of non-confidential foreign policy matters should be open for media coverage.

Other committees, too, can discuss relevant foreign policy issues, and cooperate with the Knesset Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit (KATEF, established in 2018) in improving parliamentary oversight of the Foreign Service. With regard to substance, MKs can establish caucuses  on a variety of foreign policy issues, through which they can work together with civil society organizations to raise awareness and advance diplomatic action. In previous terms, for example, the Knesset had caucuses dealing with Israeli-Arab regional cooperation, Israel-EU relations, Israel-US ties, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the status of the Foreign Service. These should now be re-established.

MKs should also request plenum discussions on foreign policy issues, address them in their speeches, and submit frequent parliamentary questions to Israel’s next foreign minister. Parliamentary questions are also a useful tool for exposing information to the public in the absence of sufficient transparency by the Foreign Service. MKs can also avail themselves of the Knesset Research and Information Center and request studies on international affairs and foreign policy, which until today have not been much in demand.

In their foreign policy work, MKs should seek the assistance of the Knesset’s Diplomatic Advisor – a Foreign Ministry diplomat – and the staff of the Knesset’s International Affairs Division. They can provide information and briefings, ahead of foreign visits, meetings with guests from abroad, and Knesset debates on international affairs. The participation of Foreign Ministry officials in Knesset discussions on foreign affairs should be increased, as a better interface between the Foreign Ministry and MKs will advance a more professional parliamentary diplomacy. In addition, think tanks that offer knowledge and recommendations on foreign policy issues, as well as unofficial opportunities to meet with experts from Israel and abroad, should also be engaged by MKs and seen as an asset.

The international activity of MKs deserves special attention, given the gap between its importance and its negative public image. Traveling abroad is part of the MKs work, and as long as it is done professionally and does not prevent them from fulfilling their duties in parliament, does not deserve excessive public criticism. MKs travel on behalf of the Knesset to strengthen inter-parliamentary relations and diplomatic ties between states; represent Israel in international forums, events and ceremonies; meet with parliamentarians from other countries (including from Arab states); and learn best practices that may be relevant to Israel. Private travels by MKs, which are not commissioned by the Knesset and that include lectures, participation in political conferences and dialogues, strengthening ties with Jewish communities and sister parties, and advancing the political agenda of MKs, are of high importance as well.

Such trips can help enhance the knowledge of MKs on international politics, help formulate clearer positions on a variety of foreign policy issues, and bring Israeli perspectives to international forums. The Knesset should assist MKs succeed in these tasks. It must ensure the freedom of action of MKs on foreign issues, even when their position is inconsistent with the government’s official position. It must also find ways to provide MKs with better guidance and tools to perform international activities, which may include language studies, translation and proofreading services, and diplomatic advice.

Parliamentary diplomacy takes place not only abroad but also in Israel. MKs receive international delegations that visit Israel and host them in the Knesset. They can be active in inter-parliamentary friendship groups and establish contacts with parliamentarians from countries with which such groups do not exist (e.g. Egypt, Jordan and Turkey). In addition, they should reach out to foreign embassies and international organizations with representative offices in Israel. These channels of dialogue enable increased political influence, international cooperation and exchange of knowledge – all of which can help MKs advance their agenda, both domestically and internationally.

Thus, MKs have a large number of tools through which they can influence Israel’s foreign relations and position Israel as a more involved and influential player in the international community. The responsibility for improving Israel’s foreign policy is no longer confined to the government’s doorstep, and the new Knesset must rise to the challenge.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; Nehoray Ofri served as Mitvim’s Government Relations Coordinator.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Members of Knesset Can Help Improve Israel’s Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When he flew to London to meet Johnson, the British Prime Minister publicly stressed his support for the two-state solution, which Netanyahu opposes; when Netanyahu flew to Sochi to meet Putin, he was left by the Russian President in the waiting for three hours and did not return to Israel with policy achievements; even Trump refrained from giving Netanyahu a pre-election “gift” as he did last time, and only indicated vague willingness to discuss an Israel-US defense treaty after the elections; and King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly rejected Netanyahu’s request for a meeting, much like other Arab leaders did earlier in the year. Moreover, the crisis facing Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, deepened further in the lead up to the elections.

Following the elections results, the responsibility for managing Israel’s foreign relations will likely change hands, with Yair Lapid being a major candidate to serve as foreign minister. The next government will need to lead a fix in Israel’s foreign policy. It should advance peace with the Palestinians; highlight Israel’s commitment to liberal-democratic values; engage with – rather than delegitimize – international critics; restore bipartisan support for Israel in the US; stop EU-bashing and improve ties with Brussels; fulfill opportunities to reshape ties with Arab countries; mend the crisis with world Jewry; legitimize the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, and the list goes on.

The Israeli elections did not produce an ideological shift from right to left, and this will limit the extent of foreign policy change we can expect, but they did open up a path for leadership change, block far-right parties, and empower Palestinian citizens of Israel. Given Israel’s difficult political reality, these are important first steps towards change.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During his two election campaigns this year, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly boasted of his alleged foreign policy achievements. At the same time, Foreign Affairs Ministry, of which he has been in charge for the past four years, has recorded yet another low in an ongoing process meant to weaken it and decentralize its authority, thereby undermining Israel’s ability to implement diplomatic goals and improve its international relations. The ministry is over NIS 300 million ($85m.) budget deficit makes it hard for diplomats to carry out their work.

