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הפוסט Axis of the weak: Iran’s proxy network has been severely damaged – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As the open conflict between Israel and Iran intensifies and American involvement increases, Dr. Aziz Alghashian, a leading Saudi expert on foreign policy, offers a sobering viewpoint from the Gulf. Speaking with Mitvim’s Head of Research, Dr. Roee Kibrik, Alghashian expressed grave concern about the direction the region is heading and the failure to resolve long-standing regional issues.

“This Isn’t a Time for Celebration — It’s a Time for Anxiety”
Contrary to popular assumptions, Gulf states are not quietly rejoicing over Iran’s current predicament, Alghashian insists. “We are deeply anxious. Every time missiles are fired at Israel, we ask ourselves: what if they were aimed at us? They have been before. We’re on the front lines.”
He adds: “Some suggest Saudi Arabia is secretly happy about the attacks on Iran. That’s nonsense. We’re not pleased – we’re alarmed. What’s happening now threatens the entire region.”

“Diplomacy Is the Only Way Forward”
According to Alghashian, Saudi Arabia made a clear strategic decision years ago: to pursue diplomacy, even with rivals like Iran. “A military confrontation with Iran would lead to endless war. They have skilfully complicated the regional arena. The only way forward is through diplomacy and trust-building.”
He warns that recent Israeli strikes on Iran could accelerate Tehran’s nuclear ambitions: “The fear is real. Instead of stopping Iran’s nuclear program, these attacks may push them to weaponize it faster.”

Thinking in Decades, Not Days
Alghashian highlights that Saudi leadership – particularly Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman – is planning far ahead. “MBS is 39. In twenty years, he’ll be 59 — still young by leadership standards. Iran won’t disappear, and Saudi Arabia is preparing to coexist. That’s why normalization with Israel, under these current conditions, is not realistic.”

No Single Leader — A Need for Collective Regional Vision
When asked who could lead the Middle East into a more stable future, Alghashian is clear: “No one. And that may be a good thing. The region lacks a single hegemon, which means collective action is essential.”

But for regional cooperation to be viable, Israel must change course. “Israel is showing military power. That might impress some, but it doesn’t invite trust or partnership — especially when it comes alongside the occupation, Gaza’s destruction, and regional instability. Under these conditions, normalization with Arab states is politically unthinkable.”

“No Regional Future Without Addressing the Palestinian Question”
For any regional order to emerge, the Palestinian issue must be addressed. “Arab states won’t engage in real cooperation with Israel while the occupation continues and Gaza suffers. This isn’t seen as peace — it’s submission.”

He points to historical precedent: during the Gulf War, Israel refrained from retaliating against Saddam Hussein’s missile attacks — a move quietly appreciated in Saudi Arabia. “That kind of restraint created the impression of cooperation. Today, we’re not seeing that same spirit.”

“We All Belong to This Region – Let’s Build a Shared Future”
In closing, Alghashian offered a personal message to the Israeli public: “I don’t want to see people running to shelters — not in Israel, not in Gaza. We’re all part of the same region. The sooner we accept that and act accordingly, the better.”

הפוסט “We’re All Part of the Same Region — It’s Time to Act Accordingly”: Dr. Aziz Alghashian Warns of Further Escalation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(Yitzhak Rabin)

The Limitations of Military Solutions and the Necessity of Diplomatic Action 

Dr. Gil Murciano, CEO of The Mitvim Institute – The military successes that Israel is achieving in its campaign against Iran, highlight the gap between Israel’s capabilities in the military-kinetic sphere and its failure to act on the diplomatic level. The last-minute military campaign in Iran stems from a political failure—both Israeli and American—primarily the withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement. Israel was forced into this situation because of the cumulative mistake of moving away from the diplomatic track. The focus on military achievements distracts from the critical question: What is Israel’s exit strategy from this dangerous war? Israel is currently focused on degrading Iranian capabilities in the nuclear and missile arenas, not on changing Iranian motivations. This approach worked in Syria, but the Iranian nuclear project is a completely different story.

