Findings and recommendations in this paper cover:
● MEPPA’s first year, which revealed a stunning level of demand to implement peacebuilding projects.
● A breakdown and analysis of what to expect in MEPPA’s second year of grants, which has a framework that makes room for significant growth, leaning into conflict resolution, smaller grants for smaller local partners, and core new audiences.
● Challenges facing civil society peacebuilding work and responsive strategies. The current environment needs this work more than ever but rising extremists fear it and threaten it.
● The role that international public and private donors and allies can play in standing up for civil society, amplifying it, and scaling the impact for conflict-sized change. Indeed, despite otherwise contentious politics and despair, broad support for large- scale peacebuilding investments continues to grow in Washington and other capitals, including the UK, Canada, and the EU.

הפוסט Amid Crisis, Peacebuilding Advances with Smart Donor Strategies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A series of indicators reflect heightened international attention to the conflict since the new government assumed power. The growing US involvement was manifested in visits by Secretary of State Blinken, National Security Advisor Sullivan, and CIA Director Burns, who met with the leaderships in Jerusalem and Ramallah, and in condemnations by senior US officials of the government policy on the settlements. This involvement includes unusual steps not seen in the past decade, namely mediation activity between the parties on formulating understandings (as a condition for withdrawing the Palestinian proposal to condemn Israel in the Security Council), and a decision to leave a team of administration officials in the region to monitor events and promote de-escalation. Until recently, the Palestinian issue seemed to be a very low priority for the administration, and it was only raised on the margins of President Biden’s visit to the region in July 2022. 

Similar dynamics are evident in the policies of other international actors. The foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain joined Blinken in issuing an unusual statement expressing “grave concern” over the government’s policy on the settlements; Senior officials from the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League initiated a special meeting in Brussels on the Palestinian issue; 94 countries signed a statement protesting the government’s punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority (PA); and 15 Security Council members issued a presidential statement (for the first time in eight years) condemning Israeli policy.  

These developments complement steps by regional actors – chief among them Jordan and Egypt –conveying public and secret messages of concern over the new Israeli government’s actions and fear of escalation. The United Arab Emirates, Israel’s partner in the 2020 Abraham Accords, also plays an important role in this process and initiated, as an UNSC member, a few Security Council meetings on the issue and worked with the Palestinians on drafting a UNSC statement condemning Israel, and it also canceled a planned visit by Netanyahu. 

The Feb. 26 Aqaba summit with the participation of Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian, Jordanian, and American representatives was a prominent expression of increasing international involvement in the conflict. A public meeting of senior Israeli and Palestinian officials, under regional or international auspices, has not taken place since the collapse of Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace initiative (2013-2014). In fact, the Aqaba Document agreed at the meeting is the first Israeli-Palestinian political memorandum of understanding since the Kerry era.  

These developments follow a decade of distinct lack of international involvement in the conflict, and a decline in the degree of international interest in the issue. The world was discouraged by the rounds of negotiations that failed to yield agreement, and did not detect political readiness for a breakthrough on either side. Other issues and arenas attracted greater international attention – both in the region (Iran, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan) and on the global stage (China, COVID-19, the rise of populism and, more recently, of course, the war in Ukraine). Additionally, the Quartet – the international group (US, Russia, UN and the European Union) that was created to sponsor the peace process, has been paralyzed in recent years. 

But these days the world is increasingly recognizing alarming signs and pushing for increased engagement. In many cases of conflicts around the world, international intervention begins, or increases, when escalation develops, or when there is a sense that the parties are approaching a confrontation. The world identifies that the Israeli-Palestinian arena is particularly explosive and sensitive. Indications of this on the ground are numerous and already during 2022 we witnessed a sharp increase in violence in the conflict. The focal points of friction and confrontation are intensifying and accumulating: from the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, through the Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, Nablus, Jenin, Hawara (in the West Bank), the Palestinian prisoners’ protest in Israeli jails, and the recent increase in Israel-Hamas hostilities in Gaza Strip. 

In the new Israeli government coalition, actors who served as extreme “spoilers” from outside of the system, are now working within the government in key positions. Radical ideas, such as annexation and violating the status quo on Jerusalem’s holy sites, are being openly discussed by senior coalition spokespersons, and steps once considered beyond the pale, such as legalizing illegal outposts in the West Bank, are becoming official policy. Indications of growing instability have also emerged on the Palestinian side, against the backdrop of the weakening and illegitimacy of the PA, along with increased attacks against Israelis, and the ongoing internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Added to all this is the constant fear of escalation during the month of Ramadan (starting March 22), and especially on the days it coincides with Passover (starting April 5). 

Many feel that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at a critical crossroads and is moving quickly towards an explosion. A dual policy is at play in Israel, with one government arm, led mainly by the security establishment, trying to calm tensions and strengthen the PA, while the other arm, led by representatives of the Religious Zionist party, contributes to unrest, backs up settler violence, and hopes for the dissolution of the PA and the opening it will provide to promote annexation. This duality was evident when National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi was dispatched to Jordan to sign the Aqaba document, while Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir publicly denied the Aqaba understandings. On the Palestinian side, the PA leadership is working to promote stability and improve governance. But it faces increased public opposition, including over its continued security coordination with Israel (as reflected in the growing Palestinian support for the Lion’s Den and the intensification of demonstrations), and efforts by Hamas and Islamic Jihad to exploit its weakness in order to enhance their power. 

Under this backdrop, three main actors – the United States, Egypt, and Jordan – try hard to prevent a seemingly inevitable escalation and to create political and security understandings that will prevent deterioration. They identify a dangerous combination of elements generating the potential for a “perfect storm” and are trying to play the role of the child sticking its finger in the dam. This is an almost impossible task given the existing political conditions, the dangerous dynamics on the ground, and after many years of a prolonged stalemate in the peace process. We can hope that it is not too little, too late, and wish that the international efforts will move beyond ad-hoc preventive diplomacy, toward a more comprehensive strategy and the creation of a long-term political horizon. 

הפוסט On the Verge of an Abyss? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Given the coalition members’ plans to harden legal sanctions on Arab Israelis to the point of stripping them of their citizenship and expel them from Israel, and given the projects to extend the settlers’ presence in the occupied territories, the proposed plans are bound to raise tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel. This could set off actions of solidarity among Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Arab countries.

Meanwhile, the new coalition’s plans to expand the settlements and give them a better legal cover by exerting control over the High Court – through legislative override or change in the judges nomination process – is also bound to raise Israeli-Palestinian tensions in the West Bank.

One could rightly argue that the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and the harsh treatment of its population has gotten for a half-century did not wait for new rules to be enacted by a rightist government.

Tensions are bound to rise

But if the proposed legislation succeeds, particularly the override rule and the change in the judicial nomination process, any move would become possible as Prime Minister Netanyahu and his allies crave for total control of the West Bank. With Finance Minister and Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich in charge of civil affairs in the West Bank and with part of the powers of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, tensions are bound to raise.

These tensions may be contained for a while but for how long given Smotrich’s political aims in the West Bank, his political alliance with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, and the fact that these two men and their allies in the Knesset exert true control on the fate of Netanyahu’s government?

Then, yes, the message from the Israeli government would become clear: there is no Palestinian Authority and there will be no Palestinian state, even a demilitarized state as Palestinian leaders have agreed to as a condition for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace since the 1990s.

