הפוסט The EU’s Cross Border Cooperation Program in the Mediterranean (CBC Med/NEXT MED) הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming of relations is expected to boost existing fields of cooperation (e.g. trade and tourism) and de-freeze fields that were put on hold during years of tensions (e.g. the strategic dialogue on regional affairs). At the same time, it also creates an opportunity to launch new fields of cooperation on issues that are relevant to current realities.

Climate change is the leading field. It is an issue of growing centrality in both Turkey and Israel, in which there is untapped potential for joint endeavors. For example, Israel’s charge d’affaires in Ankara, Irit Lillian, recently told Turkish media that cooperation in the field of sustainability could improve economic and trade ties.

Climate change is already taking a toll in Turkey, with fires, droughts, flooding and pollution in the Marmara Sea. More extreme climate events are expected in the coming decades alongside the intensification of current trends. Until recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not convey a sense of urgency regarding climate change. However, in his 2021 speech to the UN General Assembly, Erdogan spoke much about climate change, calling for international action and emphasizing Turkey’s commitment.

In October 2021, Turkey ratified the Paris Convention, becoming the last G-20 country to do so. Turkey plans to reduce emissions by 21 percent by 2030 and reach zero emissions by 2053. With the support of the EU, a network of municipalities is operating in Turkey to deal with climate change. In late 2021, Turkey adopted a program called the “Green Development Revolution,” and in February 2022, a climate council was established in Turkey, with government support and participation of representatives from all over the country.

Climate change is likely to assume a more central role in Turkey’s political discourse, as the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections draw near. In January 2022, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu addressed a letter to young Turkish citizens, pledging that the political bloc he heads would lead to real climate change and “work to save the ecological future of Turkey and the world.”

At the same time, Erdogan is trying to rebrand himself from a leader criticized for ignoring the climate issue, into a leader of innovative national environmental programs who urges the international community to take better action. The approaching elections are likely to heighten his interest in developing climate-oriented cooperation with other countries, including Israel.

President Herzog’s vision of inclusive regional cooperation to tackle climate change raised interest in Turkey. This is partly because Turkey is not a member of the current Mediterranean frameworks in which Israel participates, e.g. the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the Cypriot governmental initiative to coordinate climate change activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Turkey feels that these initiatives isolate it in the region and that they do not have a real interest in its inclusion. A new Cypriot proposal to establish a regional framework to deal with summer wildfires has also been recently presented to Greece and Israel, but not to Turkey.

Israel’s climate developments

IN ISRAEL, there has been a recent discussion of turning the EMGF into a forum dealing with renewable energies, or energy in general, and not only natural gas. This is a result of difficulties in profitable cooperation in the natural gas field and the increased importance of renewable energies. Each EMGF member has veto power over adding new members or observers. For example, the Palestinian Authority has torpedoed the UAE’s request to be accepted as an observer in the forum.

Turkey does not believe Greece and Cyprus would accept its membership. To a lesser extent, there is a similar Turkish perception about Egypt. Even if the Hellenic states were willing to include Turkey, Turkey would likely demand representation for Turkish Cypriots as well, a condition that Cyprus and Greece are not expected to accept.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of upgrading the EMGF into an inclusive regional framework also dedicated to environmental issues does not seem feasible at this stage. The establishment of a new forum, built from its onset as a partnership among all countries of the region, stands a better chance of success since it would not be perceived as directed against any regional actor.

This could enable Turkey, Cyprus and Greece a measure of political flexibility, as has been the case with other regional frameworks that they joined upon establishment, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

Such a move could be jump-started with an Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian meeting on environmental and climate issues. This would have been considered impossible until recently, but it now appears more feasible given the cautious attempts by Egypt and Turkey to improve their relations. Israel can play a role in promoting such a meeting, albeit initially on an informal level, with a focus on promoting regional dialogue ahead of COP27 scheduled for late 2022 in Egypt.

