הפוסט Solving the issue of a divided Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Efforts to avoid discussion of the issue have been made repeatedly during the peace process. Authors of the 1993 Oslo Accord agreed the issue was volatile and would be best postponed for future discussion on a permanent status agreement. When talks began on a permanent status agreement, under the Barak government, negotiators were directed to delay discussion of the issue. It finally came up at the Camp David Summit (in July 2000), where it naturally became a major bone of contention. Israel also tried to evade the issue at the 2007-08 Annapolis talks with the Palestinians, with then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni under instructions not to talk about Jerusalem. Prime Minister Netanyahu also refused to engage in a serious discussion of Jerusalem during the US-mediated 2013-14 peace talks, insisting repeatedly that the matter was not up for negotiation. Repeated attempts to ignore and delay discussing this sensitive matter undermined negotiations even when leaders were willing to move toward an agreement.

The current round of violence in Jerusalem, just like previous ones, should be analyzed on two levels: The immediate triggers that set it off and the deeper causes arising from the situation in the city in the absence of a political solution to the conflict. The Israeli discourse tends to focus on the immediate causes, discussing tactical aspects and ignoring the structural problems that underpin this explosive reality. East Jerusalemites are orphans. Comprising some 40% of the city’s population, the Palestinian residents nonetheless have no political institutions or representation, no Israeli citizenship (except for a small minority, most of whom are Israeli Arab citizens who moved to the city) and no Palestinian citizenship, and they suffer from discriminatory policies in terms of services, infrastructure and planning. Due to their status as permanent residents, they are not entitled to vote for the Knesset, and while they are entitled to vote in municipal elections, most boycott them (arguing that participation in the election will legitimize the Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem) and therefore the Palestinians have never had representation on the Jerusalem city council.

Over time, an artificial separation has been made in the Israeli discourse on Jerusalem between discussion of “improving the lot of the residents” and dealing with the fundamental problems, but anyone familiar with the hardships in East Jerusalem realizes that the residents’ problems cannot be de-linked from the fundamental anomaly in the city. Much has been discussed over the past decade in Israeli media of the “Israelization” of East Jerusalem Palestinians following construction of the Separation Fence. One can undoubtedly identify a stronger affinity on the part of East Jerusalem residents to the city’s West in terms of employment, education, leisure and entertainment, but these processes are only part of the complex picture in the divided city. Since the events of summer 2014, the government has realized that ignoring East Jerusalem is dangerous, and a decision was made on a five-year plan to bridge gaps (Plan No. 3790). But while one hand is working to promote employment and improve infrastructure, the other continues with evictions, razing of homes and creating a “no man’s land” in the neighborhoods on the other side of the fence.

The case of Sheikh Jarrah is a good example of a dangerous situation stemming from the city’s structural problems. The eviction threat facing Palestinian families stems from a discriminatory legal framework formulated after 1967, which provides Jews with the “right of return” to East Jerusalem land owned by Jews prior to 1948. The Palestinian Jerusalemites, on the other hand, including those evicted from their homes, are barred from demanding a similar return of property owned by their families in the western parts of Jerusalem. This situation undermines the Israeli position against the Palestinian claims to a “right of return” and re-open the discussion on property abandoned in the 1948 war. As has become obvious in recent days, this situation severely undermines Israel’s international standing and threatens relations with its new allies in the Arab world. Right-wing groups, with government support, are taking advantage of the legal framework to promote a process of “Hebronization” in East Jerusalem with a view to thwarting any future solution.

The superficial Israeli political discourse on Jerusalem’s future has boiled the question down to the question of whether the city should be divided, yes or no. But this framing is misleading. The goal of finding a political solution to the city is to recognize fully both its Israeli and Palestinian residents, the existence of both Jerusalem and al-Quds, and to find a path to partnership in the shared city, ensuring political representation and equality for all residents.

A recently published biography of former Secretary of State James Baker (by Susan Glasser and Peter Baker) recounts Baker’s statement upon taking office that he would not deal with the conflict in the Middle East as his predecessor had done, to which diplomat Dennis Ross replied: “You can ignore the Middle East – but it will not ignore you.” The same applies to Jerusalem: Even if the parties to the conflict and the international community try to avoid dealing with this sensitive issue, the problem will not go away and will make its presence felt over and over. Resolution of the problem cannot be delayed further and addressing the situation in the city must relate to both levels – to the triggers of the unrest and to its underlying causes.

In the immediate term, calm must be restored, escalation avoided and dangerous provocations curbed. In this context, diverting the Jerusalem Day Flag Parade from Damascus Gate and the intervention of the Attorney General in the Supreme Court’s session on Sheikh Jarrah evictions were steps in the right direction. Efforts by international actors, including the Biden Administration, to restore calm at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and block the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah are also welcome. Previous US administrations played similar roles at times of crisis in the city. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton demanded a halt to the eviction of families in Sheikh Jarrah when the issue arose in 2009-2010, and Secretary of State John Kerry intervened to prevent escalation and preserve the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in 2014-15. But beyond management of the current crisis, in order to avoid finding ourselves in the same place next time, diplomatic efforts are required to achieve a more substantive change for the long term and an understanding that Jerusalem remains on the table and cannot be ignored.

הפוסט No, Jerusalem is not off the table הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

To counter public claims asserting that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had no actual intention of implementing annexation, the Emirati leadership has emphasized that the Abraham Accords were the result of a diplomatic effort for the sake of the Palestinian people. The UAE presented Israel’s decision to halt the annexation as a quid pro quo for the normalization agreements and as the result of pressure the UAE exerted on the Israeli government.

Senior Emirati officials emphasized in the Israeli media the importance of halting annexation and of the Israeli and American commitments to do so under their agreement. The UAE thus set a red line in its relationship with Israel regarding future annexation attempts. The linkage between normalization with Israel and an end to the threat of annexation of Palestinian land signals a new stage in the UAE’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Previously, the UAE was passive on the issue, supporting the Arab Peace Initiative from the sidelines. Now, it is leading a significant move positioning itself as an active player in this arena, despite its rift with the Palestinian leadership.

However, while annexation was defined as a clear red line in Israeli-Emirati relations, other issues within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain a gray area, for example, the issue of the settlements in the West Bank. Along with positive relations and flourishing cooperation, the UAE has been implicitly critical of Israel over its activities in the West Bank. In December 2020, the Emirati media gave wide coverage of the shooting of a young Palestinian by Israeli soldiers, and in February 2021, it reported on the decision of the International Criminal Court in The Hague to investigate whether Israel had committed war crimes in the Palestinian Territories.

Additionally, the two countries share new economic relations, with many Israeli delegations visiting the UAE, including one representing the Shomron Regional Council, the umbrella organization of Jewish settlements in the northern West Bank. In December 2020, the Shomron Council signed an export agreement with the UAE’s FAM Holdings. Such cooperation, however, is limited to the private sector, and UAE officials have yet to present clear positions on the purchase of settlement-made goods, ties with the settlements and, in general, the settlement enterprise. Nonetheless, the developing cooperation with Israel will presumably force the UAE to formulate such a policy, or at least to respond to initiatives relating to the territories.

The Temple Mount/Haram Al Sharif issue is also considered a gray area in the Israeli-Emirati relationship. On August 31, 2020, during the first official Israeli delegation visit to Abu Dhabi, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed declared his commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem.

IN OCTOBER 2020, senior Emirati representatives visited al-Aqsa Mosque and encountered angry Palestinians who cursed them and shouted at them to get out, an incident that inflamed tensions between the sides and could result in rethinking the sovereignty issue at the holy site. The incident prompted Israel to strengthen security at the site for visitors from the Gulf, but once tourism from the UAE and Bahrain opens up, the site could once again provoke friction in the trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-Gulf states relationship.

Those following the UAE’s diplomatic declarations and activities undoubtedly noticed that in the initial three months after plans were announced to normalize ties with Israel, the Emirati leadership went out of its way to express its commitment to Palestinian national aspirations. The many statements on the issue could attest to its importance to the Emirati leadership as well as the concern over criticism of the agreement with Israel.

Given the precedent it set among Arab and Muslim states by forging full diplomatic relations with Israel, the UAE invested heavily in public diplomacy vis-à-vis its own citizens, the Palestinian people, and the Arab world. Nonetheless, the absence of dialogue with the Palestinian leaderships deprives the UAE of significant leverage in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and forces it to choose roundabout channels to exert influence, for example, through Jordan, Egypt and the UN.

Jordan and Egypt serve as a mediating channel between the Emirates and the Palestinians, given their close relationship and importance to both sides, but most of the activity within these channels remains classified. The UN, on the other hand, serves as a public platform on which the UAE demonstrates its support of the Palestinians by providing humanitarian aid, for example, by coordinating Emirati medical equipment delivered to the Palestinians during the pandemic. Israel has now also joined these Emirati channels of influence, which provide it with a certain measure of involvement in the Palestinian arena, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and possibly in a future negotiating process.

According to Dr. Ebtesam al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center, despite Palestinian opposition to the Abraham Accords, the agreements could actually serve the Palestinian position in the conflict with Israel by:

1) Introducing a new paradigm for peacemaking.

2) Introducing new actors into the peace process, such as the Emirates, serving both Israeli and Palestinian interests.

3) Changing Israeli public opinion regarding the Arab world and the benefits Israel could derive from peace agreements, thereby boosting support for negotiations with the Palestinians. This narrative serves as the UAE’s main argument in explaining its influence on regional stability and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – in both practical terms and in raising awareness.

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, the UAE has sought to spotlight its direct humanitarian contribution to the Palestinians (though not via UNRWA), its relationship with the Palestinian community in the Emirates, its intention to develop new economic channels for the Palestinians and, as mentioned, its commitment to the Palestinian people and to the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

The Emirati leadership’s key message is that its decision to forge ties with Israel was designed to benefit peace, but not at the expense of the Palestinian issue. At a UN Security Council debate, the UAE urged all sides to harness the momentum created by the peace agreement with Israel for renewed negotiations with the Palestinians. With this message, the UAE is outlining its role within the new paradigm of Israeli-Arab relations and the new rules of the game it has defined.

This article was published in The Jerusalem Post, May 10th 2021.

הפוסט A look at UAE policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

One of the Palestinian national movement’s greatest achievements under Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was its November 2012 recognition as a UN General Assembly observer state, a significant step in its quest for international legitimacy and struggle for statehood. That journey began with the 1964 founding of the PLO-led Palestinian Foreign Service as a central strategic goal, to both improve the terrorist organization’s image and mobilize global support for what the PLO regarded as the Palestinian people’s government in exile. One of the PLO’s first steps was to establish ties with the Arab world.

The PLO has declared the establishment of a Palestinian state twice, once by Yasser Arafat in Tunis in November 1988 and again by Palestinian Authority (PA) President and PLO Chair Abbas in November 2013. The Palestinians also developed a worldwide foreign service with representative offices in 95 states, as of 2017. Yet, the PA continues to conduct itself as a non-state body and its PLO-led diplomatic activity has failed to break through the freeze in the peace process with Israel, while its many offices around the world are often only of symbolic value.

After the PA’s establishment, and due to the centralized nature of the Palestinian regime, the PLO’s Foreign Service did not take part in negotiations with Israel, focusing instead on creating a favorable international climate for the Palestinian issue and seeking to advance the Palestinian cause vis-à-vis governments and civil society around the world.

In a strategic shift, Abbas sought to rectify Arafat’s mistakes, turning the Palestinian struggle from an armed campaign into a diplomatic one. Abbas realized that armed struggle was ineffective and that masked weapons-toting Palestinians do not generate sympathy in the West. He also realized that despite European recognition, most states did not conduct full diplomatic relations with the PA and that absent broad European support, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state was not feasible. The diplomatic measures he led raised hope among the PLO leadership of change in the Palestinians’ international standing, but the diplomatic path yielded limited results. Under Abbas’ stewardship, the PA joined Unaffiliated organizations and was recognized as a state by a number of additional European states, but its standing remained essentially unchanged.

Diplomatic ties between the PA and Israel have been frozen since Netanyahu assumed power in 2009. The last significant negotiations took place between Abbas and Olmert during the Annapolis process. The Palestinian issue has since been marginalized, mainly due to Netanyahu’s insistence on preserving the status quo and the regional tumult following the Arab Spring – political instability in Egypt, civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS. Trump’s rise to power, overturning the Obama Administration’s progressive foreign policy, did not augur well for the Palestinians.

Trump’s initial steps signaled support for an iron wall between the US and the Arab world, with a ban on entry visas for residents of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. Because of his positive declarations on Israeli construction in the West Bank, relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and closure of the PLO office in Washington, the PA no longer viewed the US as an honest broker. The PA sought an alternative axis with Moscow, asking Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry to assume a bigger role in mediation between the sides. In his most recent UNGA speech in September 2019, Abbas revealed that Russia had made three attempts to revive the peace process, but Israel had rejected them. The PLO-Russia rapprochement has significant historic precedent. In addition to ideological-historic affinity of the socialist and Marxist factions within the PLO, Abbas himself was close to the Russian regime for many years.

