Among the speakers: Tamar Zandberg, Minister of Environmental Protection, Alon Ushpiz, Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Amb. Tor Wennesland, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle Ease Peace Process, Mitvim’s researchers, former diplomats, journalists and more.

Watch the full conference here.

Watch the English parts here.

הפוסט Mitvim’s 6th Annual Conference: Israel’s Foreign Policy Between Change and Continuity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Who is this man and why did he, from among all Israeli politicians, define and shape Israel for the past generation? Today, at the age of 72, after countless embarrassing political combinations, broken promises to his supporters, three criminal cases, quarrels with US Presidents Clinton and Obama, and a flirtation with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Netanyahu is considered the most seasoned and charismatic politician. He enjoys the highest percentage of support in the Israeli public of any candidate, when asked who is the most qualified for the position of prime minister. One can feel various emotions toward Netanyahu, but it’s hardly possible to ignore him. Even when his competitors talk about themselves and their ideology and goals, they often end up talking about Netanyahu.

Not only in Israel but also abroad, attitudes toward Netanyahu are polarizing—you either love him or hate him. His supporters believe that he is irreplaceable in somewhat messianic terms. In practice, they credit him and his policies for the country’s dramatic economic growth during his years in office since 2009. They respect his ability to avoid dangerous concessions and yet achieve a breakthrough with several Arab countries in the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, his opponents warn of the great danger inherent in his ambitions (and his efforts to shed off his legal problems) and do not shy away from using the harshest terms in describing him as not trustworthy, sneaky, cheap, and egoistical. They hint heavily that he has come under the influence or control of his wife and son.

Thus, in public, he is either greeted with chants of “Bibi—King of Israel” or with bitter “Don’t come back” banners placed on the roadsides. Some of his own supporters may occasionally promise themselves to wean the Likud off its dependence on Bibi. And yet, despite the curses and disappointments, his support base crowns him time and again as their absolute leader. His grip on his party is as firm as ever.

The Leader of the Jews

Netanyahu leads the second generation of right-wing politicians since the founding of the state in 1948 (Ze’ev Jabotinsky led the right in the pre-state era). The first-generation leaders were Prime Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, both of whom were active in pre-state underground organizations who fought the British. They were known to live modest lifestyles and adhere to conservatism in politics and personal life.

Netanyahu, who became the head of the opposition for the first time in 1992, was their antithesis. He grew up in the United States, after his father—Benzion Netanyahu, an historian of Jewish life in Europe—left the country, unable to advance his academic career due to his revisionist views. Benjamin Netanyahu or Ben Nitay, as he called himself during his years in the US, served—alongside his two brothers—in the prestigious General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal), but the aura of heroism and sacrifice that he gained stemmed from being the brother of Yonatan Netanyahu who fell while commanding the Entebbe rescue operation in 1976.

Netanyahu loved the US and built a life there, focusing on a career in business and with an MBA from MIT (making him the Israeli prime minister with the highest level of formal education). He also got involved with the Institute for the Study of Terrorism named after his brother and thus got to know senior Israelis and developed close ties with them. The transition to a new career as an Israeli diplomat was sharp and quick. In 1984, paradoxically, it was Prime Minister Shimon Peres who appointed Netanyahu to serve as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, to the dismay of the Likud leader, Yitzhak Shamir, who called Netanyahu an “angel of destruction.” This nickname stuck with Netanyahu, and many of his political enemies still use it today when they come to imply that in politics, Netanyahu ruins everything that he touches.

The Likud’s young generation of “princes” (sons of the party founders) were also not enthusiastic about Netanyahu either—he was too American, he relied on American advisers, and according to many of them (none of whom is currently in the Likud’s Knesset list), his style was more suited to the US. It turns out that the American style and advisers were exactly what the Israeli right needed.

The millionaire from Caesarea, the owner of luxury real estate who went to one of best US schools and endorsed a firmly entrenched free market philosophy, became the idol of the people living in the small towns of Israel’s periphery who suffered from discrimination and the lack of good work opportunities. They had been the key voting force behind the right-wing revolution in 1977 that brought the Likud to power. The man whose way of life is distinctly secular had whispered in a conversation with an influential religious mystic (Rav Kaduri) the iconic phrase—“They [the Left] forgot what it is to be Jewish” and implied that Israelis who believe in the partition of the land are not Jews at all. Later, in the aggressive campaign he would lead against civil society organizations, much of the media, and the left-wing parties in 2015, he would define their activities as “anti-Jewish.”

L’Etat, C’est Moi

Bibi’s articulation of “Jews against a hostile world”—which gained credence among many in Israel after the horrifying violence of the Second Intifada in the years 2000–2005, destroying the political base of the left-wing parties—helped him shape Israel during his years in power. He had friends among fellow conservative leaders in the West—Stephen Harper in Canada, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and others—but he retained his belief that even the US, Israel’s greatest friend, is capable of abandoning the Jews to their fate, hence his willingness to openly challenge President Obama over the Iran nuclear deal. When he developed close ties with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, despite the American sanctions against Russia following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, he justified it as “good for the Jews.” Russia controlled (and still controls) the airspace over Syria, which Israel uses to attack Iranian forces planning attacks against Israel. His ties with figures on the European extreme right, such as Victor Orban in Hungary, gave leverage to the pro-Israel elements in Europe and weakened the critics of Israel: again, in his eyes, it was good for the Jews, even when many Jews in Europe and the US begged to disagree.

Netanyahu’s growing attention to foreign policy in his later years in office led to a personal brand of diplomacy (while chopping away at the functions of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he saw as rife with critics of his policies). He built a new relationship with Greece (even when it was led by the left) and Cyprus. He struck a significant personal bond with Prime Ministers Narendra Modi of India and the late Shinzo Abe of Japan and renewed Israel’s involvement in African affairs. His crowning achievement in foreign affairs was the promulgation of the Abraham Accords. This new diplomatic momentum further enhanced his sense that his personal presence at the helm has become vital for the national interest.

As time went by, indeed, it seemed that what was “good for Netanyahu” became (in his and his family’s eyes) a central part of what is “good for the Jews.” A talented and gifted man, well-read and broad-minded, he began to identify himself more and more with Israel. In 2017 he claimed that his investigations were driven by the “left” in an attempt to launch a “judicial coup” against the will of the voters and despite the impressive state of Israel’s foreign relations and economic success. According to Netanyahu, his opponents as well as Israelis who chose to protest against him were probably on the “payroll of the New Israel Fund,” and every critic, even one with the most impressive military record, became a “stooge of the Arabs, Iran and the left.”

Soon the media that accused him of corruption, and the justice system that wanted to investigate and then pressed charges, became personal arch-enemies, and even the subversive enemies of his state.

Gradually, his sense of being persecuted intensified, as Mazal Mualem, an Israeli journalist wrote in her book Cracking the Netanyahu Code. So did his desire to restructure and adapt the media, the judiciary, and the political systems to his needs. Many biographers of Netanyahu believe that the turning point came in 2016, when he appointed himself minister of communications, maintained close ties to the key media moguls, and, according to their testimonies, personally interfered when negative items were published about him, his wife, or his son. As the judicial system kept investigating his dealings with his billionaire friends, whose gifts seemed to cross the thin line into graft, every person involved in the proceedings—the general commissioner of the Police, the attorney general, the state prosecutor, and the judges—all became targets of campaigns of incitement led from the prime minister’s residence on Balfour Street. Could it be that Netanyahu, who used to be an energetic and dynamic minister of finance, now avoided promoting necessary but difficult reforms and refrained from significant changes in the political, economic or social spheres, because he was too busy with political survival and wars with the media and the justice system? It might be just another one of Netanyahu’s paradoxes. Another one is his attitude toward Israel’s Arab minority—which he warned against during political campaigns while taking pride in having initiated a massive program of public sector investment in Israeli Arab towns and neighborhoods.

Today, his base is united behind him. But many other Israelis are flying banners against him from the bridges and overpasses. They fear that in another twist of the endless elections saga and in an attempt to escape a criminal verdict that might end his otherwise spectacular political career, Netanyahu will continue his brutal war against the media and the judiciary, form a government with the most extreme and xenophobic elements in the far right, and carry forward Israel’s “Orbanization” process following the Hungarian model. At the same time, the other part of the Israeli polarized public apparently believes that Israel could collapse if Netanyahu does not return to power, and that the Lapid–Ganz government, that lasted for just one year, was the least competent in the history of Israel.

Many in Israel attribute the country’s ongoing political polarization to this man who has ruled the government for nearly 15 years, already longer than the founding father, David Ben-Gurion. Others will conclude that this attribution is an attempt by Netanyahu’s opponents to suppress popular support for him, out of their elitist disdain toward his voters. All other issues—the worsening security situation in the West Bank, the gas deal with Lebanon, the high cost of living, the war in Ukraine—are currently woven into this lasting political moment of Benjamin Netanyahu and his ability to shape Israel’s discourse and its politics. For now it seems that Netanyahu is not going anywhere, even if he will lose (again) the ability to build a rightwing majority after elections. And even if at some point he will be removed from the Likud leadership, his influence will continue for many years to come.

The op-ed was published in November 2022 in Jerusalem Strategic Tribune.

הפוסט The Paradox of Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is disappointing because Lapid has professed his support for a two-state solution and all the polls indicate that a majority of Israelis support this solution above all others. What is more, a recently survey commissioned by the Geneva Initiative (GI) indicates that most Israelis favor diplomatic negotiations with the Palestinian leadership.

Is the most powerful member of Israel’s government of change still suffering the poisonous effects of the legacy of Benjamin Netanyahu governments?

Lapid has already proven that he is not necessarily bound by Netanyahu’s harmful policies. He skillfully restored relations with Jordan. He improved ties with the European Union (EU), despite its criticism of Israel’s occupation and settlements. He normalized relations with Sweden, despite its recognition of a Palestinian state. He engaged in rebuilding Israel’s relations with the US Democratic Party and American Jewry, neglected by Netanyahu in favor of an alliance with the populists and messianic evangelists in the US. In a refreshing recent comment, Lapid said Israel was not necessarily opposed to an agreement between world powers and Iran, after Netanyahu fought every agreement and drove Iran closer to military nuclear capabilities.

Lapid certainly realizes that without a diplomatic horizon we are weakening moderate Palestinians and bolstering Hamas. He surely understands that without a diplomatic horizon the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be hard pressed to continue its security cooperation with our forces, and that saves lives on a daily basis. He must have heard during his meetings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain that the absence of a diplomatic horizon hampers the expansion and deepening of the normalization circle. He certainly knows that the absence of a diplomatic horizon poses a dire threat to our ability to preserve the Zionist vision of Israel as the democratic nation-state of the Jewish people.

Limiting the conflict with the Palestinians, a strategy espoused by Micah Goodman, is important in order to ease the daily lives of our Palestinian neighbors, but it is not an alternative to the need for determined action to end the occupation that threatens our strategic and moral future. Limiting the conflict could anesthetize the diplomatic process to a great extent, causing far more harm than good.

That is why last week’s meeting between PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Defense Minister MK Benny Gantz was important for the sake of strengthening cooperation, but cannot replace a significant diplomatic process.

I am not naive and I realize the importance of preserving the current government and preventing the return of an alliance between Netanyahu supporters and extremist right-wingers, but the refreshing policies adopted by the government of change in so many areas will not go down in the annals of history unless it seeks with all its might to extricate Israel from the greatest threat to the future of the Zionist vision.

Lapid has displayed impressive political capabilities in facilitating the formation of this government. Lapid proved that an Arab party can take part in an Israeli government and that agreements can be reached between opposing ideological parties for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Israel. He must display that same political and diplomatic wisdom by presenting a diplomatic horizon. The diplomatic horizon is the Zionist horizon.

This article is from “The Jerusalem Post“, from January 9, 2022

הפוסט Israel needs a diplomatic horizon to preserve the Zionist vision- opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Europe’s Initial Reactions to Israel’s Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Erdan, who says he has long aspired to the jobs, reminded us that Israel’s iconic diplomat Abba Eban also served simultaneously in these two senior posts, and claimed he was certain of his ability to fulfill both. As the French would say, “He is proud of his humility”. Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu had sought to distance Erdan from Israel for political reasons, he is obviously fully aware of the extent and demands of the two top Foreign Service jobs, having served himself in the US, first as DCM in Washington and then as UN Ambassador.

Representing Israel in the US is a demanding, fulltime job. The ambassador in Washington is in charge of the relationships with the administration and Congress as well as with politicians throughout the 50 states, and with the divided Jewish community. He is also tasked with Israel’s public diplomacy challenges, its security, strategic and economic ties with the US, and oversight over eight Israeli consulates spread all over the country .

The position of Ambassador to the UN is also a non-ending investment of hours and efforts, often in times of crises, of which we supply plenty. Part of the ambassador’s job is also to initiate and conduct ties throughout the year with the representatives of many among the 192 member states and with the organization’s numerous committees. That, too, is more than a full-time position.

I have known Erdan for years, and my appreciation of his skills notwithstanding, I do not believe he can fulfill all these complex tasks at the same time, for the simple reason that no one can do so fully and satisfactorily. Only unique figures, such as Abba Eban, who served at the UN when it was still in its infancy and consisted of only 33 states could have done so.

What, then, is the meaning of Netanyahu’s decision? Cost cutting was obviously not a consideration given the installation of Israel’s biggest and most spendthrift government at the height of an economic-social crisis. The real reason lies in Netanyahu’s consistent attitude and conduct over the past decade toward Israel’s Foreign Service, and the deep contempt he displays toward the ministry that safeguards the state’s essential interests and toward its professional staff.

This attitude has led Netanyahu to strip the Foreign Ministry of many of its traditional purviews, such as diplomatic strategy, the anti-BDS campaign, relations with the Diaspora and public diplomacy and to hand them out as “consolation prizes” to various party loyalists . These moves have deprived the Ministry of many of the key roles its staff carried out for decades on the front lines of Israel’s struggles to establish or renew diplomatic ties with the countries of the world, promote trade agreements and international investments, and defend Israel’s essential interests in international organizations. Some representatives were felled by terrorists in the line of duty. Netanyahu’s moves have demoralized the staff, deprived Israeli diplomats of their professional pride, transferred the handling of important issues to non-professional hands and generated confusion, lack of coordination and even embarrassment.

Last year’s dramatic budget cuts dealt an almost fatal blow to the Ministry and the Foreign Service. The work of the missions abroad ground to a halt due to lack of funding, wages were cut, Israel’s international foreign aid enterprise was suspended, the diplomatic campaign against Iran was stalled, public diplomacy and cultural activities were undermined and the promotion of Israeli economic activity abroad was significantly eroded. As an example of the absurdity of the situation, Israeli diplomats were unable to represent the state at important functions away from the city of their posting because they had no money for train tickets.

Tasking a person of legendary skills like Abba Eban with both positions in the 1950s was born out of necessity when Israel was a young, poor state. A similar move in 2020 reflects the continued systematic destruction of the Israeli Foreign Service even as significant developments are emerging on the horizon with a possible change of administration in Washington and international fallout from the Israeli government’s annexation intentions.

הפוסט Foreign Service Closing-Out Sale: Gilad Erdan’s Dual Appointment to UN and Washington הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The discovery of offshore hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean over a decade ago has sparked intense diplomatic activity. Hoping to maximize the sea’s riches, many of the region’s governments have proposed ambitious projects that would transport the natural gas to Europe via undersea pipelines. Encouraged by U.S. administrations that saw energy development as a vehicle for strengthening ties between its allies, the rough edges of a new regional framework for cooperation slowly took form in January 2019, when the governments of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, a multinational body tasked with developing a regional gas market and mechanism for resource development.

COVID-19 has scuttled this momentum. The pandemic’s impact on the global energy market has damaged the conditions for Eastern Mediterranean states to profitably export their gas, and has caused a massive rethink amongst policymakers about how to make the most out of the circumstances. Although regional actors may no longer be bound to building pipelines, energy still has the potential to propel greater regional cooperation in the coming decade. American diplomatic support and engagement would go a long way to turning this opportunity into a reality.

Israel’s Stake in the Eastern Mediterranean

This is a bitter pill for all of the region’s actors to swallow, but perhaps none more so than Israel. Historically bereft of fossil fuels, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields (in 2009 and 2010, respectively) were seen as a potential game-changer for the Jewish State. The Netanyahu government committed to the concept of gas exports as a strategic boon to Israel, and aggressively pursued a regional policy that embraced partnerships with Greece and Cyprus, as well as export deals with Jordan and Egypt. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz spent most of the last five years promoting the “East Med pipeline” — a 1,900-kilometer undersea pipeline that would link Israel to Italy via Greece and Cyprus.

However, the East Med pipeline — which upon completion would be the longest undersea pipeline in the world — was always more of a political project than a serious commercial endeavor. Not only did the path of the proposed pipeline run through disputed waters between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, but also active geological fault lines and deep trenches. These geopolitical and technical challenges could theoretically be overcome, yet industry experts argue that the biggest obstacle to the East Med pipeline is its commercial feasibility. With an estimated $7 billion price tag, there are doubts that Israeli and Cypriot gas would remain competitive by the time it arrived in Europe. For several years the European Commission has been exploring the possibility of committing to the pipeline, but at this stage is unlikely to back it financially.

The collapse of global energy prices brought on by the combination of an oversupplied market, warmer-than-average winter, and the coronavirus pandemic, has buried the East Med pipeline and put Israel in a serious quandary. Committed to a contract with Tamar and Leviathan’s developers that no longer meshes with the current economic circumstances, Israel is paying three times the global average for its own gas. The price discrepancy is so sharp that the Israel Electric Corporation is buying imported liquid natural gas at half the price of domestic supply. It is no wonder, then, that Steinitz began his second term in office with declarations that Israel would accelerate its construction of solar energy infrastructure.

The Position of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey

Israel is not alone in this predicament. Almost the entire Eastern Mediterranean is wrestling with similar questions.

The vanishing prospects for the East Med pipeline are as disconcerting for Greece and Cyprus as they are for Israel. Both countries are essential partners in the project. In January 2020, leaders from the three states met in a public demonstration of their commitment to the pipeline (they reportedly signed an agreement but this document has not been made public). Cyprus hoped to link its modest offshore discoveries to the East Med pipeline, and Greece was eager to function as a conduit to Europe. The important difference is that Cyprus’ natural gas fields are not yet operational. In early May, Italy’s ENI, France’s Total, and ExxonMobil announced a year-long suspension of drilling activities in Cyprus’ waters. There are no guarantees that the developers will return with the same interest as they once did, and the remaining export options are costly.

Even operational energy partnerships are facing tough choices. For example, Jordan’s energy arrangement with Israel (45 billion cubic meters over 15 years at an estimated $10 billion) is deeply unpopular because it normalizes ties with a country seen by most Jordanians as a belligerent. With a global energy market that is driving liquid natural gas prices to historic lows, the monarchy is under mounting pressure to find cheaper alternatives. If Israel continues with its plans to partially annex the West Bank, Amman may sacrifice the deal as a symbolic gesture of disapproval even if the underlying causes are economic. Jordan might hope that it could fall back on the United States, as a guarantor in the deal, to cover its debts.

Egypt hoped that offshore discoveries would transform it into a regional energy hub, converting Israeli and Cypriot gas at its liquid natural gas facilities in Idku and Damietta and then shipping them off to Europe. Today, Egypt is struggling to find buyers, has frozen activity at one of its liquid natural gas sites, and cut production at Zohr field. While the Egyptian domestic market is diverse enough to absorb some Israeli imports, this isn’t the long-term arrangement the two parties envisioned some 16 months ago.

No matter where you turn, the Eastern Mediterranean energy picture is bleak. Debt-ridden Lebanon was dismayed by news in late April that initial explorations failed to uncover a meaningful gas field. Politicians in Beirut dreamed that offshore discoveries would deliver an instant economic windfall. But with energy companies announcing a suspension of activities in Cyprus’s waters just a week later — the same companies exploring Lebanese waters — the Lebanese government will have to search elsewhere for a financial bailout.

Meanwhile, Turkey appears to be taking advantage of the regional turmoil by continuing to send exploratory and drilling vessels into Eastern Mediterranean waters. However, these vessels’ purpose is more political than commercial. Spurned by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and with no resolution to the Cyprus conflict in sight, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned his military — on land and at sea — to protect Turkish claims to the continental shelf and break what is perceived as strategic containment of Turkey by the region’s actors. Turkish intervention in the Libyan civil war is at least partially driven by Ankara’s desire to break the will of its neighbors and force them into direct negotiations. Not only has this strategy put Turkey at loggerheads with longtime rivals Greece and Cyprus — with whom Turkey shares a long history of maritime boundary disputes — but other actors as well, including the United States.

In the long run, low liquid natural gas prices could become the norm. Some forecast that the present gas glut may continue for nearly a decade as other projects come onto the market. International projects that require costly infrastructure are going to find it difficult to compete with existing liquid natural gas providers and a growing renewable energy industry. Although COVID-19 appears to have undone significant progress in the Eastern Mediterranean, it ironically may have rescued Eastern Mediterranean states from shortsighted investments. Policymakers have benefited from a rare mulligan and can now reassess their regional prospects.

Post-Pandemic Energy Strategy

The first, and most obvious, post-coronavirus strategy, is to keep the gas local. Rather than prioritizing export markets in Europe, the challenge for Eastern Mediterranean states is to diversify their domestic infrastructure and economies to be more gas friendly. This is especially relevant for Egypt, whose domestic demand is only going to increase as its population grows. Emphasizing the regional market will require intense discussions between the main developers and governments to find the appropriate contractual language that suits the involved parties.

But would organizing a regional market assume that all actors can benefit? Over the last decade, offshore hydrocarbons were as much as cause for confrontation between Eastern Mediterranean states as they were an incentive for cooperation. Now that it is clear the gas bonanza won’t arrive as quickly as anticipated, perhaps the region’s actors will consider a recommitment to regional diplomacy and conflict resolution. From the ongoing Libyan civil war to the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey, there is no shortage of opportunities for those willing to decouple their energy aspirations from their interest in creating a functional regional space.

This is where the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum comes into play. Whereas the forum’s original purpose was to deal with matters pertaining to natural gas, post-COVID it could serve as a platform for discussion on a host of issues, from tourism to environmental protection to pandemic support to alternative energy cooperation and security. If a global pandemic instructs states about anything, it is that neighbors remain neighbors regardless of the boundaries placed between them. In short, it behooves Eastern Mediterranean states to support one another.

America’s Role in the Region

The United States should play a central role in this process. Not only is Washington the preferred mediator for many of the region’s conflicts, but American support for the development of offshore hydrocarbons and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been a rare point of bipartisan consensus during both the Obama and Trump administrations, who saw the region’s gas as way to strengthen the position of its Eastern Mediterranean allies while also reducing European dependency on Russian gas. Continued engagement with Eastern Mediterranean actors will allow the United States to guide its partners towards a more cooperative future, help develop deconfliction mechanisms, and discourage interference from outside actors like Russia, Iran, and China.

This should happen in a number of different ways. First, the United States should reengage Eastern Mediterranean states in the process of maritime boundary delimitation. This issue a priority for all of the region’s actors, including European heavyweights France and Italy. In particular, Turkey’s signing of a maritime boundary agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in November 2019 sparked considerable protest throughout the region and entangled the ongoing civil war in the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy politics. While the Libyan civil war isn’t the source of all of the region’s tensions, American mediation between the aggrieved parties — notably NATO member states Turkey and Greece — on the issue of maritime boundaries would start rolling back tensions and create a more constructive environment for future negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus. The signing of a maritime boundary agreement between Italy and Greece on June 9 was widely seen as a maneuver to check Turkey’s advance. U.S. diplomats should also encourage Israel and Lebanon to resolve their outstanding maritime issues, which would allow foreign companies to feel more comfortable exploring in Lebanese waters whenever they decide to resume activities. A semi-enclosed maritime space like the Eastern Mediterranean requires delimitation agreements in order to avoid conflict. Ideally, the United States would bring all region’s actors to the negotiating table simultaneously. However, the present conditions necessitate a flexible, hands-on approach to certain disputes.

Additionally, the United States can empower the nascent Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum by investing more diplomatic resources in the organization, and incentivizing collaboration between members states. One way of doing this is by expanding the language of the 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (also known as the Menendez-Rubio Bill) in a manner that offers potential avenues for participation by Eastern Mediterranean actors not mentioned in this legislative package, specifically Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Turkey. The United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center described in the Menendez-Rubio Bill could be a conduit for multinational research and development in the myriad topics that are directly and indirectly impacted by offshore hydrocarbon exploration. This could open channels of communication between American and Eastern Mediterranean industries, strengthening both economic, cultural, and strategic interests.

Going Forward

For the better part of the last decade, it was expected that energy would transform the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the pandemic’s aftershocks have disrupted the prospects for regional cooperation. A collective pivot — with American support — away from the uncertain promises of energy could be a blessing in disguise. It provides regional states the opportunity to embrace a shared future that emphasizes energy diversification, multinational cooperation, and conflict resolution.

