In previous instances, similar developments have led to harsh rhetoric and criticism of Israel by Erdogan, and to a de facto downgrade of ties but this time – things kept on moving forward, albeit at a slower pace than under Israel’s previous government.

Maintaining this will be a key objective of both countries in the coming months. But, their goal should be to look beyond a more-of-the-same approach, and seek new advances by involving new societal sectors, setting up cooperative endeavors in new fields, and leveraging positive geopolitical developments. This, while acknowledging that relations between the states are not limited to those between heads-of-state and governments. There is also much space for others in Israel and Turkey, who share different sets of values than their leaders, to find common ground and work together.

First and foremost, Israel and Turkey should increase the scope of their bilateral ministerial meetings, which have not taken place often during the last six months. Beyond meetings and photo-ops, it will be crucial to ensure that sustained working relations are set between the professional levels at relevant ministries – especially those dealing with foreign affairs, energy, economy, environment and defense.

Climate change is important to Israel, but less for Turkey

Of special importance is the issue of climate change, which is central in Israel’s regional ties, but around which only limited cooperation with Turkey exists. It is an issue that is of utmost importance to President Isaac Herzog, who set up the Israeli Climate Forum and who is advocating an inclusive regional approach toward a “Renewable Middle East.” The trust established between Herzog and Erdogan in recent years should be utilized to ensure the sustainability of Israel-Turkey ties, even should political conditions create renewed tensions, and climate change is an agenda item through which this could be done.

Relations could also be improved in terms of parliamentary cooperation – whether through direct engagement between the speakers of parliament (as has recently happened between Israel and Morocco), through the exchange of parliamentary delegations, or via cooperation between sister parties (including via multilateral groupings such as the Socialist International). The fact that Turkey’s former ambassador to Israel Namik Tan has recently been voted into parliament, can give a boost to parliamentary cooperation.

WHILE THE Israeli and Turkish political leaderships, diplomatic echelons and private sectors are already cooperating rather well, an emphasis should be put on enhancing civil society cooperation, which is still lagging. The Turkish-Israeli Civil Society Forum, which managed to create and maintain NGO ties during the years of bilateral political crisis, can be a central pillar of this. It should now be empowered as a focal point for non-governmental cooperation. A specific emphasis should be placed on academic cooperation, enhancing exchange of students and faculty – whether through relevant EU programs (such as Erasmus+), bilateral agreements between universities, and governmental investment (such as was done in the past with the Süleyman Demirel Program for Contemporary Turkish Studies at Tel Aviv University).

On the domestic fronts, as pro-democrats in both Turkey and Israel are stepping up their efforts to safeguard their democracy, there is much room for bilateral exchanges between them, on best practices and lessons learned. This type of cooperation has increased in recent months, with Turkish and Israel experts sharing insights and recommendations with audiences in each other’s countries.

It may grow in importance in the coming months, as municipal elections in both countries approach (October 2023 in Israel, and March 2024 in Turkey). They are seen as significant political tests for those committed to liberal democracy and can create a new space for exchange of expertise and new collaborations between pro-democracy candidates and mayors.

Developments in the region and their importance

Regional developments are also creating new opportunities for innovative Israel-Turkey cooperation. Turkey is stepping up its rapprochement with Arab countries with which Israel already has good relations. Just after the Turkish election, further progress was evident in Egypt-Turkey rapprochement as well as in UAE-Turkey ties.

As these relations continue to improve, new tripartite and minilateral modalities of cooperation – also involving Israel – could be envisioned, on issues such as energy, water, security, climate change, conflict resolution, and improving the situation in Gaza. This can also enable more inclusivity in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the convening of a regional conference (an idea promoted by the EU, but which has not yet happened also due to Egypt-Turkey tensions) and Turkish involvement (even if short of membership) in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Turkey and Israel relations should also focus on improving Israeli-Palestinian ties and advancing peacebuilding. The issues of Gaza and Jerusalem caused tensions between the countries in the past, and this can happen again – especially if the extremist nature of Israel’s current government leads to another flare-up.

In the absence of dramatic escalation, Turkey and Israel should aim – as part of their strategic dialogue – to identify concrete contributions that Turkey can make to improve the situation. This can include the establishment by Turkey and other international actors a dialogue house on the seamline in Jerusalem, which will enable pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians a safe and convenient space to convene and advance joint civil society endeavors. Turkey is relevant to this as it has already set up a cultural center in Jerusalem, and can also share lessons learned from the Home of Cooperation established in the buffer zone in Cyprus to improve ties between the Turkish and Greek communities there.

Turkey-Israel relations might face renewed challenges in the near future given the deep ideological differences between their leaderships on the Palestinian issue. In the meantime, both countries can benefit from advancing shared bilateral and regional interests, that will broaden Israel-Turkey ties and assist in preventing another crisis if and when political tensions increase. In parallel, Israelis and Turks who hold beliefs and ideologies that differ from their leaders, should utilize the improved official ties to step up their value-based cooperation, and enhance bilateral and international liberal partnerships

The article was published on “The Jerusalem Post“, on June 18th.

הפוסט Advancing Israel-Turkey relations, new regional cooperation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A month has passed and, for the first time since 2008, a Turkish leader and an Israeli prime minister are expected to meet today, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. This is a diplomatic success story uncommon in the conflict-ridden Mediterranean. Examining the key factors that enabled the gradual transformation of Israeli-Turkish relations in 2021 and 2022 could help other countries in the region that are seeking to improve ties achieve this goal.

