ארכיון Jordan - Mitvim

Jordanian-Israeli Food Security: A Road Map of Potential Collaboration

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 09 Apr 2025 13:31:22 +0000

Food security has become a critical priority in recent years, driven by the growing impacts of global climate change. As countries develop strategies to ensure stable and sufficient food supplies, they must address key dimensions such as availability, accessibility, utilization, and resilience. At the same time, unprecedented climate and political instability, coupled with multiple human-made and natural crises, underscore the need for communities to strengthen their preparedness and adaptability, especially when national governments cannot provide immediate assistance. This document examines the food security practices of Jordan and Israel, reviews past and present joint initiatives, and outlines a roadmap for future cooperation. It emphasizes the role of communities and the private sector in enhancing collaboration and resilience in the face of ongoing challenges.

הפוסט Jordanian-Israeli Food Security: A Road Map of Potential Collaboration הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

How Israel’s War Risks Destroying Ties with Jordan and Regional Allies

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 12 Nov 2024 15:03:54 +0000

Relations between countries naturally ebb and flow.

While high tides are often seen as a positive sign, low tides can strain these connections.

As we mark the 30th anniversary of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, relations between the two appear to be nearing an unprecedented low – mirroring the current state of Israel’s ties with other countries in the region.

The bonds and shared interests linking Israel and Jordan are deeper than those Israel has with any other country with which it holds diplomatic relations.

Since its early days as Transjordan, the Hashemite Kingdom has been considered Israel’s “best of enemies.”

While Jordan participated in the 1948 and 1967 wars against Israel, its leaders maintained secret ties with Israeli counterparts throughout this period.

The existence of common enemies and Jordan’s reliance on Western allies (first Britain, later the United States) made Israel a valuable partner in preserving Hashemite rule.

King Hussein expressed gratitude to Israel for its support during Black September in 1970, when he was engaged in a struggle against the PLO.

In return, he warned Golda Meir of the impending war during their meeting at Glilot in September 1973.

Israel, in turn, could generally rely on the Jordanian army to secure the long-shared border, preventing terrorist incursions.

Over time, Jordan also developed additional strategic needs, such as water and gas, which Israel provides.

Before 1994, peace with Jordan had always been a possibility. However, unlike Egypt, Jordan lacked the strength to withstand opposition from the broader Arab world and the Palestinian population within its borders.

But Israel’s signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords with the PLO provided Jordan with the legitimacy it needed to formalize its own peace treaty a year later.

After years of attempting to represent Palestinian interests, Jordan relinquished this role to the PLO, while retaining its special role in the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, according to the peace treaty.

How to proceed?

Since then, the failure to solve the Palestinian problem has presented the regime with a dilemma, of how to square its own interests, and those of the state, with the demands of its citizens.

The response has been to keep diplomatic relations with Israel on a low-profile while sustaining close, clandestine military, defense, and intelligence cooperation.

Thus, while public relations remain cool, covert ties have remained strong. A similar dynamic has unfolded with Egypt but with a significant difference: in Jordan, more than half the population is Palestinian.

Tensions on the Temple Mount and conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians have consistently strained relations between Israel and Jordan.

The Jordanian government has typically responded by recalling its ambassador and issuing strong condemnations of Israeli actions – measured responses that have not jeopardized the peace agreement itself.

However, as the current conflict endures, as Palestinians in Gaza face ongoing humanitarian hardships, and as Israel refrains from offering a political horizon, the voices in Jordan calling for more decisive actions against Israel are likely to grow louder and could increasingly impact Jordanian policymakers.

Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, exemplifies the duality of Jordan’s stance.

Throughout the conflict, he has issued strong condemnations of Israel’s actions, yet he has also emphasized that Jordan, along with the broader Arab world, seeks peace rather than war, advocating for a solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative.

Developments with Jordan may be more pronounced, but a similar pattern is evident in Israel’s relations with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

Despite a shared interest in countering Tehran, all these states condemned Israel’s recent attack on Iran.

Although these countries maintain varying levels of relationship with Israel, even the UAE – despite continuing flights to Israel and maintaining moderate statements – has made it clear that it will not participate in “the day after” in Gaza unless progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state.

This stance is also shared by Saudi Arabia, which has yet to normalize relations with Israel.

Taking peace with Arab states for granted

Under the Netanyahu government, Israel appears to take its relations with peace and normalization with Arab states for granted.

The longevity of peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt – 30 and 45 years, respectively – may create the impression that these relationships are immune to crises. However, this assumption should not be put to the test.

Rational government policies should consider the circumstances, limitations, and risks associated with their implementation.

Israel’s limited strike on Iran was influenced, if not compelled, by American pressure to avoid complicating matters for the US administration ahead of the elections.

Similarly, an Israeli government acting with strategic foresight must weigh not only its own interests and those of its closest ally, the United States, but also the interests of other regional countries with shared concerns.

In this context, two key issues arise.

In the short term, priorities include ending the conflict, securing the release of hostages, securing Hezbollah’s withdrawal from the northern border, and establishing an alternative governing structure in Gaza.

In the longer term, a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue is essential, ideally through the formation of a state-like entity.

Resolving the first set of challenges could improve relations with the Arab states; however, only addressing the second will elevate these relationships to new heights.

This may currently seem like a fantasy, but so did peace with Egypt and Jordan just a few decades ago.

The article was published on November 11th in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט How Israel’s War Risks Destroying Ties with Jordan and Regional Allies הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Islam’s Influence in Jordan Presenting Significant Challenges for the King

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 23 Sep 2024 14:11:46 +0000

Recent attention has turned to Jordan, following the murders of three Israelis at the Allenby Bridge Crossing. These killings have reignited fears in Israel about a potential deterioration in security, fueled by Iran’s efforts to recruit armed Jordanians for terror attacks against Israel and to destabilize the Hashemite regime.

However, the Allenby Bridge Crossing attack diverted attention from another significant event in the kingdom – the House of Representatives elections held every four years. The timing of these elections was particularly inconvenient for King Abdullah, given the ongoing war in Gaza, the worsening economic crisis, and the terror attack just two days earlier. They were held in the context of a process of liberalization that the king has been leading in recent years, with three main goals.

First, the process primarily aimed at strengthening the political parties and integrating more of them into the political system. Of the 130 outgoing members of the House of Representatives, 118 were independents, while only 12 represented just four parties.

What lay behind this step were fears of an increase in the strength of the Islamic Action Front (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan). Thus, in the new electoral system, every citizen votes for two candidates: a representative from a national list and a representative from a regional list.

Two-thirds of the 138 seats in the House of Representatives are allocated to representatives from regional lists (97), with the remaining seats (41) awarded to those from national lists. This system was designed to dilute the power of the Islamist party. However, the intended outcome did not materialize.

While the new House includes 12 parties – three times more than before – the Islamic Action Front has tripled its number of representatives to 31 and now comprises around 23% of the House.

The second goal was to increase the representation of women and younger people, reflecting the ambitions of sectors traditionally underrepresented in Jordanian politics. King Abdullah has, in fact, been working to advance the status of women and youth for several years. On this front, significant progress was made compared to the past: 27 of the 138 members (nearly a fifth) in the new House of Representatives are women, up from 15 out of 130 (11.5%) in the previous House.

The third goal of the reforms was to increase public trust in politics. A survey conducted in May 2023 by the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman found that the majority of Jordanians do not trust political parties and believe they have failed. Only 2% follow party activities, and just 1% know the names of party leaders or would consider joining a party. Therefore, this third goal has not yet been achieved, as only a third of the electorate turned out to vote – just slightly more than in previous elections.

Overall, to the king’s credit, the elections were fair and transparent, as confirmed by EU supervisory commissions at the polling stations – no small feat in a region dominated by autocratic regimes that avoid unnecessary political risks.

The gains made by the Islamic Action Front were hardly surprising, however, as the past two years have seen a significant rise in support for political Islam across the Middle East. Many Jordanians favor greater inclusion of Islamic parties in national politics.

According to a May 2023 survey by the Arab Barometer, around 50% of Jordanians reported reading religious texts and praying daily as well as expressing a desire for Islamist parties to play a more prominent role in the country’s politics.

Muslim Brotherhood aligned with the Palestinian cause

Additionally, there has been substantial support for the Hamas movement despite it being legally banned. Around 57% of the Jordanian public demonstrate their sympathy for Hamas, even before the outbreak of the current war. When the Gaza war began, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan aligned itself with the Palestinians and expressed solidarity with Hamas. The Brotherhood organized pro-Hamas demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Amman and other locations, raised funds, and coordinated donations of food, clothing, and equipment for Palestinians in Gaza.

It maintained contact with Hamas leaders and supported both the continuation of the fighting and the recruitment of Jordanian volunteers for terror attacks against Israel. In this context, the timing of the war worked to the advantage of the Islamic Action Front, which was able to incorporate the Palestinian resistance into its election campaign messaging.

Support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, demonstrated by the elections, extends beyond the cities. It is deeper and more widespread, reaching towns in the periphery and even Bedouin tribes. Residents of weaker peripheral regions, often lacking proper infrastructure, have traditionally supported Islamic movements and, at times, expressed sympathy for Islamic terrorist organizations. One such region is Ma’an in southern Jordan, the hometown of Maher Diab Hussein Al-Jazi, the terrorist responsible for the murder of three Israelis at the Allenby Bridge Crossing.

In recent years, Bedouin Jordanian citizens have become more prominent within the Islamic Action Front, including as members of the House of Representatives.

In contrast, Palestinians in Jordan have shown greater loyalty to the Hashemite regime and refrained from engaging in subversive activities or mass protests against the government during and after the “Arab Spring.” Their strong participation in Jordan’s economy is one of the key factors behind this loyalty.

To what extent, then, should Israel be concerned about the election results?

Historically, it is important to note that this is not the first time the Muslim Brotherhood has garnered significant support in Jordan. The party reached the peak of its influence in the 1989 elections when it secured 22 seats in the House of Representatives, which at the time had only 80 members – meaning that the Brotherhood controlled about a quarter of the available seats.

Just as King Hussein skillfully managed Jordan’s foreign policy with a balanced approach, signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, despite the Brotherhood’s opposition, King Abdullah will also have to navigate between national strategic interests and local political pressures. The House of Representatives is likely to become more vocal and critical of Israel and the West.

Combative declarations, antisemitic slogans, and calls to revoke the peace treaty or expel the Israeli ambassador are expected to resurface.

The king is well aware that the threats he faces come not only from Iran but also from the growing strength of political Islam within his kingdom. In response to these challenges, King Abdullah will continue to rely on the West, Egypt, the Gulf states and Israel – an alliance crucial to the survival of the Hashemite regime.

The article was published on September 23rd in The Jerusalem Post.

הפוסט Islam’s Influence in Jordan Presenting Significant Challenges for the King הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The US and Jordan can work closer together on the Israeli-Palestinian issue

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 06 Feb 2023 14:12:09 +0000

King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein’s White House visit on Feb. 2 reflected that Jordan is a like-minded partner for the United States when it comes to preventing an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and advancing a two-state solution.

The visit took place amidst a rise in violent incidents between Israelis and Palestinians. Both Washington and Amman have voiced concerns about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s new government, each for its own reasons. There are several concrete next steps that the two countries can now take to follow up on the visit and promote stability, peacemaking, and regional cooperation.

The U.S. and Jordan should prepare for the sensitive overlap between Ramadan and Passover this coming April by coordinating their efforts, dividing the labor, and utilizing their leverage over Israel and the Palestinian Authority, respectively, to lower the risk of escalation.

They should also work to bring together international actors willing to invest political capital in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Middle East Quartet, composed of the U.S., Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, has not been effective for years, and a new multilateral mechanism is needed, even if informally at first.

Jordan can bring on board France, Germany and Egypt — its partners in the Munich Group (which has convened periodically since 2020 to maintain the prospects for a two-state solution). Whereas, the U.S. can invite its Quartet allies — the EU and the U.N. Switzerland and Norway, whose special envoys to the region recently visited Jerusalem, can also be incorporated, alongside Turkey — given its recent rapprochement with Israel and good relations with the Palestinians.

At the regional level, the U.S. should respect Jordan’s decision to stay out of the Negev Forum until there is progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. In the meantime, it should make sure that the interests of Jordan and the Palestinians are considered during the upcoming Negev Summit, planned for March in Morocco. Additionally, Washington should link Jordan and the Palestinians as much as possible to regional projects enabled by the Abraham Accords.

The U.S. can also encourage Jordan and Saudi Arabia to work together on updating the Arab Peace Initiative, bringing it in line with recent regional developments and making it a more effective incentive for peace. Amman played a key role in the drafting of the initiative over 20 years ago, and it may want to do so again. The Saudis emphasize their commitment to the initiative and notably convened a multilateral gathering toward updating it on the sidelines of the 2022 U.N. General Assembly.

Finally, the U.S. can assist Israel and Jordan to put in place a crisis-management mechanism that will enable the two neighbors to deal effectively with the consequences of any Israeli-Palestinian escalation and prevent the collapse of their bilateral ties.

The article was published in MEI@75 on February 6.

הפוסט The US and Jordan can work closer together on the Israeli-Palestinian issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Jordan 2nd Policy Dialouge

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 22 Jul 2020 09:08:48 +0000

As the Israeli government advanced its intentions to annex territories in the West Bank, we at Mitvim conducted policy dialogues in June with regional partners, to exchange views on the situation and assess possible scenarios. We invested significant time on Israel’s neighbor and strategic partner Jordan, for whom annexation is a source of serious diplomatic concern, and conducted Mitvim’s 2nd Israel–Jordan Policy Dialogue via Zoom. In a series of meetings with political, security and diplomatic figures in Jordan, we learned just how much Jordan is opposed to annexation, how it may respond, and what opportunities exist to improve bilateral ties.

הפוסט Israel-Jordan 2nd Policy Dialouge הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 19 May 2020 13:52:19 +0000

Israel’s new foreign minister should lead a process of fixing Israel’s foreign policy. This paper presents recommendations for messages he can convey and actions he can take to improve Israel’s regional relations with Arab states, the Palestinians and Europe. It is based on deliberations by a Mitvim Institute task team that includes Dr. Nimrod Goren, Merav Kahana-Dagan, Dr. Roee Kibrik, Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Maya SionTzidkiyahu and former MK Ksenia Svetlova.

הפוסט Recommendations for Israel’s New Foreign Minister: Initial Policy Messages הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s Relations with Key Arab States in 2019

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 19 May 2020 13:37:24 +0000

Israel’s Relations with Key Arab States in 2019; a series of policy papers by Mitvim experts:

Israel-Jordan: Continued Deterioration / Yitzhak Gal
Israel-Egypt: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness? / Dr. Haim Koren
Israel-UAE: Warming Relations, Also in Civilian Affairs/ Dr. Moran Zaga
Israel-Morocco: Warming from the Bottom Up / Einat Levi
Israel-Iraq: Security Challenges and Civilian Warming / Dr. Ronen Zeidel

הפוסט Israel’s Relations with Key Arab States in 2019 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 19 Apr 2020 13:21:40 +0000

The issue of possible Israeli land annexation in the West Bank has become an endless source of spin for Israeli politicians. The hard-line right-wing Yamina party is accusing the right-wing Likud of not really wanting to push ahead with the annexation and only giving it lip service. The centrist Blue and White party said it was willing to discuss such a move “under certain circumstances,” only to have its No. 2, Gabi Ashkenazi, reportedly dismiss the option out of hand.

Two things stand out in this regard. The first is the normalization of the annexation idea. The senior Israeli politicians on the verge of forming a unity government of some sort, whether now or after fourth elections are held in the summer, are addressing the annexation issue in terms of when, not if. Whereas two or three years ago, talk of annexation was the purview of Knesset members from the hard-line HaBayit HaYehudi (now Yamina) party and the most right-wing flank of the Likud, nowadays, the leader of Blue and White Benny Gantz is wrangling with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the manner of its execution and its extent, not over the very question of whether the issue should be considered at all. Meanwhile, members of Gantz’s party, some of them originally Labor party voters, are keeping mum on the issue.

The second thing that stands out: There is a clear majority in the current Knesset, and probably in the next one, too, for annexation. The right-wing bloc, joined by the newly minted faction of Knesset members Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel (Derech Eretz), Knesset member Orly Levy-Abekasis (Gesher faction) and probably Blue and White’s lawmakers, as well as the seven representatives of the Yisrael Beitenu party and perhaps even Yesh Atid, could all vote in favor of annexation. If Netanyahu (assuming he is the next prime minister) moves ahead with annexing the settlement town of Maale Adumim, its surrounding area (known as E1) or the Jordan Valley, he is presumably assured Knesset approval.

The prime minister’s office continues to work on possible annexation maps, but with the coronavirus running amok, all this talk is motivated by politics rather than ideology. The controversial annexation issue serves the various parties involved as a bargaining chip and a tool with which to goad their rivals, whereas actual implementation of this move entails three conditions: formation of a government, a full return to post-corona normal, and White House support. Since a return to normal could take time, and the White House is busy managing the COVID-19 crisis and preparing for the November elections, even if a new Israeli government is sworn in, annexation legislation could be delayed until after the US presidential vote. In other words, it will not happen in the coming days, weeks or months.

The Arab world, however, does not make the distinction between the ideological component of annexation and the political one, and is monitoring the declarations of Israeli politicians with grave concern. On April 13, the Arab League warned of the severe repercussions of annexation, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas held an urgent round of phone consultations with Arab leaders. The Palestinian leadership is convinced that Israel and the White House are pushing forward with the “deal of the century” that President Donald Trump unveiled in late January while the world’s attention is diverted by the coronavirus. Ramallah, as well as Amman, Cairo and Riyadh view the much-discussed annexation as an immediate threat, even if only a theoretical one, for now.

The Israeli annexation discourse bolsters radical elements in the Arab world and undermines the moderates. At this stage, with Arab regimes dealing with the COVID-19 outbreak, the issue could fan the flames of regional instability and endanger Israeli security. A recent internal Foreign Ministry assessment reflects Israel’s concerns over a possible collapse of several Arab regimes as a result of the coronavirus, an Iranian breakout toward a nuclear weapon and significant strengthening of radical terror organizations, such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. With Israel aware of the regional threats to its security, it would be logical to assume that now is not the time to rock the fragile Middle Eastern boat and to undermine cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States. Even before the pandemic, the Arab regimes and their populations were not enamored by the annexation prospects. Now, with millions in the Arab world unemployed and facing a severe economic crisis, any hasty move could deal a blow to the delicate fabric of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and eventually have a much harsher impact on Israel’s security.

Most former and current defense officials who enjoyed close relations with their senior Arab counterparts for decades are aware of the danger lurking in the annexation policy. Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilad, former director of policy and political-military affairs at the Ministry of Defense, warned Feb. 7, after President Donald Trump unveiled his plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace, that imposing Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley would undermine the peace treaty with Jordan. Former Mossad chief Danny Yatom expressed a similar view, whereas Commanders for Israel’s Security, a nonprofit representing dozens of former defense officials, has conducted an online campaign designed to influence Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi and Labor leader Amir Peretz to withhold support for the move.

These harsh warnings of an impending disaster, particularly at such a sensitive time when the battle to defeat the coronavirus should be at the top of Israel’s agenda, appear to be falling on deaf ears. The distinction between army and defense agency veterans who conducted Israel’s ties with Arab regimes for years, and the politicians, most of whom lack any experience in defense or diplomacy, is evident. Even Netanyahu, who in the past avoided annexation moves and sidelined proposed legislation by members of his Likud party to annex Maale Adumim and the Jordan Valley, continues to throw about promises of annexation. This is a man who periodically meets and talks with Arab rulers, and knows their views on annexation and the threat that it poses in destabilizing the Middle East. His actions contradict his favorite and widely expressed thesis that the Arab world does not care about the Palestinians and would be willing to advance ties with Israel, even if it fails to reach an agreement with the Palestinians.

Israel has failed to establish formal relations with more Arab states in recent years, and it has not boosted trade or forged closer diplomatic ties. While it enjoys a slight warming of relations with some Arab rulers, and growing public interest in what it has to offer, Israel would pay dearly if it annexed the West Bank, dealing a significant blow to the Palestinians and destabilizing Jordan. The repercussions would put an end to its dreams of cooperation with the region and of a united front against Iran.

(originally published on al-Monitor)

הפוסט Israeli annexation talks threaten ties with Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 19 Apr 2020 11:28:15 +0000

This paper focuses on the role of energy in shaping Israel’s policies towards the Mediterranean. It is based on the main points raised at the fourth meeting of the research and policy group on “Israel in the Mediterranean” held in December 2019 at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The meeting was held at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center. This paper highlights the main repercussions of energy findings on regional cooperation and the opportunities it opens up for Israel. It presents the link between diplomatic and economic considerations, and the emerging energy alternatives that Israel is considering as it formulates and implements policies. The paper does not reflect agreement among all meeting participants.

הפוסט Israel and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 27 Feb 2020 15:19:40 +0000

At the annual Munich Security Conference in mid-February, the most important event of its kind – to which Israel did not bother send a single senior representative this year, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan put an end to rumors of a possible meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “There will be no such meeting,” bin Farhan said, explaining that the Saudi position on the Palestinian issue remained unchanged.

One can argue about the extent to which the Palestinian issue is important to the Arab Sunni states. A quick glance at the evening news on the pan-Arab television channels, such as Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya, or local channels from Morocco to Bahrain clearly shows that news from Gaza and the West Bank barely make it into the lineup. Nonetheless, there is not a shadow of a doubt that absent progress on resolving this issue there will not be any significant progress on normalizing ties between Israel and Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or other Arab capitals.

During the three election campaigns of the past year, the most bizarre in Israeli history, Netanyahu sought time after time to set up a meeting or summit with Arab leaders. Feelers were put out to the king of Morocco, requests were sent to the king of Jordan, pleas were conveyed to the president of Egypt, demands were made of the king of Bahrain and insistent appeals were directed to the Saudi crown prince. All to no avail. In the case of the Jordanian monarch, a meeting with Netanyahu as he floats ideas of annexation would not be conceivable in any case. Other states, even those that persistently signal to Israel their willingness for warmer ties, were not wild about the idea, either.

Arab leaders are well aware that Netanyahu is the only real beneficiary of such meetings. For them, a meeting not conditioned on renewed negotiations with the Palestinians or a sign talks are in the offing, would be worthless at best and a wonderful gift for their domestic opposition in the worst-case scenario.

Several months ago, when Netanyahu made a surprise appearance at a conference marking the 25th anniversary of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty – organized by MK Merav Michaeli – he explained how his visit to Oman in late 2018 was different than the one conducted there by late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in the 1990s. “Rabin was forced to pay with Oslo, but I am not paying with concessions,” he explained to the guests, among them Middle East scholar Prof. Itamar Rabinovich and the former director-general of Rabin’s office, Shimon Sheves.

