• To sideline Trump’s dangerous proposals for Gaza, stabilise the situation, and generate diplomatic progress, European actors must work with Arab states and others to present viable alternatives that can credibly claim to better fit Trump’s regional goals. In this context European actors should focus on achievable outcomes and play to their strengths. Whereas Europeans have limited capacity when it comes to strongarming Israelis or Palestinians to make difficult
compromises on final status issues, they have a lot to offer in bottom-up Palestinian state building and establishing a regional framework for a two-state process.

Stopping the war and creating a regional framework for diplomacy

• European actors must work with as wide a coalition as possible of Arab states and others to persuade Trump that his interests are aligned with the European
mainstream, moderate Arab states, and moderate Israelis and Palestinians.

• Europeans should work with Arab states and others to promote conditions that are politically helpful for Israeli moderates to make the case domestically for
regional normalization linked to Israeli commitment to a demilitarized Palestinian state.

Stopping annexationist moves in the West Bank

• Changes in the West Bank driven by settler extremists working with ministers are threatening Palestinians and entrenching the settlement project with the intention of making a two-state solution impossible.

• If Netanyahu, with the backing of the Trump administration, continues down this path, European actors will have to consider what costs and incentives they can apply to influence Israeli government steps. In deploying any coercive measures, they must consider how to maximise intended effects whilst minimising the risk of unintended consequences.

• At the same time, there may be untapped potential for European incentives. Floating recognition of Israeli positions on issues like refugees, settlement blocks
and Jerusalem as part of a regional process could deepen the divide between Netanyahu’s coalition and the mainstream.

Bottom-up Palestinian state building

• An indispensable component for progress towards a Palestinian state is a revitalised Palestinian Authority, with the priority being security (for both Israelis and Palestinians) governance and delivery.

• The agenda should include measures to strengthen Israeli confidence, including delivering on announced changes to stop the welfare system rewarding terrorists, removing incitement from the education system, and reassessing the role of UNRWA.

• For the Trump administration, the EU’s role in reforming the PA through newly applied conditionality should be framed as an essential building block for a successful normalisation deal involving Saudi Arabia.

• The Gaza Strip represents an immeasurable logistical challenge. Politically the challenge is to create mechanisms for international actors and the PA to rebuild, whilst marginalizing Hamas.

Bolstering moderates in wider society

• Any hope for a future stable political order depends on a critical mass of public support on both sides for the goal of a two-state solution.

• Europeans should significantly increase long term investments in grass roots peace building.

• They should also confront social media companies about the promotion of extremist content, and work with them to support content orientated towards moderation and coexistence.

• Europeans should partner with Arab and wider Muslim cultural drivers of tolerance and moderation.

הפוסט Stopping annexation and advancing normalization in Trump-world: A framework for European policy makers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In fact, under growing global friction, when fractures are clearly showing between the unpredictable and belligerent Trump administration and the rest of the West, the current far-right Israeli government finds itself in a more comfortable EU zone – that of interests and real-politic. The new Israeli foreign Minister, Gideon Saar, even said that some in Europe sees Israel as a potential bridge to the Trump administration.

Netanyahu was the first international leader to meet Trump at the White House and received more support than he could have expected. When EU’s new High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas, visited Washington, secretary of state Marco Rubio canceled the meeting with her without explanation or apology. Later that day, at his first cabinet meeting, Trump stated that the EU was created “to screw the US” and that he intends to impose 25% trade tariffs on the bloc.

In the rapidly shifting transatlantic relationship—where a Trump administration appears to be disengaging from Ukraine and Europe — the EU must choose its battles. It is clear to everyone that Ukraine comes first and is linked to strengthening the defence of Europe. Gaza is not even third. Perhaps reacting to Trump’s tariffs on Europe are? The EU’s internal interest of repatriating rejected asylum seekers to the new Syria and elsewhere? Stopping Iran from turning nuclear? Much is on the list. Under the current ceasefire, Gaza and the Palestinian issue ranks low in priority.

Thus, while the EU formulates a normative language that largely reflects its liberal-democratic values, its bark has no bite. This is not new. We’re back to the EU simultaneously condemning Israel while also considering deeper cooperation with it in research and innovation, energy, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and other fields.

Critical engagement

It’s important to remember that the convening of the Association Council is a commitment under the EU -Israel Association Agreement, setting a routine and institutionalized political dialogue once a year. Nowhere in the agreement does it say that meetings will only occur if relations are good or improving. The purpose of the Association Council is to facilitate dialogue — whether critical, friendly, or a mix of both.

Actually, it is precisely in times of crises that it is essential for the parties to engage in an open and candid dialogue – what EU calls critical engagement.

More than anything, the latest Association Council meeting reflected the shift from the previous Commission, where the former foreign policy chief Josep Borrell led a strongly critical tone – even confrontational – toward Israel, to the second von der Leyen Commission. President Ursula von der Leyen had always a friendlier stance toward Israel.

Borrell’s successor, Kaja Kallas, does not have a particularly defined position on Israel. She adheres to EU’s “agreed language” and promoted the meeting for the sake of engagement. She is now scheduled to visit Israel in late March. Borrell only visited Israel once in November 2023, six weeks after Hamas’s murderous terrorist attack on Israel, when he was still using acceptable language.

Soon afterwards he returned to harsh rhetoric against Israel. Later he amplified the positions of Spain and Ireland, who pushed to invoke Article 2 of the Association Agreement. The article stipulates that the agreement is based on shared democratic values and respect for human rights.

By now, the position of Spain and Ireland aimed at downgrading relations with Israel has been dropped. Article 2 was only generally mentioned in the EU position paper for the Association Council.

The new Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, has been tasked to plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. Similarly to Kallas, she does not have a specific approach to Israel – neither as favorable as Várhelyi, the former Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, nor as critical as Lenarčič, the former Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid. Together with von der Leyen, this trio of women is relatively neutral or even supportive of Israel.

Criticism, cooperation and challenges

Kallas must also represent the position of all 27 EU member states. As a result, the EU’s statement on the eve of the Association Council meeting was drafted as a 1+1 formula: both political and normative criticism, alongside an expressed willingness for deeper cooperation with Israel.

It is mainly diplomacy and security which stands in the center of this real-politic approach. In a world where global friction and internal Western fractures are intensifying – as highlighted by the Trump-Zelensky disastrous meeting in the Oval Office – Israel is both a burden and an asset to the EU.

It is a burden because when the EU engages with Israel in what appears to be business as usual, it faces allegations of double standards from the Global South, human rights organizations and part of the public in Europe. About 120 organizations have signed a protest letter calling for a review of the Association Agreement with Israel because of its alleged violations of international and humanitarian law. The protest would have probably been even stronger if they would have added settlers’ violence and de-facto annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank.

Israel is an asset because, like it or not, it got the upper hand in its multi-front war against Iran and its proxies in the region. As the EU has to rebuild and strengthen its defence capabilities and military know-how, Israel has valuable assets to offer.

The Israeli government is a liability because of its refusal to plan for a political exit strategy from Gaza which could lead to a political solution of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Israel can become an asset if it brings about a desired normalisation with Saudi Arabia, which will also advance peace with the Palestinians. Such a 1+1 approach is a direction that the EU would be willing to advance and take part in.

הפוסט The EU-Israel Association Council: Harsh Criticism of Israel Alongside Desire to Advance Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A “Revitalized” EUBAM Rafah? One Avenue for Eu’s Involvement in the “Day After” in Gaza הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The European Union’s response to the war in Gaza has been widely criticized as irrelevant and incoherent, casting doubt on its ability to become a credible player in the region. While the EU is indeed incoherent, it is not entirely irrelevant. Its chief relevance lies in the civil sphere, mainly through its efforts to sustain and encourage reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and its role as a capacity builder. These EU actions and capabilities have political significance for the “day after” the war. The EU has many tools it can use in the region but has yet to show a collective willingness to fully employ them, because of internal divisions and the multiplicity of voices within it. The paper reviews these spheres of cacophony and maps the realignment of camps within the EU in response to the war in Gaza.

This article was published in the Strategic Assessment of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Issue 27 (4), November 2024.

Introduction

Less than a week after October 7, some analysts were quick to argue that “the Israel-Hamas war exposed the EU’s irrelevance” (Karnitschnig, 2023). “No one cares what Europe thinks” continued the harsh assessment. “Europe has been relegated to the role of a well-meaning NGO, whose humanitarian contributions are welcomed but is otherwise ignored.” Many in Israel, Europe and around the world would agree, yet we wish to present a more nuanced picture. Unlike in Ukraine, Europe struggles to find a strong, united voice regarding the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The EU’s incoherence significantly reduces its capabilities as a credible player and prevents it from taking a meaningful role while the war expands. Yet Europe is relevant as a mid-level player in the reform of the Palestinian Authority, the rebuilding of Gaza, and in wider efforts to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict.

In 2018, then president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, asserted that it was not enough for Europe to exert its financial muscle. It also had to learn to act on the global stage: “The EU is a global payer, but must also become a global player” (European Parliament, 2018). Josep Borrell, the High Representative (HR) of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), argued in 2019 that Europe “must learn quickly to speak the language of power,” and not only rely on soft or normative power as it used to do (European Union External Action, 2020). Over the past three decades, the EU has been one of the main donors to the Palestinians. It became a significant actor in the civilian sphere, but not a meaningful political player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and certainly not in the realm of security (See Hollis, 1997, Bouris, 2014 for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the EU’s lack of actorness, see Toje 2008). What has changed (if at all) since October 7?