Iran’s nuclear project is a national endeavor, for which the country has sacrificed a great deal over the past three decades. It is a national interest of the regime to ensure its survival, to create deterrence against Israel, and to bolster Iran’s regional standing. The continuation of this project is a central narrative in Iran’s concept of national honor. Therefore, halting a project of this magnitude and significance requires a shift in Iran’s motivations. How do you change Iranian motivations? Either through a face-saving agreement that guarantees Iran’s basic interests or through regime change.

The likelihood of regime change in the foreseeable future is low, leaving us with the option of an agreement. It seems that the Israeli attack has opened the door to a change in the Iranian leadership’s cost-benefit calculations—it sharpens the realization that the nuclear project has shifted from a tool to ensure regime survival, to a threat to its stability. But the ability to change Iranian thinking—to persuade Iran to give up military nuclear development through a long-term agreement—depends on the diplomatic component. It requires a framework that offers Iran a way to step back from the nuclear project without losing face, allowing the Iranian regime to claim victory before agreeing to abandon its military nuclear program. On the international level, the success of such an agreement would require a multilateral coalition similar to the one that convinced Iran to sign the 2015 nuclear agreement. A combination of international players would be needed—not just the U.S., but also China, with its significant influence on Iran’s economy, as well as Russia and Saudi Arabia. The good news is that international actors—especially the Gulf states—have an urgent interest in promoting such a solution. The bad news is that it’s unclear whether they have the tools to stop the escalation and put the genie back in the bottle.

Eitan Ishai, Head of Middle East and North Africa Program at Mitvim – A plausible possibility is that the Islamic regime in Iran will survive the current confrontation but emerge from it weakened, both internally and externally. In such a situation, the regime will need to reassess and reexamine fundamental assumptions that formed the basis of the strategy it cultivated and led for years. This could lead it to choose between two alternatives: adopting a more moderate approach toward nuclear and regional issues with the aim of “improving positions” and strengthening its status anew; or alternatively, adopting a rigid and aggressive approach aimed at rapid restoration of Iranian deterrence and regional status. Either way, Israel bears the responsibility to ensure that Iran cannot benefit from a vacuum created following the tectonic changes the region has experienced. Preventing Iran’s renewed penetration into Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and other arenas will not be possible through continuous military activity alone; instead, a political and diplomatic strategy is required. Israel must strengthen and restore its relations with its allies in the region and beyond, and develop partnerships with power brokers that serve its interests to ensure they do not lose their power and in turn create a vacuum that will once again be filled by hostile forces.

Israel’s relations with the world depends on ending the war on Gaza, not on the outcomes of its fight with Iran

Dr. Nimrod Goren, President and Founder of Mitvim Institute; Executive Board Member at Diplomeds – The Council for Mediterranean Diplomacy – The initial days of fighting with Iran brought significant damage to Israeli citizens – loss of life, property damage and a blow to personal security. Alongside the essential public discourse surrounding this, the discussion in Israel about physical disconnect from the world is prominent. The closure of the airport, prohibition on leaving the country, difficulties of Israelis returning from abroad and inequality that allows those with means or connections to circumvent prohibitions – all make headlines. This also happened during previous national crises, such as COVID-19, and once again emphasizes how much Israeli society — despite the common belief that “the whole world is against us” – yearns for connection and belonging to the international community. Such a connection is not just measured in the technical aspect of incoming and outgoing flights from Ben Gurion Airport, but in deeper layers related to policy, mindsets, perceptions, and even international law. In these regards, Israel remains in a state of ongoing estrangement from the international community—not because of the war with Iran, but due to the never-ending war in Gaza. Until recently, it seemed the world had grown weary of the conflict, but Israel’s cancellation of the ceasefire and obstruction of humanitarian aid have brought it back to the top of the global agenda.

