ארכיון Iran - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/iran/ מתווים Tue, 29 Apr 2025 17:45:05 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.1 https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/fav-300x300.png ארכיון Iran - Mitvim https://mitvim.org.il/en/tag/iran/ 32 32 Dr. GIL Murciano discusses the latest developments. Middle East Now, i24NEWS, April 2025 https://mitvim.org.il/en/media/middle-east-now-i24news-april-2025/ Mon, 14 Apr 2025 14:03:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=media&p=12757 ● Remarks on the situation in Gaza ● Hezbollah and Iran’s Regional Strategy ● Remarks on the Trump relocation proposal ● Analysis of the Saudi strategy and U.S. Relations ● Insights on the Iran Nuclear issue and U.S. diplomacy under Trump Watch the full segment here

הפוסט Dr. GIL Murciano discusses the latest developments. Middle East Now, i24NEWS, April 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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● Remarks on the situation in Gaza

● Hezbollah and Iran’s Regional Strategy

● Remarks on the Trump relocation proposal

● Analysis of the Saudi strategy and U.S. Relations

● Insights on the Iran Nuclear issue and U.S. diplomacy under Trump

Watch the full segment here

הפוסט Dr. GIL Murciano discusses the latest developments. Middle East Now, i24NEWS, April 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Is it time for a new approach to deal with the Iranian threat? – opinion https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/is-it-time-for-a-new-approach-to-deal-with-the-iranian-threat-opinion/ Sun, 02 Oct 2022 12:49:32 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8573 Tough times are ahead for decision-makers in Jerusalem. As the clock ticks in Washington, Brussels and Tehran, counting down to Iranian nuclear breakout capability and international pressure intensifies to accept a flawed and much weaker agreement than the one signed in 2015, Israel must choose between bad and worse options. On the one hand, it adheres to its policy of rejecting any agreement with Iran, on the other, it faces the growing realization that no real alternatives exist to an agreement that would halt Iran’s nuclear race. In the meantime, the futility of military measures to stop Iran’s rush to nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly clear. Lacking new ideas, and consistently harping on the same policy messages formulated a decade ago, Israel’s bargaining position and its ability to influence the state of play have been deeply eroded. Why name it after Menachem Begin? The current crisis challenges the fundamental principles of Israel’s nuclear proliferation policy, named after prime minister Menachem Begin’s decision to attack Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981. The so-called “Begin Doctrine” has since served as the guiding Israeli principle dictating the use of “all means necessary” to prevent its enemies from acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine mostly focused on two principles: independent Israeli action in the face of such threats, and kinetic military action as the main method to upend development efforts, even at the cost of possible military escalation. Since the attack in Iraq, the concept has undergone some adjustments in accordance with changing reality. For example, political and operational US-Israel coordination has increased, but

הפוסט Is it time for a new approach to deal with the Iranian threat? – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Tough times are ahead for decision-makers in Jerusalem. As the clock ticks in Washington, Brussels and Tehran, counting down to Iranian nuclear breakout capability and international pressure intensifies to accept a flawed and much weaker agreement than the one signed in 2015, Israel must choose between bad and worse options.

On the one hand, it adheres to its policy of rejecting any agreement with Iran, on the other, it faces the growing realization that no real alternatives exist to an agreement that would halt Iran’s nuclear race. In the meantime, the futility of military measures to stop Iran’s rush to nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly clear. Lacking new ideas, and consistently harping on the same policy messages formulated a decade ago, Israel’s bargaining position and its ability to influence the state of play have been deeply eroded.

Why name it after Menachem Begin?

The current crisis challenges the fundamental principles of Israel’s nuclear proliferation policy, named after prime minister Menachem Begin’s decision to attack Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981. The so-called “Begin Doctrine” has since served as the guiding Israeli principle dictating the use of “all means necessary” to prevent its enemies from acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine mostly focused on two principles: independent Israeli action in the face of such threats, and kinetic military action as the main method to upend development efforts, even at the cost of possible military escalation.

Since the attack in Iraq, the concept has undergone some adjustments in accordance with changing reality. For example, political and operational US-Israel coordination has increased, but the doctrine’s principles are unchanged. Its credibility was further enhanced by the success of the 2007 operation “Out of the Box,” an Israeli airstrike that nipped in the bud a Syrian-North Korean effort to develop nuclear weapons.

The Begin Doctrine also underpins Israel’s policy on the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed, the political component – support for maximum international pressure and opposition to contractual solutions with Iran – is an essential component of Israeli policy. However, the policy also entails kinetic activity – intensive use of a variety of military means to physically halt the Iranian project. This is a large-scale and creative effort, one of the most extensive in the history of Israel’s national security, to identify vulnerabilities and develop operational capabilities to damage the infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear project.

The effort has yielded a decade of operational successes using an array of tools, according to foreign reports, from the introduction of the Stuxnet malware into Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities in 2011, through a series of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, to the sabotage of the enrichment facility in Natanz last year. These successful operations have created the illusion that the campaign to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions would be a rehash of Israel’s success in quashing the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear bids. Here, too, the Jewish (and American) brain, along with several hundred kilograms of high explosives, would put an end to Iran’s military nuclear fantasies.

However, although Israel has won many battles, it has lost this war. While its varied and imaginative operations delayed Iran’s progress, they did not change its direction. Iran is currently approaching the status of a “nuclear threshold state”; its ability to break through to nuclear weapons depends to a large extent on its leaders’ decisions alone, not on developing additional capabilities.

Should Iran choose to leap forward and enrich enough uranium for a bomb, it can do so at its leisure. Should it choose to hang back, it can seek to take advantage of its proximity to nuclear capability in order to enhance its geopolitical standing. In either case, the tangible Iranian experience of recent years – enriching uranium to high levels of 60% – has moved them through a conceptual point of no return, a point that the emerging agreement will no longer be able to turn around.

Advanced centrifuges can be shattered, and enriched uranium can be shipped for storage to a third country, but how do you obliterate the knowledge the Iranians have accumulated in high-level enrichment? How do you reverse the expertise gained in the construction of upgraded centrifuges?

The failure to halt Iran’s nuclear program has exposed the fundamental weakness of the Begin Doctrine – it is effective primarily in degrading enemy capabilities, not in changing conditions or motivations. When the doctrine meets a national-strategic effort of a powerful state, the most it can do is postpone the inevitable conclusion. A hint of this was clearly discernible in the Iraqi reactor attack: the facility’s destruction did not prevent Saddam Hussein from nearing nuclear capability less than a decade later, on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The current crisis point ostensibly presents Israel with a prime opportunity to reexamine its strategy against nuclear proliferation. However, criticism of existing policy on the Iranian nuclear project and discussion of shifting realities and their future implications are strictly limited at the political level.

Across the political spectrum, few are willing to admit the fundamental flaw of the Israeli perception and its failure, let alone, to offer alternatives. The people of Zion are not overly fond of prophets of doom, and the electoral price of such outspokenness is too high. Far more convenient to continue talking about military options (knowing they do not exist) and the tightening of sanctions (which do not achieve their ultimate goal).

And so, almost 50 years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli system is once again in cognitive dissonance, crippled by a political, professional and mental inability to challenge a concept that has taken root over four decades. How can we explain to the public and to ourselves why we have invested so much money and political capital and endangered human lives, in promoting a failed policy? It is easier to stick to the existing concept, introducing tactical improvements to current policy, rather than change the line of thinking outright.

What Israel needs now is nothing short of a conceptual overhaul of the fundamental assumptions underpinning its policy on the Iranian threat. It needs a new and different strategic forum that will pose new questions we must ask even if we do not wish to do so.

Topping the list is the most difficult question of all – what happens on the day after Iran achieves the nuclear threshold level? Along with last-minute attempts to scuttle this stage, we are required to ask what changes Israel should make to its strategic policy in case of Iranian nuclearization. A political-strategic discussion on Israel’s political moves in this grim but not impossible reality is imperative at this point. This does not, of course, mean that Israel should cease its attempts to block Iran from completing its advance toward an operational nuclear facility.

However, confronting the question of the day after is also essential for Israel in order to plan its actions on this day; the matter must be addressed despite the mental difficulty it provokes. Challenging assumptions requires discussing questions to which we think we already know the answers. Central among them is the question of whether Iran is one rigid and monolithic whole, or whether there are shades and differing interests among its influential actors.

An essential part of the discussion should be reserved to practical steps. It should examine the potential to incorporate international and regional systems as partners in a coordinated political campaign against shared Iranian threats. First, Israel’s strategic relationships with its strategic partners should be reexamined, with an emphasis on rethinking the concept of a strategic alliance between Israel and the US, as well as significantly upgrading the relationship with NATO. Second, the discussion must address the most significant development since the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement – the normalization agreements and the new potential for building a system of strategic security partnerships with countries in the region, whether above or below the surface.

Israel has already begun this discussion, mainly in the field of air defense, but there is still great untapped potential for expansion. In this context, a joint strategy is vital for outlining possible scenarios, such as an increase in Iran’s regional military activity or the threat of a regional arms race.

Establishing a new strategic discussion forum necessitates diversifying the circle of participants and injecting new and different knowledge into the mix. Shaping new concepts and thinking about Iran requires a different circle of experts that combines existing expertise with new voices and disciplines. Regional and international diplomatic expertise, as well as deep and multilayered knowledge of Iran’s society, economy and culture are essential components. Civil society should have a central place in the debate as a repository of thinking not limited by political or bureaucratic constraints.

The challenge facing Israel in rethinking and adapting its Iran policy to the new reality is one of the most complexes it has ever faced. The nation that demonstrated creativity in penetrating dozens of meters below ground into the centrifuge facilities at Natanz will now be required to demonstrate similar creativity in the political and conceptual spheres. The starting point is to admit to ourselves that the existing conception, the Begin Doctrine, is no longer relevant.

This article is from “JPost“, from October 2, 2022

הפוסט Is it time for a new approach to deal with the Iranian threat? – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Iran helped Turkey and Israel mend ties. Here’s how. https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/iran-helped-turkey-and-israel-mend-ties-heres-how/ Fri, 09 Sep 2022 09:34:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8585 In June, amid the season for summer vacations, some alarming news was published about the dangers posed to Israeli tourists visiting Turkey. According to intelligence provided by Turkish and Israeli spy agencies, agents of the Iranian regime were following Israeli citizens, intending to kidnap or kill them. Upon the news, Israel immediately urged its citizens to leave Turkey and avoid visiting Istanbul due to the imminent terror threat. Jerusalem also heartfully thanked Turkish authorities for fruitful cooperation on intelligence and security matters, indicating a high level of coordination with Ankara. The summer plot against Israelis in Istanbul was foiled and Turkish authorities detained some suspects in June and July. At the beginning of August, Turkish authorities released rare footage showing the capture of Iranian agents following Israeli tourists in Istanbul, providing more information on Iran’s plans to harm Israeli citizens. Israeli and Turkish media emphasized the mutual struggle of respective security agencies in both countries to stop Iranians from committing terrorist acts against Israeli holidaymakers on Turkish soil. Such was the background to the visit of Yair Lapid—the soon-to-be prime minister—to Ankara in June. A few months earlier, Israeli President Yitzhak Herzog, who invested considerable effort into reigniting bilateral relations between the two countries, had also paid a visit to the Turkish capital, where he met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This rapprochement soon culminated in the return of ambassadors and the full restoration of diplomatic ties, ending a long period of tense relations between Ankara and Jerusalem. Despite the rift that started with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010—some would say it has brewed since President Erdogan’s rise

הפוסט Iran helped Turkey and Israel mend ties. Here’s how. הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In June, amid the season for summer vacations, some alarming news was published about the dangers posed to Israeli tourists visiting Turkey. According to intelligence provided by Turkish and Israeli spy agencies, agents of the Iranian regime were following Israeli citizens, intending to kidnap or kill them. Upon the news, Israel immediately urged its citizens to leave Turkey and avoid visiting Istanbul due to the imminent terror threat. Jerusalem also heartfully thanked Turkish authorities for fruitful cooperation on intelligence and security matters, indicating a high level of coordination with Ankara.

The summer plot against Israelis in Istanbul was foiled and Turkish authorities detained some suspects in June and July. At the beginning of August, Turkish authorities released rare footage showing the capture of Iranian agents following Israeli tourists in Istanbul, providing more information on Iran’s plans to harm Israeli citizens. Israeli and Turkish media emphasized the mutual struggle of respective security agencies in both countries to stop Iranians from committing terrorist acts against Israeli holidaymakers on Turkish soil.

Such was the background to the visit of Yair Lapid—the soon-to-be prime minister—to Ankara in June. A few months earlier, Israeli President Yitzhak Herzog, who invested considerable effort into reigniting bilateral relations between the two countries, had also paid a visit to the Turkish capital, where he met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This rapprochement soon culminated in the return of ambassadors and the full restoration of diplomatic ties, ending a long period of tense relations between Ankara and Jerusalem.

Despite the rift that started with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010—some would say it has brewed since President Erdogan’s rise to power in 2002—Israel and Turkey have maintained economic relations. These ties seem to have a life of their own and have continued to grow despite the hostile political climate and the lack of respective ambassadors. In 2020 alone, Israel exported $1.5 billion worth of goods to Turkey, while Turkish exports reached $4.67 billion. In comparison, Russian exports to Israel amounted to $1 billion in 2020.

Both economies have benefitted from these ties, and there is no doubt that the volume of bilateral trade will continue to grow after the full restoration of diplomatic ties. In the energy sphere, President Erdogan has expressed hopes for Israeli-Turkish cooperation in establishing a pipeline from Europe to stream Israeli gas to Europe. This development can serve both countries—a NATO ally and America’s closest ally in the Middle East—in enhancing their regional and global influence.

In addition to diplomacy, tourism, trade, and energy, there is also a security dimension to restoring Israeli-Turkish relations. For years, Turkey had acted as a patron of Hamas, an Islamist Palestinian movement that took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 and became one of the major political and military forces in the Palestinian territories. Israel had always insisted that Hamas leadership must leave Turkey as a prerequisite for re-establishing relations between the two countries, and that Turkish religious organizations stop meddling in the situation at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

Due to a significant geopolitical shift in the region, with Arab states normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords and promoting relations with its archenemy Greece, Turkey is now realigned with the Gulf countries and has eased tensions with Egypt, causing a decrease in support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, it remains to be seen whether Hamas leadership will soon be looking to relocate elsewhere and stop its malign activity against Israel on Turkish soil.

Another question of grave strategic importance to Israel is how the two countries can cooperate against Iran, which might soon be relieved of some sanctions due to a possible revival of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), thereby enjoying an unprecedented economic and diplomatic renaissance. It is a given that Israel sees Iran as its worst enemy and existential threat, however, Turkey also often finds itself on the opposite side of the Islamic Republic, especially in Syria and Azerbaijan.

Additionally, just like Israel, Turkey is wary of growing Russian-Iranian cooperation and fears the possible weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program if the JCPOA isn’t revived, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

In recent years, Turkey and Iran have increased their economic cooperation. However, even if their economic interests overlap at times, the geopolitical divisions between the countries have grown as well. The recent Iranian terror plot against Israeli citizens is a good example of that; Ankara fumed over the Iranian attempt to compromise its security and harm its diplomatic goals of improving ties with Jerusalem and Washington. Indeed, cooperation with Israel against Iran’s malign regional activities might serve Turkey’s interests in the United States well, increasing synergy between its allies and providing a strong front against Tehran’s regional ambitions.

The change in Turkish policy towards Israel, Hamas, and Iran was seen well during the recent Israeli military operation Breaking Dawn at the beginning of August. Although Ankara had rushed to condemn Israel’s military operation in the Gaza Strip and called for “restraint,” the condemnation itself was significantly more moderate than on previous occasions. And, only a few days after the operation, Ankara and Jerusalem festively restored their ties. This change in attitude might have something to do with the fact that the group targeted in Gaza was not Hamas, but rather the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—a pro-Iranian movement, heavily sponsored by Tehran. The PIJ had verbally attacked Ankara’s restoration of relations with Israel.

It remains to be seen how Israel and Turkey will play the Iranian card in the future, as some regional powers—such as the United Arab Emirates—are looking at diffusing tensions in the Gulf. However, it seems that Ankara and Jerusalem will continue to work jointly to prevent terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens in Turkey, as this threat is still not entirely removed, and explore the possibility of pursuing common goals vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic and its many regional proxies.

This article is from “Atlantic Council“, from September 9, 2022

הפוסט Iran helped Turkey and Israel mend ties. Here’s how. הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Iran drives antisemitism in the Muslim world- analysis https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/iran-drives-antisemitism-in-the-muslim-world-analysis/ Fri, 21 Jan 2022 12:19:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=8461 When Iranian General Alireza Tangsiri, the commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, said that Saudi Arabia’s royal family actually descends from Jews who used to fight with the Prophet Muhammad in ancient Arabia, he obviously thought this was the best possible way to insult and humiliate the house of Saud. Between a rumor and a policy Tangsiri is certainly not the first one in the Middle East to “expose” the Jewish roots of the rival party and to accuse a leader or a dominant figure of being a descendant of the Jews. The internet is full of conspiracy theories about the Jewish mother of the late Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, the Jewish roots of ex-Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Jewish origins of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former leader of the terrorist ISIS organization. Yet, there is a big difference between an obnoxious internet-born rumor and official state policy that proudly trumpets its antisemitism. While some countries in the Middle East are making an effort to promote tolerance and coexistence and to fight against antisemitism in the education system and in the media, it seems that Iran – along with radical Islamist movements – is pulling the Muslim world in the opposite direction, says Iranian-born Ellie Cohanim, who served as Deputy Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism in the Trump administration. “The Iranian regime engages in what I have termed an ‘obsessive antisemitism,’ meaning that antisemitism motivates much of their activity and is part and parcel of their ideology,” Cohanim told The

הפוסט Iran drives antisemitism in the Muslim world- analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When Iranian General Alireza Tangsiri, the commander of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, said that Saudi Arabia’s royal family actually descends from Jews who used to fight with the Prophet Muhammad in ancient Arabia, he obviously thought this was the best possible way to insult and humiliate the house of Saud.

Between a rumor and a policy

Tangsiri is certainly not the first one in the Middle East to “expose” the Jewish roots of the rival party and to accuse a leader or a dominant figure of being a descendant of the Jews. The internet is full of conspiracy theories about the Jewish mother of the late Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, the Jewish roots of ex-Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Jewish origins of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former leader of the terrorist ISIS organization.

Yet, there is a big difference between an obnoxious internet-born rumor and official state policy that proudly trumpets its antisemitism. While some countries in the Middle East are making an effort to promote tolerance and coexistence and to fight against antisemitism in the education system and in the media, it seems that Iran – along with radical Islamist movements – is pulling the Muslim world in the opposite direction, says Iranian-born Ellie Cohanim, who served as Deputy Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism in the Trump administration.

“The Iranian regime engages in what I have termed an ‘obsessive antisemitism,’ meaning that antisemitism motivates much of their activity and is part and parcel of their ideology,” Cohanim told The Media Line. “Whether it is the fact that they have named their militia group the ‘Al Quds Force,’ so named for their desire to ‘liberate’ Jerusalem from the Jews; or their Holocaust denial as state policy; or their terror proxy activity through Hamas, Hizbullah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and even the Houthis, all aimed at the destruction of Israel, the regime’s desire to end a Jewish sovereign presence in the Middle East animates much of their activity,” she said.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is home to a Jewish community of about 10,000. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, a few Iranian Jews were accused of spying for Israel and executed; 35,000 Iranian Jews left Iran soon after. Officially, Iran separates between the Jews and the “Zionists,” however, in practice, these terms are often used interchangeably.

Cohanim highlights the use of both the terms Zionist and Jew in the Iranian general’s speech in which he claimed that the Saudis are descendants of Jews. “Noteworthy in this speech is how the navy general would flip back and forth between the terms Zionist and Jew, contradicting the regime’s own narrative in which they claim that they don’t hate Jews they merely hate Israel. But in moments like in this speech, or when Ayatollah [Ali] Khamenei had the gall to refer to US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner as ‘Jewish’ and ‘filthy Zionist,’ in those moments they undermine their own narrative,” she said.

‘I’m a Semite, too. How can I be against myself?’

It’s not a secret that for many years antisemitism was well accepted in most parts of the Middle East, and often propelled by various regimes, both conservative and progressive. Antisemitic sermons were read at the mosques and antisemitic tropes were taught in classrooms at schools and universities. However, today, when more Middle East countries are developing warmer relations with the Jewish state, and the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as a peace deal with Morocco are flourishing, it seems that the tide is finally turning, even though it might take many years to undo the indoctrination of the past. Yet, Iranian leadership – as well as Muslim Brotherhood offshoots around the world – keep promoting the same old hate-filled agenda against the Jews and the Jewish state, relying on several sources rooted in religion.

While Islam recognizes Judaism as a monotheistic religion and sees Jews as the “people of the book,” relations between the Prophet Muhammad and the Jews weren’t always easy. While the hadiths – a traditional collection of the sayings of Muhammad and of his tacit approval or criticism – contain information about the care and concern the prophet had for his Jewish neighbors, the Quran and the Hadith also mention that Muhammad had fought against the Jewish tribes that refused to embrace Islam. These verses are often recited and quoted by antisemitic religious and political leaders in the Muslim world; however, the verses are often misquoted and their meaning is distorted, according to Haras Rafiq, interim managing director of ISGAP – The Institute for Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy and a trustee of the British charity Muslims Against Antisemitism.

“When we look at traditional, classical Islam we see that Jew is not a derogatory term. This phenomenon is approximately 100 years old. Today, when you want to attack somebody in the Muslim world, you call him Jewish. It’s the worst kind of a slur among the Muslim majority around the world. When Imran Khan became a prime minister of Pakistan, there was a fundamentalist extremist organization that called him a Jew,” he told The Media Line.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the vacuum was filled with various ideologies such as fascism, communism, Islamism, Baathist and more, Rafiq says. “Leaders, such as the Grand Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini merged the European form of antisemitism with misinterpreted verses from the Quran and turned it into a religious issue,” Rafiq said.

Rafiq, who has advised numerous British prime ministers and worked with UK ministers and US secretaries of state, notes the misuse of the Quranic quotes and stories, and blames the propagandists from Iran and radical Islamist organizations for using the Quran and the Hadith for incitement and recruitment purposes. “The Shia in Iran believe that we are now at the ‘End of Times’ and the Jews are doing the work of the Dajjal, the Antichrist, by controlling the money,” he explained.

Saudi citizens do not appear to have reacted to the Iranian’s general verbal attack against the royal family.According to Ahmed N. Al-Ibrahim, a Saudi-American political analyst, the Saudis are not bothering themselves with Iranian slurs and insults too much. “Sometimes Iran says that the Saudi royal family is Jewish. And sometimes they say that the Sauds are from Mars,” he said.

“They can say whatever they want. We know that the Iranian regime is backward – it is against the Arabs, against the Jews, against all. Their number one enemy is Al-Saud. We are not worried. Also, the bloodline of the Sauds is well-known. These are stereotypes for local consumption. As for antisemitism, well, Jews are not the only Semites in the Middle East. We are Semites too. I’m a Semite. How can I be antisemitic? It means that I will be against myself,” Al-Ibrahim added.

Decades to achieve real change

Experts are looking at what can be done today to curb the hateful antisemitic propaganda coming from Iran.Cohanim believes that, in order to stop the inciteful rhetoric, the US has to choke off the Iranian regime’s funding sources.

“The reality is that the regime’s record since taking power in 1979 has been to use the country’s resources to line their own pockets, fund their terror proxies, develop nuclear weapons capability, and fund a massive multilingual propaganda machine to the tune of $1 billion this year alone according to reports,” she said.

Rafiq says that education and relying on trustworthy knowledge about Islam are key, especially in the West.“I said in the past that soon there will be more radical mosques here in London than in Saudi Arabia. It is very dangerous. Today we see a positive turn in some Middle Eastern countries, but still – it might take decades to achieve a real change,” he concluded.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 21, 2022

הפוסט Iran drives antisemitism in the Muslim world- analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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2017-2018 https://mitvim.org.il/en/report/2017-2018/ Sat, 13 Jun 2020 13:00:32 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=report&p=3691 US Policies towards Israel and the Middle East is a monthly publication of the Mitvim Institute, currently written by Amb. (Ret.) Barukh Binah. The publication covers issues related to US-Israel relations, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, and the changing Middle East. The publication’s previous editors were Rebecca Bornstein, Brian Reeves, and Grant Rumley.

הפוסט 2017-2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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US Policies towards Israel and the Middle East is a monthly publication of the Mitvim Institute, currently written by Amb. (Ret.) Barukh Binah. The publication covers issues related to US-Israel relations, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, and the changing Middle East. The publication’s previous editors were Rebecca Bornstein, Brian Reeves, and Grant Rumley.

הפוסט 2017-2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-iraq-cooperation-in-2019-security-challenges-and-civilian-warming-2/ Tue, 19 May 2020 14:24:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3919 The final months of 2019 were marked by widespread, prolonged protests throughout Iraq. The demonstrations, centered in Baghdad, targeted the ruling political elite and the state backing it: Iran. When Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi resigned at the end of November, he threw official Iraq into a political vacuum and guaranteed that any premier appointed to replace him would be considered an interim ruler whose government would only be accepted by the weakened political elite, and not by a significant part of the population. Today, a replacement is yet to be found. Despite the local turmoil, 2019 saw no significant changes in terms of diplomatic relations between Israel and Iraq. Neither was there any development in the economic arena, where ties between the states remain non-existent. However, Israel’s perception of Iraq as a security challenge went up a notch. After ignoring Iraq for several years, Prime Minister Netanyahu and senior defense officials changed course in 2019. They know Iraq is an important part of the supply route of ballistic and other weapons from Iran to the front with Israel. Israel also closely monitors the construction of a military base near the Syria-Iraq border, and last summer, several fatal drone attacks conducted against Shiite militia bases in Baghdad and deep in Iraqi territory were attributed to Israel. These were the first strikes on Iraq for which Israel took responsibility in almost 40 years; their predecessor is, of course, Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981. Yet Iraq’s official response was meek.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The final months of 2019 were marked by widespread, prolonged protests throughout Iraq. The demonstrations, centered in Baghdad, targeted the ruling political elite and the state backing it: Iran. When Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi resigned at the end of November, he threw official Iraq into a political vacuum and guaranteed that any premier appointed to replace him would be considered an interim ruler whose government would only be accepted by the weakened political elite, and not by a significant part of the population. Today, a replacement is yet to be found.

Despite the local turmoil, 2019 saw no significant changes in terms of diplomatic relations between Israel and Iraq. Neither was there any development in the economic arena, where ties between the states remain non-existent.

However, Israel’s perception of Iraq as a security challenge went up a notch. After ignoring Iraq for several years, Prime Minister Netanyahu and senior defense officials changed course in 2019. They know Iraq is an important part of the supply route of ballistic and other weapons from Iran to the front with Israel. Israel also closely monitors the construction of a military base near the Syria-Iraq border, and last summer, several fatal drone attacks conducted against Shiite militia bases in Baghdad and deep in Iraqi territory were attributed to Israel. These were the first strikes on Iraq for which Israel took responsibility in almost 40 years; their predecessor is, of course, Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981.

Yet Iraq’s official response was meek. The investigative committee that was appointed belatedly determined that Israel was responsible. However, the Iraqi government did not commit to a response. It was embarrassed and portrayed as weak. The militias, for their part, adopted increasingly harsh rhetoric against Israel, but Iraqi civilians condemned the manner in which Iran sought to turn their country into a wrestling ring with the US and Israel.

The Kurdish region has not taken part in the countrywide protests but, given its dependence on developments in Baghdad, it has been affected nonetheless. Not unexpectedly, Kurdish efforts to repair ties with Iran negatively impacted Israeli-Kurdish relations, at the same time as Israeli-Iraqi relations took tentative steps forward.

In the civilian, cultural and identity arenas some progress has been made, and there is currently more interaction between Israelis and Iraqis, although not on the official level. The Iraqi political elite is bound to Iran on the Israel issue, but this has not prevented a grassroots, people-to-people model of “winning hearts and minds”. Significantly, this trend continued and even intensified after the demonstrations in Iraq broke out. Privately, through social media and rare visits, a growing number of Iraqis express desire for ties with Israel after their country undergoes change. They also plead with Israel to support them by harming Iran. The protesters refrain from publicly identifying with Israel, due to claims by the regime that the protesters are backed and funded by Israel – but tellingly, anti-Israel expressions are extremely marginal.

Israel backs this trend. Notably, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a Facebook page “Israel in Iraqi Dialect”, a unique, first-of-its-kind effort, in late 2018. The Arabic-language page is aimed at encouraging discourse with the Iraqi people, and it gained huge momentum in 2019, especially after expressing clear sympathy for the protesters, who responded with appreciation. Today the page boasts some 292,000 followers. Meanwhile, four delegations from Iraq visited Israel in 2019 as guests of the Foreign Ministry, and Iraqis were also included in another visiting Arab delegation.

In that sense, it can perhaps be said that official Israel “discovered” Arab Iraq in 2019. Whereas Israeli declarations of solidarity were previously directed mainly at the Kurds and their aspirations, no such declarations were issued in 2019. Yet July 2019 saw another leap in messages from Israel to Iraq.

First Israel’s Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, publicly wished the Iraqi people well and expressed his desire for increased cooperation with them. The nature of his Facebook video sought to bypass the government and avoid a direct appeal to the regime. In November, after the wave of protests began, Katz issued a message of support for “the Iraqi people” and their justified demands. And in December, Netanyahu condemned the massacre of protesters carried out by militias in Baghdad and blamed Iran for the bloodshed. Israel’s senior echelons view the protests as an opportunity to challenge Iran – but to date Israel is the only state in the region to have expressed support for the protesters and their demands.

A threat remains, however, After the Foreign Ministry leaked news of the visits in April, discussions began in Iraq regarding normalization of ties with Israel. Yet the militias took the most radical line against the issue, and threats facing Iraqis who meet with Israelis are both serious and tangible.

Today, Iraq stands at an internal crossroads; the direction it takes is bound to impact its relations with Israel. If the protests are suppressed with active Iranian support, Iraq will inevitably become Iran’s first “proxy state” in the region. If Baghdad is, de facto, ruled by the commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ al-Quds force, the puppet regime in Baghdad will be almost wholly unable to resist Iranian demands.

Should this happen, repercussions will be felt mostly in the realm of security. For example, Iran could move ballistic equipment to Syria without interruption – and perhaps even use Iraq as a launch pad.

A continued status quo between the government and the protesters in Iraq will further weaken the government, which is already forced to lean on Iran as its sole source of support. The little legitimacy it retains will disappear. Iraq will sink into political paralysis and selfcenteredness, and will lose even more of its importance as a factor and target for improved relations with Israel. But if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the regime, an opportunity will open up for Israel. The deep anti-Iranian sentiment underpinning the protests will lead the state’s new rulers to distance themselves from Tehran. The new Iraq will seek new regional allies that respect the change it has undergone, which would align satisfyingly with Israeli interests.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Now is the time for the EU to put all of Hezbollah on its terror list https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/now-is-the-time-for-the-eu-to-put-all-of-hezbollah-on-its-terror-list/ Tue, 05 May 2020 14:15:04 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3916 It happened at last. Germany finally announced on Thursday it has designated Lebanese Hezbollah a terror organization, banning all of its activities in the nation. Germany – and other European countries – could have taken this step seven years ago, when Hezbollah’s military arm was banned by EU in 2013. Perhaps, if it had then banned all Hezbollah’s activities on its soil, both military and “political,” Germany would not have turned into an operational hub for Hezbollah and enabled the network of over 1,000 activists. Today Berlin had discovered what was well known for quite a while to Israel and the Arab Gulf states – there is no distinction between Hezbollah’s military and “political” wings. There is only one Hezbollah – murderous, poisonous, and dangerous. Now, it is time for the European Union and other countries around the world to ban Hezbollah in its entirety. Four years ago, the members of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) classified Hezbollah as terrorist organization, a decision adopted by the Arab League. GCC Secretary-General Abdullatif al-Zayani then accused Hezbollah of committing “hostile acts” against GCC states, including recruiting young men to carry out “terrorist attacks, smuggling weapons and explosives, stirring up sedition and incitement to chaos and violence.” Did Europe really think back then that Hezbollah, which had already performed an act of terrorism on its soil by killing innocent Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012, would stop there? Of course, Hezbollah continued its nefarious behavior. It has been a known fact for quite some

הפוסט Now is the time for the EU to put all of Hezbollah on its terror list הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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It happened at last. Germany finally announced on Thursday it has designated Lebanese Hezbollah a terror organization, banning all of its activities in the nation.