This paper focuses on the European response to the war in Gaza and the hostilities towards Israel in the wider region. Although it concentrates on the EU, there is also a brief discussion of actions taken by other European countries, mostly the United Kingdom (UK). It aims to give an empirical description and analysis of Europe’s responses, capabilities and actorness in this regional war. The article begins with the shifting European positions from strong support and solidarity with Israel after the October 7 massacre, to fierce criticism of Israel and its government. The second section maps where the EU is a mere payer and where it is a player. It reviews the EU’s decisions and actions in the humanitarian field, Palestinian state-building, the diplomatic arena, its employment of “sticks” and sanctions and the military sphere. The third section discusses the divisions afflicting the EU which have hampered its ability to act as a meaningful player in the region. It reviews the instances of discordant voices within the European Commission, between heads of EU institutions and mostly between member states on multiple issues, and maps the realignment of camps in Europe on the conflict. In the conclusions, the article evaluates the EU’s response to the war in Gaza, its capabilities and actorness in the Gaza war. It argues that the EU has been able to chalk up some accomplishments in less sensitive areas, most noticeably as a capacity builder in the Palestinian Authority. Its financial muscle has come to the fore in important humanitarian activity and especially in working to prevent the financial collapse of the PA. Europe has also carried out operations to enhance maritime security in the wake of attacks by the Houthis. Despite divisions which prevent it from becoming an effective actor in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, it still has an important role to play.

The EU and the War in Gaza: From Support to Criticism of Israel

Europe’s solidarity with Israel in the wake of the Hamas massacre of October 7 and kidnapping of more than 250 civilians and soldiers, was remarkable. It was immediate, extensive, and strong. Political support came from across Europe. There was fierce condemnation of Hamas from across the board. All EU member states supported Israel’s right to defend itself. The strong solidarity with Israel was demonstrated through numerous declarations, visits, and actions.

For a few weeks, the Gaza war took precedence over the war in Ukraine on the EU’s agenda. Manifold statements, speeches, Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) declarations, and European Council conclusions condemned the Hamas attack in the strongest terms (European Council, 2023). An unprecedented European Parliament (EP) resolution called for the elimination of Hamas with 500 votes in favor and 21 against (European Parliament, 2023a). These verbal expressions of support were important to Israel and gave it legitimacy for the war against Hamas.

Many heads of state as well as foreign and defense ministers from all across Europe visited Israel within a matter of weeks in an impressive show of solidarity. They travelled to the south of Israel to witness the devastated communities, they met with relatives of the hostages and restated Israel’s right to exercise self-defense. Among the first to arrive, on October 13, were the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and French President Emmanuel Macron all visited Israel between October 17-24 to express their solidarity with the Israeli people. Several weeks later HR Josep Borrell visited. This was his first visit to Israel since he assumed his mandate in 2019 (Lis, 2023). Between October 7, 2023 and May 2024, about 80 out of 100 high level visits to Israel were from Europe (Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe Division, June 23, 2024). Israelis felt they were not alone.

Yet, as the war in Gaza continued, European support for Israel gradually declined. Support for Israel’s right to defend itself is on condition that civilians are afforded protection in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law (IL & IHL). Amid the growing number of Palestinians killed in Gaza and the increasingly acute humanitarian situation there, the mood in Europe gradually turned against Israel. In addition, the refusal of Netanyahu’s government to accept a cease-fire, or discuss plans for the “day after” the war, its outright rejection of a role for the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an alternative to Hamas in Gaza and its fierce opposition to the possible establishment of a Palestinian State in the long run, have created great difficulties for Israel’s friends in Europe, since both the EU-27, the UK and Norway support the establishment of a Palestinian State.

The international legal cases against Israel make it more difficult for Europe to support it, especially under its current extreme right-wing government. In December, South Africa petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is now investigating claims that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. In May, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor applied for arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Gallant. In July, the ICJ published its advisory opinion on Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories (case opened in 2022). IL & IHL are normative pillars of the EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, in view of Europe’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war, where it has demanded that Russia adhere to IL & IHL and has imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow, and despite the major differences between the war in Ukraine and that in Gaza, the EU has been accused of applying double standards regarding Israel’s conduct in Gaza. This harms the EU’s reputation and interests in the Global South.

Europe’s solidarity with Israel and its delayed call for a ceasefire have strained its relations with countries in the Global South. Europe has worked hard since February 2022, reaching out to these countries in order to mobilize support for Ukraine. The alarming death toll in Gaza and the severe humanitarian situation sabotaged Europe’s efforts. Equating these two wars is problematic (Navon, 2024), but this doesn’t prevent some in the Global South and in Europe from doing so. As Konečný (2024) points out:

Efforts to convince [the Global South] that Europe’s… support for Ukraine against Russian aggression was based on universal principles of international law rather than the West’s geopolitical agenda, were squandered when the West veered off those same principles in Gaza.

Borrell concedes that this is a problem for the EU, and that he is regularly confronted with accusations of double standards:

What is now happening in Gaza has portrayed Europe in a way that many people simply do not understand. They saw our quick engagement and decisiveness in supporting Ukraine and wonder about the way we approach what is happening in Palestine… The perception is that the value of civilian lives in Ukraine is not the same as in Gaza, where more than 34,000 are dead, most others displaced, children are starving, and the humanitarian support [is] obstructed. The perception is that we care less if United Nations Security Council resolutions are violated, as it is the case by Israel with respect to the settlements, [as opposed to] when it is violated by Russia. (EEAS Press Team, 2024a).

Europe’s credibility and its ability to forge a wide international coalition against Russia is undermined by the perception of countries in the Global South that Europe’s attitude towards the war in Gaza is an embodiment of its double standards. Support for Israel by some European countries exacts a price for the whole EU, impacting its relations with the Global South, and its case for and reputation as a supporter of Ukraine.

The EU’s Role—From Payer to Player? 

The EU has taken concrete steps in several fields in an attempt to transform itself from a mere payer in the conflict to an actual player. It seeks to intervene and influence by applying leverage on some actors, especially by exerting its financial muscle. In addition, the EU has conducted a defensive operation to intercept Houthi attacks on ships, and has taken steps to crack down on the financing of Hamas. It adopted sanctions against violent Israeli settlers aimed at impacting the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But its main intervention comes in its significant role in financially sustaining the PA and conditioning its contributions on substantial and comprehensive PA reforms, alongside agreed US-EU conditions for the PA to return to rule in Gaza (see below).

The Humanitarian Field: Significant Payer, Attempts as a Player

There is no doubt that the EU is a significant payer. Humanitarian aid provided by the 27 member states to the Palestinians from October 7 until September 2024 was more than quadruple its level in the equivalent period preceding the war, reaching €678m, while EU aid increased ninefold from €28m to €262m (European Parliament, 2023b; Reuters, 2023). For comparison, in the same period the US donated $1 billion to the Palestinians. (USAID, 2024b).

The European Commission and a number of EU member states also tried to become more actively involved, by forging a multilateral force which facilitated a new pathway for humanitarian aid. In March, the European Commission, Cyprus, the US and the United Arab Emirates launched the Amalthea Initiative, operating a maritime route for emergency assistance from Cyprus to the northern part of the Gaza Strip. The initiative was proposed by Cyprus less than three weeks after October 7 (Politico, 2023) but was implemented only in March 2024 amid an increasingly acute humanitarian situation in Northern Gaza. The US was the key player in implementing the project in Gaza, building the jetty, while Europe established the Joint Rescue Coordination Center in Larnaca. Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK all participated in the operation ( ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2024).

The gap between expectations and implementation of the Amalthea Initiative was considerable. There were high expectations that at full capacity, the route could facilitate the transfer of humanitarian assistance for at least 500,000 people (USAID, 2024a), yet the quantities of aid delivered were very small (7000 tons, equivalent to only 350 trucks, or a day and a half of aid transferred by land). Between May and July, the jetty operated for only 12 days due to bad weather and the need for repairs, while its building costs were over $230 million. Several European ships delivered cargo to the jetty, which was distributed by aid organizations in the Strip. The jetty was eventually dismantled by the US at the end of July (Cleaver, 2024). The maritime route was diverted to Ashdod port and aid continued to enter Gaza via land crossings. In effect, the Amalthea initiative made only a cosmetic difference to humanitarian efforts and contributed little to Europe’s actual role.

Palestinian Statehood—Significant Payer and Possibly a Significant Player

The EU’s financial assistance to the Palestinians testifies to its potential to become a more significant player. In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to the PA, with over €1.2 billion originally planned for 2021-2024 (European Commission, 2023). This gives the EU potential leverage over the PA. While it has been reluctant to use it in the past, this now appears to be changing.

The PA depends upon Israel to collect import taxes on its behalf, which constitute 64 per cent of the Authority’s total income. The EU’s increased payments to the PA are an attempt to counter the Israeli government decision to confiscate parts of Palestinian tax revenue. This policy, led by Finance Minister Smotrich, dates back to January 2023 and is justified as a consequence of PA payments that incentivize terror by rewarding families of Palestinians in Israeli jails and those who killed Israelis. After October 7, the part of the budget that the PA routinely transferred to Gaza was also confiscated by Israel (Times of Israel, 2023; Gal, 2024). The PA has been in a dire financial situation for many years and the confiscation of funds could bring about its collapse. This would destabilize the West Bank and the region even further. After the EU and its member states invested so much in building the PA as the institutional backbone of a future Palestinian State and enhancing systems of governance, their role as payer has come to the fore and heightened their significance as a player. 

In July, the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), which oversees support programs in Europe’s Eastern and Southern areas, signed a “Letter of Intent” to the PA, announcing a €400m emergency package of aid to it to be paid until September, conditioned upon reforms in eight fields (DG NEAR, 2024a,b). In addition to playing a significant role in preserving the PA, the EU is using its financial leverage to pressure the PA to carry out reforms by employing conditions to the funding (as it does with states seeking to join the EU). The EU has significant experience and expertise in state building in general and with the PA in particular. It could use its financial muscle to help restore the independence of the Palestinian judicial system and de-radicalize and reform its education system (Tzoreff, 2024); although the latter is best done in cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. If its efforts to revitalize the PA succeed, the EU’s credibility as a player in the region would be strengthened. Such careful conditionality can build trust with Israel and could therefore enable the EU to play a more meaningful role not only vis à vis the PA, but also in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Capacity Builder for the Day After the War—Established Player 

The EU has been advancing Palestinian statehood via capacity building for a few decades. A month after October 7, the US, EU and UK were aligned regarding the basic conditions for a ceasefire leading to a long-term sustainable plan for the day after the war in Gaza. It included the return of the PA to Gaza (Gal and Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024). To date, the Israeli government has not agreed to their proposals, but preparations on the European side have begun nevertheless. For example, on May 27, the FAC agreed in principle to reactivate the civilian Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), which operated out of Rafah until Hamas took over the Strip in 2007. The EU appeared to be willing to reactivate it, but needs the approval of and coordination with the PA, Egypt and Israel (FAC 2024). According to reports, Israel rejected this option (Barel, 2024). To gain agency, the EU needs to prove itself as a credible player, and to engage and build trust with Israel.