However, the essence of the crisis is not budgetary. It lies in the ministry’s ongoing exclusion from the core issues of Israeli diplomacy and the scattering of its roles and budgets among various government ministries and entities. Its public standing has been undermined with deliberate intent, and Israelis are insufficiently aware of the ministry’s importance. The voice of diplomats is marginalized in Israel’s decision-making processes, which therefore lack the broad diplomatic angle that Foreign Ministry professionals could bring to the table. This has a direct negative impact on Israel’s national security.

There is a price to be paid for an enfeebled Foreign Ministry and its inability to promote Israeli interests in the international arena, such as creating diplomatic alliances and expedient terms for cooperation with other countries, forging ties with international organizations and institutions, identifying economic opportunities and helping Israel fulfill its potential. Among the ministry’s other core tasks is aiding Jewish communities around the world and Israeli citizens abroad, promoting foreign aid that contributes to Israel’s sense of self-worth and public image abroad, and carrying out the public diplomacy essential to explaining Israel’s cause and mobilizing international support for its survival and prosperity. The weakening of the Foreign Ministry harms all these missions and damages Israel’s future.

The recent appointment of Israel Katz as a full-time foreign minister, after four years of Netanyahu holding the position among his many other duties, was a positive development that underscored the importance of staffing this post. The new minister is rightly seeking to identify measures to bolster his ministry and help resolve the dispute it has with the Finance Ministry. However, the reform he is proposing, as reported in Haaretz, reportedly consists primarily of shifting the ministry’s focus to the economic realm and is therefore unlikely to solve the issues at stake.

FIRST, REGARDLESS of the proposal itself, a reform in the Foreign Affairs Ministry should be carried out by a minister appointed for a full term, and not as a caretaker in a transition government. It should also be conducted in coordination with the ministry’s professional directors, taking into account the planning work undertaken by them in recent years to prepare it for the future.

Second, the reform as reported merely perpetuates the trend of shrinking and weakening the ministry’s work, undermining the core of its activity: diplomacy. Strengthening the economic component in the ministry’s work and its ability to measure and assess its performance are positive steps, appropriate in the era of modern diplomacy; but only in accordance with additional important measures designed to strengthen the ministry’s impact on foreign policy design and implementation, and boosting its voice at the decision-making level. Presenting Israeli diplomats with new economic demands that are far from the added value they are able to provide is not the solution.

The campaign ahead of Israel’s September 17 elections is an opportunity to reiterate the importance of Israeli diplomacy and foreign relations. It provides an opportunity to demand that the political parties and their candidates boost the standing of the Foreign Service. This is an opportunity for the candidates to explain to voters the importance of a strong diplomatic apparatus and the opportunities that it can help promote, and to present concrete foreign policy goals and action plans. In addition, civil society organizations dedicated to Israeli foreign policy and its Foreign Service are growing in number and strength, representing varied professional and ideological backgrounds, and they can also help shape the conversation during (and after) the elections campaign.

The formation of a new government and ministerial appointments are an opportunity to empower Israel’s Foreign Service, also by restoring to the Foreign Affairs Ministry the foreign policy responsibilities and budgets farmed out to other agencies in recent years, appointing a full-time foreign minister and forming a ministry-led inter-agency committee to coordinate all government activity in the field of foreign relations. This is also an opportunity to ensure that the voices of diplomats and foreign policy professionals become an integral part of decision-making processes.

The swearing in of the next Knesset will be a time to ensure that its committees, especially the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, deal with foreign relations issues properly, and do not allow them to be overshadowed once again by Israel’s security-focused discourse. Israel can follow the example of other countries and establish a parliamentary committee solely dedicated to foreign affairs. This may also present an opportunity to promote structural change in the National Security Council that would ensure a role for diplomats within it, and to encourage the cabinet to demand regular briefings on foreign affairs by the ministry.

The incumbency of a new foreign minister also provides an opportunity to define clear goals for the ministry, build a work plan and set measurable targets with which to assess its achievements, its ethics and equity for Israel’s citizens. The Foreign Affairs Ministry must improve its cooperation with civil society organizations, the media and the Knesset; share information about its ongoing activities and its annual assessments, enable parliamentary and public oversight and encourage transparency, professional freedom and sound administration.

In summing up, Israel’s Foreign Service is weak and is deliberately being weakened even further. We are paying the resulting cost to our diplomacy, economy, civil society and security. None of this is preordained. It stems from a political decision and thus can be transformed. The coming elections are a chance for change. We as citizens must demand that our candidates and parties, from across the political spectrum, pledge to repair the damage and bring Israel’s Foreign Service back to the forefront.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; Dr. Nimrod Goren is head of the institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Service Is Being Weakened and We Are All Paying the Price, הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The MFA is a victim of the traditional predominance of military, defense and intelligence agencies in providing responses to the diplomatic and security challenges Israel faces. Politicians and government officials tend to dismiss the ministry’s potential contribution to key issues on the national agenda. This continuous neglect has resulted in a string of budget cuts and closure of Israeli diplomatic missions throughout the world, undermining the ministry’s classic diplomatic roles, chief among them developing and maintaining Israel’s diplomatic ties with other countries. With deliberate intent, Netanyahu’s governments have steadily chipped away at the ministry’s significant role in designing and conducting Israel’s diplomacy and defense agenda.

The next Israeli government could reverse this grim trend if the Prime Minister appoints a full-time Foreign Minister and gives him or her full backing. Provided the new government displays willingness and openness to MFA reform, it will have to start by adopting a conceptual change in mapping the current spheres of influence in the international arena, which are no longer limited to government and state level. There are other, varied spheres of influence, some devoid of any diplomatic or state-level definition, some without an organized structure and/or territorial (or other) borders, which are often more powerful and influential than those of governments and states. These new spheres of influence include the internet and social media, giant corporations and multinational groups. They command huge budgets, often greater than the average budget of a small or medium-sized state. Religious and ethno-cultural streams numbering many millions of believers and members also hold growing sway, as do influential global civil society organizations.