Given their possible consequences on the ground, on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and in the West Bank, the proposed rules are bound to provoke a deterioration of the relations between Israel and the Arab countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations – no fewer than six.

STOPPING THE projects of the annexation of the West Bank by the previous Netanyahu government was already a condition that made the Abraham Accords possible. The plans of the present Israeli coalition to expand settlements won’t benefit Israeli-Arab relations when progress is expected in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

This point is not only a diplomatic issue, it touches the very fabric of Arab public opinion. Normalization won’t be fully accepted if there is no progress and there is indeed a deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The moment is for building on the assets that the Abraham Accords represent for regional cooperation and peace. The present Israeli government needs to show political and diplomatic maturity. The Middle East has changed positively since the Camp David, Oslo and Abraham Accords, except for a majority of the Palestinian people.

It is time an Israeli and Arab leadership emerges that understands these issues and breaks with the politics of conflict and arrogance. The business communities are here and the civil societies, too, and the potential for shared initiatives and prosperity is real.

It may be that today the unlocking of this situation sits on the shoulders of one man: Netanyahu. The possibility that he does not go to court and avoids prison is completely linked to the fate that his governing coalition is preparing for the Israeli High Court. But by changing the legal rules and particularly by putting the override rule into law, Netanyahu might sacrifice the stability of this country and its relations with its neighbors for his singular benefit.

No one knows better than Netanyahu and the members of Knesset what is better for peace and their country, and their regional and international standing. If the United States and the United Kingdom have already expressed strong reservations about dealing with the present Israeli government and certainly with some of its members, what could be the position of Cairo, Amman, Abu Dhabi, Manama or Rabat?

The present legal issues before the Knesset and Israeli public opinion may be a matter of domestic politics but the way they are handled through votes in the Knesset, civil disobedience, the resignation of opposition MKs or an amnesty law will deeply affect the fate of Israeli-Palestinian relations, which are already at a very low point, and the status of Israeli Arabs, which, in fact, has been improving amid firm and continuous efforts after decades of stagnation.

Jamal Amiar is a Moroccan journalist and writer and a guest contributor to Mitvim Institute for Regional Policies.

The article was published in The Jerusalem Post on March 16.

הפוסט Israeli-Palestinian relations are deeply affected הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט From a space of conflict to a space of peace: The role of urban planners in advancing the peace process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The visit took place amidst a rise in violent incidents between Israelis and Palestinians. Both Washington and Amman have voiced concerns about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s new government, each for its own reasons. There are several concrete next steps that the two countries can now take to follow up on the visit and promote stability, peacemaking, and regional cooperation.

The U.S. and Jordan should prepare for the sensitive overlap between Ramadan and Passover this coming April by coordinating their efforts, dividing the labor, and utilizing their leverage over Israel and the Palestinian Authority, respectively, to lower the risk of escalation.

They should also work to bring together international actors willing to invest political capital in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Middle East Quartet, composed of the U.S., Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, has not been effective for years, and a new multilateral mechanism is needed, even if informally at first.

Jordan can bring on board France, Germany and Egypt — its partners in the Munich Group (which has convened periodically since 2020 to maintain the prospects for a two-state solution). Whereas, the U.S. can invite its Quartet allies — the EU and the U.N. Switzerland and Norway, whose special envoys to the region recently visited Jerusalem, can also be incorporated, alongside Turkey — given its recent rapprochement with Israel and good relations with the Palestinians.

At the regional level, the U.S. should respect Jordan’s decision to stay out of the Negev Forum until there is progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. In the meantime, it should make sure that the interests of Jordan and the Palestinians are considered during the upcoming Negev Summit, planned for March in Morocco. Additionally, Washington should link Jordan and the Palestinians as much as possible to regional projects enabled by the Abraham Accords.

The U.S. can also encourage Jordan and Saudi Arabia to work together on updating the Arab Peace Initiative, bringing it in line with recent regional developments and making it a more effective incentive for peace. Amman played a key role in the drafting of the initiative over 20 years ago, and it may want to do so again. The Saudis emphasize their commitment to the initiative and notably convened a multilateral gathering toward updating it on the sidelines of the 2022 U.N. General Assembly.

Finally, the U.S. can assist Israel and Jordan to put in place a crisis-management mechanism that will enable the two neighbors to deal effectively with the consequences of any Israeli-Palestinian escalation and prevent the collapse of their bilateral ties.

The article was published in MEI@75 on February 6.

הפוסט The US and Jordan can work closer together on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a key hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict claimed by Israelis and Palestinians and left under temporary Israeli responsibility by the Interim Agreement (1995). For almost three decades, Israel has been reducing the Palestinian living space in the area and deepening its hold, managing all planning and building processes, expanding settlement areas and so-called “state lands” and demarcating “military zones” and “nature reserves” for itself. The collapse of the peace process also encouraged the Palestinian Authority (since 2009) to act unilaterally on the ground. While Israel has assumed a “piecemeal” approach and sees Area C as a vital space for settlement and security, the Palestinians have taken a “holistic” approach, viewing the area as a necessary space for a contiguous and sustainable state. The campaign currently being waged on the ground perpetuates friction and a bloody struggle over land and infrastructure, distances the chance of a stable Israeli-Palestinian agreement, prevents development and construction for Palestinians, poses a tangible danger to nature and the environment, and deepens humanitarian and legal challenges of population expulsion and relocation.

Turning this important area into a foundation for Israeli-Palestinian progress requires two types of policies – a reactive policy in the short term to prevent further deterioration, and a long-term policy of practical cooperation. In light of the new radical right-wing government’s policy advocating the de facto annexation of Area C to Israel, the pro-peace camp must take preventive measures: promote a campaign to “unmask” the government’s moves and intentions and expose the dangers of annexation as a fatal blow to Israel’s identity, security, and political and economic standing; expand demonstrations in conjunction with the overall protest against the new government’s anti-democratic policies; file objections to settlement construction and to harmful measures against the Palestinians. Down the line, Israel and the Palestinians must abandon their “zero sum game” approach and instead formulate joint systemic planning and promote positive steps in Area C: approve outline plans for Palestinian construction that were already submitted to Israel for approval, prevent crime and piracy, and promote joint projects with international and Arab assistance. These include solar power fields, agricultural and food cultivation areas, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and industrial zones. Advancing these measures without a political horizon will result, at most, in some specific improvement. On the other hand, advancing measures with a view to a political settlement – including the transfer of parts of Area C to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the advancement of a comprehensive economic plan for the Palestinians – will lead to a real change, strengthen Palestinian ability and motivation to prevent terrorism, and make it possible to gradually advance the two-state vision based on the “Creeping Peace” strategy.

הפוסט Area C: From a Hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict to a Space for “Creeping Peace” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Benjamin Netanyahu begins his current term as prime minister with a domestic focus, and with a sense of urgency that relates to a personal, not national, issue. Seeking a way out of his corruption trial seems to be his top priority. This dictated which parties became part of the coalition, and which policy directives are advanced first.

In his first months in office, Netanyahu is likely to promote the judicial reforms announced by Justice Minister Yariv Levin. If approved, these reforms will dramatically undermine Israeli democracy, and that is already generating significant pushback and causing deep polarization within Israel.

Domestic escalation is therefore coming first. It seems to be a price Netanyahu is willing to pay to solve his personal legal problems and consolidate power. While doing so, he will be seeking international legitimacy and regional stability, to give him more room to maneuver domestically and to counter claims that the government damages Israel’s global standing. For that reason, Netanyahu may be willing to abide by certain redlines conveyed by the Biden administration (for example, on settlements and Jerusalem).