With the PA seeking closer ties to Russia, the US sought a new axis with the Gulf States. Lack of stability in the Arab republics along with Iran’s growing power and deepening involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, prompted the Gulf States, chiefly Saudi Arabia, to tighten relations with the US in a bid to ensure their defense. The fact that Trump, like the Gulf States, opposed the Iran nuclear deal bolstered this trend. Many among the younger generation in the Gulf view the Palestinian issue as a historic obstacle and lip service they must pay for the sake of pan-Arabism. They express willingness to advance ties with Israel, over the heads of the Palestinians, in order to promote their defense interests. Nonetheless, the freeze in the peace process clearly limits their room for maneuver, as well as Israel’s.

In recent years, the Trump Administration has been trying to formulate a peace vision, which it has yet to unveil but is known to center around the concept that advancing economic peace would engender a diplomatic process. The Palestinians, Russia and China boycotted the economic workshop that the US held in Bahrain earlier this year; Israeli officials were absent, too, and the gathering does not seem to have achieved any progress.

The PA’s greatest fear is loss of the historic safety net that the Arab world has provided the Palestinians since 1948. Prior to the 1990s peace process, this safety net helped the Palestinians reject conciliation attempts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 1990s, the Palestinians used Arab support to boost the legitimacy of negotiations with Israel. However, the climate of normalization between Israel and the Arab world emerging in recent years – not only in clandestine meetings of leaders and brief handshakes at international fora, but also fostered by leading bloggers and media personalities on social media, confronts the Palestinians with a diplomatic nightmare.

Clerics from Bahrain and bloggers from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have already visited Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. If a pro-peace government is installed in Israel, the PA will no longer have to fear a rapprochement between Israel and certain Sunni states, viewing it instead as a confidence building measure toward renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as part of a multi-channel regional process.

Dr. Ido Zelkovitz is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute and Head of Middle East Studies at the Yezreel Valley College. He is an expert of Palestinian society and politics.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Palestinian Foreign Service at a Time of Diplomatic Freeze הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Greenblatt was appointed shortly after Trump’s election victory and initially it appeared both the Israeli and Palestinian sides were willing to work with him. During his first months on the job, Greenblatt met several times with Palestinian President Abbas and other senior Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, even visiting a Palestinian refugee camp and meeting with Palestinian and Israeli students and religious leaders. At first, he also tried to promote cooperation between the sides and was involved in the contacts on the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal that resulted in understandings between Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation Hanegbi and the Head of the PA’s Water Authority Ghuneim. However, these first steps were upended with a series of Trump Administration measures against the Palestinians, starting in late 2017. These included the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, aid cuts, shuttering the PLO office in Washington and departure from the twostate principle – all of which led to a complete and unprecedented rift between the US administrations and Ramallah. Greenblatt became the first US Envoy in the annals of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process who lost contact with one of the sides and the ability to serve as a broker.

At that point, rather than taking advantage of his position to calm tensions and to try and restore trust and to facilitate dialogue with the Palestinians through back channels, Greenblatt actually sought to escalate the crisis and exacerbate the public verbal and media conflict with the Palestinians. He did so in contravention of the basic principles of mediation, which every first-year student of international relations learns. Greenblatt began facing off against various Palestinian representatives on Twitter, and tweeted blatant attacks on the Palestinian leadership. His remarks also disavowed the basic principles of the peace process. He spoke, for example, about Israel’s right to annex territories, and expressed disregard for the international resolutions on the conflict. The photos showing Greenblatt taking a hammer to breach an ancient tunnel under the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan in East Jerusalem, at an inauguration ceremony of the “Path of the Pilgrims” that was organized by the Elad organization, was a jarring final note that faithfully reflected the direction in which Greenblatt had taken his role. The much-touted Trump peace plan (dubbed “the deal of the century), over which Greenblatt had labored with Kushner and Amb. Friedman, has yet to be unveiled, with its publication date put off repeatedly, whereas the economic component of the blueprint, which the US team presented in Bahrain, failed to leave its mark.

Despite Greenblatt’s inexperience when he took over his position, he did have several levers of influence he could have used, chief among them the personal ties and trust with President Trump. He also enjoyed the initial willingness of both sides to cooperate with him. However, his mission has come to a crashing end with the unprecedented rift between the US administration and the Palestinian side and his inability to play any significant role in the different issues and aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian arena. We do not know, yet, the reason for Greenblatt’s decision to step down, but it undoubtedly illustrates the pointlessness of the measures to achieve the “deal of the century”, thus far. It will be interesting to see whether Greenblatt’s departure signals a change in approach and policy or whether the remaining Kushner-Friedman team will adhere to the current policy guidelines.

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Program on Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking at the Mitvim Institute. He is a Postdoctoral Fellow at The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and The Harry S. Truman Research Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Resignation of Jason Greenblatt, the Peace Envoy Who Did Not Broker הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The development of the Wadi Hummus residential area stems from decades of Israeli land expropriations in Sur Baher for the construction of the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods of East Talpiot and Har Homa (as well as for the fence and the so-called “American Road”), leaving Sur Baher without land reserves for its population growth and forcing it to expand eastward toward the West Bank. The dozens of new apartments that were built there house young families from Sur Baher. During discussions in the early years of the millennium on construction of the fence (in light of the second Intifada), residents of Sur Baher asked that its route encircle the neighborhood leaving it intact, including Wadi Hummus, rather than dividing it in two. Their request was accepted, but it generated various legal issues discussed over the years in the courts, especially with regard to the legal status of Sur Baher’s residents living in this area. Since Wadi Hummus is under official control of the PA (in areas A and B of the West Bank, according to Oslo accords), residents sought and received building permits from PA planning authorities.

This anomalous situation led to a dispute between the residents in Wadi Hummus and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent years. In 2012, the head of the IDF’s Central Command issued a ban on construction within 250 meters of the fence (on the “Israeli” side), and demolition orders were issued for 13 buildings containing some 70 housing units within that perimeter. In court petitions, the Palestinian residents argued that Israel has no authority over planning and zoning in the area, noting that the PA had approved the construction. The Supreme Court, however, accepted the army’s argument that security considerations necessitated the demolitions. The IDF also rejected various compromises, including raising the height of the fence. On the morning of July 22, bulldozers along with army and police forces arrived at the site and began razing the homes.

Urban planning and home demolitions are among the most sensitive and painful issues in East Jerusalem. These issues touch upon the unresolved legal and political status of the area, the absence of zoning plans and land registry in the Palestinian neighborhoods, and municipal policy on building permits. The circumstances in this case are somewhat different and unusual due to the location of the homes in an area under PA control, and it therefore resonates abroad more loudly than other home demolitions in East Jerusalem.

For example, in the days preceding the demolitions, a delegation of foreign diplomats, mostly European and including the French Consul in Jerusalem, paid a visit to the neighborhood. The demolitions gave rise to international protests and condemnations, among others by the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, the EU and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov. Separately, three senior UN officials – Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, Director of West Bank Operations for UNRWA Gwyn Lewis, and Head of the UN Human Rights Office in the occupied Palestinian territories James Heenan – issued a statement decrying the demolitions and condemning Israel for violating international humanitarian law. In addition to that, the EU Members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and the UK), together with Estonia as a forthcoming Security Council member, published a joint statement to condemn the demolition, arguing it constitutes a violation of the Oslo Accords. The PLO’s Executive Committee held an emergency session and called on the world to intervene.

The Sur Baher demolitions are severe and troubling, both in terms of civilian and municipal aspects and of international diplomatic ones. Some 70 Jerusalem families with legal status of Israeli residency, who received PA building permits, are caught in the middle of this complex diplomatic and legal situation and held hostage to fateful issues such as the future status of Jerusalem, the Oslo Accords and the Separation Barrier. This move has disastrous and painful repercussions for the delicate fabric of life in the city and casts into grave doubt the various declarations and plans made in recent years by city and national authorities regarding efforts to improve the lives of East Jerusalem’s residents

Dr. Lior Lehrs is a Policy Fellow and Director of the Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking Program at the Mitvim Institute; he is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and the Harry S. Truman Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

הפוסט House Demolitions in Sur Baher: Out of Jerusalem, Inside the Fence הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Negotiations succeed or fail not only because of the mediator’s skills and personality. Various reasons may explain why Israeli-Palestinian talks have failed over the years. However, history shows that a broker whom both sides regarded as just and honest was an asset in reaching agreements. Such was the case when Henry Kissinger mediated between Israel and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel and Syria, on the other, reaching the 1974-75 disengagement agreements. The Arab side never regarded Kissinger’s Jewish faith as detrimental to his mediation capabilities. US president Jimmy Carter, too, successfully maneuvered between prime minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David ahead of the 1979 peace treaty. Personally, Carter appeared closer to Sadat than to Begin, but this did not prevent him from conducting negotiations in an impartial manner. In his mediation between Israel, the Palestinians and Syria, president Bill Clinton also convinced the sides of his impartiality although he was personally closer to the Israeli leaders and almost all his advisers were Jewish.

The US stance under the President Donald Trump is so blatantly pro-Israel that the question arises whether it can mediate between the sides at all. Several examples point to asymmetry or inequality in its conduct. Firstly, since assuming office, Trump has met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the US and Israel seven times; he only met with PA President Mahmoud Abbas in Washington and Ramallah twice.

Secondly, the Trump administration has made several historic decisions in total contradiction with previous US policy, all of them supportive of Israel and/or damaging to the Palestinians. The list is long. Closure of the PLO office in Washington in September 2018; US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and the transfer of the US embassy there; and US funding cuts to UNRWA in September 2018. One can also add Trump’s 2019 declaration recognizing Israel sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which while unrelated to the Palestinians, certainly buttresses the image of the US as a one-sided Israel backer.

Thirdly, the US consulted over its peace plan almost exclusively with the Israeli side only. The ultimate move was the participation of Greenblatt and US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman in a recent ceremony inaugurating a tunnel in Silwan, an archaeological project funded by Elad, an NGO dedicated to strengthening the Jewish link to Jerusalem with government help. Moreover, the US position toward the Jewish settlements stands in sharp contrast to all previous administrations, which the saw the settlements as an obstacle to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

This was the context of the Palestinian refusal to take part in the recent Bahrain economic “workshop.” The Palestinian objection to the conference stemmed not only from concern that the economic component of the peace plan would serve as an alternative to the real thing. It was also an expression of anger, frustration and helplessness over what the Palestinians perceive as humiliating US behavior that ignores them. Thus, the Palestinians – and part of the Arab world – view the Trump administration as a dishonest, unreliable broker and therefore untrustworthy even before his peace plan has been unveiled.

PUTTING TOGETHER a peace plan is a complex undertaking consisting of several phases. First, studying past proposals to understand what they included, what worked and what failed. The Americans seem to assume that everything that had been tried in the past had failed, requiring new “out of the box” thinking. This may perhaps be logical, but nevertheless mistaken, because “the box” evidently contains some good ideas.

The second stage is preparing public opinion around the world and in the region ahead of the new plan’s presentation, while stressing that this is a historic opportunity for its implementation. So far, it seems that the Americans put a lot of work into this stage.

The third stage – and the most important one – is preparing the various sides to the conflict for the compromises (or rather sacrifices) they will have to make. A lot of work went into this vis-à-vis the “moderate” Arab states, but the Israeli and Palestinian arenas were totally ignored.

The only way the Trump administration can regain Palestinian trust is by submitting a plan that offers some solutions to the central issues – namely, the question of borders (including the settlements), Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Media reports so far do not suggest this is where the Americans are going. Moreover, when Greenblatt tells Makor Rishon that he never uses the term “two-state solution,” he is already mapping out the direction of a “stateless state” that the Palestinians are bound to reject (as will the Arab world to a large degree). On the other hand, a plan that provides a response, even a partial one, to Palestinian aspirations, would meet with harsh criticism in Israel, which has become used to free lunches in the Trump era.

If the Trump administration succeeds in pulling off a deal, it will certainly be the “Deal of the Century,” if not “of the millennium,” given all the mistakes made on the way. However, a sober analysis of the process so far leads to the assessment that the plan is destined for failure and the blame should be placed squarely at the door of the dishonest broker.

הפוסט The US became a Dishonest Broker between Israel and the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An outsider might think that Netanyahu as prime minister and foreign minister has achieved results on the European front. There is one such achievement – the Eastern Mediterranean Alliance between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. In view of tripartite cooperation regarding natural gas, Greece has changed its policy on Israel, turning from a critical and hostile government into an ally. Greece was the first country to break the European consensus on Israel when it blocked an anti-Israel resolution in January 2016.

Since then, Netanyahu has adopted a “divide and rule” policy within the EU with the help of outlier member states, forging closer relations with Hungary and Poland. Under his leadership, Israel’s values underwent a dangerous shift. An unusually warm relationship with leaders that espouse undemocratic and a-liberal (and even anti-Semitic) platforms, such as Hungary’s Orban, Poland’s Morawiecki and Italy’s Salvini should greatly trouble Israelis. Romania, with its high levels of corruption, recently joined the club of member states to which Netanyahu has appealed to block EU resolutions that are critical of Israeli policies.