Netanyahu seems to truly believe the Arab world has despaired of the Palestinians, gotten on with its business and all obstacles to cooperation with Israel have now been lifted. After all, our sportsmen and women are allowed to participate in international tournaments in Dubai and Doha, our ministers travel to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in Cairo and to international meetings in Abu Dhabi and a significant security dialogue is being conducted behind the scenes between Israel and Arab states, chief among them the Gulf States.

On the face of it, he is right. The Iranian threat brings Israel closer to the states in the region that have despaired of the Palestinians and realized that Israel is not their enemy. Nonetheless, absent resolution of the Palestinian issue, Israel will remain a “mistress” to these states but never “a legally wed wife.”

Arab leaders reiterate this caveat time and again, so there was nothing new in what the Saudi foreign minister said in Munich. There may be other goodies ahead Israel could present as a “breakthrough” in relations, but nothing more. The Palestinian issue is akin to a glass ceiling that limits the development of relations between Israel and the Arab world, and, as Netanyahu found out personally, it cannot be breached without paying the price.

Relations with the countries of the Middle East are very important for Israel. The importance of proper ties with Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other states cannot be overstated. At the same time, Israel clearly must strive for resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians, first and foremost for its own sake. Advancing ties with Arab states and Israel’s integration in the region are a highly significant bonus. Those dreaming of shortcuts that will allow them to reach Riyadh without stopping in Ramallah should think again.

The writer, a former member of Knesset, is director of the Program on Israel-Middle East Relations at the Mitvim Institute. She is a senior research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya and formerly a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט No preelection gifts from Arab leaders to Benjamin Netanyahu הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A new type of peace in the Middle East

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 23 Feb 2020 15:16:10 +0000

With Washington trying once again to randomly sketch new Middle East maps, intellectuals, politicians and Arab journalists are dreaming of a fundamental change in attitudes and true normalization leading to peace between peoples, not only between leaders. Who has real prospects of success?

The nephew of the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, a former Kuwaiti government minister, a Lebanese Shi’ite cleric and dozens of journalists, researchers, ministers and former lawmakers met several months ago in London to discuss normalization and peace with Israel.

The Israelis were not in the room, but members of the Arab Council for Regional Integration – an initiative established in November 2019 by intellectuals, politicians and clerics from around the Arab world – spoke mostly about Israel. They discussed the historic ties between Jews and Arabs and proposed ideas for combating the anti-Israel boycott movement.

The launch of the initiative generated broad interest and media coverage, but also harsh criticism within the Arab world, especially in the Palestinian Authority, Egypt and Jordan. Despite the more agreeable and positive attitudes toward Israel recently emerging from the Arab world, supporters of the initiative believe they still have much work ahead to foster normalization and peace, and the chilly reception they encountered in the Arab media was the clearest indication that they are right.

This spirit supposedly contradicts the new realities in the Middle East. Israel has been awash in recent years in reports heralding a new era in relations with the Arab world. Israel was said to be discussing a possible agreement of nonbelligerence with Bahrain, it was allowing its citizens to visit Saudi Arabia, UAE authorities are allowing Israelis to attend the international Expo 2020 fair in Dubai, and Israeli government ministers were shuttling between Arab capitals, until recently closed to Israelis, to advance cooperation on energy and defense issues.

HAS ISRAEL’S dream truly come true, and can it now enjoy normal relations with most of its neighbors in the region?

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes that is the case, indeed. In addressing the Knesset in November 2019 on Israel’s peace with Jordan, he said Israel was successfully enhancing its standing in the Arab world without paying a price – in other words, without renewing peace talks with the Palestinians or signing a peace agreement entailing significant and painful concessions.

In analyzing the current state of affairs in the Middle East, things look different, less glowing and hopeful.

A rapprochement with Israel is undoubtedly of strategic interest for the ruling elites in several Arab states, especially in the Persian Gulf, which fear growing isolation in light of the gradual US disengagement from the Middle East and growing Iranian influence in the region.

However, at the same time, the influence of movements opposed to normalization with Israel is also increasing, especially in the countries at peace with Israel, Egypt and Jordan. In the Gulf States, too, things are not as simple as they appear from the optimistic reports about Israeli visits to Manama and Abu Dhabi, where the elites are also facing complex limitations.

While the Palestinian issue may not be high on the regional agenda these days, it still dictates the pace of relations between Israel and Arab states. At the same time, anti-Israel sentiment, often antisemitism, too, are still pervasive in the Middle East.

In light of the above, will Arab societies really be able to accept Israel and normalize relations with Israel?

A DRIVING force behind the new initiative is Joseph Braude, an American scholar, writer and media personality of Jewish origin, who heads the Center for Peace Communications. It appears to be inspired by the new climate of relations between Israel and the Gulf and changing attitudes toward Israel in other countries, from Iraq to Morocco.

However, members of the Arab Council for Regional Integration are interested not only in cooperation among leaders, but also among peoples.

Braude, who speaks Arabic, Farsi and Hebrew, is a regular guest on Arabic-language television channels and serves as an adviser to the Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Center in Dubai.

In his recent book, Reclamation: Cultural Policy for Arab-Israeli Partnership, Braude presents a coherent strategy designed to dispel the effects of toxic incitement, antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiments in the Arab world. He calls for a significant change in the Arab media by creating a support network for Arab peace proponents who advocate relations with Israel and the Jews, and reducing the influence of Iranian and jihadist propaganda channels.

In a certain sense, this book served as the manifesto of the Arab Council for Regional Integration upon its inception.

Participants in the London gathering set themselves an overriding goal of fostering change in their societies and overcoming internal obstacles of division and distrust. Most of the meeting was devoted to issues that engage Israelis and Jews – the fight against the boycott movement, which participants argued was a harmful movement first and foremost to Arab states, and the desire for rapprochement with Israel.

In fact, this initiative is similar to Israeli initiatives that seek to foster changed attitudes within Israeli society and acceptance of “others” before engaging with the Arab side.

After years of numerous unofficial dialogue meetings and projects between Palestinians and Israelis, the number of these initiatives appears to be in decline, inter alia due to lack of official negotiations for over five years. On the other hand, only a handful of initiatives over the years involved bilateral meetings between Israelis and representatives of Arab states, both because of concern on the Arab side about domestic criticism and Arab states’ focus on the Palestinian issue, until recent years. Such meetings may now be easier to carry out than before.

Participants in the London meeting referred to the inherent limitations of the agreements between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the PA, arguing that the generals and diplomats who conducted the peace negotiations never sought to promote peace between their peoples. The new initiative espouses peace among peoples and cultures, arguing that peace agreements between countries do not stand a chance unless the people accept them. According to this view, before launching diplomatic negotiations on peace and normalization, the ground must be prepared from the bottom up.

The mission of the new Arab Council is complex and important. Its members want to influence discourse, positions and media depictions. They are interested in promoting a new set of ideological values to replace the rubble of old ideologies, which, despite their failure, still manage to dictate Arab societies’ tone toward “the other.”

Will the new initiative change the rules of the game in the region, or will it be just another passing chapter in the annals of the Middle East?

It is too soon to say, but given the current regional reality rife with terrorism, wars, blood and hatred, an initiative designed to eradicate hatred and foster goodwill is undoubtedly a necessary and welcome measure, even if it sometimes seems like tilting at windmills.

Israel could benefit from a similar initiative of its own, which would aspire to promote a moderate and balanced view of Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims in the Israeli media, politics and society. After all, in order to advance relations with our Arab neighbors, both sides must lower the bar of hatred. It is time that Israelis, too, understand and believe that we are an inseparable part of the Middle East, that we do not live on a lone island, and that despite the clear difficulties, cooperation with the region is feasible, first and foremost with states that are already Israel’s partners in peace – Egypt and Jordan.

The writer is director of the program on Israel-Middle East relations at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. She is a senior research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and formerly a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A new type of peace in the Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Gas forum a diplomatic opportunity for Israel

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 08 Feb 2020 14:59:22 +0000

A new international organization was born in the Mediterranean on January 15. In parallel to the joint statement by the Israeli and Egyptian energy ministers on the start of Israeli gas exports to Egypt, representatives from Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Jordan, Italy, Greece and Cyprus met in Cairo. They decided to institutionalize the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) – launched a year ago – turn it into a recognized international organization. France has also requested to join.

Given the protracted freeze of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and growing tensions generated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s annexation intentions, the Israeli and Palestinian willingness to jointly participate in establishing a new organization is a bright spot not to be taken for granted. The fact that the EMGF includes European and Arab states as full members, as well as the US, EU and other international organizations (such as the World Bank) as observers, further highlights the unique nature of this development.

The underpinning of the new organization is economic, with its members seeking to cooperate in maximizing the energy reserves discovered in the Mediterranean over the past decade. Israel is generally deterred by international groupings, fearing members’ pressure regarding its policy on the Palestinian issue. However, although it initially preferred that the gas forum remain a non-binding body, Israel eventually agreed to its institutional upgrading, probably at Egypt’s behest.

While Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Italy are discussing the construction of a gas pipeline from Israel to Europe – a project whose economic, technical and diplomatic feasibility is highly doubtful – the new organization positions Egypt as a regional energy hub with its gas liquefaction facilities that enable gas exports to Europe without a pipeline.

The make-up of the current forum is unique, but need not be finite. Lebanon and Turkey are two important regional players currently absent from the EMGF due to disputes and confrontations with forum members. However, in order to realize the cooperation potential in the Eastern Mediterranean, the organization should seek to draw them into its ranks in the future. The UN, too, which plays a role in mediation tasks in the Mediterranean region – between Israel and Hamas, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Israel and Lebanon in marking their maritime borders – could also be represented as an observer.

The organization has diplomatic, not just economic, potential, including to support Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts. In recent years, no multinational organizations have been active in this regard. Under the Trump administration, the Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) lost whatever limited importance it had beforehand.

French-led efforts to set up an international support group for the peace process were unsuccessful. The absence of an influential multinational body makes it difficult for the international community, for example, to implement its plan to introduce a coordinated package of political and economic incentives for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The EMGF could be an asset for a new Israeli leadership wanting to re-start the peace process and striving to link regional ties to the Palestinian issue. Until such time, and beyond constituting an additional channel to the PA, the new organization could advance Israeli peace ties with Egypt and Jordan.

ISRAELI GAS exports to Egypt and the visits by Israel’s energy minister to Cairo for meetings of the forum are already making a difference in relations. Nonetheless, Israel does not have an ambassador in Cairo, even though the foreign minister approved the appointment of Amira Oron to the post about a year-and-a-half ago. The government has repeatedly avoided approving the appointment and fixing this should be a high priority for the next government.

As for ties with Jordan, cooperation on the gas issue has yet to generate a positive momentum in the relationship. Instead, it has been met with public and political protests in Jordan against the backdrop of the harsh crisis of trust between the two. Jordan’s King Abdullah recently declared that the relationship was at its lowest ebb, and clearly, only a change in Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue as well as prioritizing the rehabilitation of links with Jordan could change that.

Benny Gantz has already issued messages in that direction when he addressed a ceremony in Naharayim marking the 25th anniversary of the peace treaty. The new organization could also help improve Israel’s relations with the EU following several tense years.

The EMGF links Israel and European states in a manner that has won EU approval and that is not viewed in Brussels as a move designed to split and weaken the EU – unlike the alliance Netanyahu forged with the Visegrad Group, especially Hungary. The participation of France in the new organization can also assist – given a new Israeli leadership – to overcome obstacles that prevent the renewal of the high-level political dialogue between Israel and the EU (the Association Council).

For Israel to effectively make the most of the opportunity provided by the new organization, it must learn the lessons of its conduct in other regional and international organizations. Budgetary difficulties – coupled with a general skepticism towards such organizations – limited Israel’s ability to take full advantage of similar opportunities in the past.

For example, Israel held the position of deputy general secretary of the Union for the Mediterranean, which it gave up due, also due to its Foreign Ministry’s financial crisis. Israel also has financial debt to the UN, which casts a shadow over its activity there.

Strengthening the Foreign Ministry can help resolve such issues and realize the potential of Israeli membership in the EMGF. It is the Foreign Ministry that should play a leading role when it comes to Israeli participation in international organizations, unlike the current situation with the EMGF in which it is the Energy Ministry that is mostly in charge.

The establishment of the new organization in the Mediterranean is more than just an important economic development. It is also a diplomatic opportunity for Israel. The next Israeli government would do well to leverage the EMGF not only for the economic profit it can generate from the country’s gas reserves, but also for diplomatic gains that advance Israeli-Palestinian peace and broader regional cooperation.

The writer is the founder and head of Mitvim-The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Gas forum a diplomatic opportunity for Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Trump Peace Plan: Not Even an Opportunity

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 29 Jan 2020 14:45:30 +0000

It is a special event when a peace plan for the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict commissioned by an American president is launched. But true to President Donald Trump’s record, his peace plan may have disrupted norms – but despite the fanfare, it is far from a real opportunity to resolve the conflict.

In the long history of the conflict, only three peace plans have been identified with a US president: The Reagan Plan (1982), the Clinton Parameters (2000), and the “Roadmap” — identified with Bush but did not bear his name (2003). In other cases, American peace plans or initiatives were identified with secretaries of state in order to not embarrass the president in case they failed. This was the case with the Rogers Plan in 1969, the Shultz Initiative in 1988, and the Kerry Initiative in 2013-14.

The release of a peace plan should be outstanding opportunity to advance a resolution. Its release, in general, follows dramatic events, such as wars, revolutions, and regime changes.

It was no surprise that the Rogers Plan was released after the 1967 War; Kissinger began his step by step diplomacy following the Yom Kippur War that led to the disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria in 1974-75; Reagan presented his plan after the Lebanon War; Shultz presented his initiative after the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987; the Madrid Conference convened in 1991 following the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and Bush released the “Roadmap” during the Second Palestinian Intifada that broke out in 2000.

The release of a peace plan should therefore be a cause for celebration. Delving into the details of the Trump Peace Plan offers no such satisfaction show that the plan is doomed to fail for several reasons: First, the Americans, as honest brokers, should have consulted also with Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority and not only with Israel and the Arab states.

Since 2017 there has been a serious rupture between the US and the PA; that bad blood was intensified by Trump’s closure of the Palestinian mission in Washington and the US cutting aid to UNRWA. The absence of the Palestinians from the process of devising the plan has created a situation like a chess game with one player. That the plan was launched with no Palestinian representative is testimony to the discord between Trump and the Palestinians, as well as the Palestinians’ unwillingness to play the game.

Second, the details of the plan show its clear unilateralism in its adoption of Israeli positions, especially those supported by right-wingers and settlers. It gives a green light to the Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements. Palestinians are offered an everdiminishing stake: in the Oslo agreements the Palestinians accepted just 22 percent of historic Palestine (within the 1967 borders), but Trump now offers them much less territory. On Jerusalem and refugees, the plan far from the Palestinians’ positions. In return for their concessions on Jerusalem, territory and the refugees, Trump is trying to entice the Palestinians with a financial “bribe” – $50 billion – an unsecured, unsourced fortune, to be offered over ten years.

The fact that the Trump Peace Plan stands in complete contrast to all previous plans is not necessarily a bad thing. However, if it represents the interests of only one side of the conflict, then it is bad, and it does not have any chance of being accepted.

Every successful peace agreement is a compromise that required each side to give up on demands that were perceived in the past as necessary and vital. They were never achieved dictation or surrender. In a fair agreement, both sides leave with half (or less) of their desired outcomes. That is not the situation here.

This plan is the wet dream of Israelis located in the center and rightward on the political map. However, its presentation, and all the more so, its implementation, will be one bridge too far, and will not serve Israeli goals. There are several reasons for this.

First, it will strengthen the positions of those refusing peace on the Arab side. Those rejectionists argue in any case that Israel (and the “Jewish Lobby”) and the United States are in cahoots. Second, it will further weaken the moderates on the Palestinian side who believe in a peaceful and negotiated resolution to the conflict. In such a situation, escalation with Hamas in Gaza and mass demonstrations in the West Bank are not imaginary scenarios. In fact, the pressure cooker in the West Bank that is already bubbling as a result of economic and social causes, as well as anger about the corruption of the PA, is likely to explode now against Israel (a Third Intifada). The violence would surge if Israel decides to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlements.

Third, Egypt and Jordan, signatories to peace treaties with Israel, will now face heavily oppositional domestic public pressure and will not be able to support Trump’s plan, despite the fact that they have an interest in advancing a peaceful solution. But not one that looks like this. Recalling ambassadors and freezing bilateral relations are steps that have already been taken in the past and could easily be re-implemented.

Finally, the creeping normalization of Israel’s relations with the Gulf states is likely to suffer. True, the UAE, Omani and Bahraini ambassadors took part in the launching of the plan and Saudi Arabia released a mild statement in response to the launch. Yet, any Israeli move to unilaterally implement its share of the plan would not pass unanswered.

The release of Trump’s peace plan at the present time is a blatantly political maneuver. It was concocted in coordination between Trump and Netanyahu, in order to assist the Israeli prime minister’s reelection. The release of the plan just before the elections is a direct intervention in Israel’s domestic politics, intended to embarrass Netanyahu’s only real challenger, Benny Ganz by putting him in a situation where he cannot come out against the plan. If Netanyahu intervened in the domestic politics of the United States when he spoke in Congress in 2015 two weeks before the US elections, Trump has now repaid him.

Former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban is often quoted that the “Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Interestingly, Jared Kushner, senior adviser to the President, declared on CNN that if the Palestinians reject the plan “they’re going to screw up another opportunity, like they’ve screwed up every other opportunity that they’ve ever had in their existence.” Well, he forgot that Israel as well has missed a few opportunities, of which the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) was the latest and most substantial.

But more important, this time the Palestinians are not be missing an opportunity, because the Trump Peace Plan simply does not constitute an opportunity to resolve the conflict. Sadly, it might end up serving as a trigger for escalation, and the eruption of violence.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is currently a visiting professor at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics

(originally published in Haaretz)

הפוסט The Trump Peace Plan: Not Even an Opportunity הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Recommendations for restarting Israel-Jordan relations

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 23 Jan 2020 14:37:06 +0000

Some 25 years after the historic peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed the time has come to restart the strategic relationship between the states and fuse the written words with real substance. We recently visited Amman as part of the Israel-Jordan Policy Dialogue of the Mitvim Institute. Despite frustration, anger and disappointment on the Jordanian side, we returned with a clear sense that renewed substance can be poured into the relationship, restoring it. After all, both countries have a clear interest in cooperation and the relationship between them has survived for a quarter of a century despite regional challenges and crises, such as the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Naharayim terror attack, the Second Intifada, military operations in Gaza, crises surrounding the Jerusalem issue (including the relocation of the US Embassy) and hostile public opinion in Jordan.

The huge potential in the relationship has not yet been realized. Israel can successfully promote bilateral cooperation with Jordan in tourism, water and hi-tech, but there is also the feasibility of promoting wider regional cooperation that will increase regional stability and the volume of trade. Jordan can also fulfill an important role in the political arena: leveraging the status it holds over holy sites in Jerusalem, supporting the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian peace and serving as a stabilizing force in the region in general. In order to achieve these goals, Israel must change direction: seek to open new dialogue channels, prioritize relations with Jordan, be attentive to Jordan’s needs and complaints, and reexamine joint projects. Politicians and decision-makers in both countries must understand that inaction and neglecting the relationship will take a high toll.

The establishment of a new government in Israel in 2020 could provide an opportunity for significant change. This can begin with positive Israeli statements about the relations and their importance. Statements should then be transformed into concrete actions. This requires planning ahead of time. As such, we present a list of key recommendations the next Israeli government can take to restart the relationship with Jordan.

Expressions of goodwill and general support for the strengthening of relations are needed. Calls to annex the Jordan Valley and/or parts of the West Bank should be avoided and Jordan’s special role regarding the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem should be reaffirmed by Israeli leaders. Beyond that, Israel and Jordan need real ‘glue’ – substantial projects that will bring them together and focus the relations on growth and development. Israeli decision-makers should prioritize renewing joint projects in the fields of water and infrastructure, increasing exports of Jordanian goods to the Palestinian Authority and advancing cooperation in tourism, hi-tech and medical tourism.

Discussion of water issues should be expanded to include broader solutions in which Israel can assist Jordan. Such support should begin with catalyzing the Aqaba desalination project (even disconnecting it from the Red Sea-Dead Sea project if necessary) and expediting an expanded agreement of water supply from the Galilee to Jordan. Concurrently, we recommend advancing a comprehensive program for collaboration in other fields related to water and energy. That would include, for example, supplying desalinated water from the Mediterranean, supplying electricity from Jordanian solar fields (against Israeli gas supplied to Jordan) as well as other water and wastewater treatment projects, including cooperation in the reconstruction of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.

Transportation is another field deserving of attention. During the last two decades, a network of regional railroads has been developed; this can facilitate a land bridge enabling rapid, economically competitive movement of goods between the Gulf states and the Mediterranean Sea. Jordan is strategically located at the junction of this railway system. Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is critical for the implementation of this initiative, which has vast potential to become a game-changer for the Jordanian economy.

Other high-priority issues (both new and pending) include the ‘Jordan Gateway’ joint industrial park, facilitation of trade through the trade corridor via Haifa Port, development of a new version of the QIZ trade agreement focusing on tourism and cooperation in exporting advanced industrial products and services to other markets. Israel must pay close attention to joint programs that have stalled and therefore generate frustration on the Jordanian side. We propose setting up an intra-ministerial task force on the subject, under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office and including representatives from the foreign ministry, as well as from the and ministries of regional cooperation, economy and defense.

Furthermore, the numerous obstacles to maintaining contact with Israel that Jordanian businesspeople face should be removed. Currently, they endure a cumbersome process to get visas to enter Israel, including prolonged and unexplained delays in processing applications, inconsistencies in rejection or approval and reluctance to in granting multi-entry visas. These difficulties drive away many of those Jordanian businesspeople who are interested in developing business relations with Israel, and this must be changed.

We are convinced that despite the unfulfilled potential and differing readings of the peace treaty by both parties a boost of energy and attention dedicated to renewing Israeli-Jordanian relations – along with advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – will transform the dynamics, create a healthy partnership and inject real substance into the peace treaty. In turn, these will provide for multiple economic and political opportunities that will expand bilateral relations and bear the fruits of peace. The stability and prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom must be a priority for Israel, since it will provide stability on its longest border and cooperation from which both parties will benefit.