Another new opportunity for regional cooperation on climate change issues is the parallel warming of relations between Israel and Turkey, and Turkey and the UAE. From an economic point of view, trilateral projects are already reportedly being discussed, and an Israeli-Turkish-Emirati summit on environmental and climate issues can also be advanced. In this case, there is less sensitivity than there is with Egypt – especially in light of Erdogan’s successful visit to the Emirates – and a gathering of officials from the three countries should be possible early on in the process.

Including the Palestinians

IT IS IMPORTANT to include the Palestinian issue in any discussion of regional cooperation on climate and the environment. The Palestinian issue is important to Turkey, and as part of warming relations with Israel, Turkey has an interest in finding new ways to help the Palestinians and advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Cavusoglu clearly stated that during his press conference with Foreign Minister Lapid, and that environmental issues could be part of a positive agenda that serves the interests of all parties.

In addition to the regional aspect, Israel and Turkey should launch bilateral cooperation on climate change, which could include a regular ministerial-level annual meeting – alternating between Israel and Turkey; ongoing contact between relevant professionals in government ministries, exchange of knowledge, coordination and joint work; mutual assistance in the event of exceptional climate events (fires, flooding, etc.) and the launch of a climate hotline; support for civil society organizations from both countries that are interested in environmental projects and joint action; and encouraging academic cooperation in the fields of environment and sustainability, which will include conferences, research as well as faculty and student exchanges.

Climate change is already reshaping the international system, creating common interests and fostering cooperation between countries that used to be at odds. Israel-Turkey relations stand to benefit from this trend. Tackling climate change can become a central pillar in the new chapter in relations, bringing benefits not only to the citizens of both countries, but potentially also to the region as a whole.

This article is from “JPost“, from June 27, 2022

הפוסט Israel and Turkey must cooperate on climate change- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming of relations is expected to boost existing fields of cooperation (such as trade and tourism) and de-freeze those that were put on hold during years of tensions (such as the strategic dialogue on regional affairs). At the same time, it also creates an opportunity to launch new initiatives on issues that are relevant to current realities and needs. Climate change stands the on the top of this list. It is an issue of growing centrality both in Turkey and Israel, in which there is untapped potential for joint endeavors to take shape. For example, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Israeli embassy in Ankara, Irit Lillian, recently told Turkish media that cooperation in the field of sustainability could improve economic and trade ties between the two countries.

Climate change in Turkey: from neglect to hot topic

Climate change has already been taking a toll in Turkey, with fires, droughts, flooding and pollution in the Marmara Sea. More extreme climate events are expected in the coming decades alongside the intensification of current trends: warming, dehydration, damage to water sources, and rising sea levels.

However, until recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not convey a sense of urgency regarding climate change. Among other things, he promoted the Istanbul Canal project, which is claimed to have negative environmental consequences, and was absent from the COP26 conference in Glasgow. However, Erdoğan devoted much of his 2021 speech to the UN General Assembly to climate change, calling for vigorous international action and emphasizing Turkey’s commitment to the issue.

In October 2021, Turkey ratified the Paris Convention, becoming the last G-20 country to do so. Since ratification, Turkey has reached an agreement with the World Bank, France and Germany to receive considerable financial assistance that will help it meet its treaty obligations. The country plans to reduce emissions by 21 percent by 2030 and reach zero emissions by 2053. With the support of the EU, a network of municipalities is operating in Turkey to deal with climate change. In late 2021, Turkey adopted a program called the “Green Development Revolution”. And in February 2022, a climate council was established, holding its first meeting in Konya, with government support and participation of representatives from all over the country.

Climate change is likely to assume a more central role in Turkey’s political discourse, as the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections draw near. This because of the increased global spotlight on the issue, effects of climate change that are already felt in Turkey, the opposition’s criticism of Erdoğan’s handling of the issue, and his renewed focus and calls for action. In January 2022, opposition leader KemalKılıçdaroğlu addressed a letter to young Turkish citizens, pledging that the political bloc he heads would lead to real climate change and “work to save the ecological future of Turkey and the world.”