Although the United States appears committed to reducing its presence on the global stage, it should preserve and expand energy-centric multilateral diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean that enjoys bipartisan support. The region is rich with American partners — a lasting foreign policy legacy would be finding a formula that would allow them to settle their own disputes and find new ways to cooperate.

(originally published in “War on the Rocks”)

הפוסט COVID-19 Put the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Dreams on Hold הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the current Israeli government’s stated intention to annex parts of the West Bank illustrates the potential for folly, as historian Barbara Tuchman aptly described in her excellent book The March of Folly. In order to define a decision as unwise, according to Tuchman, it must appear so in real time rather than hindsight. Such is the case of the annexation idea, which not only risks Israel’s interests vis-à-vis the Palestinians, Arab states, the European Union and even the United States, it also risks creating a lamentable and irrevocable situation.

In 1969, shortly after the Six Day War and the PLO’s takeover by the Fatah movement headed by Yasser Arafat, the organization adopted the idea of establishing a democratic, secular state of Muslims, Jews and Christians in Palestine. The Jews perceived the plan, rightly so, as a recipe for Israel’s annihilation, and all the Zionist parties rejected it. Slightly over 50 years later, Israel is moving slowly – and if annexation occurs, swiftly – toward the creation of one state, albeit neither secular nor democratic. In other words, a more radical version of the plan categorically rejected a half century ago is about to be adopted by the government and public without serious discussion. Already in 1986, former Military Intelligence chief and Middle East scholar Yehoshafat Harkabi warned in his book Israel’s Fateful Hour that annexation “would bring about implementation of the PLO’s idea for a democratic Palestinian state.”

SO HOW did we get to this point?

Israel’s political system is based on coalition governments (often with a small majority) that prefer to avoid critical decisions, especially controversial ones, in order to preserve their rule.

Since their capture in 1967, the occupied territories, and especially the West Bank, have been a divisive issue among proponents and opponents of Jewish settlement there. The resulting status quo policy de facto sanctioned the creeping takeover of lands, although no government has ever approved a strategic decision to settle or annex the West Bank. Even the Alon Plan, issued in the days of the Labor Party government, remained unofficial policy. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, there was never a conspiratorial plan to settle the West Bank or annex it. Nonetheless, the absence of a clear governmental policy and the determination of the settlers – encouraged by certain governments or ministers – lulled the international community, as well as most Israeli Jews, who oppose this policy, into complacency.

Division of the Land of Israel (Palestine) has always been the widely accepted solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A series of partition plans has been proposed since 1937, each giving the Palestinians less than the previous one. The 2020 Trump plan goes as far as to deprive the Palestinians of one-third of the land promised to them in the Oslo Accords, which in themselves included less than 22% of the territory of Mandatory Palestine. The Trump plan is largely a mirror image of the 1937 British Peel Commission plan, which provided only 15% of Mandatory Palestine for the establishment of a Jewish state. Both sides, as we know, rejected the plan.

Over 80 years after the partition idea was first broached, Israel is purposely and adamantly working to bury it. Annexation of parts of the West Bank – whether of a few percent of the area (only the settlements), 17% (the Jordan Valley) or the entire 30% allocated under the Trump blueprint – means that Israel is in effect destroying the two-state option.

EVENTUALLY, THE annexation plan may not pan out, for a variety of reasons. First, US insistence on implementation of the Trump plan along with the annexation – i.e., the establishment of a Palestinian state in the remaining parts of the West Bank. Second, the vehement opposition of the EU, including Israel’s friends, and Germany chief among them. During his June 10 visit to Israel, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas expressed his country’s objections and those of other European states. Finally, there is the settlers’ rejection of the price they would have to pay for Israeli sovereignty – i.e., the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Yet Netanyahu, who will not want to violate his annexation pledge, especially as he is immersed in his trial, could push for a mini-annexation, attesting to his determination but also to his responsibility as a leader attentive to criticism. Such a decision could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory, leaving annexation advocates unsatisfied and opponents viewing it as an aggressive and threatening move, requiring response.

However, even if the Israeli government, as Eban remarked, eventually makes a rational decision and avoids annexation, the conclusion will invariably be that Israel does not want a Palestinian state. Pulling back from annexation would not mean that Israel truly wants to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict with the Palestinians, but that circumstances and pressure forced it to do so. In other words, avoiding a small foolish move (annexation) cannot change the larger folly of continued occupation of the West Bank.

Most Israelis are oblivious to what goes on in the territories. In fact, most do not consider the annexation a key issue. According to a poll commissioned by the Two-State Coalition, only 3.5% of respondents believed annexation should be one of the two main issues on the government’s agenda. However, those who favored annexation said they supported it even at the cost of undermining Israel’s peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt (60%) and escalating terrorist attacks against soldiers and civilians (43.5%). These findings should serve as an alarming warning because annexation is not worth such repercussions.

The only good news to come out of the annexation crisis is the renewed discourse about the future of the occupied territories. From now on, the debate should focus on resolution of the Palestinian problem. Most of the experts dealing with these issues in civil society and academic circles keep insisting on the urgency of dealing with the Palestinian problem, so why is no one listening?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Avoiding a small annexation will not prevent the larger occupation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The values underpinning the relationship: The Puritan pilgrims that arrived at Plymouth Rock in 1620 Americas regarded themselves as the builders of the New Jerusalem envisioned by the biblical prophets. This theme and ethos were adopted by the founding fathers in writing the Declaration of Independence and US Constitution. Over a century later, the spirit of the US revolution and principles of the Constitution would inspire the founders of Zionism. Many Americans still regard Israel as a sister state peopled by immigrants who established a just, democratic, liberal society after the removal of the English control

Shared interests: Since President Truman’s recognition of Israel 11 minutes after David Ben-Gurion declared its independence, Israeli leaders have aspired to close ties with the US as leader of the free world and the strongest global power. Energy deposits in the Gulf critical to the American and global economy would soon turn the Middle East into a strategic target of US foreign policy. Israel was a US partner in the Cold War and in its war against terrorism, enabling the US to avoid boots on the ground unlike those it deployed in defense of other partnerships in South Korea or West Germany.

Israel’s political influence: Israel enjoyed bipartisan US support for years, with Democrats and Republicans both treating it as an issue transcending their political divide. The pro-Israel forces were and still are well organized and politically strong, deeply involved in US politics and the media. The American Jewish community is only two percent of the population (more than 70 percent Democrats) but to an extent beyond their numbers in donations and influence in politics. The pro-Israel AIPAC lobby, with its professionalism and determination, buoyed by the myth of Jewish influence, became the most powerful and effective foreign policy lobbying group in Washington. As for Israel’s Christian evangelical supporters, they are almost all Republican voters but their large numbers, some 80 million, and organizational capacities are impressive. They believe that support for Israel is a religious imperative that will result in resurrection.

It would seem, then, that all is well and the “special relationship” is robust and deeply rooted. In fact, not all is well because of troubling trends in all three areas.

Values: Based on Donald Trump’s election and policies as President, one might assume that the US shift toward conservative values and its disdain for liberal democracy are similar to Israel’s. Demographics prove otherwise. In Israel, they are in fact pulling to the right given the high ultra-Orthodox birthrate and other factors, such as late marriage age of liberals. In the US, on the other hand, the percentage of minorities leaning to progressive values is growing.

Interests: The US is losing interest in the Middle East, to a large extent justifiably so. It is no longer dependent on the region’s energy resources and all its major interventions in the Middle East have failed – full-scale military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, “leading from behind” in Libya and avoiding action on Syria.

Politics: Israel has become a partisan issue in US politics. The sense among large swathes of the Democratic Party base is that Israel has tied its destiny to the Republicans. The distancing by progressive liberals from Israel is beginning to manifest itself in Congress. Unprecedented criticism of Israel and calls to condition US aid on Israeli policies have also emerged in the Democratic presidential campaign. This trend includes the Jewish community which mostly identifies as liberal and votes for Democratic presidents. Israeli annexation in the West Bank sometime between July 1 and the November elections would further exacerbate things given Democratic voters’ vehement opposition to unilateral moves and violation of international law.

How can Israel remedy the problem?

Israel must return to bipartisan diplomacy with the US and build bridges to progressive and minority elements. Israel must embrace the US Jewish community regardless of political views and streams of Judaism. Israel’s ties with the world’s largest Jewish Diaspora are not only vital to the relationship between states, they stem from Israel’s very mission as the nation state of the Jewish people.

In order to keep the Americans in the Middle East, Israel must promote a contractual defense pact with the US anchored in legislation. Contrary to prevailing views, a defense pact would advance peace by deterring military adventurism. It will increase the US commitment to Israel’s defense, but also incentive to promote peace in the Middle East, and increase the US interest in determining Israel’s borders (diplomacy is far less expensive than wars).

Should the US administration change hands in January 2021, Israel must return to the security plan formulated by Gen. John Allen together with the IDF’s Planning Directorate for the defense of Israel’s Eastern border. The plan drafted at the behest of then-Secretary of State Kerry includes technological means and a US presence in the Jordan Valley and would help cement the US commitment to the region and to Israel’s security.

Israel should also advance civil society links with progressive American individuals and organizations who are unaware that many Israel share their worldview and are engaged in promoting justice regardless of the administrations in either state. A bi-national foundation to promote Tikkun Olam, if formed, could support cooperation between non for-profit organizations and between USAID and Israel’s foreign aid arm, MASHAV.

Israeli public diplomacy should engage with US civil society in a positive manner rather than in detrimental useless arguments and hasbara (public diplomacy). Israel has much to offer the US but our defensive approach makes us appear less relevant and less attractive.

In conclusion, Israel’s relations with the US are more important than its ties with any country in the world and their value is nothing short of strategic. Despite the deep and robust nature of the relations, current trends are greatly troubling and unless we work quickly to address them, Israel’s strategic posture would suffer a fatal blow.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and the US: Is the Special Relationship Still Special? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s diplomatic emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean evolved throughout the 2010s based on natural gas findings in Israel’s economic waters and growing tensions with Turkey. Israel cooperated with Greece and Cyprus to establish a new trilateral alliance, which was in line with similar triangular alliances the Hellenic countries were developing (e.g. with Egypt). This alliance became increasingly visible, with the leaders of Israel, Greece and Cyprus setting the tone by conducting multiple summits. Other ministers, government agencies and non-governmental organizations followed suit, and managed to inject significant and diverse content into the emerging alliance. Over the time, the US also stepped in and began to participate in Israel-Greece-Cyprus meetings.

The alliance was presented to the public in a positive light. A special logo was designed, which included a motto emphasizing the democratic natures of the three countries. The EU seemed to welcome this new alliance, and was willing to help fund the feasibility study of the ambitious East Med pipeline project (aimed at exporting gas from Israel, through Cyprus, to Europe). The cooperation around natural gas brought additional countries into the picture, leading to the establishment in Cairo of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in early 2019. The EMGF, which in early 2020 is evolving into a recognized international organization, enables Israel to be part of a regional mechanism with a unique composition of Arab and European states. Apart from Israel, its members include the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, Italy, Cyprus and Greece. Recently, France also asked to join, while the US, EU and World Bank serve as observers. Such an organization provides Israel with both diplomatic and economic opportunities.

Israel can benefit from even more inclusive mechanisms and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. From the onset of its engagement in this sub-region, Israel emphasized that its emerging alliances are not intended against any other country. Namely, Israel’s ties with Greece and Cyprus have not been described by Israel as anti-Turkish. When Israel reconciled with Turkey in 2016 (an agreement that did not hold for long), it did so in parallel to its ties with Egypt and the Hellenic countries, which have deep conflicts of their own with Turkey. Israel began to practice a win-win regional diplomacy that is different from its traditional zero-sum mindset. Recently, however, Israel has been taking sides in the tensions in the Mediterranean, supporting Greece and Cyprus against Turkish actions and aspirations. Nevertheless, Turkey has strategic importance for Israel, and both countries should invest efforts in improving bilateral ties, starting with an exchange of ambassadors. Israel may thus benefit from having Turkey join the EMGF, although this is not likely to be accepted by other members. Israel can also benefit from Lebanon joining. The US has been trying to mediate between Israel and Lebanon, so they can resolve their maritime border dispute, but this did not yield success yet. Joint membership of the two countries in a regional organization may help in setting up new dialogue options.

But, most importantly, Israel should leverage developments in the Eastern Mediterranean to help it solve the conflict with the Palestinians. Restarting the peace process – not annexation in the West Bank – should be the top priority of Israel’s new government, and the Mediterranean lens can enable fresh thinking and ideas on how to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza, reestablish a unified political structure that connects the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and leverage the EMGF to becoming a regional mechanism that also produces positive incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace and contributes to conflict resolution in the region.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Eastern Mediterranean: A New Diplomatic Arena for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Relations with Arab states

1. Israel is interested in bolstering the peace with Jordan and Egypt and achieving peace with additional Arab states in order to normalize relations with its neighbors in the Middle East. Arab leaders are invited to visit Israel.

2. Israel’s relations with Arab states should extend beyond the clandestine, security realm to include open diplomatic, economic and civilian cooperation.

3. Israel attaches importance to the thrice-endorsed 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and welcomes the willingness of Arab states to consistently ratify it over time. Israel views the proposal as an opportunity to promote negotiations with the Palestinians. Israel is also interested in launching a regional peace process with the involvement of both Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

4. Israel believes Arab states could play a significant role in promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such peace would also provide significant opportunities to fulfill the potential of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Israel calls for a regional conference to relaunch the peace process.

5. Israel seeks to cooperate with Arab states on people-to-people projects that could change negative attitudes and forge links of peace. Israel seeks to contribute its know-how in the fields of hydrology, climate, renewable energy and security for the benefit of the Arab states and their inhabitants.

6. Israel believes its unique geopolitical location enables it to assume a significant role in furthering connections and cooperation between Europe and the Middle East. This is already happening in the Eastern Mediterranean, and should be broadened into wide-ranging, institutionalized multi-regional cooperation beneficial to both Israel and Arab states.

7. Israel will give top priority to restoring relations with Jordan and trust with King Abdullah. These relations are of supreme strategic importance and must be bolstered and developed. Israel recognizes Jordan’s special status vis-à-vis Islam’s holy sites in Jerusalem. It will work to advance new joint projects with Jordan, fulfill past commitments and is ready to help Jordan deal with the refugee challenge and with threats of terrorism.

8. Israel recognizes Egypt’s key regional importance and the vital role it plays in promoting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and preventing escalation between Israel and Gaza. Israel welcomes the growing cooperation with Egypt on natural gas, and will also invest efforts in promoting civilian ties with Egypt. First off, Israel will immediately appoint a new ambassador to Egypt following a lengthy hiatus during which the position was not staffed.

Relations with the Palestinians

1. Israel is interested in peace with the Palestinians based on the two-state solution and will take steps to advance it. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only reaching an arrangement with Gaza, is a top priority for Israel.

2. Israel is extending its hand to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority in a bid to renew dialogue and the peace process and is interested in creating a direct channel between leaders and top officials. Israel also attaches importance to promoting ties and dialogue between the two peoples and building mutual respect and trust.

3. Israel does not want the PA’s collapse. It views the PA as a partner for negotiations and a key partner in resolving the situation in Gaza. Israel chooses to engage with the PA, which recognizes it, rather than with Hamas, which rejects its right to exist.

4. Israel is interested in continuing coordination with the PA to prevent security deterioration and addressing joint challenges and opportunities in other fields. Israel will support the PA’s efforts to unite the West Bank and Gaza Strip into one Palestinian entity under its leadership and to hold elections.

5. Israel pledges to help improve living conditions for the Palestinians, not as an alternative to a diplomatic solution but out of a moral-humanitarian commitment. Israel calls on the international community to contribute to this effort as well as to diplomatic efforts to advance peace.

6. Israel is willing to enable the planned construction in Kalkilya to accommodate natural population growth, to avoid demolishing houses and public facilities in east Jerusalem and Area C, to increase the number of work permits for Palestinians, and ease freedom of movement and the transfer of taxes it collects on behalf of the PA.

7. Israel appreciates the efforts invested by the US administration in formulating its vision of peace, but emphasizes that resolution of the conflict must stem from direct negotiations between the sides, with regional and international involvement, taking into consideration the needs and aspirations of both sides to the conflict.

8. Israel will not undertake unilateral annexation measures in the territories. It will freeze construction in the settlements that risks the feasibility of the two-state solution and will preserve the status quo at Jerusalem’s holy sites.

Relations with Europe

1. Israel wishes to turn the page on its relationship with the European Union. Israel regards the EU as a friend and partner with which it shares common values and wants to deepen and expand diverse and positive cooperation.

2. Israel will continue promoting bilateral relations with EU member states, viewing them as an effective tool to influence decision-making in Brussels. However, it will not take advantage of such moves to undermine the EU and deepen its internal divisions.

3. As a state committed to the values of liberal democracy, Israel attaches great importance to a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and will prioritize ties with European states that share those same values.

4. Israel will continue to criticize EU measures that it opposes, but will do so through open, honest dialogue and in as positive a climate as possible. The new government will cease the harsh rhetoric and incitement against the EU and express its criticism in a professional manner.

5. Israel will continue to boost its alliance with Greece and Cyprus and promote additional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the formation of regional frameworks with the participation of European and Arab states, and restoration of relations with Turkey to ambassadorial level.

6. Israel extends an invitation to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for an official visit. Israel’s foreign minister will conduct an official visit to Europe, during which he will seek to meet with EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.

7. Israel seeks to renew the high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012, in order to update old agreements and discuss new ones.

8. Israel welcomes the 2013 European proposal of upgrading Israel-EU relations to the level of a Special Privileged Partnership once Israeli-Palestinian peace is achieved, and is interested in launching a dialogue on the proposal’s potential content.

9. Israel values the EU’s support for advancement of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation through civil society organizations and other channels and its efforts to promote peace and democracy in the region.

10. Israel would like to inform the EU that it seeks the renewal of the peace process with the Palestinians and will avoid unilateral steps that endanger the feasibility of the two-state solution.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Initial policy recommendations for Foreign Minister Ashkenazi – opinion הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Now Is the Time for an Israeli Diplomatic Initiative, Not Annexation הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and the Environment in the Mediterranean Basin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Middle East Rediscovers the Jews הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite its undeniable standing as a sustainable regional power, Israel continues to conduct itself like a state battling for survival. While the state’s key challenges lie in the field of diplomacy and soft power, its politicians present them through a military prism even as security experts caution that military might cannot solve Israel’s fundamental problems.

Israel has been the strongest power in the region and one of the strongest in the world for years. You and your colleagues in the defense establishment are responsible for that remarkable achievement that turned the burning embers of the Holocaust into a Jewish regional power in a relatively short time in historical perspective.

Nonetheless, as the Americans found out in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, even the strongest military in the world lacks solutions to modern challenges. The IDF, which enjoys its strongest advantage ever over our enemies, cannot achieve a decisive victory because that term no longer applies in the modern battlefield.

Whether in terms of relations with our enemies or the ability to translate our military might into a better life for our people, the solutions all lie in the diplomatic arena. Diplomacy also plays a decisive role for Israel’s export-oriented economy that owes its international standing to its innovative capacity. With most challenges becoming increasingly global – pandemics, climate change, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the response can only be found in the diplomatic arena, not in military arsenals.

Nonetheless, from its infancy, successive Israeli prime ministers have weakened the Foreign Ministry for various reasons, some political (from the days of Ben Gurion’s clashes with Sharett and up to the present), others stemming from our survival complex. We have always opted to look for answers in the wrong place. In recent years, the situation has deteriorated. The Foreign Ministry has sustained deep budget cuts, with many of its tasks outsourced to other ministries and its unique expertise in the international arena excluded from the decision-making process on core issues of diplomacy.

While cabinet meetings always include presentations and assessments by military officers, who often also propose solutions, the Foreign Ministry is largely absent, and its professional opinions are not heard. The explanation for this phenomenon is also to be found in the Foreign Ministry itself, which has grown accustomed to staying out of issues that touch on politics, although every core issue obviously has a political bearing, and often vice versa. Foreign Ministry staff have come to believe that their role is limited to conveying to the world decisions made by other people in other ministries. Rather than having significant impact on decision making, the Foreign Ministry has positioned itself as an agency dedicated to public diplomacy and logistics abroad.

You served as chief-of-staff when the IDF adopted a courageous professional stance against an Israeli attack on Iran, which had a decisive effect on the Prime Minister’s decision. On the other hand, it is hard to think of a position taken by the Foreign Ministry that differed from that of decision makers, simply because the Ministry preferred to wait for diplomatic instructions rather than contribute to shaping them.

Diplomats, like military officers, are obviously bound by the decisions of the elected echelon, but their job is also to represent their professional stand with determination and to ensure that their familiarity with the global arena is taken into consideration.

As for substance, following are the issues of the highest priority.

The Foreign Ministry’s most important role is to advance the peace agreements with our neighbors, and in that context, the most urgent priority is to ensure that in the window of time between July and November, no unilateral moves are made that irrevocably exclude a future arrangement based on the two-state principle. The twostate solution is essential to Israel’s preservation as the democratic nation state of the Jewish people, as well as to our strategic relations with Jordan, Egypt and the pro-Western, anti-jihadist axis in the Middle East. Unilateral moves would also undermine the lifesaving security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the PA’s ability to administer the lives of millions of Palestinians, whose lives we have no interest in running. It is also vital that we maintain the potential for bilateral and regional channels to an accommodation with the Palestinians rather than having these issues dealt with by the International Criminal Court and various BDS arenas.

Bipartisanship has constituted the basis for Israel’s special standing with successive US administrations, Congress and public opinion. In recent years, Israel is being perceived as affiliated with the Republican Party, dealing a fatal blow to the special relationship with the world’s leading power. The loss of bipartisan support also severely undermines our ties with US Jewry, our most important Diaspora community, the majority of which backs the Democrats and steers clear of Israel.

The vast majority of world Jewry, and especially in North America, is gradually distancing itself from Israel, put off by the state’s growing tendency toward segregation, extremism, and its reluctance to accept the different streams of Judaism, their needs, views and concerns. Israel’s political establishment tends to prefer ties with Christian evangelists and Orthodox Jews and to treat liberal Jewish communities that make up the vast majority of US Jewry, as irrelevant at best and as non-Jews in the worst-case scenario. This poses an immediate and present danger to the cohesion of the Jewish people, its links with the State of Israel and to a large extent the security of the state, which also relies on the solidarity of Diaspora Jewry with Israel.

Government policy of recent years distances the State of Israel from the Zionist vision of a model, egalitarian society that protects the rights of minorities and empowers the disadvantaged. These values are the foundation on which Israel’s innate alliance with liberal democratic states rests. However, the erosion of this foundation is generating growing aloofness on the part of democratic, liberal nations toward Israel. The government clearly prefers alliances with states led by dictators, nationalists and racists, among them some with anti-Semitic past and/or current anti-Semitic leanings. This process directly endangers the Jewish communities in those countries, where minority rights are crucial for the Jews, both morally and strategically.

In summing up, I urge you to treat the Foreign Minister’s role as an unusual opportunity to influence Israel’s future significantly, to make a difference as a politician and to make your mark on history. Your success is our success, and the sooner you achieve it, the better.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A Letter to Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the 1990s, Qatar was one of the first Arab states to open a diplomatic mission in Israel and allow Israel to open a commercial office on its territory. With the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, relations were suspended, and even when operations of the Israeli trade office were resumed in Qatar in the mid-2000s and when Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni conducted an official visit to Qatar, relations were no longer the same. Qatari media adopted a harsh and highly critical tone on Israel, and the regime feared warmer ties would undermine the united Arab stance against normalization with Israel absent an IsraeliPalestinian agreement. In the days of the Arab Spring, Qatar openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood and significantly strengthened its links with Turkey, further exacerbating the distrust between Jerusalem and Doha.

The opportunity to improve Israel-Qatar relations arose, of all times, at the height of Israel’s deep crisis with the Gaza Strip. A strange deal was forged between Hamas – a number of whose leaders were being hosted by Qatar after leaving Syria during the civil war, the Qatari regime – which sought to extricate itself from regional isolation and improve its image in Washington, and Israel – which needed a mediator to restore calm and help alleviate the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Leaders in Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were likely displeased with the arrangement. Egyptian and Gulf media devoted extensive coverage to news of a rare visit by the head of the Mossad to Doha in February 2020, as revealed by Yisrael Beitenu party Chair Avigdor Liberman, wondering whether Israel was seeking closer ties with Qatar. So far, this pragmatic cooperation between Israel and Qatar, based on the shared interests of all parties involved, has not undermined Israel’s growing rapprochement with other Sunni states.

Nonetheless, by allowing Qatar to play an increasingly significant role in the Gaza Strip, is Israel developing a dependence on the emirate and subsuming reality in the territories to Doha’s wishes? For now, there is no alternative to the Qatari funds keeping the heads of Gaza’s residents above water. However, it is important to realize that this money also perpetuates Hamas’ rule in Gaza, deepens the Islamist movement’s entrenchment in its unyielding attitude toward reconciliation with Fatah and, in fact, undermines domestic Palestinian unity. The Netanyahu government apparently believes that its current “divide and rule” policy serves it well. That explains why Israel has not returned to the negotiating table. Netanyahu believes that the Palestinian issue is no longer on the agenda and that relations with most Arab states can be advanced even without negotiations and compromises.