Things have initially been going Netanyahu’s way on the international front. Arab leaders have shown interest in continuing to cooperate with his government, a White House visit is reportedly in the works, and the European Union has expressed a desire to continue the high-level dialogue it launched with former Prime Minister Yair Lapid. While international actors are raising red flags and voicing genuine concerns, many of them are adopting an almost “business-as-usual” approach, waiting to see whether the new government takes actions on the Palestinian issue that will necessitate a response.

Netanyahu’s intention was seemingly to make sure that should escalation on the Palestinian front happen, it would only come second. The recent security deterioration, however, indicates that such an escalation is already taking place, even if that was unintended, and might quickly spiral. In any case, Netanyahu remains determined to block any prospect of a future Palestinian state and has handed authorities related to the West Bank to far-right politicians. Netanyahu may limit them somewhat at first — for the sake of avoiding international crises or regional troubles — but eventually they are likely to carry out provocations in Jerusalem and work to deepen and broaden Israeli control over the Palestinian territories. Such developments might lead to further escalation, especially during the sensitive overlap (in April) between Passover and Ramadan.

An Israeli-Palestinian flare-up could be a catalyst for the third type of escalation — the regional one. If this were to happen, Arab and Muslim countries would find it difficult to maintain their current level of relations with Israel. Regional countries are likely to respond in different ways, depending on the nature of the conflict that erupts, while trying to hold onto the benefits of increased ties with Israel.

Netanyahu, cherishing his regional achievements and seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, may utilize an Israeli-Palestinian escalation to shake up his coalition. If escalation occurs after his desired legal reform is approved, and if he can blame his far-right coalition partners for the flare-up, he may seek to replace an extremist party in his government with a centrist one. He will frame it as a step to restore security and safeguard Israel-Arab relations — a framing that security-oriented centrists, seeking to “save Israel,” might adhere to.

Considering these potential developments, and in an attempt to shape them for the better, the international community should already put in place de-escalation mechanisms, conceive of preventive and proactive diplomatic steps it can take, and step up its support for those in Israel pushing back against democratic erosion.

The article was published in MEI@75 on Janurary 30.

הפוסט Israel’s new government raises the likelihood of escalation on multiple fronts הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The publication prompted belligerent reactions, which appear to be part of an ongoing orchestrated campaign by the right wing and the settlers. National Missions Minister Orit Struck labeled it “a subversive plan to establish a Palestinian state contrary to agreements and against the law.” Minister in the Defense Ministry Bezalel Smotrich argued that the EU was helping to establish “an Arab terrorist state in the heart of the Land of Israel, unilaterally.”

Shlomo Ne’eman, head of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization representing communities in Judea and Samaria), said that “the takeover of Area C is the greatest strategic threat in our region.” Right-wing MKs banded together and drafted a letter demanding that the EU “immediately cease illegal construction in Israeli sovereign territory.”

Area C of the West Bank

Area C constitutes 60% of the West Bank’s area. Contrary to right-wing claims, the territory is not under Israeli sovereignty, since Israel never annexed it. According to the Interim Agreement with the PLO (1995), the area, which was occupied in 1967, is under “temporary” Israeli control, and with the exception of the areas left for negotiations on the permanent stage, most of Area C was to be handed over eventually to the Palestinians.

As the parties did not reach a permanent agreement, this ongoing conflict has a negative impact on developments in Area C. The PA, for example, cannot exercise the functional powers it was granted under the Interim Agreement, since Israel controls all movement, planning and infrastructure in the territory.

Along with violence, terrorism and crime, nature and the environment are severely damaged; Israel is torpedoing construction projects necessary for Palestinian living and livelihoods; and Palestinians are sometimes expelled from their homes and require international humanitarian assistance. The lack of coordination along a “zero-sum game” approach prevents construction and development according to a long-term spatial perspective, as the EU suggests.

Reviewing the EU Delegation’s proposal illustrates the extent to which the Israeli claims are unfounded and motivated by a political agenda. The EU’s vision has not changed in any way. Europeans have long supported the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and have been trying for many years to provide humanitarian assistance to the isolated Palestinian population in Area C, which Israel abuses.

The European vision is, in fact, in line with Israel’s long-term interest – to promote the two-state solution in order to ensure its existence as a safe, Jewish and democratic state. This differs deeply from the radical Right’s agenda, which wants to demarcate and isolate Palestinian cities, to annex most of Area C to Israel, and to perpetuate a bloody conflict between the peoples.

Contrary to right-wing claims, the delegation’s document adheres to the Oslo Accords and international law, and even recommends avoiding unilateral measures and implementing a nonconfrontational approach to Israel (“Do No Harm”). This constructive approach falls on the deaf ears of politicians in the right-wing government, who today see the PA and the international community as “enemies of Israel,” motivated by antisemitism to work against it.

The document is also based on a professional approach of spatial planning and environmental sustainability (green energy and green economy). Instead of adopting this approach for coordinating European-funded humanitarian and development construction, Israel is taking unilateral divisive measures, expanding settlements deep within the territory, and demarcating extensive “military zones” at the expense of Palestinian living space, taking over land that is not its own and harming the land and the population.

The extreme Right’s claims of an “illegal” Palestinian takeover of “our” territories, accusing the Palestinians of trying to delineate the borders of their state by stealing and defrauding the State of Israel, are astonishing. Blaming the Palestinians for “settlement-style” activism is like a hunchback who doesn’t see the enormous hump on his back.

The majority of the Palestinian population in the West Bank (approximately three million people) lives in densely populated areas A and B. Without Israeli approval, the PA cannot expand the residential areas. The PA’s requests for building permits in Area C are denied in most cases. Only 0.5% of the applications are approved by the Civil Administration. Thus, Palestinians are unable to cope with natural growth without so-called illegal construction.

Since 1967, more than 460,000 Jews have moved to the occupied territories (not including the Jerusalem area). Settlement expansion at a dizzying pace leads to suffering for the approximately 260,000 Palestinians living in Area C, the destruction of structures and facilities, and the expulsion and confiscation of property, while Israel is the party violating international law.

The international community, including the EU, provides humanitarian and economic assistance for the development of the occupied Palestinian territory, with Israeli approval and in accordance with the agreements. The right-wing is reluctant to incite against other foreign elements (such as UN-Habitat, USAID) that also operate on the ground, under similar principles. Instead, it is treating the EU as a scapegoat.

CONTRARY TO the Right’s accusations, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council has not yet voted to adopt the document on the development of Area C as an official decision. EU resolutions require unanimous consent by the council, which includes representatives of the 27 member states and the European Foreign Service. Until it is accepted, this is a proposal, not an action plan.

The leak of the document has once again unleashed the far-right demon of anti-EU incitement. Right-wing politicians, especially those from the far Right, are no strangers to spreading vicious anti-EU incitement. However, its volume and speed this time suggest a potential new low in relations between Israel and the EU under the sixth Netanyahu government, after relations had been greatly improved by concerted efforts of the previous government.

The two agreements promoted by the Bennett and Lapid government, Creative Europe and the operational agreement with Europol, have already stalled and are unlikely to be advanced by the current government. The European Commission is also renewing its claim for financial compensation from Israel for the destruction of structures and facilities in Area C, damaging European taxpayer funds.