At the same time, Erdoğan is trying to rebrand himself from a leader criticized for ignoring the climate issue into a leader of innovative national environmental programs who urges the international community to act in a more just and effective manner. The approaching elections are likely to heighten his interest in developing climate-oriented cooperation with other countries, including Israel.

A dedicated bill and a special envoy: Israel wakes up to the call

In Israel, climate change is gradually becoming a high-priority issue. In recent years, civil society organizations were the ones taking a lead in educating the public, advancing policies and advocating for change. Governments were lagging, as was clearly spelled out in an October 2021 report by the State Comptroller on “National Climate Action by the Government of Israel”, which concluded that “Israel has yet to make the necessary perceptual shift to effectively deal with climate change”.

However, since taking office in June 2021, the current government has made several resolutions related to climate change and has set targets and actions for implementation. In May 2022, an important milestone was reached, with the approval in the government of a climate bill, championed by Environmental Protection Minister Tamar Zandberg.

Climate change is currently acknowledged in Israel as both a national security threat and an opportunity to develop regional cooperation with Muslim and Arab countries. For example. the security establishment is convening experts to finding paths to best address the climate-related security challenges. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appointed Ambassador Gideon Beharas a Special Envoy for Climate Change and Sustainability, a trilateral Israel-UAE-Jordan deal has been reached on the exchange of water and electricity, and President Isaac Herzog has established – shortly after being elected – the Israeli Climate Forum, which brings together all leading experts from multiple sectors to develop and advance joint initiatives and recommendations.

A foot into regional partnerships (ousted by old enmities)

President Herzog’s vision of a “renewed Middle East”, the activities of his Climate Forum, and his remarks – prior to visiting Ankara – about the need for a regional partnership to deal with climate change, are of interest to Turkey. This is partly since Turkey is not a member of the current regional frameworks in which Israel participates in the Mediterranean, e.g. the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the Cypriot governmental initiative to coordinate climate change activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey feels that these initiatives isolate it in the region and that they do not have real interest in its inclusion. A new Cypriot proposal to establish a regional framework to deal with summer wildfires has also been recently presented to Greece and Israel, but not to Turkey.

In Israel, there has been recent discussion of turning the EMGF into a forum dealing with renewable energies, or energy in general, and not only natural gas. This is a result of difficulties in profitable cooperation in the natural gas field and the increased importance of renewable energies. So far, the EMGF has yielded policy benefits for its member states and facilitated cooperation among them, but it has not yielded significant fruits regarding its original purpose – maximizing the profits of natural gas discoveries.

Each EMGF member has veto power over adding new members or observers. For example, the Palestinian Authority has torpedoed the United Arab Emirates’s request to be accepted as an observer in the forum. Turkey does not believe Greece and Cyprus would accept its membership. To a lesser extent, there is a similar Turkish perception about Egypt. Even if the Hellenic states were willing to include Turkey, Turkey would likely demand representation for Turkish-Cypriots as well, a condition that Cyprus and Greece are not expected to accept.

Out with the old, in with the new

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of upgrading the EMGF into an inclusive regional framework also dedicated to environmental issues does not seem feasible at this stage. Establishment of a new forum, built from its onset as a partnership among all countries of the region, stands a better chance of success since it would not be perceived as directed against any regional actor. This could enable Turkey, Cyprus and Greece a measure of political flexibility, as has been the case with other regional frameworks that they joined upon establishment, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

Such a move could be jump started with an Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian meeting on environmental and climate issues. This would have been considered impossible until recently, but it now appears more feasible given the cautious attempts by Egypt and Turkey to improve their relations. Israel can play a role in promoting such a meeting, albeit initially on an informal level, with a focus on promoting regional dialogue ahead of COP27 scheduled for late 2022 in Egypt.

