Instead of dealing with foreign policy and diplomacy, Israel has over the years developed a narrow and pessimistic concept of national security, which consists of providing military intelligence responses to specific security threats, but lacks a pro-active diplomatic approach. Military-defense thinking is undeniably of paramount importance to Israel’s existence and security, and preparing the IDF and other defense agencies for the many challenges they face is a critical issue, indeed. However, every state has at its disposal a potential array of diplomatic assets that are no less essential, and sometimes even more so, to shaping its national security. Foreign policy is not designed to complement military policy, on the contrary. Military strategy is supposed to be a derivative of foreign policy goals driven, first and foremost, by the desire to forge alliances, agreements and normalization based on a broad complex of international relations in order to preclude clashes and wars.

Israel’s aversion to formulating a comprehensive and integrative diplomatic strategy over the past decade is a mistake, at best, and neglect of its national security needs, at worst. The leadership must shift course and place Israeli foreign policy on a pro-active path, replacing the ad hoc measures of “putting out fires” characterized by passiveness and pessimism to which we have grown accustomed over the past decade. The next government must break out of this foreign policy bunker and emerge into the sunlight and fresh air. Israel is crying out for a strategy that would allow it to achieve regional diplomatic arrangements, to exist within sovereign, permanent borders as a Jewish and democratic state with a distinct Jewish majority, without ruling over another people – while enjoying recognition by most countries of the world and full normalization of relations with them.

The existing Israeli paradigm is illustrated, for example, in the issue of the Gaza Strip’s future. Israel has adopted an essentially military strategy on Gaza and its Hamas rulers, manifested in localized management of the conflict and preservation of the current situation. However, leaders are elected to strive for change and shape a better and more promising future for their country in a responsible and sober manner.

To that end, Israel’s military strategy vis-à-vis Hamas in Gaza is insufficient; a distinct foreign policy strategy is required. After all, the Gaza issue has clear regional and global aspects, mainly as regards the humanitarian crisis afflicting the enclave and prospects of infrastructure and financial development and reconstruction using international state and institutional aid.

That is why Israel must define the broad, regional vision to which it aspires. A vision that includes normalization in the Middle East and neighborly relations with a demilitarized Palestinian state would create a context within which Israel could shape policy on various regional issues, including Gaza. However, the road to that goal invariably entails a diplomatic initiative, not a military one.

Various arrangements and mobilization of foreign aid for regional development, including of Gaza, must be set in motion. Within the framework of such broad, diplomatic activity, a determined Israeli initiative is required to renew the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority, giving full consideration to Israel’s security needs. Broader and more comprehensive diplomacy is also required to provide an overarching framework for the whole process: An Israeli initiative for regional negotiations that would include, in addition to the Palestinians, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states and the Arab League. Participants would commit to shouldering the burden involved in weakening Hamas and rebuilding Gaza, with the help of the international community. To that end, Israel’s political leadership must first commit to preserving and protecting Israel’s future existence as a Jewish and democratic state. That means striving for separation from the Palestinians with all the attendant diplomatic implications, and ensuring Israel’s security interests and needs, both during negotiations and after an arrangement is reached. There is no guarantee of the strategy’s success, because its implementation depends on additional elements. However, its very adoption and the shift from a passive, reactive policy to initiatives on long-term solutions would benefit Israel in public diplomacy and in presenting its case in the international arena, while safeguarding its security and avoiding significant military concessions. Nothing will change as long as Israel continues to adopt a military-defense strategy without any vision or diplomatic initiative, precludes positive change on the ground, lacks sufficient international legitimization for security activity Israel undertakes, and perpetuates the current stagnation with the Palestinians.

In the coming years, Israel should advance a comprehensive regional agreement under the auspices of the US and other international players, which takes into consideration Israel’s essential, long-term security needs; promote a move to separate from the Palestinians in the context of two independent states and as part of the regional agreement; help reconstruct Gaza, as part of an agreement with the Palestinians and with the support of the international community (including Arab states); develop a public diplomacy and foreign policy strategy in case an agreement with the Palestinians will not be feasible even after Israel makes an effort to achieve one; adopt a “carrot and stick” diplomatic strategy that includes potential deterrence and incentives vis-à-vis significant regional powers, mainly Iran and Turkey; restore bipartisan American support for Israel, taking into account the changes in US politics and society, including within the Jewish community there; work to consolidate Israel’s relations with current and emerging global powers, such as Russia, China and India.

A compelling, relevant foreign policy approach must be developed as a key layer of Israel’s national security. At the same time, it is vital for Israel’s next government to rehabilitate and strengthen Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Israel Needs a Diplomatic Strategy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is time to revisit the one peace initiative that gained support from every Arab state in the Middle East: the Arab Peace Initiative.

Today, when uncertainly about the future of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rising, the Arab Peace Initiative could serve as a good basis for relaunching negotiations between the two sides. Almost 18 years ago, then-Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud presented his peace vision during the Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This plan was adopted by the Arab League members and it is still valid today.

Sadly, no Israeli government has so far officially reacted to this peace proposal that aims at providing a just and acceptable solution for the conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Almost two decades have passed since its inception, and while some updates may be required, this initiative is still by far the best platform for resuming the bilateral negotiations with much needed regional support.

What will happen if the Trump administration’s “deal of the century” does not take off? Many in Israel believe the status quo is not such a bad thing. We live our lives, there is no major violence, and the world seems to be less and less interested in what is happening in this part of the region. But, in fact, nothing can be farther from the truth, as the status quo is nothing but illusion.