The excessive powers granted to Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir over maintaining security and managing Palestinian civilian life in the West Bank make clear what we can expect from now on – violent provocations, tacit permission to aggravate attacks on Palestinians, particularly in Area C, and activities to promote the de facto annexation of the territory to Israel.

It is therefore difficult to expect a positive change in the attitude of this most right-wing government. On the other hand, engaging the EU in battle at the present time is liable to harm Israel’s interests, and might result in a broad “counter-coalition” vis-à-vis Israel.

This is even as the EU has demonstrated its interest in increasing its partnership with Israel against the backdrop of the Russo-Ukraine war, and in view of Israel’s energy and security assets.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Eli Cohen have a responsibility to prevent Area C from becoming a new focus of escalation and further damage to the PA’s ability to survive, while at the same time maintaining intact relations with the Europeans. In view of the government’s makeup, they are expected to face a fierce containment battle even in meeting these basic goals.

This article is from “JPost“, from Janurary 16, 2023

הפוסט EU Delegation to the PA propose joint development of Area C הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The current government has embarked on a fundamental clash with international law due to its intent to transform the occupation into a permanent reality de facto even if not de jure. Despite the claims of Israel’s political right that “a people cannot be an occupier of its own land”, and without denying the historical connection of the Jewish people to regions of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, this is also undoubtedly the land of the Palestinians living in these territories. The Palestinians in the West Bank experience violent military occupation whereas Palestinians living in annexed East Jerusalem face discrimination in all aspects of life. In the West Bank, a different law applies to Palestinians and to Israeli settlers living there, and in East Jerusalem, Palestinian residents do not enjoy Israeli citizenship and are discriminated against in terms of municipal and social services and in the residency permits they are required to obtain from the government and municipality. In other words, Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are subject to different and discriminatory rules compared to their Jewish neighbors.

Israeli governments has nonetheless managed to avoid significant international sanctions over this clearly immoral reality unparalleled in Western democracies due to its claim that the situation is temporary in nature and that Israel is reaching out to the Palestinians in search of a peaceful solution to the conflict. These two claims have long since ceased to hold water, but nonetheless enjoy US backing and benefit from European inertia. Israel has thus been spared sanctions of the kind imposed on Russia since its 2014 occupation of Crimea, and even more so since its invasion and occupation of parts of eastern Ukraine.

Dr. Micah Goodman’s theory of “shrinking the conflict”, which was adopted by the previous government as unofficial policy due to its inability to seek an accommodation with the Palestinians, is nothing more than self-delusion. Anyone familiar with the situation in the Occupied Territories knows that the conflict cannot be shrunk and cannot be “managed.” The question is essentially dichotomous – Israel is either an occupying power or it is not. Vague definitions and hollow words cannot change this fundamental fact. In practice, the “shrinking the conflict” policy of the past year has failed to achieve its already limited goals. The Israeli presence in the West Bank creates a routine of violence against the Palestinian population,by Jewish settler violence intended to take over Palestinian territory and make Palestinian life a misery. Discriminatory laws, which allow Palestinians to be evicted from their homes and lands while their Jewish neighbors live comfortably in homes on land that belongs to Palestinians, are intended to thwart any solution that would divide the land between Israelis and Palestinians. Nonetheless, successive Israeli governments, including the so-called government of change (2021-2022), have succeeded in convincing the world that the occupation that begun in 1967 is temporary.

The new government, according to its declarations and the wording of the coalition agreements underpinning its formation, is about to expose this prolonged masquerade and thereby eliminate the international protective umbrella that allowed Israel to keep it in place. This government has announced its intention to continue building settlements in the Palestinian territories and even to whitewash the outposts considered illegal under Israeli law due to their location on private Palestinian land.

The new government also intends to significantly weaken the independence of Israel’s judicial system, which has served as a shield against international legal intervention by convincing the West that Israel should be allowed to deal with human rights violations in the Occupied Territories on its own.

Moreover, the new government intends to undermine the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, a move that would severely undermine the peace agreement with Jordan and damage Israel’s other agreements with Arab countries, not to mention the real danger of widespread violence as a direct result. It should be noted that, contrary to Netanyahu’s claim that the Abraham Accords proved that the Sunni Arab states are not interested in the occupation, all Arab states supported the December 2022 UN resolution seeking the International Criminal Court’s opinion on the Israeli occupation.

The new government’s policy reflects a disregard for international law and the norms underlying it. It is important to understand that most countries in the Western world, of which we claim to be a part, regard international law as the infrastructure for their foreign affairs policy. Therefore, once it becomes clear that the occupation is not temporary and does not comply with the rules governing transition periods, their policy towards us may change significantly. Without the US veto power in the Security Council, the Palestinians would have long since been accepted as a UN member. In fact, without the American diplomatic umbrella, most countries would have recognized a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. The two-state solution, which the new government is renouncing, is accepted by almost all countries of the world except Israel, Iran and a number of other non-democratic states.

The longstanding American diplomatic defense on which we have pinned our hopes for decades is about to be eroded, and rightly so. The US administration will no longer be able to justify, either domestically to the majority of Democrats, nor externally to the international community, the protection it provides for Israel’s occupation once Israel’s new government exposes the fraud that enabled its existence. There are already increasing calls in the Democratic Party to stop providing Israel with financial and diplomatic assistance given the Israeli government’s contravention of the two countries’ shared values and interests. Younger American Jews no longer remember Israel as the small and week country extending a hand of peace to the hostile neighbors threatening its existence, which justified their parents’ mobilization to help the fledgling state at all costs. The younger generation rightly sees Israel as a military power making no move to end the conflict while continuing to expect American military aid.

The ultra-Orthodox right-wing government is causing the great majority of the American Jewish community and the Democratic Party to distance themselves from Israel, undermining not only the automatic defense of Israel, but also our ability to serve as the national home of the Jewish people in the Diaspora in accordance with the Zionist mission. The vast majority of American Jews and Democratic voters will be unable to adhere for long to a partnership with Israel cemented by shared values and interests when the State of Israel chooses to disengage from these values and turn itself into an ethnocracy based on Jewish supremacy. Israel’s position at the center of US political consensus has already been severely eroded by Netanyahu’s previous governments. If the State of Israel continues in the direction on which it has embarked, we will soon be left only with the support of Trumpist populists and evangelical Christians who hope for Armageddon in which they hope that most of us will be killed and that the rest of us will convert to Christianity with the return of Jesus Christ.

For years, there has been talk of a political tsunami. The fact that it failed to materialize no longer means it will not.  For those like myself who fear the demise of the Zionist dream and its promise as the democratic homeland of the Jewish people, external intervention to halt such deterioration is not bad news. For all those who, like me, think that the eternal domination of the Palestinians is incompatible with our humane and Jewish values, removing the mask may actually be beneficial by exposing the obvious cost of the occupation and making it clear to all that we cannot be part of the enlightened world as an occupying people. My only hope is that the price we pay will not include bloodshed and the dangerous weakening of Israeli society and of the magnificent Zionist project established by our grandparents and parents.