Another new opportunity for regional cooperation on climate change issues is the parallel warming of relations between Israel and Turkey and Turkey and the UAE. From an economic point of view, trilateral projects are already reportedly being discussed, and an Israeli-Turkish-Emirati summit on environmental and climate issues can also be advanced. In this case, there is less sensitivity than there is with Egypt – especially in light of Erdoğan’s successful visit to the Emirates – and a gathering of officials from the three countries should be possible early on in the process.

It is important to include the Palestinian issue in any discussion of regional cooperation on climate and the environment. The Palestinian issue is important to Turkey, and, as part of warming relations with Israel, the country has an interest in finding new ways to help the Palestinians and advance Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Çavuşoğlu clearly stated that during his press conference with Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid, and environmental issues could be part of a positive agenda that serves the interests of all parties. Pro-peace Israeli ministers and MKs consider climate change as an important topic for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, as was evident by Minister Zandberg’s meeting with her Palestinian counterpart in Ramallah, and by a special conference convened in the Knesset by MK Emilie Moatti.

Trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Turkish cooperation on climate change can be encouraged, with the first step being a meeting of the three relevant ministers.

Bilateral to-do list

In addition to the regional aspects, Israel and Turkey should launch bilateral cooperation on climate change, which could include:

1) Convening a regular government-to-government annual meeting for strategic dialogue on climate and energy issues – alternating between Israel and Turkey.

2) Establishing a direct channel between Turkey’s Chief Climate Negotiator and Israel’s Special Envoy for Climate Change and Sustainability and developing ongoing contact between relevant professionals in government ministries, exchange of knowledge, coordination and joint work.

3) Providing mutual assistance in the event of exceptional climate events (fires, flooding, etc.) and the launch of a climate hotline, preferably with participation of other Mediterranean countries. In the past, private entrepreneurs were the ones enabling cooperation on such issues, but with the warming of relations – the state apparatus should be the one taking the lead.

4) Linking Turkey’s Climate Council and the Israeli Climate Forum, in a way that enables joint events, initiatives, deliberations and sharing best practices. Leaders of the two entities can meet on a regular semi-annual basis, and a webinar for all participants could be organized, for mutual acquaintance, to learn about official and unofficial efforts conducted within each country to tackle climate change, and to discuss together pressing climate issues in the lead-up to COP27.

5) Creating a joint platform for civil society organizations from both countries that are interested in environmental projects and tackling climate change, possibly under the umbrella of the Turkish-Israeli Civil Society Forum.

6) Encouraging Israeli and Turkish companies to cooperate on climate-related CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) and ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) criteria, under the possible umbrella of the Israel-Turkey Business Council.

(7) Encouraging academic cooperation in the fields of environment and sustainability, which will include conferences, research as well as faculty and student exchanges. This could be done through the signing of Memorandum of Understandings between universities, exchange of students and staff via the EU’s Erasmus+ higher education mobility program, joint research projects through the Horizon Europe research and innovation program.

Climate change is already reshaping the international system, creating common interests, and fostering cooperation between countries that used to be at odds. Israel-Turkey relations stand to benefit from this trend. Tackling climate change can become a central pillar in a new chapter of relations, bringing benefits not only to the citizens of both countries, but potentially also to the region as a whole.

This article is from “ISPI“, from June 23, 2022

הפוסט Climate change can help bring Israel and Turkey closer הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Cavusoglu, who is expected to be accompanied by energy minister Fatih Donmez, is scheduled to meet his counterpart Yair Lapid on Wednesday, a day after holding talks with Palestinian officials.

Energy sector cooperation is expected to top the agenda, with Ankara expressing its willingness for a partnership between Israel and Turkey in a project that could carry Israeli natural gas to Turkey, and then potentially on to Europe.

But a wider issue is also expected to be discussed –  the re-establishment of diplomatic ties at the ambassador level, after Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador in 2018, following the Israeli killing of almost 60 Palestinians in protests against the opening of a United States embassy to Israel in Jerusalem.