Germany – and other European countries – could have taken this step seven years ago, when Hezbollah’s military arm was banned by EU in 2013. Perhaps, if it had then banned all Hezbollah’s activities on its soil, both military and “political,” Germany would not have turned into an operational hub for Hezbollah and enabled the network of over 1,000 activists.

Today Berlin had discovered what was well known for quite a while to Israel and the Arab Gulf states – there is no distinction between Hezbollah’s military and “political” wings. There is only one Hezbollah – murderous, poisonous, and dangerous.

Now, it is time for the European Union and other countries around the world to ban Hezbollah in its entirety.

Four years ago, the members of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) classified Hezbollah as terrorist organization, a decision adopted by the Arab League.

GCC Secretary-General Abdullatif al-Zayani then accused Hezbollah of committing “hostile acts” against GCC states, including recruiting young men to carry out “terrorist attacks, smuggling weapons and explosives, stirring up sedition and incitement to chaos and violence.”

Did Europe really think back then that Hezbollah, which had already performed an act of terrorism on its soil by killing innocent Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012, would stop there? Of course, Hezbollah continued its nefarious behavior.

It has been a known fact for quite some time that Hezbollah’s operations in Europe, as well as in Latin America includes drug trafficking, illicit tobacco trade, money laundering, recruitment and fundraising, with the revenues directed to Lebanon to fund terrorist attacks and arms procurement.

Hezbollah – which faithfully fulfills Iran’s orders – has destroyed Lebanon, creating a state within a state, and has sown death and destruction in Syria, acting on behalf of its Iranian master while using foreign countries with lenient policies to promote their goal.

Yet, the world was exceptionally slow to react to this immediate threat and many important players continued to insist on artificial and ridiculous distinction between its military and the “political” wings, even when Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was laughing loudly about this distinction.

“Just as a joke, I propose that our ministers in the next government be from the military wing of Hezbollah,” he said during a televised speech in 2013, following the EU’s designation Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist organization.

Indeed, both political and military wings of this organization are united by the same murderous ideology, created and funded by Iran. There is no disparity between them.

As expected, Iran was not happy with this development. Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council went as far as saying that “ISIS failed to reach Europe because it was defeated by Resistance groups such as Hezbollah.”

Naturally, Iran would want the world to think that “an enemy of an enemy is my friend.” Hopefully, no one will fall for this trap. ISIS is a danger to humanity, but so is Iran that continuously threatens regional security, pushing for more destruction and death through its many tentacles.

Not only Germany, but also countries in Latin America such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil have recently decided to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and change the legislation respectively. These countries have seen for themselves how deep Hezbollah has penetrated, and how dangerous it is. Along with Israel and the Arab states, these countries have a long and painful experience of combating Hezbollah.

Everyone should know, that when Hezbollah traffics drugs, illicit tobacco, weapons or diamonds through Hamburg port or through porous borders in Latin America or East Africa, this dirty money will be later used to send rockets on the civilian population in Israel, kill more Syrians, and perform terror attacks in Europe or Arab states. That’s why the EU and countries around the world should follow the example of Germany and put the entire Hezbollah on its terror list, in an effort to eradicate Hezbollah’s power and global presence.

(originally published in Al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Now is the time for the EU to put all of Hezbollah on its terror list הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-iraq-cooperation-in-2019-security-challenges-and-civilian-warming/ Thu, 19 Mar 2020 11:15:28 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3271 The final months of 2019 were marked by widespread, prolonged protests throughout Iraq, which began in October. Baghdad was the focal point of the demonstrations, which were directed at the ruling political elite and the state backing it: Iran. Prime Minister Adil AbdulMahdi resigned at the end of November, throwing official Iraq into a political vacuum and guaranteeing that any premier appointed to replace him would be considered an interim ruler and as such, his government would only be accepted by the weakened political elite, but not by a significant part of the population. A 2018 study of Israel-Iraq relations, written within the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s ties with Arab states, stressed that a rapprochement between official Iraq and Israel was unlikely. Its central argument was that relations between the two countries were hardly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict and that the main factor influencing relations was the conflict between Israel (and perhaps the US, too) and Iran. The events of recent months bolstered this assessment. Iran and its proxies within the Iraqi regime accuse the West and Israel of fanning the unrest. The Shiite militias, the standard bearers of Iraq’s cooperation with Iran, ramped up their anti-Israel rhetoric even before the protests broke out. Given this polarized state of affairs, another trend spotlighted in the previous study is gaining momentum – wide-ranging solidarity manifested on social media between a growing number of Iraqis and Israelis, stemming from hostility to

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The final months of 2019 were marked by widespread, prolonged protests throughout Iraq, which began in October. Baghdad was the focal point of the demonstrations, which were directed at the ruling political elite and the state backing it: Iran. Prime Minister Adil AbdulMahdi resigned at the end of November, throwing official Iraq into a political vacuum and guaranteeing that any premier appointed to replace him would be considered an interim ruler and as such, his government would only be accepted by the weakened political elite, but not by a significant part of the population.

A 2018 study of Israel-Iraq relations, written within the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s ties with Arab states, stressed that a rapprochement between official Iraq and Israel was unlikely. Its central argument was that relations between the two countries were hardly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict and that the main factor influencing relations was the conflict between Israel (and perhaps the US, too) and Iran. The events of recent months bolstered this assessment. Iran and its proxies within the Iraqi regime accuse the West and Israel of fanning the unrest. The Shiite militias, the standard bearers of Iraq’s cooperation with Iran, ramped up their anti-Israel rhetoric even before the protests broke out. Given this polarized state of affairs, another trend spotlighted in the previous study is gaining momentum – wide-ranging solidarity manifested on social media between a growing number of Iraqis and Israelis, stemming from hostility to Iran and an affinity for the history of Iraqi Jewry. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and senior political figures contributed significantly to boosting this trend in 2019.

This article reviews the changes that occurred in 2019 in the nature of Israel-Iraq cooperation, as they relate to diplomatic, security, economic and civilian aspects.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Positive signs in Israel-Egypt relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/positive-signs-in-israel-egypt-relations/ Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:37:01 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3013 Since President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s rise to power in 2014, Israeli-Egyptian ties have been marked by defense-strategic cooperation, based on the shared perception of Iran and radical Islamist terror organizations as a threat, and the common interest in managing the Palestinian issue, in general, and specifically the Gaza arena. In the permanent tension between ideology and interests, Egypt continues to strive for an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and seeks to bring about internal Palestinian reconciliation beforehand. Its role as an important mediator between Hamas and Israel is crucial in ending periodic bouts of violence, is in line with Egypt’s standing as an important regional leader and is serving Egypt’s own interests as well. Israel perceives its peace with Egypt as a highly important asset. Four decades of peace have proven that it is resistant to changes and shock waves. The peace also provides a potential platform for strategic cooperation. Relations between Israel and Egypt are characterized as a “cold peace,” an image based on the fact that as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, Egypt is unable to progress to full normalization with Israel despite crucial shared interests. Although this position has become somewhat muted in light of the growing defense-strategic cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states in the region, it still dictates the nature and extent of relations. Israeli-Egyptian links are an asset to the region, especially to the states of the Arab Sunni axis, as well as to the US and other powers. They regard the

הפוסט Positive signs in Israel-Egypt relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Since President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s rise to power in 2014, Israeli-Egyptian ties have been marked by defense-strategic cooperation, based on the shared perception of Iran and radical Islamist terror organizations as a threat, and the common interest in managing the Palestinian issue, in general, and specifically the Gaza arena.

In the permanent tension between ideology and interests, Egypt continues to strive for an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and seeks to bring about internal Palestinian reconciliation beforehand. Its role as an important mediator between Hamas and Israel is crucial in ending periodic bouts of violence, is in line with Egypt’s standing as an important regional leader and is serving Egypt’s own interests as well.

Israel perceives its peace with Egypt as a highly important asset. Four decades of peace have proven that it is resistant to changes and shock waves. The peace also provides a potential platform for strategic cooperation. Relations between Israel and Egypt are characterized as a “cold peace,” an image based on the fact that as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, Egypt is unable to progress to full normalization with Israel despite crucial shared interests. Although this position has become somewhat muted in light of the growing defense-strategic cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states in the region, it still dictates the nature and extent of relations.

Israeli-Egyptian links are an asset to the region, especially to the states of the Arab Sunni axis, as well as to the US and other powers. They regard the ties as a boost to regional stability after a period of great upheaval. Throughout 2019, Egypt was a pivotal component in ties between Israel and the Palestinians. It played a central role in all attempts at ceasefires with Hamas, which were also assisted by UN mediation and Qatari funds.

Israel and Egypt both seek to limit Iran’s presence in the Middle East, to advance increased sanctions against it by diplomatic means, and to fight its various proxies. Israel and Egypt also worked, each individually, to limit Turkey’s activity in the Eastern Mediterranean by nurturing alliances in the region. They also mounted campaigns against terror organizations, born of a joint perception of the threat they pose and the required responses. In addition, Israel and Egypt share a similar view of the US role in the region, resulting in Israeli-Egyptian coordination in some fields (such as the Qualified Industrial Zones – QIZ). Along with cooperation on the diplomatic front, 2019 also saw continued security cooperation between Israel and Egypt, which has underpinned relations between them in recent years.

Given the cooperation described above, a high-profile celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Israel-Egypt peace agreement would have been expected in 2019. However, while Israel held academic seminars and various other events, no similar events or ceremonies were conducted in Egypt. Ambassador David Govrin completed his term at the end of July 2019, and Israel currently does not have an ambassador in Cairo. The ambassador-designate’s appointment in October 2018 has not been presented for government approval.

ALONG WITH diplomatic-strategic cooperation, cooperation between Israel and Egypt on energy issues was also prominent in 2019. Significant steps were taken to promote cooperation allowing Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Greece (and perhaps Lebanon in the future) to form a regional hub of natural gas production as a basis for export to Europe. In January 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) was launched in Cairo by seven Middle Eastern and European governments, among them Israel and the Palestinian Authority (but without the participation of Turkey and Lebanon).

Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz met with his Egyptian counterpart, Tariq al-Mulla, in full view of the cameras during the launch event. In January, a decision was made to upgrade the EMGF to a recognized international organization, which France asked to join too, and which will include the US, EU and World Bank as observers. Strengthening multilateral cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean helps boost Israeli-Egyptian ties.

In September, Israel’s state-owned Eilat Ashkelon Pipeline Company signed a contract with the owners of the Egyptian EMG gas pipeline to allow the flow of gas from Israel’s offshore Leviathan and Tamar gas fields to Egypt. The deal is expected to yield the Israeli company an annual commission of NIS 200 million. In addition, a compromise was reached between the Egyptian government and the Israel Electric Corporation, according to which the Egyptians would only pay the IEC $500m. of the $1.76 billion ruled in its favor in international arbitration several years ago. That compromise removed the remaining barriers to the supply of gas from Israel to Egypt, and in January, Israel began exporting gas to Egypt from the Leviathan reservoir. None of the above would have been possible without intensive contacts between the Egyptian and Israeli governments.

Nonetheless, there were no other significant changes in Israel-Egyptian economic cooperation in 2019. The QIZ initiative continued to operate in its current format, as did agricultural projects. Unfortunately, there were no new initiatives in the spheres of solar energy, water desalination or green energy, which could have been very beneficial to the Egyptian economy. No progress was reported in scientific, medical, technological or academic cooperation, either. Nonetheless, there was an increase in the number of Israeli visitors to Egypt, with hundreds of thousands visiting the Sinai Peninsula and a few thousand touring Egypt itself. Positive developments occurred in the other direction, too – with the growth of Egyptian Copt pilgrimages to Israel, especially for the “Great Sabbath” and Easter holy days. Their numbers grew to about 7,000 in 2019 from some 5,000 in 2015.

In addition, as part of Egypt’s efforts to display more tolerant and liberal attitudes, especially toward religious minorities, among them Jews and Copts, progress was made in terms of Egypt’s commitment to refurbish Jewish heritage sites. Cairo’s Bassatine Jewish Cemetery compound was renovated in 2019 with Egyptian government funding, the Eliyahu Hanavi Synagogue restoration in Alexandria was completed in January. Ambassadors from many countries were invited to the impressive synagogue ceremony, but the Israeli ambassador was not invited. The Egyptians framed the event as a Jewish rather than Israel-related occasion.

Over four decades of Israeli-Egyptian relations testify to continuity and change. The two states’ mutual interests constitute the basis for their peace, despite the obstacles, disagreements, and tensions over the years. The emerging regional and international reality (especially since Sisi’s rise to power) has increased cooperation but was not successful in thawing Egypt’s cool attitude toward the peace with Israel. A significant obstacle to the relationship continues to be Egyptian avoidance of cultural cooperation. The Mediterranean identity starting to take root in certain Egyptian and Israeli circles may generate a dialogue that will eventually yield more open cultural relations. Social media, which enable a direct and comprehensive discourse with young Egyptians, constitute another arena in which Israel operates and that holds potential for civilian rapprochement. Israel should quickly appoint a permanent ambassador to Egypt, one able to support and lead attempts to bolster ties and take advantage of existing opportunities.

The writer is Israel’s former ambassador to Egypt and South Sudan, a task-team member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. Read a longer version of this article on the Mitvim Institute’s website.

הפוסט Positive signs in Israel-Egypt relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/10-trends-in-israels-regional-foreign-policies-july-december-2019/ Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:34:09 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2993 Every six months, the Mitvim Institute maps key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, based on the institute’s monthly reports that monitor ongoing developments. From July through December 2019, we identified the following 10 trends: 1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes. 2) Efforts to achieve a long-term truce with Hamas, while preserving the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) just short of collapse – Israel and Hamas conducted indirect contacts via Qatar, Egypt and the UN special envoy in a bid to achieve a long-term truce, which will also enable the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip. Despite occasional flare-ups of violence, Israel opted to forego another round of war with Gaza and instead sought to reach understandings with Hamas and implement them. At the same time, Israel gave the PA funds it had deducted from its budget in order to avert its collapse but did not support it politically, and continued to encourage

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Every six months, the Mitvim Institute maps key trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies, based on the institute’s monthly reports that monitor ongoing developments. From July through December 2019, we identified the following 10 trends:

1) From creeping annexation in the West Bank to intentions for official annexation – Driven by political campaigning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to formally annex the Jordan Valley. He subsequently expanded his intentions to annexation of all West Bank settlements, generating declarations of domestic public support for the move. While the US administration avoided challenging Netanyahu on the issue, many international players, among them candidates for the US Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, expressed opposition. At the same time, Israel’s government continued to advance creeping annexation in the West Bank, as manifested in ongoing construction, diversion of resources and regulatory changes.

2) Efforts to achieve a long-term truce with Hamas, while preserving the weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) just short of collapse – Israel and Hamas conducted indirect contacts via Qatar, Egypt and the UN special envoy in a bid to achieve a long-term truce, which will also enable the reconstruction and development of the Gaza Strip. Despite occasional flare-ups of violence, Israel opted to forego another round of war with Gaza and instead sought to reach understandings with Hamas and implement them. At the same time, Israel gave the PA funds it had deducted from its budget in order to avert its collapse but did not support it politically, and continued to encourage the intra-Palestinian divide.

3) Opposition to international criticism of the occupation and settlements while relying on a weaker US administration – Israel continued its campaign against the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement in the legal sphere and on social media, and by banning activists entry into the country. It faced growing criticism of the occupation and settlements, including a legal decision in Europe on labeling settlement products and a decision in the International Criminal Court on a possible inquiry regarding war crimes. Israel’s countered these via personal attacks on the critics, attempts to undermine their authority and discredit their claims, and reliance on the Trump administration’s support despite a decline in international US influence.

4) Crises in ties with Jordan and a disconnect between the leaders without a significant Israeli response – A severe crisis of trust emerged between Jordan and Israel, including a disconnect between their leaders. King Abdullah stated that relations with Israel are at their lowest ebb ever. The border enclaves of Naharayim and Tzofar were restored to full Jordanian sovereignty, and protests erupted in Jordan against Israeli gas exports and the peace treaty between the two sides. The administrative detention in Israel of two Jordanian citizens raised tensions, whereas Netanyahu’s stated desire to annex the Jordan Valley was perceived as a negative game-changer. President Reuven Rivlin stepped in to try restoring trust and expanding the dialogue channels between the two states.

5) Attempts to raise the level of ties with Gulf states and increase their visibility – Israel sought to publicize the development of its ties with Gulf states, including the presence of senior Israeli officials at international events in the Gulf, positive social media interaction, participation in sports competitions, and visits of unofficial delegations. Israel stepped up its preparations toward its participation in Expo 2020 in Dubai. Foreign Minister Israel Katz declared his intention to advance non-belligerent agreements with Gulf states, which in return underscored the need for progress between Israel and the Palestinians as a condition for normalizing relations. These developments occurred against the backdrop of Iran’s growing aggression toward Gulf states, which was not met with a significant American response.

6) Efforts against Iranian entrenchment along Israel’s borders and against the nuclear agreement with Iran – Israel urged Western European states to adopt a tough line on Iran and support renewed economic sanctions, but without significant effect. It took part in an attempt to establish an international maritime security force in the Gulf and achieved certain success in encouraging other countries to classify Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as terrorist organizations. On the military level, Israel kept up its raids on Iranian targets in Syria, expanding them to Lebanon and Iraq. In view of growing Russian criticism, Israel acted to preserve its defense coordination mechanism with Russia.

7) Israel and Europe alternate between cooperation and disagreement while Israel dials down its Visegrád Group links – The European Union continued to be Israel’s biggest trading partner, and additional areas of cooperation were advanced. The new EU leadership expressed commitment to the two-state solution and to upgrading Israel-EU ties once peace with the Palestinians is achieved. Israel’s government took a negative and confrontational stance toward the EU, an attitude which filtered down and affected Israeli public perception of the organization as a foe rather than a friend. Israel’s warm ties with the Visegrád Group, which Netanyahu championed earlier this year, disappeared from the public discourse, while tensions with Poland increased over Holocaust remembrance issues.

8) Strengthening of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean while trying to keep an open channel to Turkey – Israel continued to deepen its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on energy and participation in the regional gas forum (EMGF) established in Cairo in early 2019. Turkey’s growing isolation in the region began affecting Israeli policy. Although it had avoided doing so in the past, Israel expressed growing support for Greece and Cyprus in their maritime disputes with Turkey. At the same time, it worked to maintain an open channel to Turkey, despite tensions over the Palestinian issue, and especially over Jerusalem, Gaza and Hamas activity in Turkey.

9) Netanyahu mobilized foreign policy issues for his election campaign but his image in the world suffered – As he did ahead of the April 2019 elections, ahead of the September elections Netanyahu also sought to portray his foreign policy achievements. He scheduled (and sometimes canceled) international visits and meetings in a bid to improve his electoral prospects and aid his attempts to form a government. He highlighted issues such as the Jordan Valley annexation, Israel’s struggle against Iran and Gaza, efforts to relocate embassies to Jerusalem and the idea of a defense treaty with the US. The peace process was absent from the election campaigns. However, foreign leaders, among them Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, were less responsive to Netanyahu’s political needs than they had been in the past.

10) Despite the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to face a severe crisis – After four years, Netanyahu appointed a full-time foreign minister but this did not resolve the crisis suffered by the MFA. The ministry’s deep budgetary shortfall and labor disputes with the Finance Ministry continued. Israel’s unusual political predicament took its toll and further undermined the MFA’s ability to carry out its tasks. Israel failed to appoint new ambassadors to France, Russia, Canada and the UN, and left its embassy in Cairo without a permanent ambassador (although an appointment was already approved by the MFA). At the same time, Israel’s defense agencies continued to play a dominant role in foreign policy issues, at the expense of diplomats.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is director of research at Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, of which Dr. Nimrod Goren is the founder and head.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies July-December 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Limited European Leverage over Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-limited-european-leverage-over-israel/ Thu, 12 Dec 2019 13:07:25 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2820 Israel and the EU maintain exceedingly close relations with each other. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and has extensive cultural and political ties to the country. Despite this, Israeli public discourse often portrays the EU as an opponent – not least due to their differences over the Middle East Peace Process and Israel’s settlement policy, as well as the EU’s continued defence of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power. Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the EU maintain exceedingly close relations with each other. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and has extensive cultural and political ties to the country. Despite this, Israeli public discourse often portrays the EU as an opponent – not least due to their differences over the Middle East Peace Process and Israel’s settlement policy, as well as the EU’s continued defence of the Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Israelis tend to view the EU as being less significant than it once was. This is partly due to its internal divisions and increasingly inward-looking nature, as reflected in issues ranging from Brexit to the refugee crisis, to the rise of populist parties in Europe. Many Israelis feel that the EU is losing its importance on the global stage – and, as such, is no longer a key partner for their country. Israel considers European actors to be less relevant to the broad economic, political, and security challenges that Israel faces in the Middle East – particularly the series of conflicts in the region that are increasingly defined by military power.

Israelis are far more concerned about the US’ positioning, given that the country continues to be Israel’s strongest ally and is perhaps the only international actor that can persuade Israel to substantially change its policies (even if the Trump administration is broadly uncritical of these policies). Israelis also see the US as an important ally in efforts to roll back Iran’s regional activities and to undo the JCPOA.

Israel attributes significant importance to Russia, especially in relation to Iran and Syria. Russian forces’ involvement in Syria has constrained Israel’s freedom of action in the country, because it feels the need to coordinate with Moscow on Israeli military action there. As a result, Prime Minister Netanyahu has invested significant effort in strengthening his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Netanyahu portrays this as a foreign policy success to the Israeli public, although it has not achieved Israel’s strategic goal of pushing Iran out of Syria.

Many among the Israeli policy elite believe that gaps between Israel and the EU on the Palestinian issue are bound to widen, that an improvement in Israel-EU ties is unlikely in the coming years, and that Israel may benefit more from building alliances with other regions and emerging superpowers. In this, they emphasize the development of relations with Asian countries, particularly China. Nevertheless, Israel’s opposition parties increasingly understand the need to improve ties with the EU.

Some actions taken by the EU in recent years have had an impact on Israeli decisionmaking. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call to Netanyahu in February 2016, in which she voiced concern about a proposed bill that would limit Israeli civil society, reportedly led him to row back on some components of the legislation. Europe may have also played a role in preventing Israel’s forced evacuation of the Palestinian Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar, in the West Bank. The EU’s and some of its member states’ insistence on adding territorial clauses that exclude the settlements to their bilateral agreements with Israel have also had an impact, forcing the Israeli government to effectively acquiesce on several occasions. But these steps remain largely haphazard rather than part of a concerted effort to change Israeli behavior.

If anything, Netanyahu’s government has increasingly focused – unsuccessfully – on pushing the EU to fall in line with its positions. The undertaking was based on the perception that the EU values cooperation with Israel more than it did in the past, given Europe’s growing security concerns in the Middle East.

Keenly aware of intra-European divisions on Middle East policy, the Israeli government has increased its attempts to exploit these differences in recent years. Israel has traditionally focused on the development of ties with individual member states rather than EU institutions. Recently, such engagement has evolved into efforts to weaken the EU and increase divisions among its members, thereby preventing a consensus between them on issues that affect Israel. The undertaking has sometimes borne fruit from Netanyahu’s perspective, bringing EU decision-making to a relative halt. For example, since June 2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not published conclusions regarding the Middle East Peace Process, as it regularly did in the past. Nevertheless, Israel’s failure to significantly shift the EU’s or member states’ positions towards those of the US on the Iran and Palestinian issues illustrates the limitations of this approach.

In recent years, the Netanyahu government has come close to portraying the EU as a foe of Israel. Ministers have accused the bloc of financing boycotts of Israel and terrorist organizations, passing anti-Israel resolutions, and jeopardizing the country’s (and Europe’s) security by supporting the JCPOA. Netanyahu even reportedly refused to meet Federica Mogherini, then the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, in June 2018. The formation of a more moderate Israeli government would provide an opportunity to improve relations between Israel and the EU, as well as enhance high-level political dialogue between the sides. It might also lead Israel to finally give a positive response to the EU’s offer to establish a Special Privileged Partnership after peace is achieved. While this would not resolve the existing policy differences between the sides, it might give the EU greater influence on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

There remains a significant gap between Israelis’ negative perceptions of the EU (as a result of their foreign policy differences) and the scope of cooperation between Israel and the bloc. In 2019 a poll conducted by the Mitvim Institute found that 45 percent of Israelis considered the EU to be more of a foe to Israel than a friend. Only 27 percent thought the opposite. Disillusionment with the EU is also widespread among left-leaning Israelis due to the bloc’s perceived inactivity in advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, there is no sizeable pro-EU constituency in Israel. This has helped Israel’s right-wing leadership dismiss any European criticism of Israel’s policy as anti-Israeli or even anti-Semitic.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

The article was written for the European Council on Foreign Relations, and was published on 12 December 2019 as part of a broad project on European leverage in the Middle East and North Africa

הפוסט The Limited European Leverage over Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/when-israel-smiled-at-the-world-the-world-smiled-back/ Fri, 15 Nov 2019 12:52:38 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2818 “In the last decade of the twentieth century, atlases, history and geography books no longer present an up-to-date picture of the world. Walls of enmity have fallen, borders have disappeared, powers have crumbled and ideologies collapsed, states have been born, states have died and the gates of emigration have been flung open. It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is now – to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and do everything possible to fit into this world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us’. We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation.” With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict. Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly.

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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“In the last decade of the twentieth century, atlases, history and geography books no longer present an up-to-date picture of the world. Walls of enmity have fallen, borders have disappeared, powers have crumbled and ideologies collapsed, states have been born, states have died and the gates of emigration have been flung open. It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is now – to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and do everything possible to fit into this world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us’. We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation.”

With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly. He did so based on solid reasoning and a broad strategic view. He was a pragmatic man who could read the map, identify opportunities and make tough decisions. He understood that the PLO was growing weaker and that unless he sought agreement with that organization, he would face a tougher alternative – Hamas. He also understood Israel’s changing circumstances following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Soviet bloc.

Rabin assessed that this was an opportunity to try to resolve the conflicts with Israel’s immediate neighbors so that when the time came, Israel would be able to face its harshest and most dangerous enemies – Iraq and Iran. He was thoroughly aware of the hurdles he would have to face on the path he had chosen, the crises, the disappointments, but he had decided that he would leave our children and grandchildren a different kind of world, one of hope and normalcy.

I had the privilege of serving the State of Israel and working with him. I had the privilege of serving during the Oslo Accord days, of witnessing the changes Rabin underwent and the tremendous breakthroughs made by Israel’s Foreign Service. From a state that just months previously had clashed with the US government over loan guarantees for immigrant absorption, Israel became a desired ally. Relations with the US were transformed, becoming warm and intimate, with every Israeli diplomatic move coordinated with the US administration and receiving its blessing and support.

I saw and experienced how the world opened up to us, how states which did not even recognized us changed their position. From China and India to Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. Representatives from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all gathered at my home in New York, where I served as Consul General, to meet Rabin. He also managed to make the old dream of peace with Jordan a reality.

The Middle East began opening up to us, and new channels of cooperation were examined at well-attended economic conferences we held in Morocco and Jordan. Europe, too, opened up to us, giving Israel preferential trade status and making it the first non-European partner in its Horizon 2020 research program.

I had the great privilege of being at Rabin’s side when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1996, ten days before his assassination. The hall was packed. Most Heads of State in the audience applauded at length, not only because of what he said but also because they appreciated Rabin and his leadership. They stood in line for long moments to shake his hand. The sympathy of the world enveloped us, constituting the best proof that when we open up to the world, it opens up to us.

Rabin the soldier fought tenaciously against terrorism. I saw him angry and pained when he was informed of a terror attack, I saw him uncompromising when he had to make decisions and I also heard him shouting at Yasser Arafat when he had to. But he also bequeathed us new concepts, redefining the term “security” to include not just tanks, planes and missile boats, but also education, housing and well-being. Security, for Rabin, lay mostly in human hope.

Yitzhak Rabin was a modest man, often introverted, but also sure of himself; a man who did not like small talk and had no patience for fools and liars, for sycophants and fear-mongers. The red-headed Prime Minister spoke his mind, sometimes bluntly. In this sense, he was not blessed with diplomatic skills. But it was his direct style, his deep voice and shy mien that won the hearts of many.

In these days of determined attempts to undermine the State’s gatekeepers and institutions, it is important to remember Rabin’s respect for democracy and the rule of law, even when it concerned his personal life. Let us remember his desire to place the citizens at the top of the government’s priorities, his actions in support of civil equality, his attitude toward the Arab citizens in whom he saw partners, and the real actions he took to rectify past injustices.

Rabin, the man with the analytic mind, had well-defined, firm views, but he knew how to adapt himself when necessity dictated. Rabin knew how to dream and how to make his dreams come true. For him, the essence of Zionism was to establish a safe haven for the Jewish people.

For me, Rabin’s legacy is of integrity and modesty, courageous leadership, respect for democracy and civil rights, the vision of peace, and, above all, a life of hope.

Colette Avital is a former Member of Knesset and Ambassador, and is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-real-danger-that-brexit-poses-for-israel/ Wed, 23 Oct 2019 11:59:34 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2802 When Israelis ask what Brexit means for them, many will think of economy and trade, and about diplomatic relations with Britain and Europe. These are important, but in considering Brexit’s implications, there’s a far bigger picture that Israel’s leaders need to see. Beyond the political crisis in London and Brussels, Brexit represents a clash over the future of world order, and it is this issue which has the most significant long-term significance. For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern. A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages,

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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When Israelis ask what Brexit means for them, many will think of economy and trade, and about diplomatic relations with Britain and Europe. These are important, but in considering Brexit’s implications, there’s a far bigger picture that Israel’s leaders need to see. Beyond the political crisis in London and Brussels, Brexit represents a clash over the future of world order, and it is this issue which has the most significant long-term significance.

For sure, Brexit itself – if and when it is finally implemented – will have some impact on Israel’s economic and political relations with Britain and Europe. Much of Israel-UK trade – worth roughly 20 billion shekels (4.4 billion pounds) – is governed by Israel-EU trade agreements. But the effect on Israel will not be direct. If the UK eventually leaves with a deal, existing arrangements will be maintained. If it leaves without a deal, a new bilateral UK-Israel agreement, already agreed in February, will replace EU-Israel trade agreements. Down the line there would be the opportunity for deeper bilateral trade agreements. But the bottom line in the short term, is that UK-Israel trade terms should not change, and therefore should not be Israel’s primary concern.