The opening conditions were difficult, with tensions being the norm in relations over the last decade. Starting with Israel’s Cast Lead operation in Gaza in 2008 and continuing with the Davos and Mavi Marmara flotilla incidents in 2009 and 2010 respectively, relations were mostly in crisis mode. The failure of a reconciliation agreement reached in 2016 within only two years of its signing intensified this. It also led to increased skepticism in both countries as to whether long-lasting reconciliation was attainable and whether the other side was trustworthy and serious in its intentions.

Tensions between Israel and Türkiye, initially based on deep differences regarding the Palestinian issue (mostly related to Hamas, Gaza, and Jerusalem), became further fueled by more recent geopolitical divergences. Israel developed meaningful relationships with countries that Türkiye was at odds with—Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and the United Arab Emirates—while Türkiye built economic cooperation with Iran and engaged in talks with it and Russia regarding Syria. Each country regarded the other as part of a rival regional camp, sometimes in an exaggerated manner due to an insufficient understanding of each other’s interests. The ongoing tensions and harsh rhetoric generated negative mutual perceptions, lack of trust, and a disconnect between the Israeli and Turkish leaderships.

Nevertheless, relations were sustained, albeit on a limited scale and via relatively low-level engagement. For several years, there was no sense of urgency to change this; the status quo seemed to work and to address sufficiently the needs of both countries. Bilateral trade even reached new heights during this period. There was little public pressure in Israel or Türkiye to normalize ties and almost no champions for doing so within their respective political systems. Finally, there was not much interest among the international community in investing political capital to bring the countries closer together.

Several factors stand out in how Israel and Türkiye managed to overcome this situation and succeeded in opening a new and promising chapter in their relationship. They include the historical resilience of ties, the consistency of Türkiye’s interest in improvement once it decided to advance it, the change of leadership in Israel, the practicing of effective diplomacy, the successful design and implementation of a gradual diplomatic process, the setting of a positive agenda, the restoration of dialogue and trust, some geopolitical convergence, and electoral considerations.

A Multifaceted Enabling Context

Israel and Türkiye have enjoyed diplomatic relations since 1949. Although occasionally downgraded in response to disputes, these were never cut off. Ups and downs were characteristic of the relationship throughout the decades. In 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu set a precedent when they reached an interest-based agreement to repair relations and resolve the flotilla crisis. Türkiye then walked back on reconciliation in 2018, following the relocation of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and multiple Palestinian casualties caused by Israel in protests near the Gaza Strip border.

The historical resilience of relations provided a supportive framing for yet another reconciliation process to be launched, however. And, in parallel, unofficial connections—through nongovernmental organizations, academia, business, and cultural actors—helped maintain ties even in difficult years and repeatedly helped to bounce back from crises.

The consistency of Turkish interest in improving ties—which started in December 2020 when Erdoğan publicly spoke in favor of better relations with Israel, while still criticizing Israeli policies toward the Palestinians—was an important factor. Although its initial signals about wanting warmer ties were taken with a grain of salt and largely disregarded in Israel, Türkiye continued to convey this message. It also accepted the slow pace of progress, which was what Israel’s government wanted, and it found ways to respond to Israeli-Palestinian tensions in Jerusalem and to the escalation in Gaza without damaging the prospects for reconciliation. This helped convince skeptics in Israel that it was worth exploring whether normalization was feasible.

The change of leadership and the formation of a new government in Israel in June 2021 provided a game-changing opportunity. The new government did not start off as a friend of Türkiye. Most of its senior members were critical of the country and of Netanyahu’s 2016 agreement with Erdoğan, and they did not place reconciliation on their agenda. Nevertheless, Netanyahu’s ousting shook things up and provided an opportunity to seek a fresh start.

The election of Isaac Herzog as president of Israel in 2021, in parallel to the formation of the new government, was a major turning point. His positive approach toward Türkiye (including a family-related angle), diplomatic skills, support for regional cooperation, and constructive rhetoric were key factors. He received backing from the government to test the waters with Türkiye, and his successful efforts created conditions for reconciliation and persuaded previously skeptical Israeli politicians. Supporters of reconciliation gradually emerged in the public sphere, filling the previous void.

Beyond political leadership, professional and effective diplomacy were major factors in bringing success. Diplomacy is about building relations and finding common ground, even in times of tensions and crises. Career diplomats from both countries exemplified optimism and determination as they quietly improved the situation and dismantled obstacles. The empowerment of Israel’s foreign service under the new government enabled skilled diplomats to take a lead and make a more significant impact than they could have under Netanyahu, who deliberately weakened the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his terms as prime minister.

A slow, gradual, and careful process of reconciliation was designed and successfully implemented, including a correct sequencing of events and phases. Through the accumulation of small wins, proofs of success, and tangible benefits, the process created momentum. Cooperation was re-energized, security challenges were overcome, differences contained, and positive developments routinized. With a success story apparently in the making, people became motivated to join in, and there was an increase in exchanges and joint endeavors.