This article is from “Haaretz“, from Janurary 5, 2023

הפוסט The Impact of the Occupation on Israel’s Foreign Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a key hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict claimed by Israelis and Palestinians and left under temporary Israeli responsibility by the Interim Agreement (1995). For almost three decades, Israel has been reducing the Palestinian living space in the area and deepening its hold, managing all planning and building processes, expanding settlement areas and so-called “state lands” and demarcating “military zones” and “nature reserves” for itself. The collapse of the peace process also encouraged the Palestinian Authority (since 2009) to act unilaterally on the ground. While Israel has assumed a “piecemeal” approach and sees Area C as a vital space for settlement and security, the Palestinians have taken a “holistic” approach, viewing the area as a necessary space for a contiguous and sustainable state. The campaign currently being waged on the ground perpetuates friction and a bloody struggle over land and infrastructure, distances the chance of a stable Israeli-Palestinian agreement, prevents development and construction for Palestinians, poses a tangible danger to nature and the environment, and deepens humanitarian and legal challenges of population expulsion and relocation.

Turning this important area into a foundation for Israeli-Palestinian progress requires two types of policies – a reactive policy in the short term to prevent further deterioration, and a long-term policy of practical cooperation. In light of the new radical right-wing government’s policy advocating the de facto annexation of Area C to Israel, the pro-peace camp must take preventive measures: promote a campaign to “unmask” the government’s moves and intentions and expose the dangers of annexation as a fatal blow to Israel’s identity, security, and political and economic standing; expand demonstrations in conjunction with the overall protest against the new government’s anti-democratic policies; file objections to settlement construction and to harmful measures against the Palestinians. Down the line, Israel and the Palestinians must abandon their “zero sum game” approach and instead formulate joint systemic planning and promote positive steps in Area C: approve outline plans for Palestinian construction that were already submitted to Israel for approval, prevent crime and piracy, and promote joint projects with international and Arab assistance. These include solar power fields, agricultural and food cultivation areas, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and industrial zones. Advancing these measures without a political horizon will result, at most, in some specific improvement. On the other hand, advancing measures with a view to a political settlement – including the transfer of parts of Area C to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the advancement of a comprehensive economic plan for the Palestinians – will lead to a real change, strengthen Palestinian ability and motivation to prevent terrorism, and make it possible to gradually advance the two-state vision based on the “Creeping Peace” strategy.

הפוסט Area C: From a Hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict to a Space for “Creeping Peace” הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To counter public claims asserting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had no actual intention of implementing annexation, the Emirati leadership has emphasized that the Abraham Accords were the result of a diplomatic effort for the sake of the Palestinian people. The UAE presented Israel’s decision to halt the annexation as a quid pro quo for the normalization agreements and as the result of pressure the UAE exerted on the Israeli government.

Senior Emirati officials emphasized in the Israeli media the importance of halting annexation and of the Israeli and American commitments to do so under their agreement. The UAE thus set a red line in its relationship with Israel regarding future annexation attempts. The linkage between normalization with Israel and an end to the threat of annexation of Palestinian land signals a new stage in the UAE’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Previously, the UAE was passive on the issue, supporting the Arab Peace Initiative from the sidelines. Now, it is leading a significant move positioning itself as an active player in this arena, despite its rift with the Palestinian leadership.

However, while annexation was defined as a clear red line in Israeli-Emirati relations, other issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain a gray area, for example, the issue of the settlements in the West Bank. Along with positive relations and flourishing cooperation, the UAE has been implicitly critical of Israel over its activities in the West Bank. In December 2020, the Emirati media gave wide coverage of the shooting of a young Palestinian by Israeli soldiers, and in February 2021, it reported on the decision of the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate whether Israel had committed war crimes in the Palestinian Territories.

Additionally, the two countries share new economic relations, with many Israeli delegations visiting the UAE, including one representing the Shomron Regional Council, the umbrella organization of Jewish settlements in the northern West Bank. In December 2020, the Shomron Council signed an export agreement with the UAE’s FAM Holdings. Such cooperation, however, is limited to the private sector, and UAE officials have yet to present clear positions on the purchase of settlement-made goods, ties with the settlements and, in general, the settlement enterprise. Nonetheless, the developing cooperation with Israel will presumably force the UAE to formulate such a policy, or at least to respond to initiatives relating to the territories.

The Temple Mount/Haram Al Sharif issue is also considered a gray area in the Israeli-Emirati relationship. On August 31, 2020, during the first official Israeli delegation visit to Abu Dhabi, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed declared his commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem.

IN OCTOBER 2020, senior Emirati representatives visited al-Aqsa Mosque and encountered angry Palestinians who cursed them and shouted at them to get out, an incident that inflamed tensions between the sides and could result in rethinking the sovereignty issue at the holy site. The incident prompted Israel to strengthen security at the site for visitors from the Gulf, but once tourism from the UAE and Bahrain opens up, the site could once again provoke friction in the trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Gulf states relationship.

Those following the UAE’s diplomatic declarations and activities undoubtedly noticed that in the initial three months after plans were announced to normalize ties with Israel, the Emirati leadership went out of its way to express its commitment to Palestinian national aspirations. The many statements on the issue could attest to its importance to the Emirati leadership as well as the concern over criticism of the agreement with Israel.

Given the precedent it set among Arab and Muslim states by forging full diplomatic relations with Israel, the UAE invested heavily in public diplomacy vis-à-vis its own citizens, the Palestinian people, and the Arab world. Nonetheless, the absence of dialogue with the Palestinian leaderships deprives the UAE of significant leverage in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and forces it to choose roundabout channels to exert influence, for example, through Jordan, Egypt and the UN.

Jordan and Egypt serve as a mediating channel between the Emirates and the Palestinians, given their close relationship and importance to both sides, but most of the activity within these channels remains classified. The UN, on the other hand, serves as a public platform on which the UAE demonstrates its support of the Palestinians by providing humanitarian aid, for example, by coordinating Emirati medical equipment delivered to the Palestinians during the pandemic. Israel has now also joined these Emirati channels of influence, which provide it with a certain measure of involvement in the Palestinian arena, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and possibly in a future negotiating process.

According to Dr. Ebtesam al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center, despite Palestinian opposition to the Abraham Accords, the agreements could actually serve the Palestinian position in the conflict with Israel by:

1) Introducing a new paradigm for peacemaking.

2) Introducing new actors into the peace process, such as the Emirates, serving both Israeli and Palestinian interests.

3) Changing Israeli public opinion regarding the Arab world and the benefits Israel could derive from peace agreements, thereby boosting support for negotiations with the Palestinians. This narrative serves as the UAE’s main argument in explaining its influence on regional stability and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – in both practical terms and in raising awareness.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has sought to spotlight its direct humanitarian contribution to the Palestinians (though not via UNRWA), its relationship with the Palestinian community in the Emirates, its intention to develop new economic channels for the Palestinians and, as mentioned, its commitment to the Palestinian people and to the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

The Emirati leadership’s key message is that its decision to forge ties with Israel was designed to benefit peace, but not at the expense of the Palestinian issue. At a UN Security Council debate, the UAE urged all sides to harness the momentum created by the peace agreement with Israel for renewed negotiations with the Palestinians. With this message, the UAE is outlining its role within the new paradigm of Israeli-Arab relations and the new rules of the game it has defined.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 10th 2021.

הפוסט A look at UAE policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Morocco is committed to the Palestinian issue and to safeguarding Islam’s holy sites, a commitment stemming above all from the religious authority vested in its king as a descendant of the Alawite dynasty and Prophet Muhammad’s family. Morocco has been an Arab League member since 1958 and has chaired the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Al-Quds Committee for the protection of Islam’s holy sites since 1975.