A more significant concern is that if Britain were to ultimately leave without a deal – a possibility that still cannot be absolutely ruled out – this would cause serious disruption in Britain, as trade agreements between Britain and the EU disappear overnight. There could be delays at UK ports and shortages, and the economic shock will harm Britain for years. EU states including France and Germany would also suffer economically. With Europe accounting for one third of Israel’s trade, this economic blow could have knock-on effects for Israel. But whilst the impact of this extreme scenario would be significant, Europe’s economy would adjust in time. What about political relations between London and Jerusalem? Britain’s membership of the EU is not central here. The most significant aspects of UK-Israel intelligence and strategic cooperation are bilateral.

It should be said that Brexit will impact internal dynamics shaping EU common foreign policy, including towards Israel. Israeli politicians generally perceive EU diplomacy as biased towards the Palestinians. Britain has typically resisted French-led efforts to impose the EU into the peace process, and favoured a balanced approach supporting US-led diplomacy. Israel may therefore regret the weakening of Britain as bridge-builder between the US and Europe. Israel may also miss Britain’s influence in the EU on confronting Iran and its proxies. The UK led the way promoting EU sanctions on Iran during the Obama administration, and went ahead of EU partners by proscribing Hezbollah in entirety earlier this year.

Britain’s international influence generally has already been seriously harmed by its preoccupation with Brexit, as demonstrated by its limited response to recent crises in the Gulf and Syria. Therefore, even if UK-Israel ties strengthen as Britain invests in relationships outside the EU, the value of British support will be less, because Britain is likely to remain a diminished player for some time to come. All this is regrettable from an Israeli perspective. However, the direct significance for Israel of reduced British influence in the EU and beyond is not of itself game changing for Israel’s international relations, and should not be overstated.

So what aspect of Brexit should be of greatest concern? It is that Brexit is both symptom and symbol of a wider trend of broader significance: the rise of populist nationalism, the turning inward of major Western powers, most importantly the US, and the weakening of the Western alliance, bonded partly by the values of liberal democracy. Some Israeli policy makers, including those around Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, may enjoy what they perceive as a blow to the EU, which they consider institutionally hostile. Netanyahu has increasingly aligned with populist leaders in Europe and beyond, who insist on national sovereignty, and resist attempts by international institutions to interfere in their affairs by promoting universal liberal values.

The backlash against liberal internationalism, and splits in the EU, suits Netanyahu, as he seeks to neuter international criticism of Israeli policies regarding the Palestinians. There are those on the Israeli right also keen to capitalize on the anti-Muslim sentiment that European radical right parties have incited and exploited. Those parties increasingly express solidarity with Israel to bolster anti-Islamic credentials and to detoxify themselves from associations with anti-Semitism. The Israeli right welcomes the opportunity to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the West’s struggle against militant Islam, rather than being caused by the unresolved occupation. But before they celebrate Brexit as a victory for European populist nationalism and its anti-Islamic politics against liberal internationalism, they should think twice.

First, it is too soon to tell whether Brexit will weaken or strengthen the European integration project. The political chaos and economic harm to Britain will likely deter others from leaving, and Britain’s departure may ultimately strengthen EU institutions. Second – and most importantly – the values of liberal democracy, which the EU champions, have been part of the glue attaching the Jewish state to a transatlantic Western alliance, which has broadly supported Israel and its interests. Those liberal values have also guaranteed the welfare of Jews in Western countries. It is these trends, of which Brexit is a part, that in the broader perspective, will be most significant for Israel and the Jewish people.

We cannot know if we are witnessing a long-term decline of Western liberal democracy, or if it will rebound. Israel cannot play a decisive role in determining the outcome of that identity struggle, and will have to develop resilience to a world of increasing disorder. But Israel does not have to align with the populist right, just to get a break from pressure over the Palestinian issue, and such an approach is not only unprincipled, but short-sighted. Its shortsightedness is already evident in the US case. Recent events in Syria and the Gulf show that Trump, with his disinterest in taking responsibility for global challenges, is an unreliable ally. US isolationism, alongside a strategically weak Europe, unwilling or unable to engage in the future of the region, creates a vacuum to be filled by more dangerous actors, including Turkey, Russia and Iran.

At the same time, the warmth between Netanyahu and Trump, coupled with Netanyahu’s shift to the right, has dangerously eroded America’s bipartisan consensus on Israel, as well as alienating many American Jews. Israel should avoid similarly being a wedge issue between political camps in Europe. Aside from being unprincipled and short-sighted, this approach is also unnecessary. Europe’s economic and security challenges actually create unprecedent incentives for many states to deepen cooperation with Israel, with its dynamic economy, and valuable technological, intelligence and military assets.

In this context, Israeli reaffirmation of commitment to a two-state solution, and even modest steps towards that goal, could be enough to secure broad European support against BDS and Palestinian diplomatic moves against Israel, and ensure stronger support for Israel during military conflicts. Those formulating Israel’s foreign policy can’t be myopic, or seek immediate gratification. That policy must be designed to manoeuvre in a world of increasing disorder, which Brexit symbolises. This means adopting policies which enable a broad base of support for Israel within and between Western powers, not a short term bet on the populist nationalist wave.

Dr. Toby Greene is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow in the School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary College, University of London.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Real Danger that Brexit Poses for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trends-in-israels-regional-foreign-policies-vol-3/ Thu, 19 Sep 2019 10:20:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3222 This document outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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This document outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trouble-in-paradise-cracks-are-forming-in-the-saudi-emirati-relationship/ Wed, 07 Aug 2019 10:37:11 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2797 The relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always been smooth. Even before the latter’s independence in 1971, the affairs between the ruling families, al-Nahyan of Abu-Dhabi and al-Saud of Riyad, were tense due to borders disputes and power struggles. Today, however, it seems that the two countries have never been closer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated, over the last decade, a solid partnership in decision-making processes and see eye to eye on major strategic questions in their region. The strength of their cooperation was expressed in varied interests and arenas, such as the backing the rise of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt (2014), joining forces in their campaign in Yemen (2015), imposing an unprecedented boycott on Qatar (2017) and introducing groundbreaking national laws in both states such as the Value Added Tax law (2018)—all of which are taking place in times of rapid and significant changes within their own territories. The alliance between the two states rests on close personal ties between their leaders—Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de-facto ruler, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Emirati crown prince and de-facto ruler. It’s also based on similar, though not identical, world-views in which political Islam and Iranian influence form two destabilizing forces in the Middle East. Nevertheless, just like in romantic relations, the more they are becoming intense and weighty, the more difficulties they reveal. The recent tension in the Gulf affords a glimpse into one of many disputes between Saudi Arabia

הפוסט Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always been smooth. Even before the latter’s independence in 1971, the affairs between the ruling families, al-Nahyan of Abu-Dhabi and al-Saud of Riyad, were tense due to borders disputes and power struggles. Today, however, it seems that the two countries have never been closer. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated, over the last decade, a solid partnership in decision-making processes and see eye to eye on major strategic questions in their region. The strength of their cooperation was expressed in varied interests and arenas, such as the backing the rise of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt (2014), joining forces in their campaign in Yemen (2015), imposing an unprecedented boycott on Qatar (2017) and introducing groundbreaking national laws in both states such as the Value Added Tax law (2018)—all of which are taking place in times of rapid and significant changes within their own territories.

The alliance between the two states rests on close personal ties between their leaders—Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince and de-facto ruler, and Mohammed bin Zayed, the Emirati crown prince and de-facto ruler. It’s also based on similar, though not identical, world-views in which political Islam and Iranian influence form two destabilizing forces in the Middle East. Nevertheless, just like in romantic relations, the more they are becoming intense and weighty, the more difficulties they reveal.

The recent tension in the Gulf affords a glimpse into one of many disputes between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on appropriate responses to common challenges, this time with Iran. While Saudi Arabia took a public stance using confrontational language vis-à-vis Iran, the UAE remained vaguer in its media coverage of events and did not point an unequivocal finger of blame towards Iran. In the first attack against four oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on May 12, the UAE tried to diminish the significance of the attacks, claiming that the damage caused was minor. Some reports even claimed that Saudi Arabia preferred a military response towards Iran, while the UAE sought to smooth over the situation with a diplomatic resolution.

An additional dispute between the two countries relates to the war in Yemen. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have jointly led the campaign in Yemen against the Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebels, who have been garnished with weaponry, advisors and money from Tehran. While the Saudi forces focused on air operations, the UAE army has played a more significant role on the ground, leading to several game-changing outcomes. Even though the Saudis led their allies to the war, it is now the UAE who is steering the wheels by gradually withdrawing from Yemen. In its cautious and sophisticated nature, the UAE had calculated its battles on the expanding fronts and realized that its focus should be granted to more immediate and close challenges. As tension with Iran increased, the UAE took a swift step to tackle the rising threat with greater attention and a reallocation of resources for any possible development.

The increasing international criticism over the humanitarian effects of the Yemen war was another catalyst for the Emirati withdrawal. The UAE’s pulling off from Yemen without a satisfactory arrangement acceptable to Saudi Arabia, is a probable source for a conflict between them and a death blow to the latter’s attempt to reach a victorious image in this arena.

Despite the increasing tension and apparent disagreements between the countries, their relationship is yet far from a crisis, as it is based on deep ideological and strategic partnership. The disagreements at this point mainly revolve around methods of action and degrees of force that each of the sides is interested in applying, whether in regard to military action, diplomatic decisions or social processes. Of the two, the UAE behaves like the “responsible adult” in its tactical choices, while Mohammed bin Salman has been portrayed as more reckless. Despite the open channel of communication between the two leaders, their continued proactive policies are increasing the likely challenges in the relationship between them.

The struggle between Iran and the Sunni Arab states has shaped the way researchers, journalists and intelligence analysts have understood and analyzed regional dynamics for many years. This struggle has geostrategic and ideological impacts on the region which affect many arenas. Alongside this struggle, however, another battle has been taking place for a while now which also has a significant impact on the character of the Middle East and beyond. Without standing out to a comparable degree, the competition between the Arab Gulf states, as we have seen in North Africa, Yemen, the Red Sea and the Palestinian arena, has made its mark on the region. This competition, which is driven by aspirations for influence and prestige in the Arab world, indirectly influences such issues as nuclear proliferation and regional arms races, thus bringing up new challenges for the security of the Middle East.

In the past, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia demonstrated restraint in conducting their foreign affairs. They stood in the shadow of others and made primary use of their comparative economic advantage. Today, they are the driving force behind many regional changes, and are key players in many arenas. However, with this power comes the weight of responsibility for maintaining regional stability. In this matter, it seems that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are implementing divergent approaches regarding the use of their power.

Yoel Guzansky is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served at Israel’s National Security Council and advised other ministries including the Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry for Strategic Affairs.

Moran Zaga is a research fellow at the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy and a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in The National Interest)

הפוסט Trouble in Paradise: Cracks are Forming in the Saudi-Emirati Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/who-remembers-the-palestinian-issue/ Thu, 28 Feb 2019 07:22:44 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2769 Public attention in the upcoming Israeli elections is focusing on domestic political and economic issues, such as Netanyahu’s legal situation and the cost of living – and on security-related political issues, such as Iran, Gaza, Syria and Hezbollah. However, the question of relations between Israel and the Palestinians has been marginalized and has almost disappeared from the political agenda. With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections. The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role. Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy.

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Public attention in the upcoming Israeli elections is focusing on domestic political and economic issues, such as Netanyahu’s legal situation and the cost of living – and on security-related political issues, such as Iran, Gaza, Syria and Hezbollah. However, the question of relations between Israel and the Palestinians has been marginalized and has almost disappeared from the political agenda.

With Tzipi Livni’s decision to quit politics, the last voice preaching for an immediate settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians has also disappeared. Obviously, this is one of the achievements of the Right, which succeeded in diverting attention from the issue that should be the most important one in the upcoming elections.

The temporary quiet in the Palestinian territories, as well as the continued covert cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces, support the belief that the more we wait, the better Israel’s situation becomes. This is especially true with regard to the ongoing construction in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. However, the clock continues to tick and the conflict with the Palestinians will erupt sooner or later if the deadlock continues. Recognizing the destructive consequences of the current stalemate between the Israelis and the Palestinians is the first step toward a historic reconciliation between the two peoples, and this is where the election campaign may play a key role.

Dealing with the pressing Palestinian issue is critical for two reasons: the more urgent one is that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is 83-years-old and unhealthy. The fact that he has been consistently opposed to the use of violence, and was involved in the Oslo Accords and adhered to them, is indicative of his thinking and policy. He has made a few mistakes, such as rejecting (or not accepting) Olmert’s proposals in late 2008, and by making some hasty statements – especially after Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, all in all he has been the most moderate of all Palestinian leaders. Abbas has not appointed a successor, and the struggle over the Palestinian leadership may be ugly and violent, which may also hinder negotiations.

The second reason relates to the demographics in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea – including Israel, the West Bank and Gaza – where the number of Palestinians is almost equal to the number of Jews. This process leads to one state, which is not Jewish or democratic.

It may be argued that negotiating with the Palestinians now is risky in light of the division between Fatah and Hamas, which seems unbridgeable. However, the Oslo Accords were signed with Arafat when he was very weak, and when his involvement in the Palestinian intifada was largely expunged following his support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. A new Israeli government that recognizes Abbas’s conciliatory policy and rewards him will be able to embark on a peace process.

Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the initiator of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, used Abbas to carry out his plan rather than turning him into a partner. As a result, Hamas could then portray the disengagement as a success of its own military struggle – just as Hezbollah did in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Israeli mistake was not necessarily the withdrawal but rather its unilateral implementation, which prevented the moderate Palestinian camp from enjoying its dividends.

Israeli governments were not generous with Abbas, offering him only few gestures. The current Netanyahu government has not allowed Abbas even a shred of achievement, nor a retroactive recognition of the Palestinian construction in Kalkilya, which was supposed to expand the Palestinian Authority’s territory. This step was part of a larger secret plan, coordinated with several moderate Arab states and intended as a prelude to Israeli-Arab negotiations along with a series of gestures from the Arab side. But Netanyahu has succumbed to pressure from the hard-liners in his government. It has become his pattern of behavior: advancing his agenda behind the scenes while withdrawing in public.

Netanyahu and his right-wing partners have found a way to evade the Palestinian issue by appealing to pragmatic Arab countries, which fear Iran and terrorism and therefore see Israel as a partner in this joint struggle. Although these Arab countries are not particularly interested in the Palestinian issue, as long as Israel does not make steps toward resolving the conflict, it will not be possible to have overt relations with them, and the relations will remain largely hidden.

Arab leaders have enough problems at home, and the risk embedded in making relations with Israel official – without obtaining a political gain that will serve them internally – is too high. However, according to the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, 54 percent of Jewish Israelis think that the Arab countries will normalize their relations with Israel even without the Palestinians, because Netanyahu convinced them it is possible. Alas, this is wishful thinking. This is not to negate the possibility of short-term gains – similar to the one Netanyahu made when visiting Oman – but this does not change the situation in a meaningful way.

Therefore, the upcoming elections are an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the center of the national agenda, with the understanding that significant progress toward a solution is also a significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems of the State of Israel. Moreover, a new Israeli initiative by a new government will be received with enthusiasm by the US and the EU, and will improve Israel’s international standing.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Remembers the Palestinian Issue? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The End of the Struggle Over Syria https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-end-of-the-struggle-over-syria/ Thu, 27 Dec 2018 15:51:04 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3019 US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the remaining American troops from Syria came as a surprise, but the writing was on the wall already in April, when the he announced his intention to do so. This move effectively implies leaving the Syrian territory to Russia and Iran, who strive to control Syria, if not the entire Middle East. In 1965, British journalist Patrick Seale published a book called The Struggle for Syria, in which he described the international conflicts between the USSR and the US and between Egypt and Iraq over Syria since the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. More than 50 years later, the struggle over Syria is ongoing in full force, but it now seems to have been decided. Unlike the past, when the US struggled to maintain its influence in the Middle East, it has now decided to abandon the region. The civil war in Syria, since 2011, has witnessed unprecedented involvement of internal and external players – more than any other conflict in the region. Upon the beginning of the civil war, the US, Jordan and Saudi Arabia helped the Free Syrian Army – the most significant opposition group – when the goal of the pro-Western coalition was to topple President Bashar Assad’s regime. This coalition was joined by Turkey, which not only attempted at toppling the regime, but also ensured that neither the Kurds nor Islamic State would establish territorial outposts in Syria. Despite the ideological differences, the establishment of a Kurdish and/or

הפוסט The End of the Struggle Over Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the remaining American troops from Syria came as a surprise, but the writing was on the wall already in April, when the he announced his intention to do so. This move effectively implies leaving the Syrian territory to Russia and Iran, who strive to control Syria, if not the entire Middle East.

In 1965, British journalist Patrick Seale published a book called The Struggle for Syria, in which he described the international conflicts between the USSR and the US and between Egypt and Iraq over Syria since the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. More than 50 years later, the struggle over Syria is ongoing in full force, but it now seems to have been decided. Unlike the past, when the US struggled to maintain its influence in the Middle East, it has now decided to abandon the region.

The civil war in Syria, since 2011, has witnessed unprecedented involvement of internal and external players – more than any other conflict in the region. Upon the beginning of the civil war, the US, Jordan and Saudi Arabia helped the Free Syrian Army – the most significant opposition group – when the goal of the pro-Western coalition was to topple President Bashar Assad’s regime. This coalition was joined by Turkey, which not only attempted at toppling the regime, but also ensured that neither the Kurds nor Islamic State would establish territorial outposts in Syria.

Despite the ideological differences, the establishment of a Kurdish and/or Islamic state on the Turkish border was perceived as a serious threat, while Iran and Hezbollah rushed to assist Assad, followed by Russia who only joined in 2015. The involvement of so many players in the campaign confirmed Seale’s perception that whoever controls Syria also controls the Middle East. This perception results from Syria’s geostrategic role as a link between the Gulf region and the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, in the absence of other Arab allies, Syria has become an important anchor of Russia’s and Iran’s policies in the region.

The withdrawal of the US is not substantial militarily. A 2,000-soldier force, however efficient it may be, cannot significantly alter the balance of power. In fact, the fight over Syria was decided already in 2015, when it became clear that Russia showed relentless resolve to attain its objectives in Syria, in contrast to the hesitancy that the Obama administration demonstrated.

The talks in Astana and Sochi in recent years in an attempt to find a political settlement between the countries involved and the factions in Syria did not include the US. Therefore, Washington has long lost a central role in shaping the new political order in Syria. Yet, the withdrawal of American forces from Syria still holds a symbolic and moral significance that will adversely affect not only the US position in the region in general, but also its allies.

It symbolizes the failure of the US in Syria and the Middle East in general, and emphasizes the absence of a clear strategy and its lack of commitment to recognized allies. Paradoxically, Trump’s policy continues the policy of his predecessor president Barack Obama: first, by gradually withdrawing from the Middle East, and second by betraying his allies.

What does the recent American move mean for Israel? The implications for Israel are not significant, since even prior to this withdrawal, the US no longer played a major role in the Syrian playground. Unlike the Cold War, Israel’s situation today is better because it maintains a dialogue with Russia.

In addition, the fact that Russia and Iran do not necessarily share common interests in Syria may allow Israel to receive Russia’s help in preventing Iran from being even more influential in a Russian-controlled territory. If during the civil war Russia and Iran had a shared objective to secure the Assad regime, then after reaching this goal it is quite possible that competition over the rebuilding of Syria in the aftermath of the civil war may increase the rivalry between the two countries.

In any event, after seven years of bloody civil war that led to the destruction of the country, the death of half a million people and the creation of millions of refugees, Syria poses no threat to Israel. Moreover, based on past experience, the Syrian regime has kept the situation at the Syrian-Israeli border quiet and stable.

The bad news is that the victory of the “axis of resistance” in Syria has given a tailwind to those who are active on the northern front against the West and Israel. The fight over Syria is over for now, but the final word has not yet been said.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The End of the Struggle Over Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-spring-of-israels-relations-with-its-arab-neighbors/ Sun, 09 Dec 2018 15:57:45 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2916 In the past few weeks it seems that Arab and Muslim countries have been competing with each other over Israel. Following news on back-channel intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to a well-publicized visit to Oman. Later, Chad’s president arrived in Israel for a visit, during which Netanyahu revealed that Sudan and Bahrain are about to upgrade their relations with Israel as well. It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states. The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In the past few weeks it seems that Arab and Muslim countries have been competing with each other over Israel. Following news on back-channel intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to a well-publicized visit to Oman. Later, Chad’s president arrived in Israel for a visit, during which Netanyahu revealed that Sudan and Bahrain are about to upgrade their relations with Israel as well.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-renewed-affair-with-oman/ Thu, 08 Nov 2018 15:47:31 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2913 The official visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen to Oman turned the spotlight on this distant principality in the Gulf that is unfamiliar to most Israelis. Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well. Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The official visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen to Oman turned the spotlight on this distant principality in the Gulf that is unfamiliar to most Israelis.

Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well.

Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman supported the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and after the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of the three Arab countries (alongside Sudan and Morocco) who did not sever their diplomatic relations with Egypt. This fact is noteworthy especially in view of the resulting delicate position that was imposed on Oman vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, which have boycotted Egypt. Moreover, the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 tainted the relations between Oman and Iran, which was under the rule of the Shah, an ally of Qaboos. This independent behavior became a feature of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy.

Beginning in 1980, Mossad agent Nachik Navot used to meet regularly with Qaboos. The talks dealt with the common interests of the two countries, which included concern about the spread of Soviet influence and armaments in the Middle East, the Iran revolution, and the advancement of the peace process.

After the Madrid Conference, the signing of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan, there was a turning point in Israeli-Omani relations. In February 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin held a secret meeting with a senior Omani official to discuss relations between the two countries, which led to Oman’s decision to host in Muscat in April 1994 the fifth meeting of the working group on water in the context of the multilateral talks of the Oslo process. The involvement and participation of Oman in the working group on water and environment was not a secret. However, the secret contacts between Beilin and Yusuf bin Alawi, the foreign minister of Oman, prepared the ground for the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Sultan Qaboos, on 27 December 1994, two months after the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. This was the first official meeting between an Israeli leader and an Arab ruler in the Gulf.

This visit exposed Oman to criticism from within the Arab world. As a result, most interactions continued behind the scenes. Yet, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his counterpart, Alawi, met in public in Washington in June 1995. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, and the presence of Alawi, who represented the sultanate, in the funeral, led to more overt relations: in January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement to open trade missions. In April 1996 Peres visited Oman (and Qatar). The visit took place at the summer palace of the Sultan in Salalah. He was accompanied by Dan Gillerman, Chairman of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of businessmen in order to promote economic ties. Peres’s advisor Avi Gil insisted that Peres be accepted by a military parade that included the Israeli anthem. In September 1999, Foreign Minister David Levy met with Alawi during the UN General Assembly. However, a year later, Oman closed the Israeli mission as a result of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada. It was only in 2008 that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Alawi when she participated in the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The most important project carried out by Israel and Oman was the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), inaugurated in 1997. The project was the outcome of the talks in the multilateral working group on water and environment. The center was financed by the United States, the European Union, Japan, Oman and Israel. Oman, an arid country in need of desalinated water, was interested in establishing the center in its territory and using Israeli technology. Within the umbrella of technology cooperation, Oman and Israel could continue to hold covert meetings. Israeli officials could also meet with Arab officials from the Gulf whose countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Oman took advantage of having the center in its territory to develop desalination projects and to train local experts. The center continued to be active throughout the Intifada.

Netanyahu’s visit to Oman symbolizes the renewal of an old “romance.” At the same time, Oman’s willingness to reveal the meeting is indicative of boldness and self-confidence, especially against the backdrop of the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. In the local press, Qaboos is portrayed as a “man of peace”. In light of his fatal illness, perhaps this is the legacy he wants to leave behind. Yet, more concretely, two reasons may explain the visit’s aims: One, an attempt to offer an Omani mediation to the dormant IsraeliPalestinian peace process. The fact that Mahmoud Abbas visited the Sultanate a few days earlier and that Alawi was sent to Ramallah after the Netanyahu visit may support this thesis. Second, Israel wanted to use the good offices of Oman, which enjoy good relations with Iran and/or Syria. Beyond achieving prestige vis-à-vis the Saudi and Qatari neighbors, Oman can use Israel to reach out to the United States and the West in general. In any event, the visit substantiates once more again that Israel is recognized as an important player in the Arab Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently working on a study dealing with Israel’s secret relations with the countries in the Middle East.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-in-an-unchanging-middle-east/ Mon, 27 Aug 2018 15:20:41 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2904 The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time. The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals. No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/voices-of-peace-in-saudi-arabia/ Mon, 06 Aug 2018 15:07:42 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2901 A serious overview of the Saudi media, as recently done by some MEMRI reports, shows a considerable improvement in the Saudi media’s treatment of Israel. These voices are important since they represent senior Saudi journalists and civil society activists. Even more important is the fact that the op-eds express explicit recognition of Israel and its achievements. They are not devoid of criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, yet their concerns and antagonism toward Iran and the Shi’a are far greater than the media’s disapproval of Israel. Many Saudis believe Iran poses a greater threat than Israel, not only because of Iran’s geographical proximity, but also because the fear of Shi’ization is greater than of Judaization. It is clear that this pattern is not coincidental but prescribed from above. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), himself confirmed in an interview to the Atlantic in April 2018, that the Israelis (as well as the Palestinians) “have the right to their own land.” As antiSemitic statements by Saudi rulers in the past were not rare (in particular, statements by the founder of the Kingdom Ibn Sa’ud and King Faisal), the change reflected in MBS’s rhetoric is significant and, in fact, can be traced to the reign of King Fahd and Abdallah. Although the Saudi media is not free of anti-Israel and even occasionally anti-Semitic voices, it is impossible to ignore this change in Saudi discourse. Its importance derives from several factors: (1) Saudi Arabia plays a special role in the

הפוסט Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A serious overview of the Saudi media, as recently done by some MEMRI reports, shows a considerable improvement in the Saudi media’s treatment of Israel. These voices are important since they represent senior Saudi journalists and civil society activists.

Even more important is the fact that the op-eds express explicit recognition of Israel and its achievements. They are not devoid of criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, yet their concerns and antagonism toward Iran and the Shi’a are far greater than the media’s disapproval of Israel. Many Saudis believe Iran poses a greater threat than Israel, not only because of Iran’s geographical proximity, but also because the fear of Shi’ization is greater than of Judaization.

It is clear that this pattern is not coincidental but prescribed from above. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), himself confirmed in an interview to the Atlantic in April 2018, that the Israelis (as well as the Palestinians) “have the right to their own land.” As antiSemitic statements by Saudi rulers in the past were not rare (in particular, statements by the founder of the Kingdom Ibn Sa’ud and King Faisal), the change reflected in MBS’s rhetoric is significant and, in fact, can be traced to the reign of King Fahd and Abdallah.

Although the Saudi media is not free of anti-Israel and even occasionally anti-Semitic voices, it is impossible to ignore this change in Saudi discourse. Its importance derives from several factors: (1) Saudi Arabia plays a special role in the Muslim and Arab worlds as a result of its control of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina (in fact, the king is called the Custodian of the Two Holy Places), and more than two million people perform the Hajj every year; (2) As an oil-rich country, Saudi Arabia has financial leverage over its beneficiaries that can be used in the diplomatic field when necessary; and (3) Saudi Arabia is considered a “neutral” player in the Israeli-Arab conflict by virtue of the fact that Saudi Arabia has no treaty with Israel (in contrast to Egypt and Jordan).

The most significant element in the Saudi change of rhetoric is that it potentially could change Saudi society’s image of Israel and the Jews and build a more congenial climate for peace – if and when it is achieved. At least one notable case study may prove this point: Egypt. In the pre-1973 period, certain Egyptian intellectuals began talking about the need to recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty with it, for the sake of Egyptian interests.

In the post-1973 period, these voices were given a free rein from above to disseminate their views and they undoubtedly played a role in Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977. The conclusion is that voices of peace sometimes precede and may foreshadow the actual peace.

Saudi Arabia does not need peace with Israel. Israel and Saudi do not share a border and there is no state of war between the two countries. In fact, the two have never fought each other. The Saudis are, however, concerned by regional instability – caused by deterioration on the Israeli-Palestinian or the Iranian fronts – and its impact on oil prices. This is partially the reason why the Saudis have already initiated two peace plans – the Fahd and Abdallah initiatives (1981 and 2002 respectively), which turned into Arab peace plans. Israel unequivocally rejected these initiatives, at least in part due to its negative image of the Saudis.

The changing climate in Saudi Arabia poses yet another opportunity to Israeli decision makers. In Saudi Arabia, they might find a partner who is most willing to cooperate against Iran and also willing to cooperate in reaching a deal with the Palestinians. The ultimate deal for Israel, to use a worn-out phrase, is not between Israel and the Palestinians – important as is – but with the greater parts of the Islamic and Arab worlds, to which Saudi Arabia might pave the way. There are no free lunches, but that is exactly what the Netanyahu government is trying to do with the Saudis, when he is trying to promote cooperation without giving anything in return in the Palestinian track. A move from the hidden to the public domain would necessitate a tangible reward to the Palestinians, but this is not likely to happen, unfortunately.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and Iraq: Taking the Civilian Path to Improve Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-iraq-taking-the-civilian-path-to-improve-relations/ Wed, 01 Aug 2018 11:02:55 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3089 This research examines the potential for cooperation between Israel and Iraq, the largest Arab country to Israel’s east. Iraq is changing and is undergoing reconstruction following a series of wars and crises. It works to bring together its diverse ethnic and religious groups, and to navigate through the regional geopolitical conflict between Sunni states and Iran. Israeli decision makers tend to ignore the centrality of Iraq, and to focus only on the Kurds there. Israel generally sees Iraq as a country that lost regional significance following the Gulf wars, and as a failed state under Iranian dominance. This, however, does not reflect reality and needs to change. While the Iraqi leadership is not likely to alter its official policies towards Israel anytime soon, there is a chance for a bottom-up process of change. Israel-Iraq relations can benefit from positive mutual images fostered by the JewishIraqi community, and from existing people-to-people interactions via social media. Practical cooperation can be developed in the fields of trade, infrastructures, agriculture, and tourism, and this can serve as a basis for future diplomatic ties between the two countries.

הפוסט Israel and Iraq: Taking the Civilian Path to Improve Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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This research examines the potential for cooperation between Israel and Iraq, the largest Arab country to Israel’s east. Iraq is changing and is undergoing reconstruction following a series of wars and crises. It works to bring together its diverse ethnic and religious groups, and to navigate through the regional geopolitical conflict between Sunni states and Iran. Israeli decision makers tend to ignore the centrality of Iraq, and to focus only on the Kurds there. Israel generally sees Iraq as a country that lost regional significance following the Gulf wars, and as a failed state under Iranian dominance. This, however, does not reflect reality and needs to change. While the Iraqi leadership is not likely to alter its official policies towards Israel anytime soon, there is a chance for a bottom-up process of change. Israel-Iraq relations can benefit from positive mutual images fostered by the JewishIraqi community, and from existing people-to-people interactions via social media. Practical cooperation can be developed in the fields of trade, infrastructures, agriculture, and tourism, and this can serve as a basis for future diplomatic ties between the two countries.