Israel and Türkiye decided not to let their differences dictate their relations and to seek cooperation based on a positive bilateral and regional vision. As a positive agenda was set, a more constructive rhetoric became the custom, new narratives were put forth, and sensitivity to each side’s needs was practiced. The process highlighted tangible economic steps and benefits prior to reconciliation, as well as the existence of multiple areas of potential political, security, economic, and civilian cooperation. This helped increase support for the process as it unfolded, making it seem only natural when a decision to de facto upgrade ties was reached in the summer of 2022.

It also led to the restoration of dialogue and trust. Channels of communication between officials and leaders were expanded and diversified, and high-level visits took place with much visibility and positive symbolism. The Israeli public expressed support for improved ties and the overall view in Türkiye regarding the process was positive as well.

Geopolitical trends also played a part. In parallel to their reconciliation process, the two countries were working to improve their other relationships in the region, thus creating a broader context of ending isolation, more regional dialogue, and less conflict. The United States under the Biden administration, while not actively mediating between Israel and Türkiye, encouraged them to reassess and realign their foreign policy in light of regional changes (including the Abraham Accords of 2020), reflecting US interests.

Finally, domestic politics were also a factor, especially regarding the timing of reconciliation. Preparing for a seemingly difficult election cycle in 2023, Erdoğan wanted to present concrete achievements to counter domestic criticism of his policies in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The nearing of elections in Israel, which might put Netanyahu back in power, was another factor. Sealing the deal before domestic politics came in the way, and in a manner enabling Prime Minister Yair Lapid to present another diplomatic success prior to the elections, were also important catalysts for progress.

How to Keep Moving Forward

This unique culmination of factors enabled Israel and Türkiye to do what many doubted they could—start a new chapter in their relationship and reconcile, despite difficult opening conditions and without external mediation. Both countries are doing so while being well aware of their differences on key policy issues. They are also seeking to create a mechanism that will help overcome future obstacles.

Israel and Türkiye should now formalize their reconciliation by quickly finalizing the appointments of ambassadors and consul generals. The ambassadors should prioritize interaction with the two countries’ public via media interviews and in-person engagement with as many sectors of society as possible. In parallel, the two countries should relaunch their strategic dialogue (which did not officially take place during the years of crises), start convening an annual government-to-government consultation, establish friendship groups in both parliaments, devise a joint vision for the future of ties, and orchestrate parallel public events in both countries—with a strong cultural component—to celebrate the new chapter.

Ministers and senior officials from both governments should be encouraged to hold mutual visits, identify potential spheres of cooperation, and sign memoranda of understanding and agreements in order to diversify and expand the fields of cooperation and add new components to relations. Sustainable channels of communication should be established between professional echelons in a variety of ministries, in a way that can be resilient to future changes in political leadership.

The recent agreement on civic aviation, including the resumption of flights by Israeli carriers to and from Türkiye, can further increase the human connection. In that regard, the two sides should cherish the important role that civilian cooperation played in sustaining relations during the years of crisis and should work to elevate such cooperation. For example, they can establish a joint fund to support civil society organizations seeking to advance joint projects. These could include nongovernmental organizations, schools and universities, think tanks, cultural and sports institutions, and more. In addition, an academic exchange program can be established, and both countries can ask the EU to incentivize academic cooperation between themselves as part of the Horizon Europe and Erasmus+ programs.

Finally, the Israeli-Turkish reconciliation should be leveraged to advance regional cooperation and to support conflict resolution. For example, the two countries could seek trilateral cooperation with the United Arab Emirates or convene joint meetings of the existing Israeli-Turkish and Israeli-Palestinian economic committees. Together with additional countries in the Mediterranean, they could also advance a new inclusive regional mechanism to deal with climate change. Israel could support reconciliation between Egypt and Türkiye while Türkiye could seek ways to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. All of this should be done with the goal of transforming the Mediterranean into a region characterized by more cooperation and less conflict.

Sustaining their reconciliation process, injecting more diverse content into it, and finding constructive solutions to policy differences will be the next diplomatic tasks for Israel and Türkiye. But already, the process both countries have undertaken is a meaningful diplomatic success story, which will hopefully inspire others in the Mediterranean to follow their example.

This article is from “GMFUS” from September 20, 2022

הפוסט Israeli-Turkish Reconciliation Is a Rare Success Story of Diplomacy in the Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The summer plot against Israelis in Istanbul was foiled and Turkish authorities detained some suspects in June and July. At the beginning of August, Turkish authorities released rare footage showing the capture of Iranian agents following Israeli tourists in Istanbul, providing more information on Iran’s plans to harm Israeli citizens. Israeli and Turkish media emphasized the mutual struggle of respective security agencies in both countries to stop Iranians from committing terrorist acts against Israeli holidaymakers on Turkish soil.

Such was the background to the visit of Yair Lapid—the soon-to-be prime minister—to Ankara in June. A few months earlier, Israeli President Yitzhak Herzog, who invested considerable effort into reigniting bilateral relations between the two countries, had also paid a visit to the Turkish capital, where he met with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This rapprochement soon culminated in the return of ambassadors and the full restoration of diplomatic ties, ending a long period of tense relations between Ankara and Jerusalem.

Despite the rift that started with the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010—some would say it has brewed since President Erdogan’s rise to power in 2002—Israel and Turkey have maintained economic relations. These ties seem to have a life of their own and have continued to grow despite the hostile political climate and the lack of respective ambassadors. In 2020 alone, Israel exported $1.5 billion worth of goods to Turkey, while Turkish exports reached $4.67 billion. In comparison, Russian exports to Israel amounted to $1 billion in 2020.