Yitzhak Gal is a researcher at the Mitvim Institute and an adviser specializing in the Arab markets; Ksenia Svetlova is director of the Program on Israel-Middle East Relations at the Mitvim Institute and a former member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Recommendations for restarting Israel-Jordan relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 4

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 19 Jan 2020 10:55:34 +0000

This document outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 4 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s foreign policy mustn’t be sidelined by energy interests

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 02 Jan 2020 14:23:44 +0000

On January 2, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will reportedly sign an agreement to export Israel’s natural gas via the proposed EastMed pipeline via Cyprus and Greece to Europe. The accord, which will be co-signed by Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Anastasiades in Athens, seeks to strengthen the commitment between the three Eastern Mediterranean states, as well as to remind Turkey that it is not a participant in the region’s grand energy plans.

But the summit will do little to resolve the maritime disputes that are increasingly overshadowing hopes for regional cooperation. If Israel is to unlock the potential of its offshore riches, then it must commit to reviewing its entire Eastern Mediterranean foreign and energy policies.

Foreign policy is an essential lens through which one can assess the risks and rewards of offshore energy development, and this subject deserves more serious discussion by both Israeli policy-makers and the Israeli public. Advocates of the Netanyahu government’s export plan emphasize the strategic benefits of energy cooperation with Israel’s regional neighbors, while opponents to the government plan often sidestep the foreign policy argument in favor of a discussion about the plan’s domestic consequences, particularly the marginal impact on the cost of electricity, continued monopolization of the energy market by a handful of companies, and the environmental implications of offshore drilling. Neither camp directly confronts the argumentation of its rival, thus ensuring that public debate on Israel’s export strategy remains stuck on repeat.

Yes, Israel has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a new regional architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, but that should not come at the expense of domestic needs and interests. Energy cooperation requires long-term planning; a commitment to building and expanding bilateral relationships with neighbors in the years to come.

This means developing a strategy that expands beyond the limited scope of gas pipelines. In order to chart an optimal course forward, Israelis must first engage in an honest conversation about the prospects of transformative change at the regional level.

Energy cooperation does not always transform into something more meaningful at the bilateral level. Look no further than Israel’s current energy ties with the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Egypt. In all three cases, the parties benefited from a local and affordable energy stream. However, resource management and jurisdiction remain sensitive issues for Palestinians, who are seeking to reduce their dependence on Israel.

THE 2014 DEAL signed between the Tamar field partners and Jordanian-owned Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine has been met with popular resistance in Amman. Jordanian parliamentarians frequently demand that the government renege on the deal. And even the most optimistic voices wouldn’t claim that a gas pipeline will impact Egyptian public attitudes towards Israel. Israelis must also be concerned about a long-term partnership with an authoritarian regime having an uncertain future. That shouldn’t discourage diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with regional actors, but the Israeli public needs to be realistic about the limitations of normalization, so long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. The floor for cooperation has risen, but the ceiling remains high.

The same dose of realism must also be applied to other potential energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It was only in 2016 that Israeli and Turkish officials cited the prospect of energy cooperation as a primary reason for patching up their bilateral differences. Though the downgrading of ties in 2010 was born out of the Gaza flotilla affair, optimism that reconciliation would lay the groundwork for future natural gas contracts appeared to be one of the primary motivations on both sides. Today, it seems implausible that Israel and Turkey would consider such a partnership – but this demonstrates the Eastern Mediterranean’s unpredictable geopolitical winds, as regional actors vie for influence over the direction of its energy flow.

One of the byproducts of strained Israeli-Turkish relations over the last decade has been the strengthening of bonds between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. After the 2010 fallout, Jerusalem’s hope was to play diplomatic “moneyball” and recreate Ankara’s strategic value in the aggregate by replacing it with other regional partners.

The tripartite relationship, or “Energy Triangle,” exemplifies one of the crowning achievements in contemporary Israeli diplomacy. Still, some in Nicosia and Athens worry about the day that Ankara decides to extend an olive branch to Israel. Will efforts to advance relations with Jerusalem over the last decade come up short if Turkey makes an offer that Israel can’t refuse? How would Israel balance a desire to rebuild ties with Turkey with its existing commitments to its Hellenic partners?

Worryingly, the signature project that Israel, Greece and Cyprus champion – the EastMed pipeline – currently lacks technical and commercial feasibility. While the European Commission is currently reviewing aspects of the pipeline’s feasibility, the decline of global energy prices and availability of cheaper options for the European market cast serious question marks on this endeavor. Based on current numbers, it is doubtful that Israeli natural gas would be competitive on the European market by the time it arrived in Italy or elsewhere in the EU. Despite the political support for the project, many in the energy industry remain skeptical.

WHICH MAKES the developments of recent months all the more concerning for Israeli policymakers. As Israel and other regional actors translated their shared energy interests into developing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum – a body tasked with coordinating regional interests into the formation of cooperative energy policies and a regional gas market – Turkey has desperately sought ways of forcing itself back into the regional conversation.

Over the summer, Ankara placed drill ships at strategic positions in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to stake out its territorial claims over maritime space around Cyprus. On November 29, Turkey announces that it had reached a delineation agreement with Libya’s UN-supported government over their maritime boundaries, driving an imaginary wedge through the Eastern Mediterranean that challenges Greek and Cypriot maritime claims and could potentially threaten the region’s maritime security.

For years, Israeli officials reiterated that regional energy cooperation was not designed to exclude any other state. But as Turkey’s actions have crossed more Greek and Cypriot red lines, so has Israel joined Egypt, the European Union and the United States in criticizing Ankara. It remains to be seen whether this collection of actors is committed enough to formulating a strategy that either includes or excludes Turkey. If Netanyahu’s participation in this week’s summit is any indication, this current cycle of regional tension is far from over.

Is Israel executing an energy policy that achieves its foreign policy goals, or vice versa? Should future governments adjust these policies in the hopes of either maximizing the potential of regional energy cooperation, or out of concerns that domestic interests have been overlooked? Israelis need to ask whether their government should continue investing in these multilateral processes for the sake of national security, even if they won’t positively impact their cost of living in the immediate future (or ever), and if there is no guarantee that they will deliver additional strategic benefits.

Considering the ongoing investigations connecting the country’s political and national security elite with secondary aspects of the energy and defense industry, Israelis have just cause to remain skeptical about the motivations of their public servants and to demand greater transparency. Healthy democracies should execute foreign policies with the intention of fulfilling public interests. An open discussion that considers both the domestic and foreign policy implications of Israel’s energy policy would be a valuable first step.

The writer is a policy fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a doctoral candidate in government and international affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s foreign policy mustn’t be sidelined by energy interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 19 Dec 2019 10:47:08 +0000

The Mitvim Institute 3rd annual conference provided an annual assessment of Israel’s regional foreign policies. It was held in Tel Aviv on 14 November 2019, in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The conference included sessions on Israel’s ties with its adjacent regions – moderated by Dr. Nimrod Goren, and participated by Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari, former Member of Knesset (MK) Ksenia Svetlova, Dr. Ido Zelkovitz and Dan Catarivas – and on the quest for IsraeliPalestinian peace in Israeli statesmanship – moderated by Yael Patir and participated by Dr. Lior Lehrs, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin, Kamal Ali-Hassan and Nadav Tamir. MK Yair Lapid (Blue and White party) and EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process Susanna Terstal delivered the keynote speeches. This document summarizes the main points covered by the speakers. The full conference can be viewed on Mitvim’s YouTube channel [Hebrew].

הפוסט Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies: An Annual Assessment הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

25 Years of Israel-Jordan Peace: Time to Restart the Relationship

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 19 Nov 2019 10:40:17 +0000

Towards the 25th anniversary of the peace treaty with Jordan, Mitvim experts visited Amman for a series of meetings with political, security, media and civil society figures in Jordan. The purpose of the visit was to assess the current status and challenges of Israeli-Jordanian relations, better understand how these challenges are impacted by the situation in Jordan and developments in the region, and identify opportunities for improving relations between the two countries.

Despite the feelings of frustration, anger and disappointment on the Jordanian side, we returned from Amman with a distinct feeling that the relations could be recharged and saved. After all, both countries have a clear interest in cooperation, and the relationship has survived for 25 years despite all odds, regional challenges and crises, such as the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the terror attack at Naharayim, the second Palestinian intifada, military operations in Gaza, several crises over the issue of Jerusalem (including the relocation of the American embassy) and hostile public opinion in Amman.

However, the extraordinary potential of relations is yet to be fulfilled. Not only can Israel successfully advance bilateral cooperation with Jordan in tourism, water and high-tech, there are also many prospects of wider, regional cooperation that will allow for increased trade and regional stability. Jordan can also play an important role in the political arena: leveraging its position in relation to Jerusalem’s holy places, supporting advancement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and as a stabilizing force in the region at large.

In order to achieve these goals, a restart of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship is required. It is necessary to rebuild communication channels, put the relations with Jordan high on the Israeli agenda, pay attention to Jordan’s needs and grievances, and rethink joint projects accordingly. Politicians and decision makers on both sides must fully understand that the cost of non-action and neglecting the relations is extremely high.

This report starts with a snapshot of Israeli-Jordanian relations after 25 years of peace, followed by a discussion of challenges and key issues that were presented by our Jordanian counterparts during the policy dialogue, and ending with recommendations and suggested actions for the immediate term.

הפוסט 25 Years of Israel-Jordan Peace: Time to Restart the Relationship הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Quality of Israel’s Peace with Jordan is Dependent on the Israeli-Palestinian Issue

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 19 Nov 2019 10:35:58 +0000

The question of the affinity between the Israeli-Palestinian track and the Israeli-Arab track is a contentious issue in Israeli public discourse. Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly claims that the Palestinian issue can be bypassed on the road to normalization with the Arab world, even without progress on that front. However, the history of Israeli-Jordanian relations attests to the strong and intrinsic link between these two arenas. The breakthrough that led to the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan was enabled by progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, and every crisis since in the Palestinian arena is reflected in relations with Jordan. All attempts to warm relations with Jordan and increase cooperation on civil issues (beyond the intelligence and military cooperation) require a parallel move vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

הפוסט The Quality of Israel’s Peace with Jordan is Dependent on the Israeli-Palestinian Issue הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 15 Nov 2019 12:52:38 +0000

“In the last decade of the twentieth century, atlases, history and geography books no longer present an up-to-date picture of the world. Walls of enmity have fallen, borders have disappeared, powers have crumbled and ideologies collapsed, states have been born, states have died and the gates of emigration have been flung open. It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is now – to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and do everything possible to fit into this world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily ‘a people that dwells alone’ and no longer is it true that ‘the whole world is against us’. We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation.”

With these words, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin introduced his government to the Knesset 27 years ago. The warrior, former head of the IDF, did not warn of threats from Iran or Iraq, nor did he talk about the need to strengthen the military. He spoke about the need to open up to the world and abandon eternal victimhood, about his government’s plan to promote peace and end the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Yitzhak Rabin set out to change Israel’s national priorities. He was no dove. He did not participate in the Oslo Accord signing because he was a left-wing ideologue, nor did he sign the agreement lightly. He did so based on solid reasoning and a broad strategic view. He was a pragmatic man who could read the map, identify opportunities and make tough decisions. He understood that the PLO was growing weaker and that unless he sought agreement with that organization, he would face a tougher alternative – Hamas. He also understood Israel’s changing circumstances following the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and dismantling of the Soviet bloc.

Rabin assessed that this was an opportunity to try to resolve the conflicts with Israel’s immediate neighbors so that when the time came, Israel would be able to face its harshest and most dangerous enemies – Iraq and Iran. He was thoroughly aware of the hurdles he would have to face on the path he had chosen, the crises, the disappointments, but he had decided that he would leave our children and grandchildren a different kind of world, one of hope and normalcy.

I had the privilege of serving the State of Israel and working with him. I had the privilege of serving during the Oslo Accord days, of witnessing the changes Rabin underwent and the tremendous breakthroughs made by Israel’s Foreign Service. From a state that just months previously had clashed with the US government over loan guarantees for immigrant absorption, Israel became a desired ally. Relations with the US were transformed, becoming warm and intimate, with every Israeli diplomatic move coordinated with the US administration and receiving its blessing and support.

I saw and experienced how the world opened up to us, how states which did not even recognized us changed their position. From China and India to Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. Representatives from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all gathered at my home in New York, where I served as Consul General, to meet Rabin. He also managed to make the old dream of peace with Jordan a reality.

The Middle East began opening up to us, and new channels of cooperation were examined at well-attended economic conferences we held in Morocco and Jordan. Europe, too, opened up to us, giving Israel preferential trade status and making it the first non-European partner in its Horizon 2020 research program.

I had the great privilege of being at Rabin’s side when he addressed the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1996, ten days before his assassination. The hall was packed. Most Heads of State in the audience applauded at length, not only because of what he said but also because they appreciated Rabin and his leadership. They stood in line for long moments to shake his hand. The sympathy of the world enveloped us, constituting the best proof that when we open up to the world, it opens up to us.

Rabin the soldier fought tenaciously against terrorism. I saw him angry and pained when he was informed of a terror attack, I saw him uncompromising when he had to make decisions and I also heard him shouting at Yasser Arafat when he had to. But he also bequeathed us new concepts, redefining the term “security” to include not just tanks, planes and missile boats, but also education, housing and well-being. Security, for Rabin, lay mostly in human hope.

Yitzhak Rabin was a modest man, often introverted, but also sure of himself; a man who did not like small talk and had no patience for fools and liars, for sycophants and fear-mongers. The red-headed Prime Minister spoke his mind, sometimes bluntly. In this sense, he was not blessed with diplomatic skills. But it was his direct style, his deep voice and shy mien that won the hearts of many.

In these days of determined attempts to undermine the State’s gatekeepers and institutions, it is important to remember Rabin’s respect for democracy and the rule of law, even when it concerned his personal life. Let us remember his desire to place the citizens at the top of the government’s priorities, his actions in support of civil equality, his attitude toward the Arab citizens in whom he saw partners, and the real actions he took to rectify past injustices.

Rabin, the man with the analytic mind, had well-defined, firm views, but he knew how to adapt himself when necessity dictated. Rabin knew how to dream and how to make his dreams come true. For him, the essence of Zionism was to establish a safe haven for the Jewish people.

For me, Rabin’s legacy is of integrity and modesty, courageous leadership, respect for democracy and civil rights, the vision of peace, and, above all, a life of hope.

Colette Avital is a former Member of Knesset and Ambassador, and is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט When Israel Smiled at the World, the World Smiled Back הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 01 Nov 2019 12:33:14 +0000

The 26th of October marked the silver jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The media emphasized the fact that no formal celebrations were held on both sides of the Jordan River. Indeed, like the 40th anniversary of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the event passed without fanfare. The absence of formal celebrations was assessed as a true manifestation of the frozen peace between Israel and Jordan.

Yet both Jordanian (and Egyptian)-Israeli relations should be evaluated on two different levels: the overt and the covert. Obviously, the overt aspects of these relationships are well known, while their covert aspects are hidden, making a balanced account of the relations difficult, if not impossible.

A quick review of the public relationship between Israel and Jordan in the last decade reveals multiple crises: In 2009, Jordan recalled its ambassador in retaliation against Israel’s launch of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. A new ambassador, Walid Obaydat, was nominated only in 2012: The delay was the result of Jordan’s resentment over Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. King Abdallah’s policy stemmed from his desire to appease the local and vocal opposition coming from Jordanian citizens (many of whom are Palestinians or belong to the Muslim Brotherhood). The trade unions and the Anti-Normalization Committee in Jordan hold significant sway over the population and the king could not ignore them. Two years later, in 2014, the ambassador was recalled once again. This time the motive was Israeli provocations on al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). Throughout this period, the king refused to meet Prime Minister Netanyahu, in order to avoid legitimizing the latter’s policy.

In July 2017 another crisis ensued when an Israeli security guard shot a young Palestinian who tied to stab him in his home in Amman. During the incident the Jordanian owner of the house was accidentally killed as well. The event triggered a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations and in the media there were calls to revoke the treaty. Eventually, Israel paid compensation to the family’s victims and also agreed to remove the metal detectors positioned at the entrance to Temple Mount. Israeli ambassador Einat Shlein was not allowed to return to her post and a new Israeli ambassador, Amir Weisbrod, was appointed only nine months later. Finally, the king decided not to extend the lease of 25 years on the disputed territories of Zofar and Naharayim, as stipulated in the peace treaty (although he later allowed the extension of the lease for another six months), in response to public demand. Thus, in view of the strained public relationship between the two countries, it was no surprise that Jordan held no official ceremonies on the occasion of the silver jubilee.

Yet, the last decade also saw an expansion of Israeli-Jordanian security, intelligence and economic cooperation. One of the major reasons for this development was the rise of ISIS in neighboring Iraq and Syria following the Arab Spring. Israel’s concern for Jordan’s survival prompted growing intelligence cooperation against mutual threats. Moreover, in 2014 Israel supplied Jordan with 16 Cobra Helicopters, which were had been taken out of service the IDF. The mission of these helicopters, added to the 25 Cobras already in use by the Jordanian Air Force, was to detect ISIS guerilla fighters on Jordan’s borders. A year later, Israel and Jordanian aircrafts fueled each other during a military drill called Red Flag, which was held in Nevada with US and Singapore. A Jordanian air force delegation visited Israel several months later, while an officer who refused to participate in the delegation to Israel was summarily fired. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two armies along the border and the bridges is impeccable. As the above information is available on the media, one may speculate that the actual extent of cooperation is even wider. All the Israelis involved in Israeli-Jordanian relations whom I interviewed during my research on Israel’s clandestine relations with its neighbors admitted that the military and intelligence relations between the two countries have been excellent.

The economic sphere, which largely operates covertly, saw a significant rise in the last decade in the transfer of trade transit between Israel and the Gulf through Jordan. Israel, according to Mitvim’s Yitzhak Gal, imports petro-chemical products, as well as other products from the economic free zones in the Gulf. In addition, Jordan uses the Haifa port, particularly after the closure of the land transfer through Syria, in order to export products to Turkey, Russia and eastern Europe. The same route is used to deliver products to Jordan and the Gulf. Thus, Jordan constitutes an important link for Israel to another field of clandestine activity – the Gulf.

For many years Israel has suffered from what I call the Mistress Syndrome—the fact that Arab countries and minorities in the Middle East prefer to keep their relations with Israel out of the public eye. Israel expected that its relationship with its Arab neighbors would change and become public when a formal peace treaty is signed. True, diplomatic relations were initiated and embassies were opened, but the main channel of relations remained hidden. The Mossad, the Ministry of Defense, and the Prime Minister’s Office envoys, on the Israeli side, and their Jordanian counterparts, became the main channels of communication. Both sides apparently found it useful to rely on agencies that would guarantee the secrecy of their contacts and prevent leaks. The foreign offices, on both sides, were not considered reliable.

The result was that Jordan (and Egypt as well) kept the better part of their relations with Israel behind closed doors. So in many ways—despite the peace treaties and Israel’s military strength— Israel has remained a desired, yet hidden, mistress. The main reason for this anomaly, one should emphasize, is the lack of resolution of the Palestinian problem. To become a publicly recognized partner, Israel must deliver on the Palestinian issue. Until then, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty or the absence of silver jubilee celebrations should not be a cause of disappointment.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At present, he is a Visiting Professor at the LSE, England.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Exaggerated Disappointment on the Silver Jubilee of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

After 25 Years of Peace, Israel-Jordan Relations Need a Restart

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 27 Oct 2019 12:05:25 +0000

Jordan will not celebrate this month’s 25th anniversary of the festive signing of the historic peace agreement with Israel in Wadi Araba. The winds of reconciliation that blew at the time, the dreams, have long since dissipated. Most people in Amman do not feel there is anything to celebrate, and those who do believe in the agreement and in the vitality of the Kingdom prefer to downplay their emotions. Despite the grimness, and regardless of the crisis between the two states over the Jordanian enclaves of Tzofar and Naharayim, leased to Israel and soon to be returned to Jordanian sovereignty, the peace agreement is alive, albeit light years away from the dreams of Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein, may they rest in peace.

Ahead of the anniversary, a Mitvim Institute team visited Amman and held policy dialogues with academics, diplomats and former army officers. Many expressed amazement that we had bothered to come, that someone in Israel is interested in Jordan and wants to know how to improve the relationship, how unnecessary crises can be averted and how the sides can work together toward a common goal of peace and prosperity.

Israeli officials, researchers or politicians hardly ever come here anymore, our interlocutors told us. The one exception are the Israeli security officials who regularly and frequently meet with their Jordanian counterparts. The security aspects of the peace accord run smoothly, reflecting the security-oriented approach of the outgoing government, an approach that prioritizes security relations over all other aspects, believing that no progress on them is possible, in any case.

However, should the strategic ties with the Hashemite Kingdom be limited to security issues, important though they are? Can a limited relationship that begins and ends with ties between defense officials carry the weight of the entire agreement for long? Do economic, diplomatic and civilian ties not create an additional layer to the relationship that can also enhance progress in the security field? The peace agreement with Egypt has also been emptied of real content, being largely limited to security cooperation – and normalization nowhere on the horizon. Many in Israel believe that given the opposition to normalization by many Jordanians and Egyptians, there is no choice but to make do with what is available – security cooperation that does, indeed, save lives and provides security and defense.

During the journey to Amman, we came to realize the extent to which Jordan desires cooperation with Israel in areas such as tourism (medical tourism, too), water and high-tech. Israel does not prioritize these fields and they are not at the top of the government’s diplomatic agenda (if it even has one). Thus, after many years of discussing major and significant mutual projects, these are postponed endlessly to the chagrin of the potential Jordanian partners.

Jordan’s economic crisis and its hosting of 1.5 million Syrian refugees came up in every conversation we had in Amman. The crisis is not new, and last year the Jordanian capital was shaken by mass protest government, cutback and corruption – similar to the ones taking place in Beirut these days. Arab States, the US and the World Bank have provided urgent aid to stabilize the Kingdom, but Israel hardly noticed. The media does not deal with the major projects stuck for years or with the fact that Israel could have done a lot more to help its neighbor to the east attain economic stability, which could have definitely enhanced security, too. Israelis are not sufficiently interested in Jordan, even though the country is of vital importance to Israel’s security – with its 309-kilometer border a vital shield against any troubles from the east.

The Israeli enthusiasm over the signing of the 1994 peace agreement has already waned, and Israelis only touchdown with Jordan only when they fly to the Far East, transiting through Amman or when vacationing in Aqaba. By the way, anyone wishing to shorten the waiting time at the land border between the two states will have to shell out hundreds of dollars for the very short flight. There is barely any demand for that route and the Jordanians would rather sell Israelis cheap tickets for continuing flights to India, Thailand and Sri Lanka, aviation sources told us. The absence of visits also stems from the difficulties of most Jordanians to get entry visas to Israel. Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab told us about repeated requests by his friends and family to visit Israel for family occasions or other needs. “In the end, people simply give up. Israel loses out big time because those who do manage to get a visa are generally favorably impressed and take home a positive impression of the state,” Kuttab said.