הפוסט Israel and Iraq: Taking the Civilian Path to Improve Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-iraq-relations-opportunities-to-advance-cooperation/ Wed, 01 Aug 2018 10:31:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3086 On 17 May 2018 the Mitvim Institute held a workshop on Israel-Iraq relations, based on a research by Dr. Ronen Zeidel, which was conducted as part of Mitvim’s project of the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The workshop took place just after the general elections in Iraq, and featured Dr. Ronen Zeidel, Linda Menuhin and Idan Barir. The discussion focused on Iraq’s internal processes, the complexities of the Iraqi state, Israel’s relations with the Kurdish region, strategic and economic interests of Israel in connection with Iraq, the opportunities emerging from the growing civic interactions between Israelis and Iraqis, and the possibility of establishing future economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. This document summarizes the main points of the discussion, but does not necessarily reflect an agreement between all participants.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On 17 May 2018 the Mitvim Institute held a workshop on Israel-Iraq relations, based on a research by Dr. Ronen Zeidel, which was conducted as part of Mitvim’s project of the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The workshop took place just after the general elections in Iraq, and featured Dr. Ronen Zeidel, Linda Menuhin and Idan Barir. The discussion focused on Iraq’s internal processes, the complexities of the Iraqi state, Israel’s relations with the Kurdish region, strategic and economic interests of Israel in connection with Iraq, the opportunities emerging from the growing civic interactions between Israelis and Iraqis, and the possibility of establishing future economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. This document summarizes the main points of the discussion, but does not necessarily reflect an agreement between all participants.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Relations: Opportunities to Advance Cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Netanyahu Is Actively Courting the Iranian People, but There Could Not Be a Worse Messenger https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/netanyahu-is-actively-courting-the-iranian-people-but-there-could-not-be-a-worse-messenger/ Mon, 30 Jul 2018 14:56:09 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2898 The Islamic Republic of Iran soon turns 40. Since 1979, the U.S. has been the primary ideological target of Iran’s enmity. Recently, we’ve seen the rhetoric heating up, with Iran’s President Rouhani threatening America with “the mother of all wars,” and President Trump’s all-caps response – that further threats would lead to “unprecedented consequences.” But Israel – or the “Little Satan” – plays no less central a role. Thanks to tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear aspirations and its proxy war involvement in Syria close to Israel’s northern border, for the first time, Iran and Israel’s relationship is showing signs of evolving from a cold war to a hot war. Despite this, Iranians and Israelis are, surprisingly, communicating with one another more now than they have since the days of the Shah. And it is during this period of geopolitical uncertainty that civil society actors on both sides should buck the trend and encourage and participate in a new narrative of understanding and goodwill. Every year, at the state ceremony marking Holocaust Memorial Day, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws parallels between the murderous plans of the Nazis and the inflammatory rhetoric of the Islamic Republic. And like their premier, most Israelis see Iran as an existential threat. Iran’s decades-long propagation of Holocaust denial, as well as arming of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reinforces this ingrained perception. When Iran test fires ballistic missiles decorated with Hebrew writing that calls for Israel’s destruction, it reaffirms popular opinion on the streets of

הפוסט Netanyahu Is Actively Courting the Iranian People, but There Could Not Be a Worse Messenger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Islamic Republic of Iran soon turns 40. Since 1979, the U.S. has been the primary ideological target of Iran’s enmity. Recently, we’ve seen the rhetoric heating up, with Iran’s President Rouhani threatening America with “the mother of all wars,” and President Trump’s all-caps response – that further threats would lead to “unprecedented consequences.”

But Israel – or the “Little Satan” – plays no less central a role. Thanks to tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear aspirations and its proxy war involvement in Syria close to Israel’s northern border, for the first time, Iran and Israel’s relationship is showing signs of evolving from a cold war to a hot war.

Despite this, Iranians and Israelis are, surprisingly, communicating with one another more now than they have since the days of the Shah. And it is during this period of geopolitical uncertainty that civil society actors on both sides should buck the trend and encourage and participate in a new narrative of understanding and goodwill.

Every year, at the state ceremony marking Holocaust Memorial Day, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws parallels between the murderous plans of the Nazis and the inflammatory rhetoric of the Islamic Republic. And like their premier, most Israelis see Iran as an existential threat.

Iran’s decades-long propagation of Holocaust denial, as well as arming of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reinforces this ingrained perception. When Iran test fires ballistic missiles decorated with Hebrew writing that calls for Israel’s destruction, it reaffirms popular opinion on the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. According to a poll conducted in early May, 44 percent of Israelis support a unilateral strike in order to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The prospects of military confrontation between Israel and Iran have increased over Syria. Israel established two red lines on Iran’s entrenchment and transfers of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah, and has responded to Iranian disregard for these red lines with a series of airstrikes on Iranian facilities in Syria. But Israel does not seek an expansion of this conflict, and is using two soft-power tactics in the hopes of forcing Iran’s hand.

The first tactic is diplomacy with Russia. While successfully lobbying the Trump administration to walk away from the JCPOA and reinstitute economic sanctions on Iran, Netanyahu has simultaneously prioritized his relationship with President Vladimir Putin.

Israel doesn’t have much choice. After Russia installed its S-300 air defense systems in Syria, Israel was compelled to develop a de-conflicting mechanism so that its planes could continue to overfly Syrian airspace without interfering with Moscow’s interests. Negotiations between Jerusalem and the Kremlin over an Iranian withdrawal from southern Syria are ongoing and according to reports, received a boost during Trump and Putin’s Helsinki summit and other recent high-level meetings.

The second Israeli strategy – and one that turns more heads – is a direct courtship of the Iranian people. In a series of videos published on YouTube aimed at the Iranian public, Netanyahu describes the travails of the imaginary 15-year old Iranian teen girl Fatehmeh; he longs for the day when Israeli and Iranian national soccer teams can compete against one another, asks Iranians to consider using Israeli agricultural technology to minimize the effects of drought, and congratulates Iranian protesters for questioning the allocution of state funds to military campaigns in the Middle East.

Israel may be executing this new approach in tandem with the U.S., which over the last year has frequently engaged Iranians and the Iranian government with different messages. Israel’s government seems to have accepted the notion that it can pressure Tehran’s ruling class by addressing the Iranian public. The game plan is simple: force the regime to justify its war-mongering policies to its own people, and force Iranians to ask what price they are willing to pay in order to pursue this ideological end-goal, to query whether the call for the destruction of Israel resonates beyond the Iranian leadership and Revolutionary Guards cadre.

No Israeli leader has ever adopted this approach before, and Netanyahu knows full well that he is touching a nerve. The timing is no coincidence. Not only is Tehran under international pressure to rethink its regional agenda, but, domestically, anger over the regime’s disconnected foreign and economic policies is also growing. Slogans such as “Leave Palestine be, think about us [Iran]” and “Palestine, Syria are reasons for our misery” are now commonly used in protests taking place across Iran.

Netanyahu’s message is accurate, but there could not be a worse messenger. Rather than ceding the platform to Netanyahu – an unpopular figure in Iran – Israelis must seize this opportunity and develop their own dialogue with the Iranian people. Similarly, Iranians need to be ready to respond to their Israeli counterparts, and engage in a serious conversation about their vision for the future.

Creating successful mechanisms for Israeli-Iranian dialogue was the central question raised by a group of U.S.-based Israeli and Iranian policy analysts and scholars (including the authors of this piece) in Washington, D.C. in late 2017. While participants agreed that Israeli and Iranian officials would not be conducting direct negotiations to reduce bilateral tensions anytime soon, many felt that the Iran nuclear deal, to which at the time the U.S. was still a signatory, presented an opening for some limited people-to-people dialogue, especially if executed in coordination with Israeli and Iranian diaspora communities. Despite Trump’s withdrawal from the deal, the discussion about how this people-to-people dialogue might develop is as relevant as ever.

Iranians at the meetings explained that, while their countrymen are protesting their government’s adventurism abroad, this should not lead Israelis to assume that anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments in Iran are merely skin-deep. Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians over the last decades have strengthened negative Iranian attitudes towards the Jewish state. Moderate voices in Iran who recognize that hostility towards Israel does not serve their country’s interests do exist, however they lack clear incentives to advocate for a moderate approach.

Emphasizing cultural bonds between the two peoples won’t bridge political differences between the two governments, but they deserve more attention. As our meetings revealed, there are no shortage of stories from older generations who recall the once warm relationship between Tehran and Jerusalem. In a similar vein, the 2015 Israeli film “Baba Joon” was well-received by Iranian audiences because of its touching depiction of how an immigrant family from Iran retained their Persian identity despite relocating to Israel. Unsurprisingly, many Persian Israelis root for “Team Melli” during the World Cup.

A similar emphasis should be placed on social media initiatives. The 2012 “Israel Loves Iran” and corresponding “Iran Loves Israel” campaigns attracted the support of thousands to an anti-war message and revealed how many Israelis and Iranians refuse to accept their respective government’s worldview. These campaigns were particularly successful in targeting younger audiences, and breaking taboos – particularly in Iran, where until several years ago the media would never refer to Israel by name.

Above all, Israelis and Iranians need to be realistic about what a military conflict would mean and the role their governments play in perpetuating this antagonism. So long as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is in charge, an Iranian U-turn on Israel isn’t in the cards. And it is even less likely that Iran will halt its support for other regional actors, such as Hezbollah, in the years to come. Top-down changes within Israel should not be anticipated either. Rather than wait for political elites to make rational choices, Israeli and Iranian citizens must be the ones to engage one another in dialogue, voice their concerns to their respective leaders, and explore every alternative to war.

The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA damaged the ability of third parties to effectively deescalate tensions between Israel and Iran. Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in Syria should be applauded, but the results may only serve a stopgap before the next chapter of hostilities. Despite this pessimism, the channels of communication have never been more accessible. People-to-people initiatives may not be able to reverse the narrative of conflict that pervades the Israeli-Iranian relationship, but it may thwart a descent into chaos.

Gabriel Mitchell is policy fellow at the Mitvim Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a PhD candidate at Virginia Tech. Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Netanyahu Is Actively Courting the Iranian People, but There Could Not Be a Worse Messenger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Exploring New Bridges between Regional Rivals: Overview of a Dialogue Channel between US-Based Israeli and Iranian Experts https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/exploring-new-bridges-between-regional-rivals-overview-of-a-dialogue-channel-between-us-based-israeli-and-iranian-experts/ Thu, 26 Jul 2018 10:24:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3082 Since 1979, Israel and Iran have engaged in a decades-long cold war against one another. However, the signing of the JCPOA in 2015 – freezing Iran’s nuclear program for a minimum 10-year period – created a window of opportunity to alter the narrative of hostility that has dominated Israeli-Iranian ties this century. In an effort to discuss the future of this volatile relationship, a group of US-based Israelis and Iranian experts met over the course of several weeks in late 2017. The meetings, organized by Mitvim Policy Fellow (and then-US representative) Gabriel Mitchell and Middle East Institute senior fellow Alex Vatanka, focused on increasing knowledge and awareness between elites, establishing new policy dialogue channels, and identifying possible mechanisms for reducing tensions between Jerusalem and Tehran. The meetings generated four main policy insights: A. Long considered a cold war, the Israeli-Iranian relationship is heating up. Despite a shared history of public animosity, the two states have never been engaged in direct conflict within each other. However, due to regional developments this dynamic appears to rapidly be shifting from a cold war to a hot war, as Israel feels compelled to deter Iranian entrenchment in Syria. This change in the bilateral relationship could have serious regional consequences. B. Hostility and distrust is deeply embedded within both societies. While moderate voices exist in both countries, there is not a clear set of domestic or international incentives for Israeli and Iranian politicians to tone down their public rhetoric against one another. C. Diaspora populations

הפוסט Exploring New Bridges between Regional Rivals: Overview of a Dialogue Channel between US-Based Israeli and Iranian Experts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Since 1979, Israel and Iran have engaged in a decades-long cold war against one another. However, the signing of the JCPOA in 2015 – freezing Iran’s nuclear program for a minimum 10-year period – created a window of opportunity to alter the narrative of hostility that has dominated Israeli-Iranian ties this century.

In an effort to discuss the future of this volatile relationship, a group of US-based Israelis and Iranian experts met over the course of several weeks in late 2017. The meetings, organized by Mitvim Policy Fellow (and then-US representative) Gabriel Mitchell and Middle East Institute senior fellow Alex Vatanka, focused on increasing knowledge and awareness between elites, establishing new policy dialogue channels, and identifying possible mechanisms for reducing tensions between Jerusalem and Tehran.

The meetings generated four main policy insights:

A. Long considered a cold war, the Israeli-Iranian relationship is heating up. Despite a shared history of public animosity, the two states have never been engaged in direct conflict within each other. However, due to regional developments this dynamic appears to rapidly be shifting from a cold war to a hot war, as Israel feels compelled to deter Iranian entrenchment in Syria. This change in the bilateral relationship could have serious regional consequences.

B. Hostility and distrust is deeply embedded within both societies. While moderate voices exist in both countries, there is not a clear set of domestic or international incentives for Israeli and Iranian politicians to tone down their public rhetoric against one another.

C. Diaspora populations are a critical link in establishing dialogue between Israel and Iran. Direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and Iran are not happening anytime soon, and interaction between civil society actors is very hard to achieve. Still, the potential for dialogue remains, thanks in part to social media. There is a role that Israeli and Iranian diaspora communities can play in bridging the divide.

D. The US remains the most critical outside actor in the Israeli-Iranian relationship, but under the Trump administration has abdicated some of that influence to Russia, who has now taken a central role in negotiating between Israeli and Iranian interests in Syria.

The dialogue channel was held under Chatham Rouse rules. Therefore, participants’ names are kept private.

הפוסט Exploring New Bridges between Regional Rivals: Overview of a Dialogue Channel between US-Based Israeli and Iranian Experts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-new-mideast-in-familiar-clothing/ Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:51:07 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2897 Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed. Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved. First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/netanyahus-new-iran-approach-youtube-diplomacy/ Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:44:28 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2896 Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership style always includes dramatic warnings about threats to Israel. For more than a decade now, Israel’s prime minister warns that Iran – in particular its nuclear program – are the chief threat. In 2015, a glaring Netanyahu stared down the UN General Assembly in silence for almost a minute. The gesture was to protest what Netanyahu described as the organization’s lack of action against Iran’s murderous plans to destroy Israel. More recently, in April, the prime minister held a press conference in which he pulled away black sheets, unveiling thousands of documents and dozens of CDs that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, stole from a Tehran nuclear archive. The data, the prime minister stated, was proof of Iran’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons capability during the early 2000s. Against this background, it was rather surprising when the Prime Minister’s office began airing in May short YouTube videos of Netanyahu addressing Tehran in a different way. The crux of the clips: Netanyahu doesn’t see the Iranian people as the threat, only its regime. In fact, Netanyahu is concerned for the well-being of the Iranian people. He stands with them against their oppressive leaders. Netanyahu stated in a May 31 video that the Iranian people are “brilliant,” and that it’s the regime that prevents them from flourishing – in part by diverting Iranian resources to terrorism and regional subversion. In a June 10 clip, he offered Israeli technology to help alleviate Iran’s water crisis. The prime minister reminded his

הפוסט Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership style always includes dramatic warnings about threats to Israel. For more than a decade now, Israel’s prime minister warns that Iran – in particular its nuclear program – are the chief threat.

In 2015, a glaring Netanyahu stared down the UN General Assembly in silence for almost a minute. The gesture was to protest what Netanyahu described as the organization’s lack of action against Iran’s murderous plans to destroy Israel. More recently, in April, the prime minister held a press conference in which he pulled away black sheets, unveiling thousands of documents and dozens of CDs that Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, stole from a Tehran nuclear archive. The data, the prime minister stated, was proof of Iran’s efforts to secure nuclear weapons capability during the early 2000s.

Against this background, it was rather surprising when the Prime Minister’s office began airing in May short YouTube videos of Netanyahu addressing Tehran in a different way. The crux of the clips: Netanyahu doesn’t see the Iranian people as the threat, only its regime. In fact, Netanyahu is concerned for the well-being of the Iranian people. He stands with them against their oppressive leaders. Netanyahu stated in a May 31 video that the Iranian people are “brilliant,” and that it’s the regime that prevents them from flourishing – in part by diverting Iranian resources to terrorism and regional subversion.

In a June 10 clip, he offered Israeli technology to help alleviate Iran’s water crisis. The prime minister reminded his Iranian viewers that their government stands between them and Israeli technology by banning Israelis from traveling to Iran. However, he stated, Israel will circumvent the Iranian restrictions, by publishing a Persian-language Telegram channel and website about the country’s water shortage that shares Israeli expertise.

During the 2018 World Cup in Russia, Netanyahu commended Iran’s national soccer team for its courage, insinuating that similar courage can be displayed on the political field against their regime. Like the earlier video, Netanyahu drew a clear distinction between the Iranian people and their regime, and claimed Israeli affinity and admiration for the former. The clips ooze with hipness. A more relaxed Netanyahu replaces the formerly ominous one, as he is seen bouncing a soccer ball at the entrance to his office.

Instead of speaking to a global institution such as the UN, the messages are aired on YouTube. The prime minister’s long, dark pontifications are amended in favor of seventysecond messages of hope. The clips begin with an informal gesture – such as pouring a glass of water – and end with a short, marketing-like slogan, envisioning a future IsraeliIranian collaboration in the areas of sports and entrepreneurship.

The videos reflect what may amount to a new turn in the Israeli approach to its conflict with Iran. Israel has long been concerned by Tehran’s nuclear program and its regional aspirations, especially in Syria. Now, Israel almost openly calls, in effect, for regime change in Tehran. At the same time, Israeli officials are careful to calibrate expectations in this regard. As noted, Netanyahu separates his rhetoric between the Iranian regime and its people. He advises the latter that life without the Islamic Republic would be better. This new tact is probably one public manifestation of Israeli-American efforts, reported by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, to develop a strategy against Iran, including assisting and maybe even fomenting internal dissent in the Islamic Republic.

Israel has been traditionally careful not to intervene in the internal politics of its foes. In part, because past efforts to do so, are generally viewed by Israel’s security elites as breeding mostly adverse effects. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with a secret goal of inaugurating a pro-Israeli Lebanese president. The goal wasn’t achieved, but Israel remained as an occupier in parts of Lebanon until 2000, and in the process, contributed to the rise of a new foe, Hezbollah. Some 1,000 Israeli soldiers paid with their lives for this “regime change” effort. In 1992, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi. This paved the way for a much more capable leader that also emerged to be one of Israel’s most formidable enemies in the region, Hassan Nasrallah.

It is not clear why the prime minister amended Israel’s cautious approach to meddling in internal affairs in the region. Maybe it’s a result of his effective consolidation with the Mossad. It may also reflect Israeli adaptation to the new global norms of external interfering in internal politics, as seen by the Russian intervention in the 2016 US elections. It is also interesting that the prime minister is spearheading the effort himself, in the most public of ways. Gone are the days of mid-level intelligence officials such as Kermit Roosevelt secretly conniving to topple the prime minister of Iran during 1953. Now, a head of state is leading the charge.

This may be a reflection of the continued direct involvement of leaders in diplomacy, what Hebrew University’s Piki Ish Shalom called the “king diplomat.” This is even more pronounced with the Israeli prime minister. Before Netanyahu was elected in 2009, Israeli comedy show Erezt Nehedert (“a wonderful country”) mocked his monarchic approach to democratic politics, at least in comparison to his first tour as prime minister during 1996 to 1999. Even Time Magazine had a 2012 cover with the title, King Bibi. Perhaps it’s Netanyahu’s own sense that his videoed pleas can change history, such as a clip during the 2015 elections to rally his voters against the Israeli left who were falsely accused of “bussing the Arabs to the polling stations.”

Either way, Netanyahu’s populist policy delivery now resembles that of US President Donald Trump’s: announcing policy on social media, directly to the citizens. It’s ironic, that in their struggle against the Iranian theocracy, Netanyahu and Trump choose a populist avenue that subtly undercuts the building blocks of their own democracy and state structures, traditional media outlets, and the professional foreign policy and national security establishments. Before Trump, there was a more authentic approach by Israelis and Iranians on social media – the 2012 projects known as Israel loves Iran and Iran loves Israel – to bring about amicable relations between the two peoples. However, this is not the era of people-to-people diplomacy. This is the era of populist leaders.

Finally, the prime minister’s promise of an Israeli-supported technological progress for the Iranian people, if they would only topple the regime, reflects Israel’s own image in the last decade as a “start-up nation.” It also echoes an old Zionist theme: rejected as outsiders, the Jews can gain legitimacy by alleviating a lagging region through the introduction of innovation and technology. Palestinian leader Musa al-Alami rejected the idea in the 1930s when presented by Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during a secret dialogue.

In the 1990s, when Ben-Gurion’s acolyte Shimon Peres offered a “New Middle East” based on the same idea, many in the region saw it as a conspiracy that would lead to Israeli economic domination of the region. If history is any indicator, the promise of technology does not lead to a shift in political attitudes in the region, at least not towards Israel.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Netanyahu’s New Iran Approach: YouTube Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trends-in-israels-regional-foreign-policies/ Sun, 01 Jul 2018 10:27:55 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3083 This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Doctor, Minister, Soldier, Spy: Tehran’s Man in Tel Aviv https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/doctor-minister-soldier-spy-tehrans-man-in-tel-aviv/ Wed, 27 Jun 2018 14:28:42 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2891 On June 15, the Israeli state prosecution indicted a former minister, Dr. Gonen Segev, for spying for Iran. Israeli authorities arrested him about a month earlier. His arrest and indictment were kept secret until a gag order was partially lifted on June 18. If found guilty, Dr. Segev would be the most senior Israeli political figure ever to spy for an enemy country. Dr. Segev – a former combat soldier, officer and medical doctor – was elected in 1992 as a member of the right wing Tzomet party. In 1994 he left the party. The following year he was appointed minister of energy in the second Rabin government. He also was made a member of the security cabinet, a group of select ministers that discuss and decide on the most important security matters. Although Dr. Segev served as a minister for less than a year, his vote allowed Prime Minister Rabin to secure a majority in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) on a crucial vote for the implementation of the controversial peace deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization. By 1996, Dr. Segev was ejected from politics. Then followed a dramatic fall from grace. In 2004, he was convicted of credit card fraud. In 2005 he received a five-year jail sentence for an attempted drug smuggling operation into Israel. Following his 2007 early release, he left the country for Nigeria, where he relaunched his medical career, due in part to the fact that his medical license was revoked in Israel following

הפוסט Doctor, Minister, Soldier, Spy: Tehran’s Man in Tel Aviv הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On June 15, the Israeli state prosecution indicted a former minister, Dr. Gonen Segev, for spying for Iran. Israeli authorities arrested him about a month earlier. His arrest and indictment were kept secret until a gag order was partially lifted on June 18. If found guilty, Dr. Segev would be the most senior Israeli political figure ever to spy for an enemy country.

Dr. Segev – a former combat soldier, officer and medical doctor – was elected in 1992 as a member of the right wing Tzomet party. In 1994 he left the party. The following year he was appointed minister of energy in the second Rabin government. He also was made a member of the security cabinet, a group of select ministers that discuss and decide on the most important security matters. Although Dr. Segev served as a minister for less than a year, his vote allowed Prime Minister Rabin to secure a majority in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) on a crucial vote for the implementation of the controversial peace deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization. By 1996, Dr. Segev was ejected from politics.

Then followed a dramatic fall from grace. In 2004, he was convicted of credit card fraud. In 2005 he received a five-year jail sentence for an attempted drug smuggling operation into Israel. Following his 2007 early release, he left the country for Nigeria, where he relaunched his medical career, due in part to the fact that his medical license was revoked in Israel following his drug-related conviction.

Israeli authorities allege that he established contact with Iranian intelligence agents in Nigeria in 2012. According to the indictment, Dr. Segev provided information to Tehran’s agents and assisted them in trying to create relationships with Israeli business figures, mostly veterans of the security establishment.

Several Israelis were convicted of aiding Iran in the 1990s and 2000s, mostly businesspeople who sold Tehran dual-use or military products. Never before, however, has a senior Jewish-Israeli (former) establishment figure been convicted of spying for Iran, or indeed any other Middle Eastern country. Dr. Segev’s case highlights three issues regarding the current state and context of IranianIsraeli competition.

First, the episode highlights that Iran and Israel are engaged in a truly global intelligence struggle. Much of it is driven by Israel’s concerns over the militarized aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. This Israeli-Iranian competition includes, among other means, intelligence cooperation and alliances for both sides with regional and global partners. Former Israeli intelligence officials suggested that they warned

Dr. Segev in the early 2000s that Hezbollah was trying to make contact with him. It is highly likely that Hezbollah’s past efforts were the basis for Iranian contact with Dr. Segev a decade later. Israel, it seems, was assisted by Equatorial Guinea, which arrested Dr. Segev and repatriated him.

This is clearly a sophisticated struggle with bold moves on both sides. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasted in a dramatic April 30 press conference of stealing the archive of the Iranian nuclear program; now, Tehran’s ability to recruit a former member of Israel’s security cabinet has been revealed. At the same time, however, one wonders how long Israel may have known about Dr. Segev’s Iranian connections. Perhaps he served (knowingly or otherwise) as a double agent before being arrested? While we cannot know what the next chapter in this spy saga will be, it is quite safe to predict that more is to come.

Secondly, the Iranian revelation came after a string of dramatic Israeli operational and intelligence successes against Iran and its allies. As noted, Israeli intelligence agents stole an entire Iranian archive, and further humiliated their foes by making the achievement public in an April press conference. On May 10, Israel conducted a massive attack on some fifty Iranian targets in Syria, demonstrating both operational and intelligence dominance. In June, word emerged that Israel was able to convince Moscow to pressure Iran to withdraw its forces and allies from the Syrian-Israeli border. All this took place against the backdrop of unprecedented coordination between Jerusalem and Washington.

Israelis have had to exhibit super-human humility in light of these achievements and the sense of invincibility they have invoked. In the past, Israel miscalculated and fell into strategic traps that led to exorbitant costs during the wars of 1973 and 1982 due to an inflated sense of relative military and intelligence prowess. In this respect, Tehran provided Israel with an important reminder about the limits of Jerusalem’s power and effectiveness.

Finally, responses in Israel to the affair show that Israeli-Iranian tensions are not simply a foreign and security matter, driven by the clash of two of the strongest countries in the Middle East. The Iranian threat also is being used to advance internal political positions.

Israeli right-wing politicians were quick to a make a direct connection between Dr. Segev’s vote in 1995 in favor of the peace deal with the PLO and the current spying allegations. The specific implication is to further delegitimize the Oslo peace process. There is also a deeper effort hinted at here: leftists are traitors, and what seems like an effort to reach peace is, in fact, an act of treachery. A hint of this came in the words of Justice Minister, Ayelet Shakked, who stated on June 18 that Dr. Segev started with “ideological treachery” and then moved to “treason against the state.”

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט Doctor, Minister, Soldier, Spy: Tehran’s Man in Tel Aviv הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-art-of-the-israeli-russian-deal/ Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:46:18 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2882 On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions. On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On June 1, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vasily Nebenzya told the press that he “believes” that his country and Israel reached an agreement regarding “certain disengagement in the southwest of Syria.” Other sources reported that the agreement will include the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian-backed forces from the Syrian-Israeli border in return for implicit Israeli acceptance of the Syrian forces’ redeployment there. More speculative reports even suggested that Russia promised to look the other way during future Israeli attacks in Syria, as long as Jerusalem commits not to target Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces. The Russian ambassador’s statement was the only formal recognition that such an agreement was reached. All other Russian and Israeli officials refused to confirm that such a deal was secured. Indeed, on June 2, a “senior Israeli diplomatic source” denied that an agreement was reached, and so did the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Mualem. The reports came amid intensive Israeli-Russian diplomatic interactions.

On May 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of two foreign leaders to accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin to a V-Day parade viewing in Moscow. Netanyahu’s role in the event was a strong public signal of the intimacy between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, the other foreign leader to visit with Putin that day was President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. The Serbian president represents a country that has had – according to President Putin – diplomatic relations with Russia for 180 years, and shares common political, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia dating to the thirteenth century. High-level exchanges continued after the visit. On May 30, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke on the phone with President Putin regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. The next day Israel’s Soviet-born defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, visited Moscow and thanked the Russians for “understanding Israel’s security concerns in north.” On June 7, a Russian military delegation met with Defense Minister Lieberman in Israel to discuss “Syrian military arrangements.” This flurry of diplomatic activity came a few weeks after Israel stated it would not tolerate long-term Iranian presence in Syria. Jerusalem – which was traditionally concerned by Tehran’s nuclear project – demonstrated its opposition to long-term conventional Iranian presence in Syria by launching a number of strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

Since a deal was allegedly struck in early June, some changes are already noticeable on the ground. On June 8, it was reported that tensions arose between Russia and Iran over questions of Iran’s military deployment in Syria. Iranian-backed forces are reported to be dressing up as Syrian soldiers when deploying near the Israeli border. It is not clear if Russia and Israel achieved an agreement, and if the parties will respect such an accord. Nevertheless, the current level of Israeli-Russian exchanges over military issues in Syria illuminates at least three important issues. First, it reflects the superior Russian maneuvering over the Syrian situation. Moscow has made itself the linchpin of any current or future arrangement in Syria, and has managed to use its status to advance its broader foreign policy goals. Russia’s achievement is taken straight out of Henry Kissinger’s playbook. In the early 1970s Kissinger was able to convince the USSR’s most important Arab ally, Egypt, that only Washington could secure Cairo’s goal of getting the Sinai back from Israel. With this leverage, he managed to move the long-time Soviet ally into the proWestern ambit. Now, it’s Russia’s turn to show a close US ally, Israel, that only Moscow can secure its interests in Syria as the US loses interest there and perhaps in the region at large. This is not to say that Israel will abandon its long-term alliance with the US, but it may take Moscow’s preferences more seriously. In 2014, Jerusalem gave a hint in this direction when it avoided supporting what seemed like anti-Russian resolution at the UN regarding Ukraine, despite Washington’s expectation that Israel would support the resolution.

Second, the possibility of an Israeli-Russian deal over Syria also indicates the birth of a more nuanced Israeli approach in the region. Israel has relied for decades on the preponderance of its military forces to resolve many of its security challenges in Syria and beyond. Indeed, its main mode of operation in Syria in the last few years featured aerial attacks on Hezbollah’s materiel. Israel’s concurrent diplomatic strategy was rather simple, it pleaded with the US to secure Israel’s interests in international fora. But Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced to the Middle East – for the first time in decades – a military force that could constrain Israel. In response, Jerusalem took a more sophisticated approach, effectively coupling its historic reliance on force with sophisticated diplomacy. Traditional Israeli warnings against a monolithic, Russia-backed Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis of evil, were abandoned. Instead, Israel has shown an ability to use wedging (between Russia and Iran) to achieve its goals. Taken alongside the wedging strategy it employed on the Palestinian front between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, it appears Israel no longer relies on force alone.

Finally, Russian-Israeli exchanges have occurred during an especially close period in IsraeliAmerican relations. In May, the US reversed a seventy-year-old policy and accepted, in effect, Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is its capital. Israel’s prime minister, a former US citizen and a graduate of MIT, and Israel’s defense minister, a former Soviet citizen who maintains close contacts in the post-Soviet sphere, conduct this delicate Israeli dance between the two great powers. This maneuvering between Washington and Moscow is reminiscent of the early days of the Zionist movement, when the movement’s limited power forced it to excel diplomatically – the crowning achievement of which was securing both Soviet and American support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1947 at the outset of the Cold War.

With the slow change in global power politics, from US hegemony to a multipolar world, these last few weeks in the Middle East provide a glimpse into the adjustments that will be made by regional powers like Israel that are also US allies. Such powers will move from complete reliance on Washington to diplomacy that includes close exchanges with other powers, even at a cost of some tension with the U. This multipolar environment is bound to include others besides Washington and Moscow. Indeed, as events were unfolding in the northern Israel, the Chinese Middle East peace envoy, Gong Xiaosheng, was visiting the West Bank. The region’s diplomats will need to demonstrate skill in balancing competing interests. Israel’s possible agreement with Russia over Syria shows that it has the ability to play effectively in the multipolar world, but with the US, Russia, and China meddling in the region, much diplomatic talent will still be required.