Escalation is here already, even if it doesn’t affect daily life of the majority in Israel – yet. In recent weeks there were more attacks, more clashes in Jerusalem, and more desperate and disillusioned young Palestinians that increasingly support the one-state solution.

In fact, a status quo takes us back to the dangers of recent past when the two nations and their leadership lacked communication, understanding, and compromise. While the settlements will grow and the Israelis will be busy annexing segments of West Bank, more and more Palestinians will depart from the two-state solution and opt for one state where they will seek equal political and civil rights. The possibility to separate and draw the border between two warring nations will be lost forever.

Naturally, the Israelis and the Palestinians will be the biggest losers, but the consequences might be quite dangerous for the broader Middle East region, as well. As the situation in Israel and West Bank deteriorates – according to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chiefs and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) leaders, it will, barring real progress with negotiations – it inevitably will affect the stability of the West Bank and Jordan, and also damage relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The dream of regional integration, as well as forging a powerful alliance between all those in the region who seek stability and peace will remain just a dream. No positive development between the Palestinians and Israelis will also mean no normalization, integration or advancement of cooperation. We don’t need a status quo, but a reasonable base to resume the negotiations and regional support of the process. The Arab Peace initiative provides this foundation.

Today we have a clear vision of how a partnership in the spheres of technology, trade, tourism and defense might look like between Israel and the Arab states. The only way of getting there is by first taking care of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Whoever emerges as the winner in Israel’s upcoming parliamentary elections will need to focus on two issues: how to prevent the deterioration between Israel and Palestinian Authority, and how to promote Israel’s integration in the region. These two issues are interconnected, and the Arab Peace Initiative should be the key. It’s not too late for that today, however it might be too late tomorrow.

Ksenia Svetlova is a former member of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset. Today she serves as Director of the Program on Israel-Middle East relations at the Mitvim Institute and is a senior research analyst at Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya.

(originally published in al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Revisiting Arab Peace Initiative is best hope to solve Israel-Palestine conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly. He did so based on solid reasoning and a broad strategic view. He was a pragmatic man who could read the map, identify opportunities and make tough decisions. He understood that the PLO was growing weaker and that unless he sought agreement with that organization, he would face a tougher alternative – Hamas. He also understood Israel’s changing circumstances following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Soviet bloc.

Rabin assessed that this was an opportunity to try to resolve the conflicts with Israel’s immediate neighbors so that when the time came, Israel would be able to face its harshest and most dangerous enemies – Iraq and Iran. He was thoroughly aware of the hurdles he would have to face on the path he had chosen, the crises, the disappointments, but he had decided that he would leave our children and grandchildren a different kind of world, one of hope and normalcy.

I had the privilege of serving the State of Israel and working with him. I had the privilege of serving during the Oslo Accord days, of witnessing the changes Rabin underwent and the tremendous breakthroughs made by Israel’s Foreign Service. From a state that just months previously had clashed with the US government over loan guarantees for immigrant absorption, Israel became a desired ally. Relations with the US were transformed, becoming warm and intimate, with every Israeli diplomatic move coordinated with the US administration and receiving its blessing and support.

I saw and experienced how the world opened up to us, how states which did not even recognized us changed their position. From China and India to Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. Representatives from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all gathered at my home in New York, where I served as Consul General, to meet Rabin. He also managed to make the old dream of peace with Jordan a reality.

The Middle East began opening up to us, and new channels of cooperation were examined at well-attended economic conferences we held in Morocco and Jordan. Europe, too, opened up to us, giving Israel preferential trade status and making it the first non-European partner in its Horizon 2020 research program.

I had the great privilege of being at Rabin’s side when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1996, ten days before his assassination. The hall was packed. Most Heads of State in the audience applauded at length, not only because of what he said but also because they appreciated Rabin and his leadership. They stood in line for long moments to shake his hand. The sympathy of the world enveloped us, constituting the best proof that when we open up to the world, it opens up to us.

Rabin the soldier fought tenaciously against terrorism. I saw him angry and pained when he was informed of a terror attack, I saw him uncompromising when he had to make decisions and I also heard him shouting at Yasser Arafat when he had to. But he also bequeathed us new concepts, redefining the term “security” to include not just tanks, planes and missile boats, but also education, housing and well-being. Security, for Rabin, lay mostly in human hope.

Yitzhak Rabin was a modest man, often introverted, but also sure of himself; a man who did not like small talk and had no patience for fools and liars, for sycophants and fear-mongers. The red-headed Prime Minister spoke his mind, sometimes bluntly. In this sense, he was not blessed with diplomatic skills. But it was his direct style, his deep voice and shy mien that won the hearts of many.

In these days of determined attempts to undermine the State’s gatekeepers and institutions, it is important to remember Rabin’s respect for democracy and the rule of law, even when it concerned his personal life. Let us remember his desire to place the citizens at the top of the government’s priorities, his actions in support of civil equality, his attitude toward the Arab citizens in whom he saw partners, and the real actions he took to rectify past injustices.

Rabin, the man with the analytic mind, had well-defined, firm views, but he knew how to adapt himself when necessity dictated. Rabin knew how to dream and how to make his dreams come true. For him, the essence of Zionism was to establish a safe haven for the Jewish people.

For me, Rabin’s legacy is of integrity and modesty, courageous leadership, respect for democracy and civil rights, the vision of peace, and, above all, a life of hope.

