Lebanon now has a leader after over two years of failed attempts to elect a president. Aoun is backed by the international bloc opposing Iran (primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and France) and comes from the military establishment responsible for upholding the ceasefire with Israel. This is promising news – but realizing its potential depends also on Israel’s actions.

In the past year, Israel heavily struck Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel’s use of force during the summer and fall of 2024 – assisted by US mediation efforts – led the terror organization to agree in November to a 60-day ceasefire, relinquishing its commitment to continue fighting as long as Israel fought Hamas in Gaza. The weakening of Hezbollah also paved the way for the Syrian opposition’s successful campaign to overthrow the Assad regime in Damascus, an ally of Hezbollah and Iran.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah is one of the few diplomatic achievements that Israel has managed to secure since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror attack, and it bears significant importance.

Since the ceasefire began, rocket fire on northern Israeli communities has almost entirely ceased. Although many northern residents still do not feel secure enough to return home, public opinion surveys indicate that most Israelis support the ceasefire, support which is echoed by regional states and Israel’s Western allies.

Israel’s interest should be in making permanent this temporary lull in fighting and seizing the opportunities it presents – the weakening of Hezbollah within Lebanon’s internal politics and the gradual reshaping of Israel-Lebanon relations.

Doubts about the future

However, as the 60-day ceasefire period draws to a close, doubts are growing about Israel’s commitment to the agreements reached and to ending the fighting on the northern front. To achieve this, Israel must act wisely on both military and diplomatic fronts to best serve its long-term strategic goals.

Although Hezbollah has been defeated (in this round) by Israel, while weakened domestically, it has not been defeated in that arena and is working hard to maintain its assets and status. Hezbollah is an authentic representative of significant portions of the Lebanese population – as reflected in its representation and influence in Lebanon’s parliament. A survey published by an American think tank in early 2024 revealed that 93% of Lebanon’s Shiite population – about a quarter of the country’s inhabitants – held a positive view of Hezbollah at the time.

On the other hand, ahead of the recent presidential election, Hezbollah’s preferred candidate withdrew from the race to avoid a possible defeat, which would have signaled the group’s weakening.

Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon see an opportunity to shift the balance of power and have successfully worked to elect a new president since the ceasefire began, viewing it as a chance to establish new leadership in Lebanon that opposes Hezbollah and aligns with the West and moderate Arab states.

Despite its military strength, Israel has limited influence over Lebanon’s internal politics and should avoid actions that portray it as attempting to dictate processes or appoint leaders there – much as in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, Israel’s actions do create a context that impacts Lebanon’s internal developments. In the past, Hezbollah gained support beyond Lebanon’s Shiite community by presenting itself as a defender of Lebanese sovereignty against a powerful Israel. Now, Israel should use its military power cautiously to avoid reigniting dwindling public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel should reduce its military footprint in Lebanon, including reported drone flights over Beirut. Israel should also make a special effort not to hit Lebanese army soldiers.

Formal apologies for any such hits, as Israel made in early December, are important signals to the Lebanese public.

According to the ceasefire agreement, the Lebanese army is supposed to play a key role in replacing Hezbollah, and Israel has an interest in empowering it. On a tactical level, continued IDF strikes on the Lebanese army would likely diminish its willingness to confront Hezbollah. Strategically, such actions could undermine Joseph Aoun’s position as he transitions from army chief to president.

In Lebanon, there are complaints about repeated Israeli violations of the ceasefire, with reports of over 1,000 such incidents since late November. This creates anger in Lebanon, portrays Israel as a heavy-handed aggressor harming civilians unnecessarily, and hinders the creation of mechanisms to promote shared interests between the two countries. Israel should stop these violations, in accordance with the self-determination clause mentioned in the ceasefire agreement, and cease the destruction of villages it has occupied in southern Lebanon. Israel’s current actions risk fueling support for Hezbollah and generating hostility among moderate factions in Lebanon, who could be crucial interlocutors in future efforts to demarcate the land border and redefine relations between the two countries.

Israel must learn from the experience of the First Lebanon War in 1982. Its swift military achievements then were gradually eroded when they were met with Lebanon’s complicated internal situation.

The Palestinian armed forces were exiled to Tunisia but were then replaced by an even stronger force, Hezbollah, which has become a strategic problem for Israel, partly due to its ties with Iran. We must not be blinded by Israel’s recent short-term military success. Lebanon is a complex and difficult country to influence, but the outcomes of the war have already sparked internal processes there that could align with Israel’s interests.

Israel must now avoid causing harm or disrupting Lebanon’s internal processes, express commitment to implementing the ceasefire – including withdrawing the IDF from southern Lebanon – declare its desire for a future peace with the Lebanese state, and invest diplomatically in expanding coordination and channels of communication with Lebanon, with the assistance of international actors such as the UN, the US, France, and Gulf states. This is even more important in light of the dramatic changes occurring in Syria, which are likely to shape the region’s future in the coming years.

Excessive and prolonged use of Israel’s military power against Lebanon could lead to the imminent collapse of the ceasefire, delay the return of northern residents to their homes, cause further harm to IDF soldiers, strengthen Hezbollah, increase hostility toward Israel among moderate elements in Lebanon, and erase Israel’s impressive military achievements.

Israel is now required to act wisely, both diplomatically and militarily, and not let the Lebanese opportunity slip away. The ceasefire must be implemented, preserved, and turned into a permanent arrangement.