The mandate of the EU police and rule of law capacity building operation in the PA (EUPOL COPPS), already includes the Gaza Strip but it too has stopped operating there since Hamas took over. Its operative plans may be expanded as part of the PA revitalization process ahead of its possible return to the Gaza Strip (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a). Through such missions, the EU can function not only as a payer but also a mid-level player. These missions can be a core component of EU civil boots on the ground in the Palestinian arena.

The (Failed) Diplomatic Front

Europe has been active on the diplomatic front, proposing several initiatives, none of which was acted upon. Only one tool was adopted by the European Council. On October 27, Spain pushed to include in the European Council conclusions support for convening a peace conference (European Council, 2023). Although the move appeared disconnected from reality on the ground, it was in accord with Borrell’s diplomatic objectives. Indeed, Borrell was the source of several diplomatic initiatives. They should be viewed in the context of his Peace Day Effort Initiative—trying to incentivize the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process—that was launched in September 2023 but halted by the war (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024a).

In January 2024, Borrell put forward a twelve-point non-paper for “creating a comprehensive peace plan,” proposing to hold a preparatory peace conference which would involve the pragmatic Arab states (Psara & Liboreiro, 2024). On January 22, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of four Arab states, Israel and the PA for separate discussions at the FAC. His initiative was discussed, but did not progress. Facing internal objections by member states, the initiative failed to get off the ground. In addition, the Biden Administration stayed silent regarding the plan, probably in part due to Israel’s rejection of the initiative. It didn’t help that Borrell was perceived as being strongly pro-Palestinian to the extent that some heads of state told him that he did not represent them (Moens et al., 2024), while others described him as “obsessed” with the issue.

In another diplomatic initiative on May 27, Borrell invited the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (known as the “Arab Quint”) to the FAC. The discussion focused on finding a political solution to the conflict and potential pathways of cooperation as a means to resolve it. Borrell used these meetings and initiatives to strengthen EU-Arab relations, seemingly to enhance the EU’s actorness, though it was clear in advance to all sides that nothing concrete would come out of these sessions.

The next meeting took place in Madrid on September 13. It aimed to discuss “the need to reinforce the engagement of the international community on peace and security in the Middle East, and the challenge of creating an international consensus on a way forward based on the Two-State solution” (EEAS Press Team, 2024c). In effect, it demonstrated the lack of consensus, as only four European foreign ministers participated (Spain, Ireland, Slovenia and Norway) along with the PA and five Arab countries.

More serious efforts were made to prevent military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah. France played a leading role working for de-escalation. Europe has an interest in preventing Lebanon from becoming a failed state. It also wants to prevent the expected refugee flows resulting from a war between Israel and Lebanon. On June 13, President Macron said that France and the US had agreed in principle to establish a trilateral group with Israel to “make progress” on a French proposal to end the violence on the Lebanese border (Boxerman et al., 2024). Yet Israel has not always been willing to accommodate French or European diplomatic engagement in this sphere. Over the past year, Hezbollah argued that the key to ending the battle in Lebanon was the achievement of a ceasefire in Gaza, which in turn depends largely on agreement between Hamas and Israel on the release of all hostages. Later in the war in Lebanon, Israel sought to break this linkage. In summary, Europe is on the sidelines of diplomatic initiatives to resolve the war in Gaza and in Lebanon. What France and Europe did demonstrate was their financial role, gathering $1 billion for Lebanon in October 2024.

Employment of Sticks and Sanctions Regimes

President Macron’s proposal to build an international coalition against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), along the lines of the coalition against ISIS, did not gain traction (France 24, 2023). Yet France hosted a multilateral meeting in Paris on December 13, to enhance the financial war against them, by targeting the sources of their funding, and took action to stem the spread of terrorist content online (France Diplomacy, 2023). After the EU designated Hamas and PIJ as terrorist organizations in 2003, on January 19, 2024, the Council of the EU adopted a package of additional sanctions against them, including a freeze on the assets of several of their military leaders, among them Yahya Sinwar (Council of the EU, 2024a). This decision allowed the EU to take actions against additional individuals and entities supporting, facilitating, or enabling violent actions by Hamas and the PIJ. Yet enhancing its role through further intervention, for example, against straw companies in Turkey, did not ensue.

The EU did extend the sanctions list in June, adding six individuals and three entities (Council of the EU, 2024b). For the first time, sanctions were also imposed against violent Israeli settlers and some of their organizations in the West Bank. The process of imposition proved slower and more complicated politically for the EU than for its counterparts or its member states. The US imposed a first round of these sanctions on February 1, expanding them on March 14. The UK and France followed suit a couple of weeks later. It took the FAC until March 18 to cross the high threshold of unanimity and overcome Czech and Hungarian opposition. When the list of sanctions was published by the Council on April 19, it included four individuals and two organizations (Council of the EU 2024c,d ). The second round of EU sanctions came only on July 15, adding five individuals and three organizations (Council of the EU, 2024e). Those listed under the EU sanctions regime are “subject to an asset freeze, and the provision of funds or economic resources, directly or indirectly, to them or for their benefit, is prohibited.” Additionally, the EU imposed a travel ban on the sanctioned individuals. The slow pace of the sanctions adopted is indicative of the EU’s political difficulties in crossing what was considered a red line in its policy vis a vis Israel. Yet it was crossed.

The EU has considerable economic leverage with Israel as its largest trading partner. So far, the EU has shown little willingness to use its leverage vis à vis Israel inside the 1967 lines as the threshold of unanimity for such action in the FAC or European Council is too high (see disagreement regarding the Association Agreement below). The war has prompted the re- or over-politicization of relations in all areas of cooperation, in addition to the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli attitudes, including latent or vocal grassroots boycotts and lost opportunities. For example, it is unlikely that the EU would be able to sign a Partnership Priorities agreement with Israel anytime soon. It is also probable that a new UK-Israel trade agreement, currently under negotiation, would pose greater political challenges for the Labour government to sign.

The relative ease of taking decisions at the national level, in comparison to the EU level, is noticeable. Some European countries have shown greater readiness to impose bans on arms sales to Israel. In February, a Dutch court ordered the government to block the delivery of US-made F-35 fighter aircraft parts to Israel, over concerns they were being used to violate international law. Yet the government appealed, and meanwhile sent the parts to the US, where they were sent to Israel. Three European states took steps to fully suspend military exports to Israel: Spain, Italy and the Walloon part of Belgium. The UK, Denmark and Germany examine the export licenses on a case-by-case basis. Of the above, Germany’s stance is most significant: 30 per cent of Israel’s arms were imported from Germany and 69 per cent from the United States between 2019 and 2023 (Bermant 2024a; Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024d). Therefore, the damage caused by other European countries’ arms ban is felt less in the military-security sphere and much more in the political and diplomatic domain. This is illustrated by President Macron’s call in early October 2024 for a weapons embargo on Israel, although he referred only to the war in Gaza, not the one with Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies. In addition, France prevented Israeli companies from participating in the June 2024 Eurosatory international arms fair, although a number of Israeli companies did participate in the Euronaval defense exhibition which took place in November 2024.

Defensive Military Role

To the extent that Europe is even playing a military role, there is a clear distinction between the UK and the EU. Right after October 7, Britain joined the US in dispatching military forces to the Eastern Mediterranean to support Israel and deter Hezbollah and Iran from a full-scale attack on Israel. In addition, both Britain and France were involved in the interception of Iranian attacks against Israel in April and later in October (Times of Israel, 2024).

The EU’s military role emerged in response to the Houthis’ trade route disruption in the Red Sea. Since the Houthis began their offensive on November 19, they have attacked over forty ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Targeted strikes by the US and the UK against Houthi bases began on January 11. The EU launched operation EUNAVFOR Aspides on February 19. However, unlike the US and UK, the EU’s rules of engagement are defensive. They aim only to protect merchant shipping and restore freedom of navigation and exclude direct attacks on Houthi positions. This sea route from Asia through the Suez Canal to Europe accounts for twelve percent of global trade and is of special significance to Southern European Mediterranean countries. Alternative sea routes double shipment costs at a time when inflation has already been high in the EU and the cost of living is a sensitive social and political issue.

As of July, five European frigates had escorted over 170 merchant ships and intercepted nineteen Houthi missiles and drones (Al-Batati, 2024; EEAS Press Team, 2024b). By aiming to secure the Suez Canal route, the EU’s operation is also crucial for Egypt and the region’s economy. Through this operation, the EU enhances maritime security, furthers the protection of European, regional and international commercial interests, or at least mitigates to some extent the economic damage caused by the Houthis, while strengthening its joint military cooperation capabilities under EU command (Matoi & Caba-Maria, 2024). The success of the EU military operation as well as that of the US and the UK, is limited at best. Maritime traffic has stabilized since January at 50-60% of levels in equivalent months in 2023 (Gard, 2024).

Europe’s Tendency for Cacophony

Immediately after October 7, alongside the strong and widespread demonstrations of European solidarity with Israel and fierce condemnation of Hamas, there were many issues where the EU did not speak with one voice. The cacophony started within the European Commission, followed by open disagreement between heads of EU institutions and then between member states on issues such as funding for the Palestinians, calls for a ceasefire, recognition of a Palestinian state, South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel and the issue of payments to UNRWA. This cacophony hampers the ability of the EU to play a meaningful role.

