Thus, Israel was the only country to withdraw its ambassador from Vienna in 1986, when Kurt Waldheim – the former UN secretary-general, who was later revealed to have been an officer in the Wehrmacht – was elected president of Austria.

Even in 2000, Israel recalled its ambassador from Vienna when the Austrian Freedom Party, with roots in the Nazi regime, joined the coalition government. Once again, we were among the few in the world who placed an ethical stance above cold political considerations – and we sent a clear message about what was acceptable and unacceptable when it came to Jewish safety.

This is how Israel has acted for years: a Jewish state with a historical memory that obliges it to take a stand for our people and against racism and xenophobia of any kind. But today, 25 years later, I’m concerned about the future of Israel’s moral compass and its Foreign Ministry. The excellent individuals in the Israeli Foreign Ministry are increasingly being asked to implement policies that contradict everything we believe in, everything Israel once represented.

When Israel voted at the UN against the proposal calling for the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – alongside countries like Russia, North Korea, and of course the United States under Donald Trump – it was another painful testament to the dark place into which we have descended.

But it doesn’t stop here.

New policy directives

The Israeli Foreign Ministry continues to receive new policy directives that shame its legacy. For example, the directive from Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to work on strengthening ties with far-right parties in Europe.

These are the same parties that continue the path of neo-Nazi movements. Today, they hide behind an anti-Muslim facade, which should be a reason to not legitimize them in any case. They cast a thin veil over the antisemitic undertone that simmers beneath the surface, waiting for the right moment to break out.

While in 2000, Israel’s government condemned Europeans for allying with right-wing extremists, in 2025, the Likud has made itself an “observer member” of a grouping of far-right European parties.

Government ministers are continuing to cozy up with those who are willing to downplay their hatred for Jews in order to gain legitimacy. This is alongside other activities that shame our nation, such as the support for the ethnic cleansing carried out by Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry is composed of good and dedicated individuals who chose a career primarily focused on representing their country and fighting for it. But today, every Israeli diplomat must take a moment for self-reflection: can they continue to serve a policy that contradicts the Jewish and democratic values for which they joined the Ministry? And if they do, shouldn’t they raise their opposition to the minister’s directive?

Israel was once a moral beacon. Our founding vision was to be a light among nations. It was core to our identity to never forget. We must not lose our way, and the responsibility for this does not lie solely with the leaders – it also falls on the public and our public servants, especially those in the Foreign Ministry. These are the individuals whose role is to implement the policies of the Israeli government on the international stage.

The legitimization of racist and antisemitic parties and support for Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine are the diplomatic equivalents of an illegal order with a black flag flying above it. There are things that every principled person must stand against and say clearly: enough is enough.

The article was published on March 17th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s Foreign Policy Has Lost Its Moral Compass הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A year after Hamas’s murderous surprise attack on October 7, Israel has succeeded in restoring its deterrent edge. All the main members of the “Axis of Resistance” – Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – have suffered major military setbacks, with the entire leadership echelons of Hezbollah and Hamas having been eliminated. Israel has proved that, militarily and technologically, it is superior to its enemies.

Alongside these achievements, an unexpected development has occurred in Syria, indirectly benefiting Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of Sunni Islamic rule have led to Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance, resulting in the removal of Iranian military presence and influence on Israel’s borders and the closure of the corridor through which Iran previously supplied arms and ammunition to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The fall of Assad also exposed the vulnerability of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, which, despite the geopolitical significance of Syria, were unable to prevent the regime’s downfall. However, this positive shift is tempered by concerns that Syria may now be controlled by extremist Islamic factions backed by Turkey, though it remains too early to fully assess the nature of the new Syrian regime.

On the other side, the camp of moderate states that have signed peace and/or normalization agreements with Israel, along with Saudi Arabia, has managed to maintain its cohesion, even if much of the activity has been conducted behind the scenes.

The cooperation between these states was publicly visible during the Iranian missile attack on Israel. With the exception of Jordan, none of these countries withdrew their ambassadors from Israel or severed diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia remains on the table, though the Saudis are now demanding a higher price for such an agreement.

Despite these achievements, Israel has so far failed in its handling of the hostages in Gaza. The military defeat inflicted on Hamas was expected to be Israel’s main bargaining chip, yet the insistence on not ending the war in Gaza is driven by political rather than operational considerations. This represents a moral failure that stands in stark contradiction to the core values of Judaism and humanity in general.

Moreover, the delay in securing an agreement for the release of the hostages, the humiliating treatment of the hostages’ families by ministers and Knesset members from the coalition, and the continuous attempts to push forward the judicial revolution while stalling on solutions for enlisting haredim (the ultra-Orthodox) into military service, have all exacerbated the divisions within Israeli society.

Alongside these failures, there has been growing criticism of Israel, including hate speech and antisemitism, particularly in relation to its policy toward the Palestinians. Israel has been accused of committing war crimes against Gaza’s civilian population.

The International Criminal Court’s issuance of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes seems to be only the tip of the iceberg.

While these accusations are politically motivated, even if they are primarily or partially unfounded – and opinions are divided on this, given the lack of reliable information in the Israeli media – they have severely damaged Israel’s standing in the international community as a law-abiding state.