Both economies have benefitted from these ties, and there is no doubt that the volume of bilateral trade will continue to grow after the full restoration of diplomatic ties. In the energy sphere, President Erdogan has expressed hopes for Israeli-Turkish cooperation in establishing a pipeline from Europe to stream Israeli gas to Europe. This development can serve both countries—a NATO ally and America’s closest ally in the Middle East—in enhancing their regional and global influence.

In addition to diplomacy, tourism, trade, and energy, there is also a security dimension to restoring Israeli-Turkish relations. For years, Turkey had acted as a patron of Hamas, an Islamist Palestinian movement that took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 and became one of the major political and military forces in the Palestinian territories. Israel had always insisted that Hamas leadership must leave Turkey as a prerequisite for re-establishing relations between the two countries, and that Turkish religious organizations stop meddling in the situation at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

Due to a significant geopolitical shift in the region, with Arab states normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords and promoting relations with its archenemy Greece, Turkey is now realigned with the Gulf countries and has eased tensions with Egypt, causing a decrease in support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, it remains to be seen whether Hamas leadership will soon be looking to relocate elsewhere and stop its malign activity against Israel on Turkish soil.

Another question of grave strategic importance to Israel is how the two countries can cooperate against Iran, which might soon be relieved of some sanctions due to a possible revival of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), thereby enjoying an unprecedented economic and diplomatic renaissance. It is a given that Israel sees Iran as its worst enemy and existential threat, however, Turkey also often finds itself on the opposite side of the Islamic Republic, especially in Syria and Azerbaijan.

Additionally, just like Israel, Turkey is wary of growing Russian-Iranian cooperation and fears the possible weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program if the JCPOA isn’t revived, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

In recent years, Turkey and Iran have increased their economic cooperation. However, even if their economic interests overlap at times, the geopolitical divisions between the countries have grown as well. The recent Iranian terror plot against Israeli citizens is a good example of that; Ankara fumed over the Iranian attempt to compromise its security and harm its diplomatic goals of improving ties with Jerusalem and Washington. Indeed, cooperation with Israel against Iran’s malign regional activities might serve Turkey’s interests in the United States well, increasing synergy between its allies and providing a strong front against Tehran’s regional ambitions.

The change in Turkish policy towards Israel, Hamas, and Iran was seen well during the recent Israeli military operation Breaking Dawn at the beginning of August. Although Ankara had rushed to condemn Israel’s military operation in the Gaza Strip and called for “restraint,” the condemnation itself was significantly more moderate than on previous occasions. And, only a few days after the operation, Ankara and Jerusalem festively restored their ties. This change in attitude might have something to do with the fact that the group targeted in Gaza was not Hamas, but rather the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—a pro-Iranian movement, heavily sponsored by Tehran. The PIJ had verbally attacked Ankara’s restoration of relations with Israel.

It remains to be seen how Israel and Turkey will play the Iranian card in the future, as some regional powers—such as the United Arab Emirates—are looking at diffusing tensions in the Gulf. However, it seems that Ankara and Jerusalem will continue to work jointly to prevent terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens in Turkey, as this threat is still not entirely removed, and explore the possibility of pursuing common goals vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic and its many regional proxies.

This article is from “Atlantic Council“, from September 9, 2022

הפוסט Iran helped Turkey and Israel mend ties. Here’s how. הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The warming of relations is expected to boost existing fields of cooperation (e.g. trade and tourism) and de-freeze fields that were put on hold during years of tensions (e.g. the strategic dialogue on regional affairs). At the same time, it also creates an opportunity to launch new fields of cooperation on issues that are relevant to current realities.

Climate change is the leading field. It is an issue of growing centrality in both Turkey and Israel, in which there is untapped potential for joint endeavors. For example, Israel’s charge d’affaires in Ankara, Irit Lillian, recently told Turkish media that cooperation in the field of sustainability could improve economic and trade ties.

Climate change is already taking a toll in Turkey, with fires, droughts, flooding and pollution in the Marmara Sea. More extreme climate events are expected in the coming decades alongside the intensification of current trends. Until recently, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not convey a sense of urgency regarding climate change. However, in his 2021 speech to the UN General Assembly, Erdogan spoke much about climate change, calling for international action and emphasizing Turkey’s commitment.

In October 2021, Turkey ratified the Paris Convention, becoming the last G-20 country to do so. Turkey plans to reduce emissions by 21 percent by 2030 and reach zero emissions by 2053. With the support of the EU, a network of municipalities is operating in Turkey to deal with climate change. In late 2021, Turkey adopted a program called the “Green Development Revolution,” and in February 2022, a climate council was established in Turkey, with government support and participation of representatives from all over the country.

Climate change is likely to assume a more central role in Turkey’s political discourse, as the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections draw near. In January 2022, opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu addressed a letter to young Turkish citizens, pledging that the political bloc he heads would lead to real climate change and “work to save the ecological future of Turkey and the world.”

At the same time, Erdogan is trying to rebrand himself from a leader criticized for ignoring the climate issue, into a leader of innovative national environmental programs who urges the international community to take better action. The approaching elections are likely to heighten his interest in developing climate-oriented cooperation with other countries, including Israel.