While a weaker EU may serve Israel in the short term, it is unlikely to help Israel’s long-term interest of trust and friendship with the EU. Up until a few years ago, Israel could boast of having the highest level of achievements and ties with the EU among non-European states. That was only fitting given that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, a worldleading innovator with a developed market economy. However, Israel’s economic agreements with its main trading partner are virtually obsolete – an “Association Agreement” from 1995 and an “Action Plan” from 2004 that was meant as a temporary, four-year agreement. In 2008, Israel was about to sign an upgraded plan but the EU created a linkage: absent progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, no progress can be achieved with the EU.

The upgrade has been suspended for over a decade. Were it not for the linkage, we could have enjoyed even more prosperous relationship. On the other hand, in 2013 the EU offered Israel the status of a “Special Privileged Relationship” as an incentive – maturation of the peace process would yield significantly upgraded ties. The Israeli government did not even consider the idea. Since 2012, the Israel-EU Association Council, an annual ministerial-level political dialogue, has not convened. Relations are handled by civil servants. Meanwhile, countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have upgraded their “Partnership Priorities” agreements with the EU in recent years.

Relations between Israel and the EU have fluctuated over the years. A significant high was recorded in the 1990s following the Oslo Accords. The most recent “honeymoon” occurred between 2005 and 2008 following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and up until Operation “Cast Lead” and Netanyahu’s rise to power. For over a decade now, political relations with the world’s largest trading bloc have been at a low that is even starting to affect trade relations along with economic and research cooperation.

Netanyahu and his ministers have been inciting Israelis against the EU for several years. Israelis have grown accustomed to seeing the EU as a hostile entity rather than a friendly critic. However, even if there is disagreement with the EU over the peace process, settlement construction, Iran and more recently over Jerusalem, the EU remains Israel’s second most important strategic partner after the US. This is not a partnership born of mutual interests dictated by regional or global circumstances. Strategic partnerships are forged with those who share our world view and values, primarily with liberal democracies in which the rule of law is a substantive component that includes respect for and protection of human and minority rights.

The relationship with the EU is complex, largely because the EU itself is complex. As a union of 28 states (possibly 27 soon due to Brexit), efforts are always under way to ensure that the whole is bigger than the sum of its parts. While the EU has achieved this goal to a significant degree in the economic arena, it has had a hard time doing so in foreign policy aspects.

Brussels has often played the bad cop, such as the 2013 guidelines adding a territorial clause to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation agreement. Under that resolution, Israeli research institutions can only benefit from the agreement if they operate within the Green Line. The Netanyahu government had no choice but to go along with the EU’s territorial, legal and economic differentiation between institutions on each side of the Green Line. The backlash followed a few years later. Netanyahu has exploited the crises affecting the EU in recent years over debts, migration and Brexit, accompanied by the rise of populist parties. He took advantage of internal EU rifts to mobilize “rogue” states against anti-Israel decisions.

The new Israeli government should stop boasting of its “divide and rule” tactic and inciting public opinion against the EU and try instead to sever the EU’s linkage that is damaging to the relationship. The sad state of relations is not only the Netanyahu government’s fault. The EU did its share, adopting resolutions such as the linkage condition, the territorial clause and the labeling of settlement goods. Only a government that will advance the IsraeliPalestinian peace process will be able to fundamentally change this trend and stem the troubling deterioration in relations with Israel’s biggest partner in terms of values, trade and scientific research.

Dr. Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu is co-President of the Israeli Association for the Study of European Integration, a lecturer at Hebrew University’s Europe Forum and a member of a Mitvim Institute task team.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recalibrating the Course of Israel-EU Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Therein lies a problem. Too often, the State of Israel examines reality through riflescopes, seeking threats rather than identifying opportunities, finding partners and avoiding pitfalls and entanglement in avoidable wars. That is why, as noted in the State Comptroller’s report, Israel finds itself embroiled in endless rounds of fighting and tensions in Gaza, Lebanon and around holy sites in Jerusalem, with each round ending not far from where it began. When Israel does opt for diplomatic tools and conducts negotiations with its neighbors, security officials are usually the ones who lead the discussions.

In order to seek peace and ensure a quiet, safe existence, diplomatic thinking in decision–making must assume a far greater role, as must critical public discourse on such issues. A complex diplomatic and political discourse must be promoted among the public and decision makers. It should include better understanding of the international arena based on familiarity with the views of foreign actors towards Israel and its policies, awareness of global developments and trends, and acquaintance with the relationships among a variety of actors relevant to the scene. These goals are feasible, but require essential shifts that will empower Israel’s Foreign Service and will bring diplomatic considerations to the forefront of decision–making processes. Foreign Ministry retirees have an important role to play in promoting this.

Former diplomats could contribute significantly to Israeli society in terms of bolstering public discourse on diplomacy and foreign policy. Foreign Ministry veterans who go into retirement take with them dozens of years of experience, diplomatic skills, knowledge of various countries and organizations, intricate networks of social ties around the world, analytic capacity and deep understanding of the international arena and of Israel’s place among the nations. They know how to explain foreign affairs to the public and to raise foreign policy issues on the agenda, to support or criticize Israeli policy and propose alternatives freed of the shackles of government service, to explain the world to Israelis and explain Israel to the world (should they want to do so).

Foreign Service retirees in other countries enjoy significant appreciation, retain knowledge and prestige, are courted by various organizations, and integrate into key positions in society. They are often involved in local and national politics, and assume roles as directors of large global corporations, lecturers in academia, researchers at institutes, central activists in civil society and key media figures. Their contribution to shaping public discourse is significant. Not so in Israel. The Foreign Ministry has excellent staff, but once diplomats retire, they do not have representation commensurate with their skills and abilities in the political, cultural, academic or business arena. While some Foreign Ministry veterans find their way into academia, civil society or boards of directors, it is not a systematic course; it is unstructured and unguided by a support network, relying instead on personal motivation and ability. Sadly, the valuable experience of Israeli Foreign Ministry retirees goes down the drain.

Many obstacles stand in the way of former Israeli diplomats’ contribution to public discourse and integration in key roles. The decline in the prestige of the Foreign Ministry, a relatively late retirement age, inability to take a leave of absence during one’s career and return to the Foreign Service, lack of regional expertise, are just some of the central challenges that must be met in order to allow former diplomats to contribute their share. This would require strengthening the Foreign Ministry and restoring its prestige and power along with the power and prestige of its staff. The mobility of Foreign Ministry staff could be increased to allow them to leave the service for a while and accrue professional experience in other organizations, which would provide them with a diverse network of contacts ahead of their retirement. Regional expertise can be encouraged within the Foreign Ministry, and the retirement age could be lowered. Structured contact between the ministry and its former staff should be encouraged through periodic updates, consultations and learning, and joint mechanisms should ensure the rights of retirees and prepare them for retirement.

Obviously, the retirees themselves must have a role in improving their lot. They must take the initiative and try to integrate into the public and governance arena, deliver lectures to different audiences, contribute their analyses through the media and be active on social media. They can also provide briefings for Members of Knesset and participate in discussions held by Knesset committees and caucuses, place their experience at the disposal of local government, take part in public discussion without fear of expressing their views, and integrate into civil society and business.

Israeli society has an interest in repairing the structural, organizational and political flaws that currently impede Foreign Ministry retirees in contributing their experience, training, knowledge and varied capabilities to the public discourse. Foreign Ministry retirees have the tools to enable Israeli society to examine the diplomatic angle, too, when trying to understand reality, analyze it and decide how to act. It is important that we hear them. It is important that they not only be former diplomats but remain key figures in Israeli society.

Dr. Roee Kibrik is the Director of Research of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Former Diplomats Are a Wasted National Resource הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Throughout the dialogue, there was a sense that Turkey and Israel can find a way to overcome their current crisis and to reinstate ambassadors. Nevertheless, such progress is not expected to lead to a significant breakthrough in the relations. The Turkish counterparts expressed hope that Israel and Turkey will resume talks on natural gas export from Israel; shared their concern over what they perceive as Israel’s support of the Kurds in northern Syria; and pointed out that Turkey and Iran should not be considered by Israel as allies, but rather as countries that cooperate at times regarding shared interest but are also competing with each other and adhering to different ideologies and beliefs. The dialogue also emphasized the importance attributed in Turkey to Jewish community in the US, and to the impact it has on the American discourse towards Turkey as well as on US policy towards the Middle East.

This paper highlights key insights from the meetings and discussions that took place throughout the policy dialogue. It does not reflect consensus among all participants

הפוסט The 2018 Israel-Turkey Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

At the outset, it is important to highlight the fact that the Oslo Agreement is not all about failure. It has one major, significant success: the mutual recognition of both sides. In fact, the Palestinians had already recognized Israel indirectly in November 1988, when they accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 and condemned the use of terrorism. The Shamir government was unwilling to recognize the change in the Palestinian position, and the law that prohibited meetings between Israelis and Palestinians, promulgated in 1985, remained in force until late 1992. This mutual recognition enabled the warring parties to humanize the other and commence negotiations. Moreover, the agreement enabled the establishment of an embryonic Palestinian entity (the Palestinian Authority), which was supposed to develop within five years – though it was not stated officially – into a sovereign state. Ironically, the basic logic of the Oslo process – its gradualism, which was meant to build trust between the parties – was also its major flaw: it allowed the opposition forces on both sides to sabotage the agreement.

In our historical perspective, the Oslo Agreement looks like a failure. The reasons for that failure lie on both sides.

The Israeli party is to be blamed for three failures: (1) For not stopping the building of new settlements in the occupied territories. On the eve of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, there were fewer than 120,000 settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; by the end of 2016, the number had risen to 400,000 (not including East Jerusalem). This shows – in the Palestinian view – that Israel has never been sincere about implementing the agreement; (2) Israel has never indicated the end result, which is the building of an independent Palestinian state; (3) Israel – in spite of its military strength – has never been generous toward the Palestinians during the negotiations. Instead of treating the Palestinians with respect and honor, it continued humiliating and insulting them. After all, Israel received what it mostly desired – recognition – upfront, while the Palestinians’ most wanted demands – a state with recognized boundaries, control of East Jerusalem and resolution of the refugee problem – remained all unfulfilled.

The Palestinians, for their part, failed as well, on at least three fronts: (1) By not curbing the attacks of Hamas terrorists. It is debatable whether Arafat was capable of confronting Hamas militarily, but it is clear that he did not do his utmost to prevent these suicide attacks; (2) The Palestinian media, including the educational system, continued to delegitimize the Israeli side. This negative media campaign solidified the negative image of Israelis in Palestinian eyes and convinced Israelis that the Palestinians have not really changed their position toward them; (3) The Palestinians have never internalized that in spite of Israel’s military superiority, its psychological psyche needs continued assurance. Acknowledgment of Israel as a Jewish state would not be harmful to the Palestinians; in many ways it only reaffirms what had been already declared in the UN 1947 partition plan.

In spite of all these failures, the Oslo Agreement could have worked had Prime Minister Rabin not been assassinated in November 1995. History cannot tell us what could have occurred if Rabin had not been shot, yet in my research on missed opportunities in the ArabIsraeli conflict I reached the conclusion that Rabin – with his military background and political acumen – could have made the difference. It is important also to note that Rabin simultaneously negotiated with the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad; signing an agreement with him would have laid enormous pressure on Arafat to proceed as well.

We will never know whether Rabin could have succeeded, but his assassination removed from the field a major player who could have made a difference. This act was tantamount to the assassination of the Oslo track. The episode demonstrates that in spite of the importance of historical processes, the role of leaders in history is still paramount. This only accentuates the regretful conclusion that lack of leadership – on both sides of the conflict – is a major reason for the conflict’s endurance.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Oslo Agreement was Assassinated with Rabin הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For Zionism, a state was a pre-requisite to safeguarding the Jewish people. Israel exists to provide for the wellbeing of all its citizens, Jews and non-Jews, but it is also an existential point of reference, and if necessary a refuge, for every Jew on earth. Still today, Israel is an exemplar of a functioning democracy amongst authoritarian regimes, a true multicultural society respecting, albeit not perfectly, the rights of minorities. Still today, the majority of Israelis would prefer to live in a country abiding by the high moral tenets that the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion and his like, have upheld.

The frequent failure of present-day Israel to be fully accepted in the family of nations and to find favor in world public opinion should not in itself be of particular concern to us, Israelis. The critical importance of safeguarding the country’s borders and its citizens against those still seeking its elimination, justifies even the price of certain seclusion. Nevertheless, straying from the high moral standards upon which Israel was established, and breaching the moral boundaries the state founders have set for us, could become a real threat to the existence and wellbeing of Israel as we know it, and of world Jewry.

The visit to Jerusalem this week by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán [18-20 July] symbolizes such moral failure. The recent agreement reached by the Israeli and Polish governments, exonerating Poland of some of its notorious actions during the World War II, is another example of boundaries that Israelis should not cross.