“War is the continuation of diplomacy by other means,” as the famous quote from the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz suggests. In the current situation, one of the significant failures has been the inability to translate military successes into diplomatic achievements.

The ceasefire with Lebanon, which includes the removal of Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River and the deployment of UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese military in the area between the Litani and the Israeli border, might be considered a success. Yet, only time will tell if this achievement is sustainable, unlike the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

In contrast to the situation in Lebanon, a diplomatic resolution to the Palestinian problem appears to be a distant prospect. Numerous plans have been proposed for the “day after” the war, yet the Netanyahu government remains adamant not to engage in discussions about them.

It appears that the IDF has been instructed to establish a permanent presence in Gaza, at least in its northern part. Additionally, far-right elements within the government are actively considering the possibility of re-establishing Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Opposition to the continued control of Hamas over Gaza is justified, but resistance to the return of an upgraded Palestinian Authority or another recognized and legitimate Palestinian leadership is unwarranted. The vacuum created by the absence of governance is an open invitation for chaos or for Hamas to desperately cling to power. In any case, maintaining the current deadlock is a recipe for failure.

The main diplomatic goal that remains to be achieved is a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States have expressed interest in such an agreement, but they are waiting for the Trump presidency. The central issue revolves around the demands of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in exchange for normalization with Israel.

The key question is whether the current Saudi position, which insists on the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, is open for negotiations. Regardless, any Israeli government pursuing normalization will likely have to make concessions regarding the Palestinian issue, although the exact price remains uncertain.

Sinwar caused permanent changes

When Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar launched his murderous attack on Israel on October 7, he likely considered the possibility of becoming a martyr, but he could not have foreseen the profound and far-reaching changes it would trigger in the Middle East.

Despite the significant setbacks and failures suffered by the Axis of Resistance, Sinwar may be remembered for successfully bringing the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the international and regional agenda. This, however, came at an immense cost, particularly for the Palestinian people in Gaza, who have borne the brunt of the consequences of his actions.

In conclusion, Israel’s military successes must be translated into diplomatic achievements. The war has opened up a unique opportunity to reshape regional dynamics, but realizing this potential will require visionary leadership. The challenge, however, is that, at present, such leaders are not evident on either side of the conflict. After the calamity of October 7, failing to seize these new opportunities would amount to another profound tragedy.

The article was published on January 4th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel’s 2024 Military Successes Came at a Cost – Will It Pay in 2025? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Mitvim Institute’s 2024 Israeli Foreign Policy Index, compiled almost a year after the outbreak of the Gaza war, challenges the notion that the Israeli public moved sharply to the right. It reveals that when Israelis are asked to consider long-term strategies regarding Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Iran, a majority of them favor diplomatic solutions. This shift reflects not a leftward movement but rather a turn towards pragmatism. This emerging trend presents an opportunity for Europe to lead, together with Middle-Eastern partners, a bold, long-term vision for peace and stability in the Middle East. Outlining a vision becomes crucial as the region gradually transitions toward a regional conflict, with shockwaves likely to reverberate across the Mediterranean.

Mitvim’s survey reveals two main trends in the Israeli public – one of broad agreement and the other of deep polarization. The first trend is the rejection of the conflict management approach and the public ambition to seek decisive solutions. Only 12% said Israel should avoid strategic measures and adhere to the pre-war situation in its relations with the Palestinians. However, it is this recognition that strategic decisions can no longer be avoided that divides Israelis, leading to two radically different perceptions of what these decisions signify. Hence, the Index highlights polarization between two camps.

The pragmatists, comprising a small relative majority of about 40-50% of the public, support the setting of a political horizon with the Palestinians within a broad regional framework, recognize the limitations of military power, and seek diplomatic cooperation to solve Israel’s security problems. They back regional cooperation as a primary means of advancing an end to the war. They support a package deal that includes normalization with KSA, a US security umbrella, and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state (44%); see a regional coalition as the main solution to the Iranian threat (46%); and support the deployment of a multinational force as a temporary solution after hostilities in Gaza cease (46%).

The other camp, the fundamentalists, are a large minority (about 30%) that currently adopt positions which were the radical right domain prior to the war. This camp favors annexation of the West Bank and resettlement in Gaza (29%), independent Israeli military campaign against Iran (32%), and reliance on an independent military action.

While the survey was conducted before Nasrallah’s elimination and the escalation of the Iran-Israel war, it still reflects a significant preference among Israelis for diplomatic solutions. Even after 10 bitter months of Hezbollah’s shelling and failed diplomatic efforts to stop this unprovoked attack, not to mention the failure of the international community to fulfill UNSCR 1701 and prevent the armament of Hezbollah, a majority of the Israeli public still opt for a diplomatic solution if one could be found. 51% pavor a diplomatic solution whether in the form of an immediate negotiated withdrawal of Hezbollah beyond the Litani river, or a longer-term Israeli-Lebanese agreement. 60% opt for diplomatic options when examining long-term strategies to deal with Iran.