President Herzog’s vision of inclusive regional cooperation to tackle climate change raised interest in Turkey. This is partly because Turkey is not a member of the current Mediterranean frameworks in which Israel participates, e.g. the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) and the Cypriot governmental initiative to coordinate climate change activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Turkey feels that these initiatives isolate it in the region and that they do not have a real interest in its inclusion. A new Cypriot proposal to establish a regional framework to deal with summer wildfires has also been recently presented to Greece and Israel, but not to Turkey.

Israel’s climate developments

IN ISRAEL, there has been a recent discussion of turning the EMGF into a forum dealing with renewable energies, or energy in general, and not only natural gas. This is a result of difficulties in profitable cooperation in the natural gas field and the increased importance of renewable energies. Each EMGF member has veto power over adding new members or observers. For example, the Palestinian Authority has torpedoed the UAE’s request to be accepted as an observer in the forum.

Turkey does not believe Greece and Cyprus would accept its membership. To a lesser extent, there is a similar Turkish perception about Egypt. Even if the Hellenic states were willing to include Turkey, Turkey would likely demand representation for Turkish Cypriots as well, a condition that Cyprus and Greece are not expected to accept.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, the idea of upgrading the EMGF into an inclusive regional framework also dedicated to environmental issues does not seem feasible at this stage. The establishment of a new forum, built from its onset as a partnership among all countries of the region, stands a better chance of success since it would not be perceived as directed against any regional actor.

This could enable Turkey, Cyprus and Greece a measure of political flexibility, as has been the case with other regional frameworks that they joined upon establishment, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

Such a move could be jump-started with an Israeli-Turkish-Egyptian meeting on environmental and climate issues. This would have been considered impossible until recently, but it now appears more feasible given the cautious attempts by Egypt and Turkey to improve their relations. Israel can play a role in promoting such a meeting, albeit initially on an informal level, with a focus on promoting regional dialogue ahead of COP27 scheduled for late 2022 in Egypt.

Another new opportunity for regional cooperation on climate change issues is the parallel warming of relations between Israel and Turkey, and Turkey and the UAE. From an economic point of view, trilateral projects are already reportedly being discussed, and an Israeli-Turkish-Emirati summit on environmental and climate issues can also be advanced. In this case, there is less sensitivity than there is with Egypt – especially in light of Erdogan’s successful visit to the Emirates – and a gathering of officials from the three countries should be possible early on in the process.

Including the Palestinians

IT IS IMPORTANT to include the Palestinian issue in any discussion of regional cooperation on climate and the environment. The Palestinian issue is important to Turkey, and as part of warming relations with Israel, Turkey has an interest in finding new ways to help the Palestinians and advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Cavusoglu clearly stated that during his press conference with Foreign Minister Lapid, and that environmental issues could be part of a positive agenda that serves the interests of all parties.

In addition to the regional aspect, Israel and Turkey should launch bilateral cooperation on climate change, which could include a regular ministerial-level annual meeting – alternating between Israel and Turkey; ongoing contact between relevant professionals in government ministries, exchange of knowledge, coordination and joint work; mutual assistance in the event of exceptional climate events (fires, flooding, etc.) and the launch of a climate hotline; support for civil society organizations from both countries that are interested in environmental projects and joint action; and encouraging academic cooperation in the fields of environment and sustainability, which will include conferences, research as well as faculty and student exchanges.

Climate change is already reshaping the international system, creating common interests and fostering cooperation between countries that used to be at odds. Israel-Turkey relations stand to benefit from this trend. Tackling climate change can become a central pillar in the new chapter in relations, bringing benefits not only to the citizens of both countries, but potentially also to the region as a whole.

The op-ed was published in JPost in June 2022.

הפוסט Israel and Turkey must cooperate on climate change הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

President Erdogan has clearly expressed his country’s interest in natural gas imports from Israel, most recently at a March 9 news conference, alongside visiting Israeli President Herzog. Both sides understand full-well the two intertwined aspects of the energy issue: economic-energetic and diplomatic-strategic.

In terms of energy, Turkey’s desire for imported Israeli gas is completely understandable. Turkey imports most of its energy needs – from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria and elsewhere. Generally, about half or more of its energy imports originate in Russia and its desire to diversify its supply sources is understandable. This is particularly germane given the war in Ukraine and the West’s efforts to wean itself from dependence on the Russian energy market.

Turkey seeks to preserve and improve its global positioning by bolstering its standing as a key passageway for energy transport in a shifting geopolitical reality. The natural gas discovered in Israeli EEZ offers a clear energy resource, especially given its location almost next door. The limited economic profitability that undermined previous negotiations on gas purchases from Israel could change, given the newly emerging circumstances.

Both sides realize the diplomatic aspect, as mentioned, is an inseparable part of the economic-energetic one. Israel and other actors in the region took advantage of the prolonged chill in relations with Turkey to consolidate a rather impressive regional architecture, which in essence excluded Turkey from the regional game. Ankara only realized this belatedly and embarked on largely successful intensive diplomatic efforts to improve ties with a series of regional players – Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Its goal is to reclaim its previous central position in the region and enhance (once again) it standing on the two core issues of Turkish national interest: their relationship with Greece with its myriad disputes, and the Cypriot problem.

The regional structures built in recent years – trilateral cooperation between Israel and the Hellenic states, and between Israel and Egypt, within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – have weakened Turkey’s negotiating hand and undermined its regional standing, thwarting its ambition to expand its influence. Nonetheless, Turkey remains a significant regional player, and ignoring it does not bode well for the area’s stability.