Even as governments continue to promote relations with Israel – openly or secretly, based on shared interests, and sometimes alongside criticism of Israeli policies – the public in many countries are distancing themselves. In culture, academia, sports, economy, and tourism, the decline in Israel’s standing is evident, and the difficulty of being part of the global family – is increasing. In Israel, there is concern about traveling to western cities – from presenting an Israeli passport at the airport, taking a taxi with a potentially hostile driver, the service one might receive at a hotel or restaurant, and the terrifying moment in small talk when a foreign interlocutor asks the Israeli, “Where are you from?” A good connection with the world is necessary for Israeli foreign policy, but is also an integral part of national security and in the ability of Israeli citizens to thrive, enjoy, and fulfill their talents. The reopening of Ben Gurion Airport after a few more days of fighting in Iran will, of course, be positive, but it will not eradicate the deep-seated problems, which must be solved via leadership change in Israel. Improvement will only be felt once Israel has a prime minister that chooses to end the war on Gaza, strive for peace, and emphasize a commitment to liberal and democratic values.

Dr. Omer Zanany, Head of the Joint Unit for Peace and Security of The Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katznelson foundation – For the first time since the launch of “Iron Swords,” the war against Iran has shifted the Gaza front—and the broader Palestinian arena—into a secondary arena. As the war with Iran continues, the deepening of negative trends is expected in the following ways. Furthering the possibility of a political initiative: The Israeli attack has already succeeded in leading to the postponement of the French-Arab declaration regarding the Palestinian state. The involved countries, led by France and Britain, are now forced to direct attention to dealing with Iran and stopping the war in the Middle East. Neglecting the hostages: The public debate regarding the necessity of a hostage deal and of ending the war on Gaza has been erased from public discourse, along with the attention and the political actions to advance this. Finally, the attention given to the war in Iran allows the Israeli government to continue advancing extreme measures in the Palestinian arena, including, among other things, furthering annexation, Palestinian population expulsion within the West Bank, and continuing initiatives for long-term Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip.

Against the backdrop of these dangers, the democratic camp must underscore the crucial importance of returning the hostages and ending the war on Gaza, while also stressing the urgent need to draw lessons from the illusions of managing the Gaza war—emphasizing the importance of shortening wars and advancing a political initiative for “the day after.” The central challenge is to highlight the strong linkage between ending the war on Gaza and ending the war with Iran as a platform for advancing a new regional architecture in the Middle East. This parallels the essence of “The Israeli Initiative” that promotes Israel’s national interests, leading to a stable regional solution.

Israel-US Relations

Nadav Tamir, Board Member of Mitvim and Director of J-Street Israel – The attack on Iran could have been justified if it had been part of a broad strategy coordinated with the US to advance a US-Iran agreement. There is no military strategy that can prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, and there is a real risk that an attack could actually drive Iran—not to settle at the nuclear threshold, but, learning from the Libyan example and in contrast to the North Korean one—to break through and pursue the bomb. Netanyahu and Trump are both responsible for the strategic error of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, which caused Iran to reach the status of a threshold state, in terms of uranium enrichment and strategic alliance with Russia and China. The Israeli strategy should be to play a key role within the agreement and not to prevent it by increasing coordination with the US and achieving maximum collaboration and transparency.

The War and the Home Front

Dr. Orni Livny, COO of The Mitvim Institute – There is a direct connection between the failure of home front preparedness and the gendered worldview. The gap between Israel’s intelligence and operational capabilities and the failure to prepare for the operation’s implications on the home front is incomprehensible. In the military and tactical sphere, Israel receives an excellent grade, but in the civilian sphere, the grade is very low. The same country that knows where every nuclear scientist’s bedroom is in Tehran, doesn’t know that there are no shelters in Tamra and that more than half of the apartments in the country lack protected rooms. This reality stems from a point that has been repeatedly raised over the past two and a half years: the exclusion of women from key decision-making roles, and the consistent neglect of issues that fall outside the narrow focus of war management. This is not just a a question of how many women have a seat at the table, but a more substantial question: what topics are discussed around that table, and what values guide decision-making?

Incorporating gender perspectives into all strategic and policy decisions broadens the perspective of decision-makers, shifting their focus from military force and combat tactics to civilian issues related to personal security, national resilience, and equality. This is true for formulating Israel’s foreign policy and also for the decision to start a war. The civilian aspect is an integral part of the military aspect, and one doesn’t need to be a woman to adopt this conception. For so many years, intelligence personnel and air force teams prepared for the “D-Day” of attacking Iran nuclear facilities and presumably prepared for various scenarios and conducted simulations on how to deal with them. But in the civilian sphere—only after the Iranian response, did government ministries suddenly discover that protected spaces were lacking, that there weren’t enough solutions for vulnerable populations, and that thousands of Israelis stranded abroad somehow needed to be brought home.