The methodology and means used to exert global influence are also different from the ones we knew. Top-down processes, in which an established state entity conveys messages to broad swathes of the public through traditional media, exert declining influence. These familiar trends are being replaced by a non-hierarchical, non-filtered influence no longer based on traditional media channels but rather on direct contact through internet and social media platforms. Most of them are largely unregulated and uncensored, such as Twitter and Facebook. This constitutes a dramatic change in diplomatic and political influence. Therefore, present-day Israeli diplomacy must reflect a deep understanding of these new avenues of influence, a correct reading of global power centers and the use of innovative and relevant tools to create influence within these arenas – from classic diplomacy within the framework of traditional international relations to digital diplomacy on the internet, social media and digital communications.

Realistic funding for updated MFA operations is also a vital element of any future reform. Israel has traditionally allocated an especially low budget for its Foreign Service compared with other states that increase their foreign affairs budgets significantly each year. This undermines the potential impact of the MFA and its diplomatic activities. The required overhaul must also be based on branding Israel as an innovative purveyor of foreign aid. The MFA’s Agency for International Development Cooperation (known by its Hebrew acronym Mashav) is one of the most efficient tools for improving Israel’s image in the world.

Increasing the extent of Israeli aid to developing countries could greatly enhance its prestige in the world, in general, and in beneficiary states, in particular. The combination of Israel’s image as a start-up nation and its willingness to play a key role in Tikkun Olam – the Jewish value of “repairing the world’, a form of global responsibility – has vast potential for promoting positive branding. Unfortunately, and absurdly, this blend of foreign aid with technology and innovation is undervalued and very far from utilizing its potential. A reconstituted Israeli MFA must change this policy and turn innovation-based foreign aid into a first-rate tool of public diplomacy and branding.

Most importantly and above all, however, a new government must restore the authority stripped from the MFA and the purview over foreign policy and public diplomacy handed over to various agencies, clearly define the ministry’s roles and influence, and anchor them in government decisions and even legislation.

Dr. Ronen Hoffman is an expert on governance and foreign policy at the IDC in Herzliya, who served as a Member of Knesset and Chair of the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy in the 19th Knesset. This article is based on his speech at a conference of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Empowering Israel’s Foreign Service via Modern and Innovative Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous election campaigns did not accord the foreign policy achievements of Israeli leaders a particularly prominent position. Netanyahu’s focus on the foreign policy arena suggests, perhaps, that the Prime Minister felt that he enjoyed limited success on other issues, such as security and the economy. There may also be a personal explanation to the focus on foreign policy in the campaign: Netanyahu rose to prominence through diplomacy, serving as Israel’s deputy chief of mission in the US, Israeli ambassador to the UN and deputy foreign minister. Moreover, his approach echoes the diplomatic style of his biological and political forefathers – the Revisionist movement in pre-state times. The movement stressed grandiose public gestures, contacts and understandings with world leaders and dramatic speeches before international fora. The Prime Minister’s diplomatic flowering occurred simultaneously with the weakening of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure. Netanyahu greatly contributed to this weakening, refusing to appoint a full-time foreign minister and withholding support for the diplomats’ pay demands despite the strike they waged.

Netanyahu thus positioned himself as “a king-diplomat”, (a term coined by of Prof. Piki Ish-Shalom): a leader who controls the daily diplomatic agenda while bypassing the professionals and government bureaucracy. On the eve of election day, Netanyahu even boasted that Trump “gave” him the Golan Heights, as if it were a deal between two individuals rather than a diplomatic move between states. Netanyahu joins the global populist wave with a particular emphasis of his own – on the foreign relations angle.

What are the implications of this style and its success in the elections?

First, assuming that Netanyahu believes his image as an arch-diplomat helped him in the elections, we are likely to witness continued diplomatic activity on his part. In the coming months, Netanyahu will be launching the fight of his life in the face of three possible indictments on corruption charges and possibly an additional police inquiry into the affair involving Israel’s purchase of submarines from Germany and money that Netanyahu received from his American cousin. All of the above could not only end his political career, they could land him in jail. Under these circumstances, Netanyahu is likely to make an effort to boost his public image as an arch-diplomat whose incumbency is essential for the State of Israel, even at the cost of slowing, delaying, or halting the legal proceedings against him.

Netanyahu appears to have already made use of this argument in the past, albeit de facto (rather than by declaration). On March 6, 2017, during questioning by investigators of the anti-corruption police unit Lahav 433 at his official residence, Netanyahu suddenly received a call from the US President. The questioning was suspended so he could take the call, which reportedly focused on the threat from Iran. The call was presumably timed to coincide with the police questioning. Even if it was not, the message was clear: Netanyahu is essential for Israel’s foreign relations, and entrusting him with the state’s most important issues even justifies a halt to the legal proceedings against him.

Second, the current conditions in the international arena are ripe for moves that fit into Netanayhu’s agenda. Such moves could include, first and foremost, possible annexation of parts of the West Bank. The US under President Trump is less and less committed to the international liberal order. The rising power in the east, China, is committed to some aspects of the existing international order, but probably not to its liberal aspects. As a result, the post1945 norm against annexation of occupied lands is gradually eroding. The Arab world, that opposes Israeli annexation, is weak and busy with crises in various states. Europe, that voiced opposition to annexation, is torn on other, more pressing issues.