This role makes Morocco relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and especially to any discussion of Jerusalem as a core issue in such negotiations. A deep cultural tie also binds Morocco to Israeli Jews of Moroccan origin. Tens of thousands of Israelis visit Morocco annually, many of them in search of their roots and heritage, often more than once. The Moroccan language, culture and heritage remain conspicuously present in many Israeli homes.

Morocco has played a role in the peace process between Israel and its neighbors from time to time throughout its history due to its relatively neutral foreign policy, its location between east and west, and the trust it engenders in both sides to the conflict.

King Hassan II attributed importance to this role and his involvement consisted mainly of facilitating communication between rival actors and providing an ideal meeting venue for initial stages of negotiations. Such was the case at the difficult birth of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process in the 1970s.

However, since the Second Intifada broke out in October 2000, Morocco’s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shrunk significantly and to this day is characterized by avoidance and excessive caution.

Nonetheless, Morocco has increased its involvement in mediating other conflicts in the Arab world and Africa in recent years as a tenet of its foreign policy. This may provide an opportunity for increased Moroccan involvement in moves to advance Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution, which would depend on the political and public attitudes of Israelis, Moroccans and Palestinians.

Public perceptions in Israel present an opportunity for cooperation. The declaration of renewed official ties between Israel and Morocco generated widespread support in Israel. For Many Israelis, Morocco is not just “another state” in the region; it blends seamlessly into the landscape of nostalgia and memory that is the backdrop of Israeli society. An extensive network of civilian ties based on shared Moroccan identity and values also binds the two countries.

Some one million Jews of Moroccan origin live in Israel, where they preserve their Moroccan identity alongside their Israeli one. Morocco recognizes them as its second-largest diaspora in the world (after France).

Morocco’s renewal of ties with Israel generated a measured response by the Palestinian Authority, certainly compared to its harsh criticism of Israel’s Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Personal calls by the Moroccan monarch to PA President Mahmoud Abbas may have softened its stand, as well as Morocco’s insistence that it was not forging new ties with Israel within the Abraham Accords framework but merely resuming previous relations. The PA’s reluctance to damage its ties with Morocco was also a contributing factor. However, the renewed ties might have damaged Morocco’s neutral image in the eyes of the Palestinians to a certain extent.

The Palestinian issue remains on Morocco’s agenda, and pro-Palestinian public activity has increased significantly in recent years. Reactions in Morocco to the official renewal of relations with Israel were complex. On the one hand, they were highly positive, primarily due to the resulting US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and prompted a significant awakening of new organizations dedicated to strengthening ties with Israel and expansion of activities by existing ones. On the other hand, the move generated protests and significant opposition, along with sensitive questions in the Moroccan political arena as it prepares for elections this year.

Morocco has not been and will not be the main engine or catalyst for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, nor a key mediator. There are other more powerful international actors with greater resources and more effective leverage that could play a more significant role under certain circumstances in prompting or accompanying the peace process. However, Morocco’s politics, geography and identity provide it with an opportunity to assist and support on a wide variety of issues that are key to advancing peace.

Moroccan foreign policy that strives for a posture of neutrality and for contributing to regional stability, the positive attitude and relative trust it engenders among both Palestinians and Israelis, as well as its historic experience, provide it with an opportunity to assist in mediating between the sides. For example, on the issue of Jerusalem.

This issue is broader than the national conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and involves many actors, such as adherents of the three monotheistic faiths, Jordan that serves as the Arab world’s custodian of the Jerusalem sites holy to Islam, Saudi Arabia that is seeking a prestigious foothold in Jerusalem, as well as Turkey, the Catholic and Orthodox churches and, of course, Morocco, which as mentioned, holds a formal position on behalf of the OIC.

Morocco has important symbolic standing in this arena and an opportunity to legitimize whatever creative agreements the sides reach on the future of Jerusalem. It could also aid in improving the fabric of ties in the city even before agreement is reached.

Morocco’s geopolitical location between East and West and Africa and Europe also provides it with opportunities to contribute to the peace process. Morocco is a member of African regional organizations, which it could harness in support of the peace process. Morocco is also part of the Mediterranean, together with Israel and the PA.

While Israel’s immediate interests in that region lie in its partnership with Greece and Cyprus, Morocco could constitute a significant partner for strengthening institutions and cooperation throughout the Mediterranean, at the same time leveraging regional frameworks to advance Israeli-Palestinian cooperation (such as the Union for the Mediterranean, of which Israel and the PA are also members).

Morocco could also contribute to mobilizing public Israeli support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by virtue of its symbolic and emotional value for many Israelis of Moroccan origin. Morocco’s support, and the support of King Mohammed for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations could have a positive impact on the attitudes of Israelis of Moroccan origin to negotiations. This impact could increase as civilian ties between the two states expand and their relationship warms.

The international community sees similarities between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara, at least in terms of international law on occupation and sovereignty claims. Morocco is doing all it can, and is likely to continue doing so, to prevent such comparison, but there is undoubtedly room to study and compare international attitudes and policies to both these cases.

Should Israelis and Palestinians harness the political will to advance peace, both will find a credible, committed and positive ally in Morocco, which offers relevant opportunities and assets and would be positively inclined to help to the best of its ability to ensure the success of the process. And until the peace process is revived, it would be worthwhile offering Morocco a role in encouraging dialogue on the issue of Jerusalem in order to ease tensions and prevent escalation.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 8th 2021.

הפוסט How Morocco relates to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A key cooperation opportunity lies in the field of energy, and specifically alternative energy transportation methods from the Persian Gulf to Europe through the Mediterranean. On a December 2020 visit to Abu Dhabi shortly before leaving office, Former Trump administration Energy Department secretary Dan Brouillette met with his counterparts from the Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel to discuss energy security and the use of pipelines for gas exports. “If we can move natural gas to the coast of Egypt or the coast of Israel, then we’re moving it through the Mediterranean,” he said. He was referring both to the strategic aspect of such a move vis-à-vis Iran, and the importance of diversifying energy export routes from a sensitive region such as the Persian Gulf.

Following a visit to the Emirates in late January, Israeli Energy Ministry Director-General Udi Adiri issued a statement underscoring “the unique opportunity to develop the energy economy of both states and the entire region.” Adiri said his office was promoting a series of infrastructure projects designed to provide a connection to Europe, “and perhaps to Gulf infrastructure in the future. Electricity and natural gas projects will improve regional cooperation.”

It should be noted that the Europe-Asia Pipeline Company (formerly the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company) signed a memorandum of understanding in October 2020 for the transportation of fossil fuel from the Persian Gulf to Israel. The fuel and oil products from the UAE will be shipped to a Red Sea terminal in Eilat and from there to the Mediterranean Ashkelon terminal for distribution to clients. The signing ceremony was held in the presence of the then-US Treasury Secretary and the Emirati Minister of Economy.

Reports and analyses have also emerged in recent weeks about plans for an overland pipeline through Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. These plans have been denied, citing the high costs of such a project, but those involved in the plans appear to be seized with a spirit of creativity.

The diplomatic-strategic rationale is clear. Diversifying gas and oil export routes from the Gulf would reduce the total dependence on the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow, strategic sea route considerably vulnerable to an Iranian attack. In other words, a pipeline running through Saudi Arabia to the Egyptian or Israeli coasts, as mentioned by the former US Energy Secretary, could change the regional energy map and the relationships between the countries involved.