The impression is that in all the discussions and assessments, there was no one to stand up and ask how eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities would affect Israelis in the immediate and long term and what needs to be done so that not only the air force would be ready for the mission, but also the home front. Unfortunately, it’s clear that even if one of the female ministers had joined the restricted cabinet discussion that approved the attack, the civilian aspect would still have been considered “collateral damage” (see: Miri Regev, Minister of Transportation, who only, at the end of Shabbat, began thinking about what to do with closed skies). We need more women around decision-making tables, not because of gender, but because of their professional skills. However, to adopt a gender perspective that integrates military tactics with civilian implications, we first need a leadership that prioritizes the well-being of citizens over its own political survival.

The European Perspective

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu, Director of the Israel-Europe Relations Program – Since Iran supplied Russia with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic missiles—used in its ongoing war in Ukraine and potentially posing a threat to other European countries—it has effectively become a “friend of the enemy,” and thus, an indirect enemy of much of Europe. Ostensibly, Europe’s natural choice is to be on Israel’s side, but things are somewhat more complex. The statement by the 27 EU member states expressed deep concern about the escalation between Israel and Iran, called for restraint from both sides, and emphasized the EU’s commitment to Israel’s and the region’s security while preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. However, the EU statement refrained from recognizing Israel’s right to self-defense – a notable change compared to previous confrontations with Iran or elsewhere. Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, emphasized the need for diplomacy.

The EU position has several explanations: First, Israel was the one that attacked, and there is no consensus that this was a last-resort attack. Second, harsh feelings that have accumulated against the Israeli government regarding its handling of the war on Gaza. Third, as always, the EU statement is a balancing act among the 27 members, and there is no unanimity on the issue; however, Germany and France expressed clearer positions.

Germany, led by Chancellor Merz, condemned the Iranian nuclear program, strengthened Israel’s right to defend itself, and even correlated the attack to the defense of Israel’s existence. Merz stated that “the goal must remain that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.” France expressed support for Israel’s security and its readiness to participate in defending Israel, but not in attacking Iran. Israel did not make use of this readiness, perhaps due to its role in the summit advancing Palestinian statehood, which was planned to take place in New York from June 17^th through 20^th. Britain stood out with its noticeably restrained statements, in which the government emphasized the need for de-escalation, withheld explicit support for Israel, and made clear that it had no involvement in the operation. Israel, for its part, did not notify Britain in advance—likely a response to Britain’s suspension of trade talks with Israel on May 20, 2025—signaling a marked cooling of bilateral relations. It is possible the British government is waiting to gauge the U.S. President’s approach before adopting a more defined stance, especially given internal pressures within the Labour Party that do not necessarily align with Israel’s interests.

After Israel significantly weakened Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and Gaza—and indirectly contributed to the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria, a development welcomed by the EU—Europe sees strategic advantages. Undermining Iran also aids efforts to curb the Houthis, who continue to disrupt maritime trade through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. European leaders are well aware that the range of Iranian ballistic missiles extends to their own borders. In the long term, diminishing the threat posed by the “head of the snake,” Iran, is expected to enhance stability across the Middle East—a goal that aligns with European interests. In confronting the oppressive Ayatollah regime at home and dismantling its aggressive network of proxies abroad, Israel is the right side to support. It is carrying out tasks that many Sunni states are eager to see accomplished. The potential collapse of the Tehran regime is an outcome supported by several European governments and a significant portion of the public.

In European public opinion polls, Israel has reached a significant low, but there is one country with an even worse situation: Iran. It is important to remember that during Iran’s hijab protests, which the Ayatollah regime brutally suppressed, Europe supported the protesters and defended women’s and human rights. European public opinion was against the Iranian regime. Because of this, many in Europe recognize the service Israel is doing for the West in the current war. However, due to divisions within Europe, Israel seems to have only partial support there. Europeans are also afraid of being seen as openly supporting the Israeli attacks, and the context of the war in Gaza limits how much support Israel receives.