Reality proves the opposite. Israel is not an island, nor a villa encircled by walls in the middle of the jungle. Israel needs cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in order to advance its interests in the region. The Palestinian issue remains on the table and the absence of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still hampers establishment of diplomatic relations and expansion of partnerships between Israel and most states in the Arab and Muslim world. Visits by Israeli athletes and diplomats in the Gulf are nice to have, but the potential for cooperation with the Gulf States, as well as with Israel’s immediate neighbors Egypt and Jordan, is far greater.

Israel needs a broad regional policy to guide it and enable the promotion of its interests not only in the short term, but in the long one, too. Relations with Doha are possible to have, but Israel must be cautious and approach them with its eyes wide open, given that Qatar’s foreign policy contradicts what Israel believes and would like to see in the Middle East. The Qatari gifts carry a price tag: Aid for Gaza is not just aid for Gaza – it is also a contribution to strengthening the regional Islamist alliance (Qatar-Turkey-Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya), and only a temporary solution to Gaza’s distress. Gaza does not require band aids. What is required is a complex and comprehensive solution, in coordination with regional states that are confronting Islamist terrorism, which will also eventually provide a channel for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

הפוסט Israel and Qatar Focus on Shared Interests, Setting Aside Differences הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Despite the local turmoil, 2019 saw no significant changes in terms of diplomatic relations between Israel and Iraq. Neither was there any development in the economic arena, where ties between the states remain non-existent.

However, Israel’s perception of Iraq as a security challenge went up a notch. After ignoring Iraq for several years, Prime Minister Netanyahu and senior defense officials changed course in 2019. They know Iraq is an important part of the supply route of ballistic and other weapons from Iran to the front with Israel. Israel also closely monitors the construction of a military base near the Syria-Iraq border, and last summer, several fatal drone attacks conducted against Shiite militia bases in Baghdad and deep in Iraqi territory were attributed to Israel. These were the first strikes on Iraq for which Israel took responsibility in almost 40 years; their predecessor is, of course, Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981.

Yet Iraq’s official response was meek. The investigative committee that was appointed belatedly determined that Israel was responsible. However, the Iraqi government did not commit to a response. It was embarrassed and portrayed as weak. The militias, for their part, adopted increasingly harsh rhetoric against Israel, but Iraqi civilians condemned the manner in which Iran sought to turn their country into a wrestling ring with the US and Israel.

The Kurdish region has not taken part in the countrywide protests but, given its dependence on developments in Baghdad, it has been affected nonetheless. Not unexpectedly, Kurdish efforts to repair ties with Iran negatively impacted Israeli-Kurdish relations, at the same time as Israeli-Iraqi relations took tentative steps forward.

In the civilian, cultural and identity arenas some progress has been made, and there is currently more interaction between Israelis and Iraqis, although not on the official level. The Iraqi political elite is bound to Iran on the Israel issue, but this has not prevented a grassroots, people-to-people model of “winning hearts and minds”. Significantly, this trend continued and even intensified after the demonstrations in Iraq broke out. Privately, through social media and rare visits, a growing number of Iraqis express desire for ties with Israel after their country undergoes change. They also plead with Israel to support them by harming Iran. The protesters refrain from publicly identifying with Israel, due to claims by the regime that the protesters are backed and funded by Israel – but tellingly, anti-Israel expressions are extremely marginal.

Israel backs this trend. Notably, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a Facebook page “Israel in Iraqi Dialect”, a unique, first-of-its-kind effort, in late 2018. The Arabic-language page is aimed at encouraging discourse with the Iraqi people, and it gained huge momentum in 2019, especially after expressing clear sympathy for the protesters, who responded with appreciation. Today the page boasts some 292,000 followers. Meanwhile, four delegations from Iraq visited Israel in 2019 as guests of the Foreign Ministry, and Iraqis were also included in another visiting Arab delegation.

In that sense, it can perhaps be said that official Israel “discovered” Arab Iraq in 2019. Whereas Israeli declarations of solidarity were previously directed mainly at the Kurds and their aspirations, no such declarations were issued in 2019. Yet July 2019 saw another leap in messages from Israel to Iraq.

First Israel’s Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, publicly wished the Iraqi people well and expressed his desire for increased cooperation with them. The nature of his Facebook video sought to bypass the government and avoid a direct appeal to the regime. In November, after the wave of protests began, Katz issued a message of support for “the Iraqi people” and their justified demands. And in December, Netanyahu condemned the massacre of protesters carried out by militias in Baghdad and blamed Iran for the bloodshed. Israel’s senior echelons view the protests as an opportunity to challenge Iran – but to date Israel is the only state in the region to have expressed support for the protesters and their demands.

A threat remains, however, After the Foreign Ministry leaked news of the visits in April, discussions began in Iraq regarding normalization of ties with Israel. Yet the militias took the most radical line against the issue, and threats facing Iraqis who meet with Israelis are both serious and tangible.

Today, Iraq stands at an internal crossroads; the direction it takes is bound to impact its relations with Israel. If the protests are suppressed with active Iranian support, Iraq will inevitably become Iran’s first “proxy state” in the region. If Baghdad is, de facto, ruled by the commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ al-Quds force, the puppet regime in Baghdad will be almost wholly unable to resist Iranian demands.

Should this happen, repercussions will be felt mostly in the realm of security. For example, Iran could move ballistic equipment to Syria without interruption – and perhaps even use Iraq as a launch pad.

A continued status quo between the government and the protesters in Iraq will further weaken the government, which is already forced to lean on Iran as its sole source of support. The little legitimacy it retains will disappear. Iraq will sink into political paralysis and selfcenteredness, and will lose even more of its importance as a factor and target for improved relations with Israel. But if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the regime, an opportunity will open up for Israel. The deep anti-Iranian sentiment underpinning the protests will lead the state’s new rulers to distance themselves from Tehran. The new Iraq will seek new regional allies that respect the change it has undergone, which would align satisfyingly with Israeli interests.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The 2019 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The recording of the conference can be watched here. 

הפוסט The UN’s Call for a Global Ceasefire: Can It Help Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(originally published by IAI)

הפוסט The New Israeli Government: Preliminary Implications and Long-Term Effects הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Challenges and Opportunities for Gaza: A Mediterranean Perspective הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Jordan: Continued Deterioration / Yitzhak Gal
Israel-Egypt: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness? / Dr. Haim Koren
Israel-UAE: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs/ Dr. Moran Zaga
Israel-Morocco: Warming from the Bottom Up / Einat Levi
Israel-Iraq: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming / Dr. Ronen Zeidel

הפוסט Israel’s Relations with Key Arab States in 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To read the full document, click here

(Originally published in the Palestine-Israel Journal)

הפוסט Beyond the Trump Plan: How Can the International Community Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Role of Economy in US Efforts to Promote Israeli-Arab Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The gas field was discovered in the year 2000 some 36kms offshore at a depth of 600 meters. Estimated to hold about 1 TCF, making it smaller than other fields discovered in the region, the Marine field is commercially viable. The reservoir was discovered by British Gas, which was subsequently bought by Shell. Once it transpired that prospects of developing it were slim, Shell sold its share to the PA, which is currently the largest owner along with the Palestinian-Lebanese Consolidated Contractors Company.

Many contacts were held over the years about possible development of the Marine reservoir, with Israel’s involvement, but nothing came of them largely for political reasons. Once Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, attempts to move forward the possible exploitation of the gas field came to a halt. These were renewed in 2013 around the efforts, ultimately unsuccessful, by then-Secretary of State John Kerry to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Reported interest on the part of Russia and Energean Oil & Gas did not mature into concrete steps. Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz was quoted as telling participants of a January 2020 EMGF meeting in Cairo that contacts were underway between Israel and the Palestinians regarding possible gas sales to the PA in the West Bank, including the possible development of the Marine field. No additional details were announced and the Palestinian response was on the chilly side.

It is worth examining the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians in this regard. Israel’s interest in reaching an arrangement on Gaza to prevent further military clashes is obvious.

The Netanyahu government has in recent years expressed trust in possible long-term understandings with Hamas. Such a view fits in with the idea of “economic peace” that Netanyahu is promoting and is also in tune with the Trump plan (even though the plan is not expected to generate a real diplomatic process). In this context, there is also a convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt, which allows tight coordination of positions. Both states are interested in preventing escalation with Gaza and in progressing toward a longterm arrangement.

On the Palestinian side there are two players. The Hamas movement, which has adapted itself to the changes in the Middle East following the Arab Spring and to its room for maneuver vis-à-vis Egypt, is interested in an arrangement that would guarantee its control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas is seeking to achieve this goal in a way that would also provide it flexibility within the Palestinian arena in the future. As far as the PA is concerned, its weakness is clear, intensified by the waning days of Mahmoud Abbas. An arrangement over Gaza that would allow leadership by the PA, including progress on developing the Marine gas field, would serve its interests.

The obstacles and difficulties facing progress in developing the gas field are clear and significant. These include: Control of Gaza by Hamas, a terrorist organization and concern over empowering it at the expense of the PA; the absence of a diplomatic process between Israel and the PA and the deep mistrust between the sides; and the internal Palestinian political split between the PA and Hamas.

However, regional circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean are creating an opening for positive change. In recent years, a roadmap for potential cooperation in this region is taking shape, based on the discovery of natural gas as well as the repercussions of the Arab Spring. The most prominent institutional expression of the emerging regional structure is the EMGF, established in Cairo in early 2019, which is undergoing international institutionalization this year. It currently includes seven members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the PA, and is supported by the EU and the US. The participation of the Palestinians in this forum is significant, and serves a clear Egyptian interest, which is also acceptable to Israel. The gas forum could serve to develop the Palestinian gas field from both a diplomatic and energy perspective.

From a diplomatic perspective – developing the gas filed under the umbrella of the EMGF could provide a convenient framework for the relevant players – Israel, the Palestinians and Egypt. It could be regarded, rightly so, as an expression of regional cooperation based on converging interests.

From an energy point of view – a possible link of the gas field to Egypt, which constitutes a key diplomatic and energy player, could help resolve various disagreements and sensitivities. Egypt is interested in boosting its status as a regional energy hub, which also serves the Israeli interest (for now). Shell, which sold its share in the Marine field is still active in the region (it holds a 30 percent share of the Cypriot Aphrodite gas field) and owns liquefaction facilities in Egypt.

What should Israel do?

Accelerate diplomatic moves to reach an arrangement over Gaza – this requires aligning positions and consulting with Egypt, and renewal of activity vis-à-vis Hamas and the PA, including on the issue of the Marine gas field development. Israel must restore trust with the PA and make it clear that it wants to restore the PA to a leading and more prominent role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip;

Mobilize US support – Israel must update the US administration regarding its thinking on the development of the gas field as part of the arrangement with Gaza and ensure its support;

Create an economic-energy discourse on Palestinian gas – restore the development of the gas field to a high place on the agenda of the relevant players, including energy companies, and stir up their renewed diplomatic and economic interest in this issue;

Re-examine key issues – should Israel advance a direct link of the Gaza field to Egypt, for example to the pipeline through which Israel already exports gas to Egypt (if this is technically feasible) and thereby circumvent Palestinian disinterest and distrust of what could be considered an Israeli takeover of the gas? Can it be useful to also add a Cyprus angle to this endeavor, for example through involvement of Shell company?

Reaching a long-term arrangement between Israel and Gaza requires a complex and complicated process. Development of Gaza’s offshore gas field could and should constitute a concrete catalyst for such a process, as it addresses key interests of the relevant players. This idea also promotes a vision of regional, Mediterranean cooperation, in which the international community plays an important role in attempts to stabilize a bloody conflict.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Potential in Developing Gaza’s Offshore Gas Field הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel is wrong in depicting the EU as hostile to Israel, and the new government would do well to shift direction. The EU is a strategic ally of Israel – in trade and economy, in diplomacy and security, in technology and tourism, in research and culture. The EU’s criticism targets Israel’s policy on the Palestinians and is not inherently anti-Israel as some portray it. The EU opposes the settlements and Israel’s annexation intentions. It also encourages differentiation between the Palestinian territories and Israel, but by no means does it advocate a boycott of Israel.

The growing divisions among EU member states in recent years have undermined European consensus on a variety of foreign policy issues, among them the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu’s European supporters, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has eroded democracy in his own country, are actively engaged in thwarting EU criticism of Israeli policy in the territories. The EU Foreign Affairs Council has not adopted joint resolutions on Israel since mid-2016. Europe’s focus on more urgent challenges, such as refugees, Brexit and now the coronavirus – is also a contributing factor in this regard.

However, Europe is unwilling to ignore Netanyahu’s annexation intentions. The heads of the EU and key member states are finding ways to circumvent internal divisions in order to convey protests, opposition and warnings to Israel: Outspoken remarks by the EU new foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, joint declarations by European members of the UN Security Council, coordinated protests delivered to the Israeli Foreign Ministry by European ambassadors representing states with similar policy views, and cooperation with other international bodies, such as the Arab League, which also oppose annexation.

EU representatives have made use of all these tools in recent weeks. They have expressed unequivocal opposition to annexation, stressed that it would violate international law, recommended that Israel avoid doing so, and some even warned of legal consequences and deterioration of their relations with Israel. Countries like France, Belgium and Luxembourg have been working to place the issue on the agenda of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, calling on the EU to spell out punitive measures against Israeli annexation.

Nevertheless, also due to internal divisions, Europe seems to be waiting to see the nature and extent of Netanyahu’s annexation decision before presenting concrete reactions and a real price tag.

The differences in European approaches are evident in the phrasing of declarations. France, Ireland and Sweden, for example, express themselves in harsher fashion. Borrell, too, is outspoken, but the fact that he does not represent at this stage a unified stance of all member states weakens the significance of his remarks. At the same time, Borrell is seeking to boost EU ties with Jordan, which he identifies as a key state in regards to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.

Israel has become accustomed to viewing Europe as a weakened entity in the international arena and to dismissing its protests. However, this attitude could turn out to be wrong if Israel decides to take a formal annexation step, which many in Europe would regard as a game changer. Key European leaders might advance measures within EU institutions and elsewhere that would exact a toll on Israel. However, other than a threat of “sticks”, the EU is also offering “carrots” in the event that Israel chooses to progress toward a two-state solution. In 2013, the EU offered a significant upgrade of relations with Israel to that of a Special Privileged Partnership if it makes peace with the Palestinians. It is time to examine this offer, to which Israel has yet to respond, in a positive light.

That, in turn, requires a change in the new Israeli government’s attitude toward the EU. The new government should regard the EU as a friend and partner, and cease EU bashing. It should support a strong EU that plays a key role in the international arena and prioritize ties with those European states that are guided by liberal democratic values. The government should seek to renew its high-level political dialogue with the EU and reconvene the Israel-EU Association Council, which has been suspended since 2012. It should also welcome EU involvement in efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, including European support to pro-peace and pro-democracy civil society organizations.

However, recalibrating Israel-EU relations will not be possible while Israel is promoting annexation. These two things do not go together. Israel’s new foreign minister should indeed convey a new message to the Europeans as he takes office – of partnership and friendship, commitment to democratic values, willingness for dialogue and openness to criticism – but at the same time he should seek to block annexation. Not only because of European opposition, but primarily out of concern for Israel’s national interests, democratic character, and quest for peace.

הפוסט Israel, the EU and Annexation Intentions הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Al-Kadhimi was appointed against the backdrop of Iraq’s political crisis, which is also turning into an economic crisis with the global drop in oil prices. Widespread demonstrations were held in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities between October 2019 and February 2020 protesting political developments and Iran’s hegemony. For now, the protest has subsided due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Even before the crisis, the protesters had failed to impose an alternative on the existing political system. They failed to take advantage of the US support they received and of the assassinations of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis to achieve their political goals.

Iraq is run behind the scenes by political blocs led by unelected figures, who divide the state’s resources among themselves and employ politicians to preserve the system. Since 2018, the main godfathers of the system have been Hadi al-Amiri (who heads the Fatah bloc of parties and commands the Badr militia) and Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Iran is the sponsor and patron of this alliance between al-Amiri, al-Sadr and the others. At the same time, the escalation continued between the Shiite militias and US military forces deployed in Iraq, prompted by attempts to avenge the killing of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, mostly on the part of the Hezbollah movement in Iraq that al-Muhandis led. The escalation perpetuated the “spin” started by Soleimani in order to divert public attention from the protests toward a “patriotic” goal of achieving US withdrawal from Iraq. That, in turn, dragged Iraq into a regional Iranian-American conflict that only few want.

In fact, until March 2020, Iran was satisfied with the status quo that prevailed in Iraq. The protest had died down and the state was being ruled by a weak acting prime minister, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who resigned in December 2019. At that point, a new candidate entered the arena, posing a threat to the militias and Iran. Adnan al-Zurfi obtained the support of the Shiite religious establishment (the Marja’iya) and of the US (he is an American citizen). Iraq’s Kurdish President Barham Salih was quick to enthusiastically approve the appointment. AlZurfi had previously served as governor of Najaf Province. During his term, he led a determined campaign against the parties and militias that have previously ruled the province. Many in Iraq regarded him as an ideal candidate and hoped he would manage to form a government. Had he run in elections, there is little doubt he would have been elected. At the time, he laid out his guiding principles, pledging to place all weapons in the hand of the state, put on trial those responsible for killing protesters, put in place an “Iraq first” policy and keep Iraq out of regional conflicts. His candidacy was of great concern to the pillars of the existing political system in Iraq, and they were quick to act.

Initially, many in this political system supported al-Zurfi, probably due to a combination of an illusion that they could continue to rule through him and a desire to weaken rivals within the system. When they realized that al-Zurfi was no puppet, they were quick to shift course. Initially, senior Iranian officials visited Iraq and then a meeting was held of representatives of all the Shiite parties, at which a decision was made to withdraw support for al-Zurfi and hand it to al-Kadhimi, with Iran’s blessing, of course. The Sunnis and Kurds were quick to follow, also transferring support to al-Kadhimi. On April 9, al-Zurfi announced he was withdrawing, attributing his decision to “internal and external elements”.

Implications for Israel

Iraq is the largest and most populous Arab state east of Israel. Many Iraqis want links with Israel, for various reasons: Renewed interest in the now defunct Iraqi Jewish community, and admiration for Israel as a democracy with impressive scientific achievements as well as an enemy of Iran (and as such, a potential ally for the many Iraqis hostile to Iran).

Official Israel discovered this new Iraqi climate recently and started to communicate with the Iraqi public mostly via social media. Over the past year, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has joined the effort to encourage contacts and discourse. In 2019, several Iraqi delegations visited Israel as did Iraqi members of other delegations. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis follow the Foreign Ministry’s Arab-language social media pages, and most of them express positive views. One of these pages, “Israel in Iraqi dialect” is designed especially for IsraeliIraqi dialogue. In November 2019, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned the massacre of Iraqi protesters by pro-Iran forces. Before him, Foreign Minister Israel Katz expressed support for the protesters and their demands. Israel thus became the only state in the region to express solidarity with the Iraqi protesters.

Al-Kadhimi is a worthy candidate for prime minister and his appointment could create an unprecedented opportunity for an Israeli link with Iraq’s top political echelons. Al-Kadhimi is essentially pro-Western, a true liberal, articulate in English and his circles offer significant potential for channels to Israel. Iran and its supporters were forced to endorse a candidate for the premiership who as recently as January was accused of having a role in Soleimani’s assassination and was dubbed an “American agent”. Several weeks ago, as head of the security services, he ordered the arrest of commanders in the Iraqi Hezbollah militias. AlKadhimi now has a month to form a government and win parliamentary approval. If he succeeds, he is supposed to govern for about a year until elections are held.

However, one must not lose sight of the fact that al-Kadhimi was not elected; he was appointed by Iran’s supporters in Iraqi politics. He will have to behave himself and avoid risks. Iran’s backers will test him over the next month, for example by engineering confrontations with US forces. He will have to restrain himself. They also have contingency plans in case he turns out not to be weak enough: They will not vote for the government he forms and try to keep Caretaker Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi in power until the elections. If al-Kadhimi succeeds at some point after his official appointment as premier in freeing himself from the binds of his sponsors, Israel will be handed a true opportunity for a new horizon in its ties with Iraq. This will not happen without greater US involvement (perhaps Israeli, too) in Iraqi politics.

הפוסט The Political Situation in Iraq: An Opportunity for Israel? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The EU is based on a common market which removes economic and national borders, enabling the free passage of goods, services, capital and people. The Coronavirus crisis has resulted in uncoordinated, unsynchronized closures of national borders, hampering the passage of goods and people and undermining the EU’s integrative vision. Following the debt crisis (2009), immigration crisis (2015) and Brexit (2016), will the Coronavirus pandemic result in spillback or even the dismantling of the European integration project?

The EU was slow to react to the crisis and initially has been blamed for some failures in dealing with it. As usual, it provided a convenient punching bag, especially for those who fail to understand the limitations to its competence. Health policy is made and carried out by member states, not by Brussels. It was unrealistic to aspire or expect that in these times of chaos and pandemic fright the slow-moving, cumbersome organization would successfully coordinate emergency policy for its 27 member states, which can each respond far more quickly and effectively themselves. Brussels’ initial coordination attempts failed, and each member state adopted a different strategy at a different time. Coordination among the states was clearly lacking, as was the initial lack of solidarity, reflected for example in a halt to medical equipment exports to Italy.

When hospitals in Italy were collapsing, urgently needing life-saving protection equipment, Germany, France and additional member states where the epidemic had not yet spread suspended exports of these items. European solidarity was exposed as a hollow slogan, anchored in the Lisbon Treaty but not in European hearts. National instincts predominated. Even if Brussels thought in terms of Europe, EU member states thought of themselves and the competence was, as mentioned, in their hands. It was only several weeks later that manifestations of solidarity emerged, such as transferring Coronavirus patients on respirators from northern Italy to hospitals in Germany. The initial impression, however, was seared in the minds of Italians who desperately needed help and did not get it.

In addition to the absence of solidarity on health-related issues, economic solidarity was also lacking. Italy and other states asked the Eurozone’s finance ministers to approve “Coronavirus bonds”, meaning that the 19 members of the currency bloc would pool some of their debt. The Dutch and German refusal to share in the debt burden of southern European states generated anger, bitterness and disappointment in Italy, Spain and other countries. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen eventually apologized to the Italians on behalf of the other Europeans for failing to render assistance when their state’s health system collapsed. This was an unusual move, but perhaps too little, too late.

In April, the EU was able to cut back some of its losses and even record several achievements. The bloc was quick to regain its composure, quickly shifting to new and creative solutions. Lessons have clearly been learned from previous crises. The European Central Bank was quick to spend 750 billion euros in bond purchase, and the European Commission redirected 37 billion euros from the EU’s budget (which totals some 165 billion euro in 2020) to fighting the pandemic’s repercussions. Aid packages for the 27 member states and their 450 million residents total some 4 billion euros.

The Commission has also launched a joint procurement agreement of medical equipment for the member states and is working on EU-funded construction of joint medical equipment stockpiles. Moreover, the EU has allocated 140 million euros for Coronavirus research, to work on a vaccine and other interim solutions. In addition, the EU’s policy and legislation banning and limiting state-aid has been suspended, and a green light was given to EU member states (under the European Commission’s supervision) to increase their deficits in order to help business and citizens.

The Coronavirus crisis is not only a health crisis. It is a mega-crisis with harsh economic aspects. It is also a crisis of governance and a challenge to democracy. Changes to one’s lifestyle beget changes in perceptions, ideas and identity. The epidemic once again pits the skeptics and critics of the European integration project against its supporters, bolstering the populists and mainly the nationalists.

The Coronavirus crisis has exposed the EU’s weakness in dealing with member states not committed to the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban pushed through emergency legislation made possible under the Coronavirus crisis that allows him and his government to take action and pass laws without parliamentary oversight. The legislation, with no stipulated deadline, is akin to suspending democracy in Hungary. Although the crisis entails intrusions of privacy in many countries, no democracy in Europe or elsewhere has adopted such harsh measures. The EU is based on values of democracy, the rule of law and human and civil rights, but Orban’s move generated only a feeble response on the part of the EU and its member states. This type of challenge has hovered over the EU for several years and demands a determined response. Weak actions undermine the EU and testify to its institutional inadequacy and its normative frailty.

The economic crisis will affect the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy, too. China, where the epidemic originated, responded forcefully and blocked it relatively fast and effectively. At the height of the crisis in Italy, when its neighbors refrained from providing it with medical equipment, China sent tens of tons of medical equipment as well as medical teams. This gave China points in Italian public opinion, as the EU was losing ground. China’s economic activity has almost reverted to its pre-Coronavirus level; in Europe, the epidemic hit harder and the economy will take longer to recover. From a broader perspective, Europe, which has been experiencing an economic decline, is losing points to China in the global competition.