That was the culmination of a continuing period of poor relations, which had been difficult since the late 2000s. The two countries traded frequent accusations over Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and treatment of Palestinians, as well as Ankara’s support for Hamas, which governs the blockaded Gaza Strip.

They have also disagreed over various other regional issues, such as the 2013 coup in Egypt, the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, the 2019 withdrawal of US troops from Syria and Turkey’s military operations in the same country.

Yet it appears as if the two sides are willing to overlook this. In March, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, who predominantly holds a ceremonial position, made a landmark visit to the Turkish capital, Ankara – the first such visit since Shimon Peres’ trip in 2007.

Herzog and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan both said they wanted to normalise ties, with Erdogan also stressing the importance of energy cooperation between the governments going forward.

Phone conversations and letters between the two leaders have followed since, despite Erdogan’s often forthright public condemnation of Israeli actions against the Palestinians.

Taha Ozhan, the former chairman of the Turkish parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said that Turkey and Israel’s current goal is to establish efficient diplomatic ties again and see if it is possible to work together in certain areas thereafter.

“Turkey and Israel are aware that there is a need for them to talk to each other over regional issues, from Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean to issues related to the Arabian Gulf,” Ozhan, who is also an academic at the Ankara Institute, told Al Jazeera.

“However, much more time is needed for them to establish trust and work together in foreign policy areas, amid so many disagreements and considering the situation of Palestinians is only getting worse,” Ozhan said.

He added: “Restoring diplomatic relations might be an initial step for more dialogue and eventually lead to establishment of a positive policy agenda and deeper ties. No one should expect a shortcut to normalisation … especially during the election year in Turkey.”

Potential energy cooperation

Turkey’s desire to acquire Israeli natural gas was apparent in statements coming from Ankara even before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, a country both Turkey and Europe heavily rely on in terms of energy.

“We can use Israeli natural gas in our country, and beyond using it, we can also engage in a joint effort on its passage to Europe,” Erdogan said in February.

In another statement in March, he said “one of the most important steps we can take together for bilateral ties, I believe, would be natural gas,” adding that Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, whose government holds executive power in Israel, could visit Turkey as part of the process.

Erdogan and Bennett talked on the phone last November in the first such call in years.

According to Galip Dalay, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House in Britain, cooperation among other Eastern Mediterranean countries, namely Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, has motivated Ankara to fix its ties with the latter two.

“Turkey does not want countries around it to align themselves with Greece and Cyprus because of their own disputes or frustrations with Turkey. This seems to be why Ankara is reaching out to Egypt, Israel and even to the United Arab Emirates to fix strained relations,” he said.

“The reason for the cooperation among these governments, which puts Turkey in a lonely position, is not the conversion of their interests, but their anti-Turkey positions,” he told Al Jazeera.

But even if Turkey and Israel’s positions do become closer, it does not mean that a deal is around the corner, nor that Tel Aviv will abandon Greece and Cyprus.

Nimrod Goren, the chairman of the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, told Al Jazeera that cooperation over a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Israel is still not likely any time soon.

“Energy cooperation with Turkey is important for Israel and has much potential, but it does not need to be on the natural gas front,” Goren said.

“Israel has other regional partners in natural gas, such as Greece, Cyprus and Egypt,” he said, adding that Israel would be more comfortable cooperating in other areas with Ankara, such as renewable energy.

East Mediterranean rivalry

Turkey and the breakaway self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognised only by Ankara since 1983, have been at odds with European Union members Greece and Cyprus over energy resources and jurisdiction in the waters in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The internationally recognised government of Cyprus has signed exclusive economic zone agreements with Egypt and Israel and handed hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licences to international companies since the 2000s.

In response, Turkey signed similar agreements with the TRNC and Libya in 2011 and 2019 respectively.

Turkish and Greek vessels have explored for hydrocarbons in the disputed waters between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus over the last few years, leading to increased tensions between Athens and Ankara.