The Hellenic Alliance Provides Strategic Depth for Israel

Former Ambassador Michael Harari, Research and Policy Fellow – The Israeli attack succeeded in surprising Iran while maintaining close and impressive coordination with Washington. A kind of division of labor is being implemented whereby Israel does the “dirty work,” which aims, it seems, to return the Iranians to the negotiating table from a position of weakness. Apparently, after just a few days of attacks, it appears that the Iranians are interested in a ceasefire and returning to negotiations. Israel is not satisfied with this and seeks to continue military pressure on Iran despite the damage to the Israeli home front.

Israel enjoys regional support in silence, of course alongside lip service condemnations, and significant support in the international arena. For now, it appears that Washington is backing Israel, but this raises the question of how long the rope is. Iran’s willingness to for a ceasefire, backed by threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, indicates an Iranian assessment that it’s better at this stage to stop Israeli military attacks, even at the price of some humiliation, and return to negotiations with the US. It’s unclear whether Israel has marked regime change as the current goal, and if so, this is a dangerous, pretentious move, and there is serious doubt whether it enjoys American support. The attack on Iran also returned and highlighted the close and strategic relationship between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. Both countries impressively demonstrate their role as strategic depth for Israel from security and civilian perspectives. It’s important to note, however, that in recent months there has been growing criticism in Greek and Cypriot public opinion about the continuation of the war in Gaza, particularly around the humanitarian crisis and the large number of civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip. These feelings are not reflected in the policies of both governments, which was seen during the visits of the Greek Prime Minister and Cypriot President to Israel. At the same time, the growing public criticism joined by leading opposition parties in both countries should not be taken lightly.

הפוסט Mitvim Experts’ Responses to the Israel-Iran War, June 2025 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Addressing a December 2023 forum in Doha, he emphasized what is obvious to anyone concerned about Iran’s growing influence in the region – Israel’s refusal to discuss a political solution with the Palestinians is a boon for the leadership in Tehran. It serves as a catalyst for expanding Iran’s influence and expelling Israel from the region.

This unwillingness poses a major obstacle to seizing the opportunity of the October 7 and April 13 attacks on Israel to forge a regional alliance against Iran.

Iran’s combined missile and drone attack on Israel should have dealt a significant blow to Iran and its regional standing. It could even serve as a turning point in regional and global determination to confront the threat it poses, as it stands on the cusp of nuclear capacity. The offensive provides a clear illustration for the United States and the countries of the region of the need for a joint stand against a more aggressive, violent, and destabilizing Iran. This is an opportunity to turn the Iranian proxy network from an asset into a liability for Iran in the regional arena – to further overstretch Iran on multiple fronts.

The Gaza war has exacerbated the clash within the commitment of Iran’s Arab allies to Tehran’s directives and the interests of these host/captive countries. The growing criticism in Lebanon of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Israel-Hamas war, and the Assad administration’s refusal to allow an Iranian attack on Israel from its territory clearly illustrate these countries’ growing recognition of the price they pay for Iran’s intervention in their affairs.

Thus, the April 13 attack should serve as an impetus for an Israeli-regional alliance against Iran with American and international, and especially regional, support. The Gulf states, whose airspace was grossly violated by the Iranian missiles and drones, were provided with strong evidence of the tangible nature of the Iranian threat.

At the same time, the risk of the attack to regional stability is being compounded by Iran’s threats to block the Strait of Hormuz and shipping routes to the Red Sea. The Iranian threat thus directly affects the substantive interests of the international community. Iran has become, from an international perspective, a tangible regional threat with ripples that risk the stability in the Middle East and beyond. Ultimately, the attack increases the sense of urgency among the United States and Western countries of the need for a regional coalition.

However, the Gaza campaign has made clear that progress toward such a regional axis directly depends on Israeli agreement to discuss a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians. Recent Saudi statements make clear that the price of forging public strategic ties with Israel has gone up and now includes political progress on the Palestinian front as a condition for normalization.