The Mitvim Institute 2018 Foreign Policy Index attests to the same attitudes. Most Israelis view Saudi Arabia as the most important Arab state, not Jordan or Egypt – Israel’s strategic peace partners and its immediate neighbors. Of the two, Egypt is regarded as far more important than Jordan. The public is influenced greatly by the policy of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who talks with certainty about the strengthening ties with Arab states and the new horizons for Israel’s relationship with Gulf capitals. He never mentions the decline in trade between Israel and Jordan, the endless foot dragging over the Med-Dead project that generates great anger in Jordan, and the fact that nothing is left of the regional prosperity and cooperation forged in 1994.

The Palestinian issue is central to Israeli-Jordanian relations. The percentage of Palestinians in the Hashemite Kingdom is a matter of contention – the Jordanians say they constitute 40 percent of the population whereas Israel is convinced they number 60 percent. Either way, the situation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem, has a significant impact on Jordanian attitudes toward Israel. For Netanyahu, the Palestinians are no longer relevant and Arab states have abandoned their cause. However, our conversations in Amman made clear that this approach is illogical and not feasible. Jordan greatly fears escalation in the West Bank, and especially in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, and seeks better lines of communication with Israel.

With a relatively modest investment and prioritization of the relationship with the Kingdom, Israel could save itself the repeated embarrassments it has recently experienced in relations with Jordan. Jordanian scholars and journalists told us that had Israel acted in a diplomatic and rational fashion, it could have boosted the King’s standing vis-à-vis radicals and BDS proponents. They were puzzled over Israel’s preference for humiliating and undermining its strategic partner and the stability of that regime. Why did Netanyahu embrace the security guard who had shot dead a Jordanian at the embassy in Amman? Why was there no serious, in-depth investigation of the death of a Jordanian judge at the Allenby Bridge border crossing? Why is Israel playing along with Saudi aspirations on Al-Aqsa? Our Jordanian interlocutors wondered what Israel’s policy on Jordan was and had a hard time understanding why Israel was shaking off the important alliance with all its might. In this context, the recent call by Blue and White party Chair Benny Gantz at a rally on the Naharayim Peace Island to strengthen the peace with Jordan and create a “region of cooperation” along the border is of particular importance.

When the argument is heard that Israel’s standing in the Middle East has never been better, it is worth noticing developments in Jordan. The peace agreement with Jordan, just like the Jordan River, tends to dry up over time unless efforts are made to nurture it. Despite the frustration and disappointment, we returned from Amman with a clear sense that repairing or restarting the relationship is within the realm of the possible. Israel could win back Jordan with the right media coverage and attention, by revving up significant economic projects that would help resolve Jordan’s water shortages and create jobs, with an effort to break though the deadlock in the Palestinian arena. In the final analysis, Jordan is right here, within touching distance and not in the dark beyond. Anyone who restores Jordan to the top of Israel’s list of diplomatic priorities would do wonders for the relationship between us, benefitting all sides.

Ksenia Svetlova is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a former Member of Knesset.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט After 25 Years of Peace, Israel-Jordan Relations Need a Restart הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 19 Sep 2019 10:20:46 +0000

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies, Vol. 3 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 19 Sep 2019 10:15:25 +0000

For the past two years, Mitvim Institute experts have been studying the changing relations between Israel and key Arab states – Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. They examined the history of Israel’s ties with each of these states; the current level of Israel’s diplomatic, security, economic and civilian cooperation with them; the potential for future cooperation and the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Israel’s ties in the Middle East. Based on their research and on task-team deliberations, the experts put together a snapshot of the scope of existing and potential cooperation between Israel and key Arab states, as of mid-2019.

הפוסט Existing and Potential Cooperation between Israel and Key Arab States הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 18 Sep 2019 11:47:16 +0000

While the Israeli elections results do not yet provide clarity regarding the identity of the next prime minister or the composition of the next government, they do indicate that Netanyahu’s dominant grip over the political system is coming to an end. His party lost seats, his rightwing block does not have the required majority, and his legal issues will come back to haunt him in the weeks ahead. Netanyahu’s campaign, which was full of negativity, fear-mongering and disinformation, has failed to achieve its electoral goals. International leaders seem to have been among the first to realize Netanyahu’s political weakness. Prior to the April 2019 elections, Netanyahu was touring the world and hosting foreign leaders. Non-liberal leaders like Trump, Putin, Orban, Bolsonaro, Modi, Salvini all pitched in to support his campaign. Things did not go so well for Netanyahu this time around.

When he flew to London to meet Johnson, the British Prime Minister publicly stressed his support for the two-state solution, which Netanyahu opposes; when Netanyahu flew to Sochi to meet Putin, he was left by the Russian President in the waiting for three hours and did not return to Israel with policy achievements; even Trump refrained from giving Netanyahu a pre-election “gift” as he did last time, and only indicated vague willingness to discuss an Israel-US defense treaty after the elections; and King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly rejected Netanyahu’s request for a meeting, much like other Arab leaders did earlier in the year. Moreover, the crisis facing Israel’s Foreign Ministry, which was deliberately weakened by Netanyahu, deepened further in the lead up to the elections.

Following the elections results, the responsibility for managing Israel’s foreign relations will likely change hands, with Yair Lapid being a major candidate to serve as foreign minister. The next government will need to lead a fix in Israel’s foreign policy. It should advance peace with the Palestinians; highlight Israel’s commitment to liberal-democratic values; engage with – rather than delegitimize – international critics; restore bipartisan support for Israel in the US; stop EU-bashing and improve ties with Brussels; fulfill opportunities to reshape ties with Arab countries; mend the crisis with world Jewry; legitimize the involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in foreign affairs, and the list goes on.

The Israeli elections did not produce an ideological shift from right to left, and this will limit the extent of foreign policy change we can expect, but they did open up a path for leadership change, block far-right parties, and empower Palestinian citizens of Israel. Given Israel’s difficult political reality, these are important first steps towards change.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published in The Jewish News UK)

הפוסט Israeli Election Analysis: Netanyahu’s Dominant Grip is Coming to an End הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 28 Jun 2019 09:51:27 +0000

The economic workshop in Bahrain in late June produced some noteworthy moments that reflected recent changes in Israeli-Gulf relations: An interview of the Bahraini foreign minister by Israeli media, public interactions between Israeli and Arab businesspeople, a prayer at the local synagogue, and a generally positive vibe toward Israel. However, that was not the declared goal of the “Peace to Prosperity” workshop. President Donald Trump set out, more than two years ago, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Bahrain workshop was supposed to be an important step on the way. In reality, it came up short: Neither Israeli nor Palestinian officials attended, and it did not conclude with any tangible steps to advance the peace process. Instead, it was a low-level meeting and just one in a series of measures taken by the Trump administration since 2017 that have made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant, rather than closer.

The Trump administration is not the first to struggle when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. However, previous U.S. administrations sought a solution acceptable to both sides and were responsive to the interests of all involved. Besides the traditional U.S. bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game and goals of their initiatives. This is not the case with the Trump administration, which seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground, and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s political plan to resolve the conflict has yet to be made public – and we are supposedly waiting for its launch – US statements and actions suggest new policies are already being implemented, and they include several notable features.

Vague content: The Trump administration has been busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only to a key few. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using different excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be on the cusp of a significant move on peace. Rather the administration seems to be stalling for time, avoiding publishing its political plan while continuing to foster international discussion about it, thereby preventing other states from increasing their involvement as they wait for the release of the US plan.

Ineffective incentives: The economic part of the Trump plan, published days before the Bahrain workshop, lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians. It is supposed to convince them to engage with the U.S. plan by highlighting the benefits of doing so. However, if the Trump administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to go about it. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society in question. This was true for previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer of a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the US proposal, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is seen by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of money. Rather than promote engagement, this may lead to further alienation.

Low-level events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has focused on organizing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions, and a workshop, all centered on the economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of how to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it brought together different actors in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, in February 2019, the U.S. also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss regional security, mostly focused on the issue of Iran. The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events, while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to U.S. pressure. The Bahrain workshop was the first such event without official Israeli representation, despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. In short, U.S. attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences to promote an official breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: From time to time, President Trump and his emissaries announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for a two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as the status of Jerusalem and right of return for refugees) be taken off the table. US officials criticized the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, recently even expressing support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys also tweeted remarks refuting rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. All of these points paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump administration is heading, even if they haven’t published their plan.

Game-changing actions: In addition to their statements, the actions of the administration have also sent a clear message. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the closing of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded IsraeliPalestinian projects and the budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These measures also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding US policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. More broadly, they are also seen as a deviation from international law, generating anger toward the US and undermining its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening Palestinian leaders and bolstering Netanyahu: The Trump administration has invested a great deal of time and energy in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. Whether this is designed to pressure the Palestinians to engage in the Trump plan or it is an attempt to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, it has failed thus far. The US emissaries have accused the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism, and harming their people’s interests. They have penned opinion pieces against them, clashed with them on Twitter, and withheld a US visa from Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian negotiator. The PA was not even invited to the Bahrain workshop. All of this contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, including the ongoing coordination with him and his people – chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington – to mobilize support for his re-election, and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Taken as a whole, US declarations and actions over the past two years make clear that the Bahrain workshop was not the real deal. Instead, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The Trump administration’s policy has made the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace more distant. It also goes against the outlines of a future peace agreement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years. It weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to negotiations and opposed to terrorism. It places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace. Finally, it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians, making it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while aiding proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees Trump as a great friend, his administration’s moves on the IsraeliPalestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in the pursuit of peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace with the Palestinians must take a stand against them, despite the difficulty of confronting Israel’s strongest ally. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so too must members of the Israeli opposition when the American president’s words and actions harm the prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

(originally published by the Middle Eat Institute)

הפוסט The Bahrain Workshop and the Dwindling Chances for Israeli-Palestinian Peace under Trump הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trump Distances Peace, and Bahrain is Just the Tip of the Iceber

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 23 Jun 2019 09:27:40 +0000

The White House announcement that it was convening an economic workshop in Bahrain appeared to mark the launch of a significant US move unveiling the Trump plan we have been hearing about – under different names and titles – for over two years. The US meant to use the workshop as a platform for introducing the plan’s economic component, mobilize international support from workshop participants and follow it up with publication of the political part of the Trump plan. However, the plans and expectations shrank with every passing day and the decline in the level of participant representation. The publication of the economic part of Trump’s plan, a few days before the workshop, did not change this trend. Instead of being a keynote event reflecting a breakthrough in Israeli-Arab relations, the Bahrain workshop will be a low-level meet comprising yet another link in a series of measures taken by the Trump Administration on the Israeli-Palestinian issue since 2017, which have distanced prospects for peace.

Most previous US administrations also failed in efforts to advance peace, but they were clearly seeking a solution acceptable to both sides and responsive to their interests. Along with the traditional US bias in Israel’s favor, criticism of previous American administrations focused on the way they conducted the peace process, not on the political end-game goals of their initiatives. Such is not the case with the Trump Administration that seeks to change the rules of the game, the reality on the ground and the nature of future Israeli-Palestinian relations. While Trump’s plan has yet to be made public, and we are supposedly in waiting mode for its launch, US declarations and actions illustrate that we are already in the midst of actual implementation of new US policies, and this includes several courses of action. Vagueness on content: The Americans are busy creating an aura of mystery around the political plan they have yet to reveal. They insist the plan is secret and known to only a handful. Trump’s envoys drop hints about what is or is not in the plan; media briefings and leaks are subsequently denied; target publication dates are announced and then delayed using various excuses; US officials visit various countries to consult on the plan, leaving their hosts at a loss. Taken together, we do not appear to be dealing with the trailer for a significant peace move, but with an avoidance of publishing the political plan while fostering incessant international discourse about it (thereby preventing other states from intensifying their involvement as they await the US plan).

Incentivizing peace ineffectively: The economic part of the Trump plan lays out a vision of prosperity for the Palestinians, and as such is supposed to highlight benefits and convince the Palestinians to engage with the American plan. However, if the Trump Administration’s goal is to incentivize peace via economic dividends, this is not the right way to do so. An effective incentive for peace should be clearly linked to conflict resolution and should address the key collective needs of the society to which the incentive is offered. This was done in the cases of previous incentives, such as the Arab Peace Initiative, the EU’s offer for a Special Privileged Partnership, and the Obama Administration’s security guarantees for the two-state solution. The post-conflict benefits were tied to a clear statement about the nature of the solution to the conflict. In this case, the American proposition, which offers Palestinians a better economy, lacks reference to the political end-game and to the fulfillment of the Palestinian quest for independence. As such, it is viewed by Palestinians as a humiliating bribe offer, an attempt to buy off their national aspirations with a large amount of dollars. This might create further alienation rather than promote engagement.

Convening events: Absent an appealing plan and a real process, the US has been busy planning and producing low-level events. Over the past two years, it has invited states to participate in roundtable discussions, brainstorming sessions and a workshop, all focused on economy. In March 2018, the White House invited various states for a discussion of ways to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In June 2019, it is bringing together various states in Bahrain to discuss ways to bolster the Palestinian economy. In between, the Americans also convened a conference in Warsaw to discuss defense in the Middle East (mostly focused on the Iran issue). The Palestinians did not take part in any of these events while the Europeans gritted their teeth and sent mostly low-level delegates. The Arab world, especially the Gulf States and Jordan and Egypt, attended the meetings on the Palestinian issue largely due to US pressure. The Bahrain workshop will be the first without official Israeli representation, despite Netanyahu’s desire for a photo-op for himself or one of his top ministers with Arab leaders ahead of the September 17 elections. US attempts to bypass the Palestinians with international conferences in order to promote a breakthrough in IsraeliArab relations have so far proved unsuccessful.

Declarations and tweets: President Trump and his emissaries now and again announce various components of the US plan and its approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of particular note is Trump’s initial comment to the effect that he does not care whether the solution is one or two states. Subsequently, his people reiterated that they do not intend to express support for the two-state solution and urged that core issues of the conflict (such as Jerusalem and the refugees) be taken off the table. US officials expressed criticism of the Arab Peace Initiative, which they claimed had failed to bring peace and was therefore no longer relevant, and recently even expressed support for Israel’s right to annex Palestinian territory. At the same time, US envoys tweeted remarks intended to refute rumors that the Trump plan would undermine Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty or interests. In their entirety, these all paint a clear picture of the direction in which the Trump Administration is moving, even without publication of its plan.

Game changing actions: Alongside the verbal front, the administration is engaged in actions. These include Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, closure of the PLO office in Washington, transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and closing the US Consulate in East Jerusalem and subordinating it to the US Embassy. Other equally telling moves include the first official visits by the US ambassador to settlements, and cuts in USAID-funded Israeli-Palestinian projects and in budgets for UNRWA and Palestinian institutions. These moves also point to a clearly defined game plan, reversing longstanding American policy and clashing with the international community’s accepted views. They are perceived in the world as a deviation from international law, generate anger toward the US and undermine its ability to serve as an honest broker.

Weakening the Palestinian leadership and bolstering Netanyahu – The US administration invests great efforts in tarnishing the image of Palestinian Authority leaders. Whether by pressure on the Palestinians to engage on the Trump plan or attempts to cultivate an alternative Palestinian leadership, this conduct has failed thus far. The American emissaries have been accusing the Palestinian leadership of being serial rejectionists, supporting terrorism and harming their people’s interests. They pen opinion pieces against them, clash with them repeatedly on Twitter, and even withheld a US entry visa from Hanan Ashrawi. The Palestinian Authority was not even invited to Bahrain. This all contrasts sharply with the administration’s warm public embrace of Netanyahu, ongoing coordination with him and his people (chief among them Israel’s ambassador in Washington), mobilizing in favor of his reelection and recent intervention in his efforts to form a new government.

Seen in their entirety, US declarations and actions over the past two years indicate that the Bahrain economic worship is not the real thing. It is only the tip of the iceberg. The policy adopted by the Trump Administration distances Israeli-Palestinian peace. It goes against the components of a future peace arrangement, which a majority of Israelis and Palestinians have supported in recent years; it weakens and delegitimizes a moderate Palestinian leadership committed to the path of negotiations and opposed to terrorism; it places obstacles in the way of progress toward a two-state solution and excludes significant international elements that could contribute to the advancement of peace; it further alienates Israelis from Palestinians and makes it even more difficult for those among them who still want to meet and cooperate, while providing a tailwind for proponents of annexation in the Israeli political arena.

While Israel sees a great friend in Trump, the moves his administration is leading on the Israeli-Palestinian issue only serve to damage Israeli interests in striving for peace. Israelis who aspire to promote peace must take a stand against these moves despite the difficulty in confronting Israel’s best friend in the world, certainly during an election campaign. Just as leading figures in the US Democratic Party know how to criticize Israel’s policy on the Palestinians when necessary, so elements in Israel’s opposition should criticize the conduct of the American president and point out its negative repercussions when he distances prospects for peace.

Dr. Nimrod Goren is Head of the Mitvim Institute.

הפוסט Trump Distances Peace, and Bahrain is Just the Tip of the Iceber הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

An Economic Workshop in Bahrain, With No Political Horizon

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 18 Jun 2019 09:22:58 +0000

The June 25-26 economic workshop planned by the Trump administration in Bahrain is an attempt to put the economic carriage before the diplomatic horse. History shows that most international conferences on the Israeli-Arab conflict have focused on the search for a political solution. Such was the case with the Lausanne Conference (1949), the Geneva Conference (1973), the Madrid Conference (1991), the Annapolis Conference (2007), and more. On the other hand, the four regional conferences held between 1994 and 1997, including the multilateral negotiations on issues of water, the environment, arms control and refugees were closely aligned with the political process (the Oslo Accords and Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan) and designed to strengthen and entrench it. The collapse of the Oslo process meant also the demise of the multilateral track.

The American decision to hold the workshop in Bahrain is undoubtedly novel. Bahrain has not hosted many international conferences. It has never hosted an Arab summit, for example. Bahrain’s ruler Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa agreed to do so for several reasons. First, he leads a Sunni elite ruling an island 70 percent of whose residents are Shiite and for whom the specter of a Shiite takeover bolstered by a tailwind from neighboring Iran is a source of constant worry. Their fear is well grounded. Shiite protests erupted during the 2011 Arab Spring, but speedy military help provided by the Saudis from the other side of the Gulf put an end to them. Second, Bahrain has been relying for years on US aid. In fact, the 5th Fleet is headquartered there, the two sides signed a defense pact in 1991 and a free trade agreement in 2006, and over 200 US firms operate on the small island. Hosting the workshop is therefore not a high price for the monarchy and ruling family to pay for their reliance on the Americans and Saudis that ensure stability. What is more, the Saudi-Bahraini cooperation allows Saudi Arabia to use Bahrain as a trial balloon for a policy likely to meet opposition in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia traditionally traipses cautiously through the political Islamic and Arab minefield, due to its position as the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites.

The choice of Bahrain is convenient for Israel, too. In recent years, Bahrain’s rulers have been publicly displaying openness toward Israel, contrary to the Saudis whose contacts with Israel are conducted largely behind closed doors. Israel and Bahrain do not have diplomatic ties and Bahrain did not set up a diplomatic representation in Israeli during the Oslo period (unlike Oman, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania). Nonetheless, the two sides have been conducting public and clandestine ties since then. Yossi Sarid was the first senior Israeli official to visit Manama as Minister of Environmental Affairs within the framework of the multilateral working group in October 1994. Ties were upped a notch in the previous decade when Shimon Peres, then Minister of Regional Cooperation, met with the Crown Prince of Bahrain.

At the height of these public contacts, Peres as President and Tzipi Livni as Foreign Minister met with King Hamed in New York in 2009. However, most contacts were conducted behind the scenes. According to WikiLeaks documents, King Hamed told the US Ambassador in 2005 that his country conducts defense and intelligence ties with Israel through the Mossad. In another conversation, this one by Bahrain’s Foreign Minister with a US diplomat, Bahrain was said to be conducting “quiet business-like ties” with Israel. What is more, the King ordered officials to stop using the words “enemy” and “Zionist entity” when referring to Israel. The Kingdom also has interfaith relations with the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles and in December 2018, it named Rabbi Marc Schneier as special adviser to the King on the Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence that he had founded in Manama. Schneier has been working for the past 15 years to create interfaith bridges between Israel, the Gulf States and especially Bahrain. The Manama center, in cooperation with the Wiesenthal Center, organized an interfaith visit of 24 clerics from Bahrain to Israel in December 2017. The visit took place although President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital just days earlier. Houda Ezra Nonoo, a Jewish Bahraini woman, served as her country’s Ambassador to the US from 2008 to 2013. All this places Bahrain in an excellent position to host Trump’s economic summit, which in any case fits in with the Kingdom’s defense and economic interests.

However, Bahrain’s rulers have not had a change of heart on the Palestinian issue. In all their declarations, they invariably make clear that progress on the Palestinian issue is a prerequisite for any normalization with Israel. The main problem is that the Palestinians are boycotting the conference, thereby threatening to undermine its prospects of success. The Palestinian opposition to the conference is understandable given that Trump is not perceived as a balanced and honest mediator between the sides and because they fear that “economic peace” will constitute an alternative to a real, political peace. In any case, all the available information indicates that the political part of the peace plan, once unveiled, will be “thin” on diplomatic substance as far as the Palestinians are concerned. On the other hand, the Palestinian reaction places them, once more, as serial refusniks (e.g., the 1947 UN Partition Plan, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the Olmert-Abbas negotiations of 2007-8, and more).

The disappointing historic experience with the contribution of economic conferences to political aspects of the peace process, combined with recent events, lead to the conclusion that Trump would have been better off delaying or cancelling the economic workshop altogether. It is safe to assume that ego and honor will prevent him from doing so. Trump decided to launch the “deal of the century” by thinking “outside the box.” Undoubtedly, he succeeded; it is the first time anyone has tried to resolve the conflict without consulting, sharing or coordinating with one of the parties involved in the conflict. This “original” idea cannot provide a fair solution; it actually has the potential to aggravate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט An Economic Workshop in Bahrain, With No Political Horizon הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 02 Apr 2019 08:07:19 +0000

In recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a central focus of world powers, of states in the Middle East, Europe, and beyond, and of international corporations. Regional geopolitical developments, as well as economic opportunities generated by natural gas discoveries in the Mediterranean, have contributed to this trend and turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a distinct sub-region perceived as having unique features. Israel plays a central role in this development. Israeli diplomacy identified these trends correctly, successfully becoming an active and dominant player in the region. The natural gas findings in Israel’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) provide it with a wider range of diplomatic options, helping it promote relationships with various states in the region; including some engaged in conflict with each other. Israelis regard the Mediterranean as an important component of their identity, as reflected in the 2018 Israeli Foreign Policy Index of the Mitvim Institute, in which 22 percent of those surveyed claimed Israel belongs predominantly to this region (compared with 28 percent who said it belongs to the Middle East and 23 percent to Europe).