Stormy relations

Taha Ozhan said that economic and trade relations between Israel and Turkey have historically carried on, despite the political problems that have existed.

“Both countries have been rational on the matter of the economy in the past. Energy ties should be evaluated in this context,” he said, adding that a wider deal in the Eastern Mediterranean would create benefits for the whole region.

Goren agrees that the Israeli and Turkish governments have been able to protect their diplomatic ties, and that, despite the tensions over the years, trade and tourism between the two countries were still at high levels.

“These [trade and tourism] are all far from the potential they can reach and fulfilling that potential can be achieved through moving to the ambassador level,” he said.

“The Palestinian-Israeli issue has always been the stumbling block impacting the level of Israeli-Turkish relations, but the sides should discuss how to contain their differences when dealing with each other,” Goren added.

Ties between Turkey and Israel have been shaky since the 2008-2009 Gaza War and the death of 10 civilians in an Israeli raid on the Turkish Mavi Marmara ship, part of a flotilla trying to breach the blockade on Gaza by carrying aid into the territory in 2010.

After years of frozen ties, a 2016 reconciliation agreement saw the return of ambassadors, but it collapsed in the wake of the Israeli response to the 2018-2019 border protests in Gaza, in which more than 200 Palestinians were killed.

Turkey recalled its diplomats and ordered Israel’s envoy out of the country in 2018, as bilateral relations hit another low.

This article is from “Al Jazeera“, from May 24, 2022

הפוסט Turkey FM visit to Israel a sign relations are warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Erdogan has clearly expressed his country’s interest in natural gas imports from Israel, most recently at a March 9 news conference, alongside visiting Israeli President Herzog. Both sides understand full-well the two intertwined aspects of the energy issue: economic-energetic and diplomatic-strategic.

In terms of energy, Turkey’s desire for imported Israeli gas is completely understandable. Turkey imports most of its energy needs – from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and elsewhere. Generally, about half or more of its energy imports originate in Russia and its desire to diversify its supply sources is understandable. This is particularly germane given the war in Ukraine and the West’s efforts to wean itself from dependence on the Russian energy market.

Turkey seeks to preserve and improve its global positioning by bolstering its standing as a key passageway for energy transport in a shifting geopolitical reality. The natural gas discovered in Israeli EEZ offers a clear energy resource, especially given its location almost next door. The limited economic profitability that undermined previous negotiations on gas purchases from Israel could change, given the newly emerging circumstances.

Both sides realize the diplomatic aspect, as mentioned, is an inseparable part of the economic-energetic one. Israel and other actors in the region took advantage of the prolonged chill in relations with Turkey to consolidate a rather impressive regional architecture, which in essence excluded Turkey from the regional game. Ankara only realized this belatedly and embarked on largely successful intensive diplomatic efforts to improve ties with a series of regional players – Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Its goal is to reclaim its previous central position in the region and enhance (once again) it standing on the two core issues of Turkish national interest: their relationship with Greece with its myriad disputes, and the Cypriot problem.

The regional structures built in recent years – trilateral cooperation between Israel and the Hellenic states, and between Israel and Egypt, within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – have weakened Turkey’s negotiating hand and undermined its regional standing, thwarting its ambition to expand its influence. Nonetheless, Turkey remains a significant regional player, and ignoring it does not bode well for the area’s stability.

Its importance has been highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the West, particularly the US, have recognized this. At the same time, Israel has made it clear that efforts to improve ties with Turkey would not be made at the expense of the close relationships it has built in recent years with Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Israeli gas exports thus clash with this stance, at least right now.

HOW, THEN, can this circle be squared in order to move ahead on both aspects of the Israel-Turkey relationship? Following is a package of proposed measures designed to provide momentum and a diplomatic-energetic horizon toward which both sides can proceed.