Israeli willingness to discuss a two-state political horizon could have dealt Iran a decisive blow, but Israel is at grave risk of squandering this opportunity. Instead of leveraging October 7 for open and enhanced security cooperation with Arab states, thereby turning Hamas’s cognitive victory into a strategic defeat for Iran and its proxies, the Israeli government is serving Iran’s goals. In a January article of rare sincerity, former Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora noted that regional hands are now reaching out to Israel, but Israel refuses to hold them.

Israel’s regional partners came to its aid

Israel has celebrated the courageous regional participation of Jordan and other countries in the effort to defend it from Iran’s offensive. This rare moment of cooperation in the face of a common threat could create a false sense of renewed momentum in Arab-Israeli relations.

In fact, prospects of a renewed momentum are undermined by the deep frustration among current and potential partners in the region at Israel’s refusal to discuss the goals of the war. The April 13 cooperation obscured Israel’s deeply troubled relations with Jordan and the Gulf states and the implications for the future of cooperation vis-à-vis Iran.

It is important to distinguish between military-operational coordination under American auspices in the face of a specific attack, and the establishment of a regional, political, and public alliance against Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions.

A joint regional coalition cannot exist solely on the basis of a shared threat; it must be based on a convergence of interests to promote a common political vision, or at least agreement on the strategic direction of the partnership.

A wide chasm separates Israeli government positions and the vision of regional partners from Saudi Arabia to Egypt. The danger of sliding into this chasm has become more real for Arab leaders since October

Moreover, Iran’s attempts to erode the regional standing of Israel and the United States have deepened concern for the future relations between Israel and the region, let alone for a united front against Iran.

Thus, Iran’s April 13 attack coincides with its broad political-diplomatic offensive since the start of the war aimed at redefining the strategic balance of power in the Middle East by eroding Israeli and American influence in order to strengthen its own.

The Iranians are exploiting the war in order to roll back the assets Israel acquired through the Abraham Accords and reverse it to the status of a regional pariah. Iran’s move focuses on pressuring key countries to cancel or at least reduce diplomatic ties with the Zionist regime.

The intensive shuttle diplomacy by Iran’s foreign minister illustrates the map of Iranian interests. His schedule included a visit to India, a key component of the American-Gulf-Israeli alliance promoted by President Biden, ongoing contacts with the Saudis, frequent coordination meetings with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and a call to sever Ankara’s economic relations with Israel.

The Iranian effort has had very limited success so far. Specifically, there is no evidence that it has had a direct impact on Saudi motivation to halt normalization or on Turkey’s decision to limit the scope of trade with Israel.

However, combined with Israel’s inability to present clear goals for the devastating war in Gaza, Iran’s effort could bear fruit, as Israel’s status erodes and its short-sighted failures become apparent to all.

The solid foundation of the Abraham Accords for the UAE and Bahrain was Israel’s integration into a long-term regional process that would provide security and economic stability. The war exposed Israel as a regional power firing from the hip, driven by political compromises with the far Right, rather than by a long-term perspective. It exposed to the Emiratis, Saudis, and Bahrainis the gaps between their own long-term thinking and Israel’s inability to think beyond the tactical military level and short-term political maneuvering.

This is exactly the vacuum Iran is targeting. The first sign of Iranian success has emerged in the weakest link of the normalization countries – Sudan. On October 9, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s government renewed diplomatic relations with Iran in order to obtain weapons for its war against a rival faction. This is a classic Iranian method familiar from Yemen and Syria – Iran identified an opportunity, a political vacuum created by a civil war in a country of strategic value, and filled it.

Iran’s effort to exploit the Gaza war in order to expel Israel from the region is not only interstate-oriented. It also exploits public anger in the Arab world against Israel over the protracted war in Gaza and the worsening humanitarian crisis there. The return of the resistance narrative allows Iran to ride the wave of sympathy for its allies – especially the Houthis in Yemen.

In the face of the ineffectual response by Arab states, Iran and its allies are portrayed as the only supporters of the Palestinian struggle in the current destructive war. Its efforts are also fueled by a desire to portray Iran on the regional and global stage as a representative of the struggle against American colonization in the Middle East rather than a foreign Shi’ite interloper in the Sunni Arab world.