For now, these ideas and plans are all only on paper. However, they have already generated clear concern in Egypt given their possible implications for the Suez Canal.

The head of the Canal Authority has expressed concern about linking the Europe-Asia pipeline to the Persian Gulf. In an Egyptian television interview (January 29) he noted that Egypt was examining ways to deal with the “Israeli-Emirati project” – as he defined it – that could significantly reduce traffic through the canal.

Income from shipping through the canal, it should be noted, is vital to the Egyptian economy, which has already been severely affected by the novel coronavirus crisis. Such plans could also undermine Egypt’s aspirations to become a regional energy hub.

AS PRECIOUSLY noted, the projects’ diplomatic-strategic rationale is sound. The congruence of interests between the Gulf States and Israel, largely based on fear of Iran, could be translated into the energy field.

Nonetheless, Israel has no interest in undermining its relationship with Egypt. Serious thought must be given to integrating Egypt or compensating it appropriately if that is not possible. From an American standpoint, diversifying export alternatives from the Persian Gulf fits its interest in energy security and does not appear to contradict the Biden Administration’s desire to return to the nuclear deal with Iran.

Nonetheless, these plans generate many challenges and question marks. Can the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia adopt such strategic decisions? Is the level of trust with Israel sufficiently high and stable? And if so, can it be preserved and survive future crises? What about the problematic implications for Egypt? And what about the tremendous costs of such an overland pipeline? And of course, what is the position of the new US administration?

In-depth thinking is required to examine the seriousness and feasibility of such plans. Clearly, the Gulf angle opens up a new horizon for relevant players.

Israel is at a strategic-energy crossroads, facing a new range of options. At a news conference (February 14)) alongside the visiting Cypriot president, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to regional cooperation in the post-Abraham Accords era, including energy cooperation. Netanyahu mentioned the UAE’s desire to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and reiterated the shared interest in the proposed East-Med gas pipeline to Europe. The Cypriot president presumably asked how the Gulf angle could be combined with the Hellenic one. As far as Israel is concerned, the two could be complementary.

At issue are strategic-scale decisions and projects. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated global economic uncertainty and cast a measure of doubt on the feasibility of these energy plans and the willingness of international energy companies to invest significant sums given the unclear post-pandemic economic picture.

Nonetheless, Israel is at a fascinating crossroads with significant room for maneuverability. It must ensure a close relationship with the Biden Administration, a necessary precondition for taking advantage of the maneuvering room it now has. The main obstacle for Israel is clear: to conduct itself in light of US plans to renew the nuclear deal with Iran, and to a lesser extent in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a manner that does not place it on a collision course with Biden’s Washington.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 2021.

הפוסט Do the Abraham Accords open up new energy opportunities? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The new American administration wastes no time unmaking Trump’s legacy of indifference calling out loudly actors who violate human rights them, from Russia to Yemen. Several, though not all, of Trump’s decisions on the Israeli-Palestinian track were quickly revoked. The USAID will renew its humanitarian projects in the Palestinian territories, the U.S. consulate will open its doors again in East Jerusalem and the PLO offices will resume their work in Washington. And yet, it’s abundantly clear that the Israeli-Palestinian file is not in the top of new administration’s agenda, and there is no sense of urgency to try and fix things.

The old proverb says that if it ain’t broken, don’t touch it, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might now seem as the less urgent in comparison to regional disasters of Syria, Yemen or Lebanon. However, it is not going anywhere (despite the reassurances of the settlement lobby) and the situation is as explosive as ever. In absence of clear and consistent American policy, the unmaking of Trump’s legacy in Israel and PA might not be enough to salvage the two-states solution and to prevent the deterioration of the situation on the ground.

To be fair, the stalemate in negotiations between Israel and PA didn’t start with Trump. The leaders on both sides own the responsibility for failing many rounds of negotiations. However, it was Trump who made it crystal-clear which one of Abraham’s children was his favorite and which one will be left alone in the cold. His one-sided, cynical policy instilled confidence in settlement lobby leaders that not only will they have an upper hand in this century-long conflict, but they will do it while being cheered by the American president. At the same time, many Palestinians became completely disillusioned with the role of the U.S. as a fair broker, as well as with the ability of the Palestinian Authority to defend them and to promote their dream of independence. The PA became weaker than ever before, and in absence of direct cooperation with the IDF, the latter took a greater role in civil affairs in Palestinian territories.

The current situation presents us with serious challenges as well as rare opportunities. The situation in West Bank is fragile, the mistrust in the acting Palestinian leadership is immense, the frictions between the would-be heirs of PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas and their loyalists is growing. The Palestinian elections, set for May 22 and July 31 add even more uncertainty—the trauma of Hamas’s victory in 2006 is still fresh, even though it took place 15 years ago. Whether these elections will eventually take place or not, they are already a significant game-changer, as would-be heirs on both sides will come out and the fight for power will move into a next phase.

At the same time, normalization and peace treaties that were lately signed between Israel, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco as well as the reconciliation between the Gulf states and Qatar had enhanced regional stability and created favorable atmosphere for advancing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Some of these states had indicated priorly that they are not interested in a broker role, while others insist on having on place around the negotiating table, but all of them formally support the two-states solution, notwithstanding the criticism against the Palestinian leadership.

Some might claim that the Abrahamic accords ensured that there will be less Arab pressure on Israel in regards to negotiation process, but this development can also prove to be a double-sword. If the American administration will become serious about reigniting the negotiations, it might work constructively with its allies in the Arab world in order to advance a peace process and to provide Israel with the necessary guarantees.

And finally, change might come to Israel as well. In mid-March, Israel is heading to the polling stations for the fourth time in 2 years, and for now, everything is open. Netanyahu is dreaming about a pure right-wing coalition that will inevitably find itself in confrontation with Biden’s White house. If this scenario fails to materialize, Israel might get a brand new prime-minister and a different government for the first time during the last 12 years. This government will not be significantly more dovish than the previous ones, as it will depend on pure right wing, pro-settlement parties And yet, there is reasonable chance that this new government will be more docile while trying to avoid a serious clash with an American administration.

**The article was published on News Week, 4 March 2021.

הפוסט The Two-State Solution Won’t Save Itself, Mr. President הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

On one hand, the thought that Israeli officers will be prevented from leaving the borders of the state, or, God forbid, will be imprisoned and locked up, makes me cringe. Although I am a peace activist, I am not a pacifist. I have great appreciation for the IDF’s role in defending Israel, and in advancing the ability of Israel to promote peace. I have served in a significant position in the army and my children also served and are serving, as they were educated to do.

I am frightened that past and present military personnel will pay the price for the arrogance, distorted values and stupidity of the political echelon. As a graduate of the First Lebanon War, I witnessed firsthand the tragic folly of entering into Lebanon, and the long and unnecessary stay in Southern Lebanon.

I was much younger, but still remember the unnecessary and tragic Yom Kippur War.

If our leaders would have received the outstretched hand of the Egyptian president before instead of after the bloody war we could have avoided much suffering.

Our country is full of unnecessary graves and scarred souls and bodies of Israelis who wholeheartedly believed they were protecting the land. However, they were sent on missions that did not contribute to our protection, and in many cases, they, in fact, damaged our security.

It is not surprising that most senior IDF officials, members of the Mossad and of Shin Bet (Israeli Security Agency) become supporters of peace and the use of diplomatic tools after their retirement – they understand the damage that the current policies are causing to both the physical protection of the state and to our moral values.