Within the Commission, the difficulties started with the Hungarian commissioner for neighborhood policy, Olivér Várhelyi, who tweeted on October 9 that aid to the Palestinians would be cut. A few hours later, the Slovenian Commissioner for crisis management, Janez Lenarčič, tweeted that humanitarian aid would actually be doubled. He was echoed by HR Borrell who asserted that the EU should support the Palestinians “more, not less,” stating that this is the position of 95 percent of EU member states. Borrell stressed that the EU differentiates between terror organizations such as Hamas and the PIJ, and the PA and Palestinian civilians. Later that day, the Commissioner spokesperson clarified that there would be no aid cuts. Instead, the Commission decided to review its payments to the Palestinians, in order to ensure that no funding was reaching Hamas or the PIJ (Moens et al.2023). This review process ended in November 2023 with the decision to continue payments and, as mentioned, increase them (European Commission, 2023).

Between Heads of EU Institutions

The president of the European Council, Charles Michel, criticized the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for stating in her press conference with Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu in October 2023 that Israel had the right to defend itself, without adding that it must be done in accordance with IL & IHL. According to Michel and others, this failure to state the EU’s core values was a reflection of her pro-Israeli stance. She was accused of overstepping her powers, not representing the EU’s interests properly, “undermining the position of the EU as credible actor and honest broker between Israeli and Palestine,” projecting the image of double standards to the Global South (Borges de Castro, 2023). Also, in an unusual move, 850 employees of EU institutions published a letter complaining about von der Leyen’s omission (Agence Europe, 2023).

There are also significant differences between EU member states. On the issue of a ceasefire, on October 27, the heads of 27 member states in the European Council agreed on phrasing that called on Israel to allow “humanitarian corridors and pauses for humanitarian needs” (European Council, 2023). It took them hours to reach an agreement on “pauses,” in plural, to avoid the impression that they were calling for a permanent pause. On that very same day, the EU member states split into three camps over a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, calling for an “immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities” and condemning terrorism. Eight member states voted in favor, fifteen abstained and four voted against the text, as it did not mention Hamas or the October 7 massacre (UNGA, 2023; Alessandri & Ruiz, 2023). These divisions demonstrated once again the difficulties for the 27 member states to speak with one voice on the details of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Analysis of the EU’s UNGA voting on the Palestinian issue shows unanimous agreement among the 27 member states and the UK on the end goal of the “right of the Palestinians to self-determination” and “on permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories” (two decisions adopted on December 19). Yet when it came to the more practical vote calling for a ceasefire on December 12, or the admission of Palestine as a UN member state on May 10, the EU was split again into three camps. Overall, on eight resolutions between October 7 and May 10 relating to the Palestinian issue and the war in Gaza, the EU stayed united on only three occasions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024b). As this analysis suggests, Europe is united when it comes to supporting the two-state solution, yet it is divided on the translation of that goal into concrete policy.

In the wake of Israeli charges that some of UNRWA’s employees participated in the attacks of the October 7 massacre (UNRWA, 2024), EU member states were also split on the question of whether to freeze UNRWA’s funding. The EU and eleven European countries (among them the UK) briefly suspended the funding, while eight did not (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2024c). Further cacophony continued upon the resumption of funding. The EU attached three conditions to renewed UNRWA funding, which could have served to apply its normative power, or at least lead a united voice for all the funders of UNRWA. Yet, the EU was unable to put its own house in order, the conditions adopted by each member state were different, and most did not adopt any.

South Africa’s case against Israel in the ICJ is another example of division. Germany announced it would intervene on Israel’s behalf as a third party. Another five EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary and France) expressed their support for Israel. The UK joined them. Ireland, Slovenia, Belgium and Spain joined in support of South Africa. Other member states only called on Israel to comply with its rulings and with IL and IHL (Sion-Tzidkiyahu 2024c).

On February 14, the prime ministers of Spain and Ireland sent a letter calling on von der Leyen to carry out an urgent review of whether Israel was complying with its obligations to respect human rights, which constitute “an essential element” of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. They requested that appropriate measures be taken if Israel was found to have breached them (Lynch, 2024). The Association Agreement is the basis for EU–Israel relations in all fields: trade, economic, political dialogue and participation in different EU programs, such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus. This was the first time such a demand had been made at the level of prime ministers. Nevertheless, differences of opinion meant that the request was shrugged off at the FAC which met on March 18.

On May 27, 2024 the FAC for the first time engaged in a “significant” discussion on steps against Israel if it didn’t comply with IHL (Weatherald, 2024). That was after the ICC submitted applications for arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant on May 20, and the ICJ intermediate ruling on May 24 that Israel should adhere to IHL in its operation in Rafah. According to the foreign minister of Ireland, Micheál Martin, “there was a very clear consensus about the need to uphold the international humanitarian legal institutions,” i.e. the ICJ and ICC. Yet the FAC’s sole conclusion was to hold an EU-Israel Association Council meeting with Foreign Minister Katz to address the EU’s serious concerns and seek Israel’s response on ICJ compliance. Despite the calls from Ireland and other member states, no sanctions paper against Israel was drawn up. So far, the letter achieved little more than headlines and an unpleasant invitation to Katz.

The recognition of a Palestinian state is a major point of division in Europe. While there is consensus on the two-state solution, opinions differ on how and when to advance it. On January 30, British Foreign Minister Cameron was the first to publicly consider recognizing a Palestinian state since October 7. French President Macron, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, and senior heads in Germany also indicated they were considering it, but no actions were taken. On May 28, Spain, Ireland, and Norway recognized Palestine, followed by Slovenia on June 5, making it the 147th state and the 11th in the EU to do so (excluding Sweden’s 2014 recognition, earlier recognitions date back to 1988 and were by former Communist states, and Cyprus which was not an EU member then). Belgium and Denmark chose not to recognize Palestine. While such recognition can yield domestic and international political benefits, it is largely symbolic for Palestinians and leave realities on the ground unchanged. This cacophony demonstrates again that Europe agrees on the concept of two states for two peoples, but remains divided on how and when to pursue this goal.

Realignment of Camps

A year after October 7, the Czech Republic and Hungary continue to express strong support for Israel. The UK, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, and some Central European countries, which offered firm support for Israel, adopted a more nuanced stance in the months that followed. All stressed the importance of complying with IL & IHL in the Gaza Strip. When Israel’s security was on the line, as happened in mid-April and again in early October, the UK and France actively participated in thwarting Iran’s missile attacks, underlining their position that Israel has the right to defend itself.

Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Slovenia, and Malta were quick to restate their critical position of Israel, with Spain and Ireland calling for a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Both formally recognized the Palestinian state with Norway and Slovenia.

Germany’s long-standing historic responsibility to Israel’s security, Germany’s Staatsraison or raison d’état, is being tested. This commitment has been inserted in coalition agreements in Germany since 2008, including by the current SPD-Green-Liberal government. Despite criticism of Israel, Germany has maintained support for the country. However, amid accusations that Israel has breached IL and IHL, Germany has shown a readiness to reexamine its continued sale of military exports to Israel, including the possibility of delaying the supply of certain items.

Ultimately, the normative traditions and narrow self-interests of the government in each European state are what count in the formulation of policy towards Israel and the Palestinians, rather than the need to maintain a united harmonious and coherent European response. Given the mix of normative and interest-based approaches, consensus has been hard to achieve in the FAC or European Council. This represents the “old” CFSP, in contrast to the brisk and assertive EU response to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Alignments may shift due to elections, as was seen in Belgium in June and the UK in July, where the new Labour government under the leadership of Keir Starmer has already dropped its opposition to an international arrest warrant for Netanyahu and Gallant. His government has also suspended 30 out of 350 arms export licenses to Israel (Bermant, 2024b). However, Starmer has ruled out a complete ban on UK arms exports to Israel, saying it “would be the wrong position for this government” (Hardman, 2024).

In the past years, under Netanyahu, Israel has strengthened ties with Greece, Cyprus, and some Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria, using these alliances to counter unfavorable EU votes. Netanyahu’s “divide and thwart” diplomacy harnessed the support of friendly member states to block or soften anti-Israel decisions (Sion-Tzidkiyahu, 2021). This tactic has been effective when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured less prominently on the global agenda, or when initiatives with considerable implications come to the fore, such as reassessing the EU–Israel Association Agreement. However, during the war in Gaza, this strategy has been effective only up to a point. For example, it did not prevent sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The EU’s emphasis on IL & IHL is highlighted by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. With the ICJ’s judgement on Israeli occupation, South Africa’s proceedings on Gaza, and the ICC request for warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, the EU and its member states’ room for maneuver vis à vis Israel in the Gaza war is shrinking.

* Change after general elections

The result, one year after the war is the following continuum, from the most critical of Israel to the most supportive:

The current realignment of camps regarding Israel is much more complicated than it was before October 7. It reflects not only the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Israeli occupation and settlement building; but now encompasses Israel’s security, its right to defend itself against Iran and its proxies, and its struggle for legitimacy.

Conclusions

In the aftermath of October 7, the EU initially showed strong solidarity with Israel in its darkest hour. Yet as the civilian death toll in Gaza rose and the humanitarian situation deteriorated, most of Europe’s leaders began distancing themselves from the Israeli government and expressed increasing criticism. Despite general agreement on the two-state solution, the divisions on how and when to proceed in this direction paralyze the EU. The Gaza War demonstrated once again the difficulties of the 27 member states in speaking with one voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to the need for consensus, the only agreed action by the EU was to impose sanctions on violent Israeli settlers and their organizations. The rest of the moves were taken by small groups of member states: some joined South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel, four countries recognized Palestine as a state and a couple requested a reassessment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

The Gaza war has revealed once again the divisions, cacophony and ponderous decision-making characteristics of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In August, Borrell conceded that “the Palestine-Israel conflict is one of the most difficult issues to build EU27 consensus on, probably more than on any other issue” noting it as the stumbling-block to effective intervention (Scheindlin, 2024).