הפוסט Guiding Principles for Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 21 Mar 2019 07:59:13 +0000

As the Purim holiday arrives, many are looking forward to a break from the country’s exhausting election cycle. But for Prime Minister Netanyahu, Wednesday evening was an opportunity to reinforce his position as Israel’s leading statesmen. Hosting the 6th trilateral summit between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, Netanyahu hoped special guest US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would deliver a strong showing of support for the embattled premier and his regional energy aspirations.

Significant regional developments have transpired since the last summit. In January 2019, Cypriot, Egyptian, Greek, Israeli, Italian, Jordanian and Palestinian Ministers of Energy met in Cairo with the intention of establishing the East Med Gas Forum, an institution for regional energy cooperation. Coincidentally, the forum’s optimism was rewarded in recent weeks as major discoveries were made off the coasts of Cyprus and Egypt. Exxon Mobil is reportedly considering future exploration in Israel’s waters.

From the outside looking in, there is much to celebrate. But the summit was scheduled (notso-coincidentally) just three weeks before Israel’s national elections. Indicted by the Attorney General and challenged by an up-and-coming party of former IDF chiefs of staff, Netanyahu is pursuing every possible avenue that guarantees his political survival. For this reason, the summit was little more than a photo op, a moment for Israel’s premier to don the costume he has become so accustomed to wearing on the international stage and to smile once more with other world leaders. The pending visit of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Netanyahu’s trip to AIPAC and the White House fit this all-too-familiar theme.

Pompeo’s support for the Israeli-Hellenic partnership shouldn’t be overlooked. The reduced presence of the US Sixth Fleet – for decades, a stabilizing security presence in the Eastern Mediterranean – coincided with increased maritime tensions across the region. In America’s place, Russia and Iran have become increasingly involved in regional affairs. Turkey, a longtime US ally and NATO member, seems shifting in a different direction as is frequently at odds with the White House. But by and large, Eastern Mediterranean states seek American engagement and leadership. Viewed in concert with Ambassador David Friedman’s presence at last December’s trilateral summit in Beer Sheba, the presence of the US deputy secretary of energy at East Med Gas Forum summit, and efforts by the US State Department in 2018 to bridge the divide between Israeli and Lebanese maritime claims, Washington is reinvesting capital in the Eastern Mediterranean – specifically through its support of developing regional alliances like the one between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus – for the first time in the Trump administration.

During the joint press statement, all four leaders spoke optimistically about the prospects of an EastMed pipeline, a potential 2,000 kilometer undersea pipeline that would run from Israel and Cyprus via Greece to Italy. “If we do this right,” Pompeo said, “we will attract the investment that will maximize these resources.” Nevertheless, current trends in the global energy market and the estimated costs of the project (7 billion euro) strongly indicate that the EastMed pipeline is more a political enterprise than a realistic export option. For the project to become a reality it requires both commercial and technical viability. The EU, currently investigating the feasibility of the project, is supportive but skeptical. Italy appears to be having second thoughts. And as of today, there is no international oil company or investor that has expressed interest in the task. As proven during the Obama years – when heavy US investment in regional energy diplomacy produced finite results –there are likely limitations to what the Trump administration can deliver.

In other words, the key to regional energy cooperation does not lie outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts should be made to craft a more localized and sustainable energy policy, one that understands the limitations of the energy market and the capabilities of the involved parties. Specifically, this should manifest itself in continued partnership with Greece and Cyprus, but also with Egypt, whose existing infrastructure could service the flow of natural gas from multiple states.

Ancillary support from the US and the EU should be welcomed as a vital component to advancing a multinational framework for cooperation. In particular, continued mediation of Israeli-Lebanese and Turkish-Cypriot maritime boundary disputes, contribution to the process of incorporating the Palestinians within the regional energy network, and consultation during the development of mechanisms for regional cooperation would each play an important role in strengthening the building blocks that are currently in place. Israel’s interests are always served best when it capitalizes on American and European support, and utilizes that support in the most effective manner.

Just because the future isn’t likely to include the EastMed pipeline doesn’t mean that the Israeli-Hellenic partnership should squander the goodwill and shared interests that were forged over the course of the last decade. Energy security cooperation will remain a critical part of the trilateral relationship, and together these states can take a leading role in the future of regional energy cooperation through platforms like the East Med Gas Forum. But there are a host of other regional endeavors, including the areas of tourism, relief, cybersecurity, environmental protection, and the strengthening of democratic institutions (to name a few) that all three parties should continue to encourage as well. Committing resources in order to maximize the secondary gains of this “energy-first” relationship can provide long-term benefits well after the offshore reserves have dried up.

After six consecutive years of meetings, Pompeo’s participation at this week’s summit was a welcome blessing to the Israeli-Hellenic partnership. However, the parties must remain realistic about the opportunities for cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the risks of overstating their commitment to a flawed pipeline project with so many question marks. Considering the transformative progress that has been made thus far, the focus should remain on long-term, meaningful growth over short-term gains.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israel Institute for Regional Foreign Policies and a doctoral candidate in Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Pompeo, the Israel-Greece-Cyprus Alliance, and the EastMed Pipeline הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Who Benefits from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum?

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 15 Feb 2019 07:18:56 +0000

The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, launched in mid-January in Cairo, features a development of political importance which is a direct result of the natural gas discoveries in the region in recent years. The forum includes seven members – Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, Italy and the Palestinian Authority – and is guided by a set of principles that the member countries should respect. For example, they undertake to respect the rights to natural resources of each other and adhere to international law, to expand their cooperation towards formulating a common policy regarding the development of a regional market, and to protect the environment.

It was also decided that the forum is open to accept additional countries, insofar as they accept the its governing rules. Obviously, the message addresses the two absentees from the forum – Turkey, which sees the new forum as a confrontational act (considering that some of the member countries are in various levels of conflict with Turkey); and Lebanon, which presumably could not allow itself to participate in a forum that also includes Israel, even though potentially natural gas (and possibly oil) could be found in its economic waters as well. The presence of the US Deputy Secretary of Energy at the Cairo meeting was important, as it could be interpreted as American support of the new forum and of the cooperation that is taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The main beneficiaries of the new forum are of course the seven members. However, some countries are expected to benefit from it in particular:

Egypt: The kick-off meeting was held in Cairo. Egypt will serve as the Chair of the forum and will also host its headquarters. Thus, Egypt has established its central geo-strategic standing in the region, both as an energy producer (with known reserves) and as a leading political player. It may restore, even slightly, its regional standing, which has been significantly eroded since the events of the Arab Spring.

Cyprus: Cyprus has been long aspiring for a regional forum that emphasizes the need to respect the rights to natural resources of its members, pursuant to international law. The forum may provide significant backing for its political and energy-related positions vis-à-vis Turkey, including a kind of “defense shield” against confrontational actions on the part of Ankara. The Egyptian leadership of the forum is convenient for Cyprus (as well as for Greece), although along the way there may be conflicts of interest over the vision of the East Med pipeline, which currently does not include Egypt.

The Palestinian Authority: It may be assumed that the Palestinian Authoirty was invited to the forum by Egypt, with the intention to convey Cairo’s continued support for the Palestinian issue. By so doing, Egypt addressed the Egyptian public opinion, as well as to the rest of the Arab world. Moreover, having the Gaza Marine gas field off the coast of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority also has practical relevance to the regional natural gas market. The new forum should explore whether it can leverage the potential embedded in this gas field also for the benefit of the Palestinians.

Israel: From Israel’s point of view, this is a very important and positive development, that brings along the opportunity to take a leading role in a regional forum, bringing together both Arab countries and the Palestinians. Israel has been hoping for a regional forum such as this one, which is a political and economic dividend deriving from the gas reservoirs found in Israel’s economic waters. The underlying reason for the Egyptian leadership of the forum is the convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt in recent years, and in any event, considering the complex regional circumstances, only Egypt could sponsor such a project and make it happen. Being backed by such a forum, it would possibly be easier for the Egyptian government to deal with domestic as well as regional criticism and resistance regarding gas import from Israel. It is possible that in the future, conflicts of interest will emerge between the member countries and it would be difficult for Israel to maneuver in terms of export destinations or to maintain its status as a regional energy hub. However, it appears that the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages.

The US: This forum is a structure that well serves US interests, despite its not being a member. The member countries have close relations with Washington and would like to see an effective American involvement in the region, even in the context of natural gas. It will be particularly interesting to observe Russia’s reaction to the forum, since it is a major player in the global energy sector and a global power that is back in the region (from which the US is gradually withdrawing).

It is still too early to say whether the new forum will succeed in playing an important role in the region and beyond, both politically and with regard to the energy sector. However, it is a structure that provides the framework for potential regional cooperation, and for the time being it seems that the member countries have strong shared interests to make it a success.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. He served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Who Benefits from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Will Energy be the Next Point of Israeli-Egyptian Convergence?

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 21 Jan 2019 12:46:22 +0000

The mid-January regional meeting in Cairo, during which a new regional gas forum was announced by seven Eastern Mediterranean countries, illustrates the promising political potential embedded in the discovery of natural gas reservoirs in the Mediterranean. No less, it reflects the close relations between Israel and Egypt.

Israel and Egypt have maintained close political and security ties at the highest level in recent years, which remains covert for the most part. In a rare move, Egyptian President a-Sisi revealed it in January an interview to the American program “60 Minutes”, referring to the close cooperation with Israel, including joint military efforts against the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula.

The current convergence of interests between Israel and Egypt rests on several layers, that result from the dramatic developments in the Middle East in recent years: the turmoil during and after the Arab Spring; the regional threat posed by Iran, especially to the pragmatic Sunni states; terror activities in Sinai (that require Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, including a reassessment of the security annex to their peace agreement); and the Hamas control over the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Egyptian regime and military are still traumatized by the Muslim Brotherhood rule, which was in place from the ousting of Mubarak and until the overthrow of Morsi. This further explains the joint Israeli-Egyptian efforts to defy the threat posed by fundamentalist Islamic movements, including Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Similarly, the Egyptian and Israeli interests converge when it comes to the energy sector. Simply put, Israel wants to export part of the gas it discovered in the Mediterranean to its closest neighbors. An agreement to export gas from Israel to Jordan has already been signed. Egypt has recently discovered significant gas fields, but at least in the short term it still needs energy for its local economy, and Israel can help supply it. In the medium term, it will be possible to liquefy Israeli gas in Egypt (via two existing facilities there, which have not been in use for the last few years), and then to export it to more distant markets. Therefore, Israeli and Egyptian companies have held intensive negotiations during the recent years, which led to the signing of mutual agreements. However, both governments still need to give their consent, which will provide a legitimizing umbrella for strategic cooperation in the energy sector.

It seems that the warm ties described above should suffice to complete and implement these agreements signed by companies in the private sector. The level of trust between the Israeli and Egyptian governments is high, as exemplified by the recent visit to Cairo by Israeli Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz. Moreover, the gas forum that convened in Egypt, with participation of energy ministers from Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Egypt, illustrates the new international geometry that is emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean. The existing tripartite alliances – Israel-Greece-Cyprus and Egypt-Greece-Cyprus – are now joined by a new tripartite alliance – Jordan-Greece-Cyprus, and by the newly-established Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The existing and emerging alliances may expand and include additional countries, and the informal existing cooperation might institutionalize. Such developments would add positive Mediterranean dimensions to the complex dynamics in the region.

Turkey, an important regional player, is currently absent from these various geometric settings. The countries that are currently cooperating in the Eastern Mediterranean share an anti-Turkish agenda – Egypt, Cyprus and Greece (each to a different extent), and Israel – whose relations with Erdoğan lack trust and are characterized by harsh rhetoric, despite the realistic potential for Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the gas sector. The chances to realize this potential were one of the catalysts to the signing in 2016 of the Israel-Turkey reconciliation agreement. Since, and following new crises between the two countries, these chances have steadily diminished.

Will Israel and Egypt be able to translate their warm ties and convergence of interests into formal energy agreements at state-level? The motivation for them to do so is clear. However, the public in Egypt still opposed any normalization of ties with Israel. After all, even during the Mubarak regime, the Egyptians did not welcome economic and socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries, despite the beneficial cooperation that took place around the joint industrial zones (QIZ). The launching of a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process will clearly help to improve this situation. It will create a more positive atmosphere in the region, and above all a more favorable Arab public opinion. It can be assumed that the a-Sisi regime will succeed in overcoming domestic opposition. After all, energy cooperation between Israel and Egypt serves the interests of both countries, and perhaps Egypt will follow Jordan, who already formalized its energy cooperation with Israel, despite negative public attitudes in Jordan towards it.

The discovery of natural gas reservoirs in the Eastern Mediterranean creates an exceptional convergence of interests between a number of countries in the region, including Israel and its Arab neighbors. This opens up a wide range of additional areas of cooperation between, placing the Eastern Mediterranean on the “global map”. The visit of Steinitz to Cairo, and the unique regional gas forum launched there, may symbolize a significant step towards realizing the potential embedded in this region.

Amb. (ret.) Michael Harari is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute. He held senior positions at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and served as the Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus between 2010 and 2015.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Will Energy be the Next Point of Israeli-Egyptian Convergence? הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 02 Jan 2019 06:47:18 +0000

This document briefly outlines major trends in Israel’s regional foreign policies over the past six months. It is based on the Mitvim Institute’s monthly reports that cover ongoing developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process/conflict, Israel’s relations with the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean, and the conduct of Israel’s Foreign Service.

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies vol. 2 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 09 Dec 2018 15:57:45 +0000

In the past few weeks it seems that Arab and Muslim countries have been competing with each other over Israel. Following news on back-channel intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was invited to a well-publicized visit to Oman. Later, Chad’s president arrived in Israel for a visit, during which Netanyahu revealed that Sudan and Bahrain are about to upgrade their relations with Israel as well.

It is difficult to follow the rapid developments and to understand the connection, if there is any, between the various developments taking place throughout the Middle East and Africa. What we are witnessing is the fruition of seeds sown more than a decade ago, when prime minister Ariel Sharon instructed Mossad chief Meir Dagan to seek ways to strengthen ties with Sunni Arab states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The goal was to create a joint front against Shi’ite Iran that seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The American invasion of Iraq in April 2003, which overthrew Saddam Hussein and brought a new Shi’ite regime to power, changed the balance of power in favor of Iran and against the Gulf states.

The regional change was particularly noticeable during the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, when the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf, Jordan and Egypt verbally attacked the Shi’ite Iranian-led Hezbollah organization. Thus, these countries informally stood by Israel during that war. The ties the Mossad started weaving back then continued during the term of prime minister Ehud Olmert who, according to foreign sources, met a senior Saudi official in Jordan in 2006. WikiLeaks documents dating from 2008-2009 show that Mossad and Foreign Ministry officials met with senior officials from the Gulf states, such as Oman and Bahrain, and possibly from other countries too.

The Arab Spring revolutions that broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia brought about the overthrow of regimes and triggered civil wars. They created chaos in an area that was wellserving the supporters of radical Islam, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. Once the regime in Egypt was stabilized in June 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not hesitate to seek Israel’s assistance in his war against terrorism in Sinai, whether by obtaining permission to increase the Egyptian military force in Sinai, by exchanging intelligence information, or by using Israeli drones. The Jordanian regime, which survived the turmoil, was also assisted by Israel in various ways to confront internal and external threats. The nuclear agreement with Iran, signed during Obama’s presidency (in July 2015) by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, gave further impetus to the informal alliance between Israel and the Sunni Arab states. All the countries threatened by Iran found themselves in the same boat with Israel, which turned out to be the one representing their interests around the world, including in the US Congress.

The beginning of the Trump administration in January 2017 marked a significant policy change toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and gave a tailwind to the unwritten alliance that had developed between Israel and the Sunni Arab states since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the positive attitude towards Netanyahu in Washington, improved Israel’s prestige in many capitals in the region.

One of the main reasons for Israel’s success in creating alliances in the region – starting with the Kurds, through the periphery alliance with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia in the 1960s – was its ability to use the influence of the Jewish lobby. Even though using this channel was not always successful, Israel’s image as having political clout in the US achieved its goal. We can safely assume that this consideration played an important role in the decision of Oman, Chad and Sudan to improve ties with Israel. Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, for example, has been trying for years to remove his country from the list of countries supporting terrorism, and to this end has disengaged from Iran and sent troops to help the Saudis in Yemen. Already in 2016, there were first reports that Israel was lobbying the US and European countries to help the regime in Sudan.

The outcome of these developments was the creation of an opportunity to maintain clandestine contacts, and more recently, even overt, with the Sunni Arab states. Three reasons can explain the current timing: First, most Arab countries are preoccupied with domestic problems that require Israeli security and intelligence assistance or help with reaching out to the US. Second, the Arab states realize that the efforts to resolve the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are stalled. In other words, not only the Israelis, who are led by an extreme right-wing government, do not show any will to promote peace. The Palestinians, who are seeing the end of Mahmoud Abbas’ rule and the cleavage between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, do not want – nor can – to advance a political process. This understanding made everyone realize that whatever the opportunities currently are, they should be exhausted.

Finally, the domino effect may also have played a role. Just as the revolution in Tunisia created a ripple effect in other Arab countries, the courage of one Arab leader to take action encouraged others to follow suit. In other words, when the Arab public is preoccupied with mundane problems, they may be less inclined to deal with breaking the taboo on overt relations with Israel. However, everyone – politicians on the Arab side and academics on both sides of the divide – agree that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Arab states will have to wait for a solution of the conflict with the Palestinians, or at least for significant progress towards its resolution. It is possible that this logic is less valid for Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, but only time will tell. The fact that Saudi Arabia recently denied a visa to Israeli chess players – resulting in the transfer of the tournament to Russia – is an indication of the difficulties of normalizing relations overtly.

Ironically and paradoxically, the Arab Spring that led to chaos in the Arab world led to a spring in Israel’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries. It should be emphasized, however, that this positive development was not the result of a coherent policy of Netanyahu’s government, but rather of regional and global processes that the government neither controls nor influences. Netanyahu can boast that he achieved all this without dismantling the settlements or giving up Israeli land, but in fact, he was simply in the right place at the right time to rake in political and diplomatic capital.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The Spring of Israel’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

EastMed Gas Pipeline Must Overcome Major Obstacles

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 27 Nov 2018 15:52:47 +0000

Israel’s Minister of National Infrastructures Energy and Water Resources Yuval Steinitz has announced that the governments of Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy have reached an agreement to build a pipeline that would transport Israeli natural gas to the European market. Diplomatic cooperation is a necessary component to realizing large-scale, multinational energy projects, but there is a point in every process where politicians need to step aside and make room for the entrepreneurs, corporations, and engineers who will determine the commercial and technical feasibility of this vision.

Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have demonstrated an enduring interest in collaborating on an ambitious undersea pipeline that would deliver Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe. Since 2011, heads of state from these three East Mediterranean states have met on a regular basis and signed MOUs pledging future energy cooperation (in addition to other areas), if and when the climate is right. Italy’s deepening participation in these dialogues only adds to the general sense of enthusiasm surrounding the appropriately named “EastMed pipeline”. Neither consensus between multiple governments nor the European Union’s commitment of $100 million in a feasibility study – a number that sounds significant, but in comparison to the estimated $7 billion pipeline costs, is a drop in the ocean – promises that this vision will become reality. After all, the average Israeli family invests a larger percentage as a down payment for an apartment.

Commercial viability lies at the center of the EastMed pipeline debate. At present, companies like Noble Energy and Delek Group have found more success in smaller, regional deals. The decision to export Israeli gas to Egypt, for example, demonstrates the compelling logic of limited scale projects where there is pre-existing infrastructure. By contrast, the EastMed pipeline – which would be the world’s largest undersea pipeline – requires not only investment and partnership between multiple corporations, but also the patience to endure a longer, more ambitious, and riskier route. Eni, the Italian oil and gas supermajor developing many of Egypt’s reserves and also investing in Cyprus’ waters, might be the perfect partner for such an endeavor, however there is little indication at present that developers are in agreement about the EastMed pipeline’s feasibility and estimated timeline.

If a consortium of corporations did decide to invest in the EastMed pipeline, its members would need to be resolute in the face of the proposed pipeline route’s many anticipated engineering challenges, shifts in the global energy market that may temporarily nullify the economic value of the pipeline, as well as the predictable delays that would accompany an enterprise of this scale. It took four years to connect Tamar field – a modest, 90 kilometer pipeline – to Israel’s coastline, so it is ambitious to imagine that a 2,200 kilometer pipeline would be constructed in similar timetable. So long as shorter, cheaper options are available, it is unclear that the EastMed pipeline will reach the minimal financial investment required to get off the ground.

That doesn’t mean Steinitz is barking up the wrong tree. After all, Israel has signed impactful export agreements with Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority. In an increasingly diverse and competitive energy market, one must generate headlines in order to attract investment (on November 5, Israel extended its bid round for offshore exploration licenses), and Steinitz has proven to be a talented frontman for the Netanyahu government’s energy ambitions.

Still, Steinitz’s statement to Israeli TV on November 24 was oddly tone deaf. “For decades, we have complained about the Arab influence in Europe due to oil and gas,” he told Hadashot news, “The export of gas to Europe will moderate this influence to a certain extent and be a counterweight to Arab power.” While historically oil-producing Arab states have wielded outsized international influence because of their central role in the global energy market (and specifically in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict), many of these states are in the midst of a budding security relationship with the Jewish state. Steinitz seemingly ignores the fact that the selling point of the EastMed pipeline from a European perspective is the opportunity to diversify supply and reduce Russian influence, not necessarily Arab influence. Most importantly, the minister’s claim was based on state-level analysis of energy’s impact, sidestepping the bigger question that Israelis should be asking themselves: how will the EastMed pipeline impact my bottom line?

A major infrastructure project that delivers Israeli gas to Europe would be a historic achievement, strengthening a diplomatic and economic partnership that is essential to Israel’s success. But that doesn’t mean the average consumer is going to feel the difference when they receive their monthly electricity bill, and Israel’s government must make a more concerted effort to explain how it remains in the public interest to support projects like the EastMed pipeline. Failure to do so may result in a wave of protests similar to those that responded to the original natural gas framework. Given that the EU feasibility test is expected to offer its conclusions in 2019, there is no better time for the government to start answering the big questions associated with Israel’s energy policy.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University.