And what about Israel? The EU’s voice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has faded in any case in recent years. Since 2016, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been mobilizing his opportunistic European friends, who are interested to ram Brussels, in order to block EU resolutions critical of Israel. Instead, the EU has only been reiterating consensual decisions adopted in the past. When the number of Coronavirus fatalities in Europe soars, the foreign policy “guns” fall silent. The Coronavirus-induced crisis, weakening Europe and diverting global attention, may weaken the European response to Israeli annexation measures that will be presented as implementing the Trump plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Europe has been hit the hardest by the Coronavirus. Over 100,000 of the virus’ 180,000 known fatalities are EU citizens. For now, it does not appear the EU will be one of the epidemic’s victims, but public confidence in some of its systems has been substantially undermined and some of its “pre-existing conditions” have erupted and intensified. The EU has been weakened both internally and externally, but it is fighting back and the final word in the European integration project is far from being said.

An efficient, functioning international system is vital to confront surging nationalist sentiment. The cross-border Coronavirus does not distinguish between race and color and fighting it requires internal European cooperation. The EU has displayed resilience in bouncing back from its initial hesitant and uncoordinated response. However, the decisive question in the wake of the crisis is whether European leaders and citizens view the EU as a political or merely an economic functional project. In this context, it is too soon to chart the balance of EU losses and wins in the Coronavirus crisis.

הפוסט The EU in Times of Coronavirus: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Germany – and other European countries – could have taken this step seven years ago, when Hezbollah’s military arm was banned by EU in 2013. Perhaps, if it had then banned all Hezbollah’s activities on its soil, both military and “political,” Germany would not have turned into an operational hub for Hezbollah and enabled the network of over 1,000 activists.

Today Berlin had discovered what was well known for quite a while to Israel and the Arab Gulf states – there is no distinction between Hezbollah’s military and “political” wings. There is only one Hezbollah – murderous, poisonous, and dangerous.

Now, it is time for the European Union and other countries around the world to ban Hezbollah in its entirety.

Four years ago, the members of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) classified Hezbollah as terrorist organization, a decision adopted by the Arab League.

GCC Secretary-General Abdullatif al-Zayani then accused Hezbollah of committing “hostile acts” against GCC states, including recruiting young men to carry out “terrorist attacks, smuggling weapons and explosives, stirring up sedition and incitement to chaos and violence.”

Did Europe really think back then that Hezbollah, which had already performed an act of terrorism on its soil by killing innocent Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012, would stop there? Of course, Hezbollah continued its nefarious behavior.

It has been a known fact for quite some time that Hezbollah’s operations in Europe, as well as in Latin America includes drug trafficking, illicit tobacco trade, money laundering, recruitment and fundraising, with the revenues directed to Lebanon to fund terrorist attacks and arms procurement.

Hezbollah – which faithfully fulfills Iran’s orders – has destroyed Lebanon, creating a state within a state, and has sown death and destruction in Syria, acting on behalf of its Iranian master while using foreign countries with lenient policies to promote their goal.

Yet, the world was exceptionally slow to react to this immediate threat and many important players continued to insist on artificial and ridiculous distinction between its military and the “political” wings, even when Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah was laughing loudly about this distinction.

“Just as a joke, I propose that our ministers in the next government be from the military wing of Hezbollah,” he said during a televised speech in 2013, following the EU’s designation Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist organization.

Indeed, both political and military wings of this organization are united by the same murderous ideology, created and funded by Iran. There is no disparity between them.

As expected, Iran was not happy with this development. Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council went as far as saying that “ISIS failed to reach Europe because it was defeated by Resistance groups such as Hezbollah.”

Naturally, Iran would want the world to think that “an enemy of an enemy is my friend.” Hopefully, no one will fall for this trap. ISIS is a danger to humanity, but so is Iran that continuously threatens regional security, pushing for more destruction and death through its many tentacles.

Not only Germany, but also countries in Latin America such as Argentina, Colombia and Brazil have recently decided to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and change the legislation respectively. These countries have seen for themselves how deep Hezbollah has penetrated, and how dangerous it is. Along with Israel and the Arab states, these countries have a long and painful experience of combating Hezbollah.

Everyone should know, that when Hezbollah traffics drugs, illicit tobacco, weapons or diamonds through Hamburg port or through porous borders in Latin America or East Africa, this dirty money will be later used to send rockets on the civilian population in Israel, kill more Syrians, and perform terror attacks in Europe or Arab states. That’s why the EU and countries around the world should follow the example of Germany and put the entire Hezbollah on its terror list, in an effort to eradicate Hezbollah’s power and global presence.

(originally published in Al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Now is the time for the EU to put all of Hezbollah on its terror list הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Covid-19 pandemic has placed Israeli diplomats on the nation’s frontlines, particularly in helping obtain medical equipment and bringing home Israelis stranded abroad. Although the Foreign Ministry has had to withstand the erosion of its authority and budget, efforts to undermine it and the deterioration of its staff’s working conditions in recent years, Israeli diplomats have been operating relentlessly to accomplish their assigned tasks, with some even contracting the disease.

The pandemic has challenged the core of the diplomatic profession. Diplomatic activity entails forging and developing ties with key economic, social and political figures in foreign states; the professional-personal relationships with those key figures is a crucial element in achieving the tasks assigned by Jerusalem. For instance, such relationships made it possible to fly an experimental drug from Japan to treat Covid-19 patients in Israel, helped bring home Israeli travelers stranded in Peru, and freed a shipment of facemasks held up at an airport in Turkey.

The social distancing induced by the pandemic hampers Israeli diplomats’ ability to conduct the face-to-face meetings traditionally used to develop connections with foreign representatives. Within a very short period, all interpersonal communications have shifted to technology-mediated interaction. Whereas digital platforms served as a supplementary and targeted means in the diplomats’ toolbox in the pre-coronavirus era, at least in the short term, a sharp shift to digital-virtual diplomacy has been necessary. At present, diplomacy is only possible through technologically enabled means of communications. Reliance on digital-virtual platforms should not be perceived as a problem, but rather as an opportunity. The Foreign Ministry should take advantage of the Israeli spirit of entrepreneurship and Israeli technological pre-eminence to invent and lead new diplomatic communications, firstly for Israel’s Foreign Service and subsequently as an example to other diplomats around the world. Efficient implementation of this new form of diplomacy involves three key aspects.

First, planning communications with representatives in a foreign country must include all forms of communications: e-mail, social media platforms and video conferencing. Each suits a different part of the job and different type of relationship-building. For example, to initiate contact and send out feelers regarding shared values and interests, e-mail is preferable as it allows open-ended questions and ambivalent formulation (to the extent necessary). In order to conduct a conversation on sensitive or controversial issues, chat over a digital platform is preferable, because it makes saying “no” easier and the delayed response provides time to consult or find arguments and references to buttress the answer. The World Health Organization (WHO) provided an excellent example of why discussion of sensitive issues should be avoided on video conference when its representative simply hung up on a journalist who asked him about the role of Taiwan in confronting the pandemic. Video calls are best for strengthening personal ties, signaling empathy and reaching agreements, making them a unique form of communication in terms of content and significance. They have in fact become the “physical” meetings between diplomats in the coronavirus era.

Second, complete technological mastery in operating these tools and virtual platforms is a must. That includes simple tasks such as positioning cameras at the correct angle during a video call and silencing microphones when needed. Applications must be used correctly and technical mishaps, such as Boris Johnson’s inadvertent exposure of the dial-in code for the British cabinet’s Zoom meeting, must be avoided. Suddenly, diplomats have not only to control the tilt of their head or the perfect way to tie a bowtie. They must speedily learn the correct use of various technological tools.

Third, professionalism must be acquired in the intricacies of digital and virtual language. In this context, diplomats will have to learn how nuances and cross-cultural codes come across on digital media, such as WhatsApp or a video call, as opposed to during a face-to-face encounter. Should diplomats now employ emojis or GIFs in place of a smile and a slap on the back? On a video call, the choice will be between formal attire, replete with the Foreign Ministry logo and Israeli flag as a backdrop, and informal attire with family photos hanging on the walls, to emphasize common denominators and add a personal dimension to the interaction.

One of the major challenges posed by digital-virtual communications is information security, especially when the subject of the conversation is of a sensitive political or diplomatic nature. This challenge must be addressed in two ways: use of advanced technologies and information security tools, and mutual commitment to avoid revealing the contents of the discussion. Success in maintaining secrecy in a digital-virtual environment will likely raise the level of trust and as a result improve cooperation between the sides.

It is important to note that although a significant part of diplomatic communications will be digital-virtual from now on, this will not replace a diplomatic presence on the ground. Even in the current crisis, Israeli diplomats were required to show up physically at airports to ensure they accomplished their tasks, despite the danger involved. Diplomats’ presence at foreign posts will remain highly significant. Physical proximity enables first-hand comprehension of the climate, culture and reality that cannot be easily reflected in online research or big data tools. While digital-virtual communication will assist diplomacy and retain its newfound importance even once the pandemic is controlled, even now it is no alternative to a physical presence.

Just as companies, schools and universities have shifted to managing tasks and telelearning, once the new diplomacy is implemented, we may find that it yields faster, more precise and efficient results. We may even see negotiation processes and mobilization of political support in international institutions yielding better results when significant use is made of digital-virtual tools. Civil society organizations promoting dialogue between parties to a conflict have already achieved success in recent years through the use of new technologies to build trust and understanding. Now it is the turn of the official representatives to learn from them and bridge gaps. The coronavirus crisis is shaking up political and economic systems and its impact will be evident for a long time to come. Diplomacy is challenged by social distancing rules and diplomats are being forced to adapt to the new world, in an era in which foreign ministries are also challenged to adapt their activities to the rules of modern diplomacy. With the growing dominance of politicians as well as non-state actors in foreign relations, foreign ministries the world over are striving to justify their existence, redefine their mission and fight for relevance in decision-making processes. Diplomats must study the advantages and drawbacks of various technological tools and immediately adopt new and varied means of communications so they can continue carrying out their tasks.

For years, Israeli diplomacy marketed Israeli technological innovation and entrepreneurship to bolster Israel’s image abroad. In recent years, Israel has also demonstrated achievements in digital diplomacy, especially in creating new discourse channels with the citizens of Arab states.

The coronavirus pandemic offers Israeli diplomacy an opportunity to take another step forward and show that it can lead deep and significant change in forging innovative processes of communications to help it successfully implement Israeli foreign policy.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Coronavirus Crisis Offers Opportunities for Innovative Israeli Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

So the virus drastically changed our lives. First we were told that the “skies are closed”. Then they closed down the coffee houses, the theaters, the sports facilities. No more get togethers, no more work, no more restaurants, bars, music, dance or cinema. No more trips abroad. Just home sweet home. The world had stopped and it was telling us something – perhaps that we had gone too far, too quickly. And we must take a deep breath.

The pandemic did not only catch Israel by surprise, but unprepared. Even though the State Controller had issued a comprehensive report just a few years ago, warning of Israel’s lack of critical medical supplies in the face of a possible unexpected epidemic – the Government did not heed, and continued to allocate its budgets to other “worthy” causes, based on its preferential politics. Thus, when the virus started to spread, there was no plan of action, no strategy, no understanding as to who would be better organized to deal with the crisis on a large scale. There was a real lack of the medical supplies necessary for testing and not enough respiratory machines, not enough medical personnel.

But that was not the only virus Israel was suffering from. For the last year and half, this country has been plunged into a political crisis the kind of which we have not experienced before. Faced with a serious personal problem, acting Prime Minister Netanyahu who has been indicted of bribery, fraud and breach of trust, has done everything in his power to avoid justice and retain power. So he plunged the country into three consecutive rounds of national elections, thus practically and effectively paralyzing both the Parliament and the Executive. Netanyahu mobilized people against the very state institutions he is supposed to defend. In all election cycles he lambasted the judicial system and the police for doing their job; he attacked the media, pilloried the intellectuals, delegitimized the representatives of the Arab citizens and incited against them and depicted the left as traitors. During this whole period of time, Israel has lived with a transitional government while the Prime Minister took decisions without consulting the Parliament, thereby continuing to erode our democracy. Thus he decided, without consulting the Parliament, to apply Emergency Regulations which effectively gave him unlimited powers. This meant, inter alia, the permission to listen into the phone of any Israeli citizen.

That political situation was in fact ideal for him, because he could continue to rule, unbridled, and avoid going to court.

The corona crisis benefitted Netanyahu in so many ways, and he used it extensively. His dramatic nightly appearances on national television, giving the impression that he is the only responsible person mastering the situation amounted to a national campaign. Now that the third round of negotiations had given a slight advantage to his adversary, the leader of the “Blue and White “party, Benny Gantz, and negotiations to form a new Government were underway, Netanyahu needed to transform his image into “the father figure”, the only experienced leader. His nightly appearances sowing fear and panic among the population were effectively turned into a drama of biblical dimensions. But what also became clear was the unpreparedness of the medical establishment, the lack of coordination and disputes among Ministries, the conflicting daily orders. This is when the Ministry of Defense and the army stepped in, helping mainly in the most densely populated areas. The corona crisis here and elsewhere has underscored the importance of a centralized healthcare system and the State’s responsibility for the citizens’ health.

While the confinement policy had its positive results -compared to other countries we have had fewer victims of the virus- it took its terrible social and economic toll. Hundreds of thousands of people were fired; thousands of small businesses had to close down, with no prospect to ever reopen. Actors, singers, entertainers, the whole industry has been shut down and this for a very long time to come. Over a million and a half Israelis are unemployed and unable to pay their rent and their most elementary bills. Some cannot even buy food anymore. The Government voted an emergency fund, but so far no one has been compensated. The economic crisis is deep and will certainly last long after the virus is gone.

Under those circumstances the civil society mobilized. The corona has brought out the best in us: people have donated money to buy respiratory machines; tens of NGO’s have delivered food parcels to the old and needy, and thousands of volunteers are helping with errands those who cannot leave their homes; solidarity has been the order of the day; neighbors help each other, cook for each other.

Politically, the struggle for democracy has also been the order of the day. We all felt cheated and disappointed when the leader of the “Blue and White”, whose whole campaign had centered on barring a man indicted under the law with such serious charges from serving as prime minister, decided to join him. A movement called the “Black Flags” was born spontaneously, overnight. It started when 600,000 citizens who participated in a first virtual meeting on the internet, and then demonstrations were organized. We have all been able to overcome the strict orders against public gatherings by keeping a distance from each other, and thousands have turned out in our demonstrations in the past weeks. This struggle will continue.

The coalition agreement signed on the eve of our Holocaust Day is a total shame: in the midst of one of the worst economic crisis the government will number 36 ministers and 16 deputy Ministers (in a country much larger than Israel, Germany, there are only 16 ministers) it gives Netanyahu full immunity against a trial, and is about to amend the existing fundamental laws in order to allow it to function.

With “Blue and White” and the Labor Party having joined this coalition government led by Netanyahu, the Meretz party is the only leftwing Zionist party that has remained true to its values and principles. Together with the United (Arab) List, with whom we cooperate, we will be a determined and fighting opposition.

(originally published by Socialist International)

הפוסט In Israel: Of Corona and Politics הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Coronavirus crisis will pass. Humanity will eventually develop a vaccine and find the way to eradicate the virus or develop immunity to the pathogen. The global economy will be hard hit, as will ours, but will recover. The State of Israel is blessed with unusually creative forces that will eventually lead it out of the economic crisis stronger, more resilient and with greater prominence on the world stage.

On the other hand, the danger of annexation is irreversible – it will wipe out the Palestinian Authority and its life-saving security coordination with Israel, boost radical Palestinian forces and pose a real threat to one of Israel’s major strategic assets, the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom. Annexation will finalize the divorce between Israel and the US Democratic Party and deepen the alienation of the liberal progressive majority in the most important country in the world and Israel’s greatest ally.

Annexation will push away the majority of the US Jewish community and alienate most Diaspora Jewry, dealing a fatal blow to our existence as the nation state of the Jewish people. Europe, Israel’s most important trade partner, will lose interest in ties with a state that perpetuates occupation. The claim that the occupation was thrust upon us and cannot be ended absent a partner on the other side will shatter. Pro-Western Arab states with which we have a strategic partnership against Iran, ISIS and al-Qaida, will be unable to withstand popular pressure and growing hatred of Israel for burying prospects of a solution to the Palestinian issue, which continues to be a festering sore in the Muslim Arab world. The option of a bilateral solution will disappear and the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be dealt with by the International Criminal Court in The Hague and by the forces of BDS in civil society.

Yes, a number of friends will stand by our side – mostly members of the racist, populist alliance affiliated with the traditional anti-Semitic camp, which supports us now only because at this point in history they see Islam and Middle Eastern refugees as a greater threat to their ethnic purity than the Jews. Yes, on this holiday celebrating our freedom, we will be making a decision pushing us irrevocably into the camp of those leaders who do not believe in freedom and minority rights.

The tragedy is magnified further by the fact that those making possible this coalition agreement are people who understand the threat, who support the two-state solution and who are about to sacrifice it on the altar of the manipulated Corona emergency. In the spirit of the Passover holiday that we just celebrated – they could have placed the sovereignty issue at the top of the agenda where it deserves to be (“dayenu” – as we sing in the Seder, it would have been enough), but they did not. They could have refused to join the government to avoid legitimizing the annexation (“dayenu”, it would have been enough), but they did not. They could have taken advantage of the majority of Knesset members they had on their side to prevent the formation of this government (“dayenu”, it would have been enough), but they did not.

To draw a parallel to the four sons described in the Passover Haggadah, regrettably, the political simpletons hooked up with the wicked sons who are bent on eradicating the vision of the Declaration of Independence, rather than joining the wise sons who favor a liberal alliance consisting of minorities of all stripes. That is how we arrived at this point in time that threatens our liberty even after marking the holiday of freedom and threatening the Zionist vision when we are about to mark our independence.

הפוסט This Day of Independence, We Are in Danger of Risking the Zionist Dream הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

(Originally published in ECONFO)

הפוסט Forget the East-Med Pipeline: Advantages of Alternative Options to Transport the Easter Mediterranean Gas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Two things stand out in this regard. The first is the normalization of the annexation idea. The senior Israeli politicians on the verge of forming a unity government of some sort, whether now or after fourth elections are held in the summer, are addressing the annexation issue in terms of when, not if. Whereas two or three years ago, talk of annexation was the purview of Knesset members from the hard-line HaBayit HaYehudi (now Yamina) party and the most right-wing flank of the Likud, nowadays, the leader of Blue and White Benny Gantz is wrangling with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the manner of its execution and its extent, not over the very question of whether the issue should be considered at all. Meanwhile, members of Gantz’s party, some of them originally Labor party voters, are keeping mum on the issue.

The second thing that stands out: There is a clear majority in the current Knesset, and probably in the next one, too, for annexation. The right-wing bloc, joined by the newly minted faction of Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel (Derech Eretz), Knesset member Orly Levy-Abekasis (Gesher faction) and probably Blue and White’s lawmakers, as well as the seven representatives of the Yisrael Beitenu party and perhaps even Yesh Atid, could all vote in favor of annexation. If Netanyahu (assuming he is the next prime minister) moves ahead with annexing the settlement town of Maale Adumim, its surrounding area (known as E1) or the Jordan Valley, he is presumably assured Knesset approval.

The prime minister’s office continues to work on possible annexation maps, but with the coronavirus running amok, all this talk is motivated by politics rather than ideology. The controversial annexation issue serves the various parties involved as a bargaining chip and a tool with which to goad their rivals, whereas actual implementation of this move entails three conditions: formation of a government, a full return to post-corona normal, and White House support. Since a return to normal could take time, and the White House is busy managing the COVID-19 crisis and preparing for the November elections, even if a new Israeli government is sworn in, annexation legislation could be delayed until after the US presidential vote. In other words, it will not happen in the coming days, weeks or months.

The Arab world, however, does not make the distinction between the ideological component of annexation and the political one, and is monitoring the declarations of Israeli politicians with grave concern. On April 13, the Arab League warned of the severe repercussions of annexation, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held an urgent round of phone consultations with Arab leaders. The Palestinian leadership is convinced that Israel and the White House are pushing forward with the “deal of the century” that President Donald Trump unveiled in late January while the world’s attention is diverted by the coronavirus. Ramallah, as well as Amman, Cairo and Riyadh view the much-discussed annexation as an immediate threat, even if only a theoretical one, for now.

The Israeli annexation discourse bolsters radical elements in the Arab world and undermines the moderates. At this stage, with Arab regimes dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak, the issue could fan the flames of regional instability and endanger Israeli security. A recent internal Foreign Ministry assessment reflects Israel’s concerns over a possible collapse of several Arab regimes as a result of the coronavirus, an Iranian breakout toward a nuclear weapon and significant strengthening of radical terror organizations, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. With Israel aware of the regional threats to its security, it would be logical to assume that now is not the time to rock the fragile Middle Eastern boat and to undermine cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States. Even before the pandemic, the Arab regimes and their populations were not enamored by the annexation prospects. Now, with millions in the Arab world unemployed and facing a severe economic crisis, any hasty move could deal a blow to the delicate fabric of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and eventually have a much harsher impact on Israel’s security.

Most former and current defense officials who enjoyed close relations with their senior Arab counterparts for decades are aware of the danger lurking in the annexation policy. Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilad, former director of policy and political-military affairs at the Ministry of Defense, warned Feb. 7, after President Donald Trump unveiled his plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, that imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley would undermine the peace treaty with Jordan. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom expressed a similar view, whereas Commanders for Israel’s Security, a nonprofit representing dozens of former defense officials, has conducted an online campaign designed to influence Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Labor leader Amir Peretz to withhold support for the move.

These harsh warnings of an impending disaster, particularly at such a sensitive time when the battle to defeat the coronavirus should be at the top of Israel’s agenda, appear to be falling on deaf ears. The distinction between army and defense agency veterans who conducted Israel’s ties with Arab regimes for years, and the politicians, most of whom lack any experience in defense or diplomacy, is evident. Even Netanyahu, who in the past avoided annexation moves and sidelined proposed legislation by members of his Likud party to annex Maale Adumim and the Jordan Valley, continues to throw about promises of annexation. This is a man who periodically meets and talks with Arab rulers, and knows their views on annexation and the threat that it poses in destabilizing the Middle East. His actions contradict his favorite and widely expressed thesis that the Arab world does not care about the Palestinians and would be willing to advance ties with Israel, even if it fails to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel has failed to establish formal relations with more Arab states in recent years, and it has not boosted trade or forged closer diplomatic ties. While it enjoys a slight warming of relations with some Arab rulers, and growing public interest in what it has to offer, Israel would pay dearly if it annexed the West Bank, dealing a significant blow to the Palestinians and destabilizing Jordan. The repercussions would put an end to its dreams of cooperation with the region and of a united front against Iran.

(originally published on al-Monitor)

הפוסט Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the 1990s, Qatar was one of the first Arab states to open a diplomatic mission in Israel and allow Israel to open a commercial office on its territory. With the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, relations were suspended, and even when operations of the Israeli trade office were resumed in Qatar in the mid-2000s and when Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni conducted an official visit to Qatar, relations were no longer the same. Qatari media adopted a harsh and highly critical tone on Israel, and the regime feared warmer ties would undermine the united Arab stance against normalization with Israel absent an IsraeliPalestinian agreement. In the days of the Arab Spring, Qatar openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood and significantly strengthened its links with Turkey, further exacerbating the distrust between Jerusalem and Doha.

The opportunity to improve Israel-Qatar relations arose, of all times, at the height of Israel’s deep crisis with the Gaza Strip. A strange deal was forged between Hamas – a number of whose leaders were being hosted by Qatar after leaving Syria during the civil war, the Qatari regime – which sought to extricate itself from regional isolation and improve its image in Washington, and Israel – which needed a mediator to restore calm and help alleviate the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Leaders in Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were likely displeased with the arrangement. Egyptian and Gulf media devoted extensive coverage to news of a rare visit by the head of the Mossad to Doha in February 2020, as revealed by Yisrael Beitenu party Chair Avigdor Liberman, wondering whether Israel was seeking closer ties with Qatar. So far, this pragmatic cooperation between Israel and Qatar, based on the shared interests of all parties involved, has not undermined Israel’s growing rapprochement with other Sunni states.

Nonetheless, by allowing Qatar to play an increasingly significant role in the Gaza Strip, is Israel developing a dependence on the emirate and subsuming reality in the territories to Doha’s wishes? For now, there is no alternative to the Qatari funds keeping the heads of Gaza’s residents above water. However, it is important to realize that this money also perpetuates Hamas’ rule in Gaza, deepens the Islamist movement’s entrenchment in its unyielding attitude toward reconciliation with Fatah and, in fact, undermines domestic Palestinian unity. The Netanyahu government apparently believes that its current “divide and rule” policy serves it well. That explains why Israel has not returned to the negotiating table. Netanyahu believes that the Palestinian issue is no longer on the agenda and that relations with most Arab states can be advanced even without negotiations and compromises.