In her unconventional book on the banality of evil, reporting from the trial of Nazi criminal Eichmann, German Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote, “evil can be banal and redefined as a civil norm.” She added that, “most people will comply but some people will not […] The Final Solution […] ‘could happen’ in most places but it did not happen everywhere.” While Orbán and his like across Europe cannot be compared to Nazi criminal Eichmann, reactions today in parts of Europe to immigration from the east serves as a brutal reminder of how quickly and seamlessly moral standards can deteriorate, also and even presently in Europe.

Hosting illiberal leaders in Jerusalem whose raison d’être is elimination of immigration, and by that legitimizing their policies, is an absurdity and an outcry. The reasons pushing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to try to court Poland, Hungary and others, in an effort to split and weaken the EU toll in the region is understandable. He and his government often face automatic and even perfunctory criticism from the EU conglomerate, so trying to draw a wedge inside Europe is basic realpolitik. The EU has some responsibility, too, when others are more inclined to accept forces wishing to destroy the principles on which it stands.

Nevertheless, short-term political gains from realigning with Europe’s extreme right might prove very costly for Israel. Endorsing Orbán works against the Jewish state’s core values and interests. For Israeli leadership, national interest should go far beyond immediate political gains and their responsibility extends to world Jewry. The implications of their actions and statements ought to be in good faith for the Jewish people and for Zionism-at-large.

The litmus test for Israel’s leaders in that regard should be whether the Jewish community in the discussed country supports the leadership in question. Are the country’s Jews as a minority feeling welcome, safe and protected? In the case of Hungary, the answer is no. Orbán’s anti-Semitic undertones and policies threaten Hungary’s Jews. That should be sufficient to disinvite him and several others who are in a similar position.

Beyond the immediate political gains, the EU and Israel should act more responsibly in order to serve the long term interests and wellbeing of their people. Brussels and Jerusalem must reestablish trust and increase practical exchange within the wide spectrum of center-right and center-left in both entities. They should work together, within the many existing joint frameworks, to create more unity between moderate forces, and together reject radicalism. Israel has valued expertise it can share with the EU in the field of absorbing immigrants and making refugees feel at home. Europe’s greatest challenge today is one Israel has dealt with throughout its existence, being a true immigrant society. In proportional terms, Israel taking in one million Russian immigrants when it had less than six, some three decades ago, can be compared to Germany taking in over ten million immigrants today. Albeit not similar, specifically on the background of religious affinity between Jews which is absent in Europe, many challenges are the same.

Israel will stand to gain from opposing Europe’s extremists and sticking to the noble values upon which it was established. World Jewry will be proud once again to be affiliated with their second homeland, Israel. And Europe will have an ally with unprecedented credibility in fighting xenophobia, a calming element to a most volatile region at its footsteps, to defend the values upon which the European Union was created, on the rubbles of World War II.

Raanan Eliaz founded and led for a decade the European Leadership Network (ELNET) and its Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD), two organizations dedicated to strengthening relations between Europe and Israel. He is a member of the Mitvim Institute’s task-team on Israel-EU relations.

(originally published by EurActiv)

הפוסט Orban in Jerusalem: Challenging Days for Europe-Israel Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Since then, the number of Iraqis making contact with Israelis has grown tremendously, mainly through social networks. Among other things, Iraqi surfers recently set up a Facebook page called “The Virtual Embassy of Iraq in Israel”. The Israeli Foreign Ministry reports that about one-third of the Ministry’s Arabic site’s followers (ca. half a million) are Iraqis, and their attitude toward Israel is generally positive and friendly. In their honor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently inaugurated a unique Facebook page called “Israel in the Iraqi Discourse”, which received very positive comments and raised much interest in Iraq. In addition, other interested Israelis (for the sake of full disclosure, the author of this article is among them) maintain daily contact with many friends throughout Iraq.

A segmentation of the Iraqi participants in the discussions conducted on the Foreign Ministry’s Arabic page shows that most of the participants are educated young people between the ages of 18 and 35, an age group that accounts for about 70 percent of Iraq’s population, with about a third of them living in Baghdad. They are not afraid to disclose their real names and photographs, and they represent various Iraqi population groups: Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, and others. These young people are usually politically and socially active and constitute the backbone of Iraq’s educated class. They came to deal with Israel and Israelis out of interest in the Jewish past in Iraq or out of a certain attraction to the democratic and liberal model presented by Israel. Recently, their support for Israel has grown in the face of their hostility to Iran. Their positions on the Israeli issue are distinctly different from those prevailing in the Arab world.

Unlike other Arab countries, the interest in Israel among Iraqis is not confined to politics; it extends to the cultural and religious spheres and the daily aspects of life in Israel. Many Iraqis openly express their desire to visit Israel, but when they try to carry it out they encounter the arbitrariness of the Israeli establishment and are generally refused. The two pages of the Foreign Ministry in Arabic frequently publish non-political articles that shed light on different aspects of the Israeli way of being which raise great interest among Iraqi users. The knowledge of young Iraqis about Israel is sometimes surprising, as demonstrated through the popularity of Sarit Hadad.

It is difficult to determine whether the phenomenon is limited to social networks or whether it will also have political ramifications in future. The educated Iraqi youth in question influence the political and cultural agenda and shape public opinion. Yet in recent elections in Iraq, many of them supported the boycott movement, and others voted mainly for the parties of al-Sadr and al-Abadi, or for smaller parties on the fringe of the Iraqi national and anti-Iranian camp.

For some reason, official Israel has not yet discovered Iraq, the largest Arab state on the East. Iraq is the second largest exporter of oil in the world, after Saudi Arabia, and is a significant potential trading partner. Iraq, which is being rebuilt, is desperate for assistance with infrastructure construction, banking, irrigation, agriculture, communications, and more. It also needs indirect assistance with improving its credit rating and with encouraging foreign investments. Iraq would also welcome the assistance of Intelligence services in its fight against terrorism, in which Iraq has acquired great skill in recent years.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of secondary importance in shaping Iraq’s official position vis-a-vis Israel. The Iraqi public is quite indifferent to Palestinian suffering, and Iraq supports the Arab peace initiative, which calls for Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose capital is East Jerusalem. It does not recognize the Hamas rule in Gaza.

As Iraq enters the period of establishing a coalition that will paralyze the political system for a while, it is worth thinking about how Israel should approach this important country. While the Iraqi political echelon is preoccupied with its own affairs, the educated and the young people discuss the matter openly and boldly. In its attempts to establish relations with the Arab states, Israel tends to focus on forging contacts with the political elite, and sometimes only with one specific leader. This is how peace agreements were reached with Egypt and Jordan, and to a great extent this is also the story of the Oslo process with the Palestinians. The educated middle class in the Arab countries was neglected and as a result became alienated from the process and hostile to Israel. Iraq offers the opportunity for a different process which may begin with the educated class and will prepare the ground within wide and influential circles before the formal diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries begins. This different process will lay a firm foundation for future relationships.

Dr. Ronen Zeidel is a senior researcher of Iraq at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University and a research fellow at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study on Israeli-Iraqi relations which is part of the “Israel-Arab Relations: The Unfulfilled Potential” project.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Laying a Civil Foundation for Cooperation between Israel and Iraq הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Quest for an Honest Broker in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first time was in 1980, following the enactment of the Jerusalem Law by the Knesset. The international response to the Israeli move was harsh and included a UN Security Council resolution condemning it and calling on foreign countries to withdraw their embassies from Jerusalem. As a result, Jerusalem was emptied of embassies and Turkey, whose embassy was in Tel Aviv, called its ambassador back. It took another 12 years for a Turkish ambassador to return to Tel Aviv, which was made possible only after the Madrid peace conference.

The second time was in 2011, following the failure of efforts to resolve the Israeli-Turkish crisis that erupted following the Mavi Marmara flotilla to Gaza. The flotilla incident occurred more than a year earlier, but only after the publication of the UN Palmer Committee Report and the Israeli refusal to accept the compromise agreement formulated by diplomats from both countries did Turkey decide to take measures against Israel, which included downgrading relations. This time, it took about five years before there was an ambassador again in the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv.

Jerusalem and Gaza were the reasons for previous Turkish decisions to downgrade relations with Israel. These issues have also been at the basis of the disputes between Israel and Turkey in recent years. The current crisis combines both issues – the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem and the tension it creates in East Jerusalem, alongside the Palestinian demonstrations in the Gaza Strip and the large number of Palestinians killed therein.

In the past year, a pattern in Erdoğan’s behavior could be observed. In each of the relevant cases – the tension surrounding the al-Aqsa Mosque in July 2017, the Trump Declaration on Jerusalem in December 2017, and the recent events related with the transfer of the American embassy and the March of Return in Gaza – the Turkish response included harsh statements against Israel, a call to a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries in Istanbul, and threatening Israel with a possible damage to the bilateral relations.

To date, these moves were mostly symbolic in nature. However, they eroded the trust – which was already poor – between Israel and Turkey, stirred anger among the masses, led to verbal clashes between the countries on Twitter, and slowed down the attempts to inject new content into the relations that took place following the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement of June 2016. The negative dynamic between the two countries was intensified, not only due to bilateral tensions and Erdoğan’s declarations, but also due to an inaccurate perception of Turkey by many in Israel as an ally of Iran, in light of the Russian-TurkishIranian partnership in the Astana process.

Erdoğan’s latest moves, as in previous cases in which he chose to raise the bar of tension with Israel, are also influenced by domestic and regional calculations. On June 24, elections will be held in Turkey, in which Erdoğan is re-running for president. Raising tensions between Turkey and other countries – not only with Israel (Erdoğan currently confronts some European countries as well) – is perceived as a move that may help his election campaign, certainly when it comes to issues that are important to many in Turkey, such as Jerusalem and Gaza.

In addition, Erdoğan’s behavior also helps his regional positioning. While he is reacting harshly to US and Israeli policy, most Arab leaders are keeping a low profile. Erdoğan is thus perceived by the masses as the only regional leader who is seriously challenging Israel. He did so in the past as well, for example when he confronted President Peres at the Davos Conference during operation Cast Lead in 2009, and was later accepted as a hero in Turkey and throughout the Arab world.

The current crisis is somewhat different from previous ones because this time Turkey took diplomatic action also against the US, and not only against Israel. This may serve as a softening factor. So far, the current American administration has not shown interest in Turkey-Israel relations, but it did invest efforts in blurring the significant controversies between the US and Turkey on Syria and in creating a framework for dialogue and coordination. This should be leveraged to create a tripartite Israeli-American-Turkish policy channel that will first address the current diplomatic tension and later focus on other regional issues in which the three countries have shared interests – primarily moderating Iranian influence in Syria.

Israel’s frustration with the Turkish behavior is great, and the anger at Erdoğan is skyrocketing. However, even in such times of crisis, it is worthy to remember the strategic, economic and diplomatic importance of the relations between both countries. It is not by chance that Netanyahu and Erdoğan decided in 2016, in spite of the bad blood between them and despite public criticism, to reach an agreement, and it is not self-evident for Israel to have full, even if problematic, diplomatic relations with a key regional state that has a large Muslim population. These relations should not be casually waived.

In the near future, action must be taken to contain the Israeli-Turkish crisis and prevent further escalation. This must be done through quiet, professional and efficient diplomacy while avoiding provocative measures intended to appease the public at home. There are many in both Israel and Turkey – including in the business, policy, research, and culture sectors – who value the relations between the countries and are willing to step up and help reduce the flames, as they did in the past.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Israel-Turkey Crisis and the Need for Containment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The leaders played a significant role in the process. The president of South Korea, as opposed to his predecessors who supported tough policies and the enforcement of sanctions, adhered to his policy of dialogue with the neighbor to the north. He took advantage of the hosting of the Winter Olympics to invite a delegation from North Korea. Indeed, the participation of Kim’s sister in the opening ceremony was the harbinger of the change in North Korea’s position. On the other hand, North Korea’s president, Kim, has shown that his rigid and threatening image was wrong. Whether the economic sanctions and the fear of an American attack played a role, or whether in Kim’s view the last ballistic experiment has deterred the US, the result has been a change in his position. There are obviously those who fear that this is merely a tactical change designed to maximize profits within the international community, but in any case, the leadership has proven that it is capable of changing positions and initiating a “game-changing” course.

In comparison, the leaders on both sides of our “conflict” – Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas – have not yet proved that they are capable and willing to promote a real solution to the conflict. Netanyahu’s hands are tied by his right-wing coalition that is ideologically committed to the vision of a greater Israel. He is also engaged in internal political struggles and is troubled by his legal issues of corruption. His policies and behavior convey that he has neither motivation nor determination to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, Abbas has so far escaped two rounds of negotiations, one with Olmert in 2008 and the second with Netanyahu in 2014, and it does not seem that he is inclined – now that he is approaching the end of his political career – to sign the deal of his life. Moreover, Abbas does not enjoy Palestinian legitimacy in the PA, while Hamas challenges his authority. There are two conditions that need to be met in order to promote a solution, legitimacy and determination. Both leaders do not meet these conditions, partially or fully.