Colette Avital is a former Member of Knesset and Ambassador, and is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The three titanic clashes of the 20th century – two world wars and the Cold War – ended with victory for the democratic camp, although often requiring alliances with non-democracies. The democratic advantage in war is not limited to democratic Great Powers. At the end of the 1990s, scholars Allan Stam and Dan Reiter showed that of the 297 wars between states in the years 1816 to 1990, democracies (most of which were not Great Powers, obviously) won almost all the wars they initiated and two-thirds of those imposed on them.

Elections are one explanation for the “democratic dividend” in war. Leaders of democratic states fear voters will depose them due to failed wars and therefore opt for wars they can win. Public trauma in the wake of war can unseat even a strong, established party. Such was the case with Israel’s Mapai/Ma’arach. In 1977, voter fury at the results of the 1973 Yom Kippur War brought about its downfall after 44 years of uninterrupted rule in the pre-state Jewish political entity (The Yeshuv) and later the State of Israel.

A nation’s participation in the choice of its leaders imbues government decisions such as a decision to go to war with an added dimension of legitimacy, generating greater identification among soldiers with the combat goals. It is true that non-democratic states, such as the Soviet Union, were successful in mobilizing public support during difficult times, such as World War II. However, the repressive nature of the Soviet state made it easier for the Germans to recruit to their side over 100,000 Soviet citizens (some of them prisoners of war they had captured). Moreover, in the final historic analysis, both of these political systems that challenged democracy – Nazism and Marxist-Leninism – were defeated.

Another explanation for the advantages democracies enjoy in war pertains to their institutional structure. Democratic leaders have less room to maneuver because constitutions, lawmakers and supreme courts provide checks and balances on their power. This results in tighter oversight over the executive branch of government, and, in turn, greater effectiveness of a decision to go to war, a decision on how to conduct a war and what lessons to learn from it.

Israel beat Egypt in 1967 inter alia because Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser undermined Israeli-Egyptian stability through a series of irresponsible declarations and measures, while his army was engaged elsewhere in a far-off war in Yemen. In a better-balanced regime, such declarations and steps would probably not be possible. The institutional balance is thus very important. As scholars Philip Potter and Matt Baum showed in a 2015 study, even autocracies in which constraints are placed on the ruler enjoy greater success in foreign policy and defense.

Democracies succeed in war because of not only elections and limits on power, but also because they are underpinned by values. A democratic culture that enables domestic and external criticism is a significant force multiplier. For example, writing in a 1982 opinion piece in Haaretz, Major Gershon Hacohen backed the right of a senior officer to resign in order to avoid leading his troops on a mission with which he disagreed. Hacohen’s unusual stand earned him a reprimand and a discharge. He was re-instated several years later, rising to the rank of Major General and contributing greatly to the Israel Defense Forces with his original thinking and outspoken views.

A true democratic culture empowers individuals, encourages their initiative and commitment, and makes them more militarily effective. On the other hand, nondemocratic states repress personal initiative, especially by military personnel, to prevent them directing it against the regime. In a comprehensive study in the 1990s, scholar Kenneth Pollack showed that lack of initiative on the part of military commanders in Arab armies was one of the main reasons for their persistent failures in wars against Israel. Similarly, non-democratic regimes divert significant intelligence resources to repressing their population at the expense of developing an effective an intelligence apparatus directed at the enemy. In this respect, too, Israel enjoys an advantage over its non-democratic neighbors.

Finally, open and democratic societies have been more successful in mining creative talents in high-tech, entrepreneurship and innovation, making the democratic West more prosperous and technologically and scientifically advanced, in terms of military effectiveness, too. True, non-democratic states such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were able to reach some scientific achievements. However, only democracies managed to preserve their scientific and technological advantages in the long term. A technological edge is particularly important for Israel’s security. After all, it is this edge in technology that allows it to compensate for its limited human and material resources, when compared to its foes.

A strong democracy is therefore vital for Israel’s security. Fair elections and regime change, checks and balances with an emphasis on restraining the power of the executive branch, an open and democratic culture of criticism, and the ability to attract and retain the creative classes are the pillars of an effective Israeli national security. Undermining them means not only a different political order, but also a real threat to the security of the state.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and an Associate Professor in international relations at Haifa University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Democracy is Essential to Israel’s National Security הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Therein lies a problem. Too often, the State of Israel examines reality through riflescopes, seeking threats rather than identifying opportunities, finding partners and avoiding pitfalls and entanglement in avoidable wars. That is why, as noted in the State Comptroller’s report, Israel finds itself embroiled in endless rounds of fighting and tensions in Gaza, Lebanon and around holy sites in Jerusalem, with each round ending not far from where it began. When Israel does opt for diplomatic tools and conducts negotiations with its neighbors, security officials are usually the ones who lead the discussions.

In order to seek peace and ensure a quiet, safe existence, diplomatic thinking in decision–making must assume a far greater role, as must critical public discourse on such issues. A complex diplomatic and political discourse must be promoted among the public and decision makers. It should include better understanding of the international arena based on familiarity with the views of foreign actors towards Israel and its policies, awareness of global developments and trends, and acquaintance with the relationships among a variety of actors relevant to the scene. These goals are feasible, but require essential shifts that will empower Israel’s Foreign Service and will bring diplomatic considerations to the forefront of decision–making processes. Foreign Ministry retirees have an important role to play in promoting this.