Annexation has costs. Annexing territories without granting the Palestinians basic rights will deepen the rift between Israel and significant parts of US Jewry that views political and civil equality as a fundamental feature of just politically systems. Even a more limited annexation, only of the settlement blocs, is likely to increase these tensions, albeit to a lesser degree. Such measures would have a domestic cost, too. A significant number of Israelis oppose annexation, in part, as Jews might no longer be the clear majority in the boundaries of this new “greater Israel”

Finally, even in an era of “monarchic diplomacy” with Netanyahu as its focal point, the experience and continuity provided by professional civil servants at the MFA is of invaluable importance. Israel’s national interest lies in bolstering the foreign ministry, not weakening it. Israel’s next foreign minister should be willing to stand up to the continued undermining of the ministry.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a Senior Lecturer on international relations at the Haifa University School of Political Science.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Perils of Netanyahu’s “Monarchic Diplomacy” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Therein lies a problem. Too often, the State of Israel examines reality through riflescopes, seeking threats rather than identifying opportunities, finding partners and avoiding pitfalls and entanglement in avoidable wars. That is why, as noted in the State Comptroller’s report, Israel finds itself embroiled in endless rounds of fighting and tensions in Gaza, Lebanon and around holy sites in Jerusalem, with each round ending not far from where it began. When Israel does opt for diplomatic tools and conducts negotiations with its neighbors, security officials are usually the ones who lead the discussions.

In order to seek peace and ensure a quiet, safe existence, diplomatic thinking in decision–making must assume a far greater role, as must critical public discourse on such issues. A complex diplomatic and political discourse must be promoted among the public and decision makers. It should include better understanding of the international arena based on familiarity with the views of foreign actors towards Israel and its policies, awareness of global developments and trends, and acquaintance with the relationships among a variety of actors relevant to the scene. These goals are feasible, but require essential shifts that will empower Israel’s Foreign Service and will bring diplomatic considerations to the forefront of decision–making processes. Foreign Ministry retirees have an important role to play in promoting this.

Former diplomats could contribute significantly to Israeli society in terms of bolstering public discourse on diplomacy and foreign policy. Foreign Ministry veterans who go into retirement take with them dozens of years of experience, diplomatic skills, knowledge of various countries and organizations, intricate networks of social ties around the world, analytic capacity and deep understanding of the international arena and of Israel’s place among the nations. They know how to explain foreign affairs to the public and to raise foreign policy issues on the agenda, to support or criticize Israeli policy and propose alternatives freed of the shackles of government service, to explain the world to Israelis and explain Israel to the world (should they want to do so).

Foreign Service retirees in other countries enjoy significant appreciation, retain knowledge and prestige, are courted by various organizations, and integrate into key positions in society. They are often involved in local and national politics, and assume roles as directors of large global corporations, lecturers in academia, researchers at institutes, central activists in civil society and key media figures. Their contribution to shaping public discourse is significant. Not so in Israel. The Foreign Ministry has excellent staff, but once diplomats retire, they do not have representation commensurate with their skills and abilities in the political, cultural, academic or business arena. While some Foreign Ministry veterans find their way into academia, civil society or boards of directors, it is not a systematic course; it is unstructured and unguided by a support network, relying instead on personal motivation and ability. Sadly, the valuable experience of Israeli Foreign Ministry retirees goes down the drain.

Many obstacles stand in the way of former Israeli diplomats’ contribution to public discourse and integration in key roles. The decline in the prestige of the Foreign Ministry, a relatively late retirement age, inability to take a leave of absence during one’s career and return to the Foreign Service, lack of regional expertise, are just some of the central challenges that must be met in order to allow former diplomats to contribute their share. This would require strengthening the Foreign Ministry and restoring its prestige and power along with the power and prestige of its staff. The mobility of Foreign Ministry staff could be increased to allow them to leave the service for a while and accrue professional experience in other organizations, which would provide them with a diverse network of contacts ahead of their retirement. Regional expertise can be encouraged within the Foreign Ministry, and the retirement age could be lowered. Structured contact between the ministry and its former staff should be encouraged through periodic updates, consultations and learning, and joint mechanisms should ensure the rights of retirees and prepare them for retirement.

Obviously, the retirees themselves must have a role in improving their lot. They must take the initiative and try to integrate into the public and governance arena, deliver lectures to different audiences, contribute their analyses through the media and be active on social media. They can also provide briefings for Members of Knesset and participate in discussions held by Knesset committees and caucuses, place their experience at the disposal of local government, take part in public discussion without fear of expressing their views, and integrate into civil society and business.

Israeli society has an interest in repairing the structural, organizational and political flaws that currently impede Foreign Ministry retirees in contributing their experience, training, knowledge and varied capabilities to the public discourse. Foreign Ministry retirees have the tools to enable Israeli society to examine the diplomatic angle, too, when trying to understand reality, analyze it and decide how to act. It is important that we hear them. It is important that they not only be former diplomats but remain key figures in Israeli society.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Former Diplomats Are a Wasted National Resource הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Alternative Directions for Israeli Foreign Policy on the Eve of an Election Year הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, it seems that the glorious days of the ministry, if they ever truly existed, have long passed. Ever since the current government was formed in 2015, there has been no full-time foreign minister. The ministry, which – despite its prestige – has always struggled for a leading role in the decision-making process, is generally excluded from significant aspects of Israel’s foreign and defense policy. Salaries of the ministry’s officials are low, especially when considering the strict screening process and the job requirements. Moreover, some of the responsibilities it used to have in the past were transferred to other ministries such as the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs.