Mitvim’s index highlights that a majority of Israelis align with European policymakers on key issues, notably that the war’s end should coincide with broader Israeli-Palestinian-international efforts for a settlement. They also favor long-term diplomatic solutions with Iran and its proxies, provided Israel’s security remains intact. Most importantly – the public mindset in Israel is a mindset of decisive steps, offering a unique opportunity for the international community—especially Europe—to present a bold Middle East vision. As the U.S. approaches elections, the Biden administration is likely to avoid risky agenda-setting, making it crucial for Europe and MENA actors to lead a new coalition for peace and stability. At the brink of an uncontrolled regional conflict, Europe must lead the efforts to outline an alternative future for the Middle-East. It should channel this devastating year of warfare into an opportunity for generating new political momentum for long-term stability.

The article was publish on October 7th, 2024 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine.

הפוסט An Israeli Public Turn into Pragmatism a Year Into the War May Provide an Opening for a New International Vision for Ending the War הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Adapting the foreign system to the challenge of the climate crisis requires, first and foremost, a profound conceptual change. It calls for a shift from the logic of dealing with the climate issue as a “foster child” of secondary importance to core strategic issues to a new approach of climate diplomacy that sees the climate crisis as a political strategic game changer of prime importance to foreign policy and its implementation. Dealing with the climate crisis as a political issue challenges traditional thinking about the practices shaping foreign relations and about the actors expected to lead these processes. For example, it redefines the importance of non-governmental actors – civil society organizations, the scientific technological community, and the business sector – and positions them as active participants in shaping foreign policy. More broadly, adopting climate diplomacy provides an opportunity to reexamine the relationship between the government and non-governmental sectors in shaping Israel’s foreign relations as a whole.

Based on a review of the structure and activities of Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus on climate issues and case studies from other countries and interstate bodies, the aim of this policy paper is to propose recommendations for conceptual and structural-systemic changes to upgrade Israel’s foreign affairs apparatus handling of climate change challenges. Implementation of conceptual change in the field of climate diplomacy at the national level relies on three main components: a) anchoring and defining the role of Israel’s foreign policy within the framework of Israel’s national effort to confront climate change; b) a structural change in the foreign affairs system itself – defining a strategic integrating actor to deal with the international pillar of Israel’s climate policy; a clear internal division of roles within the system and improvement of inter-ministerial coordination through a permanent government forum; and substantial increase of resources and managerial inputs devoted to the field within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, we see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a national integrator in shaping Israel’s climate diplomacy. c) the creation of new multisectoral systems of cooperation between Israel’s governmental and non-governmental sectors.

הפוסט Upgrading the Capacity of Israel’s Foreign Policy Apparatus to Deal with the Climate Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Previous escalations forced Netanyahu to conduct a diplomatic dialogue with Jordan and agree on arrangements emphasizing his commitment to the status quo, as well as restrictions on visits by Knesset members or Temple Mount activists (i.e. the 2015 Kerry understandings). But the balance in the emerging government coalition has shifted, with the members of the Religious Zionist bloc that advocate significant change in the status quo having greater influence and Netanyahu being more dependent on them, thus having limited room for maneuver.

Growing tension

Against this backdrop, Jordanian officials have been warning that an attempt by the new government to change the status quo at the site and allow provocative actions by Ben-Gvir as a future minister of national security, could threaten peaceful relations with Jordan and inflame the entire region. Netanyahu had reportedly sent reassuring messages to Jordan but this is unlikely to allay the serious concerns over the issue.

In view of the growing tension over this issue, and based on the long history of escalation and violent eruptions at the site, it is incumbent on all relevant actors to increase coordination and institutionalize communications channels to forestall crises. The recently published annual Mitvim Foreign Policy Index found that 61% of the Israeli public (including a majority of center-right voters) support the idea of establishing a coordination mechanism among Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians to prevent escalation at Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Only 20% objected, reflecting the Israeli public’s awareness of the issue’s sensitivity and of the need to strengthen coordination and dialogue among the parties involved.

After the Six Day War in 1967, a secret channel of communication was established between Israeli authorities and the Wakf administration under Jordanian auspices, which is tasked with the management of the Temple Mount site, and a modus vivendi was developed between the parties. Professor Yitzhak Reiter demonstrated in his research on the Temple Mount that the coordination mechanism and the quiet understandings formed between the sides collapsed following the 1996 Western Wall Tunnel affair and the severe rift following the second intifada and the escalation at the site.

Under Netanyahu’s rule, tensions with Jordan deepened and the contacts with the Wakf weakened. The rounds of violence during this period led to American involvement in a bid to fill the vacuum and end the crises. This was the case, for example, in November 2014 and October 2015, when then-secretary of state John Kerry shuttled between Jerusalem, Amman, and Ramallah, and formulated understandings to ease tensions.

Over the past year, the Bennett-Lapid government attempted to preempt escalation during Ramadan through intensive Israeli-initiated contacts with Jordan and the Palestinians, which included meetings between Yair Lapid, Benny Gantz, and Omer Bar Lev with senior Jordanian and Palestinian officials. This move was led by the parties, rather than by an external actor, and was made possible by the improved relations with Jordan and the PA, reflecting a desire to act before and not after escalation.

A model for a permanent framework

But the idea examined in the Mitvim survey suggests a different model. Instead of efforts by external parties to douse the flames after the fire has already broken out or ad hoc contacts between senior officials to ease the crisis, the model proposes a permanent framework of dialogue, coordination and cooperation on this most sensitive and volatile issue.