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The Art of the (Israeli-Russian) Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Laying a Civil Foundation for Cooperation between Israel and Iraq https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/laying-a-civil-foundation-for-cooperation-between-israel-and-iraq/ Sat, 09 Jun 2018 12:36:13 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2880 The graduation ceremony of the Department of Hebrew Language at Baghdad University is considered one of the best on campus. In 2010, at the height of the evening, a female graduate interpreted the songs of the popular Israeli singer Sarit Hadad, thrilling the audience which included students from across the university. This courageous act and the way it was received attests to a fascinating change in the way Israel is perceived in Iraq. Since then, the number of Iraqis making contact with Israelis has grown tremendously, mainly through social networks. Among other things, Iraqi surfers recently set up a Facebook page called “The Virtual Embassy of Iraq in Israel”. The Israeli Foreign Ministry reports that about one-third of the Ministry’s Arabic site’s followers (ca. half a million) are Iraqis, and their attitude toward Israel is generally positive and friendly. In their honor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently inaugurated a unique Facebook page called “Israel in the Iraqi Discourse”, which received very positive comments and raised much interest in Iraq. In addition, other interested Israelis (for the sake of full disclosure, the author of this article is among them) maintain daily contact with many friends throughout Iraq. A segmentation of the Iraqi participants in the discussions conducted on the Foreign Ministry’s Arabic page shows that most of the participants are educated young people between the ages of 18 and 35, an age group that accounts for about 70 percent of Iraq’s population, with about a third of them living in

הפוסט Laying a Civil Foundation for Cooperation between Israel and Iraq הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The graduation ceremony of the Department of Hebrew Language at Baghdad University is considered one of the best on campus. In 2010, at the height of the evening, a female graduate interpreted the songs of the popular Israeli singer Sarit Hadad, thrilling the audience which included students from across the university. This courageous act and the way it was received attests to a fascinating change in the way Israel is perceived in Iraq.

Since then, the number of Iraqis making contact with Israelis has grown tremendously, mainly through social networks. Among other things, Iraqi surfers recently set up a Facebook page called “The Virtual Embassy of Iraq in Israel”. The Israeli Foreign Ministry reports that about one-third of the Ministry’s Arabic site’s followers (ca. half a million) are Iraqis, and their attitude toward Israel is generally positive and friendly. In their honor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently inaugurated a unique Facebook page called “Israel in the Iraqi Discourse”, which received very positive comments and raised much interest in Iraq. In addition, other interested Israelis (for the sake of full disclosure, the author of this article is among them) maintain daily contact with many friends throughout Iraq.

A segmentation of the Iraqi participants in the discussions conducted on the Foreign Ministry’s Arabic page shows that most of the participants are educated young people between the ages of 18 and 35, an age group that accounts for about 70 percent of Iraq’s population, with about a third of them living in Baghdad. They are not afraid to disclose their real names and photographs, and they represent various Iraqi population groups: Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, and others. These young people are usually politically and socially active and constitute the backbone of Iraq’s educated class. They came to deal with Israel and Israelis out of interest in the Jewish past in Iraq or out of a certain attraction to the democratic and liberal model presented by Israel. Recently, their support for Israel has grown in the face of their hostility to Iran. Their positions on the Israeli issue are distinctly different from those prevailing in the Arab world.

Unlike other Arab countries, the interest in Israel among Iraqis is not confined to politics; it extends to the cultural and religious spheres and the daily aspects of life in Israel. Many Iraqis openly express their desire to visit Israel, but when they try to carry it out they encounter the arbitrariness of the Israeli establishment and are generally refused. The two pages of the Foreign Ministry in Arabic frequently publish non-political articles that shed light on different aspects of the Israeli way of being which raise great interest among Iraqi users. The knowledge of young Iraqis about Israel is sometimes surprising, as demonstrated through the popularity of Sarit Hadad.

It is difficult to determine whether the phenomenon is limited to social networks or whether it will also have political ramifications in future. The educated Iraqi youth in question influence the political and cultural agenda and shape public opinion. Yet in recent elections in Iraq, many of them supported the boycott movement, and others voted mainly for the parties of al-Sadr and al-Abadi, or for smaller parties on the fringe of the Iraqi national and anti-Iranian camp.

For some reason, official Israel has not yet discovered Iraq, the largest Arab state on the East. Iraq is the second largest exporter of oil in the world, after Saudi Arabia, and is a significant potential trading partner. Iraq, which is being rebuilt, is desperate for assistance with infrastructure construction, banking, irrigation, agriculture, communications, and more. It also needs indirect assistance with improving its credit rating and with encouraging foreign investments. Iraq would also welcome the assistance of Intelligence services in its fight against terrorism, in which Iraq has acquired great skill in recent years.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of secondary importance in shaping Iraq’s official position vis-a-vis Israel. The Iraqi public is quite indifferent to Palestinian suffering, and Iraq supports the Arab peace initiative, which calls for Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose capital is East Jerusalem. It does not recognize the Hamas rule in Gaza.

As Iraq enters the period of establishing a coalition that will paralyze the political system for a while, it is worth thinking about how Israel should approach this important country. While the Iraqi political echelon is preoccupied with its own affairs, the educated and the young people discuss the matter openly and boldly. In its attempts to establish relations with the Arab states, Israel tends to focus on forging contacts with the political elite, and sometimes only with one specific leader. This is how peace agreements were reached with Egypt and Jordan, and to a great extent this is also the story of the Oslo process with the Palestinians. The educated middle class in the Arab countries was neglected and as a result became alienated from the process and hostile to Israel. Iraq offers the opportunity for a different process which may begin with the educated class and will prepare the ground within wide and influential circles before the formal diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries begins. This different process will lay a firm foundation for future relationships.

Dr. Ronen Zeidel is a senior researcher of Iraq at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University and a research fellow at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study on Israeli-Iraqi relations which is part of the “Israel-Arab Relations: The Unfulfilled Potential” project.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Laying a Civil Foundation for Cooperation between Israel and Iraq הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/netanyahu-needs-conflict-to-survive/ Wed, 16 May 2018 11:57:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2862 In 2015, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected to a fourth term as prime minister of Israel. Within months, pundits began speculating when his government would fall. So far, the answer has been never. Netanyahu has faced trouble, including ministerial resignations and police investigations, since shortly after the 2015 elections. Over the last year, the arguments for his imminent demise gathered steam: In February, police recommended that the attorney general indict him for corruption based on investigations in four different cases. The situation in the Gaza Strip festered; the Temple Mount nearly exploded; and the news warned almost nightly of a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There has been no progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace since negotiations collapsed in 2014. And at home, a wave of rage against economic hardship and massive social inequality erupted in 2011, when Netanyahu was prime minister as well, yet there has been no relief for the exorbitant cost of living in the seven years since. Why then is Bibi more beloved than ever? In 2016, Netanyahu’s Likud party polled at an average of 25.7 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, lower than the 30 seats it won in 2015 but still ahead of all rivals. Each year, the average has crept upward. When the police recommended indicting Netanyahu, his party’s numbers rose. When U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, polls gave him the highest numbers in a decade, 35 or 36 seats; one survey was even rumored to predict 42.

הפוסט Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In 2015, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected to a fourth term as prime minister of Israel. Within months, pundits began speculating when his government would fall. So far, the answer has been never.

Netanyahu has faced trouble, including ministerial resignations and police investigations, since shortly after the 2015 elections. Over the last year, the arguments for his imminent demise gathered steam: In February, police recommended that the attorney general indict him for corruption based on investigations in four different cases. The situation in the Gaza Strip festered; the Temple Mount nearly exploded; and the news warned almost nightly of a war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. There has been no progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace since negotiations collapsed in 2014. And at home, a wave of rage against economic hardship and massive social inequality erupted in 2011, when Netanyahu was prime minister as well, yet there has been no relief for the exorbitant cost of living in the seven years since.

Why then is Bibi more beloved than ever? In 2016, Netanyahu’s Likud party polled at an average of 25.7 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, lower than the 30 seats it won in 2015 but still ahead of all rivals. Each year, the average has crept upward. When the police recommended indicting Netanyahu, his party’s numbers rose. When U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, polls gave him the highest numbers in a decade, 35 or 36 seats; one survey was even rumored to predict 42.

As with so many things in Israel, Netanyahu’s solid support is based on security. In Israel’s political discourse, the word “security” signifies threats from any form of Palestinian violence, whether Qassam rocket fire, Palestinian demonstrations and attempts to cross the Gaza border, or girls wielding scissors. On Netanyahu’s watch, Israel has fought two wars against Hamas and dealt with a wave of stabbing attacks, along with a crisis on the Temple Mount and now the deadly escalation in Gaza.

When violence rises, Israelis vote right. This was the ultimate lesson of the Second Intifada, which brought a Likud leader back to power in 2001 after a short Labor Party term; the left has never won an election since.

Netanyahu has mastered the use of crises to shore up his support. Periodic escalation reminds nearly half of Israeli voters that they are relieved to keep the right in power. Just one-quarter of Israelis even believe peace is possible, and at present fewer than half of Israeli Jews support the two-state solution. The question in their minds is who knows how to manage a security problem, not who can bring peace. One Israeli voter recently told me she appreciates Netanyahu for knowing when to end military escalations. In other words, not only do many centrists and right-wingers not blame him for wars; they laud him for restraint.

Regional threats such as Iran, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State are also part of the security issue, but they are more theoretical. Israel has never fought a war with Iran. The last war with Hezbollah was 12 years ago, and there is no Islamic State to speak of in Israel. But in the public mind, they loom large, especially when Netanyahu hammers home the existential threat of Iran at all opportunities (or broadcasts a campaign ad saying the Israeli left will bring the Islamic State to Jerusalem). Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal was the jewel in Netanyahu’s crown. Whether the deal survives or whether it hinders or helps Iran’s presumed quest for military nuclear capabilities wasn’t truly the point. Netanyahu spoke, and a few days later the most powerful man in the world listened. That’s power.

It’s also vindication. For eight years, Netanyahu antagonized President Barack Obama. Israelis know the United States is Israel’s best friend; Netanyahu’s defiant attitude was a risky course not only for U.S.-Israeli relations but for Netanyahu’s home-front, too. After the 2015 elections, just one-quarter of Israelis thought U.S.-Israeli relations were good; three quarters rated relations bad or neutral; and Israeli Jews were split on whether Obama or Netanyahu was to blame.

Trump’s electoral victory set the relationship between the leaders back on solid ground; colossal policy victories such as pushing Washington to abandon the Iran deal and moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem conveyed to voters that Netanyahu was right all along. He had the grand plan before anyone believed in it.

There was another side of the foreign-policy scheme. In his fourth term, Netanyahu has made a big show of cultivating other friends beyond the United States or Europe — including India and Azerbaijan — to build economic ties and enhance the country’s regional security interests. The most important, if cryptic, relationship is with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It’s no accident that Netanyahu met Putin last week between the two strikes against Iranian targets in Syria or numerous times over the last two years as Israel has stepped up attacks of the same nature.

It’s too simplistic to say Israelis are distracted by terrorism and escalation away from Netanyahu’s corruption cases. Rather, Netanyahu’s military and diplomatic victories complement and thus burnish his image in domestic politics. Israelis regularly say, sighing, “There’s nobody else.” They mean that on the domestic as well as international scene.

Very few Israeli coalition governments have survived for a full term; most collapse and lead to early elections. Israel has had 34 coalitions in 70 years. By contrast, Netanyahu’s second government from 2009 to 2013 came close to a full term, and there’s no guarantee his current one will fall before 2019 — which would be close to another full term. Combined with his staying power (nearly 13 years combined, the second longest-serving prime minister), Netanyahu has brought a measure of political stability to Israel.

But there is a price. By the start of his fourth term, Netanyahu seemed to have unleashed his true self: a cult of personality in style and an increasingly consolidated strongman form of governance in practice.

For a time in early 2016, he held five ministerial portfolios in addition to prime minister, before slowly parceling them out; he still holds the post of foreign minister. His government shut down Israel’s historic public broadcast authority and has heaped policy and legal hardships on a new, reconstituted state-funded news corporation. Meanwhile, Netanyahu enjoys the stalwart support of the country’s highest-circulating newspaper funded by his patron Sheldon Adelson. His government is on a warpath against the Supreme Court and is currently debating a bill that would allow the Knesset to override the court’s right of judicial review.

When Netanyahu wanted a massive deal for the extraction of natural gas, the director of Israel’s antitrust authority and the economy minister resigned in protest, arguing that the arrangement prevented competition and protected a cartel, citing his direct interference. Netanyahu made himself economy minister, which allowed him to activate a special clause to sidestep antitrust regulations. To do that, he was required to consult with a Knesset committee by law. The committee members voted against the clause; he ignored them.

The result of strongman leadership is that people become much less enthusiastic for the foundations of democracy, favoring splashy personal achievements or controversy instead. And the irony of consolidating power is that it harms democracy but simultaneously generates an environment in which one person gets credit for everything going well, reinforcing support for that same leader.

Such a leader could also be blamed for all bad things. But many Israelis have apparently traded personal economic frustrations for an occasional celebration, be it Israel’s victory in the Eurovision contest or the U.S. Embassy moving to Jerusalem. Voters have lowered their standards on personal integrity in return for domestic tranquility, punctured only by the occasional war that most believe could not have been prevented. And, so the logic goes, it’s better to have Bibi fighting that war — or killing those protesters in Gaza who dare to seek a way out after 11 years of closure — than a despised left-winger.

Sooner or later, Netanyahu will eventually exit the political stage. But given the way that every crisis reinforces his power, and what his years in power have done to Israel, the pendulum doesn’t look likely to swing in the other direction soon.

(originally published in Foreign Policy)

הפוסט Netanyahu Needs Conflict to Survive הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-new-israeli-illusion-peace-with-the-arab-world-without-the-palestinians/ Tue, 15 May 2018 11:52:23 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2858 In recent weeks, Saudi officials made statements that were interpreted in Israel as a change of attitude in Saudi Arabia towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Israeli Channel 10, the Saudi crown prince told Jewish leaders in the United States that “the time has come for the Palestinians to accept the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining”. In addition, he was quoted as saying that “there are much more urgent and far more important issues to deal with – like Iran”. This statement follows a previous interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic, in which he was quoted saying, “the Jewish people have a right to a state, alongside the right of the Palestinians to a state.” These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”. Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979,

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In recent weeks, Saudi officials made statements that were interpreted in Israel as a change of attitude in Saudi Arabia towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Israeli Channel 10, the Saudi crown prince told Jewish leaders in the United States that “the time has come for the Palestinians to accept the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining”. In addition, he was quoted as saying that “there are much more urgent and far more important issues to deal with – like Iran”. This statement follows a previous interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic, in which he was quoted saying, “the Jewish people have a right to a state, alongside the right of the Palestinians to a state.”

These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”.

Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979, without including the Palestinians in the agreement, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would not have agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed only after the Oslo Accords, which radically changed Israel’s relations with the Palestinians. Until then, signing a peace agreement was not possible, even after the Jordanian king relinquished his demand for the West Bank at the end of the 1980s, and with seemingly no fundamental disagreement between him and the Israeli leadership, with whom he maintained good informal relations.

However, Netanyahu believes that a new reality has been created, and that even without negotiating with the Palestinians it is possible to normalize relations with the Arab world. It is the “new terror” that makes it possible. The threat of Islamic extremism to the Muslim world encourages the Arab leadership to ally with Israel. In his view, even in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is possible to improve Israel’s relations with other Arab countries.

Netanyahu’s belief in the transformation of the Arab world has led him to change his attitude toward the Arab League initiative. Netanyahu, who once claimed that “in its current format [it is] dangerous to the State of Israel”, claimed in 2016, “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab peace initiative”. The new Netanyahu ignores the central component of the Arab League initiative: the need for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement prior to normalizing relations with Israel. When the “Palestinian component” is left out of the equation, Netanyahu can indeed welcome the initiative. He also believes that strengthening Israel’s relations with the Arab states can lead to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. However, the Arab League still believes in the reversed process whereby the Israeli-Palestinian agreement precedes improving the relations with the Arab world. Likewise, the reports about the recent declarations of the Saudi Prince mentioned that he once again stated that “there needs to be significant progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians before it will be possible to advance negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Arab world and Israel.”

Netanyahu’s discourse is captivating and raises very few objections in Israel. Since 2000, most of the Israeli public believes like there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. If there is no Palestinian partner and if relations with the Arab world can be strengthened even without negotiations with the Palestinians, there is no reason to oppose Netanyahu’s assertion. His coalition partners from the Israeli political right are happy to promote peace with the Arab world without having to pay any price. Netanyahu’s political rivals on the political left show no objection either: some share the view that there is no Palestinian partner, and even those who believe that there is a partner for an agreement find it difficult to oppose the opportunity to strengthen ties with other Arab countries.

But even Netanyahu admitted in the past that a genuine and formal relationship between Israel and the Arab world cannot be expected without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. According to himself, “in order to fully achieve this broad peace agreement, the Palestinians must be part of it”. Indeed, there is no evidence that the hope for substantial and meaningful relations between Israel and the Arab world can occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. It is no surprise, therefore, that in February of this year, when Netanyahu mentioned again the strengthening of relations with the Arab world at the defense conference in Munich, it was reported that the Secretary-General of the Arab League tweeted in response, “there will be no peace with the Arab world before achieving peace with the Palestinians.”

Dr. Yuval Benziman teaches conflict resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a task-team member at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper written as part of the Mitvim Institute’s project on “Israel’s relations with Arab states: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/post-iran-deal-israel-and-the-post-american-era/ Mon, 14 May 2018 11:48:14 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2857 Of the many formidable foreign policy questions facing Israel as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the most auspicious is how the Jewish State should adapt to a multipolar world. The urgency to answer this question has accelerated in recent days. President Donald Trump’s decision to remove the US from the Iran deal – applauded by Israeli leadership – will, over time, force Israel to develop cooperative relationships with non-traditional partners in order to meet its regional security objectives. The White House’s desire to withdraw troops from Syria will have a similar effect. As a result, Israel’s response to the end of the American era will determine in large part its ability to protect its citizens and its sovereignty. Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations. Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Of the many formidable foreign policy questions facing Israel as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the most auspicious is how the Jewish State should adapt to a multipolar world. The urgency to answer this question has accelerated in recent days. President Donald Trump’s decision to remove the US from the Iran deal – applauded by Israeli leadership – will, over time, force Israel to develop cooperative relationships with non-traditional partners in order to meet its regional security objectives. The White House’s desire to withdraw troops from Syria will have a similar effect. As a result, Israel’s response to the end of the American era will determine in large part its ability to protect its citizens and its sovereignty.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-presidents-speech-and-the-prospects-of-an-iranian-israeli-war/ Fri, 11 May 2018 11:45:37 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2856 The evening US President Donald J. Trump took the United States out of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it smelled in Israel as if war was coming. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cut short a trip to Cyprus. His Chief of Staff canceled  his speech in the prestigious Herzliya conference. A few minutes before President Trump began his remarks, the Israel Defense Forces ordered residents of the Golan Heights (a northern region bordering Syria to brace for a possible attack from Syria, due to “abnormal movements of Iranian forces in Syria.” CNN reported that American officials had similar concerns and the State Department issued a travel advisory for the Golan Heights. Shortly after the president’s speech, Israeli planes launched what seemed to be a pre-emptive strike against an Iranian missile site located in a military base in southern Syria. The following day, Iranian forces fired a barrage of rockets on Israeli posts in the Golan. Israel retaliated (or rather, used the opportunity) to conduct a massive air raid on dozens of Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria. President Trump’s speech added to the sense of crisis in Israel. Conceptually, Israelis felt Trump adopted their world view, highlighting Iran’s destructive role in the region. More deeply, he justified traditional Israeli distrust of achieving security through multinational diplomacy, reinforcing the Israeli belief that security is most effectively attained though unilateral displays of force. President Trump’s harsh words for Iran surely also affected Israeli strategists’ calculus. Obama administration pressure contributed to the Israeli decision not to attack Iran in 2009-2012. It is hard to believe that the Trump

הפוסט The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The evening US President Donald J. Trump took the United States out of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it smelled in Israel as if war was coming. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cut short a trip to Cyprus. His Chief of Staff canceled  his speech in the prestigious Herzliya conference. A few minutes before President Trump began his remarks, the Israel Defense Forces ordered residents of the Golan Heights (a northern region bordering Syria to brace for a possible attack from Syria, due to “abnormal movements of Iranian forces in Syria.” CNN reported that American officials had similar concerns and the State Department issued a travel advisory for the Golan Heights.

Shortly after the president’s speech, Israeli planes launched what seemed to be a pre-emptive strike against an Iranian missile site located in a military base in southern Syria. The following day, Iranian forces fired a barrage of rockets on Israeli posts in the Golan. Israel retaliated (or rather, used the opportunity) to conduct a massive air raid on dozens of Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria.

President Trump’s speech added to the sense of crisis in Israel. Conceptually, Israelis felt Trump adopted their world view, highlighting Iran’s destructive role in the region. More deeply, he justified traditional Israeli distrust of achieving security through multinational diplomacy, reinforcing the Israeli belief that security is most effectively attained though unilateral displays of force.

President Trump’s harsh words for Iran surely also affected Israeli strategists’ calculus. Obama administration pressure contributed to the Israeli decision not to attack Iran in 2009-2012. It is hard to believe that the Trump administration would be hostile to a more aggressive Israeli approach towards Iran. Moreover, if the President’s decision leads to the JCPOA’s collapse, Iran may resume the military aspects of its nuclear program, which the agreement had thus far seemed to halt. This too will increase the chance of an Israeli attack.

President Trump’s speech also strengthened Prime Minister Netanyahu’s position, having advocated a military attack on Iran in the past. Not only does it appear to Israelis that the US president shares Netanyahu’s views about Iran (unlike President Obama), but also that Netanyahu was tightly coordinated with and able to affect the American position. After all, one of the few pieces of evidence President Trump cited as justification to withdraw from the JCPOA was Netanyahu’s recently publicized presentation with revelations about Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, Trump’s speech seemed to vindicate Netanyahu’s risky choice in 2015 to publically clash with President Obama over the deal before it was signed.

Indeed, polling conducted after Trump’s speech gave Netanyahu’s party, Likud, its greatest lead in the past decade, even as Netanyahu is being investigated in four separate cases of corruption. The prime minister’s image shifted from a hedonistic leader reliant on fomenting internal tensions in Israeli society – while facing a possible indictment – to that of a political leader of global scale. Even the fiery member of the Opposition, Labor’s Eitan Kabel, stated, “hat’s off to Netanyahu…his fingerprints are all over” Trump’s decision.

Finally, it seems that the speech tilted the internal balance in Israel (and perhaps in the US) in favor of populist elected politicians, and away from cautious national security officials. The national security establishment seemed to prefer that the JCPOA be preserved. Just before the President’s speech, General (Ret.) Amos Gilad, a former senior intelligence officer and senior ministry of defense official, stated that, without a clear alternative, the JCPOA should be kept. The former head of Israel’s Atomic Energy Agency, retired Admiral Shaul Horev, voiced a similar concern. Yet, the bold and marketing-style approach of Netanyahu and Trump seems to be more popular than the warnings of old generals and admirals, for the moment. It remains to be seen if this balance will remain tilted towards the populists when the bombs start falling.

Ehud (Udi) Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a board member at Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published by the Atlantic Council)

הפוסט The President’s Speech and the Prospects of an Iranian-Israeli War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-jcpoa-crisis-and-israeli-iranian-relations/ Mon, 30 Apr 2018 11:31:52 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2847 Much of the discourse on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran, has centered broadly on two issue sets. The first comprises the issues between Iran and the six powers; the second, perhaps more widely-discussed are dynamics between the U.S. and the other five powers. However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.” It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Much of the discourse on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran, has centered broadly on two issue sets. The first comprises the issues between Iran and the six powers; the second, perhaps more widely-discussed are dynamics between the U.S. and the other five powers.

However, any significant change to the agreement is bound to affect another front: the already strained Israeli-Iranian relationship. Indeed, the current debate around the JCPOA unfolds during the tensest period ever in Israeli-Iranian bilateral relations. On April 20, Hussein Salami, Vice Head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that “hands are on the trigger and missiles are ready […] north and west of Israel are at the intersection of fire.” Directly addressing Israelis, he further stated, “You will not escape. You live in the dragon’s mouth.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: “We hear the threats from Iran, and the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] and security forces are prepared for every possible Iranian move…we will not shy away from action against those who threaten our security. They will pay a heavy price.” On April 26, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was even more specific when he suggested that if Iran attacks Tel Aviv, “we will strike Tehran.”

It seems that Israeli forces are indeed on alert. In April, Israel went so far as to cancel the participation of some its war-planes in a joint US exercise in Alaska. Earlier in the month, on April 9, Israel attacked Iranian targets at the Syrian T-4 airbase, killing seven Iranian military advisors. Perhaps as justification for the attack, Israel revealed that an Iranian drone shot down on February 10 within its northeastern border was armed and on an attack mission.

Israel and Iran have viewed each other as a significant threat for decades. However, only recently has this hostility manifested in intentional, direct, and open military exchanges. As the Syrian civil war appears to enter its terminal phase, heightened tensions are partially the result of Israeli concerns over a continuing Iranian military presence in Syria. Seen from Jerusalem, victory for the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis will create a “Shia corridor” from Tehran to Israel’s northern border. Israeli strategists see Tehran’s ability to project power so close to Israel’s borders as a significant threat; a “noose of terror around our neck,” in the words of Netanyahu. This led some in Israel to explore the possibility a pre-emptive strike against the Iranian build-up. In short, Israelis are concerned by the possible evolution of Iran’s direct military challenge, which would represent an escalation within the framework of traditional regional power politics.

The reintroduction of a nuclear element into Iranian-Israeli competition could heighten the potential for escalation. If the JCPOA collapses and Iran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program, the chances of Iranian-Israeli military confrontation will be much higher. Israel’s current political leadership has discussed a possible Iranian nuclear threat in almost apocalyptic terms. Netanyahu and others have interpreted the project through the lens of Jewish history and made repeated references to the Holocaust. Israel’s security establishment, on the other hand, has not shared Netanyahu’s view. According to multiple reports, an alliance of the heads of three services – the military, the foreign intelligence agency (Mossad), and the internal intelligence agency (Shabak) – blocked the prime minister’s plan to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010. Politicians saw a Holocaust in the making, while the top brass sent a less alarmist message.

Now, when the generals look north, they can see an additional, conventional Iranian threat. They are concerned and, as in the case of the T-4 airbase attack, are willing to use force. Unlike the past civil-military rift over Iran’s nuclear project, both Israeli politicians and soldiers are equally concerned about Iran. An Israeli attack on Iran previously was prevented by a lack of a consensus on the nature of the threat. Today’s emerging consensus could lead to war. Though the consensus is focused at present on the immediate Iranian build-up along Israel’s northern border, it could easily expand to include Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This is especially true if Tehran resumes the military aspects of its nuclear program. Moreover, if a direct confrontation starts, it will be challenging to keep it confined to the Lebanese or Syrian arenas. Netanyahu already stated back in February that Israel could act against Iran, and not just against its allies.

The Israeli internal balance that prevented an attack last time around has been further disrupted: the prime minister’s chair is shaking under the pressure of four separate corruption investigations, and Netanyahu might actually benefit from tension with Iran. It could allow him to deflect the investigations by reminding the Israeli public of his essential role in times of great external danger. Additionally, the security establishment has likely recalculated the costs and the benefits of an attack. It is probably less concerned with American opposition to a confrontation than it was from 2009-2014, particularly with the recent appointments of a hawkish national security advisor and secretary of state. Moreover, the head of the Mossad is perceived, unlike his predecessors, as a close Netanyahu ally. The chief of staff of the military, a traditional check on the prime minister’s more hawkish impulses, is expected to retire on December 31, 2018, thus allowing the prime minister the opportunity to select a new chief that might be more amenable to Netanyahu’s approach.

Regional dynamics might also encourage Israel to act. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are as concerned as Israel by the prospect of an Iranian military nuclear capability. In an interview to a Saudi paper, Israel’s defense minister hinted on April 26 that Israel is in the process of securing some Arab support for a confrontation with Iran. An Iranian-Israeli war is not a forgone conclusion. Iran must be aware that Israel is far stronger, at least in the Syrian arena. Iran’s main local proxy, Hezbollah, might prefer calm, at least before the May 6 parliamentary elections in Lebanon. Moreover, Netanyahu talks baldly, but a close look at his record shows that he has always been careful in using his country’s big stick.

Finally, the merging of the Iranian conventional and nuclear threats could offer an opportunity, one that comes from Washington. A deal-making president, after all, could conclude that now, with both nuclear and conventional chips on the table, there could be even greater space for a deal. President Donald Trump already has taken the first moves toward an unexpected deal with North Korea; might he attempt to use renewed Israeli concerns to push for a new deal in the Middle East?

Dr. Ehud Eiran is an Assistant Professor at the University of Haifa, Israel, and a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Atlantic Council) 

הפוסט The JCPOA Crisis and Israeli-Iranian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/time-for-an-israel-turkey-dialogue-on-syria/ Thu, 29 Mar 2018 10:15:37 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2828 Iranian involvement in Syria is increasing, bolstering Israeli motivation to influence Syria’s reality. Israel has carried out successful military moves in recent years in order to preserve its security interests around its northern border. Its ability to influence Syria’s future using diplomatic channels, however, appears to be quite low. The February 2018 incident between Israel and Iran near the Syrian border provides Israel an opportunity to explore whether additional diplomatic channels can be put in place in order to promote Israel’s interests in Syria and prevent further escalation. To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there. Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large. After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Iranian involvement in Syria is increasing, bolstering Israeli motivation to influence Syria’s reality. Israel has carried out successful military moves in recent years in order to preserve its security interests around its northern border. Its ability to influence Syria’s future using diplomatic channels, however, appears to be quite low. The February 2018 incident between Israel and Iran near the Syrian border provides Israel an opportunity to explore whether additional diplomatic channels can be put in place in order to promote Israel’s interests in Syria and prevent further escalation.

To date, Israel’s diplomatic efforts are directed first and foremost at the US, its central ally. The Netanyahu government and the Trump administration agree on the need to limit Iran’s regional influence, and by the end of 2017 they reached an understanding and a plan of action on the issue. In practice, however, the Americans have little involvement in Syria, leaving Russia as the leading superpower in the conflict there.

Following Russia’s involvement in Syria, Israel has begun making diplomatic overtures to Moscow. The frequent meetings between Netanyahu and Putin allow Israel to voice its concerns to the Russians. Russian and Israeli interests differ, however, and even if the two states establish security coordination and reach occasional diplomatic understandings, the difference in their opinion on Iran’s presence in Syria is large.

After the latest escalation in the north of Israel, it was reported that Israel had also contacted Germany, France, and Britain, asking them to convey messages to Iran against its keeping a firm hold on Syria. These messages probably did not convince senior officials in Tehran to change their course of action. However, Israel approaching these countries shows the importance of Israel’s traditional allies in Europe, toward whom the Israeli government has in recent years taken an aggressive approach on the basis of differences of opinion on the Palestinian issue.

There is another country, with a growing influence on events in Syria, to which Israel has yet to turn: Turkey. In the past, Turkey had called for the downfall of Assad, but it recently changed course and aligned itself with Russia. As a result, it has become a central part of the Astana Process, also shared by Russia and Iran, and in which significant decisions are made regarding the reality in Syria.