So what has changed (if at all) since October 7 in the EU’s actorness? Seemingly not much. The EU has a range of financial and civilian tools to offer today and for the day after the war. It is a considerable humanitarian payer, though less of a player on the ground. It is a significant actor in Palestinian capacity and state building, willing to reactivate EUPOL COPPS in Gaza and EUBAM at the Rafah border crossing. Their renewal could enhance the EU’s role alongside its participation in the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip the “day after”.

The EU is already playing a significant role in the West Bank. At a time when elements in the Netanyahu government are acting openly to bring about the financial collapse of the PA, the EU’s role as a stabilizer in funding the PA and preventing its collapse is vital. This is essential for preserving the two-state solution and helping to prevent a major conflagration in the West Bank.

Taking into consideration that the EU’s diplomatic initiatives have all failed internally and were usually ignored by the US, the EU should think anew about how to strengthen its actorness. The EU’s most significant potential leverage stems from being the largest donor to the PA. By using its financial muscle to revitalize the PA through conditionality, DG NEAR, which has the ability to act consistently, could strengthen the EU’s role and credibility. This is the EU’s main potential leverage asset, depending on the scope and depth of the implementation of PA reforms and could make the EU a more credible player in Israeli eyes.

It remains to be seen how powerful and effective this conditionality will be under the next European Commission. If successful, the EU could be viewed in time as a more significant player, which would prompt Israel to take Europe more seriously and pay more attention to European concerns, rather than dismissing them. However, for this to happen, the EU would also need to engage more positively and directly with Israel’s government. The new European Commission, which took office on December 1, appears better placed to do this.

The EU has potential leverage with Israel, as its biggest trade partner, yet divisions among member states have hampered its ability to use this effectively. The war caused a considerable realignment, and many European governments have distanced themselves from the current Israeli government. The proceedings in the ICJ and ICC are raising serious questions over whether Israel’s actions in Gaza comply with IL & IHL. Rulings against Israel would reduce Europe’s room for maneuver in supporting Israel, let alone advance relations. Indeed, this support is likely to shrink further as Europe’s normative emphasis on IL & IHL aligns with its geopolitical interests relating to the Russia-Ukraine war.

In the wider regional conflict, the EU is more than just a humanitarian actor or a payer. It also acts as a modest security provider, as in the EUNAVFOR Aspides operation, where the EU attempts to restore maritime security and freedom of navigation, operating as a defensive rather than offensive player, protecting its own economic interests and those of Egypt as well as other developing countries on this trade route.

This paper analyzed Europe’s attempts to develop its actorness in relation to the Gaza war and hostilities in the wider region. These efforts have been only partially successful, and have been achieved mainly on the sidelines of the Gaza war. As the EU navigates an increasingly unstable multipolar world, it is still searching for ways to align its political influence with its economic and financial weight. Unlike the geopolitical awakening prompted by the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza war has not triggered a similar response. Despite the region’s security challenges and the destabilizing actions taken by Iran, its proxies, and Israel, the war in Gaza does not pose a strategic threat to Europe as does Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The EU has sought support from the Global South for Ukraine against Russia, yet the war in Gaza has undermined these efforts, amid mounting criticism of perceived European double standards towards Israeli actions in Gaza. One way to restore credibility is by laying the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a future Palestinian state. By revitalizing the PA, the EU can also strengthen its credibility and regional influence. However, the EU’s incoherence regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict reduces significantly its credibility as an actor, yet accusations that it is an irrelevance in the Middle East are wide of the mark.

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-. (2024c). https://x.com/MayaSionT/status/1823736434278478240

-. (2024d). https://x.com/MayaSionT/status/1842856675839025228

Times of Israel. (2023, January 8). Withholding millions from PA, Smotrich says he has “no interest” in its existence. https://www.timesofisrael.com/withholding-millions-from-pa-smotrich-says-he-has-no-interest-in-its-existence/

-. (2024, April 14). US, UK and Jordan intercept many of the Iranian drones headed to Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-uk-and-jordan-intercept-many-of-the-iranian-drones-headed-to-israel/

Toje A. (2008). The Consensus—Expectations gap: Explaining Europe’s ineffective foreign policy. Security Dialogue 39(1), 121-141.

Tzoreff Y. (2024). What is a revitalized Palestinian Authority? Mitvim Institute and Berl Kazenelson https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/English-What-is-a-Revitalized-Palestinian-State-Yohanan-Tzoref-January-2024-final.pdf

UNGA. (2023). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 October. ES-10/21. Protection of civilians and upholding legal and humanitarian obligations. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4025940/files/A_RES_ES-10_21-EN.pdf?ln=en

UNRWA. (2024, August 5). Investigation completed: allegations on UNRWA staff participation in the 7 October attacks. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/investigation-completed-allegations-unrwa-staff-participation-7-october

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Weatherald. N. (2024, May 27). EU foreign ministers discuss sanctions against Israel. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-foreign-ministers-sanctions-against-israel-micheal-martin/

הפוסט Europe’s Response to the War in Gaza: Capabilities and Actorness הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

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הפוסט The European Parliament Elections and Their Influence on Israel- International Briefing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A psychological evaluation may be required these days specifically to explain why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chose France as the destination of his first foreign travel since taking office in late December. In the midst of an intensifying domestic storm over the country’s essential nature and democratic values, borne on the fumes of an intoxicated coalition that reduces the concept of democracy to the tyranny of the elected majority, Netanyahu chose to travel to Paris, with inexplicable urgency.

France is the birthplace of human rights and prides itself – not always justifiably so – as a role model and custodian of democratic values in the most expansive sense of the term, including minority rights, separation of powers, separation of church and state, freedom of expression and creativity, and other liberal values considered an unnecessary evil by Netanyahu and his partners.

Before entering the courtyard of the Elysee Palace where rows of sword-bearing Republican Guard soldiers were lined up to honor him, Netanyahu’s office sought to ensure that his host would not embarrass him on this painful issue of the regime reform taking place under his watchful eye. President Emmanuel Macron was circumspect in his public statements and his spokesperson made do with a boilerplate statement about the need to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and the importance of maintaining regional stability.

But Netanyahu paid a price. Contrary to accepted practice, the sides did not issue a joint statement at the end of the visit, nor did they hold a joint news conference. Macron may be willing to preserve the dignity of his guests, but he is not willing to lie for them in public.

Inside the room, around the dinner table, as leaked to the newspaper Le Monde, Macron was quite clear in suggesting that if the legal reform passes as is, Paris will have to conclude that Israel is moving away from the concept of democracy shared until now by both countries.

With the leak of Macron’s position clouding the smiling photographs, Netanyahu’s people were quick to explain in a somewhat dismissive tone that Macron was “not well versed in the details of the reform.” French presidents have at their disposal a kind of private in-house foreign ministry called “la cellule diplomatique,” comprising skilled diplomats carefully selected according to their geographic specialization.

France also has a large and highly professional embassy in Tel Aviv, which presumably knew how to prepare the president for the meeting with Netanyahu, including on the subject of the legal reform. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that if Macron had known even more details of the planned upheaval, his reaction would have been harsher.

Perhaps a psychologist can determine whether Netanyahu’s appearance alongside the president of France in hopes of obtaining a seal of approval in the cradle of human rights was the result of a sober calculation or of his subconscious playing tricks on him.

A similar question can be asked about the slightly pathetic attempt to arrange a meeting for him with representatives of the business community of the world’s seventh largest economy, in a transparent attempt to contradict the forecasts of JPMorgan and the best Israeli economists regarding the danger to our economy due from the legal reform.

Even if the business leadership in France wanted to stand up and declare loyalty to the start-up nation, the hasty and amateurish way in which this meeting was organized made it a hopeless attempt. According to participants, no more than 10 mid-level businessmen were present in the room, while the rest were representatives of the French Jewish small-business world.

In other words, this attempt to gain legitimacy also backfired, forcing the Prime Minister’s Office to conceal the list of those present and settle instead for throwing about baseless numbers about the foreign investment of billions pouring into Israel.

The nature of Israel’s regime will be a new permanent talking point

Be that as it may, not only did Netanyahu come out empty-handed, but after United States Secretary of State Blinken’s visit and the puzzling trip to France, it is already quite clear that the usual agenda items for discussion between the prime minister and his counterparts, the heads of liberal democratic countries, will now include a new, permanent and particularly burdensome topic: the nature of Israel’s regime.

Macron’s efforts to promote the establishment of a “European Political Community” to examine the EU’s partnership with its neighbors, based inter alia on their commitment to liberal-democratic values is a good example, albeit sometimes inconsistent, of this new parameter. Israel, it must be said, has always been under the watchful eye of the world, one might even say disproportionately so.

But members of the club of world democracies focused on controversial Israeli actions, never on its essence. The community of liberal-democratic countries is even more watchful and critical given the global polarization between liberals and anti-liberals exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.

My former colleagues, Israel’s ambassadors around the world throughout the ages understood that membership in the club of liberal democracies is a valuable asset, not only in terms of Israel’s image, but also of its strategic interests. It is a small club, with only 30+ countries of almost 200 members of the UN but its economic, political and military clout is enormous.

EVEN IN the eyes of many non-members, the club holds the status of a moral compass and serves as a role model. Israel has managed to shelter in the shadow of this exclusive club thanks to its birth as a democracy as anchored in its Declaration of Independence and its preservation of these features despite wars, occupation, terrorism and more. Israel is certainly not a typical member of this club, but the others have accepted it nonetheless.

However, if real damage is caused to the foundations of Israeli democracy and Israel adopts the Hungarian model of democracy according to Orbán, there will likely be a price to pay. Hungary and Poland have been relegated to the sidelines of the club precisely because of the same type of reforms planned in Israel and it is experiencing heavy pressure from other EU members.

If it were not for the EU’s cumbersome structure and the need for consensus on almost every decision, Hungary would have already found itself under heavy sanctions or even suspension of its membership.