Reality proves the opposite. Israel is not an island, nor a villa encircled by walls in the middle of the jungle. Israel needs cooperation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in order to advance its interests in the region. The Palestinian issue remains on the table and the absence of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still hampers establishment of diplomatic relations and expansion of partnerships between Israel and most states in the Arab and Muslim world. Visits by Israeli athletes and diplomats in the Gulf are nice to have, but the potential for cooperation with the Gulf States, as well as with Israel’s immediate neighbors Egypt and Jordan, is far greater.

Israel needs a broad regional policy to guide it and enable the promotion of its interests not only in the short term, but in the long one, too. Relations with Doha are possible to have, but Israel must be cautious and approach them with its eyes wide open, given that Qatar’s foreign policy contradicts what Israel believes and would like to see in the Middle East. The Qatari gifts carry a price tag: Aid for Gaza is not just aid for Gaza – it is also a contribution to strengthening the regional Islamist alliance (Qatar-Turkey-Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya), and only a temporary solution to Gaza’s distress. Gaza does not require band aids. What is required is a complex and comprehensive solution, in coordination with regional states that are confronting Islamist terrorism, which will also eventually provide a channel for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

הפוסט Israel and Qatar Focus on Shared Interests, Setting Aside Differences הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Development of the Marine gas field off the Gaza coast is a new element that could and should help in this regard. The development could take place under the auspices of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) established last year in Cairo. That would allow the sides to overcome the internal Palestinian political crisis stemming from the split between Hamas and the PA and hampering the development of the gas field. It could also resolve the severe crisis in the Palestinian energy sector and ease the economic hardship in the Gaza Strip.

The gas field was discovered in the year 2000 some 36kms offshore at a depth of 600 meters. Estimated to hold about 1 TCF, making it smaller than other fields discovered in the region, the Marine field is commercially viable. The reservoir was discovered by British Gas, which was subsequently bought by Shell. Once it transpired that prospects of developing it were slim, Shell sold its share to the PA, which is currently the largest owner along with the Palestinian-Lebanese Consolidated Contractors Company.

Many contacts were held over the years about possible development of the Marine reservoir, with Israel’s involvement, but nothing came of them largely for political reasons. Once Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, attempts to move forward the possible exploitation of the gas field came to a halt. These were renewed in 2013 around the efforts, ultimately unsuccessful, by then-Secretary of State John Kerry to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Reported interest on the part of Russia and Energean Oil & Gas did not mature into concrete steps. Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz was quoted as telling participants of a January 2020 EMGF meeting in Cairo that contacts were underway between Israel and the Palestinians regarding possible gas sales to the PA in the West Bank, including the possible development of the Marine field. No additional details were announced and the Palestinian response was on the chilly side.

It is worth examining the interests of both Israel and the Palestinians in this regard. Israel’s interest in reaching an arrangement on Gaza to prevent further military clashes is obvious. The Netanyahu government has in recent years expressed trust in possible long-term understandings with Hamas. Such a view fits in with the idea of “economic peace” that Netanyahu is promoting and is also in tune with the Trump plan (even though the plan is not expected to generate a real diplomatic process). In this context, there is also a convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt, which allows tight coordination of positions. Both states are interested in preventing escalation with Gaza and in progressing toward a longterm arrangement.

On the Palestinian side there are two players. The Hamas movement, which has adapted itself to the changes in the Middle East following the Arab Spring and to its room for maneuver vis-à-vis Egypt, is interested in an arrangement that would guarantee its control of the Gaza Strip. Hamas is seeking to achieve this goal in a way that would also provide it flexibility within the Palestinian arena in the future. As far as the PA is concerned, its weakness is clear, intensified by the waning days of Mahmoud Abbas. An arrangement over Gaza that would allow leadership by the PA, including progress on developing the Marine gas field, would serve its interests.

The obstacles and difficulties facing progress in developing the gas field are clear and significant. These include: Control of Gaza by Hamas, a terrorist organization and concern over empowering it at the expense of the PA; the absence of a diplomatic process between Israel and the PA and the deep mistrust between the sides; and the internal Palestinian political split between the PA and Hamas.

However, regional circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean are creating an opening for positive change. In recent years, a roadmap for potential cooperation in this region is taking shape, based on the discovery of natural gas as well as the repercussions of the Arab Spring. The most prominent institutional expression of the emerging regional structure is the EMGF, established in Cairo in early 2019, which is undergoing international institutionalization this year. It currently includes seven members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the PA, and is supported by the EU and the US. The participation of the Palestinians in this forum is significant, and serves a clear Egyptian interest, which is also acceptable to Israel. The gas forum could serve to develop the Palestinian gas field from both a diplomatic and energy perspective.

From a diplomatic perspective – developing the gas filed under the umbrella of the EMGF could provide a convenient framework for the relevant players – Israel, the Palestinians and Egypt. It could be regarded, rightly so, as an expression of regional cooperation based on converging interests.

From an energy point of view – a possible link of the gas field to Egypt, which constitutes a key diplomatic and energy player, could help resolve various disagreements and sensitivities. Egypt is interested in boosting its status as a regional energy hub, which also serves the Israeli interest (for now). Shell, which sold its share in the Marine field is still active in the region (it holds a 30 percent share of the Cypriot Aphrodite gas field) and owns liquefaction facilities in Egypt.

What should Israel do?

Accelerate diplomatic moves to reach an arrangement over Gaza – this requires aligning positions and consulting with Egypt, and renewal of activity vis-à-vis Hamas and the PA, including on the issue of the Marine gas field development. Israel must restore trust with the PA and make it clear that it wants to restore the PA to a leading and more prominent role vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip;

Mobilize US support – Israel must update the US administration regarding its thinking on the development of the gas field as part of the arrangement with Gaza and ensure its support;

Create an economic-energy discourse on Palestinian gas – restore the development of the gas field to a high place on the agenda of the relevant players, including energy companies, and stir up their renewed diplomatic and economic interest in this issue;

Re-examine key issues – should Israel advance a direct link of the Gaza field to Egypt, for example to the pipeline through which Israel already exports gas to Egypt (if this is technically feasible) and thereby circumvent Palestinian disinterest and distrust of what could be considered an Israeli takeover of the gas? Can it be useful to also add a Cyprus angle to this endeavor, for example through involvement of Shell company?

Reaching a long-term arrangement between Israel and Gaza requires a complex and complicated process. Development of Gaza’s offshore gas field could and should constitute a concrete catalyst for such a process, as it addresses key interests of the relevant players. This idea also promotes a vision of regional, Mediterranean cooperation, in which the international community plays an important role in attempts to stabilize a bloody conflict.

הפוסט The Diplomatic Potential in Developing Gaza’s Offshore Gas Field הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This article examines the current Israel-Morocco cooperation and its development through 2019. It briefly describes developments in diplomatic, security, economic and civilian arenas in order to find common ground and identify trends. Naturally, the paper will not elaborate much on the security-intelligence aspect of the cooperation, despite its centrality, due to its classified nature

הפוסט Israel-Morocco Cooperation in 2019: Warming from the Bottom Up הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s health care system was unprepared to handle COVID-19. Although as of this article’s submission there is a comparatively low death toll – 56 individuals (as for April 6), the majority of whom were senior citizens – the main concern is that Israel’s medical institutions will soon be overrun by coronavirus patients which will indirectly affect the mortality rates of non-coronavirus patients. Israel only possesses some 4,000 ventilators – a critical tool to aid those suffering from the worst conditions. Each day, more health care employees are being sidelined from their tasks due to possible exposure to the virus. Inventive solutions like converting vacant hotels into housing units for patients with mild symptoms may not be enough if government measures cannot flatten the curve.

Mass coronavirus testing – one of the most successful policies adopted by countries like South Korea and Taiwan – has yet to take off efficiently in Israel. Many patients who have been tested received incorrect results, further delaying the health system’s ability to provide a vital service in a timely fashion. An absence of essential chemicals has slowed the existing testing process.

But befitting its moniker as the “startup nation”, Israel has tried to employ technology in order to curtail COVID-19. One initiative is the Health Ministry’s app that permits citizens who download it to see whether their movement has overlapped with anyone with a confirmed infection. The government has also granted the Shin Bet – Israel’s internal security agency – permission to track the movements of coronavirus patients through use of their phones and credit card data. This controversial decision reportedly identified at least 500 individuals carrying the disease.

Not surprisingly, these efforts have proven both imperfect against the coronavirus. Israel’s national expenditure on healthcare is lower than the OECD average and a 2019 Taub Center report deemed the country’s acute care system insufficient for public demand. Ad hoc solutions rarely solve chronic problems. An increasing number of public figures are asking whether the Health Ministry should be the primary actor in this saga or whether the Defense Ministry should assume the lead.

Enforcing a rigid policy of social distancing and lockdown has also proven challenging. Since March 12, Israeli schoolchildren have been homebound but the Education Ministry has been inconsistent with its execution of nationwide distance learning. Air traffic has all but ceased and public transportation has been significantly reduced, but that hasn’t stopped many from seeing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s almost nightly addresses as merely a polite suggestion. Israel’s police – and, more worryingly, its military – now patrol public spaces (including beaches), fining and arresting those violating the government’s directives.

Since day one, communicating a single, clear message to Israel’s diverse population has been a serious challenge for the Israeli government. No case exemplifies this better than the ultra-Orthodox community. Ultra-Orthodox Jews (around 12% of the general population) observe a rigid set of customs that centers around mass religious education and communal participation in lifecycle events. They often live in distinct neighborhoods and cities, separate from mainstream Israeli society. Whether portions of the ultra-Orthodox community did not receive or were willfully ignorant to the Health Ministry’s directives remains unclear, however images capturing Haredim disregarding government policy seriously damaged the already frayed bonds between this community and mainstream Israeli society. Health Minister Yaakov Litzman, who represents one of the Haredi parties in the Knesset, also violated these public safety restrictions and contracted the coronavirus. Senior government officials, including Netanyahu, are now under quarantine. Haredi leaders are now instructing their devotees not to gather in large numbers, but it has taken longer for these communities to adapt and, unsurprisingly, about half of hospitalized Israelis with COVID-19 are ultra-orthodox. Major Haredi population centers are now under lockdown, cut off from the rest of Israel.

These manifold pressures, in addition to a ballooning unemployment numbers, have manufactured perhaps one, shallow ray of light: the end of Israel’s political deadlock. Publicly, Blue & White leader Benny Gantz claimed that the coronavirus threatened Israel’s future and required that he “put politics aside” after three grueling election cycles. But many see Gantz’s decision as capitulation. And it is difficult to overlook how Netanyahu and Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein strained an already tense political atmosphere to its breaking point by utilizing the coronavirus as legitimate cause for shutting down the legislature and refusing to follow a Supreme Court order to reopen parliament. The cost of establishing a unity government with Netanyahu is high; Gantz’s decision left Israel’s opposition movement in tatters. Firmly back in the driver’s seat, Netanyahu can refocus his attention on his legal battles – and of course coronavirus as well.

As the Passover holiday approaches, most Israelis are trying to look past the egg shortages and the looming economic fallout in order to count their blessings. There is good reason to believe that the national mortality rate will remain low. But similar to many other states affected by the coronavirus, the pandemic’s damage to public trust may require years of rehabilitation.

(originally published in IPSI)

הפוסט A Very Israeli Pandemic Response הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In addition to staying in touch and looking after these Israelis and their families, the MFA, as always, is engaged in other aspects of the national effort to curb the spread of the disease. Missions abroad, with support from headquarters in Jerusalem, are busy locating manufacturers of vital equipment, and in many cases coordinating its transport to Israel. From respirators to antibacterial gel, from protective gear to overalls, from face masks to raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry. To overcome the limitations and restrictions placed by countries on the export of medical equipment at this time, Israeli representatives are required to pull strings, locate suppliers and to the extent necessary, obtain special export licenses. Some embassies hook up foreign and Israeli scientists in order to share experience and help the drive for scientific breakthroughs to stem the pandemic. Understandably, this has become the daily bread and butter of Israeli missions during these times.

To back these efforts, the MFA has announced a “national emergency rescue plan” to bring Israelis home. The decision to designate the MFA as an essential workplace, following an appeal by the Foreign Minister to reverse a previous government decision on the matter, is a welcome move. It allows the ministry to work on full emergency footing in missions abroad and at 50% capacity in Israel. The MFA headquarters plays a vital role in the overall diplomatic endeavors. Formulating policy and implementing it through instructions to the field, running a complex system of some 100 representative offices, managing human resources and ensuring the necessary security requires a fully functioning main office. The decision to exclude the MFA from near total lockdown testifies to the recognition of its vital task and underscores the need for a strong and significant Foreign Ministry as an integral part of the national effort.

The essential role of the MFA in emergencies is not new. One of my earliest memories of work at the ministry was the massive activity during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in mobilizing reserve soldiers traveling abroad and whisking them home. I also remember well the activation of Israeli missions in obtaining essential input for the economy. Along with these tasks, the MFA continued to carry out its “traditional” roles, among them mobilizing diplomatic support in international arenas and blocking initiatives to curtail Israel’s military room for maneuver, as well as conducting public diplomacy to boost favorable world public opinion.

The need for an active and accessible Foreign Service is growing. We live in an era of globalization and global challenges the solutions for which cross borders – from countering terrorism to fighting epidemics. In light of the above, Israel must ensure an active physical presence in international forums, personal acquaintance with and access to decision makers in all sectors, and experience with a large number of international arenas. This cannot be accomplished by remote control. The personal dimension – the ongoing personal contact – is an irreplaceable added value of the Foreign Service which enables both public diplomacy and “political intelligence”. Preparation for the day after the Coronavirus crisis is also important – to ensure continuity and prevent the current exigencies from undermining future needs. Once the storm abates, we will require stable infrastructure for economic recovery and growth in the international arena, too. That obviously means having a strong Foreign Ministry in normal times and in emergency situations as well.

The MFA has a key role in ensuring Israel’s national resilience. Nonetheless, as mentioned by a former senior defense official against the backdrop of the current crisis, the Ministry has been weakened in recent years and its budgets slashed (he mentioned the Health Ministry in the same breath but that is an issue for another discussion). Indeed, the status of the MFA has suffered persistent, severe and debilitating erosion in recent years at the initiative of the government. Budgets and responsibilities were shifted to other agencies for unjustified political reasons. This must be rectified at once by the new government, no matter who is at its helm.

A September 2019 Mitvim Institute poll indicated that 48% of Israelis think the MFA’s status has declined. Of these, more respondents (30%) think this downgrading significantly undermines national security than those who think it does not (18%). The importance that the public attributes to diplomacy and foreign policy is encouraging considering its insufficient awareness of the wide array of matters with which the MFA deals. The extent to which the public understands the link between the correct conduct of foreign policy and National Security (national resilience) is also encouraging. Leaders of the state, too, must recognize the need to strengthen the MFA and translate this recognition into practical terms. A strong Foreign Ministry, backed in practice by the government that it represents throughout the world, is vital under every scenario, whether in routine times or emergencies.

The MFA may not being doing enough in terms of domestic public relations. It will not tweet about “clandestine nighttime operations” that take place, and will not make public every security or civilian deal involving an Israeli ambassador. Our diplomats, men and women, hold thousands of meetings, public and private, with leaders, opinion shapers, captains of industry and others to ensure Israel’s security, and its economic and social prosperity both in normal times and in emergencies. The MFA staff operate with humility, discretion and determination, often under the radar, sometimes even in countries with which Israel does not have diplomatic relations, often under complex security conditions for themselves and their families. The Foreign Minister was right in publicly praising the Ministry’s work everywhere. It is important that the political echelons back his declarations, translate them into action, and restore responsibilities and proper budgets to the MFA.

In times of wars and military operations, the MFA places its capabilities at the disposal of the state to provide a “temporary diplomatic window” enabling completion of a military campaign. The current crisis, with its unique and different characteristics, creates new and unfamiliar challenges for the state. Addressing them requires activity abroad, too, which brings into play the capacities and capabilities of the MFA. The last thing the government should be doing now is adopting the recommendations of bean counters who define the MFA as a non-essential agency. Adopting such a classification, continuing to undermine its authority and stealing its budgets will distance our potential future diplomats, and harm – you guessed it – the State of Israel.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Foreign Ministry on the Frontlines of the Coronavirus Crisis הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The globalization processes of the past four decades, encouraging the movement of people, goods, capital, knowledge and services, have been intensive and unprecedented in scope. Under the auspices of the Western powers, the world has become one giant capitalist market – its borders opened, customs tariffs lowered, and free trade and competition turned into defining values. The interminable consumption culture greased the wheels of an economy based on competitiveness, the concept of endless resources and free movement.

And suddenly, Corona. The wheels have ground to a halt. Resources are insufficient, competition is of no use. Inequality strikes us all. Fear has vanquished freedom. There are those who suggest the time has come for a return to isolation, for locking the doors, for restoring borders, raising tariffs, banning foreigners, preserving existing resources for the use of the state and letting each country fend for itself.

However, despite the necessity of social distancing, what is currently required is cooperation in maintaining that distance. Competition does not help in this case. The climate change crisis, drug trafficking and transnational crime cannot be tackled alone, nor can the Coronavirus pandemic. Globalization cannot be halted. Epidemics were never stemmed by isolation. History teaches us that in ancient times pandemics wiped out significant swathes of humanity, even without intensive globalization and when the main weapon against them was isolation.

Such was the case in the 2nd century, when a plague spread through the Roman Empire and dismantled the world’s strongest army. Such was the case in the 6th century, when the Plague of Justinian spread throughout the Mediterranean Basin, killing 25 million people, annihilating half the population of Europe and signaling the end of the ancient era. Such was the case in the 14th century, when the Black Plague was consuming Asia, killing hundreds of millions and about one-third of the population of Europe. And this was also the case in the 16th century, when a series of epidemics imported by European settlers decimated the indigenous population of the Americas.

Plagues have been around since the dawn of history, but society’s ability to confront them has progressively improved. History taught successive generations that the most efficient treatment was based on cooperation and science. The eradication of smallpox virus is a telling example. After killing millions of people for over 3,000 years and bringing down kingdoms and empires, the virus was eliminated in the 20th century. Scientists had tried to find a vaccine for some 150 years. When it was finally developed, joint action by the world’s health organizations in testing, isolation, and vaccination, won the day. Science and cooperation were also successful in turning HIV that killed off 25 million people with AIDS into a manageable, less lethal chronic disease.

But not only epidemics have taught us the need for cooperation and joint mechanisms to tackle and prevent crises. For example, to deal with the religious wars that divided Europe in the 17th century, European rulers convened to sign the Peace of Westphalia. They agreed on the principles of a new political order that would end decades-long wars and prevent new ones. In 1909, the US led an international effort against drug trafficking and use amid the growing awareness of their repercussions, which culminated in the signing of the International Opium Convention. The agreement was designed to organize the cooperation between states in monitoring and controlling drug production and trafficking throughout the world.

The most telling and comprehensive example is the founding of the League of Nations and subsequently the UN. Following World War I, US President Wilson led to the founding of the League of Nations to settle conflicts through diplomacy. World War II, which broke out almost 20 years later, reflected the League’s weakness. It did not have the power and means to impose policy, and many states (chief among them the US itself) refused to join, and thus failed to prevent the looming crisis. With the end of the war, world states joined together once more, this time to establish the UN and achieve the same goals. Additional international institutions, international conventions, courts, aid organizations and more have sprouted up since then.

The world wars taught humanity a lesson, and significant measures were indeed adopted to ensure international cooperation in dealing with varied and numerous challenges. It seems, however, that many of these lessons have been forgotten.

International institutions have been scorned in recent years, undermining their capacities. “America First” was President Trump’s mantra, and he acted on it. Not only is he not leading any international efforts, he has slashed millions of dollars from US contributions to international organizations. In July 2018, UN Secretary General Guterres begged member states to pay their debts to the UN because it had run out of funds. In October 2019, only two months before the Coronavirus eruption, the Secretary General revealed that almost one-third of the UN member states had not paid their annual dues, and that the organization’s activity over the year had only been made possible by cuts in its emergency funding.

The State of Israel did not pay its membership dues, either. In January 2017, Prime Minister Netanyahu decided to cut 6 million USD from Israel’s commitment to the UN (which stood at 11 million USD) to protest UN Security Council decision 2334 which determined that settlements were illegal. In March 2017, Netanyahu ordered an additional 2 million USD cut because he did not like resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council, and in July of that same year, he cut another 1 million USD following a decision by UNESCO. Yes, in 2019 Israel is also among the states in arrears to the UN.

Faced with the Corona threat, we are seeking strong, effective global mechanisms to manage the crisis – to ensure the dissemination of trustworthy information; generate joint, synchronous research; set international rules to regulate the crisis and have sufficient power to enforce them. However, the international institutions are in a bad way. At this point in time, would the citizens of Israel and of the world not want strong, functioning international organizations, with their emergency funding intact? Of course, they would! Would we be happy to have fully empowered international institutions to enforce joint policy? Obviously! This is well worth remembering once we are back to business as usual.

Israel must not wait until the Corona crisis ends. It should adopt a foreign policy that emphasizes cooperation. It must act with its face to the world, divert resources to strengthen its Foreign Service, which, in turn, will bolster ties between Israel and the rest of the world. It should invest additional resources in foreign aid; take up positions in international organizations from which to influence actions; place knowledge and technology at the disposal of international organizations and other states; grant legitimacy and recognize the authority of international organizations and proffer aid to the needy to the extent possible.

This crisis must engender stronger, more powerful international organizations, with greater enforcement capacity, institutions that can operate effectively in order to prevent the next crisis and/or prepare for it. Rehabilitation of the world from the Coronavirus meltdown should be at the top of the agenda, along with coordinated actions to deal with the repercussions of global warming, which unfortunately presage yet another epidemic. Let us hope we succeed.

הפוסט The World Can Overcome the Coronavirus Crisis by Working Together הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For now, the takeaways are contradictory. On the one hand, states are closing their borders and turning inward, as mandated by health considerations. On the other hand, cooperation between states will clearly be necessary in order to overcome the unprecedented crisis in the health, economic and diplomatic arenas.

We are witnessing the rise of more conservative and populist regimes in various states in recent years, and even in some which have adopted racist overtones. The coronavirus outbreak could buttress their argument that unsupervised open borders result not only in uncontrolled immigration, but also in epidemics.

An understandably frightened public might support seclusion and isolationist trends. The immediate challenge on the day after will require a balance between what appear to be two polar positions – the version of globalization as we know it versus the veering toward separation and isolationism.

Israel is facing that challenge all the more forcefully given the trends of recent years. Its foreign policy has been marked by increased isolationism, an emphasis on threats – whether existential or merely serious attempts to block international diplomatic initiatives and a deep sense that “the world is against us” or that “the world does not fully understand the threats we face.”

The coronavirus crisis is a strategic crossroads for renewed solidarity, initiatives and cooperation in the regional and international arena. It therefore constitutes an opportunity for a shift in Israel’s foreign policy, which should be based on several layers.

1. Supporting others – Israel has achieved admirable progress in various fields. It is important to share the unique knowledge we have amassed and developed with neighboring states and with those further away. There is no need to keep boasting of Israel as a “start-up nation.” Instead, Israel should significantly expand its investment in foreign aid.

2. Highlighting opportunities alongside threats – The world appears to have internalized the “threat list” that Israel skillfully presented. Without making light of them, the array of opportunities presented in terms of joint interests with regional states in recent years should also be emphasized. There are numerous options for cooperation between Israel and its neighbors, not only in response to threats but also in taking advantage of opportunities in environmental protection, water, health, immigration and energy, to name a few. The immigration crisis, for example, requires a joint effort to stabilize the situation, but also provides an opportunity for joint plans to address understandable concerns and help create a supportive rather than a threatening and argumentative climate.

3. Regional cooperation – Recent years have presented Israel with increased potential for regional cooperation. Israel took constructive steps to take advantage of this potential, but they must be deepened and extended to the broader region. While the Arab Spring did not generate the hoped-for democratization, it did create a more conducive foundation for cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as well as a sense of a shared fate vis-à-vis a variety of challenges.

4. Conducting an open dialogue with the Palestinians – Current events have underscored the necessity for tighter coordination and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It is very important to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the COVID-19 crisis to return to a format of broader dialogue – empathetic and deep – between the sides. Its outset is in facing the ongoing crisis; its aftermath is in examining ways to break through the impasse in the peace process.

5. Good neighborly relations with Europe – In recent years, Israel has focused on the criticism voiced by Brussels against its policies. The Israeli government took a confrontational approach toward the EU and regarded its weaknesses (prompted by economic, diplomatic and social challenges) as an opportunity. Israel must realize that the geographic, economic and cultural realities linking it to Europe are an asset and not a liability. Moreover, good relations with the EU do not contradict Israel’s strategic relationship with the US, even if they appeared to do so for a short while.