Former diplomats could contribute significantly to Israeli society in terms of bolstering public discourse on diplomacy and foreign policy. Foreign Ministry veterans who go into retirement take with them dozens of years of experience, diplomatic skills, knowledge of various countries and organizations, intricate networks of social ties around the world, analytic capacity and deep understanding of the international arena and of Israel’s place among the nations. They know how to explain foreign affairs to the public and to raise foreign policy issues on the agenda, to support or criticize Israeli policy and propose alternatives freed of the shackles of government service, to explain the world to Israelis and explain Israel to the world (should they want to do so).

Foreign Service retirees in other countries enjoy significant appreciation, retain knowledge and prestige, are courted by various organizations, and integrate into key positions in society. They are often involved in local and national politics, and assume roles as directors of large global corporations, lecturers in academia, researchers at institutes, central activists in civil society and key media figures. Their contribution to shaping public discourse is significant. Not so in Israel. The Foreign Ministry has excellent staff, but once diplomats retire, they do not have representation commensurate with their skills and abilities in the political, cultural, academic or business arena. While some Foreign Ministry veterans find their way into academia, civil society or boards of directors, it is not a systematic course; it is unstructured and unguided by a support network, relying instead on personal motivation and ability. Sadly, the valuable experience of Israeli Foreign Ministry retirees goes down the drain.

Many obstacles stand in the way of former Israeli diplomats’ contribution to public discourse and integration in key roles. The decline in the prestige of the Foreign Ministry, a relatively late retirement age, inability to take a leave of absence during one’s career and return to the Foreign Service, lack of regional expertise, are just some of the central challenges that must be met in order to allow former diplomats to contribute their share. This would require strengthening the Foreign Ministry and restoring its prestige and power along with the power and prestige of its staff. The mobility of Foreign Ministry staff could be increased to allow them to leave the service for a while and accrue professional experience in other organizations, which would provide them with a diverse network of contacts ahead of their retirement. Regional expertise can be encouraged within the Foreign Ministry, and the retirement age could be lowered. Structured contact between the ministry and its former staff should be encouraged through periodic updates, consultations and learning, and joint mechanisms should ensure the rights of retirees and prepare them for retirement.

Obviously, the retirees themselves must have a role in improving their lot. They must take the initiative and try to integrate into the public and governance arena, deliver lectures to different audiences, contribute their analyses through the media and be active on social media. They can also provide briefings for Members of Knesset and participate in discussions held by Knesset committees and caucuses, place their experience at the disposal of local government, take part in public discussion without fear of expressing their views, and integrate into civil society and business.

Israeli society has an interest in repairing the structural, organizational and political flaws that currently impede Foreign Ministry retirees in contributing their experience, training, knowledge and varied capabilities to the public discourse. Foreign Ministry retirees have the tools to enable Israeli society to examine the diplomatic angle, too, when trying to understand reality, analyze it and decide how to act. It is important that we hear them. It is important that they not only be former diplomats but remain key figures in Israeli society.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Former Diplomats Are a Wasted National Resource הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Shortly after the president’s speech, Israeli planes launched what seemed to be a pre-emptive strike against an Iranian missile site located in a military base in southern Syria. The following day, Iranian forces fired a barrage of rockets on Israeli posts in the Golan. Israel retaliated (or rather, used the opportunity) to conduct a massive air raid on dozens of Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria.

President Trump’s speech added to the sense of crisis in Israel. Conceptually, Israelis felt Trump adopted their world view, highlighting Iran’s destructive role in the region. More deeply, he justified traditional Israeli distrust of achieving security through multinational diplomacy, reinforcing the Israeli belief that security is most effectively attained though unilateral displays of force.

President Trump’s harsh words for Iran surely also affected Israeli strategists’ calculus. Obama administration pressure contributed to the Israeli decision not to attack Iran in 2009-2012. It is hard to believe that the Trump administration would be hostile to a more aggressive Israeli approach towards Iran. Moreover, if the President’s decision leads to the JCPOA’s collapse, Iran may resume the military aspects of its nuclear program, which the agreement had thus far seemed to halt. This too will increase the chance of an Israeli attack.

President Trump’s speech also strengthened Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, having advocated a military attack on Iran in the past. Not only does it appear to Israelis that the US president shares Netanyahu’s views about Iran (unlike President Obama), but also that Netanyahu was tightly coordinated with and able to affect the American position. After all, one of the few pieces of evidence President Trump cited as justification to withdraw from the JCPOA was Netanyahu’s recently publicized presentation with revelations about Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, Trump’s speech seemed to vindicate Netanyahu’s risky choice in 2015 to publically clash with President Obama over the deal before it was signed.

Indeed, polling conducted after Trump’s speech gave Netanyahu’s party, Likud, its greatest lead in the past decade, even as Netanyahu is being investigated in four separate cases of corruption. The prime minister’s image shifted from a hedonistic leader reliant on fomenting internal tensions in Israeli society – while facing a possible indictment – to that of a political leader of global scale. Even the fiery member of the Opposition, Labor’s Eitan Kabel, stated, “hat’s off to Netanyahu…his fingerprints are all over” Trump’s decision.