The article was written by Dr. Ehud Eiran, Dr. Nimrod Goren and Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, and was published on January 14th 2025 in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Israel Should Make the Ceasefire with Lebanon Permanent הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

1. Hezbollah’s Continued Influence: Despite recent setbacks, Hezbollah will remain a significant player in Lebanon, and international involvement will be essential to resolving the situation.

2. Military Action Alone is Insufficient: No military action can achieve the political settlement needed for both Israel’s security and the rehabilitation of Lebanon.

3. The role of the International Community: The US, France, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States must play a central role in a settlement, while also considering Iran’s influence.

4. Failures of Previous Initiatives: Past international attempts to stabilize Lebanon, including UN Resolutions 1559 and 1701, have largely failed.

Key Discussion Points:

1. Israel’s Security vs. Lebanese Sovereignty: Any sustainable solution must balance Israel’s security needs with respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty. Israel should not seek to directly influence Lebanese politics but support reforms with international backing.

2. Rehabilitation of Lebanon: Lebanon’s political crisis and the need for reforms, including the election of a president and strengthening of state institutions, are critical to creating a stable Lebanon. Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is key to diminishing Hezbollah’s influence.

3. Weakening Hezbollah’s Dominance: Addressing the political, security, and social factors that allow Hezbollah to maintain power in Lebanon is crucial. This includes diplomatic efforts to reduce Iran’s role and a robust arms embargo.

4. The role of the International Community: The US, France, and Arab Gulf States must be involved in the process. France’s engagement with all parties, including Hezbollah, is seen as vital. Iran’s influence remains a major challenge, and the international community must work together to mitigate it.

5. UN and International Forces: A stronger role for the UN and a reformed UNIFIL, along with enhanced support for the LAF, is necessary for stabilizing Lebanon. Israel’s skepticism toward the UN complicates this effort.

6. Marshall Plan for Lebanon: A comprehensive international aid package, similar to a Marshall Plan, could help stabilize Lebanon economically and politically. However, international disagreements, particularly with Iran and Russia, pose significant challenges.

7. Challenges: There is no clear agenda-setter for future peace efforts, and determining which international instruments will be effective remains uncertain. The ongoing Israel-Iran conflict further complicates efforts to stabilize Lebanon, as tensions between these two powers will continue to affect the situation.

Conclusion:

Achieving a sustainable resolution for Lebanon requires careful coordination between international actors, consideration of Israel’s security, and respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty. Addressing Hezbollah’s role, rehabilitating Lebanon’s institutions, and securing long-term international support are all essential components for peace and stability. However, the influence of external actors like Iran and the historical failures of past efforts create significant hurdles to success.

הפוסט The International Community and the Creation of a Feasible Settlement in Lebanon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On May 26, 2000, during Hezbollah’s victory celebrations following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Nasrallah delivered a speech in which he famously declared that while Israel possesses nuclear weapons, it is “weaker than a spider’s web,” a phrase derived from the Quran.

Although the Second Lebanon War in 2006 led him to conclude that it would have been better for Hezbollah not to have initiated the military operation that sparked the war, it also resulted in the organization enhancing its military capabilities, thanks to substantial aid from Iran.  Additionally, the judicial upheavals in Israel further reinforced his perception – and that of many in the Arab world – that Israeli society is “weaker than a spider’s web.”

Hezbollah’s legitimacy in Lebanon has stemmed from its leadership in the struggle for the return of Lebanese territory still occupied by Israel and its central role in the “axis of resistance” aimed at undermining Israel, or at least reducing its power. This rhetoric may have compelled Hezbollah – possibly against its will – to enter the current war, albeit in a measured and calculated manner.

In other words, the rhetoric itself functioned as a powerful historical force that the organization no longer fully controlled. This situation is reminiscent of how Nasser was drawn into the 1967 conflict, despite his reluctance to engage in an all-out war with Israel.

Reinforcing self-image

Rhetoric is not only a powerful tool in the struggle against an enemy; it is also a tool for reinforcing self-image. During the current war, there have been instances in which Hezbollah’s media outlets have given false representations of its actions.

Thus, for example, after the assassination in July 2024 of the organization’s military commander in Beirut, Fuad Shukr, Nasrallah claimed that 340 rockets had been fired at Israel and that drones had hit two of Israel’s military bases, including Glilot. In actual fact, the bases were not attacked, and the large majority of the rockets were shot down. These boasts were intended to present a false impression of accomplishment for the Shi’ite audience in Lebanon and beyond, with the aim of restoring Hezbollah’s honor and averting humiliation.

This was surprising because, for years, Nasrallah has portrayed himself as a leader who operates in a measured manner and is capable of speaking the truth, even when it is not in his favor. This image was crucial for him in relation to both his external audience (Israel) and his internal audience (the Lebanese, particularly the Shi’ite population).

His willingness to lie in such a blatant manner was a clear indication of the pressure he was under. Furthermore, after the recent attacks, he promised that “Israel’s crime will lead to a severe response and appropriate punishment, from expected and unexpected quarters.” However, no such response materialized while he was still alive.

It is possible that Nasrallah interpreted the Israeli cabinet’s decision to include the return of residents in northern Israel to their homes as rhetoric aimed at internal purposes, akin to his own use of such rhetoric, rather than as a genuine expression of Israel’s determination to act against Hezbollah. It is particularly surprising that he failed to recognize this shift following the recent operation, which appeared to signal a significant change in Israel’s behavior.

In other words, Nasrallah did not take Israel’s declarations and actions seriously.