6. A foreign policy based on initiatives and vision – Perhaps most importantly, Israel must replace its defensive and blocking posture with a foreign policy that is proactive and that of an internationalist. Israel should present a vision of its own for regional cooperation and coexistence, based on positive common denominators, rather than being reactive and relying on negatives. By its very nature, the road to realizing a vision is difficult, but a vision-led foreign policy can contribute to a constructive and less threatening atmosphere, resulting in charging the regional climate with positive energies, with or without natural gas.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policy and a former ambassador to Cyprus.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Coronavirus crisis opens opportunity for shifting Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Instead of dealing with foreign policy and diplomacy, Israel has over the years developed a narrow and pessimistic concept of national security, which consists of providing military intelligence responses to specific security threats, but lacks a pro-active diplomatic approach. Military-defense thinking is undeniably of paramount importance to Israel’s existence and security, and preparing the IDF and other defense agencies for the many challenges they face is a critical issue, indeed. However, every state has at its disposal a potential array of diplomatic assets that are no less essential, and sometimes even more so, to shaping its national security. Foreign policy is not designed to complement military policy, on the contrary. Military strategy is supposed to be a derivative of foreign policy goals driven, first and foremost, by the desire to forge alliances, agreements and normalization based on a broad complex of international relations in order to preclude clashes and wars.

Israel’s aversion to formulating a comprehensive and integrative diplomatic strategy over the past decade is a mistake, at best, and neglect of its national security needs, at worst. The leadership must shift course and place Israeli foreign policy on a pro-active path, replacing the ad hoc measures of “putting out fires” characterized by passiveness and pessimism to which we have grown accustomed over the past decade. The next government must break out of this foreign policy bunker and emerge into the sunlight and fresh air. Israel is crying out for a strategy that would allow it to achieve regional diplomatic arrangements, to exist within sovereign, permanent borders as a Jewish and democratic state with a distinct Jewish majority, without ruling over another people – while enjoying recognition by most countries of the world and full normalization of relations with them.

The existing Israeli paradigm is illustrated, for example, in the issue of the Gaza Strip’s future. Israel has adopted an essentially military strategy on Gaza and its Hamas rulers, manifested in localized management of the conflict and preservation of the current situation. However, leaders are elected to strive for change and shape a better and more promising future for their country in a responsible and sober manner.

To that end, Israel’s military strategy vis-à-vis Hamas in Gaza is insufficient; a distinct foreign policy strategy is required. After all, the Gaza issue has clear regional and global aspects, mainly as regards the humanitarian crisis afflicting the enclave and prospects of infrastructure and financial development and reconstruction using international state and institutional aid.

That is why Israel must define the broad, regional vision to which it aspires. A vision that includes normalization in the Middle East and neighborly relations with a demilitarized Palestinian state would create a context within which Israel could shape policy on various regional issues, including Gaza. However, the road to that goal invariably entails a diplomatic initiative, not a military one.

Various arrangements and mobilization of foreign aid for regional development, including of Gaza, must be set in motion. Within the framework of such broad, diplomatic activity, a determined Israeli initiative is required to renew the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority, giving full consideration to Israel’s security needs. Broader and more comprehensive diplomacy is also required to provide an overarching framework for the whole process: An Israeli initiative for regional negotiations that would include, in addition to the Palestinians, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states and the Arab League. Participants would commit to shouldering the burden involved in weakening Hamas and rebuilding Gaza, with the help of the international community. To that end, Israel’s political leadership must first commit to preserving and protecting Israel’s future existence as a Jewish and democratic state. That means striving for separation from the Palestinians with all the attendant diplomatic implications, and ensuring Israel’s security interests and needs, both during negotiations and after an arrangement is reached. There is no guarantee of the strategy’s success, because its implementation depends on additional elements. However, its very adoption and the shift from a passive, reactive policy to initiatives on long-term solutions would benefit Israel in public diplomacy and in presenting its case in the international arena, while safeguarding its security and avoiding significant military concessions. Nothing will change as long as Israel continues to adopt a military-defense strategy without any vision or diplomatic initiative, precludes positive change on the ground, lacks sufficient international legitimization for security activity Israel undertakes, and perpetuates the current stagnation with the Palestinians.

In the coming years, Israel should advance a comprehensive regional agreement under the auspices of the US and other international players, which takes into consideration Israel’s essential, long-term security needs; promote a move to separate from the Palestinians in the context of two independent states and as part of the regional agreement; help reconstruct Gaza, as part of an agreement with the Palestinians and with the support of the international community (including Arab states); develop a public diplomacy and foreign policy strategy in case an agreement with the Palestinians will not be feasible even after Israel makes an effort to achieve one; adopt a “carrot and stick” diplomatic strategy that includes potential deterrence and incentives vis-à-vis significant regional powers, mainly Iran and Turkey; restore bipartisan American support for Israel, taking into account the changes in US politics and society, including within the Jewish community there; work to consolidate Israel’s relations with current and emerging global powers, such as Russia, China and India.

A compelling, relevant foreign policy approach must be developed as a key layer of Israel’s national security. At the same time, it is vital for Israel’s next government to rehabilitate and strengthen Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Israel Needs a Diplomatic Strategy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

True, autocratic regimes do have more tools to track their citizenry, to jail and to punish them. Democracies don’t do as well in this regard. Many in Israel and elsewhere look these days to China and emphasize that only in a dictatorship can dramatic and even cruel measures be implemented to curb the epidemic: building hospitals within 10 days, placing millions of people under tight lockdown and harshly punishing infractions.

However, many also tend to forget that autocratic regimes are based on fear and obedience and not on respect and equality. These regimes often seek to manipulate information over transparency and honest reporting. This is what led us to the initial problem.

Playing with information

The coronavirus probably began spreading in China in November, and the resulting initial fatalities occurred in December. Did information about these developments in the provinces reach the top echelons in time, or did the local officialdom try to conceal them?

Once rumors of the mysterious disease began circulating, did the Chinese regime properly notify and update the World Health Organization (WHO)? Why did China continue with its lunar New Year celebrations even as the disease was already spreading throughout Hubei province, as were video clips about the mysterious virus that was dealing a cruel blow to the elderly and vulnerable?

This was exactly how the Soviet regime responded after the blast at reactor number 5 in the town of Chernobyl on April 26, 1986. There, too, authorities initially tried to conceal the disaster from the world and from their own citizens. On May 1, thousands marched in the traditional international proletarian holiday parade, with many children in attendance. It was only several days later, when the extent of the disaster could no longer be hidden, that authorities began evacuating area residents.

In Iran, too, authorities decided to carry on with planned parliamentary elections on February 21 even when they already knew about the spreading epidemic. In fact, they concealed real information from their citizens. Iranian authorities claimed the US was deliberately spreading misinformation about the epidemic in order to reduce election turnout. The elections were held, Friday prayer services continued as usual and so did the pilgrimages to the holy city of Qum. By that time it was too late, and Iran became a focal point of the outbreak in the region.

Trust in the system is a prerequisite

Extreme situations of pandemics, natural disasters or man-made disasters require a free flow of information, trust in the institutions of government and, of course, well-performing systems. If citizens know the regime is not lying to them and is doing everything possible to deal with the situation, they will follow instructions and remain calm even under extreme circumstances.

Nonetheless, democracies must deal with the question of discipline – maintaining quarantines, adhering to instructions by government agencies, etc. In Italy, disregard of the instructions issued by health authorities, albeit with tragic delay, has resulted in disaster and the collapse of the health system.

However, even under such circumstances, transparency is preferable, with citizens knowing that the government is not lying to them and that data about the spread of the disease is real and reflects the situation on the ground. The WHO does not say so officially and publicly, but its many experts have expressed suspicion regarding the data provided by a number of non-democratic states about the coronavirus spread. One must obviously differentiate between countries that do not know how to detect the illness or deal with it from those that knowingly lie about it.

In times of disease, we all are somewhat socialists

In these frenzied times, the voice of neo-liberals calling for reduced government involvement and cuts in social service spending, including health services, is barely heard. Suddenly, while the world is dealing with a clear and present danger from an epidemic that inflicts painful death, everyone fully understands why we need a robust and well-funded public health system.

When 1,000 doctors are forced into quarantine and there is no one to replace them because of the chronic shortage of doctors and nurses, when medical teams lack the equipment they need and when one hears about a shortage of respirators in Italy, all the arguments about a necessary cut in government spending no longer sound very relevant.

US President Donald Trump, who shut down the pandemic preparedness office at the National Security Council because this boring issue appeared extraneous and esoteric, is now forced to tackle a crisis he never imagined in his worst nightmares. Israel’s health system is endowed with abundant knowledge and excellent experts, but the crisis has caught it starved of funding and other resources.

Will politicians take this message to heart when they prepare the next state budget? Hopefully, the confrontation with the coronavirus will make changed priorities.

We are all in it together

Another issue that cannot be ignored these days is the essential need for strong, functioning international organizations, multilateral organizations such as the WHO, the UN and other institutions weakened by cynical, irresponsible world leaders in recent years.
Rather than contributing to the necessary reform of these institutions, populists starved them for budgets, and undermined their prestige and capabilities. However, when a global crisis breaks out, the world must have a central body able to synchronize, transfer and cross-reference information, issue recommendations and act to the necessary extent.

Many countries rejected the recommendations of the WHO on Covid-19 and are in no hurry to adopt them these days either, and the world has no ability to impose global policy on them. It is impossible to know how long this crisis will last, but it is abundantly clear that the world, and each and every state, will have to learn the specific and collective lessons of this pandemic, otherwise, we will experience another and far more painful crash within a decade.

The writer is director of the program on Israel-Middle East relations at the Mitvim Institute. She is a senior research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, a former MK and was also a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Strengthening international systems, lesson learned from coronavirus הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Gaza Helps Israel and Qatar Find Common Ground הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The isolation imposed on the MFA by the outgoing government resulted in its gradual decline: responsibilities were transferred to other government ministries, chief among them the Ministry for Strategic Affairs; the MFA’s budgetary shortfalls grew to the extent that they hampered daily operations and led to labor disputes; and the exclusion of diplomats from key decision-making junctions increased, leading top diplomats to complain they lacked relevance and influence. At the same time, the prime minister (who served as acting foreign minister from 2015 to early 2019, and continues to do so de facto to this day) took control of most diplomatic activity, or entrusted it to close associates.

Public figures have protested loudly over the decline in the MFA’s stature over the last few years, underlining the damage this causes to Israel’s national security. Members of Knesset spoke up on this issue in the plenary, in committees, in caucuses, at press conferences, in legislation proposals and in opinion pieces. Think tanks highlighted the need to empower Israeli democracy and suggested possible ways to achieve this goal; retired ambassadors began working together to raise public awareness of the MFA’s troubled standing; ministry officials waged struggles and protests, behind closed doors and in the public arena; civil society and cultural activists pointed to the difficulties they faced in the international arena due to the ministry’s weakness; and Israelis expressed dissatisfaction in polls over this state of affairs.

The challenges currently facing Israel are more diplomatic in nature and less military. So are the opportunities, that can enable Israel to increase its regional belonging in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean. As demonstrated by the Coronavirus crisis, the current era requires a diplomacy that is more focused on global issues. Just in recent days, for example, the MFA played a key role in diplomatic efforts that enabled the importation to Israel of masks and Coronavirus test equipment from other countries. However, Israel’s involvement in global issues should not be limited to advancing its own interests. Rather, it should also foster international solidarity – placing Israeli knowledge, equity and resources at the disposal of other countries and peoples who are dealing with challenging global phenomena.

Under such circumstances, diplomacy plays an increasingly important role. Now more than ever, Israel must adopt an internationalist foreign policy. One that is not focused any longer on inward-looking, deflecting criticism, justifying positions and blocking international initiatives, but rather one that views Israel as a key player in the global arena, that expands Israeli involvement in international organizations and foreign aid, that is open to dialogue with broad audiences (critical ones, too) and that is committed to the democratic value system. In the current era, Israel’s success will largely depend on its ability to work in concert with other countries in order to jointly identify solutions to challenges, promote joint interests, and create new frameworks for collective action. That requires a capable, influential MFA, and the identity of Israel’s next foreign minister will be a key element in that regard.

The next Israeli government will have to immediately appoint a fulltime foreign minister, unlike what Netanyahu did when he formed his last government. It is crucial to appoint a foreign minister with political power, who is capable of and motivated to carry out significant change. The new foreign minister will have to adopt rapid measures to strengthen the MFA, chief among them restoring its authority and increasing its budget; lead a reform of its structure and operations; improve the interface between the ministry, the public and decision-makers; and advance a new approach to Israel’s foreign policy.

The new foreign minister will also have to examine Israel’s achievements and failures in the foreign policy arena in recent years: pay attention to missed opportunities, to the peace that has grown distant, to the threats that have intensified, to the values eroded and the relationships that were undermined. He or she will have to formulate a new national foreign policy paradigm and to ensure its support by the government, and to embark on a diplomatic voyage that will free the MFA from isolation, and propel Israel to a future of peace, prosperity and security; a future in which Israel will find its rightful place in the region and among the family of nations.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

Dr. Nimrod Goren is the Founder and Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט Set Israel’s Foreign Ministry Free from Quarantine הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A research paper that was written on the subject in 2018, in the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab states, outlined how the UAE and Israel cooperate in four central areas: diplomacy, security, economy, and civilian affairs. The paper concluded that, at the date of its publication, there was a large and diverse array of partnerships in the economic sector. The paper also pointed to the fact that most of these partnerships are founded on ad hoc interests and temporary opportunities, and therefore the relationship between the countries cannot be described as consistent or deep. The majority of these collaborations are characterized by secrecy, due to the lack of formal relations or normalization between the UAE and Israel. At the same time, collaborations that take place in international platforms benefit from a higher level of legitimacy and exposure. Examples of this include the joint air force exercises of the two countries together with Greece, Italy, and the US; Israeli athletes’ participation in sporting events that take place in the UAE; and the gatherings of statespersons in various international fora that take place in the UAE. Most of these collaborations stem from the UAE’s desire to expand its role in the international community, and its wish to serve as a hub for international events and conferences. Within this framework, relations between the UAE and Israel have been tested a number of times in recent years, and were eventually strengthened, following the gradual removal of obstacles by the Emiratis.

In 2019, a series of events sharpened the UAE’s focus and priorities: the withdrawal of its forces from Yemen and its efforts to stabilize Yemen’s political system; its involvement in multiple regions, such as Libya and the Horn of Africa; the rising tensions around violent events in the Gulf and the diplomatic measures that the UAE took to pacify Iran; the ongoing crisis with Qatar; and the UAE’s focus on domestic issues, such as the Federal National Council’s elections and efforts to expand local workforce in the labor market. These changes of focus led, inter alia, to the marginalization of the Palestinian issue in the UAE’s foreign affairs during the last year. The UAE’s involvement in the Palestinian arena was, in the last year, rather distant and symbolic, with continued humanitarian aid via UNRWA and the support of Mohammad Dahlan (believed to be a protege of Mohammed bin Zayed and the UAE’s main channel to the Palestinians). Additionally, the enduring participation of the Palestinian Nusseibeh family in senior positions in the UAE (Zaki Nusseibeh as a government minister, and his daughter Lana Nusseibeh as Permanent Representative to the UN) serves as another manifestation of the UAE’s solidarity with the Palestinians, though in their own territory.

The rather marginalization of the Palestinian issue was also manifested in a significant decline in statements of support for the Palestinian cause, and in decreased concrete involvement (or involvement attempts) in this arena by the UAE. The extent of the UAE’s support and commitment to the national struggle of the Palestinians is in dispute between researchers and policymakers. Though the decline in the UAE’s active involvement in the Palestinian issue does not necessarily attest to a decline in its commitment to the Palestinians. It may be attributed to its inability to exert influence in the Palestinian arena or to the increasing rapprochement between the UAE and Israel. The first aspect can be linked to the important role of Qatar and Egypt in the Gaza Strip, which restricts Dahlan and the UAE’s ability to exert influence in this arena except in unique cases, such as the months following the Qatar crisis in June 2017.

Turning to the second aspect, simultaneously and in contrast with moving away from the Palestinian arena, the UAE has shown greater openness to Israel and Israeli and Jewish audiences this past year. 2019 was characterized by improved informal relations between the countries, and these collaborations increased and became more diverse. The UAE’s decision to allow Israel to participate in Expo 2020 starting October of this year has become the driving force in shaping direct relations between the countries, and continues to shape them in various areas.

This paper examines existing cooperation between Israel and the UAE, and the changes that have taken place in the relations throughout 2019. The paper assesses these changes in four main areas: diplomacy, security, economy and civilian affairs, and briefly describes the main developments in each area in order to point to common denominators and indicate key trends.

הפוסט Israel-UAE Cooperation in 2019: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A 2018 study of Israel-Iraq relations, written within the framework of a Mitvim Institute project on the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s ties with Arab states, stressed that a rapprochement between official Iraq and Israel was unlikely. Its central argument was that relations between the two countries were hardly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict and that the main factor influencing relations was the conflict between Israel (and perhaps the US, too) and Iran. The events of recent months bolstered this assessment. Iran and its proxies within the Iraqi regime accuse the West and Israel of fanning the unrest. The Shiite militias, the standard bearers of Iraq’s cooperation with Iran, ramped up their anti-Israel rhetoric even before the protests broke out. Given this polarized state of affairs, another trend spotlighted in the previous study is gaining momentum – wide-ranging solidarity manifested on social media between a growing number of Iraqis and Israelis, stemming from hostility to Iran and an affinity for the history of Iraqi Jewry. Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and senior political figures contributed significantly to boosting this trend in 2019.

This article reviews the changes that occurred in 2019 in the nature of Israel-Iraq cooperation, as they relate to diplomatic, security, economic and civilian aspects.

הפוסט Israel-Iraq Cooperation in 2019: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Egypt’s international standing as an important regional leader. Egypt’s role as a mediator acceptable to all sides allows it to ensure that the “arrangements” it helps broker serve its own interests as well, including its desire to pursue cooperation with Israel on strategic issues such as security and energy. Addressing the 2019 Herzliya Conference, Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Khaled Azmi expressed his country’s key interest in preserving its stability as a nation-state in the face of regional challenges. He also emphasized the importance of providing a response to the aspirations of millions of young people in the Middle East (where 60% of the population is below the age of 30).

Israel perceives its peace with Egypt as a highly important asset. Four decades of peace have proven its resilience in the face of changes and shockwaves, and have provided a potential platform for strategic cooperation. However, relations between Israel and Egypt are characterized as a “cold peace”. Egypt is unwilling to fully normalize with Israel, despite crucial shared interests, as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. Although this position has become somewhat muted considering the growing defense strategic cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states in the region, it still dictates the nature and extent of relations. A 2018 study that examined existing cooperation between Israel and Egypt pointed to strategic cooperation between the states, as well as cool bilateral relations on all other fronts. This article follows-up and looks at the 2019 developments in the relations.

הפוסט Israel-Egypt Cooperation in 2019: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Israel and Qatar: Relations Nurtured by the Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Qatar’s friendship is good for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Lieberman, initially an ideological and political ally of Netanyahu, shifted his position over time – first preventing from Netanyahu to form a government after the April 2019 election, then insisting on a unity government between Netanyahu’s Likud and Gantz’s Blue and White after the September 2019 election, and currently indicating he wants Gantz to be the one who is called upon by the president to form a government.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Joint List, which increased its share of votes and now holds 15 seats (out of 120), has become a more legitimate political partner for Jewish parties than it has been in the past. Nevertheless, it still not clear whether this changed to the extent that will enable Gantz to form a minority government based on support from outside by Arab legislators.

This process is surprising Netanyahu, who faces a real threat of ending his 11-year consecutive tenure as prime minister, and at a bad timing for him – just as his court case is about to begin. Netanyahu is fighting back, using almost every rhetorical argument and political maneuver possible. While doing so, he is casting doubts about the legitimacy of the electoral process and about the reliability of state institutions. This has negative implications and increases polarization within the Israeli public as well as incitement against Gantz and his supporters.

A change of Israeli leadership may be near, although a fourth election cycle is also a realistic option. Should Gantz become Israel’s prime minister, even if within the context of some sort of unity government, the Israeli political landscape will change dramatically. His persona and leadership style will be different than Netanyahu’s. His goal will be to “heal the society” from divisions and incitement. His tone is a positivist one, including messages of hope, and not only fear. He represents a commitment to good governance and democracy, which eroded in Israel over the last few years.

Gantz is also likely to change course on several foreign policy issues, some of which are relevant to Israel’s relations in the Middle East. While supporting the Trump Plan, he made it clear that he opposes unilateral annexation and that any Israeli move should be coordinated with the international community and regional actors. Even though Gantz does not prioritize an immediate restart of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, he is likely to take more responsible action on the Palestinian issue, and to be more open to engagement with the Palestinian leadership and with those in Europe and the US Democratic Party who are critical of Israel’s current policies.

In terms of relations with the Arab world, Netanyahu repeatedly tried to show that he can promote normalization with Arab countries, without making any progress on the Palestinian issue. However, his efforts met a glass ceiling. Throughout the past year, he tried to get a public meeting with an Arab leader, to boost his election campaigns, but did not succeed.

Gantz is likely to continue working for improved relations with the Arab world, and to maximize new opportunities that emerge – including with countries in the Gulf. But, in contrast to Netanyahu, he may not see this as a route to bypass the Palestinian issue, but rather as something that could be leveraged to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. In such a context, the Arab Peace Initiative – with some modifications due to the changes that took place in regional realities since it was first introduced – could become much more relevant.

The Arab world should regard a leadership change in Israel as an opportunity, reach out to the new prime minister and government, and indicate a willingness to upgrade ties and cooperation should the new prime minister take positive steps. This could be done publicly, or through new dialogue channels that will need to be set up – between new policy actors in Israel and their regional counterparts. Positive messages from the Arab world may help the Israeli leadership to move in a new direction, as Israelis currently view regional cooperation as more possible, desired, and important to Israel’s foreign policy and national security.

The transition process in Israel will not be an easy one, domestically, and could still lead to political instability in the coming months. But things are changing in Israeli politics and a new era may soon begin. If this happens, new opportunities for Israel-Arab relations are likely to appear. This is an issue that pro-peace Israelis are eager to speak with their Arab neighbors about. Let’s start the conversation.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in Qposts, arabic)

הפוסט Israel Election Results Give Reason for Israel-Arab Dialogue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Positive signs in Israel-Egypt relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Katz called Borrell’s style inappropriate, and then let rip in an inappropriate style of his own: “Borrell is not the paritz (lord of the manor) and we are not the Jews of the Diaspora who bow their heads. His style is inappropriate,” said Katz. “Gone are the days when anybody could threaten the Jews and the Jewish state. We will continue to build and develop all regions of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem.” Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. Is this type of “megaphone” diplomacy, in which the sides trade verbal barbs on media platforms helpful to the already tense relationship between Israel and the EU? How does assailing a representative of the EU serve the State of Israel?

After all, the position of the EU, no matter the identity of its foreign policy chief, has been clear and well-known for four decades and offers nothing new. Back in the 1980s, the European Community adopted a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered revolutionary at the time: Two states for two people, with negotiations based on the 1967 border lines. The Community (which in the meantime has become the EU) said it would also welcome any other territorial arrangements (including land swaps) as long as they were agreed on by both sides. President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” deviates from the conflict resolution principles laid out by the EU, which the international community (including the US) had accepted – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, Borrell’s reaction to the Netanyahu government’s annexation discourse should come as no surprise.

It is hard to see how the EU, which imposed sanctions on Russia for its invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, could fail to react to a unilateral Israeli annexation of land defined as occupied territory under international law. Israelis find it hard to understand the European mindset that respects international law, urges peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for human and minority rights – whereas the Europeans have a hard time understanding Israeli reality of living by the sword and under Iron Dome. Nonetheless, the EU is still an important Israeli partner in many respects, and should be treated as such.

Borrell, who assumed office in November 2019, was never suspected of being overly sympathetic to Israel. As Spain’s Foreign Minister, he tried to lead a unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state. As the EU’s foreign policy chief he has partners for such a move in Luxembourg and probably in other EU capitals, too (Sweden did so in 2014, but some member states oppose such unilateral recognition). Nonetheless, despite Borrell’s desire to bolster the EU’s foreign policy, so far he has not affected significant change. Member states are divided on an array of foreign policy issues, including on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and this prevents decisions by the required consensus. The Israeli government, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, takes measures to foil European resolutions critical of its policies. Absent a consensus among the 27 member states, Borrell has to make do with expressing his opinion on the subject.

The policy adopted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the past four years, of sidelining the EU’s involvement in the Palestinian issue and averting harsher measures against Israel has borne fruit. Since 2016, various EU states have blocked resolutions critical of Israeli policies. The EU Foreign Ministers have not adopted a significant resolution on Israel since then. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy and other states reportedly refused to join Borrell’s recent warning on annexation, and his statement was issued in his own name alone, not on the part of the EU.