The second element concerns the role of the mediator. Trump tried to give a feel of neutrality to his mediation, when he was secretly negotiating with North Korea, during which he also sent the head of the CIA, Pompeo (who in the meanwhile had been appointed Secretary of State) for a visit. He also wisely used “sticks” and “carrots”: on the one hand, he increased the economic pressure on North Korea and also threatened to take military action; On the other hand, he proposed to hold a summit with Kim soon, which previous presidents were not willing to do, thereby granting American legitimacy to the isolated president. Unfortunately, with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump has so far made almost every possible mistake, the last of which is the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The decision, which was meant to be part of the “carrots” that Israel would receive in exchange for its concessions in the negotiations, eliminated Trump’s pretense of becoming a neutral mediator. He can still correct this by making a counter-decision “in favor of” the Palestinians, but it does not appear that he intends to do so.

Finally, the outstanding issues in the two conflicts are completely different; The main issue in the Korean conflict is the unification of the two parts of the nation, which was arbitrarily separated during the Cold War: the north is afraid of losing power; while the south fears the economic costs of unifying a strong and progressive economy with the backward economy of the north. The importance of this issue should not be underestimated, but it has already been solved elsewhere, when East and West Germany united even though the conditions were different. More importantly, the Korean conflict does not include some of the explosive components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the question of borders, the question of Palestine’s independence, and notably the status of Jerusalem and the refugee question. The fact that the religious aspect does not play a role in the Korean conflict makes it less complicated and more manageable.

Beyond that, the history of “our” conflict does not work in Trump’s favor; external mediation alone has never been able to solve it. Peace with Egypt was initiated by Sadat; the Oslo Accords were initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil society players; while peace with Jordan was led mainly by Hussein and Rabin. It follows, therefore, that unlike the Korean story, Trump’s chances of breaking the impasse in our conflict are not great. If he wishes to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Korean arena seems more promising.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute, and teaches Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Dr. Alon Levkowitz is an expert on Korea, teaches at Beit Berl College and is a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Korea Is Not a Likely Precedent for Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

This situation changed dramatically in 1980, following the Israeli decision to annex East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council condemned Israel and – with the US abstaining – passed Resolution 478 that called upon “states that established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City”. As a result, foreign embassies began leaving the city and relocating to Tel Aviv and the surrounding area. Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries to maintain embassies in Jerusalem, after leaving the city in 1980 and re-opening their embassies there in 1982 and 1984 respectfully. Eventually, they too decided to relocate their embassies in 2006, following Arab pressure.

In the U.S. political arena, the issue of relocating the embassy was first raised in the leadup to the 1972 presidential elections. Since, it has become a regular and popular preelections promise, and in every instance, that promise was walked back after the election dust had settled. In the early 1980s, legislative attempts to formalize the embassy move began circulating in Congress. These legislation attempts reached their peak in the 1990s, in the days of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Right-wing Israeli politicians, together with partners in AIPAC, advanced legislation in Congress to move the U.S. embassy.

It was clearly a move to jeopardize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, by highlighting Jerusalem as an issue of controversy. Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who felt obliged to publicly support a move nominally aimed at strengthening Israel’s capital, conveyed behind closed-doors his opposition to the legislation. He regarded it as a politically motivated move to undermine his policies. The legislation eventually passed in Congress in 1995. Since then, until the May 2018 embassy relocation, every six months – in June and in December, the U.S. President, whether Democrat or Republican, has signed a waiver postponing the implementation of the bill on the grounds of U.S. national security considerations. Among the reasons leading to the signing of these waivers was the concern that relocating the embassy would jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to serve as an honest broker and as a credible negotiator between Israel and the Arab world.

הפוסט The History of Embassies in Jerusalem and Past Attempts to Relocate the U.S. Embassy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Second, during the negotiations, the parties should refrain from unilateral actions that would hinder the implementation of the agreement, and in particular, Israel should commit to stop expanding the settlements and build new ones. Thirdly, the implementation of the Arab Peace Plan and the signing of a regional agreement after obtaining a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The main points of the agreement will be based on the principle of a two-state solution – Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, alongside Israel within the borders of the June 4th, 1967; consent to a minimal swapping of territories of similar value and size; East Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine; A just and agreed solution to the refugee problem based on Resolution 194, formulated in accordance to the Arab peace initiative.

The timing of the announcement of the Palestinian plan is intended to preempt a possible upheaval that could stir the Palestinians upon the release of an American peace plan. Moreover, it is intended to signal, as the Palestinians have already stated more than once, that the US is no longer seen as a fair mediator in view of its unilateral stance on Jerusalem, the reduction of US aid to UNRWA and the threat of closing the Palestinian representation in Washington. From a Palestinian point of view, the imbalance created by an exclusive American mediation, can be mitigated with the involvement of international partners. In addition, the speech is intended to portray Abbas to his people as a leader who dares to challenge the US, thereby strengthening his unstable legitimacy.

In view of the thicket of corruption affairs in Israeli politics, it is no wonder that the announcement about the disclosure of the plan was accepted in Israel with indifference. The Israeli Pavlovian reaction, as expressed in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s response – “Abbas has not said anything new” – is a reminiscent of countless similar negative reactions by Israeli prime ministers and foreign ministers, including the response to the Arab peace plan in 2002. Not only that, but to ensure that Abbas is not seen as someone who is willing to make concessions, Netanyahu stressed that Abbas continues to pay millions of dollars to terrorists. Danny Danon, Israel’s representative to the UN, echoed him and said that Abbas is not part of the solution, but the problem.

The importance of the Palestinian plan is not in its content; it is anyway very general and does not contain any details, which are planned to be determined during long and exhausting negotiations. Its importance is three-fold: first, it stresses – once again – Abbas’s commitment to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and a possible exchange of territories, thereby refuting the claim that Abbas intends to demand the implementation of the partition boundaries of 1947. The fact that Abbas views the Balfour Declaration as illegitimate does not change the fact that he recognizes and willing to accept the existing reality. The Palestinian narrative that rejects the Balfour Declaration will not change even after a peace agreement is achieved.

Second, Abbas’s insistence on East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital shows, by inference, that Abbas recognizes West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Thirdly, his view of the Palestinian agreement as a milestone to an Israeli-Arab peace agreement and part thereof, as expressed in the Arab peace initiative, signals that the advancement of IsraeliArab reconciliation cannot replace or advance an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

In August 1981, shortly after Saudi Crown Prince Fahd published his first peace initiative (the first Saudi initiative) – which was immediately rejected by Israel – Yoel Marcus, a senior Ha’aretz journalist, wrote that Israel had always been able to respond to Arab bomb-bearing missiles, but not to missiles bearing peace plans. His observation was correct, but not accurate. Israel has learned to intercept both bomb-bearing missiles and peace plans. It does so by simply ignoring, opposing, or announcing that they are a recipe for the destruction of Israel.

Abbas’s peace plan will probably enter the endless collection of peace plans proposed throughout the years of the conflict, which were faded into oblivion. The composition of the current government and the timing of the publication will not give it a chance. Historians will certainly wonder in the future whether a peace plan was ever proposed by an Israeli government. I will give them a hint: not even once.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Matzav Review)

הפוסט Israel and the Abbas Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Recommendations for Improving Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A recent Mitvim Institute study, written by former MK Nitzan Horowitz, found that Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), President Rivlin (as well as his predecessor, President Peres), and the former Knesset Speaker refused to meet members of extreme European right-wing parties and called on all Israeli parties to refrain from such meetings. However, the study found that certain Likud members, including incumbent MKs and key figures in the settlement movement, did not heed this advice and instead held meetings with far-right officials from Austria and other European countries. In these meetings, they did not address the anti-Semitic roots of these parties, but rather sought to develop partnerships, and expressed support and appreciation for what they perceive as these parties’ friendship to Israel.

Far right-wing European actors boast of these ties with Israel at home. By meeting with them, Israel provides them the public legitimacy they need in the face of accusations of antiSemitism. For the right-wingers in Israel, on the other hand, such ties serve to support the settlements and Israel’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the relationship between the two sides is very often based on shared hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.

This gap between Israel’s official policy and the actions of right-wing politicians must be narrowed. Far right-wing parties are gaining influence in certain countries in Europe. In Austria, such a party has recently even joined the coalition and some of its members are now appointed senior officials. It is possible that in the next elections to the European Parliament in 2019, the representatives of such parties will also become significant in EU institutions. In light of this, the MFA should formulate criteria and guidelines to instruct Israeli right-wing parties on how to conduct themselves vis-à-vis the far right in Europe. A recommendation to refrain from any interaction with the ministers of the Freedom Party was already formulated and accepted by the Prime Minister.

The aim of such a measure would be to prevent right-wing MKs from granting legitimacy to far right-wing ideology in Europe, contrary to the position of the MFA. Furthermore, it would also prevent the legitimizing of anti-Semitic elements in Europe by Israeli officials, regardless of the fact that such elements may currently focus on hating Muslims rather than Jews. The formulation of such criteria and guidelines should be led by the MFA, but should also involve other partners, including the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Knesset Speaker, the Jewish Agency, the Union of Local Authorities, and MKs who head parliamentary friendship associations with relevant countries (such as the Israel-Austria Friendship Association headed by MK Amir Peretz). Additionally, it is vitally important that the recommendations formulated become public, in order to identify those who do not comply with the guidelines, and to ignite a public debate on the issue.

However, the purpose of diplomacy – both formal and parliamentary – is not to impose boycotts, but rather to promote interests through dialogue. Therefore, it is important for Israel to formulate a list of demands and conditions for far right-wing parties in Europe as a condition for policy change toward them. Such a list will also have to take into account the needs of the Jewish communities in Europe, and can be consolidated in cooperation with other groups in Europe who oppose far right-wing parties. It does not need to focus on one country or another, but must address the growing phenomenon throughout the continent, while including lessons from change processes that parties and institutions underwent in the past.

European far right-wing parties sometimes pretend to be pro-Israeli in order to develop ties with right-wing groups in Israel and receive a certificate of integrity from them. This was the case, for example, with the interactions between the head of the Austrian Freedom Party and members of Likud. The leaders of these parties sometime carry soft messages and talk of change, but do not back up this discourse with actions. Presenting a list of clear Israeli requirements and conditions – including, for example, ousting those who are infecting the party with anti-Semitism, changing ideological frameworks and documents, and demonstrating commitment to legislation and policy denouncing anti-Semitism – will produce concrete measures to examine the actual conduct of these parties and avoid a façade of moderation.

The rise of the far right-wing and populist elements is taking place simultaneously, albeit at different levels, in a number of EU member states – especially in the central and eastern Europe. In the EU, there are now countries led by governments that move away from liberal values and democratic norms. The Israeli government is sometimes tempted to see the governments of these countries – such as Hungary – as allies and friends. This is due to block EU initiatives regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and their readiness to stand by Israel in international forums. However, viewing these countries as friends is a mistake.

Israel’s foreign policy should indeed be distanced from far right-wing elements in Europe, but this is not enough. It must also emphasize the importance of democracy and show commitment and preference for establishing alliances with countries with a strong democratic regime, even if they disagree with the current policies of the Israeli government. Israel must belong to the family of democratic nations, and should not sacrifice this position for the sake of promoting ad-hoc interests.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Forward)

הפוסט Israel’s Partners in Europe: Yes to Democracies, No to the Far Right הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

China supports the two-state solution, which includes a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It consistently votes in favor of UN resolutions along these lines. However, the Chinese Foreign Minister and other senior officials made it clear at the Beijing meeting that China does not take sides in the conflict. Rather, it claims that it is interested in promoting a solution that gives Palestinians their rights and ensures Israel’s security, recognizes the importance of Jerusalem for all religions and ethnic groups, and promotes regional stability. China declared that it intends to do so by mostly using positive economic leverages, instead of exerting political pressures. The Beijing meeting resulted in a joint Israeli-Palestinian paper that included guiding principles and policy steps towards the two-state solution. The meeting helped Chinese officials better understand the interests and sensitivities of the Israelis and Palestinians, and the points of agreement and disagreement between supporters of peace on both sides.

Is this a new and meaningful Chinese move, or is it merely a continuation of China’s low-key and symbolic involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? After all, many countries announce their aspiration for Israeli-Palestinian peace and show interest in the matter. Nevertheless, most of them do not give it high priority, do not believe that progress is possible under the current political conditions, nor do they invest great efforts and resources in advancing it. In a period of stagnation in the peace process and in light of recent American steps that make it even more difficult to renew negotiations, every country that is willing to help and contribute to peacemaking is important. China has the potential to play a useful role: It is an ambitious power with a growing global influence, which has good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries, has unique economic capabilities, and promotes large-scale international infrastructure projects, including in Israel and the Middle East (as part of its far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative).

Chinese officials stressed at the Beijing meeting that China does not see itself as an alternative mediator to the US, but rather wants to be part of a multilateral effort to promote peace. This Chinese willingness to promote peace in coordination with other players in the international community is important and positive. Previous initiatives by other countries that were competing with each other, led mainly to failures. China’s position on the final status agreement is similar to that of the EU and the Arab League, therefore the establishment of a Sino-European dialogue channel on the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be a good starting point for Chinese involvement. In the future, it is worthwhile adding Arab officials and institutions to the initiative – led by Egypt, with whom China has a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Currently, there is no more consensus within the international community regarding the desired solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The American position has shifted under Trump, and within the EU there are countries (in Central and Eastern Europe) that adopt different positions to that of Brussels and which are rather supportive of Netanyahu’s policies. This makes it difficult to formulate the required international parameters for a twostate solution, but it should not interfere with other international actions that are currently on the diplomatic agenda, i.e. the formulation of a global set of economic and political incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace. The idea of introducing to Israelis and Palestinians an incentive package that will increase public support in peace was adopted during the French Peace Initiative and by the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council. It was also included in the final document of the Beijing meeting.