The crisis in the ministry is also radiating outwards, and in recent years there has been a sharp drop in the number of candidates for the competitive cadet course. In 2012, there were 2,773 candidates whereas in 2017 only 1,374 candidates started the screening process. In an attempt to change the situation, employees at the ministry decided to take measures and in 2014 they even shut down the headquarters and embassies for the first time in Israel’s history. In late August 2018, the support staff in the ministry (which accounts to some 60% of personal abroad), staged another strike, with little notice.

The crisis in our ‘diplomatic kingdom’ is not unique to Israel. Technology, especially the digital media, allows governments to interact directory, with foreign officials and publics, making diplomatic interventions almost redundant. The decline of the nation-state and the rise of other important non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, international aid organizations, and even global cities, have weakened the need for conventional diplomacy.

But despite this state of affairs, Israel should not neglect its foreign service. In fact, it is needed today more than ever before. First and foremost, in order to prepare for global power transformations. The first change that requires strong foreign service is the rise of important new global players, such as China, but also India and in our region, Russia. We are transitioning from a world of American dominance to a world of multiple powers, that are likely to intervene in regional politics, such as ours. In such circumstances, small countries like Israel, will be required to refined diplomatic skills in order to navigate safely among the various foci of power. In recent decades Israel was in a convenient position: the US was the dominant player in the global system, and we were its closest allies. A vibrant Jewish community in the US has helped us and has been part of an effective pro-Israel lobby. It was often sufficient to appeal to Washington in order to achieve political goals in international forums such as the UN security council. However, in the new world, whereby Israel is required to maintain good relations with both the US and China (in spite of the tension between them), a more sophisticated approach will be required. Israel needs a corpus of skilled diplomats that will be able to cut the right alliances and lead Israel safely among nations.

The second change that requires a strong ministry of foreign affairs is the identity of the emerging powers. After five centuries of European and then American dominance, the 21st century is expected to be the Asian century. China has already overtaken or matched the US on a number of indicators, such as high-speed trains and supercomputers. This will require a significant shift in our mindset. The Euro-American scene is familiar to us, and to a certain extent we are part of it. For example, some of our prime ministers attended elite institutions in the US. The current prime minister (as well as the education minister) were even had American citizenship in the past. Our familiarity with the Euro-Atlantic powers is a result of demography. In the past few centuries, most of the Jewish people have lived in Europe, North America and the Middle East. As a result, we share – in spite of some extremely difficult episodes such as the holocaust – common cultural, religious and historical roots with the European world and its extension in the new world.

This is not the case in Asia. Despite the hectic backpackers’ travels and vipassana workshops that Israelis attend, Asian culture, values and history – are foreign to most Israelis. In order to conduct ourselves effectively in a world where Far-East countries are so important, a professional corpus of skilled and specialized diplomats is required. The foreign service is the natural place to build such a cadre of experts that will make it easier for Israel to face the rising powers. This will require the ministry to invest even more in training and in developing area specializations.

Finally, dispersing the authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between various institutions and ministries leads to duplication, inefficiency and the absence of a clear and sharp message. Logically, there should be a concentration of powers in one ministry with a broad outlook and an accurate reflection of the positions of international players with whom the ministry is in continuous contact. One example is the current effort against BDS. Instead of the traditional leadership of the ministry on the matter, aspects of it were securitized. Recent reports indicated that the Israeli security Agency (Shabak) is guiding the security personal in Israel’s airports with an eye towards limiting criticism of Israel’s control over the territories. This lead to some counterproductive outcomes such as an aggressive questioning at the airport this summer of a leading Jewish philanthropist, Meyer Koplow, and a leading Jewish American journalist, Peter Beinart.

In the past, the Zionist movement coped well with global power transitions and was effective in dealing with the fall the fall of the Ottoman Empire, through the Balfour Declaration and all the way to the alliance with the US in recent decades. We are facing a similar moment now, and the Foreign Ministry is perhaps the most important player to help Israel cope with the change. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, is very much needed.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute and an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Why Israel Needs a Strong Ministry of Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Towards an Increased Role for the Knesset in Foreign Affairs: Summary of a Knesset event held by the Mitvim Institute and the Caucus for Strengthening Israel’s Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since then, the number of Iraqis making contact with Israelis has grown tremendously, mainly through social networks. Among other things, Iraqi surfers recently set up a Facebook page called “The Virtual Embassy of Iraq in Israel”. The Israeli Foreign Ministry reports that about one-third of the Ministry’s Arabic site’s followers (ca. half a million) are Iraqis, and their attitude toward Israel is generally positive and friendly. In their honor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently inaugurated a unique Facebook page called “Israel in the Iraqi Discourse”, which received very positive comments and raised much interest in Iraq. In addition, other interested Israelis (for the sake of full disclosure, the author of this article is among them) maintain daily contact with many friends throughout Iraq.

A segmentation of the Iraqi participants in the discussions conducted on the Foreign Ministry’s Arabic page shows that most of the participants are educated young people between the ages of 18 and 35, an age group that accounts for about 70 percent of Iraq’s population, with about a third of them living in Baghdad. They are not afraid to disclose their real names and photographs, and they represent various Iraqi population groups: Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, and others. These young people are usually politically and socially active and constitute the backbone of Iraq’s educated class. They came to deal with Israel and Israelis out of interest in the Jewish past in Iraq or out of a certain attraction to the democratic and liberal model presented by Israel. Recently, their support for Israel has grown in the face of their hostility to Iran. Their positions on the Israeli issue are distinctly different from those prevailing in the Arab world.