Israel is not a member of the EU but it enjoys many of its perks. It would be wise to avoid being sanguine about its prospects. In many ways, we are much more vulnerable than Hungary and Poland because we are a small country in a state of ongoing conflict and in dire need of strategic partners, a diplomatic umbrella and economic partners. This umbrella is provided in large part by the democratic camp.

In his previous term, Netanyahu often preferred the company of illiberal populist leaders who did not make demands and confuse him with talk about human rights and the two-state solution. However, Vladimir Putin is no longer someone to be seen within decent society, Jair Bolsonaro has fled to Florida after losing the election, and the future of another Florida resident, Donald Trump, is shrouded in a thicker fog than before.

Yariv Levin and Simcha Rothman need to understand that the legal reform they are concocting will have implications far beyond the status of the High Court of Justice or the political future of Arye Deri. At stake is Israel’s place in the community of nations and it would behoove those who espouse the biblical promise about “a people that shall dwell alone and shall not be reckoned among the nations” to be careful about what they wish for. The line between membership in the most prestigious club of nations and the status of a pariah among them is much thinner than one thinks.

The prime minister himself needs to understand that the carte blanche he has given them will make Israel’s international integration much more difficult than it has been in the past and that dinner with Macron was just a non-appetizing first course.

This article is from “JPost“, from February 16, 2023.

הפוסט Is Israel democratic? The new talking point for Netanyahu abroad הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As is well known, Germany relies very significantly on the supply of gas from this pipeline. Simson warned that no further steps should be ruled out, even with immediate notice. All this was intended to sow uncertainty, contribute to instability in the European energy market, and concretely prevent Europe from filling its gas storage facilities.

It is especially important to emphasize the great effort that is now being invested in supplying the emergency storage facilities. Today the storage facilities stand at a level of 56 percent, a historic level that has not existed to date. Moreover, Simson warned that not all EU countries are acting with the same intensity, and therefore called on all to act vigorously. Obviously, the capacity to fill the storage facilities depends, to a critical extent, on the amount of gas that Europe manages to purchase and transport to its territory.

The most important player now in the European energy market is the USA. The latter provided a quantity of 12.8 billion cubic meters until last May, which accumulates to an annual quantity of 28 bcm(!). This means European dependence on American (liquified) gas. This is not necessarily problematic; however, it is clear that this is a new variable in the global energy market in general, and in the US-European one in particular, and it may have significant political-strategic implications. Clearly, what needs to be taken into consideration is the Biden administration’s interest in dealing with rising energy prices at home ahead of the mid-November elections.

It is essential to emphasize that European emergency measures are intended on one side of the equation to reduce, albeit gradually, dependence on Russian gas; and on the other hand, no less important, ensure enough energy for the winter. This is a complex equation, which Russia will do its best to disrupt.

In her remarks, Simson called for a series of measures designed to encourage gradual savings in gas use in preparation for winter, emphasized the importance of supplying storage facilities, and listed the steps taken to diversify gas sources to Europe:

• Norway – Reached a joint statement aimed at increasing gas supplies to Europe;

• Israel and Egypt – Mentioned the MoU signed recently in Cairo for the export of Israeli gas to Europe through Egyptian liquefaction facilities; Azerbaijan – Work is already under way with Baku regarding the possibility of doubling the amount of gas transferred via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline.

In conclusion it is essential to emphasize:

• European activity to make a strategic change of direction in the energy field is impressive. The EU is implementing extremely complex moves, in particular complicated circumstances;

• Dependence on American liquefied gas is intensifying and certainly significant. It has implications for the transatlantic relationship and, as stated, imposes a responsibility on both parties to meet this equation.

It is quite clear that Russia will try its best to disrupt these moves, perhaps in supply disruptions, and also that it is counting on the fact that energy prices are rising; moreover, Russia is counting on the uncertainty and instability for the winter, which will have an impact – i.e. perhaps crack down on Western solidarity, especially considering support (mainly weapons) to Ukraine.

Global energy prices will continue to be high under these conditions. Even though President Biden succeeded in persuading the Saudis and the Emirates to increase productivity, it is not a matter of being able to add insignificant quantities to the global energy market.

This article is from “Ekathimerini“, from August 19, 2022

הפוסט Europe’s efforts to quit Russian gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Indeed, the last decade has witnessed a global trend of democratic backsliding. An array of populist and illiberal forces, and leaders has called into question and, in some countries, actively dismantled key institutions of liberal democracy, such as independent judiciaries and civil liberties.

What is more, the liberal international order has been under attack, not only by those who seek an adjustment of its governing institutions and rules for today’s balance of power but also by those who challenge its very foundations of international law and multilateralism.

This global trend has not spared Europe and Israel: right-wing populism has made inroads, liberal democratic values have been questioned, discourses focused on ethno-national identity and security have gained popular support, and official historiography has been politicized in the service of identity, sovereignty and security.

Democratic backsliding has also taken a toll on Israel-Europe relations, as alliances were formed – during the years of Netanyahu as prime minister – between populist and illiberal right-wing Israeli and European leaders, around shared interests in weakening the EU and in fostering divisions among member states.

Pro-democracy Europeans and Israelis – some of whom have reached positions in government over the last couple of years – have been trying to respond. But so far, they have done so in a limited and rather ad-hoc manner.

And the risk of further democratic backsliding is by no means banned: Israel is headed towards an election that might well bring to power a governing coalition dominated by the right-wing and incorporating extremist elements of the far-right. The war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia are likely to have massive socio-economic repercussions, fuel social strife and empower populist forces in Europe.

Liberal democracy

Progressive Europeans and Israelis should therefore join forces to jointly stop and reverse democratic setbacks, and strengthen liberal democracy. In that context, Europeans should, in their endeavor to strengthen ties with Israel, emphasize the relevance of strengthening Israeli democracy rather than turning a blind eye to domestic developments.

That should include intervening in case an Israeli government advances (de jure or de facto) annexation or anti-democratic legislation, and actively supports pro-democracy steps advanced by the Israeli leadership. In line with its more-for-more approach, the EU should spell out concrete positive benefits of democratic enhancement and negative consequences of democratic setbacks. Israelis should, in turn, go beyond purely pragmatic and transactional foreign policies emphasizing their interest in strengthening liberal democracy in Europe, rather than allying with non-liberal forces.

Peacemaking and shared society

Europeans should also highlight the interrelation between democracy, peacemaking and shared society – for without a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and equality between Israel’s Jewish and Arab/Palestinian citizens, Israel will continue to suffer from a democratic deficit. Europeans should therefore seek a more active and effective role in efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, not least as a means of supporting Israel’s democracy.

Even as hurdles are mounting on the way towards a two state solution and as more pressing issues dominate the European agenda, Europeans should increase their pro-peace engagement in a way that overcomes internal European divisions and addresses the real needs of both sides to the conflict, and cooperate with like-minded international actors.

They should also explore the potential inherent in the Abraham Accords to strengthen Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and support constructive steps in that regard. At the same time, they should try to mitigate negative side-effects of Israeli-Arab normalization on the Israeli-Palestinian arena and beyond.

Last but not least, to play an effective role in peacemaking, the EU will need to improve its image in Israeli society. It will thus have to invest greater efforts in public diplomacy, communicating its positions and the reasoning that underlies them to the wider Israeli public.

Empowering allies

This is also about – mutually – empowering pro-democracy actors. European parliamentarians and officials should regularly meet with pro-democracy actors, when they visit Israel and they should showcase their work by inviting them to speak at conferences, mention them in speeches and on social media, and act as their champions in Europe. A regular forum, convening high-level EU officials with Israeli pro-democracy actors could serve as an additional empowerment tool.

Israeli civil society organizations working to advance liberal democracy often lack institutional capacity to bring about the change to which they aspire. They need additional resources and financial support. Europe, being a key donor on democracy issues, can expand and diversify its funding schemes.

Funding should be made more easily accessible to new, small and innovative initiatives, in parallel to continued support for well-established organizations that effectively promote long-term positive change.

But this is not only about funds: Pro-democracy actors in Israel, such as organizations promoting shared society, Israeli-Palestinian peace and human rights, have been under pressure from the right-wing. The EU and its member states should uphold their funding for these organizations, back them politically and refrain from enforcing on them inappropriate conditionality.

At the same time, progressive Israelis should help strengthen pro-democracy actors in Europe, in particular those working to confront illiberal tendencies and replace populist leaders. This should include support by Israeli progressives for maintaining space for constructive, diverse debates in Europe on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Liberal democracy at the center of relations

Europeans and Israelis can also work together to strengthen their bilateral relations based on liberal-democratic values and they can do so by setting a new agenda. In March, the EU decided to extend its Action Plan with Israel, adopted in 2005, for another three years, to “give the parties the opportunity to take forward their cooperation for the coming years, including through the possible negotiation of partnership priorities.”

This step – together with the new EU Agenda for the Mediterranean adopted in April, 2021 – should be leveraged to chart new paths for Israel-EU cooperation, based on the pillars of democracy and peace. If new priorities are set, new implementation mechanisms put in place, new resources allocated and new actors mobilized – all with a focus on advancing cooperation on liberal democratic values – Israel-Europe bilateral relations will be on a better track moving forward.

That also means not to let security dominate ties between the two entities. While the war in Ukraine is likely to enhance security as a strong feature of Israeli-European cooperation, it should be done in a way that strengthens rather than compromises liberal democratic values.

Cooperation on science, education, environment, tourism and culture should therefore be prioritized by maximizing Israeli-European civilian cooperation through programs like Horizon Europe, Creative Europe and Erasmus+, which include territorial clauses that ensure that European funds are not diverted to settlements in occupied Palestinian territories.

A concentrated Israeli-European effort that puts liberal democracy at the heart of the relationship and empowers pro-democracy actors should be the way forward in Israel-Europe relations.

This article is from “JPost“, from July 13, 2022

הפוסט Democratic values: The heart of Europe- Israel relations – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The MOU articulates that Israel and Egypt will increase natural gas sales to EU countries, who in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are trying to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels. According to the agreement, Israel will deliver natural gas via pipeline to Egypt, where it will then be converted to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and sold on the European market.