So far, incentives have been offered by the Arab League (the Arab Peace Initiative), the EU (the proposal to establish a Special Privileged Partnership with Israel and the future Palestinian state) and the US (security guarantees for the two-state solution formulated during the previous administration). China may add its own large-scale economic incentive, which will present a reality of prosperity and development that both Israelis and Palestinians will benefit from after reaching peace. For example, a senior Chinese official mentioned during the Beijing meeting that China has the potential to play a central role in the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. China can also be involved in the process of developing a new international mechanism to advance the peace process, which will be more inclusive and effective than the current Quartet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has chosen to invite to Beijing delegations that mostly included Israeli and Palestinian civil society activists, thus conveying the importance it attaches to informal activities to promote peace. Indeed, in their speeches, the Chinese officials emphasized how much hope they derive from the positive spirit of the discussions at the meeting, the agreements reached during it, and the fact that many citizens and organizations on both sides are committed to the two-state solution and to achieving it through peaceful means. As demonstrated in Beijing, the contribution of civil society to the peace process is not limited to grassroots dialogue and activism. Civil society can also have policy impact, by making genuine contributions to international diplomatic processes and by assisting politicians from both sides in reaching agreements and understandings. Although China’s added value is not in expertise regarding civil society, it can still provide significant infrastructural-economic support to Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace organizations, thereby increasing their visibility and impact, and assisting them to fulfill their potential. The meeting in Beijing did not lead to a breakthrough towards peace, nor was it its goal. It laid the foundation for greater Chinese involvement in the advancement of peace, highlighting China’s unique advantages and capabilities.

The meeting also showed Israelis and Palestinians that despite the ongoing diplomatic stalemate and increased tensions on the ground, they can still reach understandings and draw a common path forward. Promoting peace requires diverse and effective international involvement, but first and foremost, it requires local political will for peace. Achieving this requires further work, with and without China’s involvement.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute. He participated in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium, held in Beijing on 21-22 December 2017. A shorter version of this article was published by Globes on 31 January 2018.

הפוסט Can China Contribute to Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט Trump’s Statement on Jerusalem הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Rabin was not the only Israeli politician who chose to publicly pledge allegiance to the notion of a “united Jerusalem”, while understanding that a compromise in the city is required for peace. Current Israeli politicians and party leaders behave similarly, at times clearly contradicting themselves – for example, by rejecting any compromise in Jerusalem, while voicing support for the Clinton parameters (from 2000), which call for Palestinian control of Arab areas of Jerusalem.

The Israeli peace camp is criticizing Trump, and rightly so, for not making a distinction in his statement between East and West Jerusalem and for not mentioning the Palestinian aspirations for a capital in East Jerusalem. His decision not to do so places additional obstacles on the path towards peace. Despite Trump’s repeated statements about his interest in peace, his Jerusalem statement was done due to domestic political considerations, and not due to sophisticated diplomatic calculations. Previous American statements regarding the embassy relocation were also often carried out because of such motives. That was the case in 1972, when the call to relocate the embassy to Jerusalem first appeared in the platform of an American political party (at the time it was the Democratic Party); that was the case in 1995, when Congress passed the legislation requiring the embassy’s relocation; and that was the case in 2000, when George W. Bush stated prior to the elections that he will “begin the process” of relocating the embassy. The wish to gain domestic support, and not genuine concern for the fate of Israelis and Palestinians, dictated these moves.

The Clinton administration acted differently. It identified the significant damage that American steps regarding the status of Jerusalem might cause to the peace process, which the administration was deeply invested in promoting. It is not by chance that President Clinton made efforts to block the 1995 legislation attempt. Administration officials heavily criticized the proposed legislation, held briefings against its initiators, contested its legal legitimacy, and threatened that the president will veto the bill or refuse to sign it. Dennis Ross, who was leading President Clinton’s peace efforts, said at the time that if the bill will pass “my wife will be very happy. I will be able to spend much time at home with the kids. If I go to the Middle East, I will have to wear a bulletproof jacket”. Eventually, a compromise was reached, in the form of the presidential waiver signed by consecutive presidents (including Trump) every six months, postponing the relocation of the embassy due to national security considerations.

The future of Jerusalem will not be determined by politically-motivated statements of one American president or another. Such statements should not be underestimated, as they do impact developments on the ground and may shift positions among the international community. But eventually, Israelis and Palestinians will be the ones making the calls and defining their own political reality.

In recent years, there has been a flux of international peace initiatives – American, European, Arab, and even Chinese – and a striking absence of much-needed peace initiatives proposed and advanced by the local leaderships in Jerusalem and Ramallah.

The international community should contribute to peacemaking and has an important role to play on the path to peace. It can specify parameters for a two state solution, offer incentives that will make peace seem more attractive, and spell out the prices to be paid should the sides take steps that further peace. Nevertheless, the peace process itself should originate from the region and not from the outside. This has already happened in past breakthrough between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and it can happen again. In the absence of a propeace government, the Israeli opposition should take the initiative, as it did in 2003 when the Geneva Initiative was developed and published as a pro-peace alternative to the Sharon government’s policies. The Jerusalem issue can be a good starting point, especially due to the wide gap between the current reality in Jerusalem and the one that can be expected in the city after peace is achieved. Israeli and Palestinian experts drafted an initial shared vision for the city, just over a decade ago, and the effort can now continue.

Pro-peace Israeli politicians should not compete with the right-wing government over who is more enthusiastic about Trump’s statement and who is more committed to “united Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital”. Instead, they should engage in dialogue with Israel’s Palestinian and Arab neighbors, and introduce a vision of peace for the city of Jerusalem. It should be a vision based on compromise and respect, which seeks to fulfill the needs of both sides. Only this will enable the transformation of Jerusalem from a poor and conflict ridden city into the flourishing and prosperous city it should become.

Jerusalem can become a local, regional, and international success story. In an era of peace, Jerusalem will attract flocks of tourists, businesses, and international organizations. And, yes, there will also be embassies relocating to the city, and in masses. This is the story that Israelis and Palestinians should be hearing. Voicing it will be the best response to Trump’s statement.

הפוסט Introducing a Vision of Peace for Jerusalem is the Ultimate Response to Trump’s Statement הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The multiple reports published by the media in the aftermath of Trump’s declaration focused on two things: first, Trump’s desire to appease the Evangelists and/or Jews in the US; and second, his desire to honor his election campaign promise to declare Jerusalem Israel’s capital. He rationalized the decision by claiming that a new approach was required since all the other avenues were exhausted.

Trump’s decision harms US interests in several ways. One, in contrast to his desire to portray America as an honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump identified himself completely with one side – Israel. Although he qualified his statement by saying that this decision does not define the boundaries of Jerusalem, the content and tone of his speech was clearly one-sided. An even-handed mediator should have presented a corresponding or equivalent concession to the other party. As a result, the Palestinians will be highly suspicious of any new peace plan that the US attempts to present.

Two, the decision will unite Arabs and Muslims against the US. Trump worked very hard to reconcile with the Saudis following president Barack Obama’s foreign policy debacle, and he probably coordinated the declaration with moderate Arab leaders, but popular opposition across the Arab and Islamic worlds could influence the position of friendly Arab regimes. Jerusalem and the Palestinian issue are the lowest common denominators in the Arab world, and are still able to trigger charged public reactions. Although these may subside after a while, the ominous implications of Trump’s decision will last, at least as long as he remains in power.

Three, the decision opened two unnecessary fronts for the US – one in the UN, and the other with the EU, where most countries oppose Israel’s occupation and control of east Jerusalem.

Four, the consequent tension between the US and the moderate Arab countries, on the one hand, and between the US and Europe, on the other, serves the interests of Iran and its Middle East proxies, which can be counted on to exploit the opportunity to inflame their public opinion against the US and Israel. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin will no doubt attempt to use the opportunity to improve their own positions and influence.

Five, the decision will exacerbate the divisions between the various American agencies (particularly between the White House and State Department) and between them and the public, who oppose the move.

And, finally, the possibility of a violent confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere as a result of the decision should not be underestimated.

If Trump’s announcement turns out to be part of a grand plan he is cooking up behind the scenes, Israel will be forced to reciprocate and make a corresponding concession to the Palestinians. So far, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not expressed any intention of moving forward in the peace process. Even if he had, the composition of his government would not allow any significant move.

This is unfortunate, because the post-Arab Spring situation in the Middle East offers an opportunity to strike a deal with the Palestinians, with the support of several moderate Arab countries, based on a modified version of the Arab Peace Initiative. It is still not clear whether the Palestinians are ready, but a generous Israeli offer, backed the US and those Arab countries, might draw them to the negotiating table. At present, after Trump’s declaration the likelihood of a breakthrough in the conflict looks even more remote than ever. The inevitable conclusion is that Trump’s decision recalls both Eban’s euphemism and Barbara Tuchman’s march of folly theory – that governments pursue policies contrary to their own interests.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump’s Jerusalem Statement is his March of Folly הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

For several months, Israelis were speculating about US President Donald Trump’s next steps regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Each statement by the American president was amplified and analyzed: Trump is serious, Trump is determined, Trump is invested. That had become a common belief.

Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Authority and Israel was an opportunity to bring some certainty into the debate. However, if there is one key takeaway from the visit, it is that for the new president, regional security is the top priority in the region, not the Israeli- Palestinian peace process.

Whether it was in his speech in Riyadh, his remarks in Bethlehem or his statements in Jerusalem, Trump spoke a similar language – it is time to fight terror, defeat extremism and contain Iran.

Toward these goals he signed gigantic arm deals with the Saudis, called for the establishment of a new regional security partnership and urged the different peoples of the region to join hands and promote their shared interests.

In Israel, the messages regarding regional security had some additional components and twists – a pledge to defend Israel at international organizations, a commitment to prevent a nuclear Iran and a promise to continue the special bond between Israel and the United States. Trump also emphasized the importance of Jerusalem to the Jewish people and told the Israeli public that their prime minister was a man of peace.

Trump echoed Benjamin Netanyahu’s talking points to the probable delight of the Israeli prime minister, who was also content with what Trump chose not to – at least publicly – say: The American president did not refer to the two-state solution; he did not mention the Palestinians’ right to self-determination; he did not criticize Israel over settlement expansion; he did not call on Israel to show maps and define its borders.

Trump chose to speak about peace in general and ambiguous terms, in a more religious than national context. Should the three monotheistic religions be able to cooperate, he claimed, then world peace – including between Israelis and Palestinians – might just be around the corner. He also identified the enemies of peace – Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas – and made clear that he was not in the business of moderating extremists, engaging with Iran or exploring Hamas’s new policy document. He wanted to defeat them. His words on Iran were welcomed by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman, and his words on Hamas pleased Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu was happy about both.

Trump spelled out regional enemies and threats but kept vague on regional opportunities for peace. In fact, he ignored the most significant peace initiative out there – the Arab Peace Initiative (API).

Trump spoke in Saudi Arabia, the country that initiated the API. He spoke to leaders of Arab and Muslim countries that had adopted the API. He emphasized the need for multilateral efforts toward peace.

Yet he did not mention even once the offer that the Arab League made 15 years ago for normal diplomatic relations between Israel and all Arab states in return for peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors. The API, reaffirmed by the Arab League just two months ago, disappeared from Trump’s talking points, and no alternative plan for regional peace was introduced.

The Trump visit did not provide the much-needed clarity regarding the nature of a future Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and its benefits.

It even challenged the limited clarity that does exist – clarity about American support for a two-state solution, and clarity about the API as a key regional incentive for peace that can provide Israel with additional benefits to those the Palestinians can deliver on their own.

Trump’s visit should serve as a wake-up call for other international actors who care about the peace process.

Lately, the international community is rather paralyzed regarding the peace process: Past initiatives have been shelved, and subsequently, no new initiatives have been put forth. All eyes are focused on the new American president and his statements about promoting peace.

The recent visit to the Middle East indicated that Trump might not be the savior of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as some believed. It is thus time for renewed international activism regarding the peace process, as exemplified by the resolution adopted by the European Parliament just before Trump’s visit, calling for a new European Union initiative to advance Israeli- Palestinian peace.

Despite their disappointment over a lack of progress toward peace during the visit, pro-peace actors – in Israel and beyond – can leverage three messages introduced by Trump during his visit that which contradict popular Israeli rightwing rhetoric: 1. While Netanyahu claims that a breakthrough in ties with the Arab world does not require progress on the Palestinian track, Trump emphasized that steps toward the Palestinians were needed for Israel to upgrade its regional ties.

2. While the Israeli government has been delegitimizing Abbas, Trump stressed that Abbas was a genuine partner for peace.