Finally, it seems that the speech tilted the internal balance in Israel (and perhaps in the US) in favor of populist elected politicians, and away from cautious national security officials. The national security establishment seemed to prefer that the JCPOA be preserved. Just before the President’s speech, General (Ret.) Amos Gilad, a former senior intelligence officer and senior ministry of defense official, stated that, without a clear alternative, the JCPOA should be kept. The former head of Israel’s Atomic Energy Agency, retired Admiral Shaul Horev, voiced a similar concern. Yet, the bold and marketing-style approach of Netanyahu and Trump seems to be more popular than the warnings of old generals and admirals, for the moment. It remains to be seen if this balance will remain tilted towards the populists when the bombs start falling.

Ehud (Udi) Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a board member at Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.”

It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in Alaska. Earlier in the month, on April 9, Israel attacked Iranian targets at the Syrian T-4 airbase, killing seven Iranian military advisors. Perhaps as justification for the attack, Israel revealed that an Iranian drone shot down on February 10 within its northeastern border was armed and on an attack mission.

Israel and Iran have viewed each other as a significant threat for decades. However, only recently has this hostility manifested in intentional, direct, and open military exchanges. As the Syrian civil war appears to enter its terminal phase, heightened tensions are partially the result of Israeli concerns over a continuing Iranian military presence in Syria. Seen from Jerusalem, victory for the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis will create a “Shia corridor” from Tehran to Israel’s northern border. Israeli strategists see Tehran’s ability to project power so close to Israel’s borders as a significant threat; a “noose of terror around our neck,” in the words of Netanyahu. This led some in Israel to explore the possibility a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian build-up. In short, Israelis are concerned by the possible evolution of Iran’s direct military challenge, which would represent an escalation within the framework of traditional regional power politics.

The reintroduction of a nuclear element into Iranian-Israeli competition could heighten the potential for escalation. If the JCPOA collapses and Iran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program, the chances of Iranian-Israeli military confrontation will be much higher. Israel’s current political leadership has discussed a possible Iranian nuclear threat in almost apocalyptic terms. Netanyahu and others have interpreted the project through the lens of Jewish history and made repeated references to the Holocaust. Israel’s security establishment, on the other hand, has not shared Netanyahu’s view. According to multiple reports, an alliance of the heads of three services – the military, the foreign intelligence agency (Mossad), and the internal intelligence agency (Shabak) – blocked the prime minister’s plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010. Politicians saw a Holocaust in the making, while the top brass sent a less alarmist message.

Now, when the generals look north, they can see an additional, conventional Iranian threat. They are concerned and, as in the case of the T-4 airbase attack, are willing to use force. Unlike the past civil-military rift over Iran’s nuclear project, both Israeli politicians and soldiers are equally concerned about Iran. An Israeli attack on Iran previously was prevented by a lack of a consensus on the nature of the threat. Today’s emerging consensus could lead to war. Though the consensus is focused at present on the immediate Iranian build-up along Israel’s northern border, it could easily expand to include Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This is especially true if Tehran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program. Moreover, if a direct confrontation starts, it will be challenging to keep it confined to the Lebanese or Syrian arenas. Netanyahu already stated back in February that Israel could act against Iran, and not just against its allies.

The Israeli internal balance that prevented an attack last time around has been further disrupted: the prime minister’s chair is shaking under the pressure of four separate corruption investigations, and Netanyahu might actually benefit from tension with Iran. It could allow him to deflect the investigations by reminding the Israeli public of his essential role in times of great external danger. Additionally, the security establishment has likely recalculated the costs and the benefits of an attack. It is probably less concerned with American opposition to a confrontation than it was from 2009-2014, particularly with the recent appointments of a hawkish national security advisor and secretary of state. Moreover, the head of the Mossad is perceived, unlike his predecessors, as a close Netanyahu ally. The chief of staff of the military, a traditional check on the prime minister’s more hawkish impulses, is expected to retire on December 31, 2018, thus allowing the prime minister the opportunity to select a new chief that might be more amenable to Netanyahu’s approach.

Regional dynamics might also encourage Israel to act. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are as concerned as Israel by the prospect of an Iranian military nuclear capability. In an interview to a Saudi paper, Israel’s defense minister hinted on April 26 that Israel is in the process of securing some Arab support for a confrontation with Iran. An Iranian-Israeli war is not a forgone conclusion. Iran must be aware that Israel is far stronger, at least in the Syrian arena. Iran’s main local proxy, Hezbollah, might prefer calm, at least before the May 6 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Moreover, Netanyahu talks baldly, but a close look at his record shows that he has always been careful in using his country’s big stick.

Finally, the merging of the Iranian conventional and nuclear threats could offer an opportunity, one that comes from Washington. A deal-making president, after all, could conclude that now, with both nuclear and conventional chips on the table, there could be even greater space for a deal. President Donald Trump already has taken the first moves toward an unexpected deal with North Korea; might he attempt to use renewed Israeli concerns to push for a new deal in the Middle East?

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Atlantic Council) 

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel expressed its regret over the incident and promised to continue the legal proceedings, as well as pay damages to the families of the two citizens and to the family of PalestinianJordanian judge Raed Zeiter, who was shot to death at the Allenby Bridge border crossing in March 2014. In return, the Israeli Embassy in Jordan will return to full activity, although Ambassador Einat Shlain will not return to her post and will be replaced by a new ambassador.

The Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement that “Israel attaches great importance to its strategic relations with Jordan, and the two countries will act to advance their cooperation and to strengthen the peace treaty between them.” But if Israel really attaches so much strategic importance to these relations, why did it wait six months before solving the issue?

