(originally published by IAI)

הפוסט The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lieberman, initially an ideological and political ally of Netanyahu, shifted his position over time – first preventing from Netanyahu to form a government after the April 2019 election, then insisting on a unity government between Netanyahu’s Likud and Gantz’s Blue and White after the September 2019 election, and currently indicating he wants Gantz to be the one who is called upon by the president to form a government.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Joint List, which increased its share of votes and now holds 15 seats (out of 120), has become a more legitimate political partner for Jewish parties than it has been in the past. Nevertheless, it still not clear whether this changed to the extent that will enable Gantz to form a minority government based on support from outside by Arab legislators.

This process is surprising Netanyahu, who faces a real threat of ending his 11-year consecutive tenure as prime minister, and at a bad timing for him – just as his court case is about to begin. Netanyahu is fighting back, using almost every rhetorical argument and political maneuver possible. While doing so, he is casting doubts about the legitimacy of the electoral process and about the reliability of state institutions. This has negative implications and increases polarization within the Israeli public as well as incitement against Gantz and his supporters.

A change of Israeli leadership may be near, although a fourth election cycle is also a realistic option. Should Gantz become Israel’s prime minister, even if within the context of some sort of unity government, the Israeli political landscape will change dramatically. His persona and leadership style will be different than Netanyahu’s. His goal will be to “heal the society” from divisions and incitement. His tone is a positivist one, including messages of hope, and not only fear. He represents a commitment to good governance and democracy, which eroded in Israel over the last few years.

Gantz is also likely to change course on several foreign policy issues, some of which are relevant to Israel’s relations in the Middle East. While supporting the Trump Plan, he made it clear that he opposes unilateral annexation and that any Israeli move should be coordinated with the international community and regional actors. Even though Gantz does not prioritize an immediate restart of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, he is likely to take more responsible action on the Palestinian issue, and to be more open to engagement with the Palestinian leadership and with those in Europe and the US Democratic Party who are critical of Israel’s current policies.

In terms of relations with the Arab world, Netanyahu repeatedly tried to show that he can promote normalization with Arab countries, without making any progress on the Palestinian issue. However, his efforts met a glass ceiling. Throughout the past year, he tried to get a public meeting with an Arab leader, to boost his election campaigns, but did not succeed.

Gantz is likely to continue working for improved relations with the Arab world, and to maximize new opportunities that emerge – including with countries in the Gulf. But, in contrast to Netanyahu, he may not see this as a route to bypass the Palestinian issue, but rather as something that could be leveraged to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. In such a context, the Arab Peace Initiative – with some modifications due to the changes that took place in regional realities since it was first introduced – could become much more relevant.

The Arab world should regard a leadership change in Israel as an opportunity, reach out to the new prime minister and government, and indicate a willingness to upgrade ties and cooperation should the new prime minister take positive steps. This could be done publicly, or through new dialogue channels that will need to be set up – between new policy actors in Israel and their regional counterparts. Positive messages from the Arab world may help the Israeli leadership to move in a new direction, as Israelis currently view regional cooperation as more possible, desired, and important to Israel’s foreign policy and national security.

The transition process in Israel will not be an easy one, domestically, and could still lead to political instability in the coming months. But things are changing in Israeli politics and a new era may soon begin. If this happens, new opportunities for Israel-Arab relations are likely to appear. This is an issue that pro-peace Israelis are eager to speak with their Arab neighbors about. Let’s start the conversation.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Qposts, arabic)

הפוסט Israel Election Results Give Reason for Israel-Arab Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in the immediate weeks following the presentation of the plan – these did not happen. The US administration stopped Netanyahu’s efforts for rapid annexation, and by doing so created tensions within Israel’s right-wing bloc. Voting intentions of Israelis remained largely unchanged following the publication of the plan, according to multiple public opinion polls. Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz, who the prime minister tried to trap by dragging him to Washington with him to the introduction of the plan, managed to handle the situation and gain some political benefits from it. And Arab leaders kept refusing to publicly meet Netanyahu, like they did prior to the two Israeli elections in 2019 and despite American pressures.