3. While right-wing Israelis present a dichotomous approach, asking international actors to choose whether they are for Israel or against it, Trump made the case that there is no contradiction between being pro-Israel and pro-Arab.

Trump has gone in and out of three major cities in the Middle East. A major announcement was not made, a new peace plan was not introduced, and a big surprise was not revealed. But just as he departed, it was announced that his special envoy for the peace process was on his way to the region.

So maybe it will all happen the next time around?

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Trump and a Tale of Three Cities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Nevertheless, a heavy cloud still hovers over the Israel-Turkey relationship due the changes that transpired in the Turkish democracy throughout recent years. We get the distinct impression that the link that connected Israel and Turkey over the years – the pro-Western, modern democratic link – is loosening and may even tear completely one day. The escalation of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the deep stagnation of the peace process will place a heavy burden on the bilateral ties, mainly on Ankara’s part.

הפוסט Turkey and Israel: A Chronicle of Bilateral Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Hopefully this abrupt change in tone is a result of the administration’s post-inauguration meet-up with Middle East realities: that the embassy move has potentially dangerous political consequences both for Israel and for the U.S. itself, and a high potential cost in terms of human lives.

Trump’s pro-move campaign promises were received with joy by top Israeli ministers and right-wing politicians. The Mayor of Jerusalem even launched a public campaign thanking President Trump and encouraging him to follow through on his commitment on the topic.

In contrast, Israel’s neighbors in the Arab world issued harsh warnings about the possible consequences of such a move. Palestinian leaders said it will lead to chaos, harm prospects of peace, and might even lead to withdrawing their recognition of Israel. Strong opposition has also been raised in Jordan.

Relocating its embassy to Jerusalem would mean the U.S. taking a partisan stance on a central and sensitive issue, a source of controversy between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and the international community.

The future status of Jerusalem is among the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to be decided upon in the final-status negotiations. Its national, religious and symbolic meanings have already led to violence erupting due to unilateral steps taken in the city. Along the years, the U.S. has been well aware of this, and has exercised great caution regarding policies on Jerusalem.

It is not by chance that, as of today, not a single country has an embassy in Jerusalem. This was not always the case. From the 1950s onwards, Israel invested much effort in convincing states to open embassies in Jerusalem. Until 1962, the U.S. actively opposed this Israeli policy, advising countries to refrain from opening embassies there.

American involvement on the issue dissipated in the early 1960s in parallel to the development of the Israel-U.S. special relationship. By this time, Israel’s attempts showed signs of success. By 1967, almost 40 percent of the 54 diplomatic missions in Israel were based in Jerusalem. These were largely representatives of African and South American countries, to whom Israel promised aid allocations in return.

This situation changed dramatically in 1980, following the Israeli decision to annex East Jerusalem. The UN Security Council condemned Israel and – with the US abstaining – passed Resolution 478 that called upon “states that established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City”.

As a result, foreign embassies began leaving the city and relocating to Tel Aviv and the surrounding area. Costa Rica and El Salvador were the only two countries to maintain embassies in Jerusalem, after leaving the city in 1980 and re-opening their embassies there in 1982 and 1984 respectfully. Eventually, they too decided to relocate their embassies in 2006, following Arab pressure.

In the U.S. political arena, the issue of relocating the embassy was first raised in the leadup to the 1972 presidential elections. Since, it has become a regular and popular preelections promise, and in every instance, that promise was walked back after the election dust had settled. In the early 1980s, legislative attempts to formalize the embassy move began circulating in Congress.

These legislation attempts reached their peak in the 1990s, in the days of the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Right-wing Israeli politicians, together with partners in AIPAC, advanced legislation in Congress to move the U.S. embassy.

It was clearly a move to jeopardize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, by highlighting Jerusalem as an issue of controversy. Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who felt obliged to publicly support a move nominally aimed at strengthening Israel’s capital, conveyed behind closed-doors his opposition to the legislation. He regarded it as a politically motivated move to undermine his policies.

The legislation eventually passed in Congress in 1995. Since then, every six months – in June and in December, the U.S. President, whether Democrat or Republican, has signed a waiver postponing the implementation of the bill on the grounds of U.S. national security considerations. President Obama did so for the last time in early December 2016. Among the reasons leading to the signing of these waivers was the concern that relocating the embassy would jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to serve as an honest broker and as a credible negotiator between Israel and the Arab world.

Any American decision to reverse this long-standing policy and relocate the embassy will certainly backfire. With the stagnation of the peace process and question marks regarding the commitment of the new U.S. administration to the two-state solution, the embassy move could have dire consequences. Not least among those possible consequences: Escalation and violence between Israel and the Palestinians. Damage to the relationships that Israel has managed to gradually develop and deepen with some of its Arab neighbors.

If President Trump really wants to have Israel’s back, as he’s often said he does, he should focus his energy on promoting peace, rather than on taking actions like moving the U.S. embassy that will distance its achievement even further.

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem Should Wait הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

There were three central points in Kerry’s plan that dealt with the question of Jerusalem:

The first issue raised in the speech concerns the principle that Jerusalem will be “the capital of the two states.” In addition, Kerry declared that “there will be no peace agreement without reconciling the basic aspirations of both sides to have capitals there.” While Kerry was clear in his vision of Jerusalem as a shared capital of both states, he did not refer to the question of the division of sovereignty or the possible route for a border within the city. There is no reference to the principle suggested by Clinton, whereby Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would retain Israeli sovereignty, while the Arab neighborhoods would be under Palestinian sovereignty. It should be noted that the Clinton Parameters did not discuss the question of a “Palestinian capital” at all, but instead focused on the issue of division of sovereignty in East Jerusalem. However, in a speech delivered to the Israel Policy Forum in January 2001, on the eve of his departure from the White House, Clinton described the principles of a future agreement, stating that Jerusalem will serve as two capitals of two states.

The phrase “capital of the two states” was a major source of controversy during the recent round of Israeli-Palestinian talks in 2013-2014 led by Kerry to formulate a framework agreement. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refused to discuss a compromise in Jerusalem and would not agree to recognize the principle of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the Palestinians objected to the vague wording that Kerry attempted to promote. Kerry’s latest suggestion differs from Netanyahu’s position and incorporates recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both states, but the ambiguous wording—which avoids delineating the territory in which the Palestinian capital would be established—is expected to arouse opposition amongst the Palestinians.

Furthermore, the wording of Kerry’s latest plan indicates that Jerusalem as the capital of two states will be internationally recognized. Indeed, the Kerry proposal emphasizes that this solution in Jerusalem will allow the international community to recognize, for the first time, the Israeli capital beside an international recognition of the Palestinian capital.

The second issue is the question of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Kerry’s proposal calls to protect the holy sites, to guarantee free access to them, and to preserve the status quo. These important basic principles have the support of the relevant parties and of the international community. However, even in this context, Kerry leaves several key questions unanswered and avoids outlining a solution for the Old City of Jerusalem. For instance, will an agreement entail joint management of this area, or an international regime? Kerry also does not address the question of sovereignty over the holy sites, one of the most divisive issues in the negotiations.

Kerry emphasized the importance of preserving the status quo in the holy sites, an issue with which he is deeply familiar. In October 2015, against a backdrop of tensions on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and increased violent incidents in Jerusalem, Kerry led diplomatic efforts between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan. These efforts facilitated a mutual understanding and a statement by Netanyahu, re-asserting Israel’s commitment to the status quo on the Temple Mount/Al-Haram al-Sharif and to the policy that permits only Muslims to pray on the site, whereas non-Muslims are permitted to visit there but not to pray.

Kerry stated that the holy sites are sacred to billions of people around the world and asserted that the solution must take into account the needs of all three monotheistic religions, not just those of both parties. This wording stresses that the issue is important beyond the Israel-Palestine context and possibly hints at the need to integrate additional actors into a solution regarding the Old City and the holy sites. Indeed, this framework resembles Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008 to establish an international framework for the administration of the “Holy Basin,” which would include not only Israel and Palestine, but also the US, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

The third issue in Kerry’s speech was his declaration that “Jerusalem should not be divided again like it was in 1967.” This principle affirms that, alongside the agreement that the city would be shared as the capital of both sides, the agreed solution in Jerusalem would not include a strict physical division between the respective parts of the city, as was the situation prior to 1967, when a physical wall ran through the center of the city.

Two points may be made here. First, this position represents the long-standing American position, which has been presented consistently over many years. In December 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers presented a peace plan, which stated that Jerusalem should be a “unified city” within which there would be no restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. In addition, President Ronald Reagan’s peace plan in 1982 declared that “Jerusalem must remain undivided.” President Clinton voiced a similar position in a speech on the eve of his retirement from office. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State during the second Bush administration, also reiterated this position.

Second, this position overlaps with the idea of Jerusalem as an “open city,” which has been advocated by the Palestinians for many years. The Palestinians proposed this in the late 1980s and again during the Camp David process (1999-2001) and during the Annapolis process (2007-2008). President Abbas has spoken on many occasions about his vision of Jerusalem as an “open city” and a “shared city”. The Palestinian proposal suggests that, notwithstanding the political division of the city, Jerusalem would remain a single entity under a joint “umbrella municipality” with complete freedom of movement between both sides of the city. Over the course of previous negotiations, the Israelis rejected this proposal and stated that the two states needed to be separated by a clearly delineated physical border for security reasons, including within Jerusalem.

The issue of Jerusalem is at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Oslo Accords determined that Jerusalem is one of the core issues to be negotiated by the parties in the final status negotiations. It is impossible to achieve peace without an agreed solution to the question of Jerusalem, and every future serious diplomatic effort must address this issue. This will be a difficult endeavor considering the special sensitivities elicited by this question, as Kerry noted in his speech.

Moreover, the situation on the ground in Jerusalem does not remain frozen in time as one peace plan fails and new ones are presented. Since the Clinton Parameters, significant processes and moves have made the city even more complicated and explosive, ensuring that a negotiated solution to the problem of Jerusalem has also become more complicated and difficult. Nevertheless, the Jerusalemite poet Yehuda Amichai wrote that “In Jerusalem you should always hope for the good.” The positive vision presented by Kerry for the future of the city may encourage joint thinking about an alternative Jerusalem that may eventually translate into action.

(originally published in the Matzav blog)

הפוסט The Question of Jerusalem in Kerry’s Peace Plan הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The U.S. Elections and the Future of the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The adoption of this discourse should not be taken for granted; it is the result of intellectual and media activity undertaken by various civil society organizations that identified a historic opportunity – the result of changes taking place in the region – to cooperate with the “moderate” Arab states who share common interests with Israel, such as halting the political and ideological expansion of Iran and the Shi’ite axis (including Syria and Hezbollah), and a joint struggle against Sunni Jihadist Islamic non-state actors.

The original purpose of the regional concept was not to disregard, escape or divert attention from the Palestinian problem, but rather to harness the Arab states as an umbrella of support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As bilateral negotiations are at a standstill, the regional framework was supposed to steer the parties away from the impasse.

According to this logic, the Arab states can help in several ways: Egypt has leverage over Hamas because of their common border; Jordan has an interest in reaching a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem as well as a desire to play a role in the Jerusalem issue; and Saudi Arabia can provide religious legitimacy to any political compromise. All these countries have leverage over the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas.

However, the main problem is that the public consciousness has shifted in line with the positions of the right-wing politicians. In other words, those who promote the regional discourse do not do so in order to make progress on the Palestinian issue, but rather to reap the benefits of the changes in the region without having to pay its price in the Palestinian sphere. In such a way, the right-wing government also enhances its supposedly moderate image.

Indeed, Egypt’s ambassador’s return to Israel, the visit of its foreign minister (after nine years), intelligence and military cooperation with Egypt, Jordan and possibly the Gulf – all indicate that regional cooperation is alive and kicking, while the Palestinian track has been abandoned.

The public, according to a Mitvim Institute’s public opinion poll (July 2016), graciously accept it; they are mostly interested in cooperation with Egypt, while the PA is lagging behind in fourth place out of five options. In other words, the public welcomes regional cooperation according to the right-wing vision.

This regional approach is misguided and will not ultimately succeed as one may have hoped. Certain achievements may indeed be reached, but they will be limited and kept under wraps. Israel has a history of contacts with countries, organizations and prominent figures in the Arab world. As these connections were viewed in the Arab world as illegitimate, they were kept behind the scenes. Some Arab leaders also paid with their lives for this (such as Jordan’s king Abdullah, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and others). As a result, Israel has suffered over the years from what I call the “mistress syndrome.” The only time it enjoyed an extensive and open relationship with the Arab world was in the ‘90s, after the signing of the Oslo Accords. All of the achievements in the field of diplomatic relations, the economic conferences and projects evaporated at the onset of the al-Aksa intifada in 2000. In other words, real, open and meaningful cooperation will not exist without a solution, or at least significant progress, on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Any attempt to promote regional cooperation without tackling the Palestinian issue is throwing dust in one’s eyes.

And, as we know, there is plenty of dust in our region.