Similar expressions of bravado have emerged from Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. The Houthi spokesperson regularly boasts about fictitious achievements following missile launches at Israel. Another aspect of this behavior includes issuing exaggerated and empty threats, such as asserting that the Houthis are collaborating with Hezbollah and militias in Iraq to “close the Mediterranean,” or that maritime conflicts could escalate into unforeseen events that would cause Israel to “beg for peace.”

These declarations prompt many in Israel, as well as in the Arab world, to question whether the Houthis genuinely believe their own rhetoric. What is significant, however, is that this is the image they wish to project to their own public, most of whom may not have the means or inclination to verify the truth of such claims.

Iranian rhetoric shows similar patterns

Similar rhetoric can also be heard from Tehran, despite the significant setbacks faced by the axis of resistance. For instance, in response to Nasrallah’s assassination, Supreme Leader Khamenei declared, “The fate of the region will be decided by the forces of resistance,” and asserted that “the Zionists are too weak to inflict a meaningful blow on the strong structure of Hezbollah. Lebanon will make the enemy regret its actions.” Bragging statements came after Iran’s second missile attack against Israel, which caused some damage but only one fatality and a couple of light injuries.

Older readers may recognize a striking similarity to the broadcasts of Radio “Voice of Thunder” from Cairo before and during the 1967 war. The station’s propaganda transmissions in Hebrew aimed to instill fear in Israeli society, while its broadcasts in Arabic sought to bolster morale among Egyptians and Arabs through exaggerated claims of victories over Israel.

Since 1967, the media landscape has undergone a radical transformation, with the internet and social media enabling the public to verify statements made by leaders and regimes. It is not surprising that media outlets in Lebanon and across the Arab world frequently critique and ridicule the distorted narratives presented by Hezbollah – often portraying Nasrallah as an attacker of chicken coops rather than military bases, as he had claimed.

The bluster emanating from Beirut, Tehran, and Sanaa reflects a broader issue: the inability of regimes and organizations to face failure, dishonor, and humiliation. Ultimately, this rhetoric can take on a life of its own, as the speakers begin to believe their own fabrications. In Nasrallah’s case, this delusion cost his life.

The article was published on October 8th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט At His End, Nasrallah Was a Victim of His Own Rhetoric הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hezbollah’s opponents have been criticizing it for decades for  serving foreign interests and undermining the stability and security of the Lebanese state. The events of the last ten months underscore their criticism, as the Shiite organization threatens to drag Lebanon into a destructive war against the basic interests of the crisis-stricken country.

Indeed, it seems that the ongoing war with Israel sharpens the constant tension within which Hezbollah exists – the tension between its Iranian-Shiite identity and the national image it tries to project as the “defender of Lebanon.” This tension is Hezbollah’s most prominent weakness.

Since the beginning of the war, Nasrallah has tried to walk between the raindrops and reconcile the conflicting interests in the hope that the war in Gaza will end soon and allow him to continue holding the stick at both ends. Despite the clear consensus within Lebanon against a full-scale war with Israel, including among the Shiite community, and the harsh criticisms leveled at him, Nasrallah has so far managed to avoid serious challenges to the legitimacy of Hezbollah. However, the event in Majdal Shams may now threaten his ability to continue doing so.

Hezbollah’s swift denial of involvement in the attack, despite widespread evidence of its responsibility, reflects a familiar tactic. The group and its allies are using a classic strategy: diverting attention away from their actions by accusing others of trying to incite inter-communal strife within Lebanon. By doing this, Hezbollah is attempting to frame any criticism or blame directed at it as an attempt to destabilize the Lebanese state.

However, despite this denial of responsibility, genuine anxiety has spread among Lebanese in the last day about an Israeli response that could very well drag the Land of Cedars into a full-scale war and bring destruction on a catastrophic scale. Accordingly, the criticism leveled at Hezbollah is intensifying.

The internal pressure on Hezbollah is a unique opportunity to end the undeclared war between Israel and Hezbollah on relatively favorable terms for Israel. Thus, the attack on Majdal Shams can have a similar impact to the attack on Qana Village during Operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 1996 – a game-changing event that leads to a cessation of hostilities. If Israel, with the help of the international community, leverages this pressure, it can push Hezbollah to end the fighting on terms that advance Israeli interests, particularly focusing on the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s forces from the south. Obviously, such an action would provide only a temporary solution, but it would allow for a significant achievement for Israel by enabling the return of northern residents and more effectively isolating the campaign in Gaza. In doing so, it can bring substantial issues back to the table, such as Hezbollah’s legitimacy to hold weapons outside the framework of the Lebanese state, and the question of its presence south of the Litani River. 

Cooperation with the international community has a significant role in promoting Israeli goals. The attack on Hezbollah came in response to the elimination of its field commanders in Kila village, a few kilometers from the Israeli border. Hezbollah’s presence and operations in the south are an affront to the international community and its decisions, standing in complete violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The Majdal Shams massacre can be a turning point for the level of international involvement. This should include clear conditions for any economic or other assistance to the Lebanese state, requiring the enforcement of the Resolution.

It is clear and obvious that even ending the current round of fighting with a diplomatic solution will not resolve all the standing issues between Israel and Hezbollah, including territorial contentions along the land border. The likelihood of a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the coming years remains high. However, it is better for Israel to act according to Sun Tzu’s ancient advice—to choose the arena and time for the war—rather than being dragged into a conflict without clear goals or an exit strategy, and less than optimal conditions.