There is good reason for the fanfare around the agreement. The EU is moving heaven and earth to replace the 150 billion cubic meters (BCM) that Russia delivered in years past (40% of its total annual needs). By committing themselves to exporting natural gas to Europe, Israel and Egypt reaffirmed their commitments to the West’s efforts in this conflict.

And after years of discussions that failed to produce fruit, the signing of this MOU is a particularly important achievement for Israel – albeit one that materialized as a byproduct of geopolitical developments beyond anyone’s control.

Successful energy diplomacy is as much about confidence-building and momentum towards the future as it is about any singular project in the present moment. This new agreement accomplishes both, addressing immediate concerns while presenting Brussels and Jerusalem an opportunity to diversify their energy relationship in the coming years.

Nevertheless, it is also important to be modest. The MOU’s language was vague, using terms like “endeavor” and “exploring possibilities” to reflect a shared interest in cooperation, without legally binding the parties to any contractual obligations. This was done intentionally. The global energy market is in tremendous flux and everyone is hedging their bets in the event a more affordable deal comes along.

The MOU doesn’t commit to investing in new infrastructure that would expand Israel’s capacity to export natural gas or Egypt’s ability to liquefy it. Presently, Israel can deliver somewhere between 7-10 BCM to Egypt via existing export contracts, where it could then be converted into LNG and sold on the global market. Future pipeline projects will enable this quantity to increase, however Egypt’s liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals can only convert around 17 BCM per year.

IN OTHER words, the MOU loosely weaves EU energy interests into Israel and Egypt’s current energy partnership, as well as the broader trend of energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. This isn’t a game changer that will alter European energy security, rather a piece of a complex puzzle that Brussels is trying to tackle with a combination of short, medium and long-term policies on the import of fossil fuels and the development of renewable projects. It also means that future exports to Europe won’t dramatically weaken Israel’s energy security, as some have claimed. The quantities aren’t significant enough and the timeframe that the parties are discussing isn’t long enough.

To fully maximize the potential of this agreement, Israel should pursue additional methods beyond natural gas exports to support Europe’s efforts. Investing in renewable infrastructure and technology would both enable Israel to expand its storage capacity (which in turn would allow it to export more natural gas), as well as contribute to international efforts to transition from fossil fuels. Israel has yet to green-light the EuroAsia Interconnector, a proposed electricity interconnector or high-voltage cable that would link the electricity systems of Greece, Cyprus and Israel.

Unlike pipelines, interconnectors transfer electricity in both directions and are commonly viewed as one of the better vehicles to maximize the strengths of renewable energy. Imagine a scenario where Israel – alongside other Middle Eastern and Mediterranean states – supplied renewable-based electricity to Europe. And with the right dose of American mediation, Israel might find the right language to reach a maritime boundary agreement with Lebanon, thus enabling international oil and gas companies to explore additional Mediterranean waters and discover more hydrocarbons.

When world leaders gathered at COP26 in Glasgow last November, the conversation focused almost exclusively on the transition to renewables and combating climate change. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dramatically altered the short-term interests of Europe and its allies, those long-term goals remain unchanged.

Eastern Mediterranean states, such as Israel, that can adeptly navigate between these somewhat contradictory trends will not only play a constructive role in supporting Europe during this current crisis but help lay the foundations for a more interconnected and renewable tomorrow.

This article is from “JPost“, from June 21, 2022

הפוסט Exporting Israel’s gas to Europe: An initial but momentous step- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the event participated researchers and managers from Mitvim Institute, and representatives from the Center of the Middle Eastern Studies, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Israel friends of Ukraine.

The discussion was opened by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Kornichuk, and former Israeli ambassadors in Russia – Arkadi Milman and Zvi Magen. There were debates about policy, economy and communication. The participants discussed issues of food security, questions regarding the tariffs against Russia and the expectations of image that exists in both sides of the conflict.

הפוסט For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the event participated researchers and managers from Mitvim Institute, and representatives from the Center of the Middle Eastern Studies, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and Israel friends of Ukraine.

The discussion was opened by the Ukrainian Ambassador to Israel Yevgen Kornichuk, and former Israeli ambassadors in Russia – Arkadi Milman and Zvi Magen. There were debates about policy, economy and communication. The participants discussed issues of food security, questions regarding the tariffs against Russia and the expectations of image that exists in both sides of the conflict.

הפוסט For the first time – a roundtable with Ukrainian research centers הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first of these is that Russia shares a common border with Israel. In northwest Syria, Russia is present in large air and naval bases, and maintains a significant military presence. This forms a central consideration for Israel.

Russia has been a strategic pillar for Assad’s political and physical survival. Without Russian-provided military equipment and air power, the Assad regime could not have won its civil war.

Russian surface-to-air missile batteries – the most advanced in the world – are on Syrian soil, including the S-300 battery that Syria received from Russia, and the S-400, the peak of Russian air defense capabilities, operated by Russian forces in the country.

These assets could potentially form a major threat, not only to Israel’s military freedom of action in the crowded Syrian skies, but also to civil aviation in Israeli airspace. As a result, Israel places enormous weight on the dialogue with Russia.

This dialogue occurs as Israel works to prevent the entrenchment of Iran in Syria. Understandings with Russia play a hugely important role in this context and undermining these understandings could have significant consequences.

In addition, Israel is dealing with a two-dimensional Iranian threat. The first is the Iranian nuclear program. The Russian war on Ukraine has led to a delay of the signature on the revived Iranian nuclear program, despite America’s desire to fast-forward completion of the talks so that it can focus on Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the world has developed a new thirst for oil after disruption to Russia’s exports and a post-nuclear deal Iran can help quench some of that thirst, particularly if the West upgrades the sanctions on Russia to include import of oil.

Surprisingly, while both the Iranians and the West have exhibited willingness to complete the deal, it has been Russia that introduced a new clause demanding exception from sanctions placed on it when it comes to its ties with Iran.

This has led to a return to consultations, which took several days to resolve until Russia said it received the necessary guarantees from Washington.

Whatever happens with the nuclear agreement, from the Israeli perspective, it is vital that it remains free to deal with the second dimension of the Iranian threat, namely its regional military-terrorist entrenchment program, particularly in Syria.

These factors form Israel’s principal considerations, which do not vanish as Russia mercilessly pounds Ukraine. While Israeli public opinion is firmly on the side of the Ukrainian people, Israel’s government does not have the luxury of ignoring key national security calculations.

Thus, Israel has adopted a policy that condemns the aggression by Moscow. It co-sponsored the UN General Assembly condemning the Russian invasion, provides humanitarian and medical aid, and has also made clear that it will not become a route to bypass economic sanctions on Russia. However, Israel has declined Ukraine’s request for Israeli military equipment.

To date, the United States has a full understanding of Israel’s array of considerations and its careful maneuvering.

Furthermore, Washington has found Israel’s role as a mediator between Kyiv and Moscow useful, although, so far, both sides remain too far apart for compromise solutions at this time.

There is no doubt that Israel’s stance and the practical steps are being tested and examined every day by decision-makers in Jerusalem. This is not a fire-and-forget policy and it may not remain static if the war drags on for months longer.

As warnings of chemical attacks by Russia continue to hover in the background, they serve as a reminder of the fact that critical changes in the situation in Europe, such as a WMD attack or continued unrestrained Russian shelling, will obligate Israel to reassess its current position.

This would lead Israel to lose its position of mediator, but this is less important compared to the fact that it could lead to undesired elevated tension between Israel and Russia in the Middle East, should Russia choose to escalate.

In addition, should the situation change, the US could demand more categorical statements and actions from Israel as part of an alignment with Washington.

Israel is, after all, a part of the Western camp and enjoys a special alliance with the US. US support for Israel, past, present, and future, is of strategic vitality that cannot be exaggerated. This is backed by shared Israeli – American values. Hence, if the US demands a stronger Israeli posture on the European war, Israel will not be able to remain aloof.

Lastly, Israel’s handling of the Ukrainian refugee crisis began poorly, but has improved steadily with time. Many of the Ukrainians headed for Israel are eligible for automatic citizenship under the Right of Return.

Should tens of thousands arrive, this will present a considerable event for a state the size of Israel.

At the same time, unforced and morally inappropriate errors were made by Israel in the initial reception of non-Jewish refugees. As Jews, we remember the dark days of the 1930s when the world shut its doors to us and we could not escape the inferno of the Holocaust. As a nation that experienced this, we can’t turn away the small number of Ukrainian refugees who knock on our door. Most of them do not view Israel as their final destination.

Fortunately, on March 13, the Israeli government improved its policy and enabled thousands of additional Ukrainian refugees to claim asylum in Israel.

With no end to the crisis in sight at this time, Israel must prepare to keep adapting its policies as the situation evolves.

The op-ed was written in The Jerusalem Post on March 2022.

הפוסט Israel’s delicate navigation in the Russia-Ukraine war – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The big question is whether Israel has learnt from its mistakes and successes in absorbing the massive aliyah wave of the 1990’s, following the break up of the Soviet Union – and whether Israel’s current government has the capacity and the political will to make crucial decisions about welcoming and integrating these new citizens, Jewish and non-Jewish alike.

For now, what is more apparent is the lack of a clear policy on both immigration and refugees. As too often happens in Israel, decisions are taken either because of immediate political pressure or out of dire necessity, when the problem has already grown from manageable proportions into something much more critical and uncontrolled.

As planes with new olim (immigrants) and refugees are already landing at Ben-Gurion Airport from Poland, Romania and Russia, Israel must use the little time left to formulate a new policy that will benefit both the newcomers and the state.

Unlike the new olim, who get identity cards and the right to social and medical care on arrival (or after completing standard bureaucratic procedures at the Nativ immigration office), refugees are not currently entitled to any medical plan, schooling, nor do they have the right to work. This is the “policy” formulated by Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked regarding refugees with relatives in Israel.