SUCH A mechanism would enable a constant channel of communications, serve as a tool for message and information exchanges and confidence building measures, promoting coordination and preparations for times of crisis, and agreed moves to calm tensions and restore order.

Public support for the idea shows that Israelis understand the special sensitivity of the Temple Mount and the need for coordination with other parties, and recognizes their role in managing the site, especially given the risks of escalation and loss of control. Such a step is, of course, politically sensitive and will likely be opposed by those seeking to change the status quo but the majority of the public appears to support it.

If this policy direction is agreed upon, the sides will be required to discuss the nature of the mechanism, the parties involved and its mandate. The mechanism must include those involved in the daily running and protection of the site, who are well acquainted with the ins and outs of the situation, as well as political representatives acting in coordination with the decision makers to ensure a civil-political dimension and not just a security one.

Mechanisms to prevent escalation are urgently needed

The parties will also be able to discuss the integration of other actors, including a possible dialogue with religious leaders and community representatives. The Geneva Initiative of 2003 proposed the establishment of an interfaith council to serve as an advisory body on the management of the holy sites.

At the same time, the participation of additional players at the regional or international level is also important. These players could include Morocco, which chairs the Jerusalem Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Saudi Arabia, which bears responsibility for Islam’s holy sites in Mecca and Medina.

Similar proposals and ideas have arisen over the years regarding the establishment of special mechanisms for the management of the holy sites. Then-prime minister Olmert’s proposal in 2008, for example, included a framework consisting of five states: Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the US. The Amirav-Husseini plan (2000) proposed a composition of 11 states, including Israel, Palestine the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and four Arab states.

The Oslo process chose to postpone the question of Jerusalem’s future to the final stage of negotiations, consistent with Israel’s desire to delay discussion of the issue as much as possible. But the periodic tensions that erupt in Jerusalem make it clear time and again that the issue cannot be ignored.

Therefore, the construction of mechanisms to prevent escalation in Jerusalem should be an immediate and urgent move, not the end of the road. Moreover, a mechanism regarding the holy sites could also be a first step in laying the ground for cooperation on other issues, and perhaps even the start of political momentum in the future and the beginning of a real dialogue on the question of Jerusalem.

The combination of recent and increasing instability in the West Bank, the tensions in eastern Jerusalem and the fears of extreme and dangerous policies promoted by some members of the new government create a particularly volatile mix and any unusual incident on the Temple Mount could trigger a flare-up.

This state of play underscores the critical importance of preventing escalation at this sensitive site and instituting permanent and effective coordination and dialogue mechanisms between all parties involved.

This article is from “JPost“, from December 5, 2022

הפוסט As tensions grow, all eyes are on the Temple Mount הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As Sino-American relations become more contentious, Israel has been quickly drawn into the crossfire given its close association with the US. Still, Israel’s technological exports to China and the challenges they pose for the US are not new. In the mid-1990s, for example, the Israeli government sought to sell China several Phalcon Airborne Early Warning (AEW) systems for an estimated $1 billion (NIS 3.5 b.). Under massive pressure from the White House and Congress, Israel eventually canceled the deal and had to pay back the $200 million (NIS 705.6 m.) down payment to the Chinese government, as well as $150 million (NIS 529 m.) in compensation.

Over the past decade, the American administration has become exceedingly apprehensive about China’s legal, as well as illicit efforts to boost its technological competency, and challenge the US’ advantage in innovative research and development (R&D). Beijing was frequently accused of engaging in extensive cyber campaigns designed to steal sensitive data concerning novel military technology from American governmental agencies, as well as private defense contractors.

FBI Director Christopher Wray publicly asserted in July 2020 that “The greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and our economic vitality is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our economic security and by extension, to our national security.” This harsh rhetoric is reminiscent of the Cold War era and it implies there is an all-consuming Sino-American great power competition that does not allow US allies to flirt with adversaries even in the ostensibly innocuous economic realm, let alone when it comes to advanced technology with military applications.

THE TENSE technological China-Israel-US triangle is further complicated by American worries regarding the efforts of Chinese companies to gain access to and possibly ownership over Israeli critical infrastructure, including ports, railways and highways as part of Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative. In August 2021, for example, director of the CIA William Burns expressed his concerns regarding Chinese investments in Israel during a meeting with then-prime minister Naftali Bennett. A senior State Department official told the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, “We know our partners and allies in the Middle East have trade relations with China and that’s OK… but we made it clear that there is a certain kind of cooperation with China we cannot live with.”

According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, China became Israel’s largest source of imports in 2021, topping the US, and Israel’s largest trade deficit was also with China, totaling $6.6 billion (NIS 23.3 b.). Given the clear imbalance, from the Israeli perspective expanding trade relations with China makes sense and it is all about the promise of a massive and lucrative market for Israel’s burgeoning tech industry.

From the American administration’s standpoint, however, the problem revolves around military technology and dual-use technology that can serve both civilian and military functions. Israel’s role in China’s economic and military rise in support of Beijing’s regional or global aspirations, albeit considerably modest as well as indirect, is something with which the US is growingly uncomfortable.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, David Ben-Gurion had to make a difficult decision about Israel’s global orientation and choose between East and West despite previous efforts to remain non-aligned. Israeli leaders are about to face a similar pivotal moment, although this time the dilemma is less severe. The US-Israel special relationship and the diplomatic, military and economic reliance on the Americans do not lend any meaningful support to a keep-all-options-open Israeli approach.