Instead of trying to reshape “response equations,” Israel should act proactively to change the conditions in the north. The immediate goal should be providing security—albeit temporary—to the residents of the north and allowing them to return to their homes. Simultaneously, it should address the long-term necessity of preparing the state and the IDF for a military-political campaign against Hezbollah and Iran in the coming years. By doing so, Israel can ensure both the short-term safety of its citizens and strategically position itself for future conflicts under more favorable conditions. 

הפוסט The Majdal Shams Massacre – A Chance for a Diplomatic End to the War in the North on Favorable Terms for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discussion, conducted under the Chatham House Rule, was initiated while taking several basic assumptions into account:

1. An all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah would have devastating consequences for both sides, and would not be sufficient on its own to bring about a long-term settlement. Furthermore, such escalation would surely have implications both in the regional and international spheres, carrying a dangerous potential for triggering an all-out war in the Middle East.

2. All the parties directly involved (Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon) are caught in a situation from which they are unable to extricate themselves on their own and will inevitably need international involvement to do so.

3. Prevention of escalation or war will inevitably have to come as part of a broader settlement process with significant implications in both the regional and international spheres.

Given these assumptions, the discussion aimed to examine the importance of international involvement in the ongoing crisis along the Israeli-Lebanese border and to map the various relevant actors, their characteristics and interests, and their levers on other actors.

הפוסט International Involvement and Prevention of Escalation in the Ongoing Israel-Hezbollah Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In addition to the civilians on both sides of the border, the most significant victim of Hezbollah’s decision to engage in conflict, which could potentially escalate into a full-scale and destructive war, is the state of Lebanon. The recent events highlight Lebanon’s inherent weakness and raise fundamental questions about its functioning as a state entity. However, Lebanon’s weakness is actually the most effective restraint against Hezbollah and could potentially serve as a catalyst for resolving the conflict without resorting to war.

Those following Hezbollah know that the Shia movement struggles with a series of dilemmas and continuously fights to justify its existence within the Lebanese arena. These dilemmas occupy the organization during normal times and seem to become even more crucial during these days.

Hezbollah was established by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as part of a vision to export the Islamic revolution. This means the organization was born within Lebanon but not as part of it, serving a broader revolutionary-theological vision where, in the end, Islam (Shia) would rule the world. The Lebanese state, with its political mechanisms and sectarian arrangements, had no place in this vision. However, over the years, Hezbollah gradually changed its nature. Along with blurring its revolutionary Islamist dogmas, the organization began to adopt a Lebanese national identity and even integrated into the country’s political system.

This process is often described as the “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah, wherein its leaders emphasized their struggle as a national movement serving as “Lebanon’s protector” against dangers, especially from Israel. However, this “Lebanonization” is viewed with suspicion both inside and outside Lebanon. While some see it as a genuine process, many in Lebanon and abroad see it as a cynical facade meant to mask the organization’s true intentions.

This is the main dilemma occupying Hezbollah and troubling it, especially in these times—the dilemma between being an Iranian proxy and a patriotic Lebanese organization; and the dilemma between being a resistance movement committed to exporting the revolution and destroying Israel and being “Lebanon’s protector.”

Lebanon’s Internal Crisis

It seems that Hezbollah was caught off guard by Hamas’s attack on October 7 and was not prepared for its consequences. Indeed, the current time seems highly inconvenient for it to wage war against Israel. Over the past four years, Lebanon has been experiencing an unprecedented severe economic crisis. The local currency has undergone a historic collapse, GDP has plummeted, and inflation and unemployment rates are soaring. The economic crisis quickly translated into a real humanitarian crisis, with over 80% of Lebanese citizens living below the poverty line.

Moreover, Lebanon is in the midst of a complex and ongoing political crisis that exacerbates the economic collapse and fuels massive protests by desperate citizens. Since October 2022, Lebanon has had no sitting president, and since October 2021, a transitional government with no executive power has been in place. A destructive war with Israel is truly the last thing the Lebanese can afford.

Lebanon’s dire internal situation is closely linked to Nasrallah’s considerations and his choice to limit the conflict and avoid a full-scale war, at least for now. It is commonly believed that Hezbollah holds sway in Lebanon—that it dictates events, for better or worse. However, this statement is not entirely accurate. While Hezbollah is indeed the most powerful force in Lebanon, it is not omnipotent and is also subject to power limitations and restraining factors.

Internal Opposition

Even before October 7, Hezbollah suffered from a highly negative image within Lebanon. Alongside the perpetual suspicion towards it, the organization is seen by many as primarily responsible for the severe economic crisis and political stagnation, and as an obstacle preventing Lebanon from overcoming them. Since engaging in conflict with Israel on October 8, without any provocation from Israel, criticism of Hezbollah has been mounting. Public opinion in the country strongly opposes entering a war with Israel and fears its devastating consequences.

The opposition to war crosses sectarian lines and is also clear among Shias, Hezbollah’s base of support and power. As the campaign continues, criticism against Hezbollah grows for the severe damage caused by its policies and the high price Lebanon could pay if it doesn’t stop. The waves of refugees coming from the south and the growing destruction as Israel expands its attacks to more distant areas make the sense of fear increasingly palpable.

Various officials, including some considered Hezbollah’s allies, have clearly expressed their concern over the situation on the border and have not spared criticism of Hezbollah, opposing attempts to link Gaza’s events to Lebanon. More and more reports indicate that Lebanon’s official stance is to immediately return to implementing UN Resolution 1701, which includes, among other things, keeping Hezbollah fighters away from the border.