Turkey has also recently reached some understandings with the American administration with the aim of toning down tensions between the two countries, which also stem from differences of interests in Syria. Turkey is militarily and politically involved in Syria and has significant interests in shaping the country’s future. Aspects related to Kurds, Syrian refugees, trade and economic relations, as well as geopolitical areas of influence shape Turkey’s policy toward Syria.

Much like Israel, Turkey is also concerned by the growing Iranian influence in Syria, albeit to a different extent and due to other reasons. Turkey and Iran share some interests with regards to Syria, are dividing between them military zones of influence in the country, and are trying not to step on each other’s toes. However, they are not allies in the sense that Israeli officials often portray.

Over the years, Turkey and Iran have been able to foster bilateral cooperation and establish normal neighborly relations, but there is also suspicion and rivalry between them, including on issues of hegemony and influence (not only in the Middle East). Iran’s grip on Syria is not a security threat for Turkey as it is for Israel. Turkey’s concerns are mainly economic and political, and Turkey cannot be expected to take measures that would limit Iran’s military presence in Syria. But, Turkey may have interest in restricting the entry of Iranian products and companies into the Syrian market and weakening the political ties between Damascus and Tehran.

This situation creates a certain alignment of interests between Israel and Turkey which should be leveraged, particularly at a time when the two countries seem to have a limited common agenda. The mutual trust between Turkey and Israel is at a low point, and the positive dynamic created after the signing of their 2016 reconciliation agreement receded in the second half of 2017, especially after the tensions that emerged on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in July.

At the same time, the two countries remained loyal to the reconciliation agreement and now enjoy full diplomatic relations. They continually demonstrate that they can cooperate in certain areas despite fundamental disagreements over the Palestinian issue. The Syrian issue can be yet another example of that.

Given the differences in Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria, and in view of the existing security coordination between Turkey and Iran, an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on Iran’s role in Syria should be diplomatic and economic in nature, and not military. As such, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy (both of which have already taken steps to increase cooperation between the two countries since 2016), should be taking the leading role in these efforts rather than the defense establishment (which has been traditionally dominating Israel-Turkey relations).

Many in the Israeli government reject up front the option of a dialogue with Turkey and consider Erdoğan as an enemy. In the past, they did not believe that the two countries could succeed in reaching an agreement to restore relations, but reality proved them wrong. Just as the relations between Turkey and Iran are complex, so are the relations between Turkey and Israel.

Israel’s interests in its northern border require an in-depth examination of the feasibility of an Israeli-Turkish dialogue on limiting Iran’s role in Syria. Israel’s other diplomatic options did not prove themselves effective enough. Even if such a dialogue will be carried out at first with the assistance of a third party or through unofficial channels, and even if it is finally proven to yield only limited results, it is a diplomatic channel that should not be ruled out and that Israel’s Foreign Service should work to advance.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Time for an Israel-Turkey Dialogue on Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A Diplomatic Blueprint for Israel vis-à-vis Syria https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-diplomatic-blueprint-for-israel-vis-a-vis-syria/ Fri, 16 Feb 2018 10:06:58 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=2826 Following the infiltration of the Iranian drone into Israel’s air space and Israel’s retaliation, the public discourse in recent days focused mainly on the security aspect and the various ways to address it. However, the situation in Syria is increasingly becoming a diplomatic issue, that requires action through sensitive and complex diplomatic channels vis-à-vis various players in the international community. Although Iran’s move is considered an escalation, it should not come as a surprise. This is a step up in the exchange of messages between the sides, but we can safely assume that Israel anticipated that its actions, according to foreign and/or Syrian sources, would sooner or later provoke a counter-reaction. After all, the Syrian regime has reacted to attacks, presumably carried out by Israel, in a number of cases in the past. In this regard, Iran’s move may be seen as a Syrian-Iranian attempt to draw some red lines, indicating that the military freedom of action in Syria, long enjoyed by Israel, should not be taken for granted. Either way, the Israeli interests remain unchanged and focus on two main levels. The first interest relates to preventing Iran from establishing itself in Syria, or at least weakening its hold on the state, especially in the areas adjacent to the border with Israel and Jordan. Therefore, we must focus on a series of diplomatic measures: First, reaching some understandings with the relevant actors – Iran, and the Assad regime – in Syria. The tightening Iran’s grip on Syria is a

הפוסט A Diplomatic Blueprint for Israel vis-à-vis Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Following the infiltration of the Iranian drone into Israel’s air space and Israel’s retaliation, the public discourse in recent days focused mainly on the security aspect and the various ways to address it. However, the situation in Syria is increasingly becoming a diplomatic issue, that requires action through sensitive and complex diplomatic channels vis-à-vis various players in the international community.

Although Iran’s move is considered an escalation, it should not come as a surprise. This is a step up in the exchange of messages between the sides, but we can safely assume that Israel anticipated that its actions, according to foreign and/or Syrian sources, would sooner or later provoke a counter-reaction. After all, the Syrian regime has reacted to attacks, presumably carried out by Israel, in a number of cases in the past. In this regard, Iran’s move may be seen as a Syrian-Iranian attempt to draw some red lines, indicating that the military freedom of action in Syria, long enjoyed by Israel, should not be taken for granted.

Either way, the Israeli interests remain unchanged and focus on two main levels.

The first interest relates to preventing Iran from establishing itself in Syria, or at least weakening its hold on the state, especially in the areas adjacent to the border with Israel and Jordan. Therefore, we must focus on a series of diplomatic measures:

First, reaching some understandings with the relevant actors – Iran, and the Assad regime – in Syria. The tightening Iran’s grip on Syria is a reality that will be extremely difficult to uproot, at least in the short-to- medium term. The goal, then, is to limit or to prevent it from establishing itself in a way that is too threatening to the Syrian-Israeli border. This goal may be achieved with the intervention of international actors who enjoy open channels and a sufficient level of trust, vis-a-vis both sides.

Under the current circumstances, the most prominent actor is Moscow. The intensive dialogue between Israel and Russia allows for a sincere and deep dialogue, even if their interests are not aligned. The convergence of the Russian-Iranian interests is firm and tight, and it cannot be dismantled now. At the same time, Russia has a clear interest in preventing an undesirable escalation that will harm the strengthening of the Assad regime. Israel can leverage this situation in its dialogue with Moscow, while refraining from intense and unpredictable actions, in return.

Although the US has positioned itself in a less influential (albeit largely secondary) position in Syria, it is necessary to closely coordinate the Israeli-American positions. In addition, it is important to coordinate positions with Arab countries, with whom Israel has shared interests and close dialog. Jordan fears, just like Israel, the Iranian hold on Syria. Egypt is watching Iran with concern as it is becoming a stronger regional power, and Saudi Arabia adopted a most assertive policy vis-a-vis Iran. The Israeli message should be that this regional dynamic should be curbed in a coordinated regional diplomatic effort against the Syrian-Iranian axis.

Although Europe has ceded its premiership in Syria to Russia, it is still possible to recruit prominent European players to increase pressure on Iran. Germany can be a good candidate for that. The focus of the Israeli message, at this stage, should be the Syrian context, rather than the nuclear issue. Moreover, diplomatic levers should be used to make it difficult for the Iranians to further establish their presence in Syria. It is essential to expose to the international community the Iranian attempts to establish military bases, in a manner that will prove to the world Iran’s destructive conduct in the region, while establishing that an Iranian nuclear activity is prohibited before reaching a nuclear agreement.

Another Israeli interest, no less important, focuses on preventing an escalation in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Such a confrontation is not necessary as the deterrence that was achieved following the Second Lebanon War still stands and is manifested in the organization’s various public statements. Moreover, the organization is working to strengthen its political involvement in Lebanon and is looking forward to the elections for the Lebanese parliament. This trend could induce a more responsible conduct on its part, which could prevent a slide into violent confrontations to the detriment of Lebanon, as Israel repeatedly warns. Another round of violence will end with a renewed status quo, that is no different from the current one.

The strengthening of Assad’s regime in Syria continues vigorously. Currently, it is clear to all that the regime has been strengthened to such an extent that no one expects or desires to reverse the process, that was achieved thanks to the involvement of Russia and Iran (and Hezbollah). Israel must have an interest in strengthening the regime, who will, most probably, be able to deal more effectively with an excessively dominant Iranian influence. It should be emphasized again that this is a long-term process, since it is clear that Assad currently has neither the ability nor the will to challenge the tightening Iranian dominance in his country. At the same time, it is hard to ignore the moral consideration of the Assad regime. This is a murderous regime that committed war crimes against its own people. However, as Israel did not directly intervene during the civil war in Syria, it must now consolidate its interests in the face of the emerging reality.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that Israel’s strategic balance with Syria, continues to be comfortable, even after the recent escalation. Syria is still in the midst of difficult fighting between the various forces, and Assad’s takeover of the entire country is still far from being over. It should also be remembered that the relationships and interests of the Russia-IranTurkey triangle are in no way smooth. In any event, it is imperative to acknowledge that the freedom of Israeli military action is not unlimited in view of the emerging reality, hence the importance of the political-diplomatic effort. This is a challenge that Israel can and must withstand.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Division and Center for Policy Research.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Diplomatic Blueprint for Israel vis-à-vis Syria הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/preventing-an-israel-iran-escalation-in-syria-via-diplomacy/ Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:18:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3032 After an Iranian drone entered Israeli airspace 10 February 2018, Israel responded by striking Iranian and Syrian targets in southern Syria. Anti-aircraft fire led to the downing of an Israeli F-16 warplane. This was the first direct confrontation between Israel and Iran in Syria, and it has prompted concern over further military escalation along the Israeli-Syrian border. In order to prevent such an escalation, Israel cannot rely only on security means. It should also make effective use of diplomacy: to identify clear and feasible policy goals regarding Syria, to foster alliances with countries that can help advance these goals, and to mobilize these countries into constructive action. This document includes experts’ perspectives on Israeli interests at stake, and diplomatic channels that can be promoted with Russia, the US, Turkey, and Germany in order to prevent further escalation. It is based on a policy workshop convened by the Mitvim Institute on 15 February 2018.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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After an Iranian drone entered Israeli airspace 10 February 2018, Israel responded by striking Iranian and Syrian targets in southern Syria. Anti-aircraft fire led to the downing of an Israeli F-16 warplane. This was the first direct confrontation between Israel and Iran in Syria, and it has prompted concern over further military escalation along the Israeli-Syrian border. In order to prevent such an escalation, Israel cannot rely only on security means. It should also make effective use of diplomacy: to identify clear and feasible policy goals regarding Syria, to foster alliances with countries that can help advance these goals, and to mobilize these countries into constructive action. This document includes experts’ perspectives on Israeli interests at stake, and diplomatic channels that can be promoted with Russia, the US, Turkey, and Germany in order to prevent further escalation. It is based on a policy workshop convened by the Mitvim Institute on 15 February 2018.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Opportunities for Israel’s Foreign Relations towards 2018 https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/opportunities-for-israels-foreign-relations-towards-2018/ Thu, 21 Dec 2017 07:40:55 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4034 The 2017 annual conference of the Mitvim Institute was held on 1 November 2017 in Jerusalem, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. As part of the conference, a public panel was held on opportunities for Israel’s foreign relations towards 2018. It featured Helit Barel, Prof. Elie Podeh, Dr. Thabet Abu Rass, and Eran Etzion who spoke about issues related to the Iran nuclear deal, Israel-US relations, Israel in the Middle East, the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, Israeli-European relations, and the status of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The panel was moderated by Yael Patir, J Street Israel Director. This document summarizes the presentations made during the panel.

הפוסט Opportunities for Israel’s Foreign Relations towards 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The 2017 annual conference of the Mitvim Institute was held on 1 November 2017 in Jerusalem, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. As part of the conference, a public panel was held on opportunities for Israel’s foreign relations towards 2018. It featured Helit Barel, Prof. Elie Podeh, Dr. Thabet Abu Rass, and Eran Etzion who spoke about issues related to the Iran nuclear deal, Israel-US relations, Israel in the Middle East, the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, Israeli-European relations, and the status of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The panel was moderated by Yael Patir, J Street Israel Director. This document summarizes the presentations made during the panel.

הפוסט Opportunities for Israel’s Foreign Relations towards 2018 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/insights-from-the-2017-israel-turkey-policy-dialogue-of-the-mitvim-institute/ Thu, 21 Dec 2017 07:23:54 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4008 The Mitvim Institute’s annual Israeli-Turkish policy dialogue was held in Istanbul on 26-27 October 2017, for the sixth consecutive year. It focused on the state of Israel-Turkey relations following the reconciliation agreement signed by the two countries in June 2016, and on Turkey’s foreign policy in light of the changing the Middle East. The policy dialogue, which was held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, included a series of meetings with Turkish scholars, analysts, and journalists.1 This document summarizes the main insights from the dialogue.

הפוסט Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Mitvim Institute’s annual Israeli-Turkish policy dialogue was held in Istanbul on 26-27 October 2017, for the sixth consecutive year. It focused on the state of Israel-Turkey relations following the reconciliation agreement signed by the two countries in June 2016, and on Turkey’s foreign policy in light of the changing the Middle East. The policy dialogue, which was held in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, included a series of meetings with Turkish scholars, analysts, and journalists.1 This document summarizes the main insights from the dialogue.

הפוסט Insights from the 2017 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel, Kurdish Independence, and the Palestinians https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-kurdish-independence-and-the-palestinians/ Sun, 24 Sep 2017 12:45:03 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4142 On the eve of Kurdistan’s referendum, the international community is rife with speculation about what the vote will mean for the future of Iraq, the fight against ISIS, regional dynamics with Iran, Turkey, Syria, even Israel – and for relations with and between the US and Russia. The vote is expected to pass, and touch off negotiations with, or demands from, the central government in Iraq about future independence. The Iraqi Parliament has rejected the legitimacy of the vote, and its Supreme Court has ordered it suspended on suspicion of violating Iraq’s constitution. The stage is set for a clash that many fear will ignite yet another war in this tormented country. But the vote raises another significant question: How are new states born? It is a vexing problem in the post-World War II international scene. Borders are not supposed to be changed by force, yet new states are mostly born in blood. Lonely exceptions such as the peaceful “Velvet Divorce” of Czech Republic and Slovakia, or the 2006 independence of Montenegro, are far outnumbered by states born of war: the former Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and others fought bitter ethno-nationalist conflicts, the six (or seven, counting Kosovo) independent states to emerge from Yugoslavia’s breakup emerged amidst near-genocidal violence, which formed the backdrop to Montenegro’s later secession. Even the 2011 establishment of South Sudan following a legal referendum, in agreement with the sovereign state of Sudan, has descended into murderous chaos. The presence of oil resources

הפוסט Israel, Kurdish Independence, and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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On the eve of Kurdistan’s referendum, the international community is rife with speculation about what the vote will mean for the future of Iraq, the fight against ISIS, regional dynamics with Iran, Turkey, Syria, even Israel – and for relations with and between the US and Russia.

The vote is expected to pass, and touch off negotiations with, or demands from, the central government in Iraq about future independence. The Iraqi Parliament has rejected the legitimacy of the vote, and its Supreme Court has ordered it suspended on suspicion of violating Iraq’s constitution. The stage is set for a clash that many fear will ignite yet another war in this tormented country.

But the vote raises another significant question: How are new states born? It is a vexing problem in the post-World War II international scene. Borders are not supposed to be changed by force, yet new states are mostly born in blood.

Lonely exceptions such as the peaceful “Velvet Divorce” of Czech Republic and Slovakia, or the 2006 independence of Montenegro, are far outnumbered by states born of war: the former Soviet Republics such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and others fought bitter ethno-nationalist conflicts, the six (or seven, counting Kosovo) independent states to emerge from Yugoslavia’s breakup emerged amidst near-genocidal violence, which formed the backdrop to Montenegro’s later secession.

Even the 2011 establishment of South Sudan following a legal referendum, in agreement with the sovereign state of Sudan, has descended into murderous chaos. The presence of oil resources with disputed ownership in both South Sudan and Kurdistan’s Kirkuk region do not auger well for a peaceful process in Iraq.

This very real threat of violence is one factor that has led Western countries to oppose the Kurdish referendum. But their opposition is rife with self-interest. It is unlikely that the U.S. cares deeply about the effects of war on Kurdish and Iraqi people; they do however worry that such a war could dilute the fight against ISIS – fought largely by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

Principles such as the right to self-determination – hardly disputable in the case of the Kurds – appear to be missing from Western governments’ approach. Not even “earned sovereignty”, showing that the state-hopeful has functioning, self-governing and even relatively democratic institutions as Iraqi Kurdistan already does – has dented the Western opposition to date.

Perhaps the one “ideology” driving America’s policy is a residual defense of its 2003 Gulf War, after which Iraq looked, and still looks, a lot like a failed state. Yet America wants the post-Saddam country it helped to create to look like a success, and dismemberment does not fit the picture; no matter that “Kurdish blood has not yet dried” from fighting ISIS, as Kurdish telecom engineer Mohammed Yusuf Ameen told me by phone from Sulaymaniyah.

Russia provides another stark version of international hypocrisy regarding independence movements. Russia has long been the chief obstacle to UN membership for Kosovo, after the latter unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008 and was recognized by most Western countries. But Russia was only too happy to recognize the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after a short war it waged with Georgia in the summer of 2008 – perhaps as a riposte to the West’s embrace of Kosovo. On the Kurdish referendum, Russia is being coy; a recent major oil deal with Rosneft indicates that financial/resource interests will drive its response.

Similarly, Turkey has no qualms taking part in the four-decade division of Cyprus, and recognizes the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; but of course completely rejects Kurdish secessionism from its own territory.

In this stark realist environment, Israel’s response is logical: It has taken the bold position of breaking with Western allies to support Kurdish independence fairly openly. The self-interest is clear: Israel has a precedent of favoring forces that weaken a “united” hostile Arab front, such as, back in the 1980s, tacitly nurturing Hamas as a counterweight to the PLO, and fighting two and a half wars in Lebanon. A smaller, weaker Iraq is consistent with this approach.

A Western-friendly Kurdish state that could erode or fragment the Iranian Shia and Arab Sunni power struggle in the Middle East poses an attractive potential ally for Israel – sweetened for public consumption by historic friendliness, illustrated in a recent New York Times article. Given Israel’s powerful international allies, its support could actually be meaningful in advancing Kurdish independence.

But the Kurds may also have another, lower profile ally in their struggle: Palestinians. As Bassem al-Wazir, a Palestinian businessman who lived and worked in Erbil for two years, told me: “I am totally for [Kurdish independence]. If this is their national liberation, let them do it! We as an oppressed people say – good for them, hurray. You cannot keep people in a cage.”

Official Palestinian figures are keeping quiet about the referendum, mindful of the tensions regarding Iraqi territorial integrity. But Ghassan Khatib, a professor of political science at Ramallah’s Birzeit University and former Palestinian Authority minister, was less circumspect. He told me that, despite Iraqi integrity being important, “I think the Kurds have the right to self-determination and they should be allowed this right. Supporting the right of self-determination for the Kurds should encourage people to follow the same principle and support the right of self-determination, independence and statehood for the Palestinian people. Although,” he added, “we Palestinians are used to double standards, when it comes to rights by the international community.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Israel, Kurdish Independence, and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Trump Should Not Play Politics with the Iran Nuclear Deal https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/trump-should-not-play-politics-with-the-iran-nuclear-deal/ Wed, 16 Aug 2017 12:20:36 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4135 The adversarial US-Iranian relationship has many dimensions, including Syria, Yemen, the Gulf and terrorist financing. But the primary threat from Iran is nuclear. Prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American and Israeli security discourse centered on potential military strikes on Iranian facilities, and the large-scale escalation that could follow. That rhetoric has been scaled back, and Israeli security analysts no longer list a nuclear Iran as a top threat. Both the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency have repeatedly certified Iran’s compliance with the deal. If Iran’s compliance continues, the deal serves the security interests of the US, Europe and Israel. More broadly, it contributes to global stability by strengthening the nonproliferation architecture and dissuading other countries from rushing toward a bomb. The deal does not rely on trusting Tehran: it significantly lengthens Iran’s potential breakout time, and provides increased visibility into its nuclear program. Under JCPOA conditions, it is easier for the US and its partners to respond to any serious violation, as it contains mechanisms for a coordinated global response. This reality is clear, even to former critics of the deal. Trump’s bombastic rhetoric toward Iran is not backed up with fact: there is no case in which unilateral withdrawal serves US interests. If Trump withdraws, one of two scenarios would unfold: 1) The P5+1 and Iran continue to enforce the deal, marginalizing US influence. Absent a true Iranian violation, Europe would not follow a US exit, and the US would find itself with

הפוסט Trump Should Not Play Politics with the Iran Nuclear Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The adversarial US-Iranian relationship has many dimensions, including Syria, Yemen, the Gulf and terrorist financing. But the primary threat from Iran is nuclear. Prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American and Israeli security discourse centered on potential military strikes on Iranian facilities, and the large-scale escalation that could follow. That rhetoric has been scaled back, and Israeli security analysts no longer list a nuclear Iran as a top threat. Both the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency have repeatedly certified Iran’s compliance with the deal.

If Iran’s compliance continues, the deal serves the security interests of the US, Europe and Israel. More broadly, it contributes to global stability by strengthening the nonproliferation architecture and dissuading other countries from rushing toward a bomb. The deal does not rely on trusting Tehran: it significantly lengthens Iran’s potential breakout time, and provides increased visibility into its nuclear program. Under JCPOA conditions, it is easier for the US and its partners to respond to any serious violation, as it contains mechanisms for a coordinated global response.

This reality is clear, even to former critics of the deal. Trump’s bombastic rhetoric toward Iran is not backed up with fact: there is no case in which unilateral withdrawal serves US interests. If Trump withdraws, one of two scenarios would unfold: 1) The P5+1 and Iran continue to enforce the deal, marginalizing US influence. Absent a true Iranian violation, Europe would not follow a US exit, and the US would find itself with very little leverage to negotiate any future deal on Iran. 2) Iran also leaves, and the deal falls apart. Iran’s breakout time is reduced, and international inspectors are barred from facilities. The nuclear threat re-emerges as a primary global security concern, and policymakers again prepare for worst-case military scenarios.

Trump’s motivations are unclear.

JCPOA withdrawal may be part of his quest to erase the legacies of the Obama administration, whatever their merits.

The second option is that this is a strategic decision, to create a credible threat of leaving to pressure Iran to fold to US pressure on another issue (such as ballistic missiles). Pressure could take the form of additional sanctions, threats to leave, and dissuading American and European companies from developing business ties with Iran, as Trump is reportedly already doing.

Policy “wins” are in short supply for the Trump administration, and in this case, a “win” is the ability to say that he pushed Iran into a better deal. This approach has some potential, and an inherent cost.

The potential rests on Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who was just reelected on a platform of engagement with the West. Unlike his conservative competitors, Rouhani’s personal legacy is tied to the nuclear deal, and if any Iranian president can lobby Ayatollah Khamenei to accept additional restrictions, it is him.

But putting the JCPOA on the line risks nuclear security progress for an unclear end. Trump’s vision of a “better” deal might include only a minor change to the JCPOA, or symbolic concession on Iran’s regional activities. Is there a potential gain that is worth the risk to the nuclear deal, and the harm to American diplomatic credibility? While the US certified Iran’s compliance in July, Trump said that he expects Iran to be declared noncompliant at the next 90-day review, and that “if it was up to me, I would have had them noncompliant 180 days ago.” Trump has reportedly tasked White House staffers with preparing for a noncompliance possibility.

Preparing for contingencies is the job of a president. But predicting noncompliance without evidence of a meaningful violation is wrong and dangerous.

Leaving, or threatening to leave the JCPOA weakens the image of the US as a power that stands by its agreements. This has long-term implications for American diplomacy, and short-term costs for our ability to use diplomacy to constrain Iran on other issues. Confronting Iran’s destabilizing activities – without sacrificing the progress of the nuclear deal – is one of the great policy challenges of our time.

By threatening to leave, Trump is risking a great deal of global stability for very little gain.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump Should Not Play Politics with the Iran Nuclear Deal הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The New Middle East https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-new-middle-east/ Tue, 11 Jul 2017 12:11:46 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4132 Over the past year we have witnessed the molding of a new Middle East, in which Israel plays a significant role. The term “New Middle East” was coined by Shimon Peres who, after the Oslo Accords were signed with the Palestinians in the 1990s, envisioned a new era in which Israel would be integrated in the Middle East in the political and economic fields. Although the Arab world rejected this term as an Israeli attempt to achieve dominance in the region through non-military means, Israeli diplomacy made progress toward this end by scoring substantial achievements in the region. Today, however, it is not Israel’s contribution that has prompted the formation of the current New Middle East. It is a product of a number of developments, including the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the rise of Iran as a regional power seeking hegemony and nuclear power, and the wave of the Arab Spring revolutions that triggered chaos in several major (Egypt, Syria) and minor (Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Bahrain) countries. The shattering of the Arab world has forced some of its elements to seek external allies to battle threats from within and without. Together, these developments forged a new architecture of alliances and coalitions based on shared interests. One of the typical features of the New Middle East is that alliances are not based solely along religious or ethnic lines. For example, several Sunni states, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are concerned by the expansion of Iran and Shi’ite

הפוסט The New Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Over the past year we have witnessed the molding of a new Middle East, in which Israel plays a significant role. The term “New Middle East” was coined by Shimon Peres who, after the Oslo Accords were signed with the Palestinians in the 1990s, envisioned a new era in which Israel would be integrated in the Middle East in the political and economic fields.

Although the Arab world rejected this term as an Israeli attempt to achieve dominance in the region through non-military means, Israeli diplomacy made progress toward this end by scoring substantial achievements in the region.

Today, however, it is not Israel’s contribution that has prompted the formation of the current New Middle East. It is a product of a number of developments, including the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the rise of Iran as a regional power seeking hegemony and nuclear power, and the wave of the Arab Spring revolutions that triggered chaos in several major (Egypt, Syria) and minor (Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Bahrain) countries.

The shattering of the Arab world has forced some of its elements to seek external allies to battle threats from within and without. Together, these developments forged a new architecture of alliances and coalitions based on shared interests.

One of the typical features of the New Middle East is that alliances are not based solely along religious or ethnic lines. For example, several Sunni states, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are concerned by the expansion of Iran and Shi’ite Islam, and its allies, while the Sunni states of Qatar and Turkey maintain good relations with Iran. Furthermore, the Sunni Arab World is not only joining forces against Qatar, because of the latter’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and its pro-Iranian policy, but also against a range of different Sunni organizations that are considered terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, Islamic State, the Muslim Brotherhood, and more.

Another indication of the divisions among Sunnis is the split among the Palestinians, who are divided not only geographically but also ideologically and politically between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. If this were not enough, the Iraqi Kurds (who are Sunni Muslims but not Arabs) announced a referendum on their independence, exerting pressure on the federal government in Baghdad and on neighboring Turkey, which has a large Kurdish minority.

The conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite Islam and the conflicts among the Sunnis themselves are one of the reasons that major players in the Arab world are reaching out to countries outside the Arab system. Since the pragmatic Sunni Arab countries adopt a Western-oriented policy and their armies rely on Western technology, approaching Russia is not considered a real option.

However, the West in general – the US and Europe – and limit its role. Furthermore, external allies are needed to replace Iran and Turkey, which served as local allies on the margins on the Arab system and today have either become an enemy (in the case of Iran) or hesitate to cooperate (Turkey).

Thus, Israel has suddenly found itself by default courted by major countries in the Sunni Arab world. This development offers Israel several achievements: first, recognition as an important player in the Middle Eastern arena. Second, if cooperation in the past focused on the minorities (such as Druse, Kurds, Maronites, etc.) and periphery (Turkey, Iran), now Israel has penetrated the core Sunni Arab world. Third, while Israeli-Arab cooperation occurs mainly behind the scenes, some elements are currently rising to the surface. The new public visibility of cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is intentionally designed to intimidate their common enemy, Iran.

If cooperation with Israel remained secret, Israel would not be able to be used as a deterrent card. For the PA or rather for PA President Mahmoud Abbas, public cooperation with Israel against Hamas is dangerous, although the new political configuration that firmly places Hamas alongside Qatar and Iran on the side of the “bad guys” seems to have mitigated Abbas’ concerns of public indications of collaboration with Israel.

Although today’s New Middle East poses greater security threats than the former New Middle East, it is more amenable for Israel, because the Arab countries do not feel that they are being coerced into cooperation with Israel. Rather, this new constellation represents a conscious decision based on a realistic analysis of interests, and the longstanding logic “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” – a motto that has served Israel well over the years.

Israeli decision-makers identified the emergence of this unique regional opportunity relatively late, although having discovered it, they pounced upon it like a treasure chest. It is, however, too early to celebrate: cooperation between Israel and the Arab states remained limited by an undeniable “glass ceiling” whose height and thickness may be difficult to determine but its central component is clearly the Palestinian issue.

In the 1990s, Israel was permitted to penetrate the Arab world and establish diplomatic and economic ties with countries in the Middle East and North Africa in line with progress on the Palestinian issue, but these ties dissipated with the collapse of the Oslo process and the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. The lesson of this period is that a significant breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinian can remove barriers and dramatically increase Israel’s regional integration.

Most Sunni Arab states have abandoned ideology in favor of political realism. It is time for the Israeli government to do so too, and make progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Netanyahu-Trump Meeting https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-netanyahu-trump-meeting/ Sun, 26 Feb 2017 11:16:10 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=3338 The Israeli Prime Minister and his government reacted favorably to the election of Donald Trump as the new US President. However, since Trump assumed office, questions have mounted regarding his policies towards Israel, the IsraeliPalestinian peace process, and the Middle East. The first official meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, on February 15th in Washington D.C., was an opportunity to assess the policy directions of the new administration. This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and its outcomes: (1) The atmosphere was good but the policy was vague, Gabriel Mitchell; (2) The settlements and the Palestinian issue take a back seat in Israel-US relations, Nitzan Horowitz; (3) A regional breakthrough requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track, Dr. Nimrod Goren; (4) The Iran nuclear deal is likely to remain intact, Rebecca Bornstein; (5) The Palestinians do not have a friend in the White House, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (6) The Palestinian citizens of Israel were ignored once again, Kamal Ali Hassan; (7) Things went well for Netanyahu and Trump, but what comes next?, Dan Rothem.

הפוסט The Netanyahu-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Israeli Prime Minister and his government reacted favorably to the election of Donald Trump as the new US President. However, since Trump assumed office, questions have mounted regarding his policies towards Israel, the IsraeliPalestinian peace process, and the Middle East. The first official meeting between Trump and Netanyahu, on February 15th in Washington D.C., was an opportunity to assess the policy directions of the new administration.

This document includes commentaries by Mitvim Institute experts regarding the Netanyahu-Trump meeting and its outcomes: (1) The atmosphere was good but the policy was vague, Gabriel Mitchell; (2) The settlements and the Palestinian issue take a back seat in Israel-US relations, Nitzan Horowitz; (3) A regional breakthrough requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track, Dr. Nimrod Goren; (4) The Iran nuclear deal is likely to remain intact, Rebecca Bornstein; (5) The Palestinians do not have a friend in the White House, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz; (6) The Palestinian citizens of Israel were ignored once again, Kamal Ali Hassan; (7) Things went well for Netanyahu and Trump, but what comes next?, Dan Rothem.