As Sino-American relations continuously worsen, the fork in the road moment is fast approaching, and Israeli policymakers must be prepared and willing to take the right path. Ben-Gurion chose the West over the East, the US over the Soviet Union. There are short-term benefits to selling technology to China or allowing it to build or own parts of Israel’s critical infrastructure.

There may be a way to tactically come to an understanding with the American administration regarding certain aspects of the China-Israel relationship. In the long-term, however, Israel’s future is with the US and maintaining the bilateral special relationship is of the utmost strategic importance.

This article is from “JPost“, from October 7, 2022

הפוסט Israel remains caught between China and the United States- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Jewish Agency – or “Sochnut”  in Hebrew – has been very active throughout Russia (and the former Soviet Union) since the late 1980s. Allowing the Agency to operate openly was a seismic development. Where Jews had been sentenced to harsh prison sentences just years earlier for the crime of practicing their religion or requesting a visa to emigrate, they were now free to openly “be,” and were, furthermore, assisted by a foreign-based agency.

In the final years of the USSR, the Agency’s primary role was to assist Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel and, equally importantly, participating in the rebuilding of Jewish life in the country. The damage wreaked upon the population of approximately three million Jews in Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics resulting from extreme and unceasing persecution and repression was enormous.

The immediate post-Soviet era allowed a Jewish renaissance to flourish in the Russian Federation. Jewish religious and lay leaders felt secure and took great pride in the vibrant community they had revived after decades of fear, and the extremely punitive state-sponsored antisemitism of the Soviet era.

On July 5, 2022, everything changed.

But the reality is that what seemed to happen so suddenly had been building for many years, reflected in the steadfast focus of domestic security services on the Jewish Agency.

I. THE JULY 5 CRISIS: MOSCOW THREATENS TO CLOSE THE JEWISH AGENCY IN RUSSIA

Upon hearing the news of a threatened closure, Agency representatives in Israel and Russia attempted a calming spin, saying that the story was blown out of proportion; that the issue was procedural, not political or diplomatic. It would pass.

On July 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin returned to Moscow from a tripartite summit in Tehran which also included Turkey. That same day, the Agency was notified that a court hearing would be held – on July 28 – at which the Ministry of Justice would demand that the Agency cease operations in Russia.

Israel immediately attempted to send a delegation of legal experts to negotiate with Russia and defuse the situation before it became a full-blown crisis.

Forebodingly, Moscow denied the Israeli officials entry visas until 36 hours before the commencement of the trial. In Jerusalem this development was seen as a clear signal of Russia’s intention to escalate the conflict.

The “official” reason provided for this drastic action was an allegation that the Jewish Agency had breached Russian law by collecting and maintaining a database with sensitive information about Russian citizens. This represented a breach of the privacy rights of Russian citizens by a foreign agent.

The Russians were clearly turning up the heat.

II. THE PROFOUND IMPACT OF THE “SOCHNUT” ON JEWISH LIFE IN RUSSIA

As Russia sprinted from a command economy to a market one in a flash, the resulting social and economic upheaval was severe and intense. Into this breach stepped numerous enterprising Jewish organizations and individuals. All were focused on reviving Jewish life that had, for more than 70 years, been dormant, unless “underground.”

The common, critical and central element of domestic Russian Jewish organizations was that they were invested – fully – in the continuation and flourishing of Jewish life in the country. The Jewish Agency, however, had a mandate to assist and counsel any Jewish Russians wishing to emigrate to Israel. It was always in a special, suspect category.

A little known fact is that in 1996, Russian authorities threatened to close the Jewish Agency, alleging that it was engaged in illegal activity, acting as a “foreign agent.”

We know now that the fuss then had nothing to do with Agency activity and everything to do with a valuable patch of property in Jerusalem that Moscow claimed as its own. The matter was resolved eight years later to Russia’s satisfaction, but the warning shot certainly grabbed Israel’s attention.

III. THE QUIET UNEASE OF 1996-2022

Vladislav Roytblat, who was a representative of The Joint Distribution Center in the Russian Federation from 2014-2019, recalled the uncertainty of this time in a recent conversation with State of Tel Aviv. He is certain that the Jewish Agency was singled out for “special treatment,” unlike the Joint and other foreign Jewish organizations that operated in Russia at the time.

Roytblat recalled a number of unusual occurrences during his tenure in Russia. Once, for example, a Jewish Agency representative in Omsk, Siberia was questioned by several representatives from the FSB. They were asking about why a formerly high-ranking IDF official was serving with the Agency in Russia in a senior role.

Roytblat felt that the Jewish Agency in the Russian Federation was being harassed systematically. There were many incidents – like the one in Omsk – often involving educational camps. Sudden, inexplicable problems arose – often last-minute – with procuring rental accommodations suitable for their events, for example. It was clear that the FSB was watching Agency activities carefully and they wanted everyone to know.

Whereas the Jewish Agency was an ongoing concern for the FSB, if other Jewish organizations were perceived to be “too active” in promoting immigration or educational programs in Israel, they encountered similar challenges.