Its importance has been highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the West, particularly the US, have recognized this. At the same time, Israel has made it clear that efforts to improve ties with Turkey would not be made at the expense of the close relationships it has built in recent years with Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Israeli gas exports thus clash with this stance, at least right now.

HOW, THEN, can this circle be squared in order to move ahead on both aspects of the Israel-Turkey relationship? Following is a package of proposed measures designed to provide momentum and a diplomatic-energetic horizon toward which both sides can proceed.

Clarification of national interests

Each side must lay out its clear interests in a frank, in-depth manner. Israel aspires to move ahead with its relations with Turkey, albeit not at the expense of its strategic relationship with its regional allies – Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Gas exports to Turkey in the immediate term are not possible (without a shift or progress on the two key disputed issues mentioned above). The reason is fairly clear: The possible routes for shipping gas from Israel to Turkey traverse Cypriot economic waters and Israel would be unwilling at this point to damage the close relationship forged with its neighbor (and within the trilateral Hellenic alliance).

The second possible route goes through the economic water of Lebanon and Syria, and is a non-starter in any case. The renewal of a diplomatic-strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey is in its infancy, and the disagreements and mistrust cannot be overcome overnight. Turkey strives to integrate into the regional architecture shaped in recent years in a position worthy of its stature. Gas exports from Israel are therefore vital for Turkey, both in energetic and diplomatic terms.

Finding a formula for Turkey’s integration into the regional architecture: Substantial progress in Turkey’s relations with its neighbors obviously cannot be expected at this stage, especially not prior to next year’s elections in Turkey (and Cyprus). At the same time, Turkey’s exclusion from the regional gas forum, a framework that clearly illustrates the new regional architecture, cannot continue. Some sort of formula is required signaling the start of a course correction. To that end, a bilateral mechanism pointing to the direction of relations down the line would be advisable.

This would consist of a series of high-level diplomatic dialogues between Turkey and the states with which it is engaged in smile diplomacy, meaning, Israel, Egypt and Greece (and Cyprus in a more indirect way). Its goal (and branding) would be to examine the most effective way to integrate Turkey into regional activity in a manner serving both Turkey and the region. The desired goal: a serious diplomatic-political dialogue designed to identify practical ways to reverse Turkey’s exclusion from regional activity. Israel could play a key role in advancing such dialogue.

The establishment of an Israeli-Turkish working team in the energy field: The work of such a team should focus on two issues. The first is the question of future Israeli natural gas exports to Turkey. Practical questions must be discussed pending policy circumstances that will enable such exports – what quantities can be expected, how they will be conveyed (pipeline, shipping, liquefaction facilities), their price level, etc.

The second issue with which the team should deal is possible renewable energy cooperation in the immediate-to-near term. The demand for natural gas is high and understandable, but this does not eliminate the green agenda, certainly that of consumers in Europe. As a rule, regional cooperation in the field of renewable energy is perceived as softer, attractive and even practical, in a way that does not require far-reaching understandings (and conditions) at this early stage of the relationship improvement process.

The establishment of a trilateral Israeli, Turkish and European energy working group: Such trilateral dialogue would connect the European Union to the Israeli-Turkish discourse, illustrating Turkey’s central role in the European, energy and diplomatic-political agenda. After all, the EU is the most important player, alongside Washington (and perhaps even more so) vis-a-vis Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean in general.

Ultimately, this is the beginning of a process, albeit challenging and complex, and both sides should be warned that these are not developments and agreements that can be reached immediately. At the same time, it is essential to adopt a work plan adapted to the political reality and political schedule of the relevant players – a plan serving as an engine for combined political and energy momentum.

The op-ed was published in The Jerusalem Post on May 2022.

הפוסט Turkish FM’s visit to Israel is a chance to unify politics-energy momentum – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

If So, How Do We Proceed From Here?

First, it is crucial to remember that the two countries came to the intersection from different directions and with different expectations. The past few months, Turkey has initiated a series of moves aimed at improving relations with countries in the region, including Israel, Egypt, and Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. There are a number of reasons for these attempts, including a number of issues with the economy, its current regional status, considering increased cooperation within the region over the past few years, and upcoming presidential elections. Turkey has succeeded in warming up diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, to a certain extent, with Saudi Arabia, and now with Israel as well. President Erdogan’s comments at the joint press conference with President Herzog emphasized his desire to open up a new chapter in relations, but they also well reflected his expectations: cooperation with Israel and rapid progress in the energy sector, and, most concretely, Israeli gas exports to Turkey. Israel has reached this political crossroads from a different direction. As a result of the new regional architecture in the eastern Mediterranean and the Abraham Accords with the Gulf states, Israel has a convenient position from a strategic and political perspective. In this regard, the agreements to export gas from Israel to Egypt and Jordan, as well as the establishment of the Regional Gas Forum (EMGF), are compelling examples. Israel has always seen Turkey as a very important regional player with whom improving relations is in Israel’s interest as well as in the interests of the region. During the last decade, there have been significant changes in the relations between Israel and Turkey: the mutual interests that used to exist have diminished and weakened, and trust between the two countries has declined substantially. As a result, President Herzog’s visit and the return of political dialogue at the highest levels mark a positive and refreshing step forward. This state requires careful and measured conduct, as well as the necessary coordination of expectations, to avoid disappointment, or crisis, from the beginning.