The Trump plan, however, was greeted with cheer by the Israeli mainstream. It was termed by many as the most pro-Israeli plan ever and was warmly embraced by Gantz’ Blue and White party, the main contender to Netanyahu’s Likud. Voices against the plan came almost only from the Israeli left, whose power is diminishing. But even among the left there was cautious not to aggressively oppose the US president, at times even congratulating him for the efforts his administration undertook to devise the plan.

A two-state solution is still the way forward

International responses were also mild in nature. They reflected the general lack of involvement by the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Trump took office and a reluctance to challenge the US president. Countries in Europe and the Arab world issued statements welcoming the Americans for their efforts and promising to study the content of the plan. Such statements were the ones that the US administration was pushing for. The American goal was to prevent clear and immediate rejection of the plan and this has been largely achieved (there were exceptions like Ireland’s quick response against the plan).

Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place.

In the weeks that followed, multi-national organisations (the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union) made joint non-binding statements opposing the plan. Within the EU, internal divisions continued to prevent joint declarations by all 27 member states, as has been the case since 2016. EU High Representative Borrell thus issued a statement reflecting his own views, while European UN Security Council members reaffirmed the traditional European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The overall nature of these responses reinforced Netanyahu’s narrative that the international community does not care much about the Palestinian issue. His claim is that Arab countries are willing to improve ties with Israel even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and that Europe is no longer a relevant actor, now that some member states are willing to block initiatives in Brussels on Israel’s behalf. Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place. A common thought among Israelis is that if the world does not care that much anymore about the Palestinians, why should we.

The further consolidation of this mindset might become a dangerous consequence of the Trump plan. Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution should be a high-level priority for the next Israeli government. It’s crucial for Israel’s ability to maintain both its Jewish and democratic character, to live in peace, security and prosperity and to truly belong and integrate in its Middle Eastern, European and Mediterranean neighborhood. It’s also the right thing to do in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations.

Challenges and opportunities

However, doing so will not become any easier. The Israeli public is largely indifferent to the issue; the Palestinian public is losing faith in prospects of a real Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank is making the two-state solution more difficult to obtain and implement; and the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza casts a shadow over prospects for future progress towards peace.

These are major challenges that pro-peace Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders should tackle. Prospects for political change in Israel later this year – even if not representing a clear ideological shift – might provide an opportunity to begin doing so. Should a different American administration take office in January 2021, even more opportunities will emerge. Pro-peace actors should already plan towards such scenarios and begin to take action. For the past three years their primary focus was on the release of the Trump plan, what it will include and how to react. Now, after its publication, it’s the time to move on, brush the plan aside and advance steps that can bring peace.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states.

There’s a variety of steps that international actors can take: their primary goal should be to prevent Israeli annexation of territories in the West Bank, through voicing clear opposition. They should also keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue high on their agenda – especially when engaging with Israeli officials – even when they have more pressing priorities and when they do not envision immediate progress. A counter-document to the Trump plan, including alternative principles for a final-status peace agreement, should be published as to not let the Trump plan remain ‘the only game in town’.

What Europeans should do

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states. However, this remains a difficult task and, in any case, European countries should bypass the paralysis caused by divisions among EU member states by acting in smaller coalitions of like-minded actors. Borrell should be supportive of this line of action as well.

Moreover, a new international mechanism to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should be set up – whether officially or unofficially – to enable different international actors (not only European) to coordinate efforts, with participation of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. Such a mechanism should implement the plan agreed upon to introduce Israelis and Palestinians to a coordinated international package of political and economic incentives for peace. Finally, increased international support and recognition should be given to pro-peace civil society groups so they can more effectively build positive interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.

These steps can generate hope, set up new dialogue channels and craft innovative policy proposals – all of which are much-needed components on the path towards peace. They will demonstrate how local and international actors can chart a real vision towards peace and can take action together to advance its implementation. It would be the most suitable response to the Trump plan.