Israeli government ministers have tended in recent years to respond harshly to the EU and to turn it into a target of incitement. For example, Energy Minister and security cabinet member Yuval Steinitz told the EU to “go to thousands of thousands of hell”. Katz’s response to Borell continued the same line. Was it necessary to aggressively respond to such expected comments by the EU foreign policy chief? Were the responses intended for Borrell’s ears or for those of right-wing Israeli voters towards the upcoming election? Either way, Foreign Minister Katz would do well to cease aggressive reactions that turn Israelis against the EU. The EU is an important partner of Israel in multiple fields, including trade and science, and shares common values with it. Katz would be better off saving the “heavy guns” for the bumpy, dangerous road on which the current government is leading the state should it choose to annex territories. Aggressive diplomacy may serve an election campaign agenda, but it is unclear what Israeli interest it serves, if any.

Dr. Maya Sion Tzidkiyahu is the Director of the Program on Israel-Europe Relations at the Mitvim Institute, Co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University’s European Forum.

הפוסט Attacking the EU for Domestic Political Gains is Wrong הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Surprisingly, all those interviewed hold similar views despite their different political stripes. However, they are suggesting tactical solutions, rather than strategic and diplomatic goals, which are therefore bound to be short-term in nature.

A strategic approach to Gaza must relate to the overall Palestinian issue, not just to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The policy of recent Israeli governments separating the Gaza issue from the West Bank one has convinced Israelis that this split is, indeed, the desired goal. But it is a flawed assumption. Ironically, the Trump plan, which undermines prospects of peace in many respects, pointed to the inevitable solution of linking Gaza and the West Bank.

Any solution to the Gaza issue must include the Palestinian Authority (PA). But we have made the PA irrelevant to Gaza and thus achieved a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Israeli government has thwarted all attempts at rapprochement between Gaza and the PA. Such was the case when PA President Mahmoud Abbas sought to hold Palestinian elections, or when he tried to form a government of technocrats that could have enabled Hamas to move forward vis-à-vis Israel without initially abandoning its ideology.

We have weakened the PA by refusing to credit and encourage its non-violent, pro-diplomacy policies. From his first day on the job, Abbas sought agreement, if possible through bilateral negotiations, and if not, by appealing to multinational organizations.

We have turned his attempts at dialogue with Israel into pathetic overtures by continuing to build in the settlements and using negotiations to buy time and create facts on the ground. When the Palestinians tried to achieve their aims by taking multilateral steps, we dubbed their measures “diplomatic terrorism” and exerted pressure on the Americans to block them, even though the same measures – appealing to the UN – gained Israel its own independence.

While Abbas supports a two-state solution and recognition of Israel in its 1967 borders with land swaps, and even accepts the principle of a demilitarized Palestinian state, we insist instead on dealing with Hamas, which rejects our existence. Whereas Abbas continues to instruct his security forces to cooperate with the IDF and Shin Bet in foiling terror attacks, and is therefore accused by many Palestinians of collaboration with Israel, we reward Hamas with benefits and payments from Qatar.

A strategic, long-term solution to the Gaza issue is linked to renewal of the diplomatic process with the PA, and to the encouragement of a technocratic unity government in Gaza with which gradual progress can be made on demilitarization and rehabilitation. A long-term solution must be diplomatic. All our previous attempts to create deterrence have taught us that there is no military solution.

We currently have much better Palestinian partners for peace than we had in the past. The terrorist Arafat has been replaced by Abbas, who reviles terrorism; the three “No’s” (no to peace with Israel, no to recognition of Israel, no to negotiations with Israel) of the 1967 Arab League summit in Khartoum have been replaced by the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The key message of that initiative is, “please move ahead with a diplomatic solution to the Palestinian issue so that we can normalize relations with you based on the understanding that Israel could constitute part of the solution to regional problems, rather than the problem itself”.

While all these positive changes were occurring around us, our leaders continued to explain why Israel has no Palestinian partner and to empower Hamas. That is why Israeli discourse keeps going back to the same tactical suggestions that resolve nothing. These solutions only sound logical absent of a strategic alternative. But such an alternative exists and it requires courageous and sober leadership rather than political slogans and hollow clichés.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Solution to Gaza is a Diplomatic One הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since 2009, Israeli politics has been largely shaped by one man. By winning consecutive elections and forming consecutive coalitions of various sorts, Netanyahu managed to dominate Israeli politics, prevent potential contenders from standing a chance against him, and be regarded by most Israelis (and by many in the international community) as invincible. It is not by chance that the term “King Bibi” was used on the covers of both Time and Newsweek, and was the title chosen for a documentary film that explored Netanyahu’s rise to power.

For years, Netanyahu had almost total control of his party, successfully maneuvered leaders and voters of other right-wing parties, effectively disempowered opposition from the center and left, shaped the public discourse to his advantage, delegitimized political rivals while polarizing the society, and overall – stirred Israel’s reality to his direction of interest. Time and time again, Israelis went to the polls with no real hope of leadership change. The main open question used to be which type of coalition will Netanyahu form after results are announced.

And then things changed. Corruption investigations that were initially dismissed and brushed off by Netanyahu, picked up pace. From one legal phase to the other, it became evident to Israelis that a major issue is brewing. Netanyahu’s repeated and increasingly harsh attacks on key personnel in the legal establishment, which were aimed at mobilizing his political base and rally his supporters, exemplified just how problematic his situation is. It was anti-corruption slogans that played a leading role in the downfall of the Likud government in 1992 and the victory of Yitzhak Rabin, and Netanyahu seems to have understood the political danger that his legal issues pose to him.

To try and counter that, Netanyahu hastened into early elections (April 2019). His goal was to quickly form a new coalition that will advance legislation protecting him from being indicted while in office. Election results initially indicated that he has succeeded in paving the way for that. His traditional right-wing bloc had the required majority. But a surprise was in the waiting. Former Minister of Defence, Avigdor Lieberman, a nationalist right-wing politician who has been part of Netanyahu’s camp since the 1990s (although episodes of political rivalry), broke ranks. Without Lieberman’s party, Yisrael Beiteinu, Netanyahu did not have a coalition. His efforts to attract centrist/leftist parties to join a “unity government” or even to bring on board a single defector from another party who will give him the necessary majority in parliament – all failed.

In the past, Netanyahu used to carry out such political moves easily. But, due to his corruption allegation, he became a persona non grata among his opponents. They were not willing to enable him to become prime minister again, given his potential downfall and the legislative reforms he sought to advance. Netanyahu was losing ground. As he failed to form a government and went to repeat elections, his image as invincible and as a “political magician” was shattered. Moreover, his image in Israel as “Mr Security” was now effectively challenged by the Blue and White Party leader, Benny Gantz, which featured three ex-IDF Chiefs of Staff on the top of its list.

Netanyahu sought remedy in diplomatic activism. He saw the realm of foreign policy as one in which he has an added value over his contenders. Billboards of him shaking hands with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin appeared all over Israel, portraying him as a mega-diplomat. International visits and meetings were orchestrated for him, and world leaders were willing to grant Netanyahu new diplomatic achievements that he can present as part of his campaign. However, this – like other elements of his campaign – did not prove to be effective. The September 2019 elections showed a decline in votes for the Likud party, and Netanyahu failed again in forming a government, despite the loyalty of his party and ideological bloc (excluding Lieberman).

Towards the March 2019 elections, that tone of the opposition was already more confident. “He just can’t” was the slogan of Blue and White against Netanyahu, referring to his inability to form a coalition. “Netanyahu only cares about himself”, their campaign said, referring to the court case against Netanyahu that will begin just two weeks after the elections, on March 17^th. Even the announcement of the so-called Trump Plan, which was supposed to be the ultimate political gift to Netanyahu towards the elections, was handled by the opposition in a way that did not increase Netanyahu’s popularity in the polls.

It is still not clear which direction the upcoming elections will go. But, Netanyahu’s time in power should be up. His long tenure led him to develop a sense of entitlement to the position, that prevented him from doing – at least until now – what a prime minister accused of bribe should do: announce resignation. The damage to Israeli democracy, state institutions and governance caused by his political and personal conduct is mounting. Israel is paying a heavy price for this. It is a price that drives voters to the polls time and time again. It is also a price that drives many of them to seek a new prime minister.

(originally published on ISPI Online)

הפוסט The “Netanyahu Factor” Driving Israelis to the Polls הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט A new type of peace in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, in the immediate weeks following the presentation of the plan – these did not happen. The US administration stopped Netanyahu’s efforts for rapid annexation, and by doing so created tensions within Israel’s right-wing bloc. Voting intentions of Israelis remained largely unchanged following the publication of the plan, according to multiple public opinion polls. Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz, who the prime minister tried to trap by dragging him to Washington with him to the introduction of the plan, managed to handle the situation and gain some political benefits from it. And Arab leaders kept refusing to publicly meet Netanyahu, like they did prior to the two Israeli elections in 2019 and despite American pressures.

The Trump plan, however, was greeted with cheer by the Israeli mainstream. It was termed by many as the most pro-Israeli plan ever and was warmly embraced by Gantz’ Blue and White party, the main contender to Netanyahu’s Likud. Voices against the plan came almost only from the Israeli left, whose power is diminishing. But even among the left there was cautious not to aggressively oppose the US president, at times even congratulating him for the efforts his administration undertook to devise the plan.

A two-state solution is still the way forward

International responses were also mild in nature. They reflected the general lack of involvement by the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian issue since Trump took office and a reluctance to challenge the US president. Countries in Europe and the Arab world issued statements welcoming the Americans for their efforts and promising to study the content of the plan. Such statements were the ones that the US administration was pushing for. The American goal was to prevent clear and immediate rejection of the plan and this has been largely achieved (there were exceptions like Ireland’s quick response against the plan).

Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place.

In the weeks that followed, multi-national organisations (the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union) made joint non-binding statements opposing the plan. Within the EU, internal divisions continued to prevent joint declarations by all 27 member states, as has been the case since 2016. EU High Representative Borrell thus issued a statement reflecting his own views, while European UN Security Council members reaffirmed the traditional European position on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

The overall nature of these responses reinforced Netanyahu’s narrative that the international community does not care much about the Palestinian issue. His claim is that Arab countries are willing to improve ties with Israel even without progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and that Europe is no longer a relevant actor, now that some member states are willing to block initiatives in Brussels on Israel’s behalf. Because of the weak international opposition to the plan, those in Israel who criticise Trump’s vision are often accused of being anachronistic and of not accepting the changes taking place. A common thought among Israelis is that if the world does not care that much anymore about the Palestinians, why should we.

The further consolidation of this mindset might become a dangerous consequence of the Trump plan. Advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution should be a high-level priority for the next Israeli government. It’s crucial for Israel’s ability to maintain both its Jewish and democratic character, to live in peace, security and prosperity and to truly belong and integrate in its Middle Eastern, European and Mediterranean neighborhood. It’s also the right thing to do in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations.

Challenges and opportunities

However, doing so will not become any easier. The Israeli public is largely indifferent to the issue; the Palestinian public is losing faith in prospects of a real Palestinian state; settlement expansion in the West Bank is making the two-state solution more difficult to obtain and implement; and the ongoing split between the West Bank and Gaza casts a shadow over prospects for future progress towards peace.

These are major challenges that pro-peace Israeli, Palestinian and international leaders should tackle. Prospects for political change in Israel later this year – even if not representing a clear ideological shift – might provide an opportunity to begin doing so. Should a different American administration take office in January 2021, even more opportunities will emerge. Pro-peace actors should already plan towards such scenarios and begin to take action. For the past three years their primary focus was on the release of the Trump plan, what it will include and how to react. Now, after its publication, it’s the time to move on, brush the plan aside and advance steps that can bring peace.

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states.

There’s a variety of steps that international actors can take: their primary goal should be to prevent Israeli annexation of territories in the West Bank, through voicing clear opposition. They should also keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue high on their agenda – especially when engaging with Israeli officials – even when they have more pressing priorities and when they do not envision immediate progress. A counter-document to the Trump plan, including alternative principles for a final-status peace agreement, should be published as to not let the Trump plan remain ‘the only game in town’.

What Europeans should do

The EU’s foreign policy chief Borrell is showing willingness to put the Israeli-Palestinian issue back on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda and to seek conclusions supported by all 27 member states. However, this remains a difficult task and, in any case, European countries should bypass the paralysis caused by divisions among EU member states by acting in smaller coalitions of like-minded actors. Borrell should be supportive of this line of action as well.

Moreover, a new international mechanism to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking should be set up – whether officially or unofficially – to enable different international actors (not only European) to coordinate efforts, with participation of pro-peace Israelis and Palestinians. Such a mechanism should implement the plan agreed upon to introduce Israelis and Palestinians to a coordinated international package of political and economic incentives for peace. Finally, increased international support and recognition should be given to pro-peace civil society groups so they can more effectively build positive interactions between Israelis and Palestinians.

These steps can generate hope, set up new dialogue channels and craft innovative policy proposals – all of which are much-needed components on the path towards peace. They will demonstrate how local and international actors can chart a real vision towards peace and can take action together to advance its implementation. It would be the most suitable response to the Trump plan.

(originally published in IPS Journal)

הפוסט Moving on from Trump’s plan for the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Interests of Eastern Mediterranean States and Israeli Policies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Assessing Israel Katz’s First Year as Foreign Minister הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

It is time to revisit the one peace initiative that gained support from every Arab state in the Middle East: the Arab Peace Initiative.

Today, when uncertainly about the future of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rising, the Arab Peace Initiative could serve as a good basis for relaunching negotiations between the two sides. Almost 18 years ago, then-Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud presented his peace vision during the Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. This plan was adopted by the Arab League members and it is still valid today.

Sadly, no Israeli government has so far officially reacted to this peace proposal that aims at providing a just and acceptable solution for the conflict and establishing normal relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Almost two decades have passed since its inception, and while some updates may be required, this initiative is still by far the best platform for resuming the bilateral negotiations with much needed regional support.

What will happen if the Trump administration’s “deal of the century” does not take off? Many in Israel believe the status quo is not such a bad thing. We live our lives, there is no major violence, and the world seems to be less and less interested in what is happening in this part of the region. But, in fact, nothing can be farther from the truth, as the status quo is nothing but illusion.

Escalation is here already, even if it doesn’t affect daily life of the majority in Israel – yet. In recent weeks there were more attacks, more clashes in Jerusalem, and more desperate and disillusioned young Palestinians that increasingly support the one-state solution.

In fact, a status quo takes us back to the dangers of recent past when the two nations and their leadership lacked communication, understanding, and compromise. While the settlements will grow and the Israelis will be busy annexing segments of West Bank, more and more Palestinians will depart from the two-state solution and opt for one state where they will seek equal political and civil rights. The possibility to separate and draw the border between two warring nations will be lost forever.

Naturally, the Israelis and the Palestinians will be the biggest losers, but the consequences might be quite dangerous for the broader Middle East region, as well. As the situation in Israel and West Bank deteriorates – according to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chiefs and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) leaders, it will, barring real progress with negotiations – it inevitably will affect the stability of the West Bank and Jordan, and also damage relations between Israel and the Arab world.

The dream of regional integration, as well as forging a powerful alliance between all those in the region who seek stability and peace will remain just a dream. No positive development between the Palestinians and Israelis will also mean no normalization, integration or advancement of cooperation. We don’t need a status quo, but a reasonable base to resume the negotiations and regional support of the process. The Arab Peace initiative provides this foundation.

Today we have a clear vision of how a partnership in the spheres of technology, trade, tourism and defense might look like between Israel and the Arab states. The only way of getting there is by first taking care of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Whoever emerges as the winner in Israel’s upcoming parliamentary elections will need to focus on two issues: how to prevent the deterioration between Israel and Palestinian Authority, and how to promote Israel’s integration in the region. These two issues are interconnected, and the Arab Peace Initiative should be the key. It’s not too late for that today, however it might be too late tomorrow.

Ksenia Svetlova is a former member of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset. Today she serves as Director of the Program on Israel-Middle East relations at the Mitvim Institute and is a senior research analyst at Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya.

(originally published in al-Arabiya)

הפוסט Revisiting Arab Peace Initiative is best hope to solve Israel-Palestine conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

During the Oslo process, Israel had a two-track policy. It conducted talks with the PLO, which had officially and publicly recognized “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security,” in the hopes of reaching a final status agreement, and at the same time Israel waged uncompromising war on Hamas, which refused to recognize both Israel and the Oslo Accords. That policy was shared by both the left-wing and right-wing Israeli governments through the 1990s. Suggestions by certain Israeli figures, among them Rabbi Menachem Froman and Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy to promote dialogue with Hamas were rejected out of hand. However, it became increasingly obvious over the years that ignoring Hamas and excluding it from the process would be very hard given its standing in Palestinian society, especially after its 2006 election victory and takeover of the Gaza Strip.

One way of understanding Israel’s dilemma is through the concept of “peace spoilers.” In the 1990s, there was a growing discussion among academics in the field of conflict analysis, about how to relate to actors, often non-state ones, who undertake concerted efforts to thwart peace processes or agreements that they view as a threat to themselves and their goals. One of the main examples discussed in those days were Hamas and Jewish extremists, both of whom sought to foil the Oslo process. Other peace processes in the 1990s encountered a similar phenomenon. In Northern Ireland, the Real Irish Republican Army split from the IRA and carried out terror attacks in a bid to prevent a peace agreement. In South Africa, deadly violence in the early 1990s threatened to undermine attempts of reconciliation. Scholars debated how best to deal with such actors – whether to fight against them or to communicate with them and try to integrate them into the process.

Even after the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2007, Israel continued with its parallel policy: Security coordination and peace talks (until the 2014 collapse of negotiations led by US Secretary of State John Kerry) vis-a-vis the PLO-led Palestinian Authority (PA) under Mahmoud Abbas, along with a blockade of Gaza and repeated rounds of fighting with Hamas, whom Israel saw as “peace spoilers” who must be fought.

Successive Israeli governments insisted that they would not conduct any dialogue with a Palestinian unity government if it included Hamas. In October 2017, the Netanyahu government’s security cabinet reiterated this stance in light of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation attempts, announcing that Israel would engage with such a Palestinian government only if Hamas recognized Israel, stopped its terrorist activity, disarmed and severed ties with Iran.

But over the last decade, the ground started shifting, gradually. In 2011 Israel and Hamas reached an agreement on releasing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners; the parties also negotiated indirectly on ceasefires to end several rounds of fighting. But these contacts were a precursor to a far more dramatic and significant move. Ironically, the most right-wing government in Israeli history, formed in 2015, which did not include representatives of centrist or left-wing parties, was the one that eventually led to a radical shift of Israel’s position. During 2018, Israel and Hamas launched indirect intensive negotiations, mediated by Egypt and UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov.

This shift has several reasons: Both parties were finally open to the idea of dialogue, after a decade of repeated and indecisive clashes, and a primed for a more pragmatic recognition of reality. But at the same time, it also stemmed from a mutual interest in managing the conflict rather than resolving it – and in weakening the PA under Abbas. The same dynamics are true today. The Netanyahu government is not interested in fostering a peace process that would entail territorial concessions in the West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state, whereas Hamas is interested in preserving its power and standing. Netanyahu declared in March 2019 that contacts with Hamas were maintaining the split between Gaza and the PA-controlled West Bank, thus scuppering the possibility of establishing Palestinian state. A close Netanyahu campaign aide, Jonathan Urich, boasted in an April 2019 interview that his boss had “managed to achieve a split between Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and in fact crushed the vision of a Palestinian state in these two areas. Part of this achievement is linked to the Qatari money reaching Hamas each month.”

This in itself constituted a turnaround in Israel’s position: for years, it had demanded that control over Gaza be restored to the PA. Looking at the Israel-PA-Hamas triangle, it appears that any real dialogue between Israel and the PA has collapsed; contacts between Hamas and the PA have reached a dead end; and only the channel between Hamas and Israel is still working. During the 2007-2008 Annapolis process, Israel’s goal was to bolster Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas and reach a final status agreement with him, which would be expanded in its next phase to include Gaza. However, Israel is now working to preserve the split between the two Palestinian entities, and no longer seeks to create any affinity between Gaza and the PA, or to push for a broader Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It’s worth taking a step back to see just how unthinkable (until very recently) Israel’s pivot has been, and how dramatically expedient, or pragmatic, its redefinition of an acceptable partner for dialogue has been. If, as recently as some two years ago, the Israeli government rejected the idea of talks with a Palestinian unity government due to its affiliation with Hamas, today the Israeli government is talking to Hamas, while not conducting any diplomatic dialogue with Abbas, and even adopting an increasingly harsh tone toward him and the Palestinian Authority. The emerging message is that Israel is rewarding Hamas, which uses violent means against Israel (firing rockets and incendiary devices at Israel), and punishing the PA, which has adhered to tight security coordination with Israel.

Lior Lehrs is the Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט Peace-Spoilers or Negotiation Partners? Netanyahu’s Understandings with Hamas הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The interfaith rapprochement between the Gulf States and the Jewish world, including outreach efforts towards Jewish communities, has never been so strong. Bahrain was probably the pioneer of this process, as the only country in the Arab Gulf home to an indigenous Jewish community. Bahrain has emphasised its support for this community, often celebrates Jewish holidays, and appointed a Jewish woman to a leading diplomatic role in the United States. In 2017, another precedent was set when a delegation of Bahraini clerics visited Israel to promote interfaith tolerance.

In the same year, the Abu Dhabi Louvre Museum was opened in the United Arab Emirates, where several Judaic exhibits were displayed as the country declared its ‘Year of Tolerance’. These beginnings in the UAE also opened the door to intra-religious expressions of tolerance, such as the UAE’s inauguration of an official synagogue in Abu Dhabi, alongside a mosque and a church at a shared site.

This trend is also evident in Qatar which, despite its well-known affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood, announced that it would provide kosher food for Jewish visitors from Israel during the 2022 World Cup. Saudi Arabia, as part of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 reform programme, has also begun to interact with Jewish figures and institutions worldwide. In January 2020, Rabbi Marc Schneier was hosted by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tweeted about having ‘a unique Shabbat Experience in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.’

What are the motivations behind this development, and why is it happening now? These actions, which are evident across the GCC countries with the exception of Kuwait (the only Gulf state that opposes even discrete normalisation with Israel), reveal a combination of curiosity, openness and goodwill towards Judaism. While lauding these actions and statements by the Gulf States towards Jews as ‘Islam’s reformation’ – as some commentators have done – may be overstating it, they certainly reflect a changing socio-political reality in the region on two levels: an internal process of identity exploration and cultural development in the Gulf, and an external process of reaching out to the broader Muslim world and the international community. Both processes are driven by the motivation to produce, define and portray a distinct national character within which tolerance and openness towards ‘the other’ comprise important pillars.

While this trend certainly poses reputational benefits for the conservative and authoritarian Gulf States, it also entails deeper motivations, similar to those that led to the intra-Gulf rift in June 2017 in the name of denouncing ‘extremism’ and radical Islam. This boycott was part of a broader internal process of redrawing the imaginary boundaries in the Gulf, not along ethnic or religious lines but along ideological ones, particularly regarding the role of political Islam. Gulf scholar Andreas Krieg describes this process as a ‘war over narratives’ that is dividing the Arab world, and of which the Gulf states have become the main sponsors. Thus, promoting openness to other religions as a manifestation of ‘moderate’ versus ‘radical’ Islam is another aspect of this process of identity construction in the Gulf. Qatar, which is allegedly positioned beyond that imaginary boundary, plays with the same cards of soft power and religious outreach to deflect its opponents’ accusations of being a supporter of extremism.

Expressions of openness and tolerance towards Judaism carry no domestic costs for the Gulf States. In the absence of a significant presence of Jewish communities in their states, this approach does not threaten their internal political stability by risking demands for greater political rights by minority groups (unlike other marginalised groups in the Gulf, such as the Shi’a in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia or the Bedoon in Kuwait). Furthermore, and most importantly, this trend does not entail normalising political relations with Israel. Yet, despite the separation of public opinion between the relationship with Judaism and that with Israel, the interfaith brand breaks cultural barriers and carries indirect benefits by warming relations between nations and peoples in the region.

In recent years, the Gulf states have taken on a more assertive leadership role in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Emirati academic Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdulla defined this process of the growing regional and international importance of these states as the ‘Gulf Moment’, a period in which the Gulf states assert themselves in the regional and international arenas as new centres of political, economic and cultural power. With this self-perception, these states are becoming more invested in grand strategies of social and religious reforms, and their advocacy for tolerance and interfaith dialogue comprises one prominent manifestation of this. Given these factors, we will probably continue to see these expressions in the near future – even if Israel is not explicitly mentioned in these discussions.

Adam Hoffman is a junior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and Head of the Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, a geostrategic analysis and business consultancy. 

Dr Moran Zaga is the academic coordinator of the Chaikin Chair for Geostrategy at Haifa University and a policy fellow at Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

הפוסט The Gulf States’ Changing Attitudes towards Judaism: A Cultural Revolution in the Making הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the protracted freeze of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and growing tensions generated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation intentions, the Israeli and Palestinian willingness to jointly participate in establishing a new organization is a bright spot not to be taken for granted. The fact that the EMGF includes European and Arab states as full members, as well as the US, EU and other international organizations (such as the World Bank) as observers, further highlights the unique nature of this development.