In civil society, the criticism is even harsher and more outspoken. This is evidenced by a popular campaign with the hashtag “Lebanon_does_not_want_war,” gaining significant momentum on social media. Every day, more and more statements are published criticizing Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into catastrophe for foreign interests without any logic or justification.

The situation is simple: the average Lebanese citizen may not hold much affection for Israel, but these days even Palestine is not a concern. The arguments about the necessity of the resistance’s mobilization alongside Gaza simply do not convince him, not when he is concerned about his family’s survival.

A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah would essentially be a mutual destruction— a bloody and destructive stalemate. No one is under the illusion that such a war would lead to the disappearance of the other side, but the devastation and destruction that would occur in both Israel and Lebanon serve as a deterrent for both sides. Hezbollah does not hide this, and since the conflict began, Nasrallah has repeatedly stated that he does not want war, and once the “aggression” in Gaza stops, calm will return to the Lebanon border.

However, the sides are caught in a dangerous trap, and a complex dynamic has developed over recent months, where despite no one wanting war, it may become inevitable. Nasrallah hears the voices within Lebanon and knows that dragging the country into war could undermine his claim to be “Lebanon’s protector.” However, it is difficult to see how he can back away from his promise to stand by Gaza until the war ends completely.

On the other hand, while tens of thousands of its citizens have become refugees in their own country, Israel needs to present a convincing narrative to them that the threat from the border has been eliminated. It seems that among Israel’s political and military leadership, the view is growing that a change in the situation can only be achieved through military action.

Weakness as an Opportunity

Meanwhile, external actors, both regional and international, are trying to prevent the escalation. According to reports, the United States submitted a proposal to resolve the issue of the land border, which will be agreed upon after a ceasefire; France presented a similar initiative, and Qatar has also been mentioned as a potential player in the settlement. Hezbollah has expressed a willingness behind the scenes to discuss a formula that would end the conflict, and recently it was reported that one of Hezbollah’s senior officials even traveled to the United Arab Emirates, with one of his objectives being to explore the possibility of Emirati mediation to end the fighting, despite the strained relationship between the parties.

However, it seems that the path to a solution is still long, and at this moment, the possibility of a war breaking out seems more likely than reaching a political settlement. At this point, the state of Lebanon, with its weaknesses and frequent crises, becomes a critical factor in the ability to resolve the issue without resorting to war. The ongoing crisis in Lebanon and the growing internal opposition to Hezbollah are the Shia organization’s point of weakness and an important factor in restraining its activities. Nasrallah, as mentioned, is constantly trying to reconcile the existential dilemmas that occupy him, and it is likely that he would be willing to make concessions. For now, it seems there is no conflict between the interests of the Lebanese state and Hezbollah’s patrons in Iran, as Tehran is also not interested in expanding the war.

Israel would do well to take advantage of this point of weakness. In cooperation with the international community, Israel can work to create an “improved Resolution 1701,” which would include measures to rescue Lebanon from its economic and political crisis, and even lay the groundwork for resolving more complex issues in the future. Israel has much to offer the Lebanese, and many are willing to listen.

It must be acknowledged that the threat posed by Hezbollah will not disappear peacefully, and we must be cautious about falling back into the “deterrence” equation, the flaws of which were horrifyingly exposed in the case of Hamas. However, given the growing internal opposition to it in Lebanon, Israel and its regional and international partners have an opportunity to sharpen Hezbollah’s dilemma between its Lebanese and pro-Iranian identity. A challenging political move of this kind could give Israel more room to maneuver in dealing with the organization and, not least, a better position against its patron, Iran.

הפוסט Lebanon’s Vulnerability: A Chance for Israel Amid Anti-War Sentiment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

These assumptions were momentarily suspended when Israel and Lebanon finalized a maritime boundary agreement after 12 years of sporadic and interrupted efforts. With Washington’s mediation, the parties reached terms that would allow them both to exploit the sea’s riches and encourage foreign investment. For two states who share a long history of violence, grievance, and distrust, it was a significant achievement.

Could Israel and Lebanon’s willingness to compromise set in motion a domino effect that unlocks the region’s stranded hydrocarbons? And could this happen quickly enough to help Europe deal with its current energy problems? Israel and Lebanon are hardly the region’s only quarreling parties. Greece and Turkey have a decades-long, multifaceted maritime dispute, and the Cyprus conflict has a maritime dimension as well. 

The combination of incentives, timing, and effective mediation that worked for Israel and Lebanon will be hard to replicate. Yet their path to compromise, particularly the decision to shift away from international legal arguments in favor of addressing core national interests, successfully demonstrated how other Eastern Mediterranean actors could find creative solutions to their own disputes. 

Path to Compromise

A confluence of events created uniquely conducive circumstances for Lebanon and Israel to reach an agreement. Economic conditions in Lebanon, exacerbated by the tragic 2020 blast in Beirut, compelled the Lebanese government and Hizballah to temporarily set aside their ideological opposition to Israel for the sake of brokering a deal that could potentially unlock valuable gas deposits and avoid open conflict. But this was not the only geopolitical development that made the agreement possible. The signing of the Abraham Accords also encouraged indirect talks, weakening Arab opposition to engagement with Israel. And the West’s commitment to finding alternative oil and gas supplies for Europe further convinced the Biden administration to continue mediating between the two sides. The timing of domestic political developments was also fortuitous. Due to pending elections in Israel, Lebanon, and the United States, each of the negotiating parties, as well as the mediating party, hoped that a deal would help their standing at the ballot box.