The April 13 attack – despite its failure – is likely to be accepted in parts of the Arab world as evidence of Iran’s commitment to this struggle.

Israel’s research institutes and policy planners have dealt for an entire decade with the question of which threat is more dangerous – the Iranian or Palestinian. As expected, we were all wrong. The threats are intertwined and inseparable.

By weakening relatively moderate Palestinian elements and bolstering Hamas; eroding the fragile relations with Jordan and Egypt; creating a humanitarian crisis in Gaza and fomenting public anger in the Arab world, and stubbornly refusing to present a political vision for the “day after,” we are opening the door to greater Iranian influence in the region.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and the Middle East is no exception. The Iranians are experts at seizing opportunities created by extremism and conflict.

As long as we keep moving without a strategic vision, we are providing the Iranians with optimal conditions for influence.

Thus, while we prepare for direct war against Iran and its allies, the far-right architects of Israel’s colossal October 7 failure serve Iran’s strategic interests. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi could not have hoped for such predictable and effective allies as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Throughout this damned campaign, Israel has demonstrated once again that it never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

The article was published on April 21st in Jpost

הפוסט Israel’s lack of vision is a blessing for Iran הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On the one hand, it adheres to its policy of rejecting any agreement with Iran, on the other, it faces the growing realization that no real alternatives exist to an agreement that would halt Iran’s nuclear race. In the meantime, the futility of military measures to stop Iran’s rush to nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly clear. Lacking new ideas, and consistently harping on the same policy messages formulated a decade ago, Israel’s bargaining position and its ability to influence the state of play have been deeply eroded.

Why name it after Menachem Begin?

The current crisis challenges the fundamental principles of Israel’s nuclear proliferation policy, named after prime minister Menachem Begin’s decision to attack Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981. The so-called “Begin Doctrine” has since served as the guiding Israeli principle dictating the use of “all means necessary” to prevent its enemies from acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine mostly focused on two principles: independent Israeli action in the face of such threats, and kinetic military action as the main method to upend development efforts, even at the cost of possible military escalation.

Since the attack in Iraq, the concept has undergone some adjustments in accordance with changing reality. For example, political and operational US-Israel coordination has increased, but the doctrine’s principles are unchanged. Its credibility was further enhanced by the success of the 2007 operation “Out of the Box,” an Israeli airstrike that nipped in the bud a Syrian-North Korean effort to develop nuclear weapons.

The Begin Doctrine also underpins Israel’s policy on the Iranian nuclear program. Indeed, the political component – support for maximum international pressure and opposition to contractual solutions with Iran – is an essential component of Israeli policy. However, the policy also entails kinetic activity – intensive use of a variety of military means to physically halt the Iranian project. This is a large-scale and creative effort, one of the most extensive in the history of Israel’s national security, to identify vulnerabilities and develop operational capabilities to damage the infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear project.

The effort has yielded a decade of operational successes using an array of tools, according to foreign reports, from the introduction of the Stuxnet malware into Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities in 2011, through a series of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, to the sabotage of the enrichment facility in Natanz last year. These successful operations have created the illusion that the campaign to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions would be a rehash of Israel’s success in quashing the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear bids. Here, too, the Jewish (and American) brain, along with several hundred kilograms of high explosives, would put an end to Iran’s military nuclear fantasies.

However, although Israel has won many battles, it has lost this war. While its varied and imaginative operations delayed Iran’s progress, they did not change its direction. Iran is currently approaching the status of a “nuclear threshold state”; its ability to break through to nuclear weapons depends to a large extent on its leaders’ decisions alone, not on developing additional capabilities.

Should Iran choose to leap forward and enrich enough uranium for a bomb, it can do so at its leisure. Should it choose to hang back, it can seek to take advantage of its proximity to nuclear capability in order to enhance its geopolitical standing. In either case, the tangible Iranian experience of recent years – enriching uranium to high levels of 60% – has moved them through a conceptual point of no return, a point that the emerging agreement will no longer be able to turn around.