This isn’t the first time that Israel’s relations with Jordan are marred by a security incident. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls who were visiting the Island of Peace site in Naharayim. Jordan’s King Hussein rushed to calm the situation down: He cut short a visit to Spain and came to Israel to offer condolences to the victims’ families. He also issued an apology for the schoolgirls’ murder.

Several months later, Israel tried to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mashal on Jordanian soil. The operation failed, several Mossad fighters were captured by the local police and others found shelter in the Israeli Embassy building. Then-Mossad Director Danny Yatom was quickly sent by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to brief the king on the details of the operation. His request to release the detained agents was turned down, but the crisis was solved within 12 days after several Israeli officials, including Efraim Halevy and Ariel Sharon, made efforts to calm the king down. Halevy’s proposal to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison was the compensation accepted by Jordan.

In August 2011, shortly after the January 25 Revolution which led to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, seven Israelis were killed in a series of terror attacks on Highway 12. As part of Israel’s military response, an IDF force entered Sinai and killed five Egyptian policemen. The incident led to a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Egypt, which threatened to recall its ambassador. Two months later, then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak issued an apology for the killing of the Egyptian policemen, bringing the crisis to an end.

While each incident has its own unique characteristics, several insights can be drawn from these events: First of all, a quick response is highly important. It has the power of preventing the crisis, or at least preventing it from getting worse. It also shows that the other side sees the incident as important and understands the need to come up with an immediate solution.

Netanyahu did send the Shin Bet chief to Jordan immediately to try to solve the problem, but the Jordanian side didn’t feel that the Israeli government saw it as a top priority. The fact that it took six months to reach an agreement indicates that the Israeli government didn’t ascribe much importance to the crisis. Meanwhile, emotions in Jordan ran high against Israel.

Second, the political echelon’s involvement in the negotiations is highly important. The prime minister himself, or at least the defense minister, should lead the reconciliation move.

Third, we should know how to apologize. An apology isn’t a display of weakness, especially if it comes from a place of confidence and strength. Accidentally killing a Jordanian citizen is definitely a reason to apologize.

Fourth, Israel’s decision makers shouldn’t consider “their” public opinion in this case, but rather the public opinion in the other country. Part of the Jordanian anger was directed at way Netanyahu publicly greeted the ambassador and the security guard, in a bid to gain support in the Israeli public opinion. In light of the Jordanian sensitivity, the prime minister could have given up the photo-op and settled for a private rather than public meeting.

Finally, we should offer the other side compensation to convey that we understand the sensitivity on the Jordanian side, and especially its royal family, which has been standing by Israel for years—secretly and behind the scenes—when it comes to important security issues. In other words, the long-term interest overshadows the short-term interest.

We should welcome the agreement, and better late than never, but the decision-making process on the Israeli side—if such a process actually took place—must be criticized. The weak Israeli response emphasizes the absence of the Foreign Ministry, and the absence of a full-time foreign minister, from the process. In any event, we should hope the decision makers draw the lessons from this case and other past tensions with Egypt and Jordan and implement them in the next crisis.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Reconciliation: Better Late Than Never הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The split between Fatah and Hamas, the stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the violence in Palestinian society (both inwards and against the IDF and Israeli civilian targets) cannot overshadow the fact that the crisis between Fatah and Hamas will not be concluded until the two movements undergo internal processes of comprehensive reforms.

הפוסט The Postponement of the Palestinian Local Elections and its Ramifications הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

“If there is something that frightens me,” he said, “it is identifying horrifying processes that occurred in Europe…and finding evidence of their existence here in our midst, today, in 2016.” The ensuing media firestorm grew so large that, by comparison, reports of mounting tensions along the Gaza border felt like second page news.

Holocaust memory is a sensitive and often politicized subject in Israel. One could construct a pretty articulate dissertation that analyzed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeated references to the Holocaust when discussing Iran throughout his political career (including this year). On the opposite pole of Holocaust discourse, President Reuven Rivlin’s apology to Holocaust survivors on behalf of the state for not providing them with enough care and services was a compelling moment in its own right. But whether by design or default, Golan’s statements made headlines, and in the process raised an interesting point about the relationship between the Holocaust and the IDF.

The IDF was founded on May 26, 1948, just days after Israel declared its independence. Forged by fire against an enemy that promised to finish what Hitler had started, half of the Jewish fighting forces in the War of Independence were Holocaust survivors, many of whom had arrived by boat to Haifa port in 1948 only to be conscripted and marched to the frontlines. As a result of this founding legacy, almost no institution in Israel boasts such a demonstrative embodiment of the “Never Again” spirit. Israeli military flyovers above Auschwitz have become legendary amongst IDF veterans. Even during the national Yom HaShoah ceremony held at Yad Vashem (the World Holocaust Remembrance Center in Jerusalem), IDF soldiers more often than not assist survivors as they light torches for each of the six million. As former IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi reflected during his 2008 visit to the Warsaw ghetto, “The State of Israel and the IDF are the answer to the Holocaust, and they will ensure that such an event does not take place in the future.” It should come as no surprise that the IDF has consistently received high levels of public trust throughout the decades. After all, the IDF has long been perceived as more than just a civilian army, rather as the force that stands between the Israeli public and a second Holocaust.