Crucially, this confluence of events over the last 18 months led negotiators to shift from international legal arguments toward addressing Israel’s and Lebanon’s core interests. For Israel, this meant emphasizing national security concerns such as stabilizing the Lebanese economy, establishing a deconfliction mechanism along its northern maritime boundary, enabling the safe development of the Karish gas field, and achieving de facto Lebanese recognition of the buoy line Israel installed after its 2006 war with Hizballah. For Lebanon, this meant overlooking its boycott of Israel in order to convince international oil and gas companies to explore and develop its waters. Indeed, even the potential of future development could be enough for Lebanon to improve its position with the International Monetary Fund and enable it to court investments from other countries. This shift managed to break the deadlock that had muddied past mediation efforts.

The decision by Israel and Lebanon to shift away from focusing on international maritime law is very much in the spirit of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was established as a guideline rather than a strict rulebook for delimitation agreements. The past decade saw a variety of potential maps with multiple, competing boundary lines representing each country’s rival legal arguments. Tellingly, the current agreement doesn’t include a map that domestic political opponents could challenge. This reflects the underlying reality that the benefits of an agreement outweigh the technical merits of any specific set of claims. 

Finally, the agreement reinforces the argument that an informed and invested mediator may be more effective at producing a breakthrough in certain negotiations than a neutral one. Historically, Israel has always relied on the United States to mediate between itself and its regional neighbors, in large part because Washington was the only party who could offer security guarantees in exchange for Israeli concessions. Lebanese negotiators — due to a combination of their own concerns about American neutrality as well as Hizballah’s combative stance — were often reluctant to rely on U.S. mediation. But in this case, they begrudgingly acknowledged that Washington was the party most likely to deliver an agreement. 

Still, the United States didn’t accomplish this alone. Supporting actors like France and Qatar encouraged the parties to reach the finish line. The United Nations, an observer during the mediation process, also played an important technical role that enabled the parties to meet on several occasions along the Israel-Lebanon border. Finally, energy companies Energean and Total demonstrated creativity and flexibility while advocating for pragmatism. 

And this collective effort may have still come up short if it wasn’t for the singular persona of U.S. special envoy Amos Hochstein. Not only did Hochstein possess an intimate familiarity with the energy industry, the Israeli and Lebanese actors, and President Biden himself, but he also benefited from having previously tried and failed to bridge the gaps between the parties during his time in the Obama administration. The combination of experience, access, and personal investment enabled Hochstein to cut through the noise where others fell short and push the parties towards an accord. Simply put: Hochstein was much more than a messenger from the White House.

Replicating Results

Can these conditions be replicated elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean? Early signs suggest that the international buzz surrounding the Israel-Lebanon agreement has encouraged more regional actors to thaw their own frozen negotiations. Lebanon and Syria reportedly attempted (but failed) to restart negotiations on their own maritime boundary dispute. According to various outlets, Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority are also trying to advance talks on developing the long-ignored Gaza Marine field. More realistically, Israel and Cyprus have promised to put their outstanding issues over the Aphrodite-Yishai field to bed.

Each of these disputes has its own unique complexities, yet they pale in comparison to the Eastern Mediterranean’s true Gordian knot: the ongoing and often interconnected maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey and the divided island of Cyprus. Agreements on these issues would not only reduce the probability of regional conflict, but could potentially open the door to previously dismissed partnerships in the field of energy and beyond. The circumstances may be considerably less conducive here, but there are still useful lessons to be drawn. 

First, it was the prospect of exploiting offshore gas reserves that helped Lebanon and Israel see a settlement as being win-win. In the case of Greece and Turkey, their maritime dispute doesn’t promise an immediate economic bounty, thus eliminating the most obvious potential incentive for settlement. And while offshore hydrocarbons have been discovered in Cyprus’ waters, the stakes are also considerably higher, specifically as they relate to the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. 

The timing of domestic elections helped push Israel and Lebanon over the finish line. However, the elections being held in Cyprus in February 2023, Greece in July 2023, and Turkey in June 2023 are likely to have the opposite effect. With the economic benefits less imminent and the issues of sovereignty more prominent, elections will make it harder for decision-makers in Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara to compromise

Turkey’s approach will prove particularly pivotal. Like Lebanon, regional energy initiatives have left it on the outside looking in. Over the last decade it has frequently forced itself into Eastern Mediterranean energy politics, often by trying to change the legal or security realities at sea. The question is whether the lessons from the Israel-Lebanon agreement will embolden a more muscular or more compromising line from Ankara. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an October 27 press release welcoming the Israel-Lebanon agreement and stated that “this model, which reflects similar practices around the world, sets a good example for the region and in particular for Turkish and Greek Cypriots.” This might suggest a more moderate tack. But Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiadis countered by noting that Turkey has rejected past mediation efforts and declined to submit claims for international arbitration. 

It is naive to expect overnight results. Israel and Lebanon negotiated for a decade, suffering multiple setbacks before making a breakthrough. By comparison, many of the region’s other maritime disputes are further behind in the process. To make matters more complicated, Europe plans to have shifted considerably to renewables by decade’s end. On the positive side though, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus don’t have to deal with interference from a non-state actor like Hizballah.  

The Israel-Lebanon agreement suggests that the right balance of timing, compatible interests, and an invested mediator can yield a breakthrough. Resolving maritime disputes is not only about extracting resources, but also about removing sources of conflict and gradually developing trust between aggrieved parties. Even if the hydrocarbon age is slowly coming to an end, there are multiple reasons why the United States, Europe, and Eastern Mediterranean states should pursue similar types of maritime agreements in the months and years to come. The blueprint provided by Israel and Lebanon is as good a starting point as it gets.