הפוסט The Netanyahu-Trump Meeting הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/turkey-and-israel-a-chronicle-of-bilateral-relations/ Thu, 23 Feb 2017 18:43:50 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4272 As someone who personally experienced the first downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey in 1981, and kept close track of the second downgrading in 2010, I naturally feel great satisfaction at the present time with the return to normalization of diplomatic ties between the countries. In both instances, in January 1992 as well as in July 2016, much hard work was needed to mend the relations between the countries, work that testifies to the efficacy of diplomacy in healing even harsh bilateral crises. Nevertheless, a heavy cloud still hovers over the Israel-Turkey relationship due the changes that transpired in the Turkish democracy throughout recent years. We get the distinct impression that the link that connected Israel and Turkey over the years – the pro-Western, modern democratic link – is loosening and may even tear completely one day. The escalation of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the deep stagnation of the peace process will place a heavy burden on the bilateral ties, mainly on Ankara’s part.

הפוסט Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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As someone who personally experienced the first downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey in 1981, and kept close track of the second downgrading in 2010, I naturally feel great satisfaction at the present time with the return to normalization of diplomatic ties between the countries. In both instances, in January 1992 as well as in July 2016, much hard work was needed to mend the relations between the countries, work that testifies to the efficacy of diplomacy in healing even harsh bilateral crises.

Nevertheless, a heavy cloud still hovers over the Israel-Turkey relationship due the changes that transpired in the Turkish democracy throughout recent years. We get the distinct impression that the link that connected Israel and Turkey over the years – the pro-Western, modern democratic link – is loosening and may even tear completely one day. The escalation of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the deep stagnation of the peace process will place a heavy burden on the bilateral ties, mainly on Ankara’s part.

הפוסט Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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2017, a 50th anniversary that could spark a real intifada https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/2017-a-50th-anniversary-that-could-spark-a-real-intifada/ Sun, 06 Mar 2016 08:09:23 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4321 The year 2016 doesn’t bode well for the peace process, which has been stuck for a long time. The current situation ensures that the freeze will continue. This assessment is based on three premises. First, the Netanyahu government has no incentive – political, economic or ideological – to advance talks with the Palestinians. Second, regional instability and Iran’s empowerment after the signing of the nuclear accord, as well as the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, ensure that overall security issues will take priority over the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Finally, the U.S. election year guarantees that the permanent patron of peace talks will be looking inward, with Europe lacking the clout to bring the two sides to the table. While 2016 seems a wasted year in terms of the peace process, 2017 may be the year things flare up. There are several reasons; the first is coincidental. June 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the occupation. Countries and leaders enjoy marking round anniversaries to glorify the nation or themselves. Decision-makers on the right have been quick to realize the potential. Education Minister Naftali Bennett has declared that the coming school year will be inspired by the unification of Jerusalem. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely has announced that 2017 will be a festive year stressing the narrative of the whole Land of Israel, along with the line that there’s no occupation. To this list one might add the centennial of the Balfour Declaration, which favored a

הפוסט 2017, a 50th anniversary that could spark a real intifada הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The year 2016 doesn’t bode well for the peace process, which has been stuck for a long time. The current situation ensures that the freeze will continue.

This assessment is based on three premises.

First, the Netanyahu government has no incentive – political, economic or ideological – to advance talks with the Palestinians.

Second, regional instability and Iran’s empowerment after the signing of the nuclear accord, as well as the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, ensure that overall security issues will take priority over the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Finally, the U.S. election year guarantees that the permanent patron of peace talks will be looking inward, with Europe lacking the clout to bring the two sides to the table.

While 2016 seems a wasted year in terms of the peace process, 2017 may be the year things flare up. There are several reasons; the first is coincidental. June 2017 marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the occupation.

Countries and leaders enjoy marking round anniversaries to glorify the nation or themselves. Decision-makers on the right have been quick to realize the potential.

Education Minister Naftali Bennett has declared that the coming school year will be inspired by the unification of Jerusalem. Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely has announced that 2017 will be a festive year stressing the narrative of the whole Land of Israel, along with the line that there’s no occupation. To this list one might add the centennial of the Balfour Declaration, which favored a homeland for the Jewish people.

This linkage – 50 years of the occupation and 100 years after the Balfour Declaration – lends these events an almost cosmic significance.

On the other side of the political map, the 50-year anniversary is clearly a reason to mourn. The result of the 1967 war – the domination of another people – must be undone. This is a chance to mobilize all peace advocates in Israel and abroad, Jews and non-Jews, people who support a Jewish democratic state within the 1967 borders and see the occupation as a sure recipe for turning Israel into a binational, nondemocratic state.

This is the aim of the group Save Israel, Stop the Occupation, SISO, which has been established to organize events on the injustices of the occupation, culminating in 50thanniversary events. A clash between the opposing worldviews that will find expression next year are bound to lead to a flare-up.

Another factor will be the new U.S. president. It’s not certain the winner will immediately launch a drive to revive the peace process. But history teaches that even a president with a limited understanding of the Middle East, like Jimmy Carter in 1977, achieved a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within two years.

Bill Clinton, meanwhile, finalized the Oslo process and the treaty with Jordan during his first term. History also teaches that a president who really seeks a solution must start early, as proved by Clinton’s missed opportunities with Hafez Assad and Yasser Arafat at the end of his second term. The arrival of a new president on the 50th anniversary of the occupation could provide a spark.

The perception that a two-state solution is no longer applicable is increasingly taking hold. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman claims that the two-state solution is dead and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be remembered as the father of the one-state solution.

But any deep look at the situation on the ground shows that the two-state ideal is still around and viable. It depends on leaders on both sides making it work.

A public campaign in Israel and overseas that will gather momentum toward June 2017 could jump-start diplomatic ideas already on the agenda. These include a new Security Council resolution to replace or be appended to Resolution 242, incorporating elements of the Arab peace initiative.

The resolution would call for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with agreed-on border adjustments and land swaps, without addressing tougher issues such as Jerusalem and refugees. Another idea is an international conference in June 2017 that would launch talks between Israel, the Palestinians and moderate Arab countries.

I fear that if these ideas aren’t realized, the despair, frustration and disappointment of the younger Palestinian generation – directed at the occupation and Palestinian leaders who can’t deliver the goods – will lead to an intifada. The reasons have long been there, but the spark hasn’t arrived.

And the fuse will be lying about in 2017. Let’s hope Israelis and their leaders will see 2016 as an opportunity for reconciliation, not escalation.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט 2017, a 50th anniversary that could spark a real intifada הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Threat From Iran Has Been Greatly Reduced https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-threat-from-iran-has-been-greatly-reduced/ Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:57:35 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4147 Pessimists, like Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, say that the deal between Iran and major powers to curb its nuclear capabilities will only enhance Iran’s threat, by lifting economically crippling sanctions that limited its ability to project power directly or through proxies. Moreover, they argue, Iran will be able to develop a nuclear weapon when the agreement expires, or even earlier if it cheats. But in a more nuanced analysis, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, chief of staff of Israel’s armed forces, admitted that while those risks are real, it is likely that for now, Iran will abide by the plan. The deal reduces Iran’s danger in three ways. First, the existential threat Israel was about to face from an Iranian nuclear weapon is, at a minimum, delayed. It seems reasonable to accept greater Iranian regional reach in exchange for suppressing the possibility of an Iranian nuclear attack. Moreover, the regime could divert little of the deal’s financial dividends from the domestic arena, where they would preserve its legitimacy. Second, opening the channels between Washington and Tehran can facilitate joint action in cases where American, Iranian and indeed even Israeli interests overlap, such as opposing the Islamic State. After all, in the newly chaotic Middle East, there are no friends and enemies, just frenemies: states collide on one front, but cooperate on another. More broadly, talking is always better than shooting. Since the mid-1960s, Washington’s ability to talk to Israel’s foes has benefited the Jewish state and could do so yet again. Finally, the agreement

הפוסט The Threat From Iran Has Been Greatly Reduced הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Pessimists, like Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, say that the deal between Iran and major powers to curb its nuclear capabilities will only enhance Iran’s threat, by lifting economically crippling sanctions that limited its ability to project power directly or through proxies. Moreover, they argue, Iran will be able to develop a nuclear weapon when the agreement expires, or even earlier if it cheats.

But in a more nuanced analysis, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, chief of staff of Israel’s armed forces, admitted that while those risks are real, it is likely that for now, Iran will abide by the plan.

The deal reduces Iran’s danger in three ways. First, the existential threat Israel was about to face from an Iranian nuclear weapon is, at a minimum, delayed. It seems reasonable to accept greater Iranian regional reach in exchange for suppressing the possibility of an Iranian nuclear attack. Moreover, the regime could divert little of the deal’s financial dividends from the domestic arena, where they would preserve its legitimacy.

Second, opening the channels between Washington and Tehran can facilitate joint action in cases where American, Iranian and indeed even Israeli interests overlap, such as opposing the Islamic State. After all, in the newly chaotic Middle East, there are no friends and enemies, just frenemies: states collide on one front, but cooperate on another. More broadly, talking is always better than shooting. Since the mid-1960s, Washington’s ability to talk to Israel’s foes has benefited the Jewish state and could do so yet again.

Finally, the agreement enhances the chances, small as they are, that Iran will fundamentally alter its posture. The agreement is expected to generate greater interaction between Iran and the world as Tehran is readmitted to global networks of trade and finance. If hardliners’ concerns about foreign infiltration are accurate, Iran’s expected participation in the global economic order might moderate, weaken or constrain the current regime.

Like almost all problems in the Middle East, there are no optimal solutions to the Iranian challenge: a gain on one side of the scales is bound to create some costs on the other. Yet, at least for now, the agreement reduces the immediate threat Israel, and perhaps the region at large, faces.

(originally published in the New York Times)

הפוסט The Threat From Iran Has Been Greatly Reduced הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A Prophet of the Apocalypse https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-prophet-of-the-apocalypse/ Sat, 24 Oct 2015 19:08:30 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4296 The annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, which occurs every fall, affords heads of state from across the globe the opportunity to lay out their vision and policies for the future of the world. While it was Russian President Vladimir Putin who stole the show this year, the speech given by US President Barack Obama was also revealing, pointing to the foreign policy priorities of the world’s only remaining superpower. This, however, was not the case with the Prime Minister of Israel, who addressed a half-empty General Assembly hall. As usual, Benjamin Netanyahu did not miss an opportunity to put his usual gimmicks on display. This time it was a 44-second long dramatic and deafening silence accompanied by an angry and incensed stare at the members of the few delegations who remained in the hall, its only purpose to determine what kind of impression his antics left on them. The majority of Netanyahu’s monologue was devoted to listing the sins of Iran, as well as the dangers the Islamic Republic poses to the world. While it is true that this year we did not hear of Hitler and the Munich Agreement – although anti-Semitism did in fact feature in his remarks – Netanyahu seized the opportunity to attack and castigate the entire world, and particularly the United Nations that was hosting him, for its silence, as if the entire world is against us again. In the past, Netanyahu has been able to captivate the world’s attention and focus

הפוסט A Prophet of the Apocalypse הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, which occurs every fall, affords heads of state from across the globe the opportunity to lay out their vision and policies for the future of the world. While it was Russian President Vladimir Putin who stole the show this year, the speech given by US President Barack Obama was also revealing, pointing to the foreign policy priorities of the world’s only remaining superpower. This, however, was not the case with the Prime Minister of Israel, who addressed a half-empty General Assembly hall. As usual, Benjamin Netanyahu did not miss an opportunity to put his usual gimmicks on display. This time it was a 44-second long dramatic and deafening silence accompanied by an angry and incensed stare at the members of the few delegations who remained in the hall, its only purpose to determine what kind of impression his antics left on them.

The majority of Netanyahu’s monologue was devoted to listing the sins of Iran, as well as the dangers the Islamic Republic poses to the world. While it is true that this year we did not hear of Hitler and the Munich Agreement – although anti-Semitism did in fact feature in his remarks – Netanyahu seized the opportunity to attack and castigate the entire world, and particularly the United Nations that was hosting him, for its silence, as if the entire world is against us again.

In the past, Netanyahu has been able to captivate the world’s attention and focus it on the Iranian nuclear issue. There is no doubt that it is he who was able to raise this issue and place it at the top of the agenda of the international community. This time, however, now that the deal with Iran has been signed, the issue is one for the history books. No one is interested anymore. There is no doubt that Netanyahu is aware that he has failed in this regard. Moreover, he is cognizant of the fact that the manner in which he conducted himself vis-à-vis President Obama and his Administration precluded Israel from having any impact upon the nuclear agreement. Therefore, one must ask why the Israeli Prime Minister still devoted so much room in his remarks to the issue. Even if I were inclined to believe his apocalyptical prophesies, his empty slogans and talking points, which have been uttered so many times before, prevented me from doing so.

Just one day after Abu Mazen’s speech before the General Assembly, and the debate that the organization devoted to the Palestinian question, Netanyahu, too, should have given the issue the attention it deserves. Unfortunately, IsraeliPalestinian peace was but a secondary feature in his remarks. On this issue, too, Netanyahu said nothing new. He pointed an accusatory finger at Abu Mazen and again reminded his listeners of the Palestinian recalcitrance to reaching any agreement. The prime minister reiterated his commitment to a two-state solution. However, in all likelihood the goal behind doing this was to pave his path back into the good graces of the Obama Administration and to restart a positive bilateral dialogue. Other than an unconvincing call to resume negotiations “without preconditions,” Netanyahu did not present any new plan or vision. One must also ask: is the call to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people not a precondition?

In light of the deteriorating situation in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Territories in recent months, one would have expected a speech whose goal was to calm the situation and create hope in the hearts and minds of his audience – both in Israel and in the territories. Unfortunately, this section of Netanyahu’s speech was hollow and disappointing. What is more, one must wonder why Netanyahu chose to completely ignore the harsh reality of the unfolding events across the region – the ongoing, bloody conflict taking place on Israel’s northern border, as well as the Russian presence in Syria and the risks it carries.

Netanyahu’s speech was another eloquent, missed opportunity for it said nothing about the Israeli policy. This, of course, should come as no surprise: an Israeli foreign policy simply does not exist. And beyond that, it is hard to comprehend why Netanyahu chooses to confront the entire world time and again; why he castigates, protests and admonishes, if need be, exposing how isolated Israel is from the rest of the world. What precisely did he think we stand to gain from that?

הפוסט A Prophet of the Apocalypse הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-changing-discourse-on-israel-in-the-arab-world/ Fri, 28 Aug 2015 07:42:09 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4686 Dr. Abdullah Swalha, Director of the Center for Israel Studies in Jordan, was the keynote speaker at a symposium held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies on 13 August 2015. The symposium focused on the changing discourse on Israel in the Arab world as well as on opportunities for regional cooperation. It also featured MK Ksenia Svetlova (Zionist Union), Kamal Hassan (Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute).

הפוסט A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Dr. Abdullah Swalha, Director of the Center for Israel Studies in Jordan, was the keynote speaker at a symposium held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies on 13 August 2015. The symposium focused on the changing discourse on Israel in the Arab world as well as on opportunities for regional cooperation. It also featured MK Ksenia Svetlova (Zionist Union), Kamal Hassan (Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute).

הפוסט A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/is-turkeys-war-on-terror-a-consequence-of-the-iran-deal/ Tue, 25 Aug 2015 08:47:04 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4334 The deal negotiated by the P5+1 with Iran on its nuclear program has been heralded by supporters as a historic agreement and regional game-changer. Much of the international criticism thus far has centered on Israeli and Gulf Arab skepticism about the deal. Overlooked in these discussions, however, is the significant impact the Iran deal is already having on other regional disputes, including Iran’s relationship with its traditional competitor, Turkey. Operating with a caretaker government since its June 7 national elections and now heading to early elections on November 1, Turkey has opened a two-front war against the so-called Islamic State and its traditional foe, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Most analysts have pointed to the July 20 terror attack in Suruc and the subsequent killings of two Turkish police officers as the spark that triggered Ankara’s strategic shift. However, the fact that these events transpired immediately following the end of negotiations with Iran was not an accident. The broader trend of increased Iranian–Turkish competition is playing out regionally as Tehran’s support for the Kurds further antagonizes Ankara. The improvement of Iran’s international standing under President Hassan Rouhani has coincided with a decline in Turkey’s global image. As Rouhani abandoned the hostile rhetoric ubiquitous to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s brash and aggressive handling of various domestic and foreign crises tarnished his hard-earned reputation as the West’s most reliable Muslim partner. More importantly, as Iran pragmatically began to “de-conflict” with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State while still supporting the Syrian regime of

הפוסט Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The deal negotiated by the P5+1 with Iran on its nuclear program has been heralded by supporters as a historic agreement and regional game-changer. Much of the international criticism thus far has centered on Israeli and Gulf Arab skepticism about the deal. Overlooked in these discussions, however, is the significant impact the Iran deal is already having on other regional disputes, including Iran’s relationship with its traditional competitor, Turkey.

Operating with a caretaker government since its June 7 national elections and now heading to early elections on November 1, Turkey has opened a two-front war against the so-called Islamic State and its traditional foe, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Most analysts have pointed to the July 20 terror attack in Suruc and the subsequent killings of two Turkish police officers as the spark that triggered Ankara’s strategic shift. However, the fact that these events transpired immediately following the end of negotiations with Iran was not an accident. The broader trend of increased Iranian–Turkish competition is playing out regionally as Tehran’s support for the Kurds further antagonizes Ankara.

The improvement of Iran’s international standing under President Hassan Rouhani has coincided with a decline in Turkey’s global image. As Rouhani abandoned the hostile rhetoric ubiquitous to his predecessor Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s brash and aggressive handling of various domestic and foreign crises tarnished his hard-earned reputation as the West’s most reliable Muslim partner. More importantly, as Iran pragmatically began to “de-conflict” with the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State while still supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, Turkey’s anger with Assad and comparative ambivalence to the jihadist threat prompted many in the West to question this NATO ally’s commitment and value to regional security.

Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Iran in recent years has undergone a major shift, as has its broader Middle East neighborhood policy. Ankara’s soft-power charm offensive throughout the region ran up against the so-called “Arab Spring” and hard power realities, falling short of its ambitions for a neo-Ottoman role in the region. Meanwhile, Tehran has been eagerly anticipating a final nuclear settlement that would once again open Iran up to international markets. During the days of Ahmadinejad, Turkey was Iran’s largest trading partner and a key international advocate. Ankara repeatedly called for lifting international sanctions, as they inhibited the economic growth of its own eastern provinces, many of which engaged in black market trading with their Iranian neighbors just across the border. The pinnacle of this relationship was the infamous Tehran Declaration that Brazil and Turkey proudly announced with Iran in 2010. Despite being quietly killed by Washington because of “miscommunications,” the deal in many ways set the parameters and precedent for subsequent negotiations and the final Iran deal.

So why aren’t more Turkish officials applauding the signing of the Iran deal and the ending of the sanctions regime? First of all, experts disagree on the extent that Turkey will benefit from Iran’s return to the global economy or how investment that once was destined for Turkey may begin to find its way to Iran as the hot new regional destination. But more importantly, the JCPOA threatens Turkey’s regional position, given both Iran’s use of proxies across the region and, specifically, Tehran’s tacit support of the PKK in recent months.

Look no further than Syria, where Turkey and Iran are visibly working at cross-purposes. Much to Ankara’s chagrin, developments in Syria appear to be working in Iran’s favor just as they did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The shifting realities on the ground are precipitating the establishment of yet another Kurdish entity along Turkey’s border, stoking fears in Ankara that the Kurds could attain their long desired state.

Turkey established a healthy working relationship with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Yet, the close association between the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the PKK kept Ankara from developing a similar relationship with Syria’s Kurds. And although Erdoğan was in the midst of peace talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, he believed that bridging this divide would damage his reputation amongst nationalist voters. Direct cooperation with the PYD was a domestic political risk Turkey’s president was unwilling to take given that he has lost his once reliable Kurdish votes and now must appeal to his more traditional Turkish nationalist base. Instead, Ankara collaborated with those in the Syrian opposition who would pursue regime change in Damascus while respecting Turkish sovereignty.

The flaws of this policy were exposed during the Islamic State’s siege of the Kurdish-majority town of Kobane last autumn. As the United States frantically launched airstrikes to repel the jihadist advance, Turkish tanks overlooking the battlefield stood idle. Little surprise that Turkish Kurds, feeling betrayed by the man who once depicted himself as a champion of the Kurdish peace process and Kurdish rights, cast their ballots against Erdoğan in June’s elections.

In response, Erdoğan has transformed himself into a wartime president.

Legitimized by the Suruc bombing, Turkey’s two-front military campaign against the Islamic State and the PKK reminded many in the West of its irreplaceable geostrategic value and was initially received with great fanfare. But American observers of the region largely ignored the intense media battle this operation has sparked between Ankara and Tehran. Iranian state media repeatedly accused Turkey of supporting the Islamic State, even going as far as to assert that Erdoğan’s daughter Sümeyye visited wounded jihadists in Syria, while in Turkey the pro-AKP media blamed Iran for instigating regional violence through its multifarious proxies, particularly the PKK. One pro-government Daily Sabah column went as far as claiming that the Iran deal emboldened Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations like the PKK while employing rhetoric similar to the Iran deal’s opponents in Washington. And on August 24 images circulated in the Turkish press of Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli visiting the Qandil Mountains where the PKK operates.

This isn’t mere propaganda. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif cancelled his scheduled visit to Ankara amidst speculation that Erdoğan refused him an official face-to-face meeting.

The revival of the Turkish–Persian balance of power — a narrative that dominated the Middle East for centuries — is just the first ripple caused by the Iran deal, and should deeply concern U.S. officials. By minimally satisfying American needs for the sake of their own, competing regional goals, both states are undermining U.S. strategy. Can Washington turn the dispute between Ankara and Tehran into an opportunity to develop a coherent Syria strategy? The odds are slim. But now more than ever the United States must be aware of these cross-purposes and factor them into its broader regional calculations.

(originally published in War on the Rocks)

הפוסט Is Turkey’s War on Terror A Consequence of the Iran Deal? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Commentary & Analysis https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-nuclear-deal-with-iran-commentary-analysis/ Tue, 28 Jul 2015 07:37:42 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4677 The deal reached between Iran and the six world powers is likely to have significant implications for Iran’s role in the region, Israel-US relations, domestic American politics, Israel’s foreign policy, and next steps regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This document includes commentary and analysis on these issues by Mitvim Institute experts: Prof. Moshe Ma’oz, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Dr. Ilai Saltzman, and Brian Reeves.

הפוסט The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The deal reached between Iran and the six world powers is likely to have significant implications for Iran’s role in the region, Israel-US relations, domestic American politics, Israel’s foreign policy, and next steps regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This document includes commentary and analysis on these issues by Mitvim Institute experts: Prof. Moshe Ma’oz, Dr. Nimrod Goren, Dr. Ilai Saltzman, and Brian Reeves.

הפוסט The Nuclear Deal with Iran: Commentary & Analysis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/analysis-in-post-nuclear-agreement-middle-east-its-syria-stupid/ Mon, 27 Jul 2015 09:12:02 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4346 Informed commentaries have stressed, somewhat justifiably, Iran’s benefits from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 powers. Yet the agreement is, in many ways, formal confirmation of regional developments that have occurred since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring. These changes have not only transformed Iran into a legitimate player in the regional system, but also into a potential partner in the international campaign against Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra and others. Also, concerns over the emergence of a Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East extending from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Shi’ites in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria, are not new: King Abdullah of Jordan voiced such concerns as early as 2004. The issue of Iranian influence involves two elements, one unknown and one hidden. The real extent of Iran’s influence on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a is not known. We can only speculate that intelligence circles have much more credible information than do social networks or the media. What is important to remember is that many players on both sides of this field are invested in portraying an image of Iran’s role in the region that accords with their own interests. Israel and Saudi Arabia have strategic, geographic and ideological interests in magnifying the threat of a nuclear Iran, while the United States (undoubtedly joined in this by Russia and China, and possibly by the Gulf States bordering on Iran, such as Oman)

הפוסט Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Informed commentaries have stressed, somewhat justifiably, Iran’s benefits from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 powers. Yet the agreement is, in many ways, formal confirmation of regional developments that have occurred since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab Spring. These changes have not only transformed Iran into a legitimate player in the regional system, but also into a potential partner in the international campaign against Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist Sunni organizations such as al-Qaida, Jabhat al-Nusra and others. Also, concerns over the emergence of a Shi’ite Crescent in the Middle East extending from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Shi’ites in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria, are not new: King Abdullah of Jordan voiced such concerns as early as 2004.

The issue of Iranian influence involves two elements, one unknown and one hidden. The real extent of Iran’s influence on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a is not known. We can only speculate that intelligence circles have much more credible information than do social networks or the media. What is important to remember is that many players on both sides of this field are invested in portraying an image of Iran’s role in the region that accords with their own interests. Israel and Saudi Arabia have strategic, geographic and ideological interests in magnifying the threat of a nuclear Iran, while the United States (undoubtedly joined in this by Russia and China, and possibly by the Gulf States bordering on Iran, such as Oman) has the opposite interest of downplaying this threat.

History is familiar with the analogy of the 1938 Munich Agreement, in which Chamberlain and the West capitulated to Hitler but failed to prevent World War II. Yet history is also familiar with efforts to demonize the enemy that were subsequently understood to be exaggerated, if not outright baseless. For example, Israel and the West turned Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s into the Hitler of the Arab world, and according to Israeli intelligence and media sources of the period, the influence of Egypt and Nasser’s pan-Arabism pervaded the entire Arab world, including Iraq, Syria and distant Yemen. Subsequent historiography of the period shows that Nasser’s capabilities were much more limited than the grandiose powers ascribed to him. An assessment of Iran’s true power and regional influence must surely be sober rather than demagogic.

The latent dimension of Iran’s regional influence involves the future of Syria. The keystone of Iran’s strategy in the Arab Middle East is its capacity to support Bashar Assad’s regime. The Iranian-Syrian alliance, which has been in place for over three decades (with a brief interruption during the Gulf War), has become a major axis of regional politics. This is not a “natural” alliance in the respect that it is based on Iran’s cooperation with an Alawite minority regime rather than a broad Shi’ite social foundation. Syria’s significance stems from its geo-strategic location in the heart of the regional system, rather than from any economic resources that it offers. “Whoever would lead the Middle East must control Syria,” wrote esteemed journalist and historian Patrick Seale in the 1960s.

Indeed, harking back to 1950s when Syria became the focus of global and Arab Cold War struggles, at least five powers have competed for control over Syria since the outbreak of the civil war there in 2011: Iran and Russia (through the Alawite regime), the West (through the Free Syria Army), and two jihadi Sunni organizations – IS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

In view of the highly unreliable information from the field, it is difficult to predict what will happen in Syria, or whether it will maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Clearly, Iran’s success in preserving Syria’s Alawite government would be a significant accomplishment and reinforcement of the radical Shi’ite alliance in the region. Assad’s fall, on the other hand, would be a fatal blow to Iran’s regional influence by creating a vacuum in the Shi’ite Crescent, and would also weaken Hezbollah as well as Iran’s influence in Iraq. We can borrow from then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton’s famous 1992 phrase “It’s the economy, stupid,” and state with equal gusto that in post-nuclear-agreement Middle East, “It’s Syria, stupid!”

Since the Western alternative in Syria now appears to be less probable, the West, including Israel, faces a dilemma regarding whether to support Syria – backed by the demonized Iran – or to bet on an alternative regime, with the risk of chaos, anarchy and even territorial changes. Turkey and Saudi Arabia would prefer to get rid of Assad at all costs, while Egypt has decided to prop up the Assad regime. Indeed, one may wonder whether the potential rise of IS or another radical Islamic entity in Syria might be an even more destructive scenario than the Iranian “threat.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Analysis: In post-nuclear agreement Middle East, ‘It’s Syria, stupid!’ הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Supporting Iran Deal Doesn’t Make J Street anti-Israel https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/supporting-iran-deal-doesnt-make-j-street-anti-israel/ Tue, 21 Jul 2015 09:10:23 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4345 Following Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog’s announcement that he opposed the Iranian nuclear deal, right-wing critics wasted no time accusing J Street of being anti-Israel, pointing out that the organization’s extensive efforts to support the deal now fall squarely outside the bounds even of left-wing Zionist discourse. This accusation misses the point entirely: It foremost mischaracterizes pro-Israel support for the deal, ignores the political context in Israel, and most importantly reflects outdated notions of how best to support Israel in an increasingly divided U.S. Congress. The challenges facing each country’s mainstream left differ, leading them to sometimes diverge on strategy. (originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Supporting Iran Deal Doesn’t Make J Street anti-Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Following Zionist Union leader Isaac Herzog’s announcement that he opposed the Iranian nuclear deal, right-wing critics wasted no time accusing J Street of being anti-Israel, pointing out that the organization’s extensive efforts to support the deal now fall squarely outside the bounds even of left-wing Zionist discourse. This accusation misses the point entirely: It foremost mischaracterizes pro-Israel support for the deal, ignores the political context in Israel, and most importantly reflects outdated notions of how best to support Israel in an increasingly divided U.S. Congress. The challenges facing each country’s mainstream left differ, leading them to sometimes diverge on strategy.

הפוסט Supporting Iran Deal Doesn’t Make J Street anti-Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Turkey: The almost mediator state https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/turkey-the-almost-mediator-state-2/ Sat, 18 Jul 2015 08:45:19 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4333 Most analysts today consider Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, its failure must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the U.S. and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline. The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades. However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone. For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Most analysts today consider Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, its failure must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the U.S. and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

The impetus to reconcile Israel and Syria crystallized after Ankara experienced a warming of ties upon the succession of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad by his son Bashar in 2004. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu hoped secret talks would convince Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to engage in direct negotiations under the supervision of the U.S., which would serve Turkish strategic interests and score the Justice and Development Party (AKP) international accolades.

However, within six months negotiations had already stalled. With his country on the brink of open conflict with Hamas, Olmert visited Ankara in late December 2008. The two leaders sat in Erdoğan’s official residence and poured over details with Assad over the telephone. But four days later, Israel launched a military operation to curtail Hamas aggression, and the negotiations quickly came undone.

For Erdoğan, Olmert’s decision to visit Ankara, when he knew full well that the military operation would derail talks, was unforgivable. Rather than salvage the remains however, Erdoğan went on the offensive. Sitting on a panel with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdoğan excoriated Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Regardless of its dispute with Israel, Turkey remained a key player in the eyes of the Obama administration. Washington was convinced – perhaps because of Erdoğan’s previous offers – that Ankara could assist in containing Iran’s nuclear program, the dominant issue in American foreign policy. In October 2009, the Obama administration encouraged Erdoğan and Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to separately and discreetly engage in talks with Iran, as the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) proceeded to deliver a new sanctions resolution.

Instead of proving Turkey’s quality as a mediator, the resulting Tehran Declaration positioned Ankara and Washington at loggerheads. On June 9, 2010, the UNSC voted in favor of a sanctions regime. Turkey and Brazil were the only countries to oppose the measure. Some American analysts argued that the Obama administration should never have given such responsibility to a country so dependent on Iranian trade and energy: sanctions on Iran would negatively impact Turkey’s economy, and therefore it could not function as an impartial actor. Many characterized the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as simply naïve, while others even claimed that this was yet another example of Turkey trying to distance itself from the West.

There are two lessons than can be derived from these unsuccessful mediation efforts. First, the “zero problems” policy should have only been applied to Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, not the relationships between Turkey’s neighbors or relations between various actors in neighboring states. Turkey possesses neither the carrots nor the sticks to be a suitable mediator in those scenarios. More importantly, the affairs of countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood have too critical an impact on Turkey’s own fortunes for it to be considered an unbiased third party. This overextension of Turkish diplomacy came at a serious price. Second, while conceptually the notion of Turkish exceptionalism has found a place in Western political hyperbole, in reality Turkey is ill suited to function as a mediator between Western and Middle Eastern interests. If Erdoğan and Davutoğlu are committed to reframing Turkey’s foreign policy, then settling their own country’s numerous international disputes must be prioritized over the dream of functioning as an arbitrator in global affairs.