From an Israeli point of view, two non-trivial challenges are required at the political level: building trust between the two governments and re-formulating the meetings of interests between the two countries. This is a complex, but certainly possible, process that requires strenuous work in the near term. It is obvious to both parties that cooperation in the energy field requires agreements on the economic level (price of the gas, rout and other expenses), but more importantly: on the political-strategic level as well. In other words, this is not just an ordinary economic product, but one that is extremely important in its political foundation, some would actually call it a precondition. In light of the circumstances in the eastern Mediterranean, and in view of the deep disagreements, it seems that this is an issue related to sovereignty for key players in the region, including Turkey. It cannot be ignored. As part of Israel-Turkey’s political dialogue, it is important to discuss the recent institutional developments in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean in a serious, comprehensive, and honest manner.

Israel has already emphasized that its relations with Turkey won’t be developed on the expense of those with Greece and Cyprus. The same is considering its relations with Egypt. The inclusion of Turkey within the regional exercise is of a vital importance and necessity, but let us be honest, this is a real challenge, which requires a creative dialogue, and as stated, on the base of renewed trust. It is an achievable task.

The war in Ukraine poses a serious challenge to the international system in general. In our case, Israel and Turkey are each faced with complex dilemmas in this regard, and for the most part, there are considerable similarities in the way they deal with and debate it. It is of vital importance for both of them to analyze what kind of common understanding could arise for them facing this enormous crisis.

Thus, the two countries are at a crossroads of fascinating and promising opportunities. The renewed dialogue should be conducted calmly and sensibly, despite the troubling times and the urge to move forward quickly in order to avoid premature crises. By the way, returning ambassadors to the two capitals is a necessary first step, and one that doesn’t cost too much.

The op-ed was published in Turkish Policy in April 2022.

הפוסט President Herzog’s Visit to Turkey: How to Proceed? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

View the interview here.

הפוסט A New Chapter in Turkish-Israeli Relations? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Energetic dreams

The red carpet at Erdoğan’s palatial Presidential Complex in Ankara had not yet been rolled back when Turkish newspapers reported that Fatih Dönmez, the county’s energy minister, would soon visit Israel to discuss future cooperation in the energy sphere.

Since the beginning of 2022, Erdoğan has hinted that relations with Israel might significantly improve very soon. His rhetoric has connected the restoration of ties to a revival of the idea of bringing Mediterranean gas from Israel to Europe via Turkey. In 2016, Turkey and Israel discussed ways to import Israeli gas to Europe. But the negotiations quickly collapsed due to Turkey’s sharp criticism of Israeli policies in the Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem.

In December 2018, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece struck the EastMed pipeline agreement to transport gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe, helping EU countries meet their aim of reducing their energy dependence on Russia. Turkey was an ardent critic of the EastMed deal, and when Washington earlier this year withdrew its support from the project, Ankara said it was never viable or realistic.

Gabi Mitchell, an expert on Eastern Mediterranean energy and geopolitics and director of undergraduate studies at the University of Notre Dame at Tantur, told The Media Line that although the Turks are eager to promote projects in the sphere of gas with Israel, the prospects of such cooperation are and always were doubtful.

“Even before the visit, there were statements coming from Turkey about common projects in the sphere of energy. In 2016, the two sides agreed to discuss this issue. The talks finally failed in 2018. The Turks and the Israelis said they couldn’t agree on costs, but for Israel, there was also a concern about bypassing Cyprus,” said Mitchell. “The situation is not much different today, even if the EU is experiencing an exceptional situation and we might potentially witness a change of direction due to the current crisis in the energy sphere. Nevertheless, the Europeans will still be concerned about hurting the Cypriots and, at the end of the day, Europe is interested in switching from gas to renewable energy. Of course, there are also other available options on the market.”

Presidential elections in Turkey are scheduled to take place on or before June 18, 2023. Over the past few years, Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis. Criticism against Erdoğan grew significantly as the prices of food staples and oil soared and the government seemed unable to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mitchell believes that while Erdoğan is eager to show results and achievements during an election year, Israel should weigh all the pros and cons carefully and not rush into potentially risky commitments.

“First of all, a lot of Israeli liquid natural gas is supplied to Turkey through Egypt. We already provide for some of their needs. Also, Israel will need some time to realize the volume of normalization of relations. The elections are next year. For now, Israel can afford to wait and see who will run Turkey and how relations will develop,” he concludes.

Will Erdoğan drop Hamas for Israel?

Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad – two Palestinian terrorist organizations –condemned Herzog’s visit to Ankara, but Hamas leaders refrained from explicitly criticizing Turkey over the visit. Hamas political bureau deputy head Saleh al-Arouri and other top figures in the organization operate from Turkey. Many moved there from Damascus when the civil war broke out. A joke making the rounds in Gaza this week had it that if Erdoğan were to expel Hamas leaders from Turkey, they would have to search for a home on another planet. The experts warn, however, that despite the rapprochement with Israel, the Turkish president’s policies vis-à-vis Palestinian Islamists remain unchanged for now.