Clarification of national interests

Each side must lay out its clear interests in a frank, in-depth manner. Israel aspires to move ahead with its relations with Turkey, albeit not at the expense of its strategic relationship with its regional allies – Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Gas exports to Turkey in the immediate term are not possible (without a shift or progress on the two key disputed issues mentioned above). The reason is fairly clear: The possible routes for shipping gas from Israel to Turkey traverse Cypriot economic waters and Israel would be unwilling at this point to damage the close relationship forged with its neighbor (and within the trilateral Hellenic alliance).

The second possible route goes through the economic water of Lebanon and Syria, and is a non-starter in any case. The renewal of a diplomatic-strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey is in its infancy, and the disagreements and mistrust cannot be overcome overnight. Turkey strives to integrate into the regional architecture shaped in recent years in a position worthy of its stature. Gas exports from Israel are therefore vital for Turkey, both in energetic and diplomatic terms.

Finding a formula for Turkey’s integration into the regional architecture: Substantial progress in Turkey’s relations with its neighbors obviously cannot be expected at this stage, especially not prior to next year’s elections in Turkey (and Cyprus). At the same time, Turkey’s exclusion from the regional gas forum, a framework that clearly illustrates the new regional architecture, cannot continue. Some sort of formula is required signaling the start of a course correction. To that end, a bilateral mechanism pointing to the direction of relations down the line would be advisable.

This would consist of a series of high-level diplomatic dialogues between Turkey and the states with which it is engaged in smile diplomacy, meaning, Israel, Egypt and Greece (and Cyprus in a more indirect way). Its goal (and branding) would be to examine the most effective way to integrate Turkey into regional activity in a manner serving both Turkey and the region. The desired goal: a serious diplomatic-political dialogue designed to identify practical ways to reverse Turkey’s exclusion from regional activity. Israel could play a key role in advancing such dialogue.

The establishment of an Israeli-Turkish working team in the energy field: The work of such a team should focus on two issues. The first is the question of future Israeli natural gas exports to Turkey. Practical questions must be discussed pending policy circumstances that will enable such exports – what quantities can be expected, how they will be conveyed (pipeline, shipping, liquefaction facilities), their price level, etc.

The second issue with which the team should deal is possible renewable energy cooperation in the immediate-to-near term. The demand for natural gas is high and understandable, but this does not eliminate the green agenda, certainly that of consumers in Europe. As a rule, regional cooperation in the field of renewable energy is perceived as softer, attractive and even practical, in a way that does not require far-reaching understandings (and conditions) at this early stage of the relationship improvement process.

The establishment of a trilateral Israeli, Turkish and European energy working group: Such trilateral dialogue would connect the European Union to the Israeli-Turkish discourse, illustrating Turkey’s central role in the European, energy and diplomatic-political agenda. After all, the EU is the most important player, alongside Washington (and perhaps even more so) vis-a-vis Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean in general.

Ultimately, this is the beginning of a process, albeit challenging and complex, and both sides should be warned that these are not developments and agreements that can be reached immediately. At the same time, it is essential to adopt a work plan adapted to the political reality and political schedule of the relevant players – a plan serving as an engine for combined political and energy momentum.

This article is from “JPost“, from May 23, 2022

הפוסט Turkish FM’s visit to Israel is a chance to unify politics- energy momentum – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The most ambitious structure is, of course, the Regional Gas Forum, which was founded in January 2019 with 8 members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, Italy, Palestine, and France, and two observers – the European Union and the United States. Lebanon was invited to take part in the creative project, but Israeli membership and the complex internal-external arena in Lebanon prevented the move, that was quite clear that the Lebanese had a genuine interest in. Truth be told, the player who was absent from this political-strategic process – Turkey – was, to a considerable extent, the “glue” that helped formulate this impressive architecture. Moreover, its uniqueness stems perhaps from two main aspects: one, pertains to substantial encounters of interests, identified between most of these actors; and the second, it is a regional framework that the initiative to establish was from the region and without linkage to any conflict, with an emphasis of course on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Now, at the beginning of 2022, the East Mediterranean is facing an improved base, with proven potential for cooperation, but at the same time is facing a double challenge: how to deepen cooperation between its members; and how to produce an open and positive dialogue with the missing player – Turkey. Initially, it seems an impossible task, especially given the fact that the Turkish policy in recent years is seen as provocative by most (if not all) other players in the region. On the other hand, it is now clearer for Turkey and its adversaries, that an intensive and creative effort needs to be made to create a mechanism or some framework, that will allow for a political-strategic dialogue contributing to stability in the region. Turkey has felt uneasy and resentful, in the face of its exclusion from regional frameworks, and in recent months has tried to improve its relations with few countries in the region – Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The difficulties at home, in the economic and political arena, play a significant role.