But with these severe limitations, why would the term “refugee” even be used?

According to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees (ratified by Israel) and its 1967 Protocol, member states are obliged to establish and maintain a national asylum system and to create or authorize competent national authorities to establish a framework for refugee protection. Since health, according to the Convention, is a fundamental human right for all, refugees should have access to the same or similar healthcare as host populations. Today, the government, bowing to pressure, announced refugees over 60 will get full medical cover; other will have access to first aid and emergency medicine.

הפוסט Can Israel Cope With the Immigrant Wave From Russia’s War on Ukraine, Jews and non-Jews Alike? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

What did Lapid really say?

Speaking with Oded Ben-Ami on Israel’s Channel 12 News on Sunday, the foreign minister answered the anchor’s question on the possibility of Israel imposing sanctions on Russia if the US does. Here are Lapid’s exact words:

“Look, then we’ll have to consider. That’s not the situation [right now]. We need to understand, we are not there, and I assess twice a day if and when we want to move our embassy from Kyiv. We are being careful, and we need to be careful.”

Soon after the interview, the headline on Channel 12, and later in other media outlets, said, “Israel will support sanctions on Ukraine,” misquoting Lapid.

It seems that the media were too fast to interpret Lapid’s words as readiness to join the Americans in imposing sanctions on Russia, and yet his actual “wait and see” statement can also be considered an interesting deviation from traditional silence.

Why Israel chooses to be ‘Switzerland’ on Russia and Ukraine

Israeli officials often say that Israel is a small country and cannot afford to be caught between two Great Powers – Russia and the US – considering that it depends on Moscow’s cooperation in Syria.

However, even before Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, Israel maintained silence on the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Back then, the White House and State Department explicitly expressed their anger over Israel’s neutrality. Senior members of the Obama Administration, some of them are currently part of Joe Biden’s team, privately expressed disappointment at Israel’s position. After Crimea was annexed, Israel’s relations with Russia continued to flourish. Then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu paid multiple visits to Moscow and Sochi and often bragged about his “warm personal relations” with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Zvi Magen, a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, who was Israel’s ambassador to Ukraine from 1993 to 1997 and ambassador to Russia from 1998 to 1999, told The Media Line that what seemed to some like a light fluctuation in Lapid’s approach actually reflected a policy change.

“This kind of statement is not in any way incidental. I believe that the ‘narrow cabinet’ ministers took and approved this decision. Let me remind you what kind of relations we have with Russia. We have agreements and understandings: They don’t meddle with what we do in Syria [against Hizbullah and Iranian agents]; we don’t meddle in their internal business or the situation in Ukraine,” Magen said.

“But in recent weeks,” he continued, “something changed. They [the Russians] changed their tone. Their rhetoric on Israel became harsher, they operate jammers and other electronic devices that cause interference with our flights, they conduct airborne drills on the [Syrian-held eastern] Golan along with Syrians.

“It seems like a change of a political course and even a looming conflict. I have a feeling that Russia intends to open another anti-US front here in the Middle East. It will not necessarily be against us but there will be consequences,” the expert said.

Magen believes that Lapid’s cautious statement has to do with the changing situation on the Syrian front.

Ex-MK Roman Bronfman, who was born in Ukraine, said he was “pleasantly surprised” by Lapid’s words.

“The era of deliberation and the search for concealment and silence is coming to an end. It is good that Israel has chosen this step for several reasons, certainly because of the strategy of partnership with Americans, and also in terms of values. The State of Israel must stick with humanitarian values and cannot be in favor of an illegal invasion and provocations by Russia against its neighbors. It happened to us with Belarus − instead of returning the ambassadors, we sent them to attend [President Alexander] Lukashenko’s parties and events.”

The right side of history

For many Israelis of Ukrainian and Belarusian origin, Israel’s awkward silence on tragic events in Belarus, where peaceful demonstrations were crushed and supporters of change are brutally persecuted, is a sore point. Some hope that due to changing circumstances and American pressure, Israel will make the right choice.

Alexander Fruman, an Israeli who was brutally beaten and tortured by Belarusian security forces in 2020 during demonstrations in Minsk, believes that Israel can no longer afford to stick to what he calls “cowardly neutrality.”

“When responding to the Belarusian diaspora in Israel, Yair Lapid hinted that the fear of waking up a sleeping bear on the ‘common border with Russia’ on the Golan prevented the Foreign Ministry from taking any active measures against Belarus,” Fruman told The Media Line. “A fear of unpredictable actions by the Belarusian regime against Jewish organizations in Belarus was also noted as a deterrent.”

“Fateful events are taking place in the world and, as things stand now, the cowardly silence of Israel will go down in history as a diplomatic disgrace and be an eternal stain on relations between the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Israeli peoples,” he said.

“The fact that the Foreign Ministry, under pressure from the United States, is ready to quietly express its position on what should be obvious, only makes Israel out to be not completely independent in foreign policy and supports Putin’s mythical narrative that there is one sovereign and his vassals,” he added.

It is still unclear whether Israel will support American actions in case of further escalation in Ukraine. But it seems that the pressure on decision-makers in Jerusalem from within and without will continue to mount. Eventually, Israel, a staunch US ally, might discover that neutrality is not always the right or the easy choice.

The op-ed was published in The Media Line in February 2022.

הפוסט Israel Weighs Its Neutrality on Russia-Ukraine Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Western diplomats are leaving and foreign governments, including Israel, are urgently calling on their citizens to come home, to the frustration of Ukrainians, who believe that Kyiv will not be bombed or occupied, and that war with Russia is still just one of many possibilities.

In addition to issuing the travel warning to its citizens, Israel also evacuated the families of the diplomats from Kyiv. Interestingly, the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem cited the “worsening of the situation in Ukraine,” without mentioning Russia or a possible war between it and Ukraine. Since 2015, when Russia interfered in the war in Syria, Israel has been coordinating its combat activities there with the Russian army command. Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian skies largely depends on this coordination.

Unlike other Western countries, Israel is being extra careful walking the tightrope between Russia and Ukraine. While President Joe Biden warns the world of “Russian aggression,” Israel is focusing on possible evacuation of Israelis and Jews and providing some humanitarian assistance.

It seems, however, that Kyiv is growing tired of this balancing act. Yevgen Korniychuk, Ukraine’s ambassador in Tel Aviv, lately criticized Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and blamed him for “adopting the Kremlin’s rhetoric.”

“If war breaks out in Europe − I suggest that Israel will be left alone in the face of the Iranian threat,” Korniychuk said. He was later summoned to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem for a reprimand call.

On Sunday, the Israeli Friends of Ukraine organization called on the government to “join a number of Western countries in an effort to prevent war between Russia and Ukraine.”

The statement, which was published in social media and sent to offices of the prime minister, foreign minister, and minister of defense, made a moral argument for supporting Ukraine.

“As Israelis and Jews, we have experienced the horrors and disasters of wars, we understand the importance and value of support by friendly countries. … After all, the lessons of history have already taught us that indifference, watching from the sidelines, or attempts to appease the aggressor always lead to disaster,” the statement read.

“We are aware of the complexity of the security situation in the Middle East and the policy of ambiguity that Israel is pursuing while refraining from supporting either side in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. But at this critical moment, Israel, as an integral part of the family of liberal states and the Western world, cannot stand aside and watch from afar the relentless preparations for war,” the Israeli Friends of Ukraine’s appeal continued.

For now, there is no change in the Israeli position. But what will Israel do if the worst-case scenario eventuates? If the situation gets out of control and hostilities break out and shake the earth in Ukraine, will Israel keep to its neutrality and remain silent in order to appease the Russians?

Dr. Vera Michlin-Shapir, a visiting research fellow at the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications in London, believes the current conflict is much more than a regional brawl, but rather it is a tectonic clash between Russia and the West, which will make it significantly more difficult for Israel to maintain its balancing act.

“Russia wants to position itself as a Great Power. For that to happen, it aims to weaken the current Great Power – the collective West, i.e., the USA, Europe, and NATO. The Russians want to drive a wedge between the US and Europe, between Western and Eastern Europe,” Michlin-Shapir said.

“Ideally, they want to push the US away from Europe and to promote their plan for a ‘new European architecture’ that eventually will be led by Russia. I believe that now Israel will have to position itself where it belongs, with the USA,” she said.

Michlin-Shapir, who recently co-authored with Ofer Fridman an analysis called “Smoke and mirrors: Western misperceptions of Russia in Ukraine,” which was published by Institute of Modern Russia, believes the West is wrong in using the dichotomic optics of war and peace in Ukraine, and assuming that Kremlin does the same.

“In reality, the Russian strategic mindset is more flexible, as it envisions the notions of war and peace as existing on a continuum,” Michlin-Shapir said. The current crisis will include many ups and downs, and this reality might allow Israel to use its leverage and its strategic place in the Russian-Ukrainian-American triangle, she continued.

“It’s not unreasonable that in the future Israel will be able to create new spaces of dialogue. But Israel first needs to mature as a diplomatic force. Yes, it needs to take Syria into account, but now that Israel plays along with the Great Powers it needs to toughen up and to put its strategic alliances – specifically its alliance with the US − on the table,” Michlin-Shapir told the Media Line.

Dr. Evgeny Klauber, an expert on former Soviet Union countries from Tel Aviv University, warns that regardless of whether Israel maintains silence on war in Ukraine, the consequences of this conflict are already inevitable. In his assessment, war may still be prevented, or limited to areas of Eastern Ukraine, but even the possibility has already led to major developments in the Middle East.

“In the current situation, the US weakness in the Middle East will grow, and the Iranians might be drawn closer to Russia. In fact, there might be a direct connection between the US’s speedy retreat from Afghanistan and current events in Ukraine. The Middle East will feel the fire as well; it’s inevitable,” Klauber said.

The op-ed was published in The Media Line in February 2022.

הפוסט Jerusalem Tries to Navigate Russia-US-Israel Triangle Over Ukraine Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.