Alexander Shlimak, director of the Moscow branch of Hillel from 2009-2015, recalls a day when FSB officers stopped by his office. They knew every single detail about Hillel’s operations, he said, which was very disconcerting.

“We were preparing a major Hillel event at that time, and they demanded that we present them with a list of participants’ names. Their ostensible reason for this intrusive request was “security,” but Shlimak did not believe that. “They already knew everything about it,” he explained when speaking with State of Tel Aviv.

They just wanted the Jews to know that they were being surveilled. Perhaps, even when the state seemed to be relaxed about the Russian Jewish renaissance, they really were not.

IV. THE PUTIN FACTOR: A HELP OR THE PROBLEM?

Just as in the Soviet days, the state security services continued to keep an eye on the activity of Jewish religious and community organizations, especially those with strong ties to the State of Israel. And it seems that the time has now come for this trove of information to be deployed, once again, against the Jewish Agency, Israel and, possibly, Russian Jews.

In spite of the close scrutiny, until recently, most Russian Jews and Jewish organizations did not experience overt problems or pressure. Many believed that the special connection between President Putin and the Jews, based on his childhood and youth experiences and memories, would protect them.

Over time, Putin’s regime has become significantly more authoritarian and repressive. Particularly since the massive and frequent protests at Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square between 2011-2013, the authorities have been especially harsh with civil society organizations, with particular wrath targeting human rights groups.

Some organizations were forced to close, some were prosecuted on various fabricated charges, and some were designated as foreign agents. With the annexation of Crimea and hostilities with Ukraine in 2014, the crackdown on civil society intensified. Even the most tenacious groups were forced to submit to the creeping authoritarianism; realizing that the court system just rubber-stamped predetermined outcomes.

Eventually, the state turned its sights to the Jewish Agency. Beginning in 2019, the pressure began to build, yet again.

Semyon Dovzhik, a former Sochnut press secretary in the Russian language, recalls the sudden chill that set in. “There were always some routine checkups,” he said, “but three years ago (2019) the situation changed dramatically. Suddenly there were serious inspections – all documents were checked thoroughly, and sometimes they were confiscated.”

Dovzhik likened the atmosphere and relationship to one of hyper-alertness, with the Agency fearing and understanding that “something might happen at any time… but the only thing that changed was the attitude,” Dovzhik explains. Jewish Agency operations carried on as usual, for the time being.

The current Jewish Agency crisis erupted at a time when relations between Russia and Israel were souring. The pretext for the 2022 attack on the Jewish Agency is that Russia is owed property rights in yet another lucrative Jerusalem property, that the state claims belongs to the Russian Orthodox church.

But that’s just the latest grievance. Russian authorities have been diligently compiling a dossier of alleged Israeli transgressions, including Moscow’s displeasure with certain actions said to have been undertaken by Israel in Syria.

And then, of course, there’s the quite significant issue of Ukraine, as well as the extreme military tension between Israel and Russia over ongoing activity in Syria. (Both issues are considered at length in this superb analysis by Moav Vardi.)

Putin is clearly displeased with Israel and sending very clear signals about what has irked him.

V. WHERE TO FROM HERE

This is a raw power play.

On Friday, August 19, Moscow’s Basmannaya Court deferred its threat to issue a verdict in the case of Russia v. Jewish Agency for another month.

The Court denied the Jewish Agency’s request for an additional two months to gather exculpatory evidence, particularly in light of the extreme consequences and very truncated time for case preparation. In the meantime, in an effort to address the alleged problems regarding its operations, the Agency has agreed to modify certain procedures that would address concerns put forward by the Russian Ministry of Justice.

The judge agreed to a 30-day adjournment of proceedings. It seems that any additional evidence the Agency intends to submit must be presented by September 19. It is also possible that a verdict could be rendered the same day.

Jewish Agency employees in Russia concede that they are “not optimistic” about the eventual outcome of the court case. But they do express hope that during this time some form of rapprochement will be negotiated between Russia and Israel to allow Agency operations to continue.

One thing is very clear. Russian Jews – not only the Jewish Agency – have been put on notice.

After centuries of extreme persecution in Tzarist Russia, and decades under Soviet rule, Russian Jews were beginning to feel “at home” in the “new” Russia. Unlike the Soviet authorities, the new rulers of Russia did not engage in state-sponsored antisemitism, and practicing Judaism or learning Hebrew was not an act of subversion meriting serious gulag or prison time. Quite the opposite – Jewish life was thriving. So much so that Russian Jews were becoming a little too comfortable, in the eyes of some, while the witch-hunt against civil society, the NGO’s and foreign institutions was in full swing.

Many Jewish leaders and organizations maintained a silence with respect to these changes, likely from an ingrained sense of caution.

But that, too, is changing.

Pinchas Goldschmidt, the Chief Rabbi of Moscow since the early 90s, abruptly left Russia in March 2022. In June, when he officially stepped down from his position, his daughter-in-law – journalist Avital Chizhik-Goldschmidt – disclosed publicly that her father-in-law had been pressured by Russian authorities to support its war against Ukraine. He refused to do so.

Speaking to the press recently, Rabbi Goldschmidt described the current situation in Russia darkly, indicating that it was “not the same country” he had moved to 29 years ago.