In view of the fact that the discourse of “opportunities” and the “regional initiative” have been adopted by the government and the public at large, focus should now be placed on introducing another discourse, one of missed opportunities. The Israeli public likes to quote the legendary foreign minister Abba Eban’s saying that “the Arabs/Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Yet, a recent study that I completed shows that not only have the Palestinians missed opportunities, but Israel has as well. Therefore, emphasis should not only be placed on identifying a historic opportunity – which indeed exists – but emphasis should be placed on ensuring that it will not be missed.

As things stand now, the Israeli government shows no motivation to seize this historic opportunity to advance a regional initiative that includes a two-state solution, in accordance with the recommendations of the recent Quartet Report. In August 1952, David Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that “I do not want to be the man that our grandchildren… blame for having had the chance to try and achieve Jewish-Arab peace – and to have missed it.”

I believe that Netanyahu should hang this quote over his desk.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט From opportunities to missed opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The first truth is that despite obvious differences between Obama and Netanyahu, the bond between the United States and Israel remains strong. This should not be taken for granted; even in the days leading up to Biden’s visit a developing story about an alleged scheduling miscommunication between the two heads of state began to overshadow his tour.

Still, reducing the nuances of the U.S.-Israel relationship to the dynamics between their leaders is limiting. Obama and Netanyahu aren’t the first American president and Israeli prime minister to endure a difficult partnership, and they won’t be the last. In the end, regardless of the intense disputes that may poison personal relationships, the success of U.S.-Israel ties depends on shared values and common interests.

This was unexpectedly and tragically demonstrated in the aftermath of Taylor Force’s murder at the hands of a Palestinian terrorist in Jaffa on March 8. Force, a former US army officer and Vanderbilt graduate student, died just a few hundred yards away from Biden’s family, who were spending their evening on the Tel Aviv promenade (the terror attack in Jaffa was one of three that took place that day, leaving another 14 wounded).

“The kind of violence we saw yesterday, the failure to condemn it, the rhetoric that incites that violence, the retribution that it generates has to stop,” Biden told reporters during his press conference with Netanyahu. Although he would later add that terror couldn’t be thwarted by “physical force” alone, Biden’s comments were reassuring to an Israeli public concerned that a chasm has grown between them and the United States.

“You never need to doubt,” Biden reiterated, “the United States of America has Israel’s back.”

The second truth is that the Obama administration will not be leading future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Many speculated Biden would push for a renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority during his trip, which included a brief stopover in Ramallah. According to reports, Biden floated a number of proposals during his meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, notably a future Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and Israeli settlement freezes in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and abandoning the demand for a Palestinian right of return.

However, how serious were Biden’s overtures? Considering that prior to his arrival in Ramallah, Biden critiqued Abbas for failing to condemn the Jaffa terror attack, it is fair to ask how sincere these efforts were, and to what degree the vice president was given a mandate to bring both Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiation table. In the end, Biden’s meeting with Abbas was unproductive.

To Abbas’ credit, acknowledging Biden’s proposals would have only further stained his public image. And though his current political situation is tenuous at best, Abbas (and Netanyahu, for that matter) knows that come January 2017 there will be a new administration in the White House hoping to make its own mark resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, Biden’s visit confirmed what we already knew: that any Obama-led peace initiative would, at best, lay the groundwork for serious negotiations under the next administration, but is unlikely to produce meaningful results.

Finally, Biden’s trip served as a reminder to both sides that Iran will continue to test the mettle of their alliance for years to come. It was no coincidence that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ testing of ballistic missiles marked with the phrase “Israel must be eliminated” coincided with Biden’s visit. And while it did manage to prompt a direct reassurance from the Vice President that the United States stood behind its Middle Eastern ally, the incident also dredged up their bitter dispute over how to counter the Islamic Republic’s threat to regional stability just as officials in Washington and Jerusalem negotiate the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding that will determine American military aid to Israel in the coming years.

In light of the fact that Biden is a longtime supporter of Israel, and nearing the end of his political career, perhaps the impact of the vice president’s visit shouldn’t be overstated (even though the U.S. Embassy in Israel entitled its video summary of Biden’s visit, “Friends Forever”). Nevertheless, he succeeded in reminding Israelis that although tensions exist within the U.S.-Israel relationship, a deterioration of ties is preventable so long as there remains an open channel for honest dialogue. Regardless of what occurs during the remainder of the Obama presidency, Biden’s message needs to be internalized by American and Israeli politicians going forward in order to ensure that the U.S.-Israel alliance weathers inevitable future storms.

(originally published by the Israel Policy Forum)

הפוסט Biden in Israel: A reset in diplomatic ties? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Few, however, have paid much attention to the underlying processes propelling the parties inexorably toward impending catastrophe: growing Islamic anti-Semitism or Judeophobia in the Arab and Muslim worlds, on the one hand, and accelerated Jewish Islamophobia in Israel and the Diaspora, on the other.

These destructive trends, which feed off each other, have intensified sharply since Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount in June 1967. Israel’s triumphant return to Jerusalem’s religious heartland sparked heady euphoria in the Jewish world and deep trauma among Muslims.

A year after Israel’s occupation began, hundreds of religious leaders from all over the Muslim world convened at the al-Azhar Center in Cairo to craft a response. In addition to the staple anti-Zionist rhetoric, they unleashed a flurry of vitriolic anti-Semitic slurs. Jews, they declared, were treacherous, conniving monsters who deserved to die.

Secular Arab/Muslim leaders made similar public statements and from time to time called for jihad, or holy war, against the Jews and Israel. The same anti-Semitic tropes appeared in Arab school textbooks and in the media, often based on selective texts from the Koran or the Hadith prophetic tradition. Christian anti-Semitic writings, including blood libels, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and classics like the Merchant of Venice were also adduced to buttress the case against the Jews.

This murky anti-Semitic wave gathered momentum the more Israeli governments and extremist Jewish groups were perceived as undermining the sanctity of the Haram and the status of East Jerusalem. For example – the annexation of East Jerusalem by the government in 1967 and the Knesset in 1980; persistent Jewish settlement in parts of the city across the 1967 Green Line; the opening of the Western Wall tunnel by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996; Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000, which helped to trigger the second intifada.

Parallel to the growing Islamic Judeophobia, radical nationalist and religious messianic trends were developing in Israel, especially among Jews in the national religious movement. The more radical among them advocate the building of the Third Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount on the ruins of the existing mosques. In the meantime they insist on the right to go up onto the mountain and pray, in violation of Israeli government agreements with the Muslim waqf, which administers Muslim holy places, including the Haram.

As it developed, national religious radicalism took on an anti-Muslim and anti-Arab character, partly for ideological reasons, and partly in response to Arab terror and Arab/Muslim anti-Semitism. This created a vicious cycle of mutual religion-based hatred, which came to a head with the abortive attempt by the so-called Jewish Underground, led by Yehuda Etzion, to blow up the Dome of the Rock Mosque on the Temple Mount in 1984.

This type of anti-Muslim radicalism is also the driving force behind more recent attacks on mosques and burning of Korans in the occupied territories and Israel proper by Jewish extremists. Israeli leaders, secular and religious, added fuel to the flames with a string of irresponsible declarations – for example, the late Shas leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef called Islam “an ugly religion” and an Israeli broadcaster referred to it on air as a “virus.”

In 1996, national religious rabbis exacerbated an already explosive situation when they challenged a longstanding rabbinical ruling forbidding Jews from going up onto the mountain and pray ing on its holy ground until the coming of the messiah. Since then thousands of Jews have entered the holy compound and prayed, to the chagrin of the Muslim authorities. In highly publicized acts of deliberate provocation, right-wing Knesset Members have also gone up onto the Temple Mount. In early September, Housing Minister Uri Ariel of the national religious Bayit Yehudi party visited the holy space, declaring that Jews should be allowed to pray there whenever they liked and calling for the building of the Third Temple.

Influenced by radical national religious leaders, dozens of organizations sprang up preparing for the rebuilding of the temple. They produced architectural plans, building materials, priestly vestments and programs for training young priests. According to recent public opinion polls, 30 percent of Jews and 45 percent of religious Jews in Israel support the rebuilding of the temple; 64 percent of Israeli Jews are in favor of Jews being allowed to pray on Temple Mount; and 80 percent support a united Jerusalem under Israel’s sole and eternal sovereignty.

Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital has been the position of most Israeli governments since 1967, which did virtually nothing to counter the growing Islamophobic and anti-Arab trends in Israeli society. Worse, Israeli leaders failed to show corresponding flexibility on Jerusalem after Muslim and Arab governments began to discard anti-Semitic and antiIsrael positions in the late 1970s.

Interestingly in 1978, then prime minister Menachem Begin was leaning toward the establishment of a Muslim “Vatican” on the Temple Mount and in East Jerusalem. But he changed his mind and consolidated the demand for Israeli sovereignty over the entire city.

Nevertheless, on several occasions the Arab side offered Israel a way out of the Jerusalem dilemma based on divided sovereignty and agreed arrangements for the holy sites. For years the kings of Jordan, who have special custodial status on the Haram, have made practical proposals. The Egyptians, too, have called for workable compromise. In November 1977, in his speech to the Knesset, then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat offered Israel peace on condition that it agree to Arab/Muslim sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Haram, excluding the Western Wall. And, in 1979, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Jad al-Haq, published a special fatwa, Muslim religious ruling, in this spirit.

Most importantly, in March 2002, all 22 Arab states backed the Saudi peace initiative offering Israel peace, security and normalization of ties on condition that it agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. Shortly afterwards, all 35 remaining non-Arab Muslim states added their support. Saudi Arabia and Jordan also initiated a series of religious dialogues with the participation of Jewish clerics.

However, all Israeli governments, with the tacit exception of the Olmert administration in late 2008, never accepted the Saudi-Arab-Muslim initiative, not even as a basis for negotiation.

Israeli rejection of the Arab initiative has come at a price. It has already contributed to the intensification of Muslim Judeophobia and Jewish Islamophobia, to strains on relations with Jordan and Egypt, to aggravated tension with Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line, to international isolation and to the danger of a Muslim-Jewish religious war.

The writing is on the wall: To prevent escalation of the current wave of religion-motivated terror in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Netanyahu needs to quash false rumors of plans to change the status quo on the Temple Mount. More importantly, on the strategic level, to preempt wider religious conflagration, he needs to move politically to reach an agreement on Jerusalem that takes Muslim sensitivities into account and gives Israel a chance for peace with most of the Muslim world.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Report)

הפוסט The writing is on the wall הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

All other plans originated with third parties (mainly the US) or the Arab side. In addition, Israel missed several opportunities for peace (or at least for some serious negotiations). One such missed opportunity was the Arab Peace Initiative (API), presented in March 2002 by the Arab League. Israel has never officially responded to that initiative. The API is still on the table, as indicated by the most recent Arab summit, held in Baghdad in March 2012.

3. The continuation of the settlement activity undermines another target of Israeli foreign policy: the desire to be a Jewish state – and be recognized as such. This settlement activity – if continued without abatement – will eventually lead to a de facto one-state solution, which is considered a by many Israelis as the end of the Jewish state, taking into account the demographic trend among Jews and Arabs.

4. Israel supports the idea of a unified Jerusalem, which in reality means controlling and absorbing some 300,000 Palestinians in east Jerusalem – a policy that also contradicts the very essence of the desire to establish a Jewish state. In addition, it contradicts the Israeli refusal to admit more than a few thousand Palestinians refugees within a future agreement.

5. Israel recognized the international boundary as a mandatory border with Egypt and Jordan (and negotiated with Syria on its basis), yet it is unwilling to recognize the 1967 Green Line as a mandatory border with the Palestinians.

6. Israel advocates and supports the principle of democracy, but in reality it is against the Arab Spring and the possibility that Arab regimes will become democratic because it fears the rise of Islamic regimes.

7. Israel fears the rise of Islamic fundamentalist regimes, but in reality Saudi Arabia – which twice in the past proffered peace plans (the Fahd Plan, 1981- 82; the API, or “Abdallah initiative,” as noted, in February 2002) – is “a fundamentalist Islamic state.”

Therefore, an Islamic state is not necessarily an immediate threat to Israel.

8. Israel claims that there is no Palestinian partner, but in reality PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are perhaps the most moderate Palestinian leaders to date and he is in favor of a solution based on the 1967 borders.

9. Israel is the strongest state in the Middle East militarily, with the possession of nuclear capability (according to foreign reports), yet it views the Palestinians, and certainly Iran, as existential threats.

10. The Jews came to Palestine to establish an independent Jewish state and in such a way to disengage themselves from the ghetto mentality they were subjected to in Europe and the Arab countries.

Yet, several generations later, they have managed – with the help of their neighbors – to establish a new ghetto in the Middle East surrounded by walls and fences.

Obviously, the question is what to do next. Well, the first step is to recognize these paradoxes in Israeli policy. Second, there must be an attempt to address them by initiating a major change in the thinking which guides the policy. The continuation of the more-or-less same policy will lead to the perpetuation of these paradoxes in the Israeli foreign policy. The entrance of the more moderate Kadima Party to the coalition creates an opportunity for addressing these paradoxes.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Ten paradoxes in Israeli foreign policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.