This article is from “War on the Rocks“, from November 11, 2022

הפוסט Is the Israeli-Lebanese maritime boundary agreement replicable? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the expected steps for the day after, mainly to avoid a crisis of expectations on both sides of the border.

For Lebanon

In the immediate time frame, it should be expected that the agreement will make it possible to complete the gas supply, which has been discussed in recent months, from Egypt through Jordan and Syria to Lebanon. As remembered, this step was not completed since Washington did not give adequate guarantees to the parties concerned (Egypt and Jordan) that the agreement does not violate the existing sanctions on the Assad regime in Syria. Presumably, the U.S. delay in providing the appropriate guarantees served also as a means of pressuring Lebanon to complete the agreement with Israel. Although the deal will not solve Lebanon’s energy problems, it will alleviate the severe current crisis in the country concerning electricity supply.

The agreement with Israel sends a positive message for Lebanon but does not provide an immediate answer to its economic woes. It remains to be seen how the Lebanese government will handle with the IMF and the World Bank’s demands for reforms before approving vital loans to Lebanon. Significant reforms will oblige the ruling elite to take political-economic measures, which it can be assumed is not enthusiastic about doing so. The public should play a central role in Lebanon and the international community concerning the required reforms in the face of a corrupt and unpopular ruling elite.

In the near-medium term, Lebanon will seek to take advantage of the agreement to join the energy market. The French energy company TOTAL committed to start drilling in the Qana field immediately. It is essential to mention the other partnerships in this field: the Italian company ENI and the Lebanese government. The latter regained the share held by the Russian company NOVOTEK (estimated at 20 percent). According to various reports, the Qatari gas company is interested in entering the Lebanese market and acquiring this share (as well as some more percentages from the French and Italian companies).

It is extremely important to align expectations in these initial stages, on the part of the Lebanese government (and the French company). After all, it is a potential for gas and oil, but it must be found.

It can be assumed that following the agreement with Israel, Lebanon will seek to speed up energy activities in all its economic waters. Lebanon has completed the first round of tenders, but this has so far yielded only one drilling, which has not produced any proven resources. It is to be expected that Lebanon will seek to promote the second round of tenders, which has been postponed several times, and build on the positive atmosphere that the agreement with Israel projects. Either way, it is a long process, albeit one with more promising potential, given a more stable political climate.

For Israel

Israel is in a completely different situation. It has already harnessed the gas discoveries in its economic waters for significant political-strategic gains and at the economic-energy level. The agreement will remove the question marks hanging over the Karish field’s development – not concerning its being in Israel’s economic waters – but in removing a volatile potential of instability or escalation.

The question of the reserves that will be found in the Lebanese Qana gas field (which is shared by both countries) depends, as mentioned, on the drilling that will be carried out by the French company. Although future revenues for Israel should not be underestimated, this is not a significant economic element that will change the national situation from Israel’s point of view. Its political importance, which concerns the manner of implementation of the agreement with Lebanon, increases immeasurably.

An interesting and vital angle concerns the Israeli-Cypriot dispute over the joint Aphrodite-Yishai gas field. The failure of the two countries to reach an agreed mechanism still stands and more emphasized considering the Israeli – Lebanese agreement. This is a highly relevant point, precisely in view of the growing attractiveness of the East Med for Europe (following the war in Ukraine), and the regional dynamic following the Israeli – Lebanese agreement.

For the Regional Geopolitics

The agreement between Israel and Lebanon projects a regional calming, due to the potential for escalation that lay in the failure of the American mediation. The potential for Lebanon to join the regional energy system is complex and will take time. Lebanon will have to make difficult decisions in the face of the impressive regional array that was built in recent years thanks to the energy discoveries. There still stands an open invitation for it to join the regional gas forum (EMGF), but Israel’s membership is obviously a serious challenge. The first step could be to join as an observer. In any case, it is likely, or hopefully, that positive results of the expected drilling in its economic waters will force Lebanon to follow a constructive and beneficial path. It’s anticipated that Lebanon will move on to conclude agreements on its maritime borders with Syria. It should be expected that Syria will not adopt a speedy policy, partly (or mainly) to the Russian angle. The Lebanese – Cypriot agreement that Lebanon hasn’t ratified will need further discussion. It remains to be seen how the “new commers” will take a (positive) advantage from the proven regional potential of the last decade.

For the International Arena

The importance of the Israeli – Lebanese agreement for the international arena, and the U.S., in particular, relates to two key aspects: neutralizing a potential for escalation in the region; and a positive message regarding the formation of a Western energy front against Russia, even if the prospects for energy implementation look quite a few years ahead. The trilateral MOU between Israel, Egypt, and the European Union, signed last June in Cairo, illustrated the attractiveness of the Eastern Mediterranean for Europe. The Lebanese – Israeli agreement fits well into this.

Conclusion

It would be fair, even realistic, to exercise great caution concerning the positive potential arising from the agreement. Its main test lies in its implementation and the way the two parties, as well the U.S., which bears a responsibility that should not be overstated, will deal with difficulties that will obviously arise.

At the same time, both sides’ hard decisions are not self-evident. This is especially evident in the Lebanese arena, with so many players who have generally proven that they cannot overcome their different interests and needed an unprecedented political-economic crisis to bridge the gaps between them.

Similarly, Israel recognized this window of opportunity and made complex decisions, in difficult political circumstances (pre-elections), which produced restlessness in the domestic arena. The preference for the diplomatic path, and the recognition of the extraordinary meeting of interests with Lebanon, provide Israel with many meritorious points.