(originally published in IPS Journal)

הפוסט Moving on from Trump’s plan for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

First, there is security-related anxiety. Many view the Arab citizens of Israel as a potential fifth column. Israel was born out of a civil war with the local Arab population, and is still around with a generally hostile Arab World. Yet, Israel is very strong and provides effective security, both domestically and externally. It can deal with such a challenge. Moreover, even if Palestinian citizens of Israel identify with the Palestinian people, their involvement in subversive activity against the state has been negligible. Even in the early days of the state, when the scars of the 1947-9 war were fresh, defense officials believed that Israel’s Arab citizens were sufficiently loyal to join the military (IDF). In 1953, then-Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon ordered that Arabs be drafted to the IDF. Thousands flocked to recruitment centers before the initiative was revoked. An interim response to the security-related fear could be forming a coalition in the Knesset that enjoys the prestige of security professionals but leads a mainly civilian agenda. That was the Rabin way: A revered IDF Chief-of-Staff and Defense Minister, who as prime minister was heavily involved in inherently civilian issues such as education and health. The current health challenge even creates an even easier framework for such an approach.

The personal anxiety over a coalition with Arab Members of Knesset (MKs) stems from the repercussions of cultural reservations and the desire to maintain separate spaces (as reflected in polls among Jews) in politics, too. In fact, many spaces, such as the health system, and some governing coalitions in local government are completely integrated. The century-old separation between the two populations is increasingly eroding even in its symbolic dimensions. In 2019, Dr. Haj Yehia was appointed as Chairman of the Board of Bank Leumi, an institution originally established to serve the Zionist movement.

The anxiety over national identity is perhaps the most significant. Many are concerned that inclusion of a non-Zionist Arab party in the coalition poses a threat to the state’s Jewish and Zionist identity. The March 2020 news conference at which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu counted the number of Zionist MKs versus the Arab non-Zionist ones touched on this fear. This is a bit peculiar. in most sectors of Israeli politics, ideology does not appear as central as it was in the past. Very few parties, if all, presented platforms in the last few elections. Under these circumstances, the insistence on ideological commitment should be downplayed. A potential, practical solution is to leave unresolved ideological issues out of any agreement with Arab parties.

Second, on the institutional level, a measure of creativity could alleviate the identity anxieties harbored by some in the Jewish public. For example, the Arab parties could support the government in Knesset votes but grant their MKs freedom to vote according to their conscience on certain issues, or they could decide that only some of the parties that make up the Joint List would vote with the government but not all of them. A strong arbitration mechanism would also help in this regard.

Third, Zionist institutions have a history of cooperation with non-Zionist elements. The Jewish Agency, for example, which was the central tool of Zionist development until the establishment of the state, was formed in 1929 as a partnership with non-Zionist forces (although they subsequently dropped out). In fact, most Israeli governments have included non-Zionist elements, i.e. the ultra-Orthodox parties. In recent years, it was Netanyahu who cooperated with the Arab parties on several political measures, such as mobilizing their Knesset support in 2019 for his appointee as State Comptroller.

Additionally, contrary to public perception, there are precedents for the inclusion of Arab parties in coalitions. In fact, up until the 1970s, almost all coalitions included Arab slates such as the Arab Democratic Party and the Progress and Development Party. Many tended to dismiss these parties as satellites of the powerful ruling Mapai party rather than authentic Arab representatives. Still, some of their members (such as Elias Nakhleh) took to arms against the establishment of the state in the War of Independence. But once the war ended, they were elected to the Knesset and led their parties to membership in coalitions. At the very least, this is an important symbolic precedent.

Finally, it should be recalled that great Zionist leaders, such as Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Yitzhak Gruenbaum were committed to minority coalitions in Russia and Poland, that would include Jewish representation. Jabotinsky foresaw the future Jewish state with Arabs among its top political echelons. A coalition consisting of Jewish and Arab MKs members would also be important for Israel’s foreign relations, for example in helping revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and fostering regional cooperation with Arab states. Such a coalition would even have public diplomacy value in deflecting accusations at international fora that Israel is a racist state.

The anxieties over the inclusion of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the coalition are understandable. However, under current circumstances and given an orderly response to the real fears, the Blue and White party led by three former IDF chiefs must and can create a partnership with the Joint List.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Associate Professor of international affairs at Haifa University and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He is also a visiting researcher at Stanford University’s Political Science Department.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט In With the Arabs: The Joint List Should Be Part of the Coalition הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.