(originally published in Globes)

הפוסט EastMed Gas Pipeline Must Overcome Major Obstacles הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 08 Nov 2018 15:47:31 +0000

The official visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen to Oman turned the spotlight on this distant principality in the Gulf that is unfamiliar to most Israelis.

Perhaps it will come as a surprise to many, but Israeli ties with Oman are not new; their first encounter was in the early 1970s, after Sultan Qaboos seized power. At that time, Qaboos faced a rebellion in the southern Dufar region on the Yemeni border. The Sultan feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and Communism from the neighboring People’s Republic of Yemen. Britain, through an army of mercenaries, and Iran the neighbor to the east, helped the Sultan suppress the rebellion. Israel too took part in this effort, although its magnitude was never clarified. However, it seems that Israel’s part included advice, guidance, and possibly even arm supplies. It should be emphasized that in the 1960s Israel also assisted the royalists in northern Yemen in their struggle against Egypt, and therefore it is no surprise that Israel helped Oman as well.

Besides the fact that Israel sought in general allies in the Middle East, Oman’s importance derives from its geographical and strategic location in the Arab Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Relations with Qaboos continued since the early 1970s. It laid the foundation for the ties that developed between the two countries in the 1990s, and is underlying the moderate position that Oman has demonstrated toward the Arab-Israeli conflict since the end of the 1970s. Oman supported the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and after the signing of the peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of the three Arab countries (alongside Sudan and Morocco) who did not sever their diplomatic relations with Egypt. This fact is noteworthy especially in view of the resulting delicate position that was imposed on Oman vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors in the Gulf, which have boycotted Egypt. Moreover, the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 tainted the relations between Oman and Iran, which was under the rule of the Shah, an ally of Qaboos. This independent behavior became a feature of Sultan Qaboos’ foreign policy.

Beginning in 1980, Mossad agent Nachik Navot used to meet regularly with Qaboos. The talks dealt with the common interests of the two countries, which included concern about the spread of Soviet influence and armaments in the Middle East, the Iran revolution, and the advancement of the peace process.

After the Madrid Conference, the signing of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with Jordan, there was a turning point in Israeli-Omani relations. In February 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin held a secret meeting with a senior Omani official to discuss relations between the two countries, which led to Oman’s decision to host in Muscat in April 1994 the fifth meeting of the working group on water in the context of the multilateral talks of the Oslo process. The involvement and participation of Oman in the working group on water and environment was not a secret. However, the secret contacts between Beilin and Yusuf bin Alawi, the foreign minister of Oman, prepared the ground for the meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Sultan Qaboos, on 27 December 1994, two months after the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. This was the first official meeting between an Israeli leader and an Arab ruler in the Gulf.

This visit exposed Oman to criticism from within the Arab world. As a result, most interactions continued behind the scenes. Yet, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his counterpart, Alawi, met in public in Washington in June 1995. The Rabin assassination in November 1995, and the presence of Alawi, who represented the sultanate, in the funeral, led to more overt relations: in January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement to open trade missions. In April 1996 Peres visited Oman (and Qatar). The visit took place at the summer palace of the Sultan in Salalah. He was accompanied by Dan Gillerman, Chairman of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of businessmen in order to promote economic ties. Peres’s advisor Avi Gil insisted that Peres be accepted by a military parade that included the Israeli anthem. In September 1999, Foreign Minister David Levy met with Alawi during the UN General Assembly. However, a year later, Oman closed the Israeli mission as a result of the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada. It was only in 2008 that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni met with Alawi when she participated in the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The most important project carried out by Israel and Oman was the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), inaugurated in 1997. The project was the outcome of the talks in the multilateral working group on water and environment. The center was financed by the United States, the European Union, Japan, Oman and Israel. Oman, an arid country in need of desalinated water, was interested in establishing the center in its territory and using Israeli technology. Within the umbrella of technology cooperation, Oman and Israel could continue to hold covert meetings. Israeli officials could also meet with Arab officials from the Gulf whose countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. Oman took advantage of having the center in its territory to develop desalination projects and to train local experts. The center continued to be active throughout the Intifada.

Netanyahu’s visit to Oman symbolizes the renewal of an old “romance.” At the same time, Oman’s willingness to reveal the meeting is indicative of boldness and self-confidence, especially against the backdrop of the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians. In the local press, Qaboos is portrayed as a “man of peace”. In light of his fatal illness, perhaps this is the legacy he wants to leave behind. Yet, more concretely, two reasons may explain the visit’s aims: One, an attempt to offer an Omani mediation to the dormant IsraeliPalestinian peace process. The fact that Mahmoud Abbas visited the Sultanate a few days earlier and that Alawi was sent to Ramallah after the Netanyahu visit may support this thesis. Second, Israel wanted to use the good offices of Oman, which enjoy good relations with Iran and/or Syria. Beyond achieving prestige vis-à-vis the Saudi and Qatari neighbors, Oman can use Israel to reach out to the United States and the West in general. In any event, the visit substantiates once more again that Israel is recognized as an important player in the Arab Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is currently working on a study dealing with Israel’s secret relations with the countries in the Middle East.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel’s Renewed Affair with Oman הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 26 Oct 2018 15:40:53 +0000

Less than 10 months after the resolution of the previous Israeli-Jordanian crisis, a new crisis may be sparked by King Abdullah’s recent decision not to renew the two annexes to the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.

When the treaty was signed in October 1994, Israel and Jordan decided to establish a “special regime” in two areas, Naharayim (al-Baqoura in Arabic) and Tzofar (al-Ghumar in Arabic), which would remain under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. The “special regime” granted unlimited freedom to the landowners, their employees, and their invitees, without applying any customs or immigration legislation.

According to the treaty, this arrangement would be in place for 25 years and renewed automatically unless Israel or Jordan gives one year’s notice in advance of its termination. In such case, discussions between the parties shall begin.

From a purely domestic Jordanian perspective, this was a timely and astute decision: The king sought to appease the mounting opposition to the peace treaty with Israel in general and the two annexes in particular coming from parliament, political parties, trade unions and civil society at large. Facing growing criticism and periodic waves of demonstrations of citizens protesting against economic and social hardships, the king fired prime minister Hani Mulki in June 2018, but to no avail.

Now, in a single stroke, he managed to divert his people’s attention from their daily problems. Jordanian print and social media applauded the king’s bold decision. In addition, it can be speculated that King Abdullah is frustrated by the right-wing Netanyahu government, which demonstrates little interest in promoting a dialogue with the Palestinians, and is pushing for international recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thus ignoring Jordan’s special role in the holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem, as stipulated by the peace treaty. In fact, this very issue has been the cause of a series of diplomatic crises between the two countries in recent years.

Admittedly, the decision is difficult to reconcile with the consistently warm Israel-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation. Collaboration between the two countries grew even stronger in the wake of the Arab Spring, as Israel helped the kingdom in various ways to stop the infiltration of radical jihadi elements from Syrian and Iraqi territories under the control of Islamic State. It seems, therefore, that relations between Israel and Jordan move on two parallel tracks simultaneously: the public and the hidden. Yet, a deterioration in the public domain may also affect the hidden.

Israel was not entirely surprised by the king’s decision. If, as all available information suggests, Netanyahu was warned in advance of the coming decision and did nothing to prevent it, then the decision is the result of negligence and miscalculations, and a prime example of how the absence of a foreign minister working in full capacity adversely affects Israel’s decision-making. But it is also yet another demonstration of Israel’s “everything will be OK” (yehiye beseder) syndrome.

The question is what can be done now to prevent the situation from deteriorating into another diplomatic crisis. Unfortunately, as Jordan’s quiet messages went unheeded by Israel, the king tweeted his decision publicly. That makes it difficult for him to backtrack without a blow to his own pride. In addition, by inflaming public opinion, Jordanian media turned the decision into an issue that involves now national honor. Just as the tiny territory of Taba in the Sinai Peninsula became a national issue for Egypt in the 1980s, Naharayim and Tzofar have now became hot issues in Jordan.

How should Israel respond? First, it should be stated what Israel should not do: It should not threaten to cut the water supply to Jordan, which was stipulated in the peace agreement. Water is a highly sensitive issue in Jordan, and Israel has been generous in providing Jordan with more water than stipulated in the agreement, and it should continue doing so.

What Israel should do is make an effort to divert any discussions on this issue from the public to the secret track, removing the sting from the heated public debate in the media on both sides. These secret talks should focus on finding a creative solution based on the peace treaty and the two countries’ shared experience.

Article 7b of the treaty allows the parties to “enter negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic cooperation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area or areas.” A talk with several Israeli experts on the issue emphatically confirmed that a creative solution can be found which will be satisfactory to both sides.

In June 2017, after an Israeli security guard killed two Jordanians after being attacked, it took the Israeli government six months to resolve the crisis with Jordan. It was an unnecessarily long period. Today, Israel should act immediately to contain the looming crisis and propose a reasonable solution to the problem.

The main lesson from this episode is that Israel needs to pay greater attention to diplomacy. But as long as Israel’s foreign policy is subservient to national security considerations, the government will continue to suffer from periodic diplomatic blunders.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel and Jordan: A Looming Crisis That Should Be Prevented הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Boiling Water of the Red Sea: Power Struggles and Israel’s Interests

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 01 Sep 2018 09:21:07 +0000

The Red Sea basin includes 12 states with a combined population of around 300 million. On the eastern shore lie Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel share the Gulf of Eilat/Aqaba. On the African coast of the Red Sea are Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The Red Sea basin also includes Ethiopia, with no direct access to the sea, as well as Somaliland and Somalia, which are located in the Gulf of Aden, opposite the shores of Yemen, at the entrance to the Red Sea. In geographical terms, the Red Sea divides between Africa in the west and Asia in the east, and forms part of the Syrian-African rift. In geopolitical terms, throughout history the Red Sea served as one of the most vital trade routes in the world, connecting Europe and the west on the one hand with the Middle East on the other. Today it is the busiest trade route in the world. For this reason, Egypt is of particular importance in the territory of the Red Sea – it constitutes a bridge between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean – as are Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia, which are located on both sides of the straits of Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Likewise, the Red Sea was the maritime route via which every year millions of Muslim pilgrims from all over the world made their way to Mecca and al-Medina, the two holiest cities of Islam, which are located in Saudi Arabia.

הפוסט The Boiling Water of the Red Sea: Power Struggles and Israel’s Interests הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 27 Aug 2018 15:20:41 +0000

The Middle East is a confusing area. On the one hand, it is highly volatile, with frequent changes throughout the region and in the domestic affairs of its countries. On the other hand, many elements remain constant. Unchanging stability and stable changes are the two faces of the Middle East that were in force last year. On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, it is tempting to offer an analysis of this (un)changing Middle East during that time.

The Arab Spring that erupted in late 2010 brought revolution and regime change to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil war to Syria, Libya and Yemen; and widespread demonstrations to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Yet, these events did not affect – at least until now – the territorial integrity of those states. The reality is that these boundaries are more stable than many people anticipated – a product of international norms, local state identities and the elite’s interests. Some changes may still be foreseen in Libya and Yemen, yet the overall picture is of continuing stability despite these upheavals.

No less stable were the authoritarian regimes, some demonstrating even harsher methods of control than before. Sisi’s Egypt is a case in point. The one exception was Tunisia, which succeeded in transforming its authoritarian regime into a democracy. Indeed, according to the ranks of Freedom House, Tunisia is the only Arab country that was rated as “free,” with a score that was not far from Israel’s (70 in comparison to 79). Only four Arab states were considered “partly free” – Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait (in that order), while all the rest were rated “not free.”

However, most Arab countries remained fragile, on the verge of collapse. Some are virtually failed states. According to the Fragile States Index of the Fund of Peace, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia are among the 10 most fragile of the world’s 178 states. Fragility stems not only from constant and embittered civil wars but from structural, economic and social problems; malfunctioning governments and bureaucracies; and spiraling population growth.

The only improvement in the last year occurred in Iraq, which rose from four in 2006 to 11 in 2018. Yet, the picture is not as bleak in the Arabian Gulf, where all Gulf Cooperation Council countries were said to be stable with little poverty, in contrast to the relative high percentage of poverty in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Morocco and other Arab countries.

Superpower intervention in the Middle East has not dramatically changed either. Putin’s Russia is still the major foreign power in Syrian, trying to project power in other states through diplomacy and arm sales. Neither has the US withdrawn from the Middle East, yet its role is secondary. It is yet to be seen whether President Donald Trump’s bold decisions – pulling out of the nuclear deal, imposing sanctions on Iran and Turkey, and recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital – will have positive effects. The unpredictability of US policy is generally detrimental to the region’s stability.

Iran and Turkey continue to meddle in the region’s affairs. Iran continues to project power with the help of its proxies – Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Turkey is directly involved in the Syrian crisis, in an effort to prevent the emergence of an independent or autonomous Kurdish entity by creating a security zone on the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, both Iran and Turkey are now entangled in domestic economic crises of their own, which may curtail their ability to project power beyond their borders anytime soon.

The emergence of non-Arab regional powers accentuates the fact that the traditional Arab powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – no longer play a key role in regional politics. This is a result of domestic challenges that continue to hamper their ability to project power. Iraq’s role has been marginalized since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), while Egypt’s and Syria’s power has declined since the Arab Spring. Egypt’s absence from the Arab world and its involvement in the crises along its borders (particularly in Gaza and along the Nile) attest to the severity of its domestic constraints. Saudi Arabia attempted to fill this vacuum, although its military adventure in Yemen, the economic pressure on Qatar and the diplomatic struggle in Syria have not yet yielded impressive results.

The Israeli-Palestinian sphere provides the best illustration of the (un)changing nature of the Middle East. Gaza continues to attract headlines with its humanitarian crises, often attributed to the Israeli and Egyptian siege. Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas in an attempt to reach a prolonged ceasefire (hudna) has been underway for some time and may bring some cessation of the violence, but will not change the basic animosity and mistrust that will continue to exist between Israelis and Palestinians as long as no comprehensive agreement is reached.

Trump’s “deal of the century” has not yet been released but it seems that his Jerusalem decision put the brakes on a future agreement unless he finds a way to compensate the Palestinians. Yet, any compensation will meet a strong Israeli outcry, which may impede further progress.

Israeli decision makers see the complex situation in the Middle East as serving their interests. As long as Iran, Shi’ism and terrorism pose a threat to Israel and to the major Arab Sunni countries, covert cooperation from those quarters will likely continue. Seen from Jerusalem, the stalemate in the peace process is a blessing, allowing Israel to further entrench its already strong hold in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Israeli leaders should, however, be reminded that as much as Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah are a constant threat, it is the Palestinian problem that is the core of the conflict. Its resolution is the only way for normalizing Israel’s place in the Middle East.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Israel in an (Un)Changing Middle East הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 06 Aug 2018 15:07:42 +0000

A serious overview of the Saudi media, as recently done by some MEMRI reports, shows a considerable improvement in the Saudi media’s treatment of Israel. These voices are important since they represent senior Saudi journalists and civil society activists.

Even more important is the fact that the op-eds express explicit recognition of Israel and its achievements. They are not devoid of criticism of the Netanyahu government’s policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, yet their concerns and antagonism toward Iran and the Shi’a are far greater than the media’s disapproval of Israel. Many Saudis believe Iran poses a greater threat than Israel, not only because of Iran’s geographical proximity, but also because the fear of Shi’ization is greater than of Judaization.

It is clear that this pattern is not coincidental but prescribed from above. Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS), himself confirmed in an interview to the Atlantic in April 2018, that the Israelis (as well as the Palestinians) “have the right to their own land.” As antiSemitic statements by Saudi rulers in the past were not rare (in particular, statements by the founder of the Kingdom Ibn Sa’ud and King Faisal), the change reflected in MBS’s rhetoric is significant and, in fact, can be traced to the reign of King Fahd and Abdallah.

Although the Saudi media is not free of anti-Israel and even occasionally anti-Semitic voices, it is impossible to ignore this change in Saudi discourse. Its importance derives from several factors: (1) Saudi Arabia plays a special role in the Muslim and Arab worlds as a result of its control of the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina (in fact, the king is called the Custodian of the Two Holy Places), and more than two million people perform the Hajj every year; (2) As an oil-rich country, Saudi Arabia has financial leverage over its beneficiaries that can be used in the diplomatic field when necessary; and (3) Saudi Arabia is considered a “neutral” player in the Israeli-Arab conflict by virtue of the fact that Saudi Arabia has no treaty with Israel (in contrast to Egypt and Jordan).

The most significant element in the Saudi change of rhetoric is that it potentially could change Saudi society’s image of Israel and the Jews and build a more congenial climate for peace – if and when it is achieved. At least one notable case study may prove this point: Egypt. In the pre-1973 period, certain Egyptian intellectuals began talking about the need to recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty with it, for the sake of Egyptian interests.

In the post-1973 period, these voices were given a free rein from above to disseminate their views and they undoubtedly played a role in Sadat’s decision to visit Jerusalem in 1977. The conclusion is that voices of peace sometimes precede and may foreshadow the actual peace.

Saudi Arabia does not need peace with Israel. Israel and Saudi do not share a border and there is no state of war between the two countries. In fact, the two have never fought each other. The Saudis are, however, concerned by regional instability – caused by deterioration on the Israeli-Palestinian or the Iranian fronts – and its impact on oil prices. This is partially the reason why the Saudis have already initiated two peace plans – the Fahd and Abdallah initiatives (1981 and 2002 respectively), which turned into Arab peace plans. Israel unequivocally rejected these initiatives, at least in part due to its negative image of the Saudis.

The changing climate in Saudi Arabia poses yet another opportunity to Israeli decision makers. In Saudi Arabia, they might find a partner who is most willing to cooperate against Iran and also willing to cooperate in reaching a deal with the Palestinians. The ultimate deal for Israel, to use a worn-out phrase, is not between Israel and the Palestinians – important as is – but with the greater parts of the Islamic and Arab worlds, to which Saudi Arabia might pave the way. There are no free lunches, but that is exactly what the Netanyahu government is trying to do with the Saudis, when he is trying to promote cooperation without giving anything in return in the Palestinian track. A move from the hidden to the public domain would necessitate a tangible reward to the Palestinians, but this is not likely to happen, unfortunately.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט Voices of Peace in Saudi Arabia הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 17 Jul 2018 14:51:07 +0000

Slowly but surely, with the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, President Bashar Assad is regaining control over Syria. The process is still underway, but all the regional actors realize that Syria, in its current territorial format, is here to stay. The possibility that the “new” Syria might become a federation (similarly to Iraq) has not yet been ruled out, but even if it materializes, Syria’s boundaries will not change. Internal importance aside, the recent developments in Syria enfold much more far-reaching, familiar implications, specifically that the Arab state in the Middle East has proven to be much more cohesive and resilient than many believed.

Not so long ago in 2016, the centennial “festivities” commemorating the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 were accompanied by the assessment that the days of many Arab states are numbered and that the events of the Arab Spring and their outcomes – including the declaration of the caliphate of ISIS – represent a belated correction to the artificial borders of the Arab states, which had been drawn by the hands of Western colonialism in the wake of WWI. But here we are, two years later, and there has been no change to the borders of any Arab state. Several factors explain why the borders have not moved.

First, is the existence of a strong and stable national identity. In Egypt and Tunisia, territorial identity predated independence. As a result, territorial integrity withstood the threats posed by the recent shocks to these countries’ ruling powers. In more “artificial” states, the ruling establishment constructed a particular local identity through various socialization processes including national holidays, school textbooks, art and literature. The success of these efforts is difficult to quantify, but the existence of an Iraqi identity cannot be denied if, after 15 years of US occupation, ISIS-backed terrorism and a civil war, Iraq is on its way to recovery and is even conducting democratic elections.

Second, the “deep” state institutions have successfully coped with the local revolutions. In Egypt, the army and the legal system brought the system back to its pre-revolution condition. And in Tunisia, civil society forces managed to complete a democratic revolution, and were even awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.

Third, the involvement of external actors also contributed to the preservation of territorial integrity. Global and regional powers – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – have an interest in maintaining the status quo. Any violation of that could lead to instability and, ultimately, to war, rising oil prices, disruption to maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, and to regional turmoil. The best example of such a contribution is, of course, Syria, which was largely saved by the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The US, Jordan and Israel also played a secondary role in this process. US involvement in Iraq had a similar stabilizing effect on that country. No less important is the fact that Iran also had an interest in maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, but wished to subjugate it to its influence. Moreover, all the global and regional powers (with the exception of Israel) prevented the secession of Iraq’s Kurdish area, due to concerns over irredentist claims by Kurds in neighboring states.

Fourth, several Arab leaders followed a shrewd strategy that prevented any deterioration in the situation. The manifest examples are the region’s monarchs, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan. Both initiated reforms designed to satisfy some popular demands and maintained dialogue with the opposition forces in their respective states. Demonstrations in Morocco and Jordan continue to erupt occasionally but have not yet deteriorated to the point of an actual threat to the monarchy or to the state’s territorial identity. A different situation prevails in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states which used oil revenues to elicit the support of its citizens in exchange for a series of economic benefits and, more recently, governmental reforms. An interesting point is that the Gulf states – in particular UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – score high on the Fragile States Index (reflecting weak central government, non-provision of public services, widespread corruption, refugees and a sharp economic decline).

Fifth, with the memory of civil war still fresh in their minds, the citizens of several countries, including Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan and the Palestinian territories, elected not to rock their respective governmental boats. As a result, the internal developments in these states are not expected to lead to territorial changes, with the exception of the Palestinians who are struggling to attain a state of their own.

All of which leads to the conclusion that Syria is not an exception in terms of the overall pattern of stable territorial integrity in the region. Even the two remaining states – Yemen and Libya – will not change the overall picture. There is a good chance that Yemen will break up into two entities (North and South) as was the situation before the unification in 1990; and Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, appears to be geared to assume control over the entire country. Consequently, the main question that should be addressed by scholars of the modern Middle East is not why the territorial Arab states are destined to break up, but rather, what factors underlie their persistence, despite their artificial origin.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט A New Mideast in Familiar Clothing הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 01 Jul 2018 10:27:55 +0000

הפוסט Trends in Israel’s Regional Foreign Policies Vol. 1 הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 27 Jun 2018 09:58:42 +0000

Diplomatic engagement between countries in the Eastern Mediterranean presents the opportunity for greater regional cooperation on a range of issues, including policy, security and economic growth. Increased cooperation has the potential to lead to shared regional norms and institutions that promote regional stability and aid in conflict resolution support. But the potential for regional cohesion is limited, both because of differences in national priorities and recent and long-standing conflicts. This policy brief explores the limitations and potential of conflict resolution support in the Eastern Mediterranean. It offers operational recommendations for experts and policy-makers working to strengthen regional dialogue and find new lenses for approaching conflict resolution.