This has been a resilient narrative over the last 68 years. However the IDF’s relationship with the Holocaust goes well beyond rhetoric. The IDF Code of Ethics, which declares all human beings as equals, “regardless of race, creed, nationality, gender, status or role” contains meaningful post-Holocaust language that prioritizes morality. Not only does it state that soldiers must “preserve human dignity” at all costs, but the Code of Ethics also includes a clause that demands soldiers “disavow manifestly illegal orders” – a sharp contrast to those Nazi soldiers and bureaucrats who chose to blindly obey. While some may find it difficult to believe, the IDF speedily and soberly serves justice upon those within its own ranks who violate these principles. The Holocaust is seen in the IDF not merely as a cautionary tale for what happens when Jewish power is absent, but as the ultimate example of what happens when power is abused.

All of this is to say that the IDF’s identity is deeply connected with the memory of the Holocaust, and is therefore guided by a powerful moral compass. In this context, that a high-ranking IDF commander would refer to the Holocaust when discussing worrisome trends in Israeli society is not quite as shocking as it seems at first glance. Perhaps Golan was speaking on behalf of a larger institutional frustration with the status quo? From a military perspective, biannual operations into Gaza (yes, that means Israel and Hamas are due for another round of violence) and the continued monitoring of the West Bank yield no strategic victories or paradigmatic shifts. But more consequentially, preserving the status quo damages Israeli democracy and challenges the IDF’s ability to retain its moral authority. Golan was not suggesting moral equivalence between Israeli and Nazi Germany, but issuing a warning about the wider lessons that must be absorbed from the Holocaust and the necessity of maintaining moral vigilance when employing military force.

Golan is one of many outspoken military officials who have challenged the Israeli government’s positions of late. Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot’s swift condemnation of the shooting of a neutralized Palestinian terrorist in Hebron on March 24 was lambasted by several right-wing MKs, including Jewish Home party leader and Education Minister Naftali Bennett. And last November, IDF Intelligence Chief Herzi Halevi challenged Netanyahu’s claim that Palestinian violence was due to increased incitement, arguing that despair and frustration with the status quo were more prominent drivers.

Are we witnessing a new chapter in the history of the IDF’s relationship with the state? Would a more vocal military leadership balance out the incendiary rhetoric of some politicians on the Israeli right? Or is the meddling of military elites in political affairs a breach of Israeli democracy? The answers to these questions cannot be answered immediately. There is a long history of IDF interference in social and political issues over the years, so the current tension between Israel’s political and military leaders is not unprecedented.

However, Golan’s statements should serve as a reminder that while the IDF may not hold a monopoly over the memory of the Holocaust, it remains an influential voice within Israeli public discourse whose warnings should be taken seriously by politician and citizen alike. If one is to properly understand the IDF’s ethos and moral code, understanding the IDF’s relationship to the Holocaust is a necessary place to start.

(originally published by Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט There’s a reason for Yair Golan’s Holocaust talk הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Empowering Israeli Diplomacy through Legislation: Promoting a Foreign Service Bill הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In a clear and loud voice, Mahmoud Abbas renounced the disgraceful crime of kidnapping three teens in Gush Etzion, and said in front of representatives of states which have no diplomatic relations with Israel that he was determined to continue the security coordination with it.

Abbas declared that the PA would do everything in its power to make sure that the kidnapped teens are located and returned safely to their families. He asserted that this was a Palestinian interest.

Abbas chose to face the populist atmosphere on the Palestinian street courageously. The criminal abduction was accepted by many groups there as a legitimate act. Campaigns celebrating the capture of “three new Gilad Shalits” began popping up on the social media. Not only in the Gaza Strip, but also at Birzeit University, the incident was marked by handing out candy to passersby.

Despicably, under false pretense, the Palestinian terror organizations even began claiming that “three Israeli soldiers” had been taken captive.

הפוסט By condemning abduction, Abbas proved he’s a statesman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya free democratic elections were held and brought to power Islamic regimes. But contrary to commentators’ alarming predictions, these regimes have been moderate or pragmatic in their domestic and foreign policies, including their attitudes to Israel and Jews. Nevertheless, several opposition groups in these countries are militant Salafists-Islamists and Jihadists, being both anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic. This is also the case in Syria, where various Islamic groups are still fighting against the Baathist rule of Bashar Assad.

Egypt – the most populous and influential Arab state (some 88 million people) – is the most significant case to focus in on. It is governed by the ideologically religious Muslim Brotherhood, but its new constitution provides, inter alia, for a pluralist “democratic system” with freedom of expression and media, and equality for all citizens, including Christians and Jews. They will also be granted religious and worship rights according to the values of “tolerance and moderation.”

Nevertheless, the new Islamic regime has attempted to control the media and the legislative system, encountering strong opposition. In regional matters it has also reflected moderate pragmatic policies by rejecting the overtures of Shiite Iran toward improving bilateral relations (an exception to this rejection was the agreement to renew bilateral flights, which were soon after halted), while tightening ties with Turkey, perhaps within a “new democratic axis of power” (the Turkish foreign minister’s phrase). Egypt has also come closer to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states that are deeply concerned (alongside Israel and Turkey) by the Iranian threat, as well as by the survival of the pro-Iranian regime in Syria.

With regard to Israel, despite hostile expressions by Islamic militants, Egypt’s President Morsi has appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas to end the IDF operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012.

To be sure, President Morsi has a vested interest to settle not only the Hamas-Israel conflict, but also the entire Palestinian-Israeli dispute. According to him, “The Palestinian issue is first priority for Egypt and the rest of the Arab and Muslim States,” as he stated at the Islamic Solidarity Conference held in Mecca in August 2012.