Unlike other Arab countries, the interest in Israel among Iraqis is not confined to politics; it extends to the cultural and religious spheres and the daily aspects of life in Israel. Many Iraqis openly express their desire to visit Israel, but when they try to carry it out they encounter the arbitrariness of the Israeli establishment and are generally refused. The two pages of the Foreign Ministry in Arabic frequently publish non-political articles that shed light on different aspects of the Israeli way of being which raise great interest among Iraqi users. The knowledge of young Iraqis about Israel is sometimes surprising, as demonstrated through the popularity of Sarit Hadad.

It is difficult to determine whether the phenomenon is limited to social networks or whether it will also have political ramifications in future. The educated Iraqi youth in question influence the political and cultural agenda and shape public opinion. Yet in recent elections in Iraq, many of them supported the boycott movement, and others voted mainly for the parties of al-Sadr and al-Abadi, or for smaller parties on the fringe of the Iraqi national and anti-Iranian camp.

For some reason, official Israel has not yet discovered Iraq, the largest Arab state on the East. Iraq is the second largest exporter of oil in the world, after Saudi Arabia, and is a significant potential trading partner. Iraq, which is being rebuilt, is desperate for assistance with infrastructure construction, banking, irrigation, agriculture, communications, and more. It also needs indirect assistance with improving its credit rating and with encouraging foreign investments. Iraq would also welcome the assistance of Intelligence services in its fight against terrorism, in which Iraq has acquired great skill in recent years.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of secondary importance in shaping Iraq’s official position vis-a-vis Israel. The Iraqi public is quite indifferent to Palestinian suffering, and Iraq supports the Arab peace initiative, which calls for Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose capital is East Jerusalem. It does not recognize the Hamas rule in Gaza.

As Iraq enters the period of establishing a coalition that will paralyze the political system for a while, it is worth thinking about how Israel should approach this important country. While the Iraqi political echelon is preoccupied with its own affairs, the educated and the young people discuss the matter openly and boldly. In its attempts to establish relations with the Arab states, Israel tends to focus on forging contacts with the political elite, and sometimes only with one specific leader. This is how peace agreements were reached with Egypt and Jordan, and to a great extent this is also the story of the Oslo process with the Palestinians. The educated middle class in the Arab countries was neglected and as a result became alienated from the process and hostile to Israel. Iraq offers the opportunity for a different process which may begin with the educated class and will prepare the ground within wide and influential circles before the formal diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries begins. This different process will lay a firm foundation for future relationships.

Dr. Ronen Zeidel is a senior researcher of Iraq at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University and a research fellow at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study on Israeli-Iraqi relations which is part of the “Israel-Arab Relations: The Unfulfilled Potential” project.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Laying a Civil Foundation for Cooperation between Israel and Iraq הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The diplomacy of the 21st century is increasingly different in nature than that of past decades. It is no longer the exclusive domain of ambassadors and diplomats but is characterized by the larger involvement of civil society organizations, business entities, private entrepreneurs, ordinary citizens, and members of parliament.

This poses challenges for foreign ministries worldwide, whose share in implementing foreign policy becomes less significant. In order to cope with this phenomenon, some of them are taking steps that will emphasize – to decision-makers and the public alike – that even in the present age there is no substitute for professional diplomacy and the bodies that lead it.

A review of the steps taken on this issue by foreign ministries in various countries points at a common denominator: the use of public appeal and greater public participation. Foreign ministries, who are used to the practice of influencing public positions in foreign countries, also started investing efforts in fostering relations with the public in their home countries.

Recent steps taken by the foreign services of Germany, England, Australia, Sweden and the EU, for example, include: formulating and presenting foreign policy paradigms and guidelines; leading campaigns that emphasize the importance of diplomacy; explaining to the public the work of a diplomat as well as the work of the foreign ministry and its achievements; holding regular media briefings on current political issues; appearing before a variety of local audiences; and carrying out formal consultations with the public.

It is no coincidence that one of the most prominent signs of the weakening of the US State Department under President Trump, was a significant reduction in the scope and number of media briefings. Reduced interaction with the media entails reduced presence of the ministry in the public discourse therefore less exposure of its work and importance to the public.

The Israeli MFA is currently at a significant point of weakness – not only in terms of budget and manpower, but also due to a deliberate move to weaken it by dispersing its authority. Some of the measures needed to empower the ministry require that the government makes decisions and takes action. However, with regard to enhancing its transparency and sharing more information with the public about its work, the ministry can take action right away.

The 2017 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute showed that within the Israeli public there is a desire to know more about the MFA’s activities, and a belief that being more transparent will help in the empowerment of the ministry. Doing so requires a different mindset. Today, the MFA sometimes regards its weakness as a factor that prevents – rather than encourages – more transparency, and this needs to be changed.

The Israeli MFA is on the defensive against an acting Foreign Minister (Prime Minister Netanyahu) who has taken steps in recent years to deliberately weaken the ministry, against a deputy foreign minister (Tzipi Hotovely) who advances an agenda that is further to the right than that of the government, and against other ministries that provide financial means for MFA activities, but in a manner that creates dependence and limitations.

The MFA is recently recognizing the importance of increased transparency. For the first time, its 2018 work plan includes a chapter dealing with improving the ministry’s public positioning and sharing information with the public. While this is a positive development, its implementation still lies in the future. Currently, the MFA does not publish annual reports that summarize its activities and achievements, does not conduct regular media briefings, does not make its annual assessment public (unlike some security bodies), does not provide its representations abroad with clear evaluation criteria for its representations abroad, and excessively tends to seek immunity for the (few) discussions that are held in the Knesset on foreign affairs.