הפוסט Eastern Mediterranean Regional Dynamics: Conflicts and Opportunities for Conflict Resolution Support הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 29 May 2018 10:03:34 +0000

On 29 May 2018, the Mitvim Institute and the Leonard Davis Institute held a joint conference devoted to the unfulfilled potential of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. The conference took place at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It focused on mapping existing cooperation between Israel and the Arab world, identifying future potential in these relations and analyzing the link between Israel’s regional connections and the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The conference included a keynote address by Member of Knesset (MK) Isaac Herzog (Opposition leader, Zionist Union), in addition to sessions concerning civil, economic and political cooperation between Israel and Arab countries. The conference is part of a Mitvim Institute project on this same topic, and members of the project’s task team presented their conclusions and insights at the conference. This document sums up the main points of the conference.

הפוסט The Unfulfilled Potential of Israel’s Relations with Arab Countries הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 15 May 2018 11:52:23 +0000

In recent weeks, Saudi officials made statements that were interpreted in Israel as a change of attitude in Saudi Arabia towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Israeli Channel 10, the Saudi crown prince told Jewish leaders in the United States that “the time has come for the Palestinians to accept the proposals and agree to come to the negotiation table or shut up and stop complaining”. In addition, he was quoted as saying that “there are much more urgent and far more important issues to deal with – like Iran”. This statement follows a previous interview with Jeffrey Goldberg from The Atlantic, in which he was quoted saying, “the Jewish people have a right to a state, alongside the right of the Palestinians to a state.”

These statements by a Saudi senior official seem to fit with the political approach that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting in recent years. According to this position, the new reality in the Middle East allows for the belief that Israel and the Arab states can strengthen ties because they realize their common ground overrides their differences. For example, in his speech at the United Nations in 2016, Netanyahu claimed, “many other states in the region recognize that Israel is not their enemy. They recognize that Israel is their ally. Our common enemies are Iran and ISIS. Our common goals are security, prosperity, and peace”.

Judging from the history of Israel’s relations with Arab states, Netanyahu’s perception does not seem realistic: In 1979, without including the Palestinians in the agreement, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would not have agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed only after the Oslo Accords, which radically changed Israel’s relations with the Palestinians. Until then, signing a peace agreement was not possible, even after the Jordanian king relinquished his demand for the West Bank at the end of the 1980s, and with seemingly no fundamental disagreement between him and the Israeli leadership, with whom he maintained good informal relations.

However, Netanyahu believes that a new reality has been created, and that even without negotiating with the Palestinians it is possible to normalize relations with the Arab world. It is the “new terror” that makes it possible. The threat of Islamic extremism to the Muslim world encourages the Arab leadership to ally with Israel. In his view, even in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is possible to improve Israel’s relations with other Arab countries.

Netanyahu’s belief in the transformation of the Arab world has led him to change his attitude toward the Arab League initiative. Netanyahu, who once claimed that “in its current format [it is] dangerous to the State of Israel”, claimed in 2016, “Israel welcomes the spirit of the Arab peace initiative”. The new Netanyahu ignores the central component of the Arab League initiative: the need for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement prior to normalizing relations with Israel. When the “Palestinian component” is left out of the equation, Netanyahu can indeed welcome the initiative. He also believes that strengthening Israel’s relations with the Arab states can lead to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. However, the Arab League still believes in the reversed process whereby the Israeli-Palestinian agreement precedes improving the relations with the Arab world. Likewise, the reports about the recent declarations of the Saudi Prince mentioned that he once again stated that “there needs to be significant progress toward an agreement with the Palestinians before it will be possible to advance negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Arab world and Israel.”

Netanyahu’s discourse is captivating and raises very few objections in Israel. Since 2000, most of the Israeli public believes like there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. If there is no Palestinian partner and if relations with the Arab world can be strengthened even without negotiations with the Palestinians, there is no reason to oppose Netanyahu’s assertion. His coalition partners from the Israeli political right are happy to promote peace with the Arab world without having to pay any price. Netanyahu’s political rivals on the political left show no objection either: some share the view that there is no Palestinian partner, and even those who believe that there is a partner for an agreement find it difficult to oppose the opportunity to strengthen ties with other Arab countries.

But even Netanyahu admitted in the past that a genuine and formal relationship between Israel and the Arab world cannot be expected without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. According to himself, “in order to fully achieve this broad peace agreement, the Palestinians must be part of it”. Indeed, there is no evidence that the hope for substantial and meaningful relations between Israel and the Arab world can occur without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. It is no surprise, therefore, that in February of this year, when Netanyahu mentioned again the strengthening of relations with the Arab world at the defense conference in Munich, it was reported that the Secretary-General of the Arab League tweeted in response, “there will be no peace with the Arab world before achieving peace with the Palestinians.”

Dr. Yuval Benziman teaches conflict resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a task-team member at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a research paper written as part of the Mitvim Institute’s project on “Israel’s relations with Arab states: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט The New Israeli Illusion: Peace with the Arab World, Without the Palestinians הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 14 May 2018 11:48:14 +0000

Of the many formidable foreign policy questions facing Israel as it celebrates its 70th anniversary, the most auspicious is how the Jewish State should adapt to a multipolar world. The urgency to answer this question has accelerated in recent days. President Donald Trump’s decision to remove the US from the Iran deal – applauded by Israeli leadership – will, over time, force Israel to develop cooperative relationships with non-traditional partners in order to meet its regional security objectives. The White House’s desire to withdraw troops from Syria will have a similar effect. As a result, Israel’s response to the end of the American era will determine in large part its ability to protect its citizens and its sovereignty.

Israel was one of the primary beneficiaries of an interventionist US foreign policy in the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Since 1967, strategic cooperation with Washington was the bedrock of Israeli foreign policy and despite periods of turbulence the strategic alliance has never been so interdependent. American support for Israel played a central role in the realization of peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the signing of the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians. Israel remains the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the world. It is a rare occasion when the US does not defend Israel at the United Nations.

Despite the controversial decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, all other evidence – from Iraq to Yemen to Syria – points to an America more interested in extricating itself from the Middle East’s troubles than resolving them. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Trump administration, rather an organized pivot of American interests and resources to other portions of the globe.

Israeli leadership has not always readjusted its expectations of the US in the post-Cold War era, but Jerusalem has been diversifying its diplomatic options for some time. Notably, Israel’s dialogue with Russia has deepened substantially over the last decade. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met with Vladimir Putin over a dozen times (all in Moscow) in order to develop and maintain a de-conflicting mechanism that satisfies both parties. The signing of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran also encouraged security cooperation between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, most significantly Saudi Arabia. Will these arrangements evolve into a normalization process between Israel and the Arab world? There will always be a glass ceiling if there remains no progress between Israel and the Palestinians. But they reaffirm a popular notion in Israel that interests, not ideology, are the real drivers of change in the region.

New avenues of cooperation are also being explored. Benefiting from one of the most internationally recognized startup environments, Israeli officials have been able to piggyback off the accomplishments of private companies in order to expand Israel’s global outreach. Drip irrigation technology has created openings in West Africa where previously doors were shut. Recent offshore energy discoveries have generated similar opportunities. As a result, Netanyahu is the most travelled head-of-state in the country’s history, journeying as far as India, Australia, Singapore, and China, as well as taking tours of Africa and Central Asia. Israel has entered energy cooperation initiatives with Cyprus and Greece, and has signed contracts to export its natural gas to Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority.

Some in Israel are critical of the premier for spending so much of his time outside of the country (he is currently under investigation in four separate police cases). The investment in official state visits abroad has not been matched by government investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel. In the Israeli foreign policy decision-making process, most of Israel’s diplomatic corps and senior leadership are on the outside looking in.

And these new partnerships are no replacement for Israel’s Western allies. Regardless of how officials in Jerusalem chafe at the sound of their European counterparts critiquing Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories, it would be naïve to argue that the same officials think cooperation with a group of largely non-democratic states could be equal to the value-based relationships that have been fostered between Israel and the West over the last seven decades. Without the involvement of a committed US administration the future of Israel and the Palestinians is also uncertain. Traditionally, Israel preferred a global order managed by NATO and the US. Even if Israel is in the process of expanding its diplomatic horizons, it knows there is no substitute for America’s projection of both hard and soft power, nor the US’ historical commitment to Israel’s security.

The post-American era will trigger enormous growing pains amongst all Middle Eastern states as they search for a new regional order. However, Israel’s success has historically been associated with its ability to remain flexible and adaptive during trying times. Israeli leaders need to be prepared to make difficult decisions for the sake of regional stability. Specifically, will strategic cooperation with its Arab neighbors against Iran eventually necessitate an Israeli commitment to direct negotiations with the Palestinian Authority? What will Israel’s future look like if its non-Western partners decouple the IsraeliPalestinian conflict from their bilateral relationship with the Jewish State?

The US is not disappearing from the global stage, nor will its support for Israel. Nonetheless, in the event that American diminution is a long-term trend in geopolitics, whom will Israel reach out to in order to maintain its basic security needs? If Israel’s brief but colorful history proves anything, it is to expect the unexpected.

Gabriel Mitchell is a Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute, and a PhD Candidate in international relations at Virginia Tech University

(originally published by the Italian Institue for International Political Studies ISPI)

הפוסט Post Iran Deal: Israel and the Post-American Era הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 10 May 2018 09:39:30 +0000

The history of Israel-Jordan relations displays long-term strategic cooperation. The formal peace agreement, signed in 1994, has become one of the pillars of the political-strategic stability of both Israel and Jordan. While the two countries have succeeded in developing extensive security cooperation, the economic, political, and civil aspects, which also have great cooperation potential, have for the most part been neglected. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents difficulties in realizing this potential while hindering the Israel-Jordan relations and leading to alienation and hostility between the two peoples. However, the formal agreements and the existing relations make it possible to advance them even under the ongoing conflict. Israel and Jordan can benefit from cooperation on political issues, such as promoting peace and relations with the Palestinians and managing the holy sites in Jerusalem; they can also benefit from cooperation on civil matters, such as joint management of water resources, and resolving environmental, energy, and tourism issues; and lastly, Israel can benefit from economic cooperation while leveraging the geographical position of Jordan which makes it a gateway to Arab markets. This article focuses on the economic aspect and demonstrates how such cooperation can provide Israel with a powerful growth engine that will significantly increase Israeli GDP. It draws attention to the great potential that Israeli-Jordanian ties engender, and to the possibility – which still exists – to realize this potential, which would enhance peaceful and prosperous relationship between Israel and Jordan.

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Cooperation: A Potential That Can Still Be Fulfilled הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Recommendations for Improving Israel-Jordan Relations

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 02 Apr 2018 09:23:29 +0000

Israel and Jordan have recently reached understandings to overcome a bilateral crisis, triggered by the incident at the Israeli embassy in Amman on July 2017. These understandings enabled the arrival of a new Israeli ambassador to Jordan, and are a positive and necessary development. Nevertheless, further steps are needed to improve relations between the countries and overcome the damage caused by the crisis. This document includes recommendations for Israeli officials and civil society actors. They are based on a series of policy dialogues and events on Israel-Jordan relations, carried out over the past year by the Mitvim Institute. These recommendations focus on the need to emphasize the importance of IsraelJordan relations to the Israeli public, build trust with the Jordanians, strengthen cooperation between Israel and Jordan, acknowledge Jordan’s special role in the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, recognize the linkage between Israel-Jordan relations and the Palestinian issue, and draw lessons from the crisis.

הפוסט Recommendations for Improving Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 30 Mar 2018 10:20:37 +0000

After a six-month diplomatic crisis between Israel and Jordan, a new Israeli ambassador – Amir Weissbrod – is expected to arrive in Amman soon to fully resume the embassy’s operations.

This will not make newspaper headlines. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement is barely addressed in Israeli public discourse. Many Israelis are unaware of its advantages and importance. On the Jordanian street, the attitude towards the peace agreement with Israel is even worse. It is an attitude of hostility and objection to any form of a relationship with Israel. But these are peace relations which have a huge potential, and only a little of it has been realized.

The peace agreement is based on its strategic importance to both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the peace agreement with Israel is a highly important strategic anchor of stability: It has reinforced the Israeli umbrella of defense, as well as Jordan’s strategic relations with the US. The Israeli-American defense umbrella is crucial for Jordan in light of external threats from the east and from the north, but it also helps with internal security against the subversion of regional and local terror elements.

From the Israeli perspective, the peace agreement with Jordan is one of the pillars of the strategic-political stability, alongside the peace agreement with Egypt. Jordan serves as a friendly buffer state and a strategic partner – in the past, against threats from an Iraqi-led Arab front, and in recent years, against an Iranian-led Shiite coalition and dangers from the direction of Syria.

The extensive security cooperation became possible after the two governments recognized the critical need for this type of cooperation and invested all the required efforts, resources and attention for its development. The other areas – diplomatic, economic and civilian – haven’t enjoyed the same amount of attention and have not been perceived as equally vital, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made it very difficult to advance collaborations in these areas. As a result, the great potential hidden in the peace agreement hasn’t been realized.

In the diplomatic area, Jordan could become a closer partner of Israel in managing the relations with the Palestinians and furthering peace processes. It could be, as it has proved in the past, a good partner in running Jerusalem’s holy sites. In addition, it could serve as a partner in advancing relations with other Arab countries.

In the civilian area, Israel and Jordan share a number of issues and joint challenges that require tighter cooperation. Water is of course a key issue, and the existing agreements – coupled with the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance and water swaps plans – point to the existing potential. Furthermore, collaborations between the countries on issues and projects in the fields of environment, energy, tourism and infrastructure will provide the two countries with dividends that each country would be unable to achieve on its own.

It’s true that without considerable progress towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, the huge potential concealed in the relations between the countries cannot be fully realized. Nevertheless, in light of the existence of a formal peace agreement, real and invaluable progress can also be achieved in the current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinians.

The existing set of agreements between Israel and Jordan – in commerce, transportation, water, gas and other areas – serves as an infrastructure facilitating the quick advancement of plenty of collaborations, if the necessary priority is given.

The economic aspect is a good example. From the Israeli perspective, the economic relations with the small Jordanian economy are of minor importance (even in light of the latest agreement to sell natural gas to Jordan), but Jordan has a very important role as a bridge for Israeli commerce with the large Gulf state markets and other Arab markets.

According to studies conducted in recent years, opening up the Arab markets to Israel will create a new and powerful growth engine that would help increase the Israeli product by a quarter or a third more than expected in today’s conditions, and will make Israel part of the group of the world’s 15 richest countries. The Arab market will become Israel’s most important market alongside the European market.

The existing commerce and transportation agreements between Israel and Jordan could serve as a basis for the development of a new route of commerce between the Gulf states’ large markets and the Mediterranean Sea, through Jordan and Israel. This route is already active today, through the Jordan River border crossing near Beit She’an and the Haifa Port, but the volume of freight passing through it is relatively small. Turning this route into a regional terrestrial bridge will become possible by connecting Israel Railways to the new regional railway network.

This network is already in advanced construction stages in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf coasts. The plan is for Jordan to serve as the main junction of this network. Connecting the Jordanian train to Israel’s valley railroad will make it possible to complete the terrestrial bridge.

Despite some major difficulties, this project is politically feasible, as it is based on an active route and on a system of existing trade and transportation agreements. Any progress in this project could help create a new climate of faith in Israeli-Jordanian peace and gradually change the Jordanian (and Israeli) public’s views.

To strengthen the positive influence of the economic cooperation, it’s important to couple these moves with ongoing public relations efforts among both the Israeli and Jordanian publics, which would stress the benefits of the peace process, change the perception towards the other side and support the establishment of warm peace. The public perception changes, for their part, would help strengthen the collaborations and create other benefits. “Success stories” in the Israeli-Jordanian contexts would help strengthen the two countries’ regional standing as players with a stabilizing – economic and diplomatic – contribution to the regional system in general.

The Israel-Jordan peace agreement is a strategic asset with huge potential for both Israel and Jordan in many aspects. The reopening of the Israeli embassy in Jordan, after it was closed for half a year following the crisis between the countries, is an opportunity to look into ways to fix the missed opportunity and realize at least part of the major potential concealed in the peace agreement.

Yitzhak Gal is a financial and business advisor specializing in the Arab markets, and a researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and at the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on a study of Israel-Jordan relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab countries: The unfulfilled potential.”

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט The Fruits of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Are Still Waiting on the Tree הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:18:17 +0000

After an Iranian drone entered Israeli airspace 10 February 2018, Israel responded by striking Iranian and Syrian targets in southern Syria. Anti-aircraft fire led to the downing of an Israeli F-16 warplane. This was the first direct confrontation between Israel and Iran in Syria, and it has prompted concern over further military escalation along the Israeli-Syrian border. In order to prevent such an escalation, Israel cannot rely only on security means. It should also make effective use of diplomacy: to identify clear and feasible policy goals regarding Syria, to foster alliances with countries that can help advance these goals, and to mobilize these countries into constructive action. This document includes experts’ perspectives on Israeli interests at stake, and diplomatic channels that can be promoted with Russia, the US, Turkey, and Germany in order to prevent further escalation. It is based on a policy workshop convened by the Mitvim Institute on 15 February 2018.

הפוסט Preventing an Israel-Iran Escalation in Syria via Diplomacy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel-Jordan Reconciliation: Better Late Than Never

ריף יצחקי — Sun, 21 Jan 2018 10:00:41 +0000

Six months after an Israeli security guard killed two Jordanian citizens (his attacker and a second man who was shot accidentally), the solution for the crisis which marred relations between the two countries has finally been found.

Israel expressed its regret over the incident and promised to continue the legal proceedings, as well as pay damages to the families of the two citizens and to the family of PalestinianJordanian judge Raed Zeiter, who was shot to death at the Allenby Bridge border crossing in March 2014. In return, the Israeli Embassy in Jordan will return to full activity, although Ambassador Einat Shlain will not return to her post and will be replaced by a new ambassador.

The Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement that “Israel attaches great importance to its strategic relations with Jordan, and the two countries will act to advance their cooperation and to strengthen the peace treaty between them.” But if Israel really attaches so much strategic importance to these relations, why did it wait six months before solving the issue?

This isn’t the first time that Israel’s relations with Jordan are marred by a security incident. In March 1997, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls who were visiting the Island of Peace site in Naharayim. Jordan’s King Hussein rushed to calm the situation down: He cut short a visit to Spain and came to Israel to offer condolences to the victims’ families. He also issued an apology for the schoolgirls’ murder.

Several months later, Israel tried to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mashal on Jordanian soil. The operation failed, several Mossad fighters were captured by the local police and others found shelter in the Israeli Embassy building. Then-Mossad Director Danny Yatom was quickly sent by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to brief the king on the details of the operation. His request to release the detained agents was turned down, but the crisis was solved within 12 days after several Israeli officials, including Efraim Halevy and Ariel Sharon, made efforts to calm the king down. Halevy’s proposal to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison was the compensation accepted by Jordan.

In August 2011, shortly after the January 25 Revolution which led to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, seven Israelis were killed in a series of terror attacks on Highway 12. As part of Israel’s military response, an IDF force entered Sinai and killed five Egyptian policemen. The incident led to a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Egypt, which threatened to recall its ambassador. Two months later, then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak issued an apology for the killing of the Egyptian policemen, bringing the crisis to an end.

While each incident has its own unique characteristics, several insights can be drawn from these events: First of all, a quick response is highly important. It has the power of preventing the crisis, or at least preventing it from getting worse. It also shows that the other side sees the incident as important and understands the need to come up with an immediate solution.

Netanyahu did send the Shin Bet chief to Jordan immediately to try to solve the problem, but the Jordanian side didn’t feel that the Israeli government saw it as a top priority. The fact that it took six months to reach an agreement indicates that the Israeli government didn’t ascribe much importance to the crisis. Meanwhile, emotions in Jordan ran high against Israel.

Second, the political echelon’s involvement in the negotiations is highly important. The prime minister himself, or at least the defense minister, should lead the reconciliation move.

Third, we should know how to apologize. An apology isn’t a display of weakness, especially if it comes from a place of confidence and strength. Accidentally killing a Jordanian citizen is definitely a reason to apologize.

Fourth, Israel’s decision makers shouldn’t consider “their” public opinion in this case, but rather the public opinion in the other country. Part of the Jordanian anger was directed at way Netanyahu publicly greeted the ambassador and the security guard, in a bid to gain support in the Israeli public opinion. In light of the Jordanian sensitivity, the prime minister could have given up the photo-op and settled for a private rather than public meeting.

Finally, we should offer the other side compensation to convey that we understand the sensitivity on the Jordanian side, and especially its royal family, which has been standing by Israel for years—secretly and behind the scenes—when it comes to important security issues. In other words, the long-term interest overshadows the short-term interest.

We should welcome the agreement, and better late than never, but the decision-making process on the Israeli side—if such a process actually took place—must be criticized. The weak Israeli response emphasizes the absence of the Foreign Ministry, and the absence of a full-time foreign minister, from the process. In any event, we should hope the decision makers draw the lessons from this case and other past tensions with Egypt and Jordan and implement them in the next crisis.

Prof. Elie Podeh is a Board Member at the Mitvim Institute. He teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

(originally published in Ynetnews)

הפוסט Israel-Jordan Reconciliation: Better Late Than Never הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Crisis in Israel-Jordan Relations

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 10 Jan 2018 08:06:23 +0000

MK Ksenia Svetlova (Zionist Union) and the Mitvim Institute held a joint conference at the Knesset on the crisis in Israel-Jordan relations. The conference took place on 10 January 2018, after six months of crisis between the two countries, triggered by the shooting incident at the Israeli embassy in Amman on July 2017. The conference was moderated by Jacky Hugi of Galei Tzahal, and featured Members of Knesset (MKs) as well as civil society representatives. It also included an intervention (via video) by the Director of the Center for Israel Studies in Amman. The conference speakers emphasized the importance of Israel-Jordan relations, highlighted the common interests of both countries, stressed the need for quick resolution of the crisis, and identified policy steps that can assist the mending of relations. This document summarizes the main points raised at the conference. To view the conference (in Hebrew) on Mitvim’s YouTube channel, click here.