Hashim Kandil, Egypt’s Prime Minister, noted at the Davos conference this January that his country expected that the new Israeli government would renew the peace process with the Palestinians for the sake of its own interests, and the interests of Egypt and the entire region. Like all Arab states and most Muslim nations, Egypt has continued to support, up to the present, the Saudi/Arab League peace initiative of March 2002.

As is well-known, this initiative, which has been recently approved again, offers Israel peace, security and normalized relations with all Arab countries, in exchange for Israel agreeing to the erection of a Palestinian state along the pre-1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as settling the Palestinian refugees’ problem according to U.N. Resolution 194 (of December 1948). Israel has not yet accepted this unprecedented initiative, which has the potential to be a critical breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations.

Indeed, Egypt and other new Islamic regimes in the Arab world have continued to support the Saudi/Arab peace initiative, while the Palestinian issue has gained great interest and solidarity among the Muslim masses, notably amongst militant groups. Simultaneously hatred for Israel and for Jews continues to increase among many Arabs and Muslims, because of the continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel, especially of East Jerusalem with its Muslim holy shrines.

Consequently it is in Israel’s vital interest to neutralize or decrease this negative sentiment while improving its image and position among moderate/pragmatic Muslim groups and governments. These goals can be achieved by accepting the Arab peace initiative and renewing the peace process with the Palestinians. Such crucial steps are likely to facilitate Israel’s potential alliance with Sunni Muslim states, notably Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates, vis-à-vis the common hazard emanating from Iran and its allies – Lebanese Hezbollah and the Alawi government in Syria.

Such an alliance must be coordinated by the U.S. with the tacit, gradual participation of Israel – provided Israel makes substantial progress in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians and simultaneously accepts the Arab Peace initiative. Alas, as during his previous government, the Netanyahu’s current cabinet is unlikely to assume such a pragmatic policy.

A significant change may occur only under U.S. pressure and with a reshuffle of the Israeli government, namely replacing Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party with the Labor party (and perhaps also Shas). The chances for this happening are slim; it is far more likely that Israel will continue to aggravate and intensify its regional and international isolation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel Is Choosing Regional Isolation, Not Alliances הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli officials have also recently divulged that Israel had already taken a number of preventative measures, including the erection of a new electronic fence along the existing Israeli-Syrian line (announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu at the beginning of January) and the deployment of elite ground forces there.

A week before the terror threat statement, on February 3rd, the British Sunday Times reported that the IDF has drafted a plan to create a 16 kilometer-wide “security zone” on the Syrian side of the current ceasefire line on the Golan, presumably to enhance security on the Israeli side.

But these two challenges – Lebanon and Syria – are not identical. For one, the Lebanon arena of the 1980s and 1990s never included the type of weaponry that could still plausibly be used on the Syrian front. Further, Israel’s 15 year-long deployment in the “security zone” should give us reason to pause, before Israel rushes to create a new one in Syria.

Most of all, it is far from clear if the “security zone” in Lebanon was indeed necessary. At least from the early 1990s, if not earlier, Israel’s main foe in Lebanon was Hezbollah, and not the Palestinian organizations that had triggered Israel’s initial drive into Lebanon. Hezbollah, unlike the Palestinians, did not try to infiltrate Israeli territory but rather focused its efforts on the Israeli military personnel deployed in Lebanon.

This is an important difference, because the “security zone” was designed primarily to defend against possible infiltrations into Israel, but it was maintained at the cost of some 20 Israeli fatalities a year on average, even when no infiltrations were attempted. Indeed, to date, Israel’s defensive posture against Hezbollah is based on deterrence, not on an actual presence in Lebanese territory.

The second cautionary note from Israel’s 1985-2000 “security zone” experience in Lebanon is that it benefitted Hezbollah far more than it assisted Israel. The organization gained legitimacy, status, and power in the domestic Lebanese political arena, by portraying itself as the only true opposition to the Israeli presence in South Lebanon. By the time Israeli forces left Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah had become the most dominant organization in Lebanon with its own “state within a state” apparatus.

Less than two decades earlier, when Israeli forces crossed into Lebanon, Hezbollah did not even exist; in effect, Israel created the rationale for a resistance movement to its occupation of Lebanese land.

The comparison to today’s situation is clear: If Israel has direct military engagements with the global jihad forces, such as al-Qaida offshoots active on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, Israel’s actions might once again indirectly lead to the creation of an effective and highly motivated opponent, such as it has not yet faced in earnest on this front until now.

The third lesson to consider is the broad strategic outlook for Israel. By helping Hezbollah, indirectly, to build itself in Lebanon, Israel handed Iran a real lever over Jerusalem’s freedom of action. Various reports indicated that in calculating possible moves against the Iranian nuclear program, Jerusalem is affected by the possibility that Hezbollah will shell Israeli territory as it did in the 2006 war. We cannot anticipate now, who might face Israel in Syria, but we should consider the effects of this possible friction on Israel’s future freedom of action.

All this is not to say that the challenges on the Golan should be treated lightly. Israel may indeed face new threats in the wake of the demise of the Assad regime in Syria and will need to deal with them. Yet, as Israel learned painfully in Lebanon, some solutions merely lead to new, and more menacing, threats. A solution based on a “security zone” in all likelihood falls into this category.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Why Israel Shouldn’t Consider a ‘Security Zone’ in Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.