“According to some in the Turkish media, Erdoğan has secured better relations with the Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel without changing his core policies on Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood at large,” Dr. Assa Ofir, a historian of the modern Middle East and an expert on Turkish affairs, told The Media Line. “Some of the media continue to spread antisemitism and incitement against Israel. Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting, will start on April 1 in close proximity to two Jewish holidays – Purim and Passover – and the tensions in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza might grow. How will Turkey behave in case of another flare-up between Israel and the Palestinians? Will it slide back into its familiar anti-Israeli rhetoric or stay away? This Ramadan will present an opportunity to test the revived relations between the two countries,” Ofir said.

So, while the politicians were hailing a “turning point” in Turkish-Israeli relations, many questions remain unanswered for now, and many potential bumps in the road could be just around the corner. But it seems that after more than a decade of hostility, there is now political will on both sides to allow some space to work out problematic issues and regain some of the trust that was lost years ago.

The op-ed was published in themedialine on March 2022.

הפוסט Ramadan Will Test Budding Israel-Turkey Relations: Expert הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

View the full dialogue:

הפוסט A panel on Israeli-Turkish Relations: Challenges and Opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Watch the full event here:

הפוסט A joint Israeli-Turkish experts panel on Improving Israel-Turkey Relations: Opportunities and Challenges הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to offer his mediation services, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was preparing for his own conversation with the Russian president urging him to end the war immediately, allow for a ceasefire and negotiations, and enable civilian evacuations. The Turkish president also offered to host a meeting between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia. Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu orchestrated a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Erdogan had offered to act as a mediator already in early February during his visit to Ukraine amid threats of a Russian invasion.

The Turkish mediation efforts are in line with policies Erdogan adopted at the end of his first decade in power, with Ahmet Davutoglu serving as his foreign minister. Turkey was branded as a state that aspires to play regional and global mediator roles, as this being a cornerstone of its new foreign policy. Although Turkish mediation did not yield many tangible results at the time, it remained in the toolbox of Turkish diplomacy, and currently serves to preserve Turkey’s important relations with Russia and Ukraine alike. Although Turkey is increasingly leaning towards Ukraine’s side and shows signs of distancing itself from Russia since the invasion, as expressed in public statements and in restricting warship passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Ankara seeks to maintain its relations with Moscow.

These ties are far from being exemplary for Turkey. Russia’s decision to intervene in the Syrian war in 2015 prompted concerns in Ankara and led to a crisis in relations following Turkey’s downing of a Russian military jet. The two countries differ on key regional issues, chief among them Syria and Libya. Turkey fears these differences could result in Russian moves, for example, military activity in Syria’s Idlib region that would send waves of refugees to its borders.

Despite their disagreements, Turkey and Russia maintain important cooperation. Turkey imports a significant portion of its natural gas and wheat from Russia. Turkey has also been talking to Russia about defense procurement (S-400 systems), despite its membership in NATO and US opposition. Turkey also relies heavily on Russian tourism, which constitutes a significant portion of its incoming tourism flows. Reflecting this reliance, tourism was one of the issues which Russia’s ambassador to Cyprus raised with his hosts in response to their opposition to the Russian invasion. “Summer is coming up, you’ve closed your airspace – you shot yourselves in the foot,” he said. “Where will Cyprus get its Russian tourists from? They won’t come, they will go to Turkey, is that what you want? For them to go spend their money over there [Turkey]?” Over 4.5 million Russian tourists visited Turkey in 2021, an asset which Ankara would not wish to relinquish.

Nonetheless, Turkey also values its relations with Ukraine and was quick to recognize its independence in the 1990s. Ukraine is also a significant source of tourism for Turkey (some 2 million in 2021), and their varied business dealings include Turkey’s sale of the Bayraktar drones that feature in Ukraine’s attacks on the Russian invaders these days. Turkey has been expressing its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the incursion began, supplying it with humanitarian aid and urging NATO and the West to upgrade their support for Kyiv. Turkey’s foreign and defense ministers held talks with their Ukrainian counterparts, and Turkey eventually acceded to Ukraine’s request regarding Russian naval passage through the straits. However, Turkey opposes sanctions on Russia, arguing that these would not help and simply delay resolution of the core problems between the sides.

Erdogan is gearing up for elections in 2023, facing complex political challenges and an economy in crisis. A crisis with Russia could further challenge Turkey’s economy and Erdogan’s prospects. A Russian tourism boycott of Turkey following the 2015 downing of the Russian jet demonstrated the repercussions of such a move and Erdogan is keen to avoid a repeat of that scenario. However, he also wants to demonstrate equity in NATO and the West, as well as foreign policy achievements following some tough years in that arena.

In the Russia-Ukraine context, Turkey’s mediation efforts are consistent with Erdogan’s other regional diplomatic moves, mainly promoting dialogue and seeking positive agendas. This is a different approach than the one we have become accustomed to seeing from the Turkish president, who in recent years tended to highlight divisive issues and raise tensions with neighboring countries. The new approach was recently reflected in Erdogan’s successful visit to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey’s dialogue with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the warming of relations with Israel. This is a positive construct, which will enable Israel to derive more diverse benefits from restoring relations with Turkey than it could in the past, both at the bilateral and regional levels. And who knows, these developments might even encourage Israel and Turkey to promote their own respective peace processes, while trying to mediate the conflicts of others.

The op-ed was published in JPost in March 2022

הפוסט As Israel-Turkey relations shift, attention turns to Russia and Ukraine – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.