הפוסט The Crisis in Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Briefing Summary: Israel-Jordan Relations

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 21 Jun 2017 06:36:47 +0000

On 22 March 2017, the Mitvim Institute hosted Dr. Abdullah Swalha for a briefing on Jordan’s foreign policy and its relations with Israel. Dr. Swalha, founder and director of the Center for Israel Studies in Amman, discussed the main challenges that Jordan is currently facing, fields of cooperation between Israel and Jordan, sources of tensions between the countries, public opposition in Jordan to cooperation with Israel, Jordan-US relations, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This document summarizes the themes discussed in the briefing, which was held at the Jerusalem Van Leer Institute

הפוסט Briefing Summary: Israel-Jordan Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 02 Mar 2017 11:33:54 +0000

Given ongoing stagnation in the peace process and the new American administration, the Mitvim Institute convened a policy-planning roundtable to discuss which steps the international community can take in order to promote Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and which mechanisms are required in order to carry out such steps. The roundtable was attended by experts from various pro-peace Israeli organizations. This document summarizes the discussion that took place. It does not necessarily reflect consensus among participants.

הפוסט International Involvement towards Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

No Shortcuts to a Regional Breakthrough

ריף יצחקי — Tue, 21 Feb 2017 08:04:57 +0000

Prime Minister Netanyahu succeeded in injecting his regional approach into the policy vacuum that characterizes President Trump’s first weeks in office. Since 2014, Netanyahu has declared at home and abroad that a breakthrough in ties between Israel and neighboring Arab states is possible, even without progress in the peace process with the Palestinians. In Summer 2016, for example, he said that “we used to say that as soon as peace breaks out with the Palestinians, we can achieve peace with the entire Arab world […] but I am increasingly convinced that the process can work in the other direction too”.

His ministers followed suit, and have been spreading optimism about regional developments in the making. In June 2016, then-Deputy Minister for Regional Cooperation Ayoob Kara declared that within weeks or months Israelis “will hear more good news about ties with several countries in the region”. Eight months have passed, without major breakthroughs, but the optimism is still there. On February 19th, Minister Israel Katz said that Israel’s relations with the Gulf states “can be upgraded, and are going to be upgraded significantly”. Government members frequently tell the Israeli public that Israel’s current state of affairs with the Arab world is better than ever before, even though they usually refuse to provide details, citing a need for secrecy.

Does this reflect a regional reality, or a virtual regional reality? History shows us that progress on the Palestinian issue was a prerequisite for any major breakthrough that ever took place between Israel and the Arab world. The signing of the peace treaty with Egypt was dependent on Israeli-Egyptian agreement over the autonomy plan for the Palestinians. The peace treaty with Jordan was reached only after Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Accords. The Arab Peace Initiative, first published 15 years ago, emphasizes this fact in clear terms. It offers Israel normal relations with the entire Arab world, but only after an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty is reached.

Whenever peace negotiations took place, the Arab world was willing to pitch in, even if its contribution was not a game-changer. Arab leaders participated in the Madrid Summit in 1991, tried to assist Israeli-Palestinian peace summits throughout the 1990s and till the 2000 Camp David summit, and attended the 2007 Annapolis Conference that kicked-off yet another round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. It was all in the context of the peace process. And when progress in that process was evident, like in the early 1990s, the fruits of regional cooperation became visible and tangible – diplomatic representations opened up, regional business summits were convened, and high-level visits took place.

The regional approach that Prime Minister Netanyahu is advancing challenges this reality, and attempts at flipping the sequence – calling for improved Israeli-Arab ties first, and progress with the Palestinians later. It is true that Israel currently enjoys better ties with some Arab countries. There is increased security coordination, the relations that do exist are becoming more visible to the public, and new channels for dialogue and cooperation have been put in place. These are positive developments, which derive from the changes occurring in the Middle East in recent years and from the emergence of joint strategic interests. They emphasize the existence of a historic regional opportunity for Israel to reshape its relations in the Middle East.

Some Arab countries are motivated to increase even further their cooperation with Israel, and to expand them to civilian – and not only security – issues. However, the transition from Israeli-Arab relations, which mostly take place behind the scenes and focus on security coordination, to actual normal and visible relations has not yet happened, and is unlikely to happen without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. The Arab publics are not willing to accept that, and the Arab leaders are not willing to go there.

Arab leaders emphasize this in private meetings as well as in public statements. They see the Netanyahu approach as one that contradicts the Arab Peace Initiative, which they are committed to. Former Saudi official Prince Turki al-Faisal asked in September 2015 to “tell Mr. Netanyahu not to propagate false information. As long as Palestine is occupied by Israel, there’s not going to be cooperation between Saudi Arabia or Sunni states with Israel.” In their speeches at the 2016 UN General Assembly, Egypt’s President al-Sisi and Jordan’s King Abdullah also emphasized the need to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as a condition for a genuine regional breakthrough.

John Kerry tried to convince Arab leaders to take some steps towards normalization with Israel even before an Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough, but was rejected. Kerry shared insights from such efforts in his final speech before leaving office, saying in December 2016 that “the Arab countries have made clear that they will not make peace with Israel without resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – that’s not where their loyalties or their politics are.” In his speech, Kerry added that many Arab leaders with whom he has engaged have shown a willingness to support serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and to take steps on the path to normalization of relations – including public meetings — providing there is meaningful progress towards a two state solution.”

The steps that Trump is likely to take in order to strengthen US relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia may lead to increased security coordination between these states and Israel. But in order to fulfill the opportunity for a new era in Israeli-Arab relations, progress towards a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is required. This is what the Arab world requests in return. It is also an Israeli interest, even if it is not on Trump’s priority list. Should the Israeli government maintain its rejectionist policy towards the peace process, the regional opportunity is likely to be missed.

The progress that is currently taking place between Israel and the region is a seedling at best. It is certainly not a full-grown plant. This progress signals just how much potential there is for Israel in the region. It can be a source of hope for the many Israelis who find it difficult to even imagine a future of peace. It is a sign that Israel can truly achieve the regional belonging, which it very much deserves and needs.

Israelis should not settle for regional relations that are mostly secret and limited to security issues, and that do not enjoy public legitimacy in the Arab world. The 15th anniversary of the Arab Peace Initiative, in March 2017, is a reminder that regional cooperation is linked to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and that progress on the peace process can totally alter Israel’s regional standing. There are no shortcuts to a regional breakthrough. The road passes through Ramallah.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט No Shortcuts to a Regional Breakthrough הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Multi-Regional Israeli Foreign Policy

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 01 Feb 2017 11:11:10 +0000

Israel has come to see its geo-political location in a negative light, mostly as a result from the Arab-Israeli conflict and its subsequent regional isolation. As a consequence, it has developed a mentality of a secluded island, which is defensive and isolationist in nature and which views the world as a hostile place. And yet, Israel’s unique location at the crossroads of three continents should be turned into an asset. Israel must strengthen its connection to each of its surrounding regions – the Middle East, Europe, and the Mediterranean – recognize the interconnection between them, and define the regional belonging to which it eventually aspires. For this to happen, Israel needs to adopt a new multi-regional foreign policy approach. This article outlines guiding principles for such an approach, and includes recommendations for steps that Israel can take in order to enhance its regional integration.

This article is part of a publication series that introduces guiding principles for a new Israeli foreign policy paradigm, based on recommendations by a Mitvim Institute task-team. To read the summary of this paradigm, click here.

הפוסט A Multi-Regional Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Pro-Peace Israeli Foreign Policy

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 26 Jan 2017 10:51:12 +0000

A resolution to the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts is a vital national interest of Israel and must be a central goal of its foreign policy. The status quo is unstable and time is not on Israel’s side. Thus, Israel must take the initiative to change it, by promoting the two-state vision, honoring previous obligations towards it, refraining from unilateral measures, and working to determine borders that are defensible and recognized by the international community. Such a resolution will foster cooperation with moderate Arab states, improve Israel’s global standing and its ties with the West, and reduce anti-Semitism worldwide. As long as the conflict lasts, Israel must minimize the damage created by its continued control over the Palestinians, primarily by strengthening the Palestinian Authority and promoting Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. Israel’s foreign policy should emphasize that peace is both a strategic and moral issue.

הפוסט A Pro-Peace Israeli Foreign Policy הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

From opportunities to missed opportunities

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 17 Aug 2016 16:14:56 +0000

Over the past two years, the Israeli discourse has frequently included terms like “an opportunity to promote regional cooperation,” or “regional initiative.” This discourse is not limited to the political Center and Left; it has been adopted by various rightwing government officials as well, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman.

The adoption of this discourse should not be taken for granted; it is the result of intellectual and media activity undertaken by various civil society organizations that identified a historic opportunity – the result of changes taking place in the region – to cooperate with the “moderate” Arab states who share common interests with Israel, such as halting the political and ideological expansion of Iran and the Shi’ite axis (including Syria and Hezbollah), and a joint struggle against Sunni Jihadist Islamic non-state actors.

In fact, these changes began after the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, but only penetrated the public consciousness and the political system after the disastrous consequences of the “Arab Spring” were realized and the Islamic State (ISIS) entity was established.

The original purpose of the regional concept was not to disregard, escape or divert attention from the Palestinian problem, but rather to harness the Arab states as an umbrella of support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As bilateral negotiations are at a standstill, the regional framework was supposed to steer the parties away from the impasse.

According to this logic, the Arab states can help in several ways: Egypt has leverage over Hamas because of their common border; Jordan has an interest in reaching a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem as well as a desire to play a role in the Jerusalem issue; and Saudi Arabia can provide religious legitimacy to any political compromise. All these countries have leverage over the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas.

However, the main problem is that the public consciousness has shifted in line with the positions of the right-wing politicians. In other words, those who promote the regional discourse do not do so in order to make progress on the Palestinian issue, but rather to reap the benefits of the changes in the region without having to pay its price in the Palestinian sphere. In such a way, the right-wing government also enhances its supposedly moderate image.

Indeed, Egypt’s ambassador’s return to Israel, the visit of its foreign minister (after nine years), intelligence and military cooperation with Egypt, Jordan and possibly the Gulf – all indicate that regional cooperation is alive and kicking, while the Palestinian track has been abandoned.

The public, according to a Mitvim Institute’s public opinion poll (July 2016), graciously accept it; they are mostly interested in cooperation with Egypt, while the PA is lagging behind in fourth place out of five options. In other words, the public welcomes regional cooperation according to the right-wing vision.

This regional approach is misguided and will not ultimately succeed as one may have hoped. Certain achievements may indeed be reached, but they will be limited and kept under wraps. Israel has a history of contacts with countries, organizations and prominent figures in the Arab world. As these connections were viewed in the Arab world as illegitimate, they were kept behind the scenes. Some Arab leaders also paid with their lives for this (such as Jordan’s king Abdullah, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and others). As a result, Israel has suffered over the years from what I call the “mistress syndrome.” The only time it enjoyed an extensive and open relationship with the Arab world was in the ‘90s, after the signing of the Oslo Accords. All of the achievements in the field of diplomatic relations, the economic conferences and projects evaporated at the onset of the al-Aksa intifada in 2000. In other words, real, open and meaningful cooperation will not exist without a solution, or at least significant progress, on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Any attempt to promote regional cooperation without tackling the Palestinian issue is throwing dust in one’s eyes.

And, as we know, there is plenty of dust in our region.

In view of the fact that the discourse of “opportunities” and the “regional initiative” have been adopted by the government and the public at large, focus should now be placed on introducing another discourse, one of missed opportunities. The Israeli public likes to quote the legendary foreign minister Abba Eban’s saying that “the Arabs/Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Yet, a recent study that I completed shows that not only have the Palestinians missed opportunities, but Israel has as well. Therefore, emphasis should not only be placed on identifying a historic opportunity – which indeed exists – but emphasis should be placed on ensuring that it will not be missed.

As things stand now, the Israeli government shows no motivation to seize this historic opportunity to advance a regional initiative that includes a two-state solution, in accordance with the recommendations of the recent Quartet Report. In August 1952, David Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that “I do not want to be the man that our grandchildren… blame for having had the chance to try and achieve Jewish-Arab peace – and to have missed it.”

I believe that Netanyahu should hang this quote over his desk.

(originally published in the Jerusalem Post)

הפוסט From opportunities to missed opportunities הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Cooperation between Israel and the Arab world

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 23 Jul 2016 18:18:37 +0000

Israelis see high importance in advancing cooperation with Egypt, while cooperation with the Palestinian Authority is of low priority. This is the main finding from a public opinion poll conducted for the Mitvim Institute on July 13, 2016 by the Rafi Smith Institute and in cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. It sampled 500 men and women, as a representative sample of the Israeli adult population (aged 18 and older, from both the Jewish and Arab sectors). The findings were first presented on July 20, 2016, at a conference held by the Knesset Caucus for Regional Cooperation (led by MKs Merav Michaeli, Yaakov Peri, and Dr. Michael Oren), in cooperation with the Mitvim Institute. The following are the poll’s findings.

הפוסט Cooperation between Israel and the Arab world הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean

ריף יצחקי — Sat, 28 Nov 2015 07:56:00 +0000

Some 100 representatives of approximately 75 leading think tanks and research centers from across the Middle East, North Africa and the European Union (EU) gathered on 8-9 October 2015 in Milano to review Euro-Mediterranean relations. Dr. Nimrod Goren participated on behalf of the Mitvim Institute.

The discussions took place as part of the 2015 Annual Conference of the EuroMeSCo Network. Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni was the keynote speaker of the conference, which was attended by four Israelis, alongside representatives from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and the Gaza Strip.

In recent years, discussions at such regional conferences focused on assessing the developments in Arab countries in light of the Arab Spring. However, this year the emphasis was on taking stock and critically examining the European policies toward the Mediterranean just weeks before the unveiling of the EU’s review of the European Neighborhood Policy, which pertains to the countries that border the Union.

The Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the internal conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, are impacting Europe and require a reevaluation of EU policy. As one of the speakers observed, today Europe is enveloped by crises but it has not taken a leading role in any of them. The result is a highly unstable Mediterranean and a European policy toward the region that is increasingly shaped by domestic concerns.

הפוסט Assessing EU Policies toward the Southern Mediterranean הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations

ריף יצחקי — Wed, 28 Oct 2015 08:04:18 +0000

As violence between Israelis and Palestinians escalated amid diplomatic stagnation, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies convened a roundtable discussion in Jerusalem. The discussion addressed questions concerning the way forward through the current crisis as well as steps that the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, along with the U.S. and the broader international community, could and should take to prevent further bloodshed, while preserving and promoting the possibility of a two-state solution. The discussion took place on October 28th 2015, with the participation of twenty-five experts, predominantly Israeli think tank and NGO leaders, but also including foreign diplomats, and USIP’s President Nancy Lindborg. This paper summarizes the analysis and recommendations voiced during the discussion. It does not reflect a consensus of all or even some of the participants or the hosting organizations.

הפוסט The Way Forward in Israeli-Palestinian Relations הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World

ריף יצחקי — Fri, 28 Aug 2015 07:42:09 +0000

Dr. Abdullah Swalha, Director of the Center for Israel Studies in Jordan, was the keynote speaker at a symposium held by Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies on 13 August 2015. The symposium focused on the changing discourse on Israel in the Arab world as well as on opportunities for regional cooperation. It also featured MK Ksenia Svetlova (Zionist Union), Kamal Hassan (Policy Fellow at the Mitvim Institute), and Dr. Nimrod Goren (Head of the Mitvim Institute).

הפוסט A Changing Discourse on Israel in the Arab World הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

Israel won’t become part of the Middle East until the occupation ends

ריף יצחקי — Mon, 26 Jan 2015 07:55:00 +0000

A few months ago, former Justice Minister Tzipi Livni traveled in secret to New York to a meeting attended by the foreign ministers of several Arab countries, Arab League officials and European foreign ministers. The topic of the meeting was the formulation of a regional coalition, or cooperation, against ISIS. Participation of an official Israeli representative of such a call marked a significant achievement in Israel’s foreign policy, and confirms that the post-Arab Spring developments in the region have created an opportunity for Israel to forge new alliances and coalitions with regional actors. Recently, it has been revealed that Foreign Minister Liberman secretly met Arab and Palestinians officials in Paris with the aim of promoting a regional initiative. In light of the diplomatic impasse, this is good news.

The bad news is that these exchanges are held in the dark. This once again highlights the fact that Israel is still suffering from a “mistress syndrome” in the Middle East— relations with her must be kept a secret.

Since its existence, Israel has conducted secret contracts with individuals and countries in the Middle East. Common interests led to occasional cooperation, which needed to be hidden so as not to endanger the collaborators. Jordan’s King Abdullah and his grandson King Hussein held many talks with Israeli leaders. Abdullah even paid with his life for secret contacts that almost led to the first ever peace agreement with an Arab country. Even ties in the late 1950s and early 1960s between Israel, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia and perhaps Sudan—the so-called “Periphery Alliance”—were kept secret.

Cooperation in the 1950s was designed to combat the threat posed to the Middle East by the pan-Arab ideology under the leadership of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Thus, for example, Israel was covertly involved in the Yemeni civil war of the 1960s, in which it helped royalists in their struggle against the republican regime backed by Nasser. Israel also secretly helped the Kurds in Iraq in their fight against the Ba’ath regime in the mid-1960s.

Israel later aided the Maronites in Lebanon, although when that cooperation came to light in the Lebanon War in 1982, the Maronites were alienated. Even the Egyptians and Palestinians held many secret talks with Israeli before any formal agreements were signed. And since publishing of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, there have been scattered clues of meetings between Israeli and Saudi representatives.

The only period in which Israel managed to escape the “mistress syndrome” was following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The decade of the 1990s was a golden age in Israel’s relations with countries in the region; it had diplomatic relations at various levels not only with Egypt and Jordan, but also with Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and a host of states in the Persian Gulf. Cooperation between Israel and Turkey reached its peak during that time, and a number of regional economic conferences brought public meetings between Israeli and Arab businessmen.

Though there were still many in the Arab world who refused to see Israel as part of the Middle East, the Oslo Accords broke the barrier of fear and allowed many Arabs to have public relations with Israel and Israelis. Yet this positive development was reversed with the failure of the Oslo and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Israel was then relegated back to its traditional status of the concubine of the Middle East in public.

Israel has suffered from this syndrome for most of its existence; it dovetailed with the Jewish history of living in the ghetto (in Eastern Europe) or the mellah (in Morocco). However, this is not an act of fate. The history of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s shows that Israel is not doomed to isolation and boycott, but rather that isolation and boycott are also the result of its actions. No progress on the Palestinian problem, the insensitivity shown by the decision-makers in continuing settlement activity, and particularly the rejection of the Arab Peace Initiative – all these actions damage Israel interests in the Middle East.

The chance of Israel’s re-admittance to the Middle East lies in its ability to show initiative, originality and flexibility of thought. Only by attempting sincerely to solve the Palestinian problem will Israel have a chance to become a public and recognized player. It is unclear how Balaam’s biblical curse, “They are a people that shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations” (Numbers 23:9) has become the motto of so many in Israel. A more worthy motto comes from Israel’s second Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, who said that “Israel shall not be a people that dwells alone, not in the Middle East and not among the nations of the world.” This should be the guiding light of Israeli policy-makers.

(originally published in +972 Magazine)

הפוסט Israel won’t become part of the Middle East until the occupation ends הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.

5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel

ריף יצחקי — Thu, 20 Jun 2013 18:50:54 +0000

The Arab Spring was initially embraced with much enthusiasm and hope in the West. In Israel, however, it has been generally perceived as a threat to national security. Israel’s official policies towards the Arab Spring reflect these concerns. But recent regional developments should not be seen only through a negative lens. They also offer important opportunities for Israel’s foreign policy and for its regional standing, which Israeli decision makers should act upon.

1. Engaging with Political Islam: In contrast to alarming predictions, the new Islamic regimes have thus far been moderate or pragmatic in their policies, including their attitudes to Israel. This opens opportunities for Israel to engage with these new regimes. Egypt, the most important regional country for Israel, has upheld the peace treaty under Muslim Brotherhood leadership; President Mohamed Morsi appointed a new ambassador to Israel, exchanged greetings with President Peres, expressed his interest in assisting Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, and cooperated with Israel in reaching an informal agreement with Hamas, and in his efforts to fight terrorist elements in the Sinai Peninsula.

Interestingly, under an Islamic regime, Egypt has more leverage than did the previous Hosni Mubarak regime, to exert on Hamas in its dealings with Israel. No less important is the fact that a treaty honored by the Brotherhood sends a message across the Muslim world that peace with Israel is not anathema. Though Israeli-Egyptian formal relations will probably remain cold, behind-the-scenes contacts (particularly between the security establishments) will likely continue to flourish.

2. Benefitting from the crisis in Syria: The Syrian enigma can, in the long run, bring to power a Sunni legitimate regime that may be more amenable to peaceful relations to Israel. In the more immediate future, it signals the weakening of the anti-Israeli axis, led by Iran and Syria. Iran’s ability to project power on Israel’s immediate environment has undoubtedly declined. The Syrian crisis also offered Israel opportunities to improve ties with Jordan and Turkey. These opportunities have already been partially exploited over the past months. Israel and Jordan are tacitly coordinating their policy vis-à-vis the Syrian front, while Israel and Turkey are in the midst of mending their relations.

3. A New Sunni Coalition: The Arab Spring has changed the balance of power between the Sunna and Shi’a. The Iranian role in the Middle East has received a blow. Consequently, a new Sunni coalition seems to be emerging in the region, with Turkey and Egypt being central players, backed by the moderate monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco. This Sunni axis and Israel have several common interests in the region: diminishing the Iranian nuclear challenge; containing the looming threats from Syria; and ending the stalemate on the Palestinian front, which might deteriorate into a third Intifada.

4. Engaging with the Arab Street: In the past, Israel has dealt mainly with Arab elites. Yet, the Arab Spring accentuated the role of the masses. Reaching out to them—be they secular or Islamic—is difficult for Israel. Yet, because of their growing importance, Israel should attempt—publicly or behind the scenes—to do just so. The Arab Spring empowered the common people and created an opportunity for self-expression of groups and communities. In this “new” Arab world, there is growing curiosity and readiness to challenge the conventions of the old regimes. These circumstances might just enable a new discourse on Israel and with Israelis. Progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track is a key to making best use of this opportunity.

5. Promoting Peace: The Arab Spring has put on hold the possibility of reaching peace with Syria. The Israeli-Palestinian track remains the only possible track for negotiations. In the absence of a bi-lateral breakthrough, Israel should use the Arab Peace Initiative (API) to break the ice. The allegation that changes of regimes following the Arab Spring has rendered the API meaningless is untrue. The 2013 summit of the Arab League clearly re-affirmed the API, and the results of the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Arab League leaders in May 2013 have made this even more evident.

The Arab Spring—in contrast to the prevailing Israeli view—does not only offer threats but provides opportunities as well. Israeli decision makers should take advantage of these developments in order to tap into regional processes and introduce a change in the traditional Israeli policy toward the Middle East, which has thus far been characterized by a policy of “prevention” rather than “initiation.”

(originally published in The Daily Beast)

הפוסט 5 Arab Spring Opportunities For Israel הופיע לראשונה ב-Mitvim.