When the Jewish Agency story broke in early July, Rabbi Goldschmidt issued a chilling statement saying: “What the Jewish Agency didn’t succeed in doing in terms of encouraging the Jewish community to immigrate, the Russian government has [accomplished], with its policies over the past few months with the fighting in Ukraine.”

Many friends in Moscow with whom I have spoken in recent weeks expressed grave concern about the possible closure of the Jewish Agency. Such an event would be dramatic, not just because of its support of potential immigrants, but even more so, because its mere presence has become a powerful symbol of a time when Jews believed they were free and equal in Russia; free to participate fully in life there and at liberty to leave, should they so choose.

Many now fear that the Iron Curtain may well close, once again, and that Russian Jews will be the first victims. For them it is clear that Russia has very deliberately chosen isolation – first from the West – and now also from Israel. The Jewish Agency episode may well be a precursor of things to come.

The potential closure of the Jewish Agency raises fears of reverting to the Soviet era of paranoia and constant suspicion, an obsessive state-sponsored hunt for inner and outer enemies. Should the Jewish Agency become persona non grata in Russia, its Jews may well be forced to reassume their well-rehearsed role as the ultimate “other,” scheming with their “foreign connections” and “foreign influence.”

Just like it used to be during the Soviet era.

This article from “State of Tel Aviv“, from September 2, 2022

הפוסט Russia v. Jewish Agency: behind Putin’s curtain הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hopefully, with the public outcry of all those who were able to conveniently ignore this crisis until it started to threaten them directly, the government will be forced to understand that a serious response is called for. If handled correctly, that response can present a rare opportunity for the Foreign Affairs Ministry to prove its strategic value and to chart a new course by introducing ethical dimensions into Israeli foreign policy. In so doing, it would also bolster Israel’s standing in the world and instigate a move of public and political usefulness.

To realize the extent of the opportunity at hand requires an understanding of the problem that has prompted harsh criticism of Israel over the use of technologies once considered the pride of the nation. The crux of the problem is not in the way companies such as the NSO Group, Candiru and others operate. Perhaps, one might have hoped that these firms would display greater responsibility in their commercial dealings with tyrants and human rights violators, but it is hard to blame them when the Defense Ministry and government license and even encourage their actions. The real problem lies in an oversight policy that fails to take proper consideration of the ethical aspects of Israeli defense exports and the egregious human rights violations they enable.

Rather than regulating curbs on exports to regimes known for their poor human rights records, as every Western state has done, the human rights aspect is just one amongst a host of considerations weighed by the Israeli Defense Export Controls Agency (DECA) in its licensing process. In most cases, these consideration appear to be marginalized in favor of a narrow foreign policy, where economic and security interests reflect a limited perception of foreign policy grounded in realpolitik that views as legitimate tools all means fair and foul to promote Israel’s immediate, short-term commercial and diplomatic interests. This perception was not born during the past decade, but one can safely say that it has characterized the foreign policy approach of former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

From his first day on the job, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid sought to make a clean break with such past policy. In the June 14, 2021 ceremony marking his entry into office, he suggested telling Israel’s story differently in order to re-position it in the world as a liberal democracy in tune with global trends. At the July 2021 Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, he explained what he meant. “It’s time to tell the right story about antisemites. It’s time that we tell the world what we face. Antisemites weren’t only in the ghetto in Budapest. The antisemites were the slave traders who threw chained slaves into the ocean. The antisemites were the Hutu tribe members in Rwanda that slaughtered the Tutsis,” he said.

If Israel insists on defining antisemitism as a unique and special phenomenon directed solely at the Jewish nation, Lapid argued, we cannot expect the world to identify with us. On the other hand, if we explain that antisemitism is a distinct form of racism, opposition to democracy and violation of human rights, we will succeed in mobilizing solidarity and understanding of the problem that threatens all of us.

UNLIKE NETANYAHU, but similarly to the views of the current Democratic administration in Washington, this approach seeks to place the values of a modern and liberal world at the core of foreign policy. This is how the foreign minister phrased it in a document outlining the key points of the Foreign Ministry’s plans for the 36th government. “Contrary to popular perception, relations between states are not based on interests alone, but also on values. A wise foreign policy balances the ideal with the real, distinct interests with world views… the Foreign Ministry’s role is to present the State of Israel as it truly is – a liberal, vibrant democracy.”

This approach highlights the major opportunity provided by the cyber spyware scandals for the Foreign Ministry to prove the sincerity of its intentions and implement a deep change in Israeli foreign policy. When the US Commerce Department ruled that Israeli firms were supplying technologies to dictatorial regimes that use them to threaten journalists, human rights activists and dissidents, it imposed heavy sanctions on them saying they were part of the Biden-Harris administration’s efforts to put human rights at the center of US foreign policy. If Lapid wants to prove his commitment to such values, he could use the veto power that the law gives the Foreign Ministry to block exports to questionable regimes.

This policy shift would also reflect the global shift in approach to exports of weapons systems. The addition of two Israeli firms to the US blacklist proved that we cannot keep priding ourselves on being a liberal, vibrant democracy and at the same time help other regimes trample democratic values. Mobilizing the world to combat antisemitism in its universal form, as Lapid suggests, becomes a far more formidable task when Israelis sell weapons to the Hutu in Rwanda who slaughtered the Tutsi or to offer tyrannical regimes offensive cyber tools for surveillance of journalists and human rights activists.