Advanced centrifuges can be shattered, and enriched uranium can be shipped for storage to a third country, but how do you obliterate the knowledge the Iranians have accumulated in high-level enrichment? How do you reverse the expertise gained in the construction of upgraded centrifuges?

The failure to halt Iran’s nuclear program has exposed the fundamental weakness of the Begin Doctrine – it is effective primarily in degrading enemy capabilities, not in changing conditions or motivations. When the doctrine meets a national-strategic effort of a powerful state, the most it can do is postpone the inevitable conclusion. A hint of this was clearly discernible in the Iraqi reactor attack: the facility’s destruction did not prevent Saddam Hussein from nearing nuclear capability less than a decade later, on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The current crisis point ostensibly presents Israel with a prime opportunity to reexamine its strategy against nuclear proliferation. However, criticism of existing policy on the Iranian nuclear project and discussion of shifting realities and their future implications are strictly limited at the political level.

Across the political spectrum, few are willing to admit the fundamental flaw of the Israeli perception and its failure, let alone, to offer alternatives. The people of Zion are not overly fond of prophets of doom, and the electoral price of such outspokenness is too high. Far more convenient to continue talking about military options (knowing they do not exist) and the tightening of sanctions (which do not achieve their ultimate goal).

And so, almost 50 years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli system is once again in cognitive dissonance, crippled by a political, professional and mental inability to challenge a concept that has taken root over four decades. How can we explain to the public and to ourselves why we have invested so much money and political capital and endangered human lives, in promoting a failed policy? It is easier to stick to the existing concept, introducing tactical improvements to current policy, rather than change the line of thinking outright.

What Israel needs now is nothing short of a conceptual overhaul of the fundamental assumptions underpinning its policy on the Iranian threat. It needs a new and different strategic forum that will pose new questions we must ask even if we do not wish to do so.

Topping the list is the most difficult question of all – what happens on the day after Iran achieves the nuclear threshold level? Along with last-minute attempts to scuttle this stage, we are required to ask what changes Israel should make to its strategic policy in case of Iranian nuclearization. A political-strategic discussion on Israel’s political moves in this grim but not impossible reality is imperative at this point. This does not, of course, mean that Israel should cease its attempts to block Iran from completing its advance toward an operational nuclear facility.

However, confronting the question of the day after is also essential for Israel in order to plan its actions on this day; the matter must be addressed despite the mental difficulty it provokes. Challenging assumptions requires discussing questions to which we think we already know the answers. Central among them is the question of whether Iran is one rigid and monolithic whole, or whether there are shades and differing interests among its influential actors.

An essential part of the discussion should be reserved to practical steps. It should examine the potential to incorporate international and regional systems as partners in a coordinated political campaign against shared Iranian threats. First, Israel’s strategic relationships with its strategic partners should be reexamined, with an emphasis on rethinking the concept of a strategic alliance between Israel and the US, as well as significantly upgrading the relationship with NATO. Second, the discussion must address the most significant development since the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement – the normalization agreements and the new potential for building a system of strategic security partnerships with countries in the region, whether above or below the surface.

Israel has already begun this discussion, mainly in the field of air defense, but there is still great untapped potential for expansion. In this context, a joint strategy is vital for outlining possible scenarios, such as an increase in Iran’s regional military activity or the threat of a regional arms race.

Establishing a new strategic discussion forum necessitates diversifying the circle of participants and injecting new and different knowledge into the mix. Shaping new concepts and thinking about Iran requires a different circle of experts that combines existing expertise with new voices and disciplines. Regional and international diplomatic expertise, as well as deep and multilayered knowledge of Iran’s society, economy and culture are essential components. Civil society should have a central place in the debate as a repository of thinking not limited by political or bureaucratic constraints.

The challenge facing Israel in rethinking and adapting its Iran policy to the new reality is one of the most complexes it has ever faced. The nation that demonstrated creativity in penetrating dozens of meters below ground into the centrifuge facilities at Natanz will now be required to demonstrate similar creativity in the political and conceptual spheres. The starting point is to admit to ourselves that the existing conception, the Begin Doctrine, is no longer relevant.

This article is from “JPost“, from October 2, 2022

הפוסט Is it time for a new approach to deal with the Iranian threat? – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.