(originally published in the Hurriyet Daily News)

הפוסט Turkey: The almost mediator state הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel and the nuclear deal with Iran https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israel-and-the-nuclear-deal-with-iran/ Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:08:32 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4344 The signing of a nuclear deal with Iran will further aggravate the already tense relations between Israel and the US regardless of the exact details of the agreement or the nature of the mechanisms put in place to make it work. To be more specific, this dramatic development will bring Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama further apart. The prime minister presented no coherent and practical alternative; he merely advocated maintaining the sanctions against Iran and dismantling its nuclear program, even by force. This “all or nothing” approach was utterly unacceptable and unfeasible from Obama’s vantage point and mutual criticism lasted until the very last minute. The signing of the nuclear agreement will mark a new stage in Netanyahu’s anti-agreement crusade. Regardless of the outcomes of the battle in Congress, one obvious casualty will be US-Israel relations. Israel has become a partisan political issue, dividing Congress and the Jewish community, forcing people to choose between their president and their support of Israel, as Netanyahu’s speech in Congress vividly showed. Obama will do anything in his power to prevent Congress from interfering in what he believes to be one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of his administration. The crossfire will certainly take its toll and the only question is the exact price Israel will pay. Netanyahu’s maximalist and uncompromising approach throughout the nuclear talks left Israel marginalized and disengaged from the negotiations. In the post-deal period, the Israeli government must engage the administration in good faith and regain

הפוסט Israel and the nuclear deal with Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The signing of a nuclear deal with Iran will further aggravate the already tense relations between Israel and the US regardless of the exact details of the agreement or the nature of the mechanisms put in place to make it work. To be more specific, this dramatic development will bring Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Barack Obama further apart. The prime minister presented no coherent and practical alternative; he merely advocated maintaining the sanctions against Iran and dismantling its nuclear program, even by force. This “all or nothing” approach was utterly unacceptable and unfeasible from Obama’s vantage point and mutual criticism lasted until the very last minute.

The signing of the nuclear agreement will mark a new stage in Netanyahu’s anti-agreement crusade.

Regardless of the outcomes of the battle in Congress, one obvious casualty will be US-Israel relations.

Israel has become a partisan political issue, dividing Congress and the Jewish community, forcing people to choose between their president and their support of Israel, as Netanyahu’s speech in Congress vividly showed. Obama will do anything in his power to prevent Congress from interfering in what he believes to be one of the most significant diplomatic achievements of his administration. The crossfire will certainly take its toll and the only question is the exact price Israel will pay.

Netanyahu’s maximalist and uncompromising approach throughout the nuclear talks left Israel marginalized and disengaged from the negotiations. In the post-deal period, the Israeli government must engage the administration in good faith and regain access to the decision-making process, in order to influence the way the agreement is enforced and Iran’s nuclear facilities are monitored.

Moreover, in the long term, Israel should seek a reversal of Iran’s destabilizing policies in the region through encouraging US-Iranian rapprochement induced by the nuclear agreement.

Recently, Netanyahu began arguing in favor of a regional solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that involves other actors such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. He should apply the same logic to resolve the Iranian challenge to Middle Eastern stability. No doubt he will find an attentive ear in the White House if he chooses to do so.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and the nuclear deal with Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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To win, the Israeli left needs to learn from Bibi https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/to-win-the-israeli-left-needs-to-learn-from-bibi/ Sat, 09 May 2015 19:06:36 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4295 The Knesset election results have put the left on the defensive. It has since had to explain why it lost, and the blame was placed on the usual suspects: An ineffective campaign, a lack of charismatic leadership, abandoning peripheral and low-income populations, demographic trends in Israeli society, and more. The truth of the matter is that the left has been on the defensive since 1977, when the right rose to power. In the first years of independence, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion famously said he would consider any coalition “without Herut and Maki,” effectively demarcating the boundaries of political legitimacy – without Menachem Begin’s Revisionist right on the one hand, and without the radical Left in the form of the Israeli Communist Party, on the other. Years later, when Likud appropriated the term “national camp,” it was similarly meant to delegitimize their political rivals as not sufficiently “national.” The importance attached to branding was reflected in the Labor Party’s decision, before the last election, to change its name to “the Zionist Union.” It didn’t signal an ideological change, but rather a response to the right, by way of saying: we are Zionists, too. This apologetic step, however, backfired. Not only did it alienate Arab voters, it was also seen as another act of groveling before the nationalist right. The main error of the Zionist Union was its equivocation on key policies. Evidently, the use of non-radical messaging was meant to attract centrist and right-of-center voters. This pattern was particularly evident in

הפוסט To win, the Israeli left needs to learn from Bibi הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Knesset election results have put the left on the defensive. It has since had to explain why it lost, and the blame was placed on the usual suspects: An ineffective campaign, a lack of charismatic leadership, abandoning peripheral and low-income populations, demographic trends in Israeli society, and more.

הפוסט To win, the Israeli left needs to learn from Bibi הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/the-next-steps-toward-resolving-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/ Thu, 07 May 2015 07:22:35 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4654 In the immediate aftermath of Israel’s recent elections and the formation of its 34th government, and not long after a period of conflict with Gaza and heightened tensions amongst Israel’s Arab population, over thirty experts, diplomats, civil servants, journalists, and representatives of think tanks and NGOs gathered in Jerusalem on 7 May 2015 for a policy-planning workshop convened by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the International Crisis Group. On the agenda were possible next steps toward resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict. This paper summarizes the main points raised in the workshop. It focuses on the analysis of key players and the assessment of future options.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In the immediate aftermath of Israel’s recent elections and the formation of its 34th government, and not long after a period of conflict with Gaza and heightened tensions amongst Israel’s Arab population, over thirty experts, diplomats, civil servants, journalists, and representatives of think tanks and NGOs gathered in Jerusalem on 7 May 2015 for a policy-planning workshop convened by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and the International Crisis Group. On the agenda were possible next steps toward resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict. This paper summarizes the main points raised in the workshop. It focuses on the analysis of key players and the assessment of future options.

הפוסט The Next Steps toward Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Turkey: The Almost Mediator State https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/turkey-the-almost-mediator-state/ Sun, 26 Apr 2015 08:42:56 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4330 Most analysts consider Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to religious conservative movements like the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, the failures of the last few years must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey has insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the United States and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Most analysts consider Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategy a failure, and typically cite Turkey’s decision to lend its support to religious conservative movements like the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring as a primary example. However, the failures of the last few years must also be understood within the framework of a larger narrative where Turkey has insisted on functioning as an intermediary between Israel and Syria, and the United States and Iran. These episodes, during which Turkey overstepped the boundaries of its influence, revealed the limitations of Turkish foreign policy and foreshadowed its regional decline.

הפוסט Turkey: The Almost Mediator State הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Applying the ‘Obama Doctrine’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/applying-the-obama-doctrine-to-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/ Sun, 19 Apr 2015 07:57:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4317 Thomas Friedman’s interview with President Barack Obama on the Iranian nuclear issue evoked many responses, both positive and negative. In this interview, Friedman attempted to describe Obama’s policy toward pariah states such as Burma, Cuba and Iran as a comprehensive strategy that Friedman coined the Obama Doctrine (The New York Times, April 6, 2015). The essence of this “doctrine” is that a combination of engagement and satisfaction of core strategic needs could serve American interests far better than sanctions and isolation. America, in Obama’s opinion, with its overwhelming power, should have the confidence to take some calculated risks to create important new opportunities. He believes that the United States is sufficiently powerful to test new diplomatic propositions without putting itself at risk. Although Obama hopes to see a change in Iran’s position in the forthcoming years, leading it to discontinue or slow its nuclear journey, America will be in a position to use its deterrence capabilities and military force if no such change develops. According to this argument, a superpower with a defense budget of $600 billion should be able to ward off any threat emanating from a nation with $30b budget. Time will tell whether the Obama Doctrine with regard to Iran (and pariah states in general) was successful or merely wishful thinking, but no one can deny the logic of this reasoning, even if doubts regarding the sincerity of Iranian intentions persist. Interestingly, the logic underlying this doctrine appears to be even more relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian case.

הפוסט Applying the ‘Obama Doctrine’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Thomas Friedman’s interview with President Barack Obama on the Iranian nuclear issue evoked many responses, both positive and negative. In this interview, Friedman attempted to describe Obama’s policy toward pariah states such as Burma, Cuba and Iran as a comprehensive strategy that Friedman coined the Obama Doctrine (The New York Times, April 6, 2015).

The essence of this “doctrine” is that a combination of engagement and satisfaction of core strategic needs could serve American interests far better than sanctions and isolation.

America, in Obama’s opinion, with its overwhelming power, should have the confidence to take some calculated risks to create important new opportunities.

He believes that the United States is sufficiently powerful to test new diplomatic propositions without putting itself at risk. Although Obama hopes to see a change in Iran’s position in the forthcoming years, leading it to discontinue or slow its nuclear journey, America will be in a position to use its deterrence capabilities and military force if no such change develops.

According to this argument, a superpower with a defense budget of $600 billion should be able to ward off any threat emanating from a nation with $30b budget.

Time will tell whether the Obama Doctrine with regard to Iran (and pariah states in general) was successful or merely wishful thinking, but no one can deny the logic of this reasoning, even if doubts regarding the sincerity of Iranian intentions persist. Interestingly, the logic underlying this doctrine appears to be even more relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian case.

A self-confident Israel, with a defense budget amounting to NIS 57b., is a superpower in comparison to the approximately $1b. budget of the Palestinian Authority (the figures for Hamas are more problematic although there is obviously a wide gap here as well). According to the Obama Doctrine, such a gap allows Israel to take risks and offer some substantial concessions with regard to the occupied territories. Israel’s consistent argument that it does not have the luxury to test this proposition is disingenuous because its military might could easily undo whatever has been conceded.

Moreover, an agreement with the Palestinians would be supported by security guarantees provided by the United States, the European Community and perhaps other parties in the region, which would help deter Israel’s potential enemies.

Unfortunately, the chances that the newly composed rightwing government will adopt this line of reasoning are slim at best. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political allies, there is no partner on the Palestinian side. While he may be correct with regard to Hamas, placing Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas firmly in the “no partner” square is a mistake. The problem, however, goes far beyond the policy of the current government, as most Israeli governments were reluctant to take initiative in the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel was even reluctant to formally endorse, or even positively respond, to the Arab Peace Initiative, which might have served as an umbrella for advancing an agreement with the Palestinians.

The conclusion must be, therefore, that the chances for an independent Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough initiated by Israel are close to zero. This leaves the Obama administration as the only viable player that can ignite the process by offering a blueprint for a solution.

If Obama applies his doctrine to the Israeli-Palestinian case, we can expect the Obama Doctrine to be followed by the Obama Peace Plan or the Obama Peace Parameters.

In contrast to Clinton, who offered his vision in his final days in office in December 2000, Obama has sufficient time in office to promote his plan if he acts now. While the chances of this eventuality seem remote in view of the failure of the Kerry mission in 2014, coupled by Obama’s reluctance to further antagonize the Israeli government following the controversy over the Iran deal, perhaps Obama might be ready to take the chance of offering his own vision for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

After all, the deal with Iran was similarly driven by the conviction that it was “the right thing to do.” Such a proposal would surely arouse heated political debate in Israel and may lead to internal changes.

But if the Israeli government involves itself in domestic American politics, there is no reason why the United States cannot do the same.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Applying the ‘Obama Doctrine’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/a-hard-right-israeli-coalition-would-dog-ties-with-us-for-years/ Wed, 25 Mar 2015 09:04:16 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4342 Following Benjamin Netanyahu’s surprise landslide victory in the Israeli general election, the new question that has swept the national scene is how the incumbent Prime Minister will compose his ruling coalition. In order to avoid forming a coalition that is unstable or ideologically unsound, he is left with one option: a hard right-wing government. Needing 61 Knesset seats to govern, this option would entail a combination of the Likud (30), his allies on the right (24), and the ultra-Orthodox parties (13). Despite this support domestically, such a move would spell disaster for Israel on the world stage. Far more than upsetting the EU and the UN—a reality Israelis have long come to stomach—a rightist coalition left unchecked to pursue its objectives would almost inevitably undermine Israel’s already strained relationship with its key ally and financial backer, the United States. For starters, Netanyahu will have a grueling time keeping his relations with U.S. President Obama afloat. Ties between the leaders have still not had time to mend since the fallout from Netanyahu’s Congressional speech, aggravated by years of discord and undermining. Moreover, if an Israeli report back in January is true, that Obama considered Netanyahu “toast,” one can only imagine how the administration will react if Netanyahu implements the extensive settlement expansion those on the hard right and in his own party have demanded. With two years left to seal his legacy, Obama seemed positioned to get tough as reports previously indicated he is planning one last initiative to advance the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Now, before that process

הפוסט A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Following Benjamin Netanyahu’s surprise landslide victory in the Israeli general election, the new question that has swept the national scene is how the incumbent Prime Minister will compose his ruling coalition. In order to avoid forming a coalition that is unstable or ideologically unsound, he is left with one option: a hard right-wing government. Needing 61 Knesset seats to govern, this option would entail a combination of the Likud (30), his allies on the right (24), and the ultra-Orthodox parties (13).

Despite this support domestically, such a move would spell disaster for Israel on the world stage. Far more than upsetting the EU and the UN—a reality Israelis have long come to stomach—a rightist coalition left unchecked to pursue its objectives would almost inevitably undermine Israel’s already strained relationship with its key ally and financial backer, the United States.

For starters, Netanyahu will have a grueling time keeping his relations with U.S. President Obama afloat. Ties between the leaders have still not had time to mend since the fallout from Netanyahu’s Congressional speech, aggravated by years of discord and undermining. Moreover, if an Israeli report back in January is true, that Obama considered Netanyahu “toast,” one can only imagine how the administration will react if Netanyahu implements the extensive settlement expansion those on the hard right and in his own party have demanded.

With two years left to seal his legacy, Obama seemed positioned to get tough as reports previously indicated he is planning one last initiative to advance the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Now, before that process can even begin, Netanyahu is having to backpedal on his pre-election message that if he was reelected he would ensure that no Palestinian state will be created—a statement that likely helped him peel away precious mandates from the far-right Jewish Home party.

Although Obama may eventually need to take a more accommodative approach to Netanyahu to bring any progress toward resolving the conflict—or at least agreed-upon international parameters—comments from his administration in the post-election period so far indicate that he is committed to ramping up pressure. As some have noted, this pressure could come in the form of supporting a Palestinian state at the UN or simply refraining from shielding Israel from international pressure.

Then there are the Iranian nuclear talks. Having shown little if any remorse during the Congressional speech controversy, Netanyahu will doubtless continue to thwart a deal in any way he can. And yet, any more bold actions from him could again jeopardize the US government’s strong support for Israel at the UN, concerning intelligence sharing, and in other foreseeable ways short of withholding foreign aid.

Assuming a stable right-wing Israel government does not collapse within the next two years, Netanyahu will outlast Obama and find himself with a new American presidential counterpart. In either scenario of a Democrat or Republican taking office in 2016, Netanyahu would still find himself at odds with the White House.

If de facto Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton is any measuring stick, her comments during and after her service as Secretary of State reveal that Israel can expect more of the same regarding Obama’s views on Iran, as well as his and her husband Bill’s positions on both the conflict and on Netanyahu personally.

If a Republican is elected as president, history has shown the dynamic between the two nations’ leaders could be even more capricious. Even conservative hardliner George W. Bush—despite the nostalgia in Israel for his presidency—went so far as to counsel Netanyahu’s rival, Tzipi Livni, on how to beat the Likud in the 2009 general election, just as Hillary Clinton had soon afterward. Unconditional and hawkish Republican rhetoric domestically and in Congressional chambers apparently does not translate to the office of the Commander-in-Chief.

Beyond challenges from American presidents down the road, the policy direction that Netanyahu and a hard right-wing coalition would take will likely further erode the American domestic support base for the Israeli government in Congress and among the Jewish community that has long served as a critical component of Israel’s soft power.

The lack of Israeli diplomatic engagement with all sides of the pro-Israel spectrum—including the dovish lobby group, J Street—and staunch disagreements among the U.S. and Israeli governments will transform Israel even more into a divisive issue in the American political arena. Both problems could be significantly mitigated by earnest Israeli efforts to resolve the conflict, yet these would be out of the question for the coalition under discussion.

Netanyahu’s final decision on a coalition may still be weeks away, but if he makes that perilous of decisions to form an all-right-wing government, its probable course of action will risk leaving an indelible stain on ties with the American president, on the bipartisan domestic American support for Israel and on the US-Israel “special relationship” itself.

(originally published in The Hill)

הפוסט A hard-right Israeli coalition would dog ties with US for years הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Israel’s Foreign Policy: Towards Isolation or Integration? https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/israels-foreign-policy-towards-isolation-or-integration/ Wed, 25 Feb 2015 07:02:27 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4627 MK Tzipi Livni (Zionist Union), Minister Dr. Yuval Steinitz (Likud), MK Ofer Shelah (Yesh Atid), Dr. Michael Oren (Koolanu) and Mossi Raz (Meretz) spoke at a pre-elections event on Israel’s foreign policy, convened by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. The event took place in Tel Aviv on February 25, 2015, and was moderated by Arad Nir of Channel 2 News.

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Policy: Towards Isolation or Integration? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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MK Tzipi Livni (Zionist Union), Minister Dr. Yuval Steinitz (Likud), MK Ofer Shelah (Yesh Atid), Dr. Michael Oren (Koolanu) and Mossi Raz (Meretz) spoke at a pre-elections event on Israel’s foreign policy, convened by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. The event took place in Tel Aviv on February 25, 2015, and was moderated by Arad Nir of Channel 2 News.

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Policy: Towards Isolation or Integration? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Jerusalem’s Itchy Trigger Finger https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/jerusalems-itchy-trigger-finger/ Thu, 19 Dec 2013 19:00:03 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4291 Of all the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran — from the onset of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and an Iranian extension of “a nuclear umbrella” to regional proxies, from a nuclear bomb falling into terrorist hands to an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or even on the United States — the one we should take most seriously goes virtually unmentioned: a miscalculated nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran. It’s a risk that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should consider carefully; when push comes to shove, having a bomb might only make a conflict between the two countries more likely. In fact, when considering how this chain of events might unfold, the basic strategic calculus would suggest that it is Israel — rather than Iran — that would be more liable to make the calamitous mistake of initiating a nuclear conflagration. This assessment is not invoked lightly, let alone accusingly. Since Israel first obtained nuclear military capabilities in the late 1960s, it has proven itself to be an extremely responsible nuclear power. In fact, given the level of threat the country has faced — including the perceived threat to its very existence during the 1973 Yom Kippur War — Israel might well be deemed the most responsible nuclear power in the world. Read the full article at Foreign Policy

הפוסט Jerusalem’s Itchy Trigger Finger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Of all the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran — from the onset of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and an Iranian extension of “a nuclear umbrella” to regional proxies, from a nuclear bomb falling into terrorist hands to an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel or even on the United States — the one we should take most seriously goes virtually unmentioned: a miscalculated nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran. It’s a risk that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should consider carefully; when push comes to shove, having a bomb might only make a conflict between the two countries more likely. In fact, when considering how this chain of events might unfold, the basic strategic calculus would suggest that it is Israel — rather than Iran — that would be more liable to make the calamitous mistake of initiating a nuclear conflagration.

This assessment is not invoked lightly, let alone accusingly. Since Israel first obtained nuclear military capabilities in the late 1960s, it has proven itself to be an extremely responsible nuclear power. In fact, given the level of threat the country has faced — including the perceived threat to its very existence during the 1973 Yom Kippur War — Israel might well be deemed the most responsible nuclear power in the world.

Read the full article at Foreign Policy

הפוסט Jerusalem’s Itchy Trigger Finger הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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In praise of appeasement https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/in-praise-of-appeasement/ Mon, 25 Nov 2013 09:02:17 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4341 If the Israeli prime minister and his self-appointed advocates across the ocean took their historical analogies seriously, they would know that the surest recipe for war with Iran lies not in appeasement but in humiliation. After all, though Neville Chamberlain’s policy toward Nazi Germany proved fatefully ineffective, the real seeds for the rise of Nazi Germany and the eruption of World War II were sown not in Munich but in Versailles – in the humiliating terms the victorious powers imposed on Germany at the end of World War I. In fact, the problem with Chamberlain’s policy toward Hitler was less the policy and far more Hitler. To argue otherwise may prove to be politically self-serving but is, and always has been, morally and logically specious: Morally because to place so much of the blame on Chamberlain is always to a certain extent to exonerate Hitler; and logically because the 1938 Munich debacle was never so much a case study of appeasement as of its failure. To be sure, only time will tell whether the deal struck in Geneva will pave the way for a comprehensive agreement that will bring about greater stability for Israel and its Arab neighbors. But one thing is certain: Its success will largely ride on its ability to have provided the Iranians a measure of appeasement. For Munich notwithstanding, appeasement can be a highly useful diplomatic tool – one that the players of power politics can wield to great strategic advantage. In fact, we all paid

הפוסט In praise of appeasement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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If the Israeli prime minister and his self-appointed advocates across the ocean took their historical analogies seriously, they would know that the surest recipe for war with Iran lies not in appeasement but in humiliation. After all, though Neville Chamberlain’s policy toward Nazi Germany proved fatefully ineffective, the real seeds for the rise of Nazi Germany and the eruption of World War II were sown not in Munich but in Versailles – in the humiliating terms the victorious powers imposed on Germany at the end of World War I.

In fact, the problem with Chamberlain’s policy toward Hitler was less the policy and far more Hitler. To argue otherwise may prove to be politically self-serving but is, and always has been, morally and logically specious: Morally because to place so much of the blame on Chamberlain is always to a certain extent to exonerate Hitler; and logically because the 1938 Munich debacle was never so much a case study of appeasement as of its failure.

To be sure, only time will tell whether the deal struck in Geneva will pave the way for a comprehensive agreement that will bring about greater stability for Israel and its Arab neighbors. But one thing is certain: Its success will largely ride on its ability to have provided the Iranians a measure of appeasement.

For Munich notwithstanding, appeasement can be a highly useful diplomatic tool – one that the players of power politics can wield to great strategic advantage. In fact, we all paid tribute to one of its greatest successes last week when we honored president Kennedy.

Although rarely recognized as such, Kennedy’s legacy is the appeasement he prudently employed in defusing the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Recognizing the risk that Khrushchev might well opt for a nuclear war rather than bow down to an American dictate, Kennedy secretly offered him a face-saving deal: In return for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, the United States would remove its missiles stationed in Turkey.

It was a bold and pragmatic gesture, at the core of which lay a measured, strategic concession. Had the terms of the deal been made public at the time, Kennedy no doubt would have been finished off politically.

In the event, they saved the planet from nuclear catastrophe.

Unfortunately, not only has Binyamin Netanyahu been excoriating the emerging deal as appeasement, but he has been recklessly touting in its stead a politics of humiliation. As he put it in a speech before the Jewish Federations of North America the other week (and in a much-cited tweet the following day), the international sanctions regime “has brought Iran to its knees” – which is why, he went on to argue, Western powers should be able to extract from Iran a better deal than they just cut in Geneva.

This is a tragic mistake – and one that the Israeli leader should have learned not only from European history but also from Israel’s own. Simply put, Israel has never bought itself peace or security by humiliating its adversaries; the opposite is closer to the truth. The Arabs’ humiliation in the 1967 war should have rested that case forever. After all, it was only after Egypt and Syria could claim to have regained their honor in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 that they were ready to offer Israel real stability – whether in the form of a formal peace treaty (as with Egypt) or in four decades of a peaceful border (as, until recently, in Syria).

For this reason, Netanyahu’s demand that Iran completely dismantle its nuclear program is wrongheaded whichever way we look at it. First, because the Iranians will never acquiesce to it; and second, because even if they did, the deal would amount to such a shameful national surrender that it could boomerang in various ways. A humiliating deal would exacerbate Iranian grievances against the West and embolden hardliners to oust President Rouhani and his relatively pragmatic coalition from power. A humiliating deal is one that Iran would more likely violate or possibly even abrogate. It is a deal that would set the stage for Iran to seek to reclaim its lost honor and pave the way for the very war that the deal was designed to preempt.

Only a measure of appeasement will give Iran a way out – and the world at large the prospects of a diplomatic triumph. Branding the deal as appeasement, therefore, is not only to fail to condemn it, but it is to hail it for the bold pragmatism that is necessary for diplomacy to win the day.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט In praise of appeasement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/curing-the-hiccups-in-israeli-turkish-negotiations/ Tue, 05 Nov 2013 08:35:15 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4328 From tales of Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan revealing the names of 10 Mossad assets to Iranian authorities, to El Al being locked out of the Turkish market, it is hard to find a silver lining amid the darkening clouds of Israeli-Turkish relations. Of course there are only losers in this kind of game. Both prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Binyamin Netanyahu are finding it increasingly difficult to actualize their country’s foreign policy goals without regional partnership. For President Barack Obama it may register as his biggest diplomatic failure to date; it is one thing to struggle with coaxing enemies to the negotiation table, but an inability to reconcile longtime strategic partners is thoroughly disquieting. And the stalemate continues to negatively impact the Israeli and Turkish publics. For this reason, Track II policymakers from the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul and Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies congregated last week to brainstorm fresh methods that would reinvigorate the stagnant negotiations. It was a unique opportunity for dialogue during a time when diplomatic ties are downgraded and negative attitudes dominate. What came out of the (at times heated) discussions was the need, in lieu of the changes within Turkish civil society, for a new narrative, which can substitute for the military partnership that defined much of the past 60 years. Some of these narratives already exist. Erdogan’s outburst at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident aside, bilateral trade between the two countries has quadrupled since 1999 and now

הפוסט Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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From tales of Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan revealing the names of 10 Mossad assets to Iranian authorities, to El Al being locked out of the Turkish market, it is hard to find a silver lining amid the darkening clouds of Israeli-Turkish relations.

Of course there are only losers in this kind of game. Both prime ministers Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Binyamin Netanyahu are finding it increasingly difficult to actualize their country’s foreign policy goals without regional partnership.

For President Barack Obama it may register as his biggest diplomatic failure to date; it is one thing to struggle with coaxing enemies to the negotiation table, but an inability to reconcile longtime strategic partners is thoroughly disquieting. And the stalemate continues to negatively impact the Israeli and Turkish publics.

For this reason, Track II policymakers from the Global Political Trends Center in Istanbul and Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies congregated last week to brainstorm fresh methods that would reinvigorate the stagnant negotiations.

It was a unique opportunity for dialogue during a time when diplomatic ties are downgraded and negative attitudes dominate.

What came out of the (at times heated) discussions was the need, in lieu of the changes within Turkish civil society, for a new narrative, which can substitute for the military partnership that defined much of the past 60 years.

Some of these narratives already exist.

Erdogan’s outburst at Davos and the Mavi Marmara incident aside, bilateral trade between the two countries has quadrupled since 1999 and now stands at over $4 billion annually. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war when Assad closed his borders, Israel – in an act of extreme flexibility – has aided Turkey in the transportation of goods to and from Jordan.

Both countries have the ability to assist the other in conflict resolution, whether it be Palestine or elsewhere.

Israel’s offshore gas equation will (in all likelihood) involve a Turkish solution with critical regional implications.

This is not to mention the mutual strategic interests that Israel and Turkey continue to share vis a vis Syria and the Iranian nuclear program.

But no matter what new narratives may be developed in the future, the current impasse must first be settled, and Mitvim and GPoT participants were able to shed enormous light on the obstacles currently facing negotiators.

Israelis expressed a feeling of betrayal after Netanyahu’s apology in March was coldly received, and reiterated the primacy of legal innocence regardless of whether the government agrees to an ex gratia payment to the Mavi Marmara victims. Most importantly, many of the Israelis present insisted that Turkey drop all charges against any IDF officers of soldiers believed to be, or who actually were involved in the 2010 affair.

The Turks present made it abundantly clear that the criminal and civil cases related to the Mavi Marmara – which have largely been hijacked by the IHH – could no longer be dropped without the signing of an international treaty voted upon by parliament; further negotiations would be necessary in order to reach a mutually satisfactory and honorable conclusion. In addition they reiterated how a show of good will in Gaza would be positively received by the Turkish media.

Some in the room (and no doubt a healthy dose of my readers) remained skeptical. They pinned everything on Erdogan or Netanyahu. Yet those doubts were countered on both sides by claims that Erdogan has come to regret the exuberance he exhibited while divorcing from Israel, and that Netanyahu’s unwillingness to apologize was due the influence of Avigdor Liberman.

Each leader was described as a pragmatist, an intriguing term considering the abundance of negative publicity their policies and statements attract.

Though it remained unclear whether the skeptics were sufficiently answered, everyone agreed that a third party was the crucial link to ensuring normalization.

Names of potential negotiators were bandied about, including retired heads of state Carl Bildt and Bill Clinton, but I believe the only person who would garner the respect and attention of Erdogan and Netanyahu is President Obama himself.

Obama has fallen short on so many occasions it is impossible to propose his name without reservations. And yet there is a certain measure of hard and soft power generated by the White House that makes even a half-hearted effort by a lame duck impossible to ignore (see current peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians).

If Obama chose to personally tackle Israeli-Turkish negotiations, to commit fully and not be satisfied until the job is done, then we could see the normalization of ties within the next six months.

Until that day arrives, institutions like Mitvim and GPoT will continue to promote alternative channels of communication with open eyes in the quest for a new Israeli-Turkish narrative. For two Middle Eastern democracies with a history of extreme peaks and valleys, it is impossible to speak in absolutes, but considering the high level of dialogue when representatives of both countries meet it is hard to believe that relations will stay down for long.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Curing the hiccups in Israeli-Turkish negotiations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran https://mitvim.org.il/en/publication/what-happens-after-israel-attacks-iran/ Thu, 23 Feb 2012 18:35:28 +0000 https://mitvim.org.il/?post_type=publication&p=4283 Since its birth in 1948, Israel has launched numerous preemptive military strikes against its foes. In 1981 and 2007, it destroyed the nuclear reactors of Iraq and Syria, operations that did not lead to war. But now, Israelis are discussing the possibility of another preemptive attack — against Iran — that might result in a wider conflict. The public debate in Israel about whether Jerusalem should order a strike on Iran’s nuclear program is surprisingly frank. Politicians and policymakers often discuss the merits of an attack in public; over the past year, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have sparred regularly and openly with former Mossad director Meir Dagan, the most prominent opponent of an Israeli operation. But much of the conversation is focused on whether Israel should strike, not on what might happen if it does — in other words, the result on the “day after.” Read the full article at Foreign Affairs

הפוסט What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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Since its birth in 1948, Israel has launched numerous preemptive military strikes against its foes. In 1981 and 2007, it destroyed the nuclear reactors of Iraq and Syria, operations that did not lead to war. But now, Israelis are discussing the possibility of another preemptive attack — against Iran — that might result in a wider conflict.

The public debate in Israel about whether Jerusalem should order a strike on Iran’s nuclear program is surprisingly frank. Politicians and policymakers often discuss the merits of an attack in public; over the past year, for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak have sparred regularly and openly with former Mossad director Meir Dagan, the most prominent opponent of an Israeli operation. But much of the conversation is focused on whether Israel should strike, not on what might happen if it does — in other words, the result on the “day after.”

Read the full article at Foreign Affairs

הפוסט What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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