Changing the Foreign Ministry’s engagement with this issue would allow Lapid to bolster the ministry’s standing as a significant, prominent player in government decision making. It will bolster Lapid’s efforts to re-position the ministry as an actor shaping strategic policy after years of erosion in its standing. The Foreign Ministry’s veto power over defense exports was one of the innovations introduced into the Defense Exports Law of 2007 under US pressure. Whereas, in the past the ministry mostly served as a rubber stamp to uphold Defense Ministry interests, an opportunity and a need have now presented themselves to affect the considerations of the DECA.

As well, this crisis offers an opportunity to enhance Israel’s standing vis-à-vis world Jewry. A foreign policy shift that places values front and center is essential to stemming the growing alienation between many diaspora Jews, especially the younger ones, and Israel. When Israel sold Myanmar weapons, over 300 American rabbis signed a letter demanding that Israel halt all military aid to the regime, which was carrying out ethnic cleansing. Headlines around the world highlighting the use of cutting-edge Israeli technologies to persecute human rights activists and stifle free speech were a harsher blow to many Jews wishing to feel pride and identification with Israel than thousands of BDS campaigns have been.

Many advantages lie in significant Foreign Ministry involvement in this crisis, but addressing the root of the problem requires political backing for legislation curbing arms exports to regimes abusing human rights, similar to laws adopted in the US, the European Union and the entire western world. Such a move also presents an opportunity for courageous political leadership, and that enjoys broad support both within the government coalition and the public at large. The coalition would regard such legislation as a unique measure promoting a human rights agenda, and at the same time winning support from figures in the Nationalist Religious and right-wing arena, such as Rabbi Haim Drukman and Rabbi Shlomo Aviner. Such a goal also enjoys broad public support, as reflected in the annual foreign policy index of the Mitvim Institute, which found that 64% of respondents believe Israel should ban sales of technology products used to violate human rights – the most distinct finding in Israeli public opinion on foreign policy.

To sum up, serious Foreign Affairs Ministry intervention and clear legislation putting a stop to Israeli weapons transfers into the wrong hands could turn a series of crises into a host of opportunities, bolster the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Israel’s standing on the world stage and vis-à-vis world Jewry, and above all, prove that this commitment to values underpins our foreign policy and our identity as a state.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 22, 2022

הפוסט A different take on the NSO Group affair- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is disappointing because Lapid has professed his support for a two-state solution and all the polls indicate that a majority of Israelis support this solution above all others. What is more, a recently survey commissioned by the Geneva Initiative (GI) indicates that most Israelis favor diplomatic negotiations with the Palestinian leadership.

Is the most powerful member of Israel’s government of change still suffering the poisonous effects of the legacy of Benjamin Netanyahu governments?

Lapid has already proven that he is not necessarily bound by Netanyahu’s harmful policies. He skillfully restored relations with Jordan. He improved ties with the European Union (EU), despite its criticism of Israel’s occupation and settlements. He normalized relations with Sweden, despite its recognition of a Palestinian state. He engaged in rebuilding Israel’s relations with the US Democratic Party and American Jewry, neglected by Netanyahu in favor of an alliance with the populists and messianic evangelists in the US. In a refreshing recent comment, Lapid said Israel was not necessarily opposed to an agreement between world powers and Iran, after Netanyahu fought every agreement and drove Iran closer to military nuclear capabilities.

Lapid certainly realizes that without a diplomatic horizon we are weakening moderate Palestinians and bolstering Hamas. He surely understands that without a diplomatic horizon the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be hard pressed to continue its security cooperation with our forces, and that saves lives on a daily basis. He must have heard during his meetings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain that the absence of a diplomatic horizon hampers the expansion and deepening of the normalization circle. He certainly knows that the absence of a diplomatic horizon poses a dire threat to our ability to preserve the Zionist vision of Israel as the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people.

Limiting the conflict with the Palestinians, a strategy espoused by Micah Goodman, is important in order to ease the daily lives of our Palestinian neighbors, but it is not an alternative to the need for determined action to end the occupation that threatens our strategic and moral future. Limiting the conflict could anesthetize the diplomatic process to a great extent, causing far more harm than good.

That is why last week’s meeting between PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Defense Minister MK Benny Gantz was important for the sake of strengthening cooperation, but cannot replace a significant diplomatic process.

I am not naive and I realize the importance of preserving the current government and preventing the return of an alliance between Netanyahu supporters and extremist right-wingers, but the refreshing policies adopted by the government of change in so many areas will not go down in the annals of history unless it seeks with all its might to extricate Israel from the greatest threat to the future of the Zionist vision.

Lapid has displayed impressive political capabilities in facilitating the formation of this government. Lapid proved that an Arab party can take part in an Israeli government and that agreements can be reached between opposing ideological parties for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Israel. He must display that same political and diplomatic wisdom by presenting a diplomatic horizon. The diplomatic horizon is the Zionist horizon.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 9, 2022

הפוסט Israel needs a diplomatic horizon to preserve the Zionist vision- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.