So, is it possible to find meeting points that will enable for a comprehensive process in the East Mediterranean, despite the deep disagreements between many actors? Clearly, this is a challenging task, one that may have been doomed to failure from the beginning. However, in view of the danger of escalation and miscalculation, in a region prone for that, it is necessary to try producing a political discourse that will help the dynamics that have already been cast in the region.

First, we should have in mind four main insights:

Many countries in the region have rightly recognized the promising potential that developments in the region have created and managed to produce close relationships. These now seem obvious, but this was not the case a decade ago. The Israeli – Greek – Cypriot Triangle is a clear example of identifying correctly the common interests arise, adopting the necessary policy to build a solid and close trust, and deepen their bilateral and as well trilateral relations. Similar process was taken between Israel and Egypt, bilaterally and regionally.

The regional process, described above, was largely led by the countries of the region themselves, in a way that showcased the potential and significance of the region for the International Arena.

The Abraham Accords have created a potential common denominator between (some) of the Gulf states and those of the eastern part of the Middle East. Although it is too early to judge whether it will be possible to find practical meetings of interests that will strengthen the cooperation between the two sub-regions, it seems that the potential exists. The arithmetic political framework in the East Med may be adopted to some extent: how about an Israeli – Emirati – Turkish triangle, not overriding bilateral channels, trying to build trust and identify common spheres for cooperation.

The discoveries of natural gas were a catalyst for the collaborations created but could equally drag the area into an escalating tension. However, what turns out, at least for the time being, is that the potential for energy cooperation is mostly regional. This can, albeit with immense difficulties, produce interesting interface points. Not to mention the great potential for cooperation on renewable, much needed field for creative and practical solutions, and less contentious.

Beyond that, it is worth adopting two main principles, which will help create an improved understanding:

The rules of international law as a main principle that should dictate the moves of all players in the region. A major point of contention between Turkey and all other players concerns the principles adopted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This will not be easily resolved of course. However, Israel, for example, is not a party to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but it agrees with its provisions and follows them, and was able to reach to agreements with its neighbors (though not yet with Lebanon) regarding their economic zones. In other words: even if it is (very) difficult to bridge the disputes in the region in this context, interim agreements, or informal understandings, should be found considering the overriding principle of respecting international law.

There is no a zero-sum game when it comes to relations between the countries of the region. Naturally, disagreements will remain in place at present stage, and meetings of strategic interests will also remain between some, or most, of the players in the region. This does not mean that one relationship should be conditioned, practically or rhetorically, on another. Israel has already made it clear that improving the political dialogue with Ankara will not come at the expense of the extremely close relationship and trust achieved with Greece and Cyprus. This will require considerable political maneuverability, but it is possible and achievable.  The key insight that emerges from the experience of the last decade in the Eastern Mediterranean is fascinating and challenging; it has been shown that countries in such a complex and multi-conflict region have been able to identify a strategic window of opportunity, overcome disputes and mistrust, and establish a promising regional framework, which is indeed at the beginning of its path. This challenge continues to be at their doorstep, creating a constructive discourse that develops paths for understandings and collaborations, even if not necessarily accompanied by the guise of a ” love affair.”

The op-ed was published in Turkish Policy in February 2022.

הפוסט Regional Architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean: Challenges and Opportunities at the Current Crossroads הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.