Because of this, on the other hand, I look forward to developments that will constitute a wake-up call for us that we have to end the predicament in which we find ourselves. I am repeatedly shocked by the indifference of the Israeli public to the reality of the occupation, both morally and in terms of its strategic implications for the future of Zionism.

I am also welcoming any international recognition of Palestinian sovereignty and any Palestinian access to international organizations, with the hope that they will lead to the actual establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel and prevent the binational catastrophe, which the current toxic status quo points to.

Recently, the situation on the ground has worsened, partially because of the Trump administration’s support for the disastrous policies of the Netanyahu government. It is also due to the attempt of the Netanyahu government to establish facts on the ground before the Biden administration completes their appointments and starts full-time work. There has been an alarming rise in the measures designed to prevent the possibility of a two-state solution to the conflict by allowing new settlements, as well as an increase in settler violence against the Palestinian population under the auspices of protecting the settlers and their land instead of fighting against the injustices they are committing. These events are hardly reported in the Israeli media and do not interest the majority of the public.

How does one reconcile the horror of the idea that IDF officers will be arrested abroad, with the hope that the Israeli public will remember that we are still occupying another nation and that we will eventually pay a price for it?

I would certainly have preferred that the reminder of the moral and strategic problematic nature of the occupation would come from a less problematic institution, but since this is the given situation, it is important to promote serious consideration of the International Criminal Court decision. But we should not agree with the hysterical accusations of the so-called antisemitic motive of the ICC that we have already heard thrown into the air in a “Pavlovic response,” nor the calls to boycott the ICC, which was established as a lesson from the tragedy of the Jewish people.

We must call on the IDF to investigate any wrongdoings in a full and transparent manner and to ensure that no horrific acts are carried out under its auspices on the ground, as has been happening more and more recently.

We should work hard to end the occupation that eventually corrupts even basic moral individuals. We have to prevent our leaders from continuing to lead us in the current direction, which is a dead end to our future. I wish we didn’t need such problematic reminders to reconcile our problems on the ground.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 4 March 2021

הפוסט ICC investigation is Israel’s wake-up call הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The early days of a new administration are an important period of organizing, learning and preparing. Patterns consolidated during this period impact the administration’s future course, and the mechanisms and principles adopted serve as the basis for policy and set the tone for the coming years.

Administrations have maximum power and enjoy abundant credit in their early days. That is particularly true for the Biden administration that also enjoys a majority in both houses of Congress, and which could make good use of this period to create a momentum for advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. To that end, a Mitvim Institute task-team recommends the following policy directions:

1. Highlighting the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been marginalized in recent years on the international agenda, with global actors shifting to domestic concerns and more burning regional issues, and to the Covid-19 crisis. Despite the myriad of challenges it faces, the Biden administration must signal at the outset that it attributes importance to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiate declarations and steps attesting to its intention to restore the issue to the international agenda.

2. Renewing ties and building trust with the Palestinian leadership. The incoming administration must announce at an early stage the renewal of US ties with the Palestinian leadership and launch a high-level political dialogue. The renewed ties should walk back Trump-era measures by re-opening the PLO offices in Washington and the US Consulate in east Jerusalem, and resuming USAID assistance to the Palestinians and funding for UNRWA. The administration could also advance confidence-building measures vis-à-vis the Palestinians, such as promoting economic projects in Area C and assisting in alleviating the COVID-19 crisis. Declaring the return of the US to its traditional support of the two-state solution and opposition to settlements would also be of importance.

3. Emphasizing the US commitment to the two-state solution and formulating parameters for a final-status agreement. The Biden administration must declare its commitment to the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and mutually agreed land swaps as its vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a declaration would ratify the US commitment to international norms, the principles of international law and UN Security Council resolutions. At the same time, the administration should start formulating parameters for a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, to serve as a clear framework for future negotiations and shape the domestic and international discourse. However, the administration should also weigh the challenges in such a move and carefully consider the correct timing and manner of unveiling such parameters.

4. Preserving the feasibility of the two-state solution and drawing red lines. The Biden Administration must ensure that the two-state plan is preserved as a feasible and concrete solution, blocking efforts on the ground designed to make it irrelevant. The administration will have to draw clear red lines against creeping annexation measures, expansion of settlements, legalization of outposts and Israeli construction in the E1 area and Givat Hamatos. At the same time, the administration could demand that Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) ratify their commitment to their previous agreements and maintain security and civilian coordination, while demanding that the Palestinians mount a determined campaign against terrorism, condemn terror attacks and counter incitement.

5. Leading multilateral steps, such as creating a new international mechanism and an incentives package. The Biden administration should lead the formation of an international mechanism for the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Such a mechanism could be based on the P5+1 model (which negotiated the Iran nuclear deal) or on the Quartet, with the addition of key Arab and European states. This mechanism should put together an international incentives package for peace and outline international parameters for resolution of the conflict. It could also serve as a platform for additional multilateral measures, such as forming regional working groups, harnessing regional organizations of which Israel and the PA are members and convening an international peace conference.

6. Leveraging Israeli-Arab normalization to advance the peace process. The administration should harness progress in relations between Israel and Arab states for the benefit of advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace. In doing so, it could integrate the states that have normalized relations with Israel into joint forums with Israel and the Palestinians, and into economic and energy projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In attempting to promote normalization agreements with additional Arab states, especially with Saudi Arabia, the administration could create a linkage to the Palestinian issue, inter alia by conditioning normalization on a halt of settlements’ construction and creeping annexation.

7. Improving the situation in Gaza and ending the internal Palestinian divide. The Gaza Strip is facing a harsh humanitarian crisis, beset by explosive tensions that could escalate into violent clashes at any moment. The US has consistently distanced itself from the issue, but the new administration must stop avoiding it and help advance a solution. The administration should advance plans and projects with international partners to improve the well-being of Gaza’s residents, on issues such as energy, border crossings and vaccines. The administration would also do well to increase its involvement in efforts to avoid clashes between Israel and Hamas, help the UN envoy’s efforts on this front, and seek to advance a long-term solution to the Gaza issue under the aegis of the PA.

8. Empowering pro-peace Israeli and Palestinian actors, including in the civil society. The Biden administration should advance dialogue and cooperation between citizens on both sides of the conflict. The administration should provide backing for pro-peace civil society organizations in Israel and the PA, including regular meetings of administration representatives with them, and seek effective implementation of recent legislation that aids organizations engaged in Palestinian-Israeli cooperation (Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act). At the same time, the administration should appeal directly to various elements within Israel society in order to strengthen support for the two-state solution and promote a discourse on this issue, while working on the Palestinian side to stem the anti-normalization trend undermining joint Israeli-Palestinian activity.

9. Setting a constructive tone to relations with the Israeli leadership and public. The administration should shape relations with Israel in a manner conducive to the advancement of peace and creation of mutual trust. It should learn lessons from the Obama years regarding the relationship with Israel’s government and society, and pay attention to the tone and style of the discourse even when expressing criticism. The Biden administration could initiate public goodwill gestures toward Israelis, and display public expressions of sympathy for Israel, and at the same time present the government with clear demands on the Palestinian issue and set red lines.

**The article was published on The Jerusalem Post, 1 March 2021.

הפוסט How Biden should handle Israeli-Palestinian Conflict הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.