The reasons for this conduct partially lie in the need for a conceptual change within the MFA, as well as in the difficulties facing the ministry in the current political context. In such a reality, the Knesset should play a more important role in encouraging and promoting transparency in the foreign service, and in making diplomacy more central to decision making. The MFA, for its part, must open up to the Israeli public, and continue its adaptation to the modern diplomacy of the 21st century. Doing so will also prepare the ministry for the day when a new Israeli government take shape, hopefully with a full-time foreign minister, who will seek ways to empower the ministry and not further diminish it.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Need for Increased Transparency in the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there.

Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large.

After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping a firm hold on Syria. These messages probably did not convince senior officials in Tehran to change their course of action. However, Israel approaching these countries shows the importance of Israel’s traditional allies in Europe, toward whom the Israeli government has in recent years taken an aggressive approach on the basis of differences of opinion on the Palestinian issue.

There is another country, with a growing influence on events in Syria, to which Israel has yet to turn: Turkey. In the past, Turkey had called for the downfall of Assad, but it recently changed course and aligned itself with Russia. As a result, it has become a central part of the Astana Process, also shared by Russia and Iran, and in which significant decisions are made regarding the reality in Syria.

Turkey has also recently reached some understandings with the American administration with the aim of toning down tensions between the two countries, which also stem from differences of interests in Syria. Turkey is militarily and politically involved in Syria and has significant interests in shaping the country’s future. Aspects related to Kurds, Syrian refugees, trade and economic relations, as well as geopolitical areas of influence shape Turkey’s policy toward Syria.

Much like Israel, Turkey is also concerned by the growing Iranian influence in Syria, albeit to a different extent and due to other reasons. Turkey and Iran share some interests with regards to Syria, are dividing between them military zones of influence in the country, and are trying not to step on each other’s toes. However, they are not allies in the sense that Israeli officials often portray.

Over the years, Turkey and Iran have been able to foster bilateral cooperation and establish normal neighborly relations, but there is also suspicion and rivalry between them, including on issues of hegemony and influence (not only in the Middle East). Iran’s grip on Syria is not a security threat for Turkey as it is for Israel. Turkey’s concerns are mainly economic and political, and Turkey cannot be expected to take measures that would limit Iran’s military presence in Syria. But, Turkey may have interest in restricting the entry of Iranian products and companies into the Syrian market and weakening the political ties between Damascus and Tehran.

This situation creates a certain alignment of interests between Israel and Turkey which should be leveraged, particularly at a time when the two countries seem to have a limited common agenda. The mutual trust between Turkey and Israel is at a low point, and the positive dynamic created after the signing of their 2016 reconciliation agreement receded in the second half of 2017, especially after the tensions that emerged on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in July.

At the same time, the two countries remained loyal to the reconciliation agreement and now enjoy full diplomatic relations. They continually demonstrate that they can cooperate in certain areas despite fundamental disagreements over the Palestinian issue. The Syrian issue can be yet another example of that.

Given the differences in Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria, and in view of the existing security coordination between Turkey and Iran, an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on Iran’s role in Syria should be diplomatic and economic in nature, and not military. As such, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (both of which have already taken steps to increase cooperation between the two countries since 2016), should be taking the leading role in these efforts rather than the defense establishment (which has been traditionally dominating Israel-Turkey relations).

Many in the Israeli government reject up front the option of a dialogue with Turkey and consider Erdoğan as an enemy. In the past, they did not believe that the two countries could succeed in reaching an agreement to restore relations, but reality proved them wrong. Just as the relations between Turkey and Iran are complex, so are the relations between Turkey and Israel.

Israel’s interests in its northern border require an in-depth examination of the feasibility of an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on limiting Iran’s role in Syria. Israel’s other diplomatic options did not prove themselves effective enough. Even if such a dialogue will be carried out at first with the assistance of a third party or through unofficial channels, and even if it is finally proven to yield only limited results, it is a diplomatic channel that should not be ruled out and that Israel’s Foreign Service should work to advance.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Involvement of the Arab Palestinian Citizens of Israel in Foreign Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel.

Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.

This gap between Israel’s official policy and the actions of right-wing politicians must be narrowed. Far right-wing parties are gaining influence in certain countries in Europe. In Austria, such a party has recently even joined the coalition and some of its members are now appointed senior officials. It is possible that in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the representatives of such parties will also become significant in EU institutions. In light of this, the MFA should formulate criteria and guidelines to instruct Israeli right-wing parties on how to conduct themselves vis-à-vis the far right in Europe. A recommendation to refrain from any interaction with the ministers of the Freedom Party was already formulated and accepted by the Prime Minister.

The aim of such a measure would be to prevent right-wing MKs from granting legitimacy to far right-wing ideology in Europe, contrary to the position of the MFA. Furthermore, it would also prevent the legitimizing of anti-Semitic elements in Europe by Israeli officials, regardless of the fact that such elements may currently focus on hating Muslims rather than Jews. The formulation of such criteria and guidelines should be led by the MFA, but should also involve other partners, including the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset Speaker, the Jewish Agency, the Union of Local Authorities, and MKs who head parliamentary friendship associations with relevant countries (such as the Israel-Austria Friendship Association headed by MK Amir Peretz). Additionally, it is vitally important that the recommendations formulated become public, in order to identify those who do not comply with the guidelines, and to ignite a public debate on the issue.