The United States has again demonstrated its great vitality in the region, precisely at a time when it is perceived as reducing attention to the region.

By the time it will be clearer if this agreement was a game changer in a complicated and challenging region, and what lessons could be taken for other players in the region.

The op-ed was published in November 2022 in the Transatlantic Policy Quarterly.

הפוסט The Israeli – Lebanese Agreement: The Day After הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the deep crisis in Lebanon, which has been unable to establish a new government following the Beirut Port explosion, the relevant players, including Hezbollah, have now realized that talks must be renewed and an intensive effort must be made to reach agreements. This would convey a vital and positive message given Lebanon’s collapsing economy, although clearly it would take quite a few years before Lebanon could reap the benefits of maritime gas reserves in the currently contested area. For now, the coronavirus and its impact on the global energy market have put a dent in gas-exploration investment in the region.

The main obstacle to an Israeli-Lebanese agreement has almost always stemmed from Lebanon’s complex political arena with its multiplicity of domestic and foreign players. However, the Lebanese now understand that resolving the dispute with Israel is vital to tapping the energy potential of their economic waters, allowing international energy companies to proceed with gas-exploration plans, specifically in the area known as Block 9 adjacent to the contested waters.

Given Lebanon’s current severe crises, conditions are ripe to achieve agreement. The September 2020 signing of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) charter likely also made it clear to Lebanon – which is not a forum member – how far behind it is compared to the other states of the region, intensifying its desire to move ahead. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a figure acceptable to all sides, especially Hezbollah, is leading the negotiating process for Lebanon.

The Americans have in the past presented the sides with an informal proposal for resolution of the maritime dispute, which Israel agreed to accept, but to which Lebanon did not respond. According to various reports at the time, the proposal favored the Lebanese side in suggesting that more than 50% of the disputed area be recognized as belonging to Lebanon. The importance of an agreement for Israel, even if it means even greater concessions in the upcoming negotiations, would be to defuse an explosive issue in relations with its northern neighbor. It would convey a positive message to its partners in the Mediterranean Basin, although Lebanon is not expected to join the EMGF immediately even if agreement with Israel is reached.

Despit reports of imminent negotiations, it is too early to pop open the champagne. Negotiations by their very nature are rarely straightforward, even if the current circumstances appear promising. What is more, Lebanon is crippled by its fragmentation and abundant and harmful foreign influences. Nonetheless, the proactive US mediation and involvement of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are encouraging. The timing of the negotiations, on the eve of US presidential elections, would also be advantageous to the Trump administration, especially if significant progress is achieved in the coming month. Lebanon had consistently demanded UN involvement in the mediation, while Israel only wanted American involvement. The eventual decision to hold the talks at UN headquarters in Naquora, Lebanon, appears satisfactory to both sides.

It is essential to keep in mind at this point that the negotiations relate only to the maritime border, nothing else. Neither side intends to discuss land border disputes or additional issues. Nor are these talks linked to Israel’s recently signed agreements with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and obviously not to an Israel-Lebanon peace accord. Israel would do well to avoid referring to such prospects that would only complicate matters for the Lebanese players and intensify domestic and external pressures to avoid agreement with the “Zionist entity.”

These developments are not directly related to the growing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Lebanon and Israel have always wanted to resolve the maritime border issue. Nonetheless, progress on the Israel-Lebanon front would likely have a positive effect on the climate in the region and could help efforts to ease Greek-Turkish tensions. Turkey is presumably closely monitoring these “winds of reconciliation,” given its growing involvement in Lebanon in recent years, and examining the possible implications for its interests.

Thus, while discussion of peace is not on the agenda, a successful conclusion of the Israel-Lebanon negotiations is important. To that end, Israel would be wise to focus on professional energy discussions with Lebanon, in which agreement seems feasible, and avoid imbuing the talks with broader diplomatic dimensions as some political elements might be interested in doing.

The op-ed was published in October 2022 in JPost.

הפוסט Israel-Lebanon negotiations: cautious optimism but no bells of peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The main challenge concerning a provisional government taking steps of this magnitude regards Israel’s fundamental definition as a parliamentary democracy. Israel’s government serves by virtue of the trust granted to it by a majority in the Knesset. Clearly, transitional governments which do not have a Knesset majority do not enjoy this legitimation of their power.

That is a point that opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has been trying to hammer home, in the context of his wider campaign against interim Prime Minister Yair Lapid before the November 1st elections. There is no doubt that both politicians are trying to maximize profits from their bases on the Lebanon border issue and to present the other party’s position as illegitimate.

As it stands, the maritime border deal helps Lapid to establish a public image as the confident prime minister who doesn’t shy away from confronting hard decisions for the sake of unprecedented gains – for example, Lebanon’s de facto recognition of Israel’s existence. Netanyahu, in response, frames Lapid’s negotiating tactics as a treacherous selling out to Hezbollah.

Even if it is crystal clear that Lapid is trying to leverage the emerging agreement with Lebanon to shore up his stature among the electorate, that does not undermine the contention that this negotiation is vital to Israel’s national interest. But Lapid must provide prove its necessity during this sensitive period, a month prior to the elections, both by public diplomacy, by cabinet ratification and by government legal advice.

Can a caretaker PM conduct international negotiations?

This article is from “Haaretz“, from October 9, 2022

הפוסט Does Israel’s Prime Minister Have the Right to Strike a Deal With Lebanon? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.