The underpinning of the new organization is economic, with its members seeking to cooperate in maximizing the energy reserves discovered in the Mediterranean over the past decade. Israel is generally deterred by international groupings, fearing members’ pressure regarding its policy on the Palestinian issue. However, although it initially preferred that the gas forum remain a non-binding body, Israel eventually agreed to its institutional upgrading, probably at Egypt’s behest.

While Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Italy are discussing the construction of a gas pipeline from Israel to Europe – a project whose economic, technical and diplomatic feasibility is highly doubtful – the new organization positions Egypt as a regional energy hub with its gas liquefaction facilities that enable gas exports to Europe without a pipeline.

The make-up of the current forum is unique, but need not be finite. Lebanon and Turkey are two important regional players currently absent from the EMGF due to disputes and confrontations with forum members. However, in order to realize the cooperation potential in the Eastern Mediterranean, the organization should seek to draw them into its ranks in the future. The UN, too, which plays a role in mediation tasks in the Mediterranean region – between Israel and Hamas, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Israel and Lebanon in marking their maritime borders – could also be represented as an observer.

The organization has diplomatic, not just economic, potential, including to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. In recent years, no multinational organizations have been active in this regard. Under the Trump administration, the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) lost whatever limited importance it had beforehand.

French-led efforts to set up an international support group for the peace process were unsuccessful. The absence of an influential multinational body makes it difficult for the international community, for example, to implement its plan to introduce a coordinated package of political and economic incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The EMGF could be an asset for a new Israeli leadership wanting to re-start the peace process and striving to link regional ties to the Palestinian issue. Until such time, and beyond constituting an additional channel to the PA, the new organization could advance Israeli peace ties with Egypt and Jordan.

ISRAELI GAS exports to Egypt and the visits by Israel’s energy minister to Cairo for meetings of the forum are already making a difference in relations. Nonetheless, Israel does not have an ambassador in Cairo, even though the foreign minister approved the appointment of Amira Oron to the post about a year-and-a-half ago. The government has repeatedly avoided approving the appointment and fixing this should be a high priority for the next government.

As for ties with Jordan, cooperation on the gas issue has yet to generate a positive momentum in the relationship. Instead, it has been met with public and political protests in Jordan against the backdrop of the harsh crisis of trust between the two. Jordan’s King Abdullah recently declared that the relationship was at its lowest ebb, and clearly, only a change in Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue as well as prioritizing the rehabilitation of links with Jordan could change that.

Benny Gantz has already issued messages in that direction when he addressed a ceremony in Naharayim marking the 25th anniversary of the peace treaty. The new organization could also help improve Israel’s relations with the EU following several tense years.

The EMGF links Israel and European states in a manner that has won EU approval and that is not viewed in Brussels as a move designed to split and weaken the EU – unlike the alliance Netanyahu forged with the Visegrad Group, especially Hungary. The participation of France in the new organization can also assist – given a new Israeli leadership – to overcome obstacles that prevent the renewal of the high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU (the Association Council).

For Israel to effectively make the most of the opportunity provided by the new organization, it must learn the lessons of its conduct in other regional and international organizations. Budgetary difficulties – coupled with a general skepticism towards such organizations – limited Israel’s ability to take full advantage of similar opportunities in the past.

For example, Israel held the position of deputy general secretary of the Union for the Mediterranean, which it gave up due, also due to its Foreign Ministry’s financial crisis. Israel also has financial debt to the UN, which casts a shadow over its activity there.

Strengthening the Foreign Ministry can help resolve such issues and realize the potential of Israeli membership in the EMGF. It is the Foreign Ministry that should play a leading role when it comes to Israeli participation in international organizations, unlike the current situation with the EMGF in which it is the Energy Ministry that is mostly in charge.

The establishment of the new organization in the Mediterranean is more than just an important economic development. It is also a diplomatic opportunity for Israel. The next Israeli government would do well to leverage the EMGF not only for the economic profit it can generate from the country’s gas reserves, but also for diplomatic gains that advance Israeli-Palestinian peace and broader regional cooperation.

The writer is the founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Gas forum a diplomatic opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

However, the plan published by the Trump administration contradicts the interests of the State of Israel, distances us from the two-state solution and is published during very problematic political times. As a result, it will likely do more harm than good.

The two-state solution is an existential interest for Israel. It is a necessary component of the Zionist dream, in which the State of Israel is both the state of the Jewish people and a democracy characterized by complete equality for all its citizens. Yet the two-state solution is unattainable while Palestinian interests are ignored and Palestinian leaders are excluded from the peace process. I would expect Israeli leadership to be capable of making that clear to an American president.

In the past, Prime Minister Sharon tried to convince the Bush administration not to force democracy on conflict-ridden Iraq; Prime Minister Olmert sought to influence the same administration not to push for Palestinian elections at that point in time. Neither succeeded, but in hindsight, both did the right thing, as an ally should.

The Palestinians are rejecting the Trump plan outright, so it will not lead to a settlement. But from it we must try to extract components that will help achieve a settlement in the future. Of importance is the fact that a Palestinian state will be established, even according to Trump’s vision, and that it must have a capital in East Jerusalem as well as an American embassy there.

Contrary to common perception, our ability to promote true peace is stronger now than ever before. In the Palestinian leadership of today, Israel has infinitely better partners for peace than it had in Oslo and Camp David. The leaders of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah understand that terrorism has hurt them just as it has done damage in Israel, and they are trying to achieve independence through non-violent means. The regional context is also more favorable than in the past; most Arab countries see Israel as part of the solution to the problems this region faces, rather than as the problem itself, as they have in the past. This is reflected in the Arab Peace Initiative, which is endorsed time and again at the summits of Arab states and which did not exist during Oslo and Camp David.

In addition, the majority of the Israeli public supports a two-state solution, as evidenced in polls conducted over the past twenty years, even though this wasn’t reflected in the election results in Israel, because our leaders have preferred to instill fear, suppress hope for peace, and remove the Palestinian issue from the agenda.

To the extent that the Trump plan leads to annexation, it will not only keep us away from a solution of two states for two peoples. It will also damage regional stability, our relationship with Jordan and security coordination with the Palestinian Authority, which has led to relative calm and a significant reduction in terror.

Consequently, those who come to power in the upcoming Israeli elections should take significant diplomatic steps that will provide for a real peace plan. They should do so in coordination with the international community, rather than allowing themselves to be dragged on by false initiatives that do not merit the support of most of the international community or the Democratic Party in the US. Israeli leaders must make it clear to our American friends that this is not the way to advance the long-term interests of the State of Israel.

Nadav Tamir is a Board Member at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies; a former diplomat and policy advisor to President Peres

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel Needs a Real Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Trump Plan: Not the Way to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

In the long history of the conflict, only three peace plans have been identified with a US president: The Reagan Plan (1982), the Clinton Parameters (2000), and the “Roadmap” — identified with Bush but did not bear his name (2003). In other cases, American peace plans or initiatives were identified with secretaries of state in order to not embarrass the president in case they failed. This was the case with the Rogers Plan in 1969, the Shultz Initiative in 1988, and the Kerry Initiative in 2013-14.

The release of a peace plan should be outstanding opportunity to advance a resolution. Its release, in general, follows dramatic events, such as wars, revolutions, and regime changes.

It was no surprise that the Rogers Plan was released after the 1967 War; Kissinger began his step by step diplomacy following the Yom Kippur War that led to the disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria in 1974-75; Reagan presented his plan after the Lebanon War; Shultz presented his initiative after the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987; the Madrid Conference convened in 1991 following the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and Bush released the “Roadmap” during the Second Palestinian Intifada that broke out in 2000.

The release of a peace plan should therefore be a cause for celebration. Delving into the details of the Trump Peace Plan offers no such satisfaction show that the plan is doomed to fail for several reasons: First, the Americans, as honest brokers, should have consulted also with Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority and not only with Israel and the Arab states.

Since 2017 there has been a serious rupture between the US and the PA; that bad blood was intensified by Trump’s closure of the Palestinian mission in Washington and the US cutting aid to UNRWA. The absence of the Palestinians from the process of devising the plan has created a situation like a chess game with one player. That the plan was launched with no Palestinian representative is testimony to the discord between Trump and the Palestinians, as well as the Palestinians’ unwillingness to play the game.

Second, the details of the plan show its clear unilateralism in its adoption of Israeli positions, especially those supported by right-wingers and settlers. It gives a green light to the Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements. Palestinians are offered an everdiminishing stake: in the Oslo agreements the Palestinians accepted just 22 percent of historic Palestine (within the 1967 borders), but Trump now offers them much less territory. On Jerusalem and refugees, the plan far from the Palestinians’ positions. In return for their concessions on Jerusalem, territory and the refugees, Trump is trying to entice the Palestinians with a financial “bribe” – $50 billion – an unsecured, unsourced fortune, to be offered over ten years.

The fact that the Trump Peace Plan stands in complete contrast to all previous plans is not necessarily a bad thing. However, if it represents the interests of only one side of the conflict, then it is bad, and it does not have any chance of being accepted.

Every successful peace agreement is a compromise that required each side to give up on demands that were perceived in the past as necessary and vital. They were never achieved dictation or surrender. In a fair agreement, both sides leave with half (or less) of their desired outcomes. That is not the situation here.

This plan is the wet dream of Israelis located in the center and rightward on the political map. However, its presentation, and all the more so, its implementation, will be one bridge too far, and will not serve Israeli goals. There are several reasons for this.

First, it will strengthen the positions of those refusing peace on the Arab side. Those rejectionists argue in any case that Israel (and the “Jewish Lobby”) and the United States are in cahoots. Second, it will further weaken the moderates on the Palestinian side who believe in a peaceful and negotiated resolution to the conflict. In such a situation, escalation with Hamas in Gaza and mass demonstrations in the West Bank are not imaginary scenarios. In fact, the pressure cooker in the West Bank that is already bubbling as a result of economic and social causes, as well as anger about the corruption of the PA, is likely to explode now against Israel (a Third Intifada). The violence would surge if Israel decides to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlements.

Third, Egypt and Jordan, signatories to peace treaties with Israel, will now face heavily oppositional domestic public pressure and will not be able to support Trump’s plan, despite the fact that they have an interest in advancing a peaceful solution. But not one that looks like this. Recalling ambassadors and freezing bilateral relations are steps that have already been taken in the past and could easily be re-implemented.

Finally, the creeping normalization of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states is likely to suffer. True, the UAE, Omani and Bahraini ambassadors took part in the launching of the plan and Saudi Arabia released a mild statement in response to the launch. Yet, any Israeli move to unilaterally implement its share of the plan would not pass unanswered.

The release of Trump’s peace plan at the present time is a blatantly political maneuver. It was concocted in coordination between Trump and Netanyahu, in order to assist the Israeli prime minister’s reelection. The release of the plan just before the elections is a direct intervention in Israel’s domestic politics, intended to embarrass Netanyahu’s only real challenger, Benny Ganz by  putting him in a situation where he cannot come out against the plan. If Netanyahu intervened in the domestic politics of the United States when he spoke in Congress in 2015 two weeks before the US elections, Trump has now repaid him.

Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban is often quoted that the “Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Interestingly, Jared Kushner, senior adviser to the President, declared on CNN that if the Palestinians reject the plan “they’re going to screw up another opportunity, like they’ve screwed up every other opportunity that they’ve ever had in their existence.” Well, he forgot that Israel as well has missed a few opportunities, of which the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) was the latest and most substantial.

But more important, this time the Palestinians are not be missing an opportunity, because the Trump Peace Plan simply does not constitute an opportunity to resolve the conflict. Sadly, it might end up serving as a trigger for escalation, and the eruption of violence.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is currently a visiting professor at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Trump Peace Plan: Not Even an Opportunity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

As such, the “Deal of the Century” endangers Israel’s future in the Middle East rather than improves it. The international community, which stepped aside from the Israeli-Palestinian issue once Trump took office three years ago, must now make itself heard with a resounding “No.” The same goes for Israeli politicians who still seek to advance peace.

Since Trump first coined the term “Deal of the Century” in 2017, the international community has vacated the arena, even when it became apparent that the moves of the US president were encumbering resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. International actors failed to adopt any significant initiative of their own, and mostly kept silent.

Diplomats and politicians from around the world, including those who in the past expressed commitment to peace, explained their inaction using various excuses: There is no alternative to US leadership on this issue, they said. We are trying behind the scenes to influence the contents of the US plan, they claimed. We will not judge the plan before we see it, they insisted. Once the plan is revealed, we will look at the half full glass and try to move forward, they promised.

They subsequently argued that there was no point in picking a fight with Trump over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, as it was irrelevant or because the US plan might not even be published. And that is how we arrived at the point that over 40 world leaders convened in Israel for the World Holocaust Forum while ignoring the heated Israeli discourse on annexing parts of the West Bank that was taking place the very same time.

Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not have asked for better conditions to unveil the plan. From their perspective, their hard work of recent years had paid off.

The Netanyahu government was successful in distancing the international community from the Palestinian issue. It attacked international (and Israeli) players critical of its policy, portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian issue as no longer of interest to the world, and took steps to distance the feasibility of a Palestinian state. The Israeli opposition did not challenge the government effectively on this.

The ideological opposition (left-wing parties) gradually diminished, choosing to focus on social-economic issues rather than on foreign policy and national security ones; the non-ideological opposition (centrist parties) refrained from significantly diverging from Netanyahu’s policies, in a bid to appeal to right-wing voters. Israeli public opinion has been affected accordingly – according to the Mitvim Institute’s recent poll, support for the two-state solution is declining, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is not perceived as a partner for negotiations, and promoting peace is ranked low in the public’s priorities.

THE TRUMP administration worked toward similar goals, not only by formulating the plan behind the scenes and deliberately obfuscating its publication date. The administration adopted a series of measures that affected the situation on the ground and, in fact, promoted the principles of the plan even before its publication.

Trump refrained from acknowledging previous US commitments to the two-state solution; changed the traditional US stand on Jerusalem and claimed the city’s fate was no longer on the negotiating table; was harshly critical of the Palestinian leadership and tried to delegitimize it; cut funds for Palestinian institutions, peace organizations and international bodies; gave the nod to Israel’s settlement enterprise; convened discussions and summits from which the Palestinian Authority was excluded; and neutralized the Quartet (comprised of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN).

The US lost touch with the Palestinian side and in so doing forfeited its role as an honest broker.

Other international players found it hard to counter these trends, or deliberately avoided doing so. The EU’s internal divisions made it hard for Brussels to act on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and implement decisions already adopted (such as labeling products made in the settlements). EU member states chose to invest in more burning issues such as Brexit, refugees, etc.

Key Arab states engaged in advancing their relations with Israel, albeit under the limitations imposed by the freeze in the peace process, but in a manner that signaled willingness to cooperate with Trump’s moves and generated tensions with the PA. Russia and China, to which the PA appealed to join the mediation efforts, were not keen to agree. UN envoy Nickolay Mladenov became the most significant non-American player in the arena.

He voiced clear opposition to Israeli annexation as well as firm views about the principles of a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement and the implications of developments on the ground. He also effectively mediated to avert war with Gaza. Abbas and the Palestinian leadership, which adopted a strategic decision several years ago to conduct their national struggle in the diplomatic arena rather than on the military battleground, were left without significant allies in the world and devoid of achievements.

Under these circumstances, Trump and Netanyahu were able to concoct the plan they wanted. However, its unveiling must effectuate change. International supporters of peace can no longer hide behind the smoke screen of an impending, effective US plan. They must clearly voice their stand against the unilateral plan, present alternative parameters that could truly advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, coordinate among states and bodies committed to peace and willing to invest in its advancement, and join those in Israel and the PA who refuse to accept Trump’s dictates.

The next US president, perhaps a new one, will be sworn in one year from now. Until that time, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the annexation ideas included in the Trump plan do not become reality.

The writer is founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The international community should say no to the Trump plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

So, I was hiding in the heap of dead bodies because in the last week the crematoria did not function at all. The bodies were just building up higher and higher. So there I was at night time; in the daytime, I was roaming in the camp, and this is how I survived. On January 27, 1945, I was one of the very first; Birkenau was one of the very first camps being liberated.”

— Bert Stern, a Survivor

Seventy-five years ago today, the Red Army stood at the gates of Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Soviet soldiers could not believe the harrowing sights unfolding before their eyes: the 7,000 remaining prisoners—human skeletons, just skin and bones, some of them dying These were the sad remnants of 1.3 million people—women, men and children—who had been deported by the Nazis to the largest concentration camp ever constructed, a facility that combined a killing center and slave labor. It is estimated that between 1940 and 1945, at least 1.1 million people died there, some of them gassed; others tortured and shot by the Nazi guards; others succumbing to hunger, cold, disease, and exhaustion.

Auschwitz-Birkenau, one of the many concentration camps established by the Nazis, was the culmination of the Nazi plan to dominate a Europe populated by a pure Aryan race. The term “Holocaust” has been used to describe the mass-murder of six million Jews, killed simply because they were Jews. It is true that not only Jews were deported and murdered in Auschwitz: other targeted groups included the Roma, the homosexuals, and the physically and mentally handicapped. All these people were considered threats to racial purity, but for the Jews, the plan was different; it was total and final. Even seventy-five years later it is difficult to understand the frenzy and determination of the Nazis and their collaborators in their effort to wipe from the face of the earth a whole people, to perform what became known as “the final solution”, to eradicate any remnant of their culture and civilization. And perhaps most difficult to understand is that as the Nazi mass-murder machine took its daily toll, the world stood silent.

It would be a dangerous error to think that the Holocaust was simply the result of the insanity of a group of criminal Nazis. On the contrary, the Holocaust was the culmination of centuries of hatred and discrimination targeting the Jews. The hatred propagated by the
Roman Catholic Church, the persecutions and expulsions, the auto-da-fé of the Holy Inquisition, and the pogroms in Eastern Europe—all these were the fate of the European Jews for two millennia, since the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple and deportation of the Jews from their homeland.

Even in the case of the Holocaust, the Nazis did not move immediately to trying to exterminate Jews; they moved step-by-step to dehumanize Jews, so that when the “final” step came it was accepted by the masses. Throughout the 1930s, after the Nazis took power in Germany, they began with laws that required the Jewish people to be gradually removed from the rest of the population, stripping them of their citizenship and their human rights. Jews were barred from the professions, their shops looted and confiscated, their synagogues destroyed and their books burned. Then Jews were forced into squalid ghettos or confined to camps where they were used as slave labor. And all of this was accompanied by systematic incitement and racial indoctrination that portrayed Jews as sub-human, no more than cockroaches, who polluted the pristine German society.

Albert Speer was one of Hitler’s closest confidants, the Minister of the Armaments and War Production in the Third Reich. He was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment at the Nuremberg Trials. In an affidavit, sworn and signed at Munich in 15 June 1977, Speer wrote:

“The hatred of the Jews was Hitler’s driving force and central point, perhaps even the only element that moved him. The German people, German greatness, the Reich, all that meant nothing to him in the final analysis. Thus, the closing sentence of his Testament sought to commit us Germans to a merciless hatred of the Jews even after the apocalyptic downfall.”

Hatred and prejudice were not confined to Germany, however. Such conditions were prevalent in many European nations; had this not been so, the Holocaust would not have been possible. In many conquered states, the Nazis found enthusiastic collaborators in their scheme to rid Europe of Jews. There were also courageous, heroic citizens who endangered their own lives and those of their families to save Jews. We call them the Righteous Gentiles.

For us, citizens of the Free World today, it is difficult to understand the enormity of Auschwitz, and the depth of the cruelty; it is difficult to understand or accept what human beings are capable of doing to each other when motivated by blind prejudice and hatred. After the Holocaust, the world seemed eager to find a more cooperative path. The founding of the United Nations was one expression of that moment. For a while, we thought that hatred of Jews had finally been eradicated. But slowly the demonization of Jews started to come back.

Antisemitism is on the rise again all over Europe and the United States, and anti-Semitic incidents are multiplying. Irrationality and intolerance are back. Jews are being targeted as Jews again in Europe. Jews are being attacked on the streets, in supermarkets, in schools. Synagogues and Jewish businesses are attacked. There are mass-demonstrations, with thousands of people shouting death threats to the State of Israel and to Jews. There is even a revival of Holocaust revisionism, spanning those who minimize the atrocity to those who rewrite history so as to honor the disgraced officials of those dark days.

We are concerned because we know where hatred can lead.

Antisemitism and racism should have no place in the 21rst century. Houses of worship should be places of love, understanding, and healing. Nations should not tell their people to kill in the name of God

Jewish History and consciousness will be dominated for many generations by the traumatic memories of the Holocaust. No people in history has undergone an experience of such violence and depth. For us, to remember is not only a commandment, it is the moral commitment to the sanctity of human life, a commitment to pass on to the next generations the very basic values of acceptance of the Other, of tolerance and understanding.

We remember the Holocaust, because memory is an integral part of our culture. Because memory shapes us. We remember the victims because of the command “Zachor” (Remember).

Remembrance is not an isolated act; it has a moral dimension. The rescuers taught us that even in the hell known as Holocaust, the individual had the choice and the capacity to behave humanely if they cared—and had the courage. We remember because we do not want our past to be our children’s future.

(originally published in European Eye on Radicalization)

הפוסט Remembering the Holocaust: 75 Years After the Liberation of the Camps הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The huge potential in the relationship has not yet been realized. Israel can successfully promote bilateral cooperation with Jordan in tourism, water and hi-tech, but there is also the feasibility of promoting wider regional cooperation that will increase regional stability and the volume of trade. Jordan can also fulfill an important role in the political arena: leveraging the status it holds over holy sites in Jerusalem, supporting the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace and serving as a stabilizing force in the region in general. In order to achieve these goals, Israel must change direction: seek to open new dialogue channels, prioritize relations with Jordan, be attentive to Jordan’s needs and complaints, and reexamine joint projects. Politicians and decision-makers in both countries must understand that inaction and neglecting the relationship will take a high toll.

The establishment of a new government in Israel in 2020 could provide an opportunity for significant change. This can begin with positive Israeli statements about the relations and their importance. Statements should then be transformed into concrete actions. This requires planning ahead of time. As such, we present a list of key recommendations the next Israeli government can take to restart the relationship with Jordan.

Expressions of goodwill and general support for the strengthening of relations are needed. Calls to annex the Jordan Valley and/or parts of the West Bank should be avoided and Jordan’s special role regarding the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem should be reaffirmed by Israeli leaders. Beyond that, Israel and Jordan need real ‘glue’ – substantial projects that will bring them together and focus the relations on growth and development. Israeli decision-makers should prioritize renewing joint projects in the fields of water and infrastructure, increasing exports of Jordanian goods to the Palestinian Authority and advancing cooperation in tourism, hi-tech and medical tourism.

Discussion of water issues should be expanded to include broader solutions in which Israel can assist Jordan. Such support should begin with catalyzing the Aqaba desalination project (even disconnecting it from the Red Sea-Dead Sea project if necessary) and expediting an expanded agreement of water supply from the Galilee to Jordan. Concurrently, we recommend advancing a comprehensive program for collaboration in other fields related to water and energy. That would include, for example, supplying desalinated water from the Mediterranean, supplying electricity from Jordanian solar fields (against Israeli gas supplied to Jordan) as well as other water and wastewater treatment projects, including cooperation in the reconstruction of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.

Transportation is another field deserving of attention. During the last two decades, a network of regional railroads has been developed; this can facilitate a land bridge enabling rapid, economically competitive movement of goods between the Gulf states and the Mediterranean Sea. Jordan is strategically located at the junction of this railway system. Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is critical for the implementation of this initiative, which has vast potential to become a game-changer for the Jordanian economy.

Other high-priority issues (both new and pending) include the ‘Jordan Gateway’ joint industrial park, facilitation of trade through the trade corridor via Haifa Port, development of a new version of the QIZ trade agreement focusing on tourism and cooperation in exporting advanced industrial products and services to other markets. Israel must pay close attention to joint programs that have stalled and therefore generate frustration on the Jordanian side. We propose setting up an intra-ministerial task force on the subject, under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office and including representatives from the foreign ministry, as well as from the and ministries of regional cooperation, economy and defense.

Furthermore, the numerous obstacles to maintaining contact with Israel that Jordanian businesspeople face should be removed. Currently, they endure a cumbersome process to get visas to enter Israel, including prolonged and unexplained delays in processing applications, inconsistencies in rejection or approval and reluctance to in granting multi-entry visas. These difficulties drive away many of those Jordanian businesspeople who are interested in developing business relations with Israel, and this must be changed.

We are convinced that despite the unfulfilled potential and differing readings of the peace treaty by both parties a boost of energy and attention dedicated to renewing Israeli-Jordanian relations – along with advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – will transform the dynamics, create a healthy partnership and inject real substance into the peace treaty. In turn, these will provide for multiple economic and political opportunities that will expand bilateral relations and bear the fruits of peace. The stability and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom must be a priority for Israel, since it will provide stability on its longest border and cooperation from which both parties will benefit.

Yitzhak Gal is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and an adviser specializing in the Arab markets; Ksenia Svetlova is director of the Program on Israel-Middle East Relations at the Mitvim Institute and a former member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recommendations for restarting Israel-Jordan relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.