However, the purpose of diplomacy – both formal and parliamentary – is not to impose boycotts, but rather to promote interests through dialogue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to formulate a list of demands and conditions for far right-wing parties in Europe as a condition for policy change toward them. Such a list will also have to take into account the needs of the Jewish communities in Europe, and can be consolidated in cooperation with other groups in Europe who oppose far right-wing parties. It does not need to focus on one country or another, but must address the growing phenomenon throughout the continent, while including lessons from change processes that parties and institutions underwent in the past.

European far right-wing parties sometimes pretend to be pro-Israeli in order to develop ties with right-wing groups in Israel and receive a certificate of integrity from them. This was the case, for example, with the interactions between the head of the Austrian Freedom Party and members of Likud. The leaders of these parties sometime carry soft messages and talk of change, but do not back up this discourse with actions. Presenting a list of clear Israeli requirements and conditions – including, for example, ousting those who are infecting the party with anti-Semitism, changing ideological frameworks and documents, and demonstrating commitment to legislation and policy denouncing anti-Semitism – will produce concrete measures to examine the actual conduct of these parties and avoid a façade of moderation.

The rise of the far right-wing and populist elements is taking place simultaneously, albeit at different levels, in a number of EU member states – especially in the central and eastern Europe. In the EU, there are now countries led by governments that move away from liberal values and democratic norms. The Israeli government is sometimes tempted to see the governments of these countries – such as Hungary – as allies and friends. This is due to block EU initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and their readiness to stand by Israel in international forums. However, viewing these countries as friends is a mistake.

Israel’s foreign policy should indeed be distanced from far right-wing elements in Europe, but this is not enough. It must also emphasize the importance of democracy and show commitment and preference for establishing alliances with countries with a strong democratic regime, even if they disagree with the current policies of the Israeli government. Israel must belong to the family of democratic nations, and should not sacrifice this position for the sake of promoting ad-hoc interests.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Forward)

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel expressed its regret over the incident and promised to continue the legal proceedings, as well as pay damages to the families of the two citizens and to the family of PalestinianJordanian judge Raed Zeiter, who was shot to death at the Allenby Bridge border crossing in March 2014. In return, the Israeli Embassy in Jordan will return to full activity, although Ambassador Einat Shlain will not return to her post and will be replaced by a new ambassador.

The Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement that “Israel attaches great importance to its strategic relations with Jordan, and the two countries will act to advance their cooperation and to strengthen the peace treaty between them.” But if Israel really attaches so much strategic importance to these relations, why did it wait six months before solving the issue?

This isn’t the first time that Israel’s relations with Jordan are marred by a security incident. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls who were visiting the Island of Peace site in Naharayim. Jordan’s King Hussein rushed to calm the situation down: He cut short a visit to Spain and came to Israel to offer condolences to the victims’ families. He also issued an apology for the schoolgirls’ murder.

Several months later, Israel tried to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mashal on Jordanian soil. The operation failed, several Mossad fighters were captured by the local police and others found shelter in the Israeli Embassy building. Then-Mossad Director Danny Yatom was quickly sent by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to brief the king on the details of the operation. His request to release the detained agents was turned down, but the crisis was solved within 12 days after several Israeli officials, including Efraim Halevy and Ariel Sharon, made efforts to calm the king down. Halevy’s proposal to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison was the compensation accepted by Jordan.

In August 2011, shortly after the January 25 Revolution which led to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, seven Israelis were killed in a series of terror attacks on Highway 12. As part of Israel’s military response, an IDF force entered Sinai and killed five Egyptian policemen. The incident led to a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Egypt, which threatened to recall its ambassador. Two months later, then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak issued an apology for the killing of the Egyptian policemen, bringing the crisis to an end.

While each incident has its own unique characteristics, several insights can be drawn from these events: First of all, a quick response is highly important. It has the power of preventing the crisis, or at least preventing it from getting worse. It also shows that the other side sees the incident as important and understands the need to come up with an immediate solution.

Netanyahu did send the Shin Bet chief to Jordan immediately to try to solve the problem, but the Jordanian side didn’t feel that the Israeli government saw it as a top priority. The fact that it took six months to reach an agreement indicates that the Israeli government didn’t ascribe much importance to the crisis. Meanwhile, emotions in Jordan ran high against Israel.

Second, the political echelon’s involvement in the negotiations is highly important. The prime minister himself, or at least the defense minister, should lead the reconciliation move.

Third, we should know how to apologize. An apology isn’t a display of weakness, especially if it comes from a place of confidence and strength. Accidentally killing a Jordanian citizen is definitely a reason to apologize.

Fourth, Israel’s decision makers shouldn’t consider “their” public opinion in this case, but rather the public opinion in the other country. Part of the Jordanian anger was directed at way Netanyahu publicly greeted the ambassador and the security guard, in a bid to gain support in the Israeli public opinion. In light of the Jordanian sensitivity, the prime minister could have given up the photo-op and settled for a private rather than public meeting.

Finally, we should offer the other side compensation to convey that we understand the sensitivity on the Jordanian side, and especially its royal family, which has been standing by Israel for years—secretly and behind the scenes—when it comes to important security issues. In other words, the long-term interest overshadows the short-term interest.

We should welcome the agreement, and better late than never, but the decision-making process on the Israeli side—if such a process actually took place—must be criticized. The weak Israeli response emphasizes the absence of the Foreign Ministry, and the absence of a full-time foreign minister, from the process. In any event, we should hope the decision makers draw the lessons from this case and other past tensions with Egypt and Jordan and implement them in the next crisis.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Reconciliation: Better Late Than Never הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Collapse of the